ML20133K301
| ML20133K301 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1985 |
| From: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Opeka J NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8510210168 | |
| Download: ML20133K301 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES E
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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- p WASHINGTON, D. C. 20655
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OCT 17 1985 j
Docnet No.: 50-423
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Mr. John F. Opeka f
Senior Vice President-Nuclear Engineering and Operations v
. Northeast Nuclear Energy Company l
.P. O. Box 270 i
Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 l
Dear Mr. Opeka:
4
Subject:
Emergency Operating Procedures and Operator Training i
.at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 i
The purpose of.this letter is to notify you that during the staff's eval-uation of an appeal of a Senior Operator's License denial at Millstone 3 a potential problem with an emergency operating procedure and its use was
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discovered.
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The specific scenario investigated under the appeal was a steam generator i
tube rupture with a steam generator safety valve on the ruptured steam generator that opened and then failed to reseat properly. According to your procedures and the Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS),
4 the proper response to this event involves the use of E0P ECA-3.1, " Steam
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Generator Tube Rupture with Loss of Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired."
i As indicated by its title, this procedure provides instructions for cooling i
down the plant with the reactor coolant system at subcooled conditions.
However, for this particular scenario, it is. difficult, if not impossible, to cool down the plant in this manner and terminate the leak without fill.ing l
the ruptured / faulted steam generator.
Upon reaching high level in the steam -
t generator, ECA-3.1 directs the operator to go to E0P ECA-3.2, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture with Loss of Coolant - Saturated Recovery Desired," to allow the leak to be tenninated sooner and to cool down the reactor coolant system while saturated. There are two safety concerns if this transition is not made when required. First, if the steam lines are filled with water, the weight of the water may cause the steam line supports to fail resulting in an unanalyzed accident. Second, the steam generator relief and safety valves are not de-i signed to relieve water; if they rio open and relieve water, their continued operability is unknown.
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During the simulator examination, the operator license candidate failed to-i make the transition from ECA-3.1 to ECA-3.2. As part of its evaluation of i
the appeal, the NRC staff witnessed the same scenario being performed on the-j Millstone 3 simulator by members of the Millstone training staff. During j
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I 8510210168 851017 hDR ADOCK 05000423 PDR t
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OCT 17 E85 Mr. J. F. Opeka Millstone Nuclear Power Station Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Unit No. 3 cc:
i Gerald Garfield, Esq.
Ms. Jane Spector..
Day, Berry & Howard Federal Energy Regulatory Commission City Place 825 N. Capitol Street, NE Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499 Room 8608C Washington, D.C.
20426 Mr. Maurice R. Scully, Executive Director Connecticut Municipal Electric
. Energy Cooperative 268 Thomas Road Groton, Connecticut 06340 Robert W.. Bishop, Esq.
Corporate Secretary 9;
. Northeast.Utilit'ies Post Office Box 270
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Hartford, Connecticut 06141 Mr. T. Rebelowski Senior Resident Inspector Office U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Millstone III P. O. Box 615 Waterford, Connecticut 06385 Mr. Michael L. Jones, Manager Project Management Department Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company Post Office Box 426 Ludlow, Massachusetts 01056 Regional Administrator U. S. NRC, Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Mr. Karl Abraham Public Affairs Office, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 h
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Mr. John F. Opeka OCT 17 1985 l
l this exercise, the training staff also failed to make this transition.
E0P ECA-3.1, consistent with the ERG upon which it is based, provides a i
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very complex and complicated set of instructions for stopping ECCS flow and re-establishing normal charging and letdown.
It is during this se-quence that the instruction to go to ECA-3.2 on high steam generator level is provided. Because this instruction was missed by both the t
license candidate and the training staff in responding to the event f
on the simulator, it is apparent that the current procedure and training i
did not enable the operators to adequately respond to this event. There-fore, you should consider what action is necessary to provide assurance
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that operators will take appropriate actions to respond to this emergency conditions.
It may be necessary to improve your E0Ps and/or training pro-gram, both near-term and long-term, to provide this assurance, f
P For further information or clarification, please contact the Licensing Project Manager, Elizabeth L. Doolittle at (301) 492-4911.
t Sincererly, gGINAL3w,,,,ng; f
I B. J. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No. I l
i Division of Licensing L
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