ML20133K216
| ML20133K216 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/15/1997 |
| From: | Zwolinski J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9701210153 | |
| Download: ML20133K216 (115) | |
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$3400 g & UNITED STATES g j f
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o WASHINGTON, D.C. 2066tK1001
- ,+ January 15, 1996 '
1 i
NOTE TO: Document Control Desk FROM: John A. Zwolinski, Deputy Director .
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
SUBJECT:
INTERNET MAIL RECEIVED FROM MR. BLANCH 4
r I have reviewed each of the attached documents transmitted to me via the INTERNET. I find that no new safety concerns or allegations have been raised.
- Much of this correspondence relates to on-going staff initiative or other issues of general interest. The attached documents are dated from December 2, 1996 to December 31, 1996.
i It is requested that the attached correspondence be placed in the PDR. No distribution outside of the PDR is necessary.
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Subject:
PAGE 1 HARTFORD COURANT l
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 96 11:12:03 -0000 X-Mailer: Claris Emailer 1.1 From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
To: " Albert W. De Agazio" <AWD9nrc. gov >, " TIM MARTIN" <TTM9nrc. gov >,
" DAVE VIT0" <DJV9nrc. gov >, " JIM LIEBERMAN" <JXL9nrc. gov >,
" DIANE SCRENCI" <DPS9nrc. gov >, " Curt Rapp" <gort9mindspring.com>,
" JOHN HANNON";<JNH9nrc. gov >, " RICHARD CLIFF" <BMXD30A9 prodigy.com>,
" RICHARD PAULi <RCP29nrc. gov >, " BILL STYKER" <WJS9nrc. gov >,
"0PA" <0PA9nrc. gov >, " Hub Miller * <HJM9nrc. gov >,
" DAN GIETL" <DRG9nrc. gov >, " DAVE SIEGEL" <dsiege19nspe.org>,
" TONY CASTAGN0" <castaaj@gwsmtp.nu.com>,
"GERRY REARDON" <SAFENUKE9ix.netcom.com>,
" RICHARD M. KACICH" <KACICRM99wsmtp.nu.com>,
" JOHN SAUGER" <SAUGEJT99wsmtp.nu.com>, " DICK SCHMIDT"
<SCHMIRJ9nu.com>,
"AL CIZEK" <CIZEKAA99 wsmtp.nu.com>,
" DEBBIE BEAUCHAMP " <BEAUCDL9nu.com>, " DAVE STELFOX" <DSTEL9mh.com>,
" KATHY HART" <KHART@mh.com>, " DAVE AIROS0" <DAIR00mh.com>,
" GEORGE MULLEY" < GAM 9nrc. gov >,
" MARY ELLEN" <103466.17179compuserve.com>,
" SCOTT AMEY" <pogo9mnsinc.com>, " STEVE HABERMAN" <PHERALD9aol .com>,
" JIM RICCIO" <JRICCIO9mindspring.com>,
" JIM REDMOND" <REDMONJR9 songs.sce.com>,
" SENATOR PETERS" < Peters @senatedems. state.ct.us>,
"ERIC POOLEY" <EP00 LEY 9well.com>,
" Mike Mulligan" eulligan9randome.com>,
"ROSS v.EGER* <Ross.Kerber9 news.wsj.com>, "ZIN REYBLATT"
<ZVR9aol.com ,
" TONY ROSS" <AJR21009aol.com>, " HARRY SCULLY" <HSt was going to be an entirely innocent trip, and then you find out you're walking into a trap, wouldn't you turn tail? said a sympathetic NRC official, who was privy to the aborted trip and insisted on anonymity.
The account of the van incident appears in a deposition that is part of a recently unsealed file on the NRC inquiry into harassment of former NU engineer Paul Blanch. It is part of a recurring pattern of alleged coziness, or downright collusion, between the NRC and the nuclear power industry that has bedeviled the agency since its inception in 1975.
More than that, it reveals a split personality within the NRC, an agency hobbled by conflicting allegiances and a muddled mission, rooted in a past dedicated to promoting atomic energy and wedded to the industry it regulates.
It is an agency that, despite repeated attempts at reform, often seems to be at war with itself - an agency on the verge of a major makeover. NRC J
i l
' Chairwoman Shirley A. Jackson is expected to announce as early as Monday a sweeping reorganization, which may include the removal of longtime top i administrators.
Interviews with regulators and a review of previously undisclosed government documents reveal the reasons why Jackson plans to restructure, and correct, l the agency's past deficiencies. There are disturbing allegations that the NRC, l through the actions of some of its 3,200 employees, has dangerously undermined '
l its own regulatory efforts:
- Despite a spokesperson's assertion that NRC staff perform a key type of l safety inspection, The Courant found the NRC has routinely allowed NU to do Its own inspections and report the results to the agency. An NRC internal memorandum said NU feared if an independent reviewer were to do them, it would result in a shutdown of the nuclear plants.
1 i
- Just 6 percent of the NRC's work force are resident inspectors, the agency's
thin blue line' that monitors nuclear plants round-the-clock. Inspectors say they cannot possibly check everything, and critics argue the NRC does not do enough to prevent potential conflicts caused by inspectors living in close proximity to utility employees. One NRC resident inspector at Millstone bought a house from an NU engineer.
4 ,
- The NRC's internal watchdog office concluded this year that the agency l
+
simply accepted NU's repeated assurances that its troubled Millstone plants were improving, when in fact conditions were getting worse. And an inspector l general report in March found that the NRC failed to implement half of the 47 a
improvements recommended by a 1993 task force that investigated why the agency failed to protect whistle-blowers from harassment.
Over the years, congressional hearings, staff reshufflings and fits of public !
outrage have periodically sparked upheavals within the agency. Even now, the NRC is in the throes of another rebirth, an effort to make its mission clear not just to those on the outside of the agency, but to those on the inside as
- well.
- Jackson, a theoretical physicist and the first woman to head the agency, is chipping away at its image as a fraternity of ex-Navy engineers overly sympathetic to their brethren in the nuclear industry. She has made an example of NU, shutting down its three Millstone plants and pointedly transferring the NRC's regional official who presided over years of declining performance at 4
NU.
1 We are changing internally in terms of accountability, standards for performance, guidance and expectations in the performance of [ people's) jobs and how they are going to get evaluated, Jackson said in a recent interview.
, But as regulators prepare to allow the Millstone plants back on line,
, questions loom large: Are things really different this time? Why has the NRC i been so resistant to change?
?
And, most important, have the agency's well-documented lapses endangered the
. public, or are they simply bureaucratic bunglings with no real safety
- consequences?
.a
To John F. Ahearne, who was an NRC commissioner from 1978 to 1983 and its
- chairman in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident, the agency's current crisis looks all too familiar. The NRC, he said, failed to hold on to 1 the lessons learned from the infamous 1979 near-disaster. l
What I was hoping is the NRC would break out of this mold that says all plants are safe and you don't have to worry about these types of accidents,"
Ahearne said. To some extent that happened. But there was a sawtooth effect, where you had a period of changing attitudes followed by a return to old ways.
Today, I think complacency has set in again.
Conflicting mandates?
No other industry in the United States is regulated more carefully or more strictly than the nuclear energy industry. This multi-layered safety net ensures that nothing falls through the cracks.
4 So says the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's lobbying arm in
' Washington, D.C. In glossy brochures, the institute calls the NRC a strong and credible regulator" and cites statistics showing that each nuclear plant receives 3,000 to 8,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of inspections per year.
But it is difficult to tell from those statistics alone how effective the NRC's oversight really is. That is because the agency has a long and checkered history that provides ample grounds for skepticism.
The NRC was formed in 1975 as a result of the Energy Reorganization Act, which abolished the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC had been a frequent target of l criticism that its dual mandates of helping to develop nuclear energy technology, and regulating the industry that profited from it, were dangerously at odds.
Concern over safety wasn't the only reason nuclear energy regulation was reformed: The nuclear power industry was complaining that the licensing
! process for new plants was too cumbersome, an argument that found a sympathetic ear in Congress, where anxiety over the Arab oil embargo and an energy crisis made the nuclear alternative increasingly appealing.
Under the new arrangement, the Department of Energy took over nuclear research and development, and the NRC became responsible for licensing and regulating power plants. But, as the NRC itself acknowledged in a candid 1990 self-appraisal, old perceptions of the regulators as sleepy watchdogs remained.
Following Three Mile Island, the industry faced a regulatory crackdown, leading, initially, to an it. crease in the number of forced shutdowns of plants because of safety problems. But that trend soon waned. Beginning in 1982, the number of shutdowns steadily dropped, from an annual average of nine per plant to the current average of three.
Utilities argue the dramatic decrease is proof plants are being run more safely. But other NRC data tell a different story.
J l j While the number of forced shutdowns has diminished, the number of safety system failures per year has increased. To be sure, there are more safety systems in place today, so there are more opportunities for things to go
! wrong. l
- . But an academic study completed last year found another possible cause for
}. some of the failures: Utilities are pushing their plants to run longer before
- stopping for refueling and maintenance, extending the average operating cycle i from 12 months in 1979 to 18 months today.
That industry-wide trend has boosted energy production 20 percent and saves
- the average plant $10 million a year in replacement power costs, according to
- the 1995 study by John Rust, a University of Wisconsin economics professor.
l j However, there may be safety consequences.
l Analyzing 15 years of NRC reactor safety data, Rust found more serious forced i shutdowns tend to occur the longer a plant is kept on-line, leading one to
- question whether nuclear power plant operations are unambiguously safer in the j post-Three Mile Island period, he said. Forced shutdowns occur when a j problem causes safety systems to be tripped, or they are ordered by the plant j operator or regulators.
l Improvement in reactor safety resulting from the NRC's increased maintenance {
j and surveillance requirements during refuelings may have been partially offset !
- by the industry's move to longer operating cycles, Rust concluded.
i Nowhere is the dangerous nexus of economics and safety more apparent than at !
Millstone, where numerous inquiries have concluded that years of cost-cutting j and a drive to produce more energy, abetted by poor regulatory oversight, eroded plant operations. The reversal of fortunes has been dramatic.
{ In 1994, Millstone 3 was ranked 13th in energy production among all 420 nuclear power plants in the world, running at 92 percent capacity. Less than
, two years later, all three Millstone units were shut down and added to the
! NRC's watch list of worst-run plants.
T Relying on the regulated l In a Sept. 12 memorandum outlining what has to be done before the Millstone plants can restart, NRC inspector Wayne Lanning confirmed what whistleblowers and other critics of NU had been alleging for years: The utility can't be l trusted to police itself.
How did the regulators come to this conclusion? Partly because NU told them.
The licensee has identified its oversight function as deficient,' the NRC i said, and a contributing factor in the licensee's declining performance.
! Relying on companies to dutifully report their own shortcomings to the federal
! government may seem absurd to some. But it has been an integral part of the j nation's nuclear regulatory system for decades.
l The NRC considers itself an auditingI agency, meaning it relies heavily on
- ,m - -
utilities to police themselves and report problems to the agency. That helps explain why only 6 percent of the agency's employees are resident inspectors, and most of the rest are stationed at NRC headquarters in Rockville, Md.
'There are myriad actions that have to be checked, but only a few can be checked, said Ahearne, the former commissioner. Otherwise, the regulators assume things are running well. The inspectors cannot possibly check everything.
But even the few types of safety inspections that the NRC is supposed to do
, occasionally have been ceded to the utilities.
The so-called safety system functional inspection was created in the late 1980s to monitor the increasino number of safety systems implemented at plants
- after the Three Mile Island scident. The NRC points to the SSFI as an example of how it can perform its own intensive inspection, when necessary, to ensure safety at a nuclear plant.
The SSFI is a very detailed, top-to-bottom review of how the licensee performs in a specific area, said Mindy Landau, an NRC spokeswoman. We perform the inspection. Sometimes we use contractors, but we don't rely on the licensee's representation.'
However, NRC and NU documents show that, over the years, regulators have routinely allowed NU and other utilities to perform their own SSFIs and report the results to the agency. And there is evidence that some inspections have not always been carried out properly.
In 1989, the NRC relied on NU to perform its own inspection of Millstone 2 containment sump isolation valves, which are designed to allow plant operators 1
to flood the reactor chamber with coolant in certain types of accidents. If the valves could not be opened, not enough water would be available to cover the radioactive core and it could melt, causing a release of radiation.
NU hired Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. to perform the inspection to determine whether the valves were prone to pressure locking, which would prevent them from being opened during a crisis. Stone & Webster concluded that no threat existed, according to an NU report to the NRC.
Five years later, in 1994, the NRC did its own inspection, which determined
, that the valves were, in fact, susceptible to pressure locking. NU wound up filing a new report that called the earlier engineering evaluation by Stone &
Webster inadenate.
An NRC internal memorandum, dated July 16, 1990, details allegations from NU engineers about other questionable self-inspections at Millstone. Among them is the claim that a 1988 self-inspection of a reactor coolant system was hindered by a reluctance to report serious problems to management.
The SSFI team members would not come to the conclusion that the system was 2 inoperable (because to do so) 'would be like cutting off your own foot,'
the memo said.
The memo, written by an NRC Office of Investigations official, went on to say
that NU wanted to do its own SSFIs" because it feared the consequences of an unbiased review.
The licensee wouldn't want the NRC to do a detailed analysis, and if an independent reviewer were to do them it would result in a shutdown of the nuclear power plants,' the memo said.
Subsequent NRC investigations essentially backed up those claims, concluding that the Millstone plants could have been shut down or added to the agency's watch list years earlier.
Over the years, an internal debate has raged over how much the agency should
, rely on licensees. While some industry professionals say self-inspection has
! its advantages when done conscientiously, it can backfire when carried out in an atmosphere where cost-containment discourages reporting expensive-to-fix problems.
l It depends heavily on the culture that exists at the licensee, said a )
former NU official who now works for another nuclear utility. In many, many cases the utility has a better ability to perform a good self-inspection than the NRC does. But it can go the other way, too.'
At NU, there is ample evidence that the corporate culture, preoccupied with cutting costs beginning in the mid-1980s, did not encourage rigorous '
self-assessment. What's more, the NRC has known about it for years.
For instance, NU nuclear engineers discovered in 1986 that the utility had not adequately documented the numerous technical changes made to its reactors in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident. They also found inaccuracies and omissions in the Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs), multi-volume references that are arguably the most important documents on file at any nuclear power plant.
But after NU's Nuclear Engineering & Operations Division crafted an $18 million program to correct the problems, NU management chopped $7 million from its budget. An internal memo, dated June 22, 1987, explained the rationale:
Due to budgetary restraints, fund the minimum program, placing the other elements of the program for a later phase if cost benefit can be justified.
The decision came back to haunt the utility. Today, the NRC says faulty or inaccurate FSARs at Millstone and Connecticut Yankee have contributed to the hundreds of technical problems that must be fixed before the plants are permitted back on line.
Where was the NRC when NU was allowing its FSARs and other plant records to gather dust?
Most NRC inspectors do not refer to the documents, even though, as one of the NRC's four regional administrators put it, the FSAR is the baseline reference for the plant. It is where we go, fundamentally, to get the information to do inspections.
Jackson, the NRC chairwoman, recently ordered all nuclear plant operators in the country to demonstrate under oath that the plants conform to their FSARs
y .- - _ _ . - ~ - - . . .. - . _.
I
'l h
i andotherregulationsl.Jacksonpressedtheagency'stopofficialr.toexplain i
their failure to ensure regulatory compliance during a commission meeting in January, which exposed the rift that exists within the NRC's professional ranks:
s
There is absolutely no excuse for our inspectors not to use FSARs, said Stewart D. Ebneter, an NRC regional administrator. The reason they don't use it is sitting right here at the table. The regional administrators aten't enforcing it. That is where the problem is.
- *I am glad to hear you say that, said Jackson. But more than that, if you 1
are saying it, is that then a commitment?
Absolutely, said Ebneter.
Looser rules j
When NRC inspector Paul Swetland was assigned to Millstone in 1992, he needed to find a place to live in a hurry. A real estate agent soon came up with a nice house in Niantic, and Swetland grabbed it.
It wasn't until the closing, Swetland said, that he realized he was buying the
- house from a Millstone employee - someone whose performance he could be judging as a resident inspector. NRC personnel rules permit real estate transactions with utility employees.
l l For Swetland - who said the house purchase did not affect his on-the-job dealings with the Hillstone engineer - informal associations with nuclear power plant workers come with the territory. NRC conflict-of-interest rules
- have loosened over the years, permitting closer off-the-job contacts with j utility workers who live in the same community.
I When I first started back in 1980, we were not allowed to go to social
, functions, you were discouraged from joining the PTA if utility people were on the PTA, Swetland said. That changed over the years, partly because we've I proven that there was no lack of objectivity just because you lived in the i
i same community.
Swetland's upbeat conclusion notwithstanding, there have been allegations of g inappropriate relationships between NRC and utility employees.
An NRC inspector general investigation found that NRC employees dined at restaurants with a representative of a Danbury company, Nuclear Energy Services, and sometimes referred business to the company. A 1993 report of the probe concluded that the NRC officials were not sufficiently sensitive to conflict-of- interest provisions restricting off-duty relationships with licensees.
On other occasions, inspector general reports in 1989 and 1990 concluded that the NRC's executive director made false or misleading statements to Congress, 4 and that NRC staff performed a biased review of evacuation plans for the Pilgrim nuclear plant in Plymouth, Mass.
4 U.S. Rep Sam Gejdenson, D-2nd District, chaired a subcommittee in 1987 that
investigated the relationship between the NRC and nuclear industry, probing, among other things, an accusation that an NRC commissioner passed confidential information to an executive at a Louisiana nuclear plant. The executive distributed the material to others at his company, with a memo warning them to use it discreetly so as to protect the source within the NRC.
! Loren Bush, a section chief in the NRC's division of reactor safeguards, l testified to the subcomittee that the nuclear power industry had gained the upper hand" over the agency.
Who the hell is regulating who?' said Bush. In my opinion, the NRC did not have to knuckle under to industry pressure. As a result, the NRC has ;
essentially left it to the industry to regulate itself.' '
Some longtime observers of the NRC say such difficulties are almost inevitable in a highly technical regulatory environment, where government and industry officials are cut from the same professional cloth. Leo Norton, who retired as the NRC's acting inspector general this summer after 23 years in federal government, said it is a truism that regulatory agencies are always in danger of being captured by the regulated industry.
That is something the NRC has got to be on guard against," said Norton. !
If you are only speaking to the regulated, and they are only speaking to ,
you, it's human nature to form a very close club. '
l Critics say NRC and utilities have an unholy alliance By MICHAEL REMEZ and MIKE McINTIRE This story ran in the Courant December 2, !
1996 Second of 2 parts )
When Shirley A. Jackson, chairwoman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, visited Northeast Utilities on Aug. 6, she made a point of buying her own chicken lunch and avoiding small talk.
The message: No frills for this get-tough federal regulator.
I At that same moment, at a Florida beach resort 71th five golf courses, 21 tennis courts and horseback riding, more than 100 utility executives and NRC officials were getting ready for dinner and dancing, paid for by several top companies in the nuclear industry.
I Among the offerings at the four-day " utility working conference," sponsored by l the American Nuclear Society, were panel discussions on regulatory relief and a speech by William T. Russell, then a top NRC director. An NU executive 9
headed the conference's session on relations with the regulator.
The contrast between the two scenes speaks volumes about nuclear power regulation in the United States. While Jackson struggles to reform the regulatory philosophy and image of the NRC -- an announcement of a major I restructuring is anticipated as early as today -- old perceptions of coziness j within the industry have proved hard to shake.
i i
i Jackson has launched what she calls a strategic reassessment of how the agency performs its mission, a pulse-taking expected to lead to major reforms. While that review may significantly change structure and staffing, interviews with current and former agency officials, coupled with numerous investigations over l the years, show that many of the NRC's underlying problems have little to do with policies and programs.
Instead, they originate with an internal culture that, in many ways, is strikingly similar to that found at Millstone and other nuclear plants. It is a cloistered environment where, according to a former Millstone engineer, if you brought your concerns to an NRC resident inspector, "it sometimes seemed
- like you were talking to a company official."
A number of common bonds link the regulators with the regulated in a
- multi-faceted and, to some, unholy alliance.
l l For example:
- Many managers, both in the agency and at the utilities, come from the nuclear Navy and share a belief in what one government investigator called
- "the priesthood of engineering." It is a faith in technical solutions to problems that overlooks the more volatile human factor, which is blamed for j many of the employee-related problems at Millstone.
- Surveys show many workers at both the NRC and NU fear that raising safety concerns or second-guessing management's scientific judgments could derail d
their careers or label them trouble-makers.
a i
- The revolving door between the regulator and the regulated spins so l frequently that some critics allege agency staff have an incentive to act :
. leniently toward utilities, so they don't hurt their chances of big earnings as consultants or.ce they leave the government.
/
- Through annual license fees, the nuclear industry underwrites 100 percent of the NRC's $470 million operating budget, an arrangement that some critics say gives the industry an inordinate amount of influence over the agency.
The regulatory divide separating the NRC and the industry is bridged by the common backgrounds, similar viewpoints and mutual interests of the people on each side. That helps explain, some experts contend, why the NRC has been willing to give NU so many second chances before finally putting Millstone on its watch list of troubled plants.
"Even though the NRC mission is to be a neutral regulator, the profession of nuclear engineering, by its nature, attracts people who are basically pro-nuke," said Leo Norton, who recently retired as the NRC's acting inspector general.
"A large part of it is the priesthood of engineering," Norton said. "They think everything is solvable with a slide rule and, therefore, if you don't agree with them, you're wrong."
Jackson says the agency is reforming. She is working to impose more consistent and objective criteria for evaluating nuclear operators, and to change the
l regulatory philosophy and attitudes that sometimes have led inspectors to overlook serious problems. Many of these changes, she said, started before the depth of the Millstone crisis created national headlines.
"This is a good agency," Jackson said. "We have very technically competent !
, people who are trying to do the best they can do day to day. That should not be lost." I l
Still, she concedes the need for change -- from the top administrative levels on down.
Navy blues I l
Charles Morris liked to call it "the Blue Mafia." '
Morris, who died this summer, spent 14 years as an NRC engineer. He was fired in 1994 after filing several whistle-blower complaints.
From his perspective, the Navy influence weighed heavily in the agency and made it hard for non-Navy staff, like himself, to find a sympathetic ear.
I "It's a brotherhood, they take care of themselves. If you're Navy, you're there for life," Morris said during a June interview. "I would guess that something like half of the division chiefs are Navy. If you're Navy over there, you're on the fast track." j 6
i Some other current and former regulators -- who did not want to be identified for fear of reprisal -- agreed that many ex-Navy NRC officials bring with them ,
a rigid, hierarchical management perspective that discourages dissenting '
opinions or questioning attitudes from within.
One NRC reactor inspector said the shared Navy experience of agency and industry engineers also creates an " unspoken bond" that sometimes makes NRC officials too comfortable accepting the word of plant managers.
Larry King, who recently retired from the NRC after a career that also included stints in the nuclear power industry, criticized what he called a !
stifling " Navy mentality" at the agency, i "You don't challenge the boss in the Navy," said King, whose most recent job was as an inspector at the NRC's Atlanta office. "You suggest it to him. If you see he doesn't want that, you keep quiet. You don't go any further."
Ironically, while Navy camaraderie may have carried over into civilian service, it often seems that little of the military's sense of discipline and order made the transition.
Back in 1987, then-NRC Chairman Lando W. Zech Jr. acknowledged, "In the Navy we had authority, we had accountability and we had responsibility. It is not
[so) in this agency."
And that still seems to be true. An NRC task force recently concluded that agency staff mishandled safety complaints at the Millstone plants, viewed whistleblowers as "a burden," and was generally unqualified to respond to what
one NRC inspector called the " soft, mushy areas" of corporate culture and employee relations. Those issues were at the core of many of the problems at NU's nuclear plants. i Feeling that management efforts to cut costs were diminishing safety margins, a group of mid-level Millstone workers voiced their concerns, some in-house, some directly to the NRC. And, in several instances, the company was found to have harassed and intimidated those employees, while the NRC did little to stop it.
Paul Blanch, a former NU engineer who the agency found had been harassed by NU, frequently jokes that NRC stands for Nobody Really Cares. He charges the l agency does little to protect whistleblowers or punish the harassers, an allegation agency leaders vehemently dispute.
Still, Joseph V. Rees, a professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, wrote in a 1994 book that the agency's technical staff has proved ill-suited to deal with the management and cultural problems that plague many utilties. In his book, " Hostages of Each Other, the Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island," Rees said NRC managers told him they preferred not to deal with non-technical management issues.
Such attitudes were reflected more recently in transcripts of interviews with NRC staff for the agency's internal investigation of whistleblower proble;ns at )
Millstone. Gene Kelly, a section chief in the agency's Northeastern regional office, told interviewers he did not feel that culture questions were 91 thin the agency's purview or expertise.
"I'd almost cop out and tell you l'm not really equipped or qualified to sit here and speak to culture in an organization, and how culture can be measured 1 and assessed and evaluated and judged, as a regulator," Kelly said. "That's not the kind of thing that inspectors really do."
James Riccio, staff attorney for a watchdog group known as the Critical Mass Energy Project, doesn't buy the explanation. He said the rules prohibiting harassment and intimidation are clear.
" Compliance with regulations is not a cultural issue. Compliance with regulations is the law," Riccio said. " Absent that, the NRC cannot make a determination that splitting atoms is safe."
Revolving door As NU's nuclear woes worsened in 1995, the company knew it was going to need help to get back on course. l l
So the company's leadership, headed by Chairman Bernard M. Fox, recruited an expert with special credentials to join the board of trustees: E. Gail DePlanque, who had just ended her term as one of five commissioners on the
, NRC.
"If you are running five nuclear power plants," Fox said, "and you want to i
! have expertise on the board, it seems to me to be a perfectly logical place to look."
l DePlanque told The Courant she has been adhering to the revolving-door rules that limit government contacts by former NRC employees who have gone to work for the utilities they once regulated. Federal laws prohibit former regulators from lobbying the NRC for one year on any nuclear regulatory matter, and for two years on pending matters that the official worked on while at the commission.
, But the rules do not prevent former officials from immediately going to work l
for the utilities they once regulated. Several other former regulators have been hired by NU as consultants or work for law firms that the utility has hired to help on regulatory issues, including dealing with whistle-blower problems.
For example, Thomas Murley, who retired in 1994 as director of nuclear reactor regulation, has served as a consultant for NU and other utilities since leaving one of the top jobs at the NRC. And James R. Curtiss, whose term on the commission ended in June 1993, is a partner in Winston & Strawn, a Washington-based law firm that specializes in nuclear issues. In 1994 alone, NU paid the firm more than $500,000 in legal fees.
Historically, the door has spun the other way as well, with people from the industry appointed to sit on the commission. Recent appointments have steered more toward scientists or independent experts, though twc members of the current board -- Jackson and Kenneth C. Rogers -- served on the board of a nuclear utility before taking their current posts.
The agency's critics say the revolving door turns too often, arguing it contributes to a coziness, both personal and professional, between the regulator and the regulated. King, the former Atlanta-based inspector, said he worries some colleagues at the regional staff levels go easy on utilities to ensure their future earning potential.
Ernest Hadley, a Massachusetts lawyer and persistent NRC critic who has represented numerous Millstone whistleblowers, said he believed NU's practice of hiring former regulators has impeded enforcement efforts over the years at Millstone. "If you can go out with your government retirement -- which can be considerable by itself if you came through the Navy -- and then go to work for the industry, you can make a few hundred dollars an hour for consulting,"
Hadley said. "Whether consciously or not, it works that way in people's minds."
Others disagreed. NU spokesman Anthony Castagno said the company occasionally hires former agency people, not for their government contacts but for their expertise.
Well-placed friends The nomination seemed to make perfect sense.
Dan Berkovitz had served as an attorney for the NRC. He had written scholarly pieces on issues facing the nuclear industry, he had worked for the senate subcommittee that oversees the agency and he had letters of support from both Democrats and Republicans.
i y
But Berkovitz, who wa's nominated to the commission by President Clinton on Jan. 5, 1995, didn't Win Senate confirmation. The one-time staff attorney for a subcommittee chaire'd by Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, D-Conn., saw his chances fall apart the next month when another senator voiced his opposition.
At a Feb.16 confirmation hearing, Sen. Lauch Faircloth, R-N.C. and now
- chairman of the subcommittee, told Berkovitz he could not support him because of his lack of private sector experience. The barrage of written questions from Faircloth during the hearing make clear that he -- and some nuclear power plant operators -- felt Berkovitz had unfairly gone after the industry in a 1993 hearing on treatment of whistleblowers at nuclear plants.
At that earlier hearing, chaired by Lieberman, tapes made secretly by a
- utility employee were played aloud, which proved embarrassing to industry executives.
Capitol Hill watchers!say the Berkovitz case sheds light on the industry's influence in Congress. In this instance, it was able to work with legislative allies to stop a nomination it did not like.
Joseph Colvin, the president of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's l Washington-based lobbying arm, said that although the institute did not take a public position on the nomination, Berkovitz's role in giving the industry a black eye helped derail his appointment.
"There were questions about how he would perform, or the individual would perform, in a different setting," Colvin said.
Berkovitz's supporters said the industry did not want him because they feared he would be too tough on the nuclear operators, "It was unfortunate, because he would have done a real good job," Lieberman said.
Still big players Although the industry's overall influence has waned -- largely because nuclear power in the United States has not grown -- the electric utilities are still big players, making their imprint on legislation affecting industry deregulation, nuclear waste dumping and how the costs of decommissioning aging plants will be handled.
In recent years, the Republican-controlled Congress has shown little interest in NRC oversight. The House held one hearing in the 104th Congress, at which only commission members testified. No critics were invited.
Congress also has rarely taken much interest in the NRC budget, which is completely paid for by nuclear industry fees, some 80 percent of which come from power plant operators.
"I think it does create a conflict," said John F. Ahearne, a former NRC chairman, who instituted reforms at the agency in the aftermath of Three Mile Island. "They have had to be more reserved in some circumstances because of this arrangement."
After the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC proposed doubling the number of resident inspectors at the nation's nuclear plants. But Congress -- and the nuclear industry, which would have had to foot the bill through higher license fees -- balked at the cost, and a com,,romise measure providing fewer new inspectors was adopted.
Riccio argues that budgets are less of a problem than senior managers, who he says undercut front-line inspectors trying to do their jobs under difficult circumstances.
The fees paid by the utilities change each year, depending on how much is needed to meet the agency's budget authorization set by Congress. In addition, utilities pay an assortment of other fees for services, including special NRC inspections and reviews of operating licenses.
This year, NU expects to pay a flat fee of $2.7 million, apiece, for each of the five reactors it operates, plus more than $2 million for special inspections and about $500,000 for license reviews.
In real dollars, the NRC budget has shrunk over the last 10 years, but the biggest slide has come since 1993. That year, the budget peaked at $540 million. Now it is down to about $471 million.
Staff levels also have shrunk from about 3,343 in 1993 to about 3,000 today, said Ronald Scroggins, the agency's controller.
Scroggins attributed the budget slide to a variety of factors, none, he said, directly tied to oversight of operating plants. They included restructuring for great efficiency, cutting money for programs that didn't come to fruition and programs that simply ended.
"We felt we could take these reductions without impacting our ability to do our mission," Scroggins said. "As controller for some time, I have never had a situation where the lack of resources has been an impediment to our doing our job."
But the transcripts of interviews with Region 1 NRC employees responsible for oversight of the Millstone plants shows they have felt they are drowning in a rising sea of problems in recent years, some of them budget-related. The regional office could barely process the allegations of operational and management problems at the Millstone plants, let alone fully investigate.
So they started referring the complaints right back to the company.
Richard Cooper, a regional division director, told an NRC interviewer that "we I made a conscious decision" to refer complaints back to NU "because of the sheer volume and extent of the allegations."
Coming competition As Congress and " e states take up the issue of how to restructure the electricity ind .try for competition, the nuclear utilities have billions of dollars at stake.
.A
I Colvin of NEI said well-run plants can compete with other kinds of electricity if the capital costs are factored out. That means the industry must find a way to get out from under the huge construction costs for the plants.
As part of her ongoing review of the agency's workings, Jackson is looking at how the NRC should be positioned for a changing regulatory environment.
Consider this from a September 1996 NRC policy paper on reform and the economic pressures facing energy companies:
"The increasingly competitive economic environment in the electric utility industry has put significant pressure on nuclear utilities to lower budgets for facility operations, maintenance and capital improvements," NRC staffers wrote.
" Nuclear utilities are merging and reducing technical and managerial staffing levels to reduce per-unit operating costs. Experienced operating personnel in the industry have been lost because of reductions in force."
And that could spell trouble ahead.
The NRC and its staff will have to confront aging equipment at the nation's nuclear plants, high costs for decommissioning plants taken off line and a low public tolerance for error.
Riccio said Jackson has a long way to go in upgrading NRC's reputation.
"Re-establishing trust when broken takes a lot more than announcing a policy,"
Riccio said. The agency must prove it is serious about protecting whistleblowers and punishing perpetrators of harassment and intimidation."
But Jackson is confident the agency is now on the right course.
"The only way that you have things take is that you in fact do have your hiring, training and performance requirements well laid out, that you have your expectations of your own people well laid out and you give them the tools, the training, and the support they need," she said.
"Can we change? Yes. Should we change? Yes," she said "It is happening'as we speak." l Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350
--Emailer -1362334642 Content-Type: application /mac-binhex40; name="The Hartford Courant Part . SIT"
l 1
l
- From
- PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH9ix.netcom.com>
, To: WN02.WNP3(jaz)
Date: 12/3/96 2:59am
Subject:
Today's Front Page NRC announces departmental changes By MICHAEL REMEZ and MIKE McINTIRE This story ran in the Courant December 3, 1996 ROCKVILLE, Md. - The chairman of the Nuclear P.egulatory Commission announced Monday the retirement of the agency's top two executives and a staff shift designed to detect sooner the kind of problems that have dogged the Millstone
- plants in Waterford.
Shirley A. Jackson, NRC chairwoman since July 1995, told her staff that the changes would strengthen the agency's ability to perform our mission of protecting public health and safety.
Reaction from agency critics was mixed, with some saying the changes did not t
go far enough, and others saying they represent a good first step, a recognition that the agency cannot foist the blame for its troubles on plant operators such as Northeast Utilities. '
NU owns the three plants at Millstone Point, as well as Connecticut Yankee in i Haddam Neck. All four plants are now shut because of NRC safety concerns. I i
Jackson acknowledged the agency had failed to see the downward trend in performance at reactor facilities in the northeast United States.
And she said better performance by the agency is essential as the electricity !
producers move toward greater competition. !
As we move into an era of nuclear power industry restructuring and declining NRC and industry resources, it is imperative that we are able to diagnose potentially declining licensee performance as early as pos si bl e , ' ' l Jackson said.
Jackson and her fellow commissioners have been working to reform an agency beset by criticism of its oversight at Millstone and other nuclear power plants.
Various investigations have found that the agency gave repeated second chances to NU despite mounting evidence of sliding performance at Millstone between 1991 and 1996.
A recent internal agency report found that agency staff repeatedly mishandled safety complaints at the NU plants. The report said agency staffers viewed whistle-blowers as a burden and generally were unqualified to deal with the less technical management and personnel issues that plagued the operation.
The Millstone plants were put on the agency's list of troubled plants this January; none is expected to reopen until next year at the earliest.
Throughout 1996, there has been a steady stream of revelations about ineffective NRC oversight at Millstone, failure to protect whistle- blowers and management problems within the agency.
Jackson has responded by beginning what she calls a strategic reassessment of the NRC's regulatory philosophy and enforcement program, and by demanding that all nuclear plant operators demonstrate, under oath, that their plants adhere to federal safety standards. The reassessment is expected to be completed next year, she said, adding that the changes announced Monday should help the NRC carry out the recommendations that result from that process.
Among the changes: James M. Taylor, now the top manager in the agency as executive director for operations, will retire in early January. James L.
Milhoan, his deputy responsible for oversight of nuclear power plants, also will step down next month.
Earlier this year, William T. Russell, then director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, retired, and Thomas T. Martin, who had been director of the Northeast region, was pulled from that job and transferred to a lower-level job at headquarters.
Jackson also announced that Stewart Ebneter, administrator for the Southeast region based in Atlanta, will retire.
The commissioners also moved to divide the day-to-day oversight of nuclear plants and the broader evaluation of agency programs, creating a third deputy executive director position. Now there are two.
Jackson said that would allow for more independent reviews, though all three deputies would report to the executive director for operations, who reports directly to the commission.
The officials named to top jobs are all veterans of the agency.
L. Joseph Callan, now administrator for the Western region, will be the new executive director for operations. He has held a variety of posts within the agency since starting as a plant inspector in 1979. Like Taylor, he is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy.
His two new deputies - Patricia G. Norry and Edward L. Jordan - both have been with the agency since its inception in 1975 and worked for its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission. The third deputy, Hugh L. Thompson Jr., who now will oversee regulatory programs, is also a longtime NRC employee.
Samuel L. Collins, now Callan's deputy in the Western region, will serve as the new director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations. He joined the NRC in 1980 as an inspector at the Vermont Yankee plant.
The Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry group based in Washington, praised the changes, saying the commission recognizes the need for consistency and coordination of its regulatory activities.
i l.
i But some critics said they did not believe Jackson went far'enough in her ,
shake-up of the old order. Ernest Hadley, a Boston lawyer who represents several current and former Millstone whistle-blowers, said the chairman !
needed to make examples of longtime top administrators who were ultimately !
responsible for plant oversight. !
I can only rejoice over the fact that James Taylor is gone, but Jackson l should have had the courage to dismiss him outright,' Hadley said. I don't see anyone being held accountable.
Hadley added that the NRC needs new blood: They need moral leadership, and frankly, they're not going to get that from within. l l
Paul Blanch, a former NU engineer and frequent critic of both the utility and !
the NRC, welcomed the changes. But, he said, the shake-up should have ;
included NRC officials in the Northeast region responsible for oversight of NU's Connecticut plants. ,
( .
I'm disappointed there are no changes here in Region 1, Blanch said.
That's where they're really needed.
- Jackson already has implemented several changes in the region, transferring i Martin and replacing several lower level regional officials. i Dave Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists called the changes more ;
a shuffling of responsibilities than a major refocusing of effort. ' !
But he said the commissioners clearly recognize that agency actions - or ;
inaction - contributed to thc. problems at plants such as those in '
Connecticut. !
l Rather than the denial mode that we don't have a problem, they recognize
! there is something out-there that needs to be fixed and that something is in i their house, Lochbaum said.
He said the level of change seemed appropriate, given that the agency is still in the midst of the more wide-ranging reassessment.
Lochbaum noted that the period for public comment in that process has not yet ended.
l
~
Said Lochbaum, If they are indeed serious about rebaselining, they wouldn't want to do anything that would deflate that effort.
l Paul M. Blanch i Energy Consultant i 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350
~ _ __ _ . _ - _ - . - . ._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _
~
1 From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
- To
- WND2.WNP3(jaz)
- Date
- 12/3/96 12:Olpm '
Subject:
Boston Globe l Three senior NRC officials retire amid agency criticism i 4 j By Scott Allen, Globe Staff, 12/03/96 i
Beset by allegations that her agency is lax in overseeing the nuclear power industry, Nuclear Regulatory '
Commission i chairwoman Shirley Jackson announced the l retirement of l three senior officials yesterday, completing the '
removal of top bureaucrats often blamed for allowing massive i safety violations to go on at Millstone nuclear plant in Connecticut.
Jackson said the agency will now be run by an expanded management team, promoted from within the agency, whose focus will be to spot troubled reactors before they reach a crisis as Millstone did. All three reactors at Millstone, New England's largest power source, have been closed since March because of thousands of problems, some dating back decades.
As we move to an era of nuclear power industry l restructuring and declining NRC resources, it is I imperative that we are able to diagnose potentially declining performance as early as possible, said Jackson in an address to employees at NRC headquarters in Maryland.
But, despite the NRC's assertion that the reorganization was
major, agency critics said the departure of the executive director for operations, James M. Taylor, and two others was a modest step at best in restoring the NRC's credibility.
What the hell do you have to do to leave this agency in disgrace? asked Ernest Hadley, attorney for i many employee whistleblowers at Millstone. He said Taylor was retiring with praise from Jackson despite having ignored '
warnings for years that Mi11 stone's owners were .
cutting corners on safety to save money.
Aside from the three retirements announced yesterday, two other senior NRC officials accused by Hadley's clients of ignoring safety concerns at Millstone were either .
transferred or allowed to retire earlier this year. !
There's no accountability at the NRC, Hadley ,
said.
However, Rep. Edward Markey, Democrat of Malden, an NRC critic, said Jackson may be moving in the right direction. A spokesman called the changes a positive first step, but it remains to be seen whether the organizational changes will result in the type of increased commitment to safety that is needed.
Jackson, a physicist who took over the NRC in 1995, inherited an agency facing mounting criticism from industry employees, antinuclear groups and the NRC's own inspector general, all of whom alleged that the agency was too willing to bend the rules for the nuclear power industry while ignoring the concerns of critics.
l For instance, Millstone, owned by Northeast Utilities, received more exemptions from the rules than any I other US l nuclear plant, despite the fact that its safety standards were rapidly sinking as the utility tried to save
4 money.
In response to the criticisms, Jackson carried out 4
investigations that have confirmed some of the allegations.
One task force concluded recently that NRC staff treated the employee whistleblowers at Millstone as a rather than thoroughly investigating their claims.
3 Another task force found serious problems at j Maine Yankee
- nuclear plant in Maine after an anonymous whistleblower
- said the company falsified safety information.
! The Justice Department is conducting a criminal investigation into the
- issue.
Yesterday, however, Jackson declined to criticize the ,
saying it has an excellent regulatory base to work with.
She also said it had been a privilege to work with Taylor, the highest ranking NRC official below the five i commissioners, who are presidential appointees.
For more than 40 years, he has dedicated
- himself to exceptional performance in public service,
- Jackson said.
4
- Under the reorganization, Taylor's job will be divided irito two positions, while Taylor's successor, Leonaii
! J. Callan -
now running the NRC's Texas office - will have three deputies instead of two. A new executive council, to be headed by Callan, will oversee day-to-day NRC operations.
Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz,jnh,awd),TWDI.TWP4(gam,wjs),ARDl.ARP...
Date: 12/4/96 3:20pm
Subject:
Maine Yankee Letter This was published in the Portland Press Herald, Times Record, Wiscasset Paper, Lincoln County Weekly, and perhaps others. Angus was upset November 21, 1996 TO THE EDITOR:
After the NRC's Independent Safety Assessment (ISA) team completed its inspection of the Maine Yankee nuclear power plant and briefed Maine's l Governor on its findings, Governor Angus King made a patently false statement to the public which he has yet to correct. Governor King misled Maine citizens by falsely stating that this inspection was the most thorough and I comprehensive ever performed on any nuclear plant in the world. Ellis '
Mereschoff, the team leader of the ISA, stated at the NRC's public meeting in Wiscasset on October 10th that this was not true. ,
Had Governor King or a member of his staff attended this important meeting, l he might have learned something. As it is, the ISA team only looked at 4 out j of 40 systems at Maine Yankee. Within the plant, they noted 3,200 l deficiencies. Of the 4 systems inspected and the numerous deficiencies '
found, several were of major safety significance and had been outstanding for 17 1/2 years, putting the public at considerable risk. Imagine what the team would have found had they inspected the remaining 36 systems!
It is irresponsible and untenable for Maine's Chief Executive Officer to make false statements on important issues affecting public safety and take no action to correct them. Why would Angus King do such a thing? Perhaps because of the financial ties his family had to Maine Yankee's majority owner, Central Maine Power Company (CMP). The Governor's wife, Mary Herman, is a former CMP lobbyist. Angus King's former business, Northeast Energy Management, was regularly subcontracted by Central Maine Power Company. Angus King sold this company to EUA Cogenics, which was owned by another Maine Yankee shareholder, Eastern Utilitiy Associates. According to Dennis Bailey of the Governor's staff, Angus King was paid for this ,
transaction in Eastern !
Utility stock.
Rather than attempting to protect CMP and its problem child, Angus King should focus on uncovering and telling the truth about Maine Yankee, its incestuous relationship with the NRC, and the current threat it poses to the state because of unresolved issues with the emergency core cooling system.
Sincerely, Kris L. Christine i P.O. Box 12 Alna, ME 04535 l
l
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
To: JZ <JAZWOL9aol.com>
Date: 12/6/96 7:11am subject: Today's Editorial The following is today's editorial from the New London Day l
Tinkering with change !
NRC chairwoman replaced a few people, but must do more if agency is ever to regain public trust, do job adequately by MAURA CASEY ,
I Shirley Ann Jackson took a few halting steps this week to repair the j integrity of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which she heads. I She has a lot more work to do.
Like repair work on a dilapidated house, the job isn't done just because a l few shingles on the roof are replaced. And that's the extent of what Dr. j Jackson did Monday when she placed new people in several of the agency's top -
slots.
There is no question that her recent actions are the result of problems at Millstone Station. Troubles at Connecticut's nuclear plants are having a huge impact on the commercial nuclear field. In May, an Institute of Nuclear Power Operations official said that the problems in Connecticut have shaken the industry more than'any event since Three Mile Island. That's a strong statement from a member of the industry organization that helps nuclear plants meet safety standards. l In the last few months, Dr. Jackson has transferred Thomas T. Martin, former administrator of NRC Region 1, the jurisdiction which oversees Connecticut's plants. Then she accepted the retirement of William T. Russell,
' director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Mr. Russell was particularly aware of the extent of Millstone's problems since he preceded Mr. Martin as head of Region 1. Yet Mr. Russell, like many other top agency managers, looked the other way.
This week Dr. Jackson filled several top jobs and accepted the retirement of James Taylor, the NRC's executive director.
' She is making changes ~. But the house that Dr. Jackson has only begun to repair is still perilously close to- falling apart. It's in danger because top in sympathy if not l management outright collusion of _NRC with has in the past' worked top management far too closely it is supposed to of the industry i regulate.< ,
The public has lost faith in the agency because of the way in which Mr. l Russell, Mr. Martin and Mr. Taylor helped lead the NRC. Dr. Jackson sends no signal of sweeping change by transferring one man and announcing the
! a q l i-1 s
6 L retirements of two, while complimenting the new retirees for a job well done. -l l If they did such a swell job, why does the public have so little trust in the l NRC7 -
i Dr. Jackson' replaced longtime NRC bureaucrats with other longtime NRC ;
-bureaucrats from different departments and different regions around the
{ country. That isn't enough. *
' She needs to appoint' more outsiders. She needs people who have the !
technical knowledge necessary to get the NRC back on its feet, but who are ,
not hampered by industry ties. !
i
! Further, Dr. Jackson needs to move forcefully to break the' NRC's appalling j habit of penalizing its own employees who bring forth safety concerns.
i i In an agency survey, 40 percent of the NRC's own employees said raising l l safety. concerns about nuclear plants would hurt their careers. This, from ,
j employees of the public agency mandated to keep those plants safe. :
1 Dr. Jackson needs to enforce a zero-tolerance policy within her agency for-l whistleblower harassment, just as there should be no room for such actions at i a nuclear plants. She can demonstrate that by giving more power to the NRC j -Inspector General's office and by separating that office from the influence ;
( of NRC management. . :
l Dr. Jackson must take these~ steps to restore public trust. The agency's reputation is in shreds.
j i i
- i. Anyone-who read NRC inspection reports of Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 from l
- -1991 to.1995 could see that the NRC routinely acknowledged the existence of
! numerous. problems at the plants but winked at many, repeatedly penciling away
- violations. Those were the days'when the nuclear industry was under far less pressure to compete than it will be lin the future, as electric rates are
} deregulated and. competition in earnest begins.
. 'f 7 .1
] If 'the NRC' looked the other way .in the past, won't the temptation to do so again only increase. as' nuclear utilities strain under deregulation?
1 ,,2 . . . . . .
'a
! , V To, prevent:that from' happening.and to put public safety first, Dr. Jackson c mustiroot-out; agency collusion with the' nuclear power industry.
g , , _
Thi' reluctance of 4the agency th confront the nuclear industry with )
evidence"of wrongdoing was particularly obvious in early November at the ,
American" Nuclear-Society, Convention ireWashington, D.C. During a panel l discussion, a member of the audience isked James Lieberman, director of the NRC's Office of' Enforcement,.whythe har NEVER levied on a nuclear executive ;
an individual' fine for harassing whistleblowers. The NRC has had power for i years to levy such financial penalties against company officers if necessary, but the agency.has.never done so despite egregious instances of such
' harassment. particularly' involving Northeast Utilities, the operator of '
Millstone Station.
i
We haven't yet found the right case, because we expect that to be hotly contested, Mr. Lieberman replied. We just haven't' found the right case.
i We have a lower threshold when we impose fines on corporations. We want to be comfortable that our actions are well-supported. We may do it sooner rather than later.
Mr. Lieberman's remarks are tantamount to admitting that the NRC would never take dramatic steps to curb whistleblower harassment at nuclear plants, especially given the clear-cut cases his office has handled involving NU.
That is the kind of reluctance that Dr. Jackson must confront if she is to help her agency develop the integrity it needs to police an industry under increasing economic pressure. For if NRC officials were tempted before to cut utilities a break,'that will only increase in years to come unless Dr. ;
Jackson acts. ,
1 She's fixed a few shingles on the NRC's rotten roof. Now she must shore up the agency's eroding foundation.
Paul M. Blanch l Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 4 l
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz),TWDI.TWP4(gam),ARD1.ARP1(drg)
Date: 12/6/96 5:52am subject: Blanch Statements to the Press
> Are you the same Paul that in the past pointed out that the $100,000
> fine to NU for H&I'ing you wasn't nearly enough (coffee money so to
> speak)? I didn't think you were sitting next to Kacich that long.
I knew I was going to take heat.on this one, but it was a well thought out position, at least in my mind.
Yes I am.the same person and I did mention that to the press and to Lieberman yesterday. The $100,000 sent a message in 1993 and that was it is OK to harass people. Why shoilld we allow our federal government take a few more million from CT. people and let them spend it on god knows what. Do you really think it would serve any practical purpose at this point? I think having 4 plants shut'down for. a long period sends a clear message. This is what we have been fighting for for years. Civil penalties do no good, suspend the license and/or keep them down. Take criminal action against these people that knowingly put the public at risk. This is what works. Fines are a meaningless'" illusion of action." Do you really think a clearer message would be'sent if they fined NU $50 million?
What we really need to do is demand the money back from the NRC that we have been' paying for their inspections over the past 20 years. This is money from our pocketbooks to the NRC for not doing its job. Maybe we, the public should hold an enforcement conference and demand answers from the NRC as to why they failed to to protect the public.
Paul M. Blanch . <
Energy Consultant l 135 Hyde Rd. '
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 l
l
)
I l
I J
_.y _ .. __ _ _ _ _ ._ . _ _ . _ . - . . _ . _
s c .
e 4
2 From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0ix.netcom.com>
~ To: '
JZ <JAZWOL9aol.com>,
Date: ' 12/6/96 9:22am 4 usubject: .
y ,
l r- ;
John: .
I<am. confused. Due to the low probability of needing these switches, why '
didn't they^just say this is'ok as the NRC did in the ISAT report for some of j
the,ECCS systems? Further, these switches would have probably worked just ;
fine.-We appear to have some inconsistancy WRT operability determinations. ,
+________________. ___+ +_______________________+ j i lPOWERREACTOR ,, l l EVENT NUMBER: 31412 l
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MAINE YANKEE HAS'A TOTAL OF.FOUR SAFETY RELATED DC POWER TRAINS. THE PLANT l DESIGN BASIS REQUIRES CABLE SEPARATION IN EACH SAFETY RELATED DC POWER l
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I DURING A PLANT REVIEW PFR NRC GENERIC LETTER 96-01, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT TWO SAFETY RELATED DC CABLES IN THE 'C' SAFETY RELATED DC CABLE TRAY 1
ARE POWERED FROM THE 'D' TRAIN SAFETY RELATED DC POWER SOURCE AND TWO l-l SAFETY RELATED DC CABLES IN THE 'D' SAFETY RELATED DC CABLE TRAY ARE l POWERED FROM'THE 'C' TRAIN SAFETY RELATED DC POWER SOURCE.
I l
THUS, THE LICENSEE DECLARED 2 0F 2 SETS OF MANUAL REACTOR TRIP PUSH BUTTONS INOPERABLE EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE FUNCTIONAL.
I l l \
l TECH SPEC 3.9 REQUIRES THAT AT LEAST I 0F 2 SETS OF MANUAL REACTOR TRIP l
l PUSH BUTTONS BE OPERABLE. THE LICENSEE ENTERED TECH SPEC 3.0.A WHICH i REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO COMPLY WITH TECH SPEC 3.9 WITHIN ONE HOUR OR TO PLACE THE PLANT IN,AT LEAST HOT SHUTDOWN MODE WITHIN THE FOLLOWING 6 HOURS.
l AT 047,' THE. LICENSEE BEGAN SHUTTING THE PLANT DOWN TO MAKE REPAIRS.
i < ;
- i. -
l,THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC -
RESIDENT INSPECTOR, WILL NOTIFY MAINE STATE !
- ,e 4 _ , ,
l'0FFICIALS, AND'PI.ANS T0 ISSUE +A PRESS RELEASE. ;
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Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 '
Fax: 860-232-9350 p +
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%,% pg 12/6/96 5:41pm Su t: HARRY BLANK vs USNRC Forwarded with the permission of Harry Blank.
l UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November 21, 1996 Harry S. Blank Eight Griswold Court Waterford, Connecticut 05385
Dear Mr. Blank,
I am responding to your letter of September 18, 1996 to Chairman Jackson in which you requested information concerning an NRC investigation into the layoffs which occurred at Millstone in January of this year.
In March 1996, a task force was set-up to review the January 1996 work force reduction at Northeast Utilities to determine if the process was utilized to discriminate against employees who had raised safety concern.
The task force completed its efforts in mid-April and orally reported its findings to senior NRC management. Subsequently, the Office of Investigations (OI) initiated two investigations regarding several compl aints. The Office of Investigations presently is pursuing these and other related matters. In mid-September, the task force was asked to document its findings and a report has now been completed. The task force report and the 01 investigations are part of the review being conducted by the United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut and as such I cannot comment on the finding and conclusions drawn by the task force at this time.
However, you also requested information on the composition of the task force and inquired as to why "each and every one" of the employees who were laid off have not been interviewed. Let me address these issues.
The task force was comprised of four individuals who were chosen because of the expertise. Richard Paul is presently the Field Office Director for 01 in our regional office located outside of Chicago. He has 13 years of experience investigating complaints and discrimination. Diane Koplewski is an investigator with the Department of Labor (DOL) and was detailed to the NRC to participate on the task force. She has conducted numerous DOL investigation concerning the complaints of harassment and intimidation.
Dwight Chamberlain is presently the Deputy Director, Division of Nuclear Material Safety in our regional office located in Arlington, Texas. Mr.
Chamberlain has held numerous technical positions within the agency and is a former Senior Resident Inspector. He was assigned to the task force to provide a technical expertise. Dennis Dambly, Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Material, Antitrust and Special Proceedings was asked to lead the task force because of his expertise in employment related matters. Prior to his selection for his present position, Mr. Dambly was the agency chief labor and employment attorney with approximately 20 years experience in that area.
pma g* 4 UNITED STATES s* S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g Ed to your concern tlwhism&W,lo.tendpated employees were opallgga ons ed, the task force was not chartered to investigate individual of discrimination. Rather, the task force was asked to look into the process utilized in the layoffs and determine if the process had been
, misused. To that end, they were given a list of 23 individuals who had been
- terminated and the files associated with the terminations of these i individuals. The 23 were chosen to represent a cross section of the terminations and intentionally included a significant number of individuals known to the agency to have engaged in protected activity in the past.
The Task force reviewed the files pertaining to these individuals, i interviewed as many of them as could be located, and were willing to talk to j 4
the agency, and interviewed individuals in their supervisory chain up to and 1 including the vice president level. The task force also reviewed the work '
force reduction files for everyone who was terminated and interviewed a couple of employees not on the original list of 23.
The task force also interviewed individuals at Northeast Utilities (NU) who were responsible for the design and implementation of the matrix system and '
reviewed files pertaining to the development and implementation of the system and background information pertaining to the decision to reduce the workforce at NU by approximately 250 employees.
This was all done in a period of less than six weeks. thus while it may appear that the agency did not respond to the concerns regarding the layoffs quickly, the opposite is true. I trust that this information has addressed your concerns to the extent practical, in light of the ongoing review being conducted by the United States Attorney's Office.
. Sincerely, i
James L. Milhoan Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research Harry S. Blank EIGHT GRISWOLD COURT WATERFORD, CONNECTICUT 06385 203-447-8052 December 4, 1996 Mr. James L. Mihoan Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation Regional Operations & Research USNRC Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Mr. Milhoan, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your letter of November 21, 1996. It reflects a great deal of time and effort that went
pn Rtou p" q\ UNITED STATES s* E N
) reparation. UCLEAR However R EGUl.ATORY COMMISSION ghe points you raise. m ag & ,t ge m , difference" of opinion with IiYregardtothetaskforce'scharter. It was "not chartered to investigate individual allegations of discrimination. Rather, the task force was asked to look into the process utilized in the layoffs and determine if the process had been misused". Mr. Milhoan with all due respect, that statement appears to be synonymous with saying that "we closed our eyes to all but 23 of the 104 individuals that NU selected for us to look at, but looked instead at the machinery that destroyed these individuals lives to see if it functioned properly, or the patient died, but the operation was within procedures" If the NRC cannot look into ALL of the individual allegations of discrimination, then the whole effort was indeed flawed. Only the data they wanted the NRC to see was shown, and that's apparently all the data the NRC wanted to see, less they find something amiss. Tsk Tsk shame on the NRC for believing what NU told them, or that the files of 23 individuals given to the NRC might be skewed, and not reflect the actual discrimination perpetrated by NU against " whistle blowers" Indeed if I were NU and had something to conceal, I would certainly provide you with a list of 23 secretaries, clerks, or other individuals that I would be sure would be proven not to be involved in protected activities. Thus my comment of interviewing "each and every one was to the point that by talking to ALL of the. individuals, and it may be the very last one you talk to, some surprises might come out.
In my specific case Mr. Milhoan, I was laid off due to a " cost reduction",
my pink slip read " lack of work" despite working 60-70 hours per week, and then to add insult to injury an individual was apparently hired from outside the company into my department to function in the same capacity that I did within days of my departure. Did the task force know that? But there was no discrimination, was there?
I was also interviewed by the Office of Investigations after.a period of 9 months had transpired and I suspect upon my numerous letters of complaint to Dr. Jackson. The investigators were allowed to tape record the proceedings, and I was specifically forbidden to. When a copy of my transcripts was asked for I was told a copy could not be provided. Something about an ongoing investigation and policy. Amazing isn't it that in a country based on freedom, a copy of what we said can't be provided.
The entire episode is apparently one of tawdry back room politics that may j have been acceptable in the past, but in today's environment are not l acceptable. Personally Mr. Milhoan would you be courageous enough and secure with your findings to defend your position in front of say a " Dateline" camera, with all of America watching, or would the NRC have "no comment"?
Mr. Milhoan, please try to comprehend that despite the official sounding titles of the members of the task force, and their experience levels, they l were apparently lead down a path by Northeast Utilities. Somewhat similar to !
the highly trained and educated resident inspectors being mislead by NU !
management that all was well with the 3 Millstone Units for a number of l l
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kre e gn and implementation of the workforce reduction matrix must have ed a very interesting view of how corporate America is working lately.
l
- Here was an evaluation that was performed without the employee's )
j participation, knowledge, input, or review. It was done in secret, with 1 i highly subjective criteria that did not even follow the guidelines of NU's
! normal reviews. If NU was proud of the workforce reduction matrix, then why I
' where the ratings and evaluations kept so secretive, and no employee participation was allowed. Sound like a perfect breeding ground for fraud, i deceit, and misuse of power. Perfectly designed to eliminate "probl ems" .
Remember my comment earlier about " Dateline" cameras? After all, it was a j l
- TIME magazine article that started the ball rolling. Also, didn't the Nazis
! in W.W.II claim "I was only following orders" as they were sentenced?
} The Task Force orally reported its findings in April 1996 to senior NRC t management, then prepared a report in mid September. The Office of
- Investigations initiated two subsequent investigations regarding several i complaints. Then everyone forwarded their results to the United States
!- Attorney for the District of Connecticut, without any comment to anyone.
- Repeated attempts by myself and others to contact Mr. Ron Apter of the US i Attorney's office have resulted in Mr. Apter failing to return documented
! calls on numerous occasions. I wonder why he doesn't want to talk to those people involved in this scam? Is something being hidden again?
l_
i You mention in your letter "thus while it may appear that the agency did not l respond to the concerns regarding the layoffs quickly, the opposite is true."
i Let's see, does quickly mean 10 months? If such is the timeframe for a !
. simple investigation, then restarting any Millstone unit should be a minimum of 5 yrs. So far not ONE of the individuals laid off in January 1996 has
{ he.ard the results of ANY investigations, merely the word that investigations l
are ongoing.
j I am sorry Mr. Milhoan, but your letter did not address my concerns. It i made me feel that the NRC had made the assumption that I was ignorant and gullible, and would blindly accept any excuse that the NRC provided. These same excuses that the NRC accepted from NU that allowed Millstone to go onto a watch list. Maybe the NRC needs more people with " inquiring" minds?
l This investigation will go nowhere apparently. The task force, and the Office of Investigations have apparently washed their hands of it by referring it to the US Attorney's office. The black hole. Mr. Apter has j refused to discuss the case, even to the point of being polite and at least j talking to the individuals involved. No a decision has apparently already i been reached by the NRC. The question now is, what is it and when will it
- reach the people involved? I Hello, Stone Phillips from Dateline? have I got a story for you.
[i Sincerely,
- Harry S. Blank
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p f PAUL BL N < N h WND2.WNP3(jaz) h h 12/6/96 6:31pm
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Groups want probe of Northeast expanded Source: Reuters BOSTON, Reuters via Individual Inc. : Two watchdog groups called for a federal criminal probe into Northeast Utilities to be eganded to include "long-term negligence and mismanagement" at the company's Haddam Neck reactor, known as Connecticut Yankee.
The U.S. Attorney for Connecticut, Christopher Droney, said through a spokeswoman that the investigation in the utility's Millstone nuclear plants "is continuing."
Citing U.S. Department of Justice policy, the spokeswoman refused to say whether the probe )
would be broadened to include the 582-megawatt (MW) Connecticut Yankee that '
has been shutdown since July 22.
Meanwhile, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was concluding its second day of enforcement conferences with Northeast Utilties. Thursday's conference was to discuss the apparent violations.at the three Millstone nuclear plants which include failing to test equipment properly, provide accurate and complete information, maintain records and implement design control measures properly.
"There are numerous reviews and inspections going on involving Northeast Utilities," NRC spokesman Victor Dricks told Reuters. "And there are a number involving Millstone," which had a rating of 2,679 megawatts.
The NRC can impose only civil penalties. When the agency's reviews are completed, Dricks said, they are then turned over to the Justice Dept. to see if criminal charges are possible.
After Wednesday's NRC meeting to discuss problem-plagued Connecticut Yankee, Northeast Utilities and seven other New England power companies that operate the facility, voted to shut down the 28-year-old plant.
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O mp managementsNaN ens, hp e N N aking steps to fix g% a ,fd i
- 497 at it hoped to have at least one Millstone plant back in operation by With its nuclear arm in mothballs, NU must import up to 2,100 MW of power to meet this winter's anticipated peak demand of 5,300 MW.
NU has said it is " cautiously optimistic" that Connecticut residents will not be left in the cold this winter.
But Deborah Katz, of the Citizens Awareness Network, a watchdog group based in western Massachusetts, said in an interview that " Connecticut Yankee and Millstone l are just the tip of the iceberg. There is a consistent, systemic problem and !
not just with Northeast Utilities, but also with the NRC throughout Region l I," which includes New England.
Paul Gunter, director of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service in Washington, D.C.,
another watchdog group, said after hearing of the Connecticut Yankee closing, "NRC investigations of the utility revealing long standing negligence of safety j standards dating back to the initial startup of this reactor raises very serious questions about NU's intent to ever comply with safety regulations."
Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 l
1 Copyright 1996 Dow Jones & Co., Inc. All rights reserved.
Why would anyone put a cloth covered chair in a radiation area. Maybe they had trouble sleeping in the hard chairs. '
Headline: Maine Yankee Wire Service: APn (AP US & World)
Date: Sat, Dec 7, 1996 Copyright 1996 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
The information contained in this news report may not be published, broadcast or otherwise distributed without the prior written authority of the Associated Press.
WISCASSET, Maine (AP) -- Maine Yankee nuclear power plant officials were trying to find out how a microscopic radioactive particle became embedded in a chair used by about 40 security guards. ,
Plant president Charles Frizzle said Friday that while the guards' exposure to radiation was well below the federal limit, the discovery
" illustrates a severe weakness in work practices that cannot and will not be tolerated at Maine Yankee." ?
The microscopic particle, discovered Wednesday, may have been embedded in the cloth-covered chair at a guard station since January, plant spokeswoman Maureen Brown said. The workers didn't require medical attention.
The announcement came on the same day that the troubled, 24-year-old facility was shut down because some cables were routed incorrectly and a little more than a month after eight workers were exposed to trace levels of radiation at the plant.
Cloth-covered chairs are not recommended for the primary, or restricted, side of the plant, where the particle was found. The chairs' static can attract radioactive particles, the plant said.
The workers may have been exposed to a dosage of 1 to 5 rems of radiation, Brown said. The annual federal limit is 50 rems, she said.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is to decide in January whether to place the plant on a formal " watch list" of troubled plants.
An inspection in October by an NRC team graded the reactor's safety as adequate, but cited "significant weaknesses," and said the main causes of safety problems were economic pressures and "a lack of a questioning attitude" ,
by plant employees.
Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350
.-- __ _- 1
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i From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com> l To: WND2.WNP3(jaz,jnh),TWD1.TWP4(gam,wjs),ARD1.ARPI(dr...
Date: 12/9/96 4:54pm
Subject:
Letter to Chairman etc.
Dear Associates:
We have just recovered from a major Loss of Offsite Power event here on Hyde RD. No diesels, no batteries, and no NRC and still were able to hang on for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. We're back in business now.
Harry S. Blank j EIGHT GRISWOLD COURT i WATERFORD, CONNECTICVT 06385 l 203-447-8052 Dr. Shirley Jackson - Director ;
USNRC i Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 RE: Milhoan Letter Dated 11/21/96 Dr. Jackson, I am forwarding to you a copy of a letter I received from Mr. James Milhoan i of the NRC and my response to that letter. l I still find it difficult as an educated professional to believe that the NRC would assume that I would be placated by this letter. I am not. It merely reiterates the theme song of the NRC which appears to be "it's under investigation".
I cannot comprehend what needs to be investigated. Did NV misuse this workforce reduction matrix to specifically target individuals? YES. Did NV have something to hide? YES. Was there an aura of clandestine secrecy to an elaborate evaluation that was used to determine who was to be laid off? YES.
As normally would be expected in an evaluation were the employees involved?
N0. Was this evaluation objective? N0. Is there anything I left off?
Dr. Jackson I appreciate the task in front of you, but unless you do "the right thing" this event will continue to haunt both the NRC and Northeast Utilities. It will rise up like a ghost to cloud over any other attempts to repair the image of the NRC.
Issue to the public the report of the task force. Issue to the public the report of the Office of Investigation, and finally have the Department of Justice issue their report and charge if determined any individuals. All of the individuals involved probably outnumber by now the 104 individuals laid off in January 1996, and I am certain the cost of their efforts, both by the NRC and NV, far exceeds the money allegedly saved by NU. The delays are working against the NRC, as it creates the appearance of an inability to j conduct a thorough investigation.
(
, Dr. Jackson, given the fact that you are not bound by the " Navy Mentality" of the nuclear industry, change the image of the NRC from one of an agency 4
that protects its comrades, to one of an agency that is truly chartered with i
the safety of the public, regardless of the penalties that must be meted out
{ for NU's creative "workforce reduction matrix".
- I wish you well Dr. Jackson and sincerely hope that you can accomplish what you have set out to do.
Sincerely, 4
Harry Blank The following is from a resident of Maine:
Great news from Maine. Peter Crane's visit here was a complete success. We managed various media coverage / interviews throughout the week and almost universal coverage the day of the meeting plus a story and editorial column for the Maine Sunday Telegram (Portland Press Herald). The committee wavered a bit but with the public scrutiny and Peter Crane's eloquent remarks the vote came down as unanimous. Maine will stockpile KI at its evacuation reception centers! We will be one of only four states to do so although I understand N.H. was watching our proceedings closely.
The following is from a resident of California: .
It is very unsettling to read that a special task force performed an investigation of very serious charges in only six weeks, but it is now in years that they have been investigating SONGS for harassment / intimidation and safety problems. And no resolution yet.
No promised copies of deposition transcripts yet (some of us have several coming). No promised copies of tapes of the depositions yet.
This "not yet" concerns the NRC OI, NRC OIG, several branches of the NRC, NRC supervision, NRC top management, NASA 01, SCE supervision and management at all levels, and those of us that are gone from SONGS now. All the good that was done by four of us has been undone and taken to a point that everyone should be fearful of. As much as
- I would like to be employed again - I will NEVER go back to SONGS in any capacity and probably not to ANY nuclear facility as long as the NRC and SCE as now constituted, exicts. My many years of " knowing" that we had safe plants is shaken to the roots. We did our job the best we could -
those that are left are afraid and will just do what they are told to do and not make any waves. Integrity-Morality-Honesty-Truth-0penness -- these words seem to be missing from Nuclear Utility and NRC dictionaries. A disgusted ex-nukell!
And from the great State of VT:
Paul:
Miami FL has been summiting phony budgets for years; to the tune of 60 million dollars this years. It took a whistleblower to drag this out to light.
There wondering were all the backup agencies have been; independent state and federal agencies, who should have caught this. Miami is a typical inner city
- i i
1 whoes core population is very poor. There saying that the people (indited)
I who cooked the numbers, should be given a break, because in there own way, i they were trying to conteract the effects of the massive collaspe of the city, because the middle class moved out. In effect, you lie when facing an emergency, to the public. Self-preservation over the public good; you drag the crises out, thus magnifying the cleanup. And all those outside agencies who just closed there eyes.
1 IF politics has teached us that, if that is our core beliefes when responding to emergencies, or budding crisis, as a country, we are in big trouble. I '
think the problems of NU and Miami are very simular. Your on the road, to reteach America some very important lessons.
i
! Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant
- 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 i
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From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz,jnh),TWDI.TWP4(gam,wjs),ARD1.ARPl(dr...
Date: 12/10/96 1:59pm
Subject:
Joe Callan and other news From a trusted friend and sometime NRC critic.
I spoke with a colleague yesterday who has worked with Leonard Joseph Callan, the NRC's newly appointed Executive Director of Operations.
According to my colleague, Mr. Callan is the best person in the NRC that he was ever worked with and the NRC could not have selected a J
finer person for the EDO position. Mr. Callsn is reported to have a very strong technical background. He is said to be an enforcement advocate. Mr. Callan is said to neither favor not oppose licensees; he simply enforces the regulations. He is fair and consistent in his dealings with licensees. My colleague also reported that Mr. Callan assembled a very capable staff in Region IV.
Headline: Northeast Utilities May Need To Scrap Dividend, Audit l Wire Service: DJ (Dow Jones)
Date: Mon, Dec 9, 1996 From The Wall Street Journal BERLIN, Conn. -- A consultant told Connecticut's utility regulator that Northeast Utilities (NU) must consider eliminating its dividend to meet debt payments and the costs of righting its ntclear-power program.
The consultant's report is an 9: Ply sign of the cool reception the utility is likely to receive from state regulators if it tries to recover from ratepayers some of the costs of idling its three Millstone nuclear reactors in Waterford, Conn.
The report estimated those costs, some of which have already been met, at
$731 million to $812 million. Eliminating the 25-cent quarterly dividend would add
$128 million to Northeast's cash flow.
The report, written by Barrington-Wellesley Group Inc. of New London, N.H.,
for Connecticut's Department of Public Utility Control, blasts the utility's senior management and its board of trustees, saying they lack vision and leadership. The audit is meant to help the department decide whether
, Northeast, based in Berlin, Conn., has acted prudently in managing the plants.
The utility said some of the report's conclusions were similar to those it has already reached, including the need for new oversight. The company hired a new head of its nuclear division, Bruce D. Kenyon, in August.
Mr. Kenyon has said more recent financial analysis shows a continued dividend is supportable. Also, Jeffrey R. Kotkin, a financial spokesman for the utility, said the company is " puzzled" by the report's call for a dividend cut, since it refers to an annual dividend of $1.76 a share -- the level prior to a cut to $1 in July.
All three Millstone reactors are closed pending safety reviews. The U.S.
Justice Department is investigating whether to bring criminal charges related to possible violations there.
(END) DOW JONES NEWS 12-09-96 6 00 AM
l From:- PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH9ix.netcom.com> ,
To: Joe Callan <LJC19nrc. gov > !
Date: 12/11/96 5:12am 1
Subject:
Congratulation l Mr. Callen: l Congratulation on your appointment as EDO. Without a doubt, you are - facing l one of the biggest challenges the nuclear industry has ever - faced. j I'am enclosing some of the recent communication about your - appointment. The ,
enclosed e-mail is from Senator Lieberman-89s = office. The other attachment ?
is from an industry source and sometime -
NRC critic.
A neighbor and mutual friend of ours, Bob Pearce, has also high - regards for !
you and your integrity.
I understand you may be visiting Connecticut sometime in January and -
I would like to have a chance to meet with you and with Bob if you - desire. !
We can either do this in a formal or on an informal setting. - l This is your call. ,
If this is'not convenient, I am willing to come to DC to share my - !
perspective of the problems and the future direction of the nuclear -
industry.
My primary contact with NRC is John Zwolinski and we could make the = l arrangements through John. j i
Subject:
Re: Joe Callan and other news Date:
Wed, 11 Dec 1996 09:01:02 -0500 From:-
Joyce Rechtschaffen < Joyce _Rechtschaffen911eberm a. senate. gov >
PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCHeix.netcom.com>
this is good to hear about he callan
Subject:
Joe Callan and other news ,
Author: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0ix.netcom.com> at internet Date: 12/10/96 6:59 PM From a trusted friend and sometime NRC critic.
I spoke with a colleague yesterday who has worked with Leonard Joseph Callan, the NRC's newly appointed Executive Director of -
. . . . _ . . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . . - . . . . - - . _ . _ . . _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . - . . _ _ _ . _ . . . . .
b 1
d Operations.
According to my colleague, Mr. Callan is the best person in the - ,
1 NRC l that he was ever worked with and the NRC could not have selected - a finer person for the ED0 position. Mr. Callan is reported to - have a
- very strong technical background. He is said to be an - enforcement l advocate. Mr. Callan is said to neither favor not oppose - licensees; i he simply enforces the regulations. He is fair and consistent - in his
, dealings with licensees. My colleague also reported that Mr. =
i Callan i assembled a very capable staff in Region IV.
i i
i d
Paul M. Blanch 2
Energy Consultant i 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 f
i CC: JZ <JAZWOL0aol.com>
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From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz,jnh),TWDI.TWP4(gam,wjs),ARD1.ARP1(dr...
Date: 12/11/96 7:22am
Subject:
Request for Mitigation of Civil Penalties I fully realize I am about to take some heat for the following - position, but I believe this request is in the best interest of - everyone. Fire away! I have my new flack jacket.
12/11/96 Mr. Evan Woollancott Representative Terry Concannon Co-Chairmen State of Connecticut Nuclear Energy Advisory Council
Subject:
Upcoming Civil Penalties for Northeast Utilities The following opinions and suggestions are my personal positions and - do not reflect the opinions of any other members of the general - public. These opinions do not reflect any opinions of any of the - other members of the subcommittee that I participate in for the - evaluation of the selection of the ICAVP.
Last week I attended the NRC/NU enforcement conference held at -
Millstone to discuss proposed enforcement action against NU for - violations of NRC Regulations at Millstone. I did not attend the - enforcement conference for Haddam Neck, but feedback indicates there = will be similar enforcement action for long standing violations at CY.
During the conference, NU for the first time admitted they were at - fault for the violations. I see this as a necessary first step in the - recovery. i However, the NRC has yet to assume any responsibility for - its role in knowingly allowing NU to operate in violation of NRC - regulations.
While the regulatory violations were significant we now know the far - more significant point is that safety was comprised by both NU and - the NRC at all four reactors. I believe that NV, as a corporate - entity, and the individuals responsible for comprorrising safety must - be punished. However, I am concerned that the punishment not extend - to the innocent ratepayers and taxpayers of the State of Connecticut. 4 If you review the testimony provided for the NRC-B9s -B3Hannon -
Report,=B2 you will find that most of the interviewees attribute the = root cause of the failure of NU-B9s Employee Concerns Program with - the NRC. Most interviewees believe that had the NRC consistently - enforced its regulations, the whistleblower problem at NU would never - had existed. A review of recent NRC Inspector General reports also - confirms the NRC has failed in its mission to protect the general - public.
At the present time, the NRC has the equivalent of about 80 full time -
employees overseeing the recovery of NV. These additional costs are -
estimated to be about $20 million annually, being borne entirely by -
._ - - . . .. =- - - . . - . . --
4 NU ratepayers. Many of these costs are directly attributed to the - failure of I the NRC to fulfill its mandate, that .is to assure the = public these plants are operated safely and in conformance with NRC = regulations.
{
For the failure of the NRC to perform its statutory mandate, the NRC = is j about to impose significant civil penalties against NU. While I = have no way I ,
of anticipating the magnitude of these penalties, we can - be assured they l will be in the millions of dollar range. Again, these - costs will be !" !
shouldered by residents of Connecticut and a further - drain on the already strapped economy of the State. This is more - dollars going directly to the US (6 Treasury and will be of no benefit = to either nuclear safety or a significant ,
deterrent for future = mis-conduct. There is but one sure deterrent and that '
is to hold - those responsible for these actions personally accountable. This is - the only means to assure these actions will not reoccur. Civil -
penalties have not been effective in the past and will not be - effective now.
We must continue to call for personal accountability - and support the ongoing i Justice Department actions.
I would like to propose to the NEAC, that it take a formal position - with respect to the imposition of the proposed civil penalties. I - would like to make a formal request the NEAC consider the following - actions. l Write a letter to Chairman Jackson requesting consideration of the =
mitigation of civil penalties against NU and the residents of -
Connecticut for the following reasons:
=85 Civil penalties are not going to act as a further deterrent.
-85 The proposed penalties will not positively impact the safe = operation of the nuclear plants in Connecticut. With fewer dollars - available, irrespective of the source of these funds, will mean fewer - funds available for safety improvements.
-85 Civil penalties will further erode the already fragile economy of -
Connecticut. Ratepayers are already paying many millions for the - additional .
NRC inspections. !
-85 NRC Regulations do not specify or require the imposition of civil = l penalties for violations. The NRC-B9s Enforcement Policy has been = removed from 10 CFR Part 2.
=85 The economic future of NU is questionable with the combined costs = of the extended plant shutdowns, additional engineering, oversight = and increased NRC inspection costs. =85 NU may be willing to consider applying a portion of the mitigated - penalties to further nuclear safety and/or energy conservation within - the State of Connecticut.
In summary, the citizens of Connecticut already have paid a high = price for the mismangement of NU and lapses of the NRC. =
Unfortunately, the imposition of large civil penalties will only - serve to further compromise safety at NU by leaving fewer dollars for - correction of past problems. And, it will not provide any - significant deterrent to such future conduct.
The residents of Connecticut will also share this burden. We don-B9t = need to send more dollars from Connecticut to Washington, D.C. due to - the failure of the nuclear Regulatory Commission. The citizens of -
Connecticut may even be justified in requesting a refund from the NRC = for
the financing of an agency failing to meet its requirements to - protect the health and safety of the general public.
Sincerely, Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Rd. West Hartford CT. 06117 860-236-0326 l
l l
l l
l l
i t
From: ' PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(j az,jnh) ,TWDl .TWP4 (gam,wj s) , ARDI . ARP1(dr. . .
Date: 12/11/96 4:50pm i
Subject:
EXPECTED FLACK
, I NEVER SAID I COULD PLEASE EVERYONE. I LOST ONE SUPPORTER.
4 4
Subject:
Re: Request for Mitigation of Civil Penalties Date:
- Wed, 11 Dec 1996 17
- 25:29 -0800 2 From:
xxxxxxxxxxxxx To:
PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
l i
)
i
- BULLSHIT l Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 4
135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117
- Tel: 860-236-0326
) Fax: 860-232-9350 I
I i
1 1
i 4 a
i
. \
l i
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz)
Date: 12/12/96 4:04am
Subject:
EXPECTED FLACK AND NEWS
Subject:
Re: EXPECTED FLACK Date:
Thu, 12 Dec 1996 00:19:01 -0500 From:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX To:
PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com Well, unexpected positions are the mark of a flexible mind. Some people do seem to have a problem with that. Might be all the thinking it requires.
XXXXXXXXXXX l Ipalco, Public Citizen Take Aim At Nuclear Subsidies Source: THE ENERGY DAILY THE ENERGY DAILY via Individual Inc. : Unlikely allies Ipalco Enterprises and Public .
Citizen have joined forces in calling for tougher financial standards and elimination of regulatory subsidies for nuclear power operators in the face of increasing utility competition.
The two, along with Citizens Action Coalition (CAC) of Indiana, a consumers group, issued that call in remarks filed Monday with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in response to i the agency's draft policy statement on the restructuring and deregulation l of the electric utility industry. The comment period on the draft has been extended to Feb. l 9.
While Ipalco and CAC have teamed up before on open access issues, the joint filing marks a !
first for the typically anti-corporate Public Citizen. Charlie Higley, '
senior policy analyst for Public Citizen, admitted the alliance with the Indianapolis-based utility is very unusual, but said it is fitting for the occasion.
Clearly it is in Ipalco's ict: rest to minimize stranded cost recovery--
because they don't have
l l
f any [ stranded costs], Higley said, and we see that as major thing too, for consumers. We ,
think its great to have a utility saying the same thing as us. I think it's l going to take a lot of l weird coalitions to really move the issue in [our] favor. l Issued in September, NRC's draft policy statement spells out its concerns l as the utility industry moves into an era of deregulation and increased competition. Its l greatest concerns have to do with the potential impact of deregulation and competition on the adequacy of i decommissioning funds. In the midst of all the upheaval associated with I competition--
disaggregation, utility restructuring, mergers and corporate spinoffs that lead to changes in owners or operators of licensed power reactors--NRC's concern is that the remaining licensed entities have access to adequate funds and that those funds are available ;
for safe reactor !
operation and decommissioning. l In its draft, the agency said it will, among other things, continue to conduct reviews of financial qualifications, decommissioning funding and antitrust .
requirements involving i nuclear power plants. It also said that existing decommissioning funding assurance provisions are adequate to assure that adequate decommissioning funds exist.
But Ipalco and friends say NRC must get much tougher. Their recommendations include:
l
- Ending the fund as you go exemption for licensees' decommissioning )
funding. In a )
restructured and competitive industry, adequate funding should be assured 1 in advance, the petition says.
- Requiring that internal decommissioning funds already collected be placed immediately into independent, external trust funds. According to Higley, these funds l would be separate from utility control and would be controlled instead by NRC.
- Mandating that any funds received by any licensee for stranded cost recovery be used to fund that licensee's external decommissioning trust fund.
This last recommendation, certainly one of the most controversial, was derived in the wake of the California restructuring legislation, said Higley. He pointed but the California
l restructuring proposal fails to tell utilities how they must spend money recovered through stranded costs recovery. In California, as far as we know, utilities can spend the money any way they want and can do any damn thing with it. We want to sure that their i obligation to nuclear power plant operations are addressed first.'
l At the heart of Public Citizens and Ipalco's concerns is their belief that nuclear licensees will not have enough left in their purses for decommissioning at the end of a
! reactor's life, Higley said.
We have always argued that decommissioning cost estimates are too a
small, he said, adding that utilities have an incentive to low-ball the estimate for the sake of lower rates. And while admitting Public Citizen tends to be bearish" on those estimates, Higley said it is not ,
inconceivable that a utility could be forced to spend as much !
i decommissioning a reactor as it cost to build it.
4 John Hodowal, IPALCO's chairman and CEO urged NRC to neither frustrate competition nor i allow its regulatory regime to promote special protections, subsidies or other competitive l advantages to its licensees which are injurious to competition, consumers and competitors.
Licensees with questionable financial ability to sustain safe operations !
in a competitive
- environment should be promptly shut down and decommissioning completed.
They should not be propped-up by direct or indirect subsidies, he said.
. uTHE ENERGY DAILY -- 12-11-96>>
[12-11-96 at 17:58 EST, Copyright 1996, King Publishing Group]
Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350
i i
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
, To: .
DIANE SCRENCI <DPS9nrc. gov >
Date: 12/12/96 6:36am i-
Subject:
Flack and News
Subject:
Re: Request for Mitigation of Civil Penalties Date:
Thu, 12 Dec 96 10:21:16 EST
, From:
, xxXxxxxXxxXXxXXXX>
To:
PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
i l At 12:20 PM 12/11/96 -0000, you wrote:
i > I fully realize I am about to take some heat for the following position, but L .I believe this request is in the best interest of everyone.. Fire - away! I
- have my new flack jacket.
i You two faced creep! I did not read anything in your letter about = criminal j
- charges which must be brought against NU as a greater deterent than - any '
money penalty. Looks like the NRC are not the only ones in bed with - the NU.
Appears you too are sleeping with the enemy!
! MORE COMMENTS Hang in there, Paul.
! I showed your letter to a friend from out of town, who hasn't- any - idea of
- anything that's been going on here, and he was impressed. He asked if - you were in the legislature (and he meant that as a compliment). I told him, -
"not yet." ,
Best wishes for a good holiday season. '
j xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
. NU appoints director of employee
' concerns By SUSAN E. KINSMAN This story ran in the Courant December 12, 1996:
Northeast Utilities has turned to a former Navy captain with = extensive nuclear experience to try to restore public confidence in - the utility's ability to correct safety issues identified by nuclear = employees.
i Edward L. Morgan, 53, of Denver, Colo., started work Monday as - director of
- NU's employee concerns program at the Millstone nuclear - power plants in
, Waterford. Morgan reports directly to David Goebel, = vice president for ;
l nuclear oversight at Millstone since September.
Morgan spent 28 years in the Navy, including two years as chief of - staff
for Submarine Group Two in New London, where Goebel, a retired - admiral, was commander.
Since 1993, Morgan has worked at the federal Department of Energy's -
Rocky Flats Environmental Technology site in Golden, Colo., a former -
nuclear weapons production facility now heavily involved in = plutonium reclamation and the cleanup of widespread pollution on the =
384-acre site.
At Millstone, Morgan faces the challenge of convincing workers, - federal regulators and the public that NU is committed to resolving - safety and other workplace issues as they arise.
His success is critical to Millstone's future. The federal Nuclear -
Regulatory Commission said it will not allow any of the reactors to - restart until the utility can demonstrate that it has created an - atmosphere where employees are comfortable bringing problems to - management.
The utility must also show it is dealing with the problems quickly - and without retribution.
All three Millstone reactors have been closed since March because of - safety concerns. Federal regulators said part of the problem is NU's - long-standing inability to respond quickly or thoroughly enough to - safety problems raised by employees and to resolve complaints about - harassment and discrimination against whistleblewers.
As a result, NU whistleblowers routinely bypass NU management and - bring safety issues directly to the NRC, undermining a key line of - defense in the safe operation of nuclear power plants.
Ed Morgan will provide just the kind of leadership we need as we - address this very important issue at Millstone Station, Goebel - said in announcing Morgan's appointment.
In a written statement, Morgan said he was looking forward to -
fundamentally changing the way NU Nuclear does business.
Paul Blanch, a former NU engineer and whistleblower, said the - challenge goes beyond Morgan and rests with Bruce D. Kenyon, NU's - new president and chief executive officer for nuclear operations.
What's going to turn that program around is if Bruce Kenyon - clearly puts the responsibility on line management to get problems - resolved. A well-run ethical organization shouldn't need a safety - concerns program, Blanch said.
Morgan holds a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from the -
University of Notre Dame.
In 1993, Morgan joined Rocky Flats as facility manager, responsible - for storage and maintenance of large quantities of plutonium. In -
1995, he became technical programs manager and this year, facility - and program integration manager, responsible for safe draining and - packaging of
highly enriched uranyl nitrate solutions.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX=
XXXXX FROM THE HARTFORD ADVOCATE A Question of Change Top nuclear official says NU has turned the corner By Michael Kuczkowski Bruce Kenyon says he understands the depth of the problems that -
Northeast Utilities faces. If I could sum it up for you in one - sentence, it has been leadership. Leadership hasn-89t done its job.
Few would dispute this analysis by Kenyon, the new head of -
Northeast Utilities-B9 nuclear operations. Before he came on board, =
NU saw the Nuclear Regulatory Commission clamp down on its three -
Millstone plants in the wake of widespread reports of safety - violations at the units. In succession last winter and spring, when -
NU shut down a plant for maintenance, the NRC would step in and - demand that the plant remain offline and go through an unprecedented - top-to-bottom reinspection.
That process is still underway. The failures at Millstone - have shaken the industry nationwide. In the three months since Kenyon - took over as the utility-B9s top nuclear officer, the leadership - teams at both NU and the NRC have changed dramatically. I Last week the NRC announced major changes as well. Jim -
Taylor, the NRC-B9s executive director, is retiring. The shakeup at - the agency has included the departure of Bill Russell, the NRC-89s - top enforcement officer and Thomas Martin, the head of the NRC-89s -
Region I, where the Millstone plants are located. l At Northeast, Robert Busch, Kenyon-B9s predecessor, resigned - this past summer. Three vice presidents in the NU chain of command - have left. ,
Kenyon, in turn, has brought in a new group of four = nuclear officers from l other utilities to retool the company-B9s four = l Connecticut plants-DIincluding Connecticut Yankee in Haddam Neck, - which is now slated for a permanent shutdown. There has also been a = less-publicized reshuffling of NU=B9s middle management team. In the - past three months, says Kenyon, more than 50 percent of the - department directors in NU-89s nuclear operations have been - reassigned in some way or other.
Kenyon believes that NU-B9s internal leadership shakeup will - break the pattern of decline that has plagued nuclear operations for - the past six years. In his view, it-B9s time to look toward getting - the Millstone plants back up and running. He is set to present a more - detailed plan to do so at a meeting Dec.17 with NRC officials.
My focus is to come in here, with a new leadership team, - assess the situation, make the fundamental changes that are necessary - and bring these units back, says Kenyon. We 89ve got a lot of work - to do to accomplish
s l
that. But I do see us in a situation of having - turned a corner.
We-B9ve got new leadership in place. We-B9ve reorganized so - that the accountabilities are much clearer. We are working on the - processes and, over time, we will substantially strengthen the - organization and bring these Units back to service.
Kenyon-B9s critique of NU paints a picture of a company with - an almost universal lack of leadership. Management failed to set - proper standards, was not accountable and it allowed inefficient - processes to dominate the system. Still, identifying those problems - is not enough. In the past, NU has shown a propensity to pinpoint its - shortcomings but then ignore the solutions.
At least one critic of the utility believes he is making - progress.
For the first time, I saw them take the first step toward - recovery to admit that they have had a problem and they have screwed - up royally in the past, says Paul Blanch, an outspoken - whistleblower, who has been instrumental in pointing out flaws and - oversights in plant operations.
In the 25 years I have been dealing with the company, - that-B9s the first time I-B9ve heard them admit that. That one - statement is indicative of a change in philosophy. They-B9ve got a - significant amount of work to do.
The utility has yet to choose a contractor to review the -
reinspection work now underway at Millstone under the watchful eye of - the NRC. That announcement, along with NU-89s recommendation of who - should review its tarnished employee concerns program, is expected by - early next 1 year. Even so, this week NU may face a significant round = of new fines from i the NRC, based on safety violations prior to - !
Kenyon-89s arrival, including a Labor Day incident at Connecticut = ,
Yankee that only hints at the kinds problems Kenyon faces. l In that accident, workers allowed a nitrogen bubble to form - in Connecticut Yankee =B9s reactor core, which could have led to the - fuel in the piant being exposed-D1the precursor of a meltdown.
Kenyon says bluntly that the e Hent should never have - reached that stage. It represented a serious reducticu in safety - margins, Kenyon says.
There are a lot of underlying causes to the -
Connecticut Yankee incident. There were procedural deficiencies, - there were analysis deficiencies, there were equipment deficiencies. -
And those things combined to create a situation with potentially = serious consequences.
Kenyon concedes that such a combination of failures can be -
disastrous. We are setting much higher standards. We are not going - to tolerate the kinds of deficiencies that went with that incident, - he says.
But will the new chief be able to force NU to execute the = solutions as well as he articulates the problems?
I think the real issue is fundamentally changing how -
Northeast Nuclear functions, says Kenyon. And until I can fully - state that we have changed how we do business, I don-B9t think the - units are ready to
1 l
start up. That, of course, is what critics of NU = have been saying all along.
l Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant
- 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 1
I l
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com>
To: JIM LIEBERMAN <JXL9nrc. gov >
Date: 12/13/96 12:16pm
Subject:
DP0's I think that the imposition of civil penalties at NU if deemed appropriate by the NRC should not be set aside due to the extenuating factors of the NRC's involvement and the Connecticut's citizens having paid for the downtime. The imposition of civil penalties would be needed to send a firm reminder to the cavalier NU Board of Directors that condoned poor management from afar as long as the bottom line looked good. The bottom line won't look so good with a few coins being sent down to Washington, so maybe the Board will get the message. Second, the imposition of civil penalties is needed for fairness to all of the doctors that have been fined by the NRC. It seems unfair to make the little guys pay for little offenses when the big guys get off for big offenses.
i I never expected to see Paul Blanch compared with Camille Paglia.
RESPONSE
I think the penalty should be the same but NU should pay this money out but to be used within the State of Connecticut for the benefit of nuclear safety and/or energy conservation. What good does it do to send our dollars to the District of Corruption? I think we should also use the Connecticut lemon law and demand a refund of all the money we have given the NRC over the past 10 years. Or maybe we could sue them for malpractice.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Paul--
Appointing someone who worked in Rocky Flats administration is not very encouraging at all. They made a pretty big mess out there.
As for the flack side, I think your suggestion just shows the profound influence of the season. Didn't you fall asleep in front of the T.V. last week while they were showing re-runs of Wall Street Week, It's A Wonderful Life, and A Christmas Carol? You know how profoundly
" sleep work" gets the job done in the nuclear industry-- you sent out a piece '
on that. You did get trained and worked for them, so it just means you may still be "under the influence."
Seriously, don't you think it would be o.k. to fine them if they were forbidden to pass the cost on to their ratepayers? To my way of thinking, until the shareholders start taking it on the chin for the mismanagement of the company, NU will continue to screw around.
After all, when mismanagement is rewarded with you'd got an enormous severance package and a golden parachute, there is no incentive to change the management style or improve the operational culture.
The public is stuck with the civil penalty system--a sort of damned if you do, damned if you don't. It's too bad they can't simply lock up these bastards until they agree to do the right thing.
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0iX.netcom.com>
To: DIANE SCRENCI <DPS0nrc. gov >
- Date
- 12/13/96 6:09am
Subject:
Differing Opinions 1
Like the old saying " Opinions are like s, everyone has one"
, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
! Paul:
Congratulations on offering an alternative view. I am glad you can stand i back
- and take a broader view of things, especially since you went through the
! whistle blower wringer with Northeast Utilities.
Paul,,,,
I have to agree...it looks as if you did an about face and sided with NV....
i WHEN they have filed penalties AND civil penalties then perhaps and only then 3
should they be reviewed and possible discussions held concerning the l amounts...
! Paul
- Only the punishment truly due a felon will teach anybody at NU a lesson. Even a personal million dollar fine won't leave Bernie Fox suffering any more than
- I do after a speeding ticket. What he needs is some time in a cell with a
]
fellow felon, enough time to sufficiently ponder the value of his pelf.
! XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
- The NRC may not have handed out enough speeding tickets, but it was the i
NU middle managers who repeatedly ignored the speed limits, and the NU upper
. managers that encouraged ignoring the law by promoting known
" speeders" into management positions. In my years in NU nuclear I saw it i happen many times - if you ignored safety concerns, you were management material.
To imply that NU was somehow not responsible for ignoring safety concerns because the NRC was not tough enough on enforcement is like saying speeding tickets should not have to be paid because the state police are not tough enough enforcing the speed limit. NU managers ignored the law and have to be held accountable. I am in favor of both the civil penalties and the D0J criminal investigations. Make them pay a fine and also go after the repeat offenders.
Yes, the citizens of Connecticut already have paid a high price for the
, mismangement of NU and lapses of the NRC. But the way to keep this from happening again is not mitigating NU's civil penalties. No citezins of i Connecticut have paid a higher price than the whistleblowers who lost their jobs, and through blackballing, their careers.
i Whistleblowers and others who are now fighting NU legally are at risk of losing their homes due to legal costs and loss of income.
Consideration should be given for the NU civil pent.lties to be placed in a fund administered by the DOL to help pay the legal costs of whistleblower <
complaints. If the DOE can justify providing whistleblower protection for DOE contractors, a fund administered by the D0L to help pay the legal costs of whistleblowers should be realized.
i xxxxxxxxxxxxxx )
Dear Paul,
i I can see where you are coming from with regard to NRC fining ratepayers. Perhaps Connecticut should be sueing NU for recovery with the current suits by several states to recover medical costs from the tabacco industry as a model.We would like to see the NRC fine the piss out of Maine Yankee because, by statute, we Maine ratepayers are supposed to be immune from such costs. Me. Yankee execs are on a production bonus system; $25,000.
They aren't going to find that under their x-mas tree this year! What they should find , though, are fines laid against their salaries.
By the way, " BULLSHIT" is not a cogent argument without supporting
- premise and reasoning development.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx It seems that your desire to keep NU fine money in Connecticut so it could be applied to actual safety upgrades, rather than sent down to D.C. money coffers
, makes sense, especially since the NRC's own conduct helped make the Millstone !
, mess.
It is a shame though, when some activists go into a state of apoplexy and hammer you when you have the temerity to deviate from the mandated, orthodox, party line that they feel you are totally bound somehow to adhere to. What cold, timid souls! Hissing " betrayal" from the safe shelter a group that i thinks each member is honor-bound to think alike! l Camille Paglia, a noted feminist thinker, had the same sort of reaction a few '
years ago when she challenged the " collective voice of all women" represented by the conventional woman's movement. They had a cow.
She wrote her critics, saying in a higher literary way the equivalent of her not giving a flying rat's ass WHAT they thought! I think you just did the same in stepping to the side of, or in front of, the pack. Sadly, the response of some in the pack is to shiver, huddle closer together, and berate you for your lack of courage.
Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350
l From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz)
Date: 12/13/96 7:07am
Subject:
Hartford Courant Editorial l The following is from Connecticut's largest and most conservative - daily l newspaper.
l l
-A91996 The Hartford Courant Has the NRC learned its lesson?
This editorial ran in the Courant December 13, 1996 1
Northeast Utilities' emphasis on cost cutting at the expense of - safety at its nuclear plants in recent years was bad enough. Worse, - the federal agency that is supposed to safeguard the public was - letting New England's biggest electric utility get away with it.
Oversight by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was inconsistent and - dilatory at NU's reactors. Various investigations have found that the agency repeatedly gave NU second chances despite declining - performance in maintenance and such procedures as refueling at the -
Millstone units between 1991 and 1996.
Those units and the Connecticut Yankee plant at Haddam Neck - eventually were shut down because of NRC safety concerns. Better = oversight by the regulatory agency should have prevented the slide in = performance or prompted earlier correction of safety problems.
Acknowledging that her agency failed to see the downward trend in -
performance at reactor facilities throughout the Northeast, -
Chairwoman Shirley A. Jackson last week announced the retirement of - the NRC's top two executives and a staff realignment she says is - designed to detect sooner the kinds of problems at the Millstone - plants.
The changes represent a good first step and a recognition that the - agency can't pile all the blame for safety problems on plant = operators.
Oversight will become even more important in the future, as nuclear - plants age and competition within the industry heats up, increasing - pressure for more cost-cutting.
But will a game of musical chairs at the NRC, and what Ms. Jackson - calls a strategic reassessment" of regulatory philosophy and - enforcement programs, solve all the problems? Can these changes - fundamentally alter a culture in which the regulated and the = regulators are cozy and in which whistle-blowers have been mistreated - or barely tolerated?
Two stories by The Courant last week described the internal conflicts - at the NRC and the incestuous relationship its staff has had with the - industry. It was not comforting reading. The NRC's mission of - protecting the public's health and safety was seriously compromised - by a culture of laxity.
t
, Several factors lead to the too-close relationship between plant - operators and their overseers. Many managers at the NRC and the - utilities got their start in the nuclear Navy. That Kinship lives on. -
Many NRC staff members and even commissioners go to work for = utilities later
- in their careers. Also, many NRC workers are - reluctant to raise safety 4 concerns for fear of being branded as - troublemakers.
Ideally, commissioners at the NRC would be free of industry ties or =
- ambitions and would continuously ride herd on the staff. -
Realistically, what's needed is Congress' keen interest and - oversight.
Someone must oversee the overseers.
e i Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant
- 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 1
l i
j
d i
All the best.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Paul M. Blanch i Energy Consultant l 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax:.860-232-9350
__ _ _ _ . _ __ _ _.___- _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - . _ - - ____.m i
i i
l' From: PAUL M. BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
To: BARB NEWSOME <BARBNEWSOM9aol.com>
Date: 12/14/96 4:39am
Subject:
[ Fwd: A site for you & friends]
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
2D78582927C7 Content-Type: text / plain; charset-us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7 bit Visit this web site and let me know your reaction. Sounds like a good solution to our waste disposal problem. Anyone got any better ideas?
2D7B5B2927C7 Content-Type: message /rfc822-l Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7 bit
- Content-Disposition: inline Return-Path: <smd@wdcl.westdat.com>
i Received: from nl.wdc. net (nl.wdc. net (204.140.136.18]) by ixmail5.ix.netcom.com (8.7.5/SMI-4.1/Netcom) l id SAA20925; Fri, 13 Dec 1996 18:57:29 -0800 (PST)
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, 1996 19:14:32 -0800 (PST)
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 1996 19:14:32 -0800 (PST)
Message-Id: <199612140314.TAA102489nl.wdc. net > ,
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- Windows Eudora Light Version 1.5.2 i Mime-Version: 1.0 l Content-Type: text / plain; charset="us-ascii" To: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
From: stephen dwyer <smd9wdc. net >
Subject:
A site for you & friends X-Mozilla-Status: 0001
Dear Paul,
This whole episode with the NRC began as a simple email to them about a website I'm running.
I was actually working on a nuclear repository See: http://www.wdc. net /~smd/antarc.htm The Antarctica Nuclear Depository. I only mentioned the SONGS quake problem in passing, but it hit homel You can imagine the flack this generates.
But, with another failure to achieve orbit with a small Pu payload, I hope the Ruskies change their minds about lauching all their nuclear materials into space! That old Schlessinger idea updated. The good part is their sophisticated isotope separation process.
Also their condensation techniques.
l This would facilitate the Antarctica Plan even more.
There is a way to dispose of the weapons and fissile materials, and we should make them get past the excuse, "There is no place to put anything"...
And make them work on a realistic plan.
Please review if you can, and make suggestions.
Flack me if necessary, I can take it.
Sincerely, Stephen Dwyer smd9wdc. net
20785B2927C7--
1 i
h From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz)
Date: 12/17/96 6:30am
Subject:
Commission SALP Meeting Commissioners' Briefing yesterday on the NRC's SALP and Inspection programs. Some interesting items:
- 1) 60% of the NRC's inspection efforts are performed by the
. Resident Inspectors, 37% are regional initiative inspections, and 3% are inspections on generic safety issues.
- 2) In 1988, the NRC went to the (N+1) resident program where it had one more resident at a site than it had reactors. Given 109 plants at 70 sites, that would imply 179 resident inspectors or less than 4% of the agency's 3,300 employees. 4% of the folks doing 60% of the inspections. Why does Winston Churchill's "Never have so many owed so much to so few" come to mind?
- 3) The Senior Resident Inspector used to develop the SALP report, now he or she is not even on the SALP board. Commissioner
. McGaffagin asked why it was changed. The staff said it was due to industry pressure. I guess having the region write the SALP report is at least better than making the licensees write it themselves.
J
- 4) Commissioner Diaz had a long and rather amusing monologue about the bland, non-descript language in the SALPs. He quoted several recent SALPs that stated the utility demonstrated weakness, but didn't define the weakness. He asked if that 1 meant they had problems with their knees or what. He quoted i other SALPs that stated the utility management lacked sensitivity. He asked if this meant they were having romantic troubles .
- 5) The staff stated that the purpose of the SALP program was to
- communciate its perception of plant performance to the licensees and to the public. The Commissioners generally concluded that the SALP program was O for 2.
The transcript of the meeting should be on FedWorld soon. I'd recommend reviewing it.
Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350
1 From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz)
Date: 12/17/96 6:44am
Subject:
Maine Yankee News Wiring search shuts down Maine Yankee By Edward D. Murphy Staff Writer
-A9 Copyright 1996 Guy Gannett Communications WISCASSET - Maine Yankee will not produce power again until at least - the end of the month while workers sort through miles of cable to - look for places were the nuclear plant's electric lines may cross.
On Dec. 5, plant workers found two crossed cables in a control room - system that automatically shuts down the nuclear plant in case of a - problem.
Another set of cables, which control a steam valve, were - found crossed and routed improperly a week later, leading to the - decision to close the plant for at least two weeks, said Leann Diehl, - a Maine Yankee spokeswoman.
Additional wires will be inspected to see if there are other - instances where '
the lines cross or are not in the proper place, she - said.
But although Diehl said the plant's safety was not compromised, the - state's nuclear safety adviser says the latest report of a problem at - the plant has him worried.
'There's been enough that it's raised my attention level, said -
Uldis Vanags, who said he will meet today with officials from the =
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to discuss the latest disclosures.
And a longtime opponent of Maine Yankee raised the prospect of a - fourth referendum to close the plant.
I think there's a whole new climate because of repeated problems - at the plant, said Bill Linnell, a spokesman for Safe Maine Energy, - an anti-nuclear ,
power group.
The wiring problems come on top of a litany of disclosures that - continue to raise concerns about the safety of the Wiscasset plant.
The day before the plant found the crossed cables, workers discovered - a that a tiny radioactive particle had become embedded in the seat of - a chair in a security guard's station, possibly exposing as many as -
40 security guards to radioactivity.
Early this fall, the NRC found Maine Yankee was adequate to run, - but said major improvements are needed. An NRC review of the plant = said pressure to cut costs and a lack of a questioning attitude among - workers undermined safety.
Maine Yankee officials say they will spend $27 million and hire 50 - more l workers next year to raise the level of safety at the plant.
4 1
The cable problems will cost the plant's owners about $500,000 to buy -
replacement preer if Maine Yankee is shut for a month, Diehl said. -
Central M.'in<i Power Co., which owns the biggest share of the plant, - has said
- it will not pass the cost of the shutdown on to consumers.
Diehl said +f ficials do not believe the safety of the plant was ever =
. compromised by the wiring problems. In the first instance, a fire - could have fused the two cables together, knocking out a system that - is intended the "k shut down the nuclear reactor in case of a problem, =
! Diehl said.
1 She noted ths, a third system is designed to detect whether the - shutdown i signals get through. If they are not received in the control - room, that j system shuts down the reactor, she said.
1 But the cables should have been separated to lessen the chance of - both lines j being disabled at once, she said.
Last Friday, workers found another instance of crossed cables in a - line that a controls a steam valve in an auxiliary building. If fire - knocked out both
! cables and a signal to close the valve was not sent, - the valve would
) continue to release steam, raising the temperature in - the building and
- endangering safety monitoring equipment and part of - the emergency cooling l.
system, Diehl said.
Vanags said reviews as far-reaching as those Maine Yankee has gone - through
, should uncover problems, but he's concerned about how many - have been revealed.
l There may be more there than meets the eye, he said. We are - concerned 5
. . . there have been many items uncovered.
The public has a right to be concerned about this, Vanags added, - saying 4 if the state is not assured of safety, it will demand that the -
, NRC close the plant.
i l Linnell said many of the problems that have been found date back to - the plant's construction.
The same folks have been telling us for a quarter-century that the - plant is safe, he said. It's more evident with each passing day - that they've been blind to these problems. We need to seriously - consider a referendum.
i The state's voters have rejected three previous referendums on - closing the
, plant, but Linnell said the public's mood may be - changing.
i If all of these problems were known to the public each of these - times, it might have gone the other way,' he said. People that - supported the plant were under the impression that that the plant was - safe.
i Linnell said he will talk to legislators about a referendum that - would require the plant to be closed no later than 2008. Lawmakers = can put a question on the ballot or referendum supporters must - collect thousands of signatures to put the item before voters.
- l
l l
~
Diehl said the NRC spent 17,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> reviewing Maine Yankee and = co'ncluded that it is safe to operate. The disclosures of problems are - a result of the '
plant's heightened focus on safety, she said.
'We are under a great deal of scrutiny right now and if we have a - problem, we are addressing it directly, she said. The basic - safety question has been answered. "
l Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant l 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 I
i i
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz)
Date: 12/17/96 4:23am
Subject:
NEWS, Letters, etc.
P.O. Box 88 Peaks Island, ME 04108 December 13, 1996 Hon. Shirley Jackson Chairwoman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 205550-0001
Dear Madame Chairwoman:
I am writing in reference to your December 9, 1996 letter addressing !
questions i I raised in several letters addressed to you, including letters dated i September 4, 13 and 25, 1996 and October 7 and 14, 1996.
I take issue with what appears to be your position that the staff's i independent safety assessment (ISA) finding (i.e., ".... overall performance I at Maine Yankee was adequate for operation") constitutes an appropriate basis I for a judgement "that operation in accordance with current license restrictions and authorizations can be conducted with reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety." The NRC's use of this wording as its basis for allowing operations at Maine Yankee implies that the staff (and Commission) are unable to make a finding of substantial compliance with regulations. In effect, as discussed later in this letter, the Commission, 1 in my opinion, is allowing '
Maine Yankee to operate on the basis of a relaxation of requirements imposed by the Atomic Energy Act.
The staff has not even enumerated the specific violations identified by the Independent Safety Assessment Team (ISAT). For example, the ISAT findings indicate significant deficiencies in Maine Yankee's quality assurance program.
Yet, the staff did not enumerate Appendix B violations, nor the implications of such findings with respect to aspects of the plant that were not subject to the ISA inspection. How is the Commission able to review the staff's overall conclusion when the staff has not specified either (A) violations identified by the ISAT or, because of the ISAT's limited scope, (B) the degree of confidence that significant violations have not yet been identified? In fact, the likelihood of significant as-yet undiscovered deficiencies is manifest in last week's discovery of an inappropriately located cable.
In addition to not enumerating specific violations, the ISAT report does not make a clear finding with respect to the ISA's first goal: 1.e.
" independently assess the conformance of MYAPS to its design and licensing bases .... " I call your attention to ISAT Report Section 5.1, Licensing And Design-Basis. While the staff concluded that Maine Yankee is sufficiently in
conformance with its design and licensing basis to support operations at 2440 MWt but not at 2700 MWt, the report overall does not support this conclusion and, indeed, the Section 5.1 text is so qualified that it is consistent with a bottom line inference that the plant deviates significantly from its licensing and design basis at power levels less than 2440 MWt.
I call your attention to an August 14, 1980 memorandum sent to the Commission by Mr. Malsch on behalf of the General Counsel, Mr. Bickwit. This memorandum addressed, among other things, the question of whether the NRC l might issue an
! Operating License (0L) without first finding compliance with all applicable l NRC safety regulations. The memorandum includes the following statement:
1 ....
Commission adjudicatory decisions are clear that compliance with the Commission regulations is essential to a determination of adequate protection I
of the public health and safety under the Atomic Energy Act." The memorandum refers to Section 185 of the Atomic Energy that provides that Operating Licenses are issued "upon finding that the facility authorized has been constructed and will operate in conformity with ... the rules and regulations of the Commission."
(Emphasis added.)
l While Mr. Malsch's memorandum addresses the question of the need to make a finding of compliance prior to OL issuance, such a finding implies that plant must comply with regulations following OL issuance. If the Commission believes that licensed reactors may operate on the basis of satisfying a reduced safety standard (e.g. "overall performance is adequate for operation" notwithstanding the plant not being in a state of substantial compliance with regulations), I believe the Commission has an obligation to make a public statement of this fact, along with a legal rationale as to why Mr. Malsch's conclusions do not apply to reactors following OL issuance. Adoption of the "overall performance is adequate for operation" standard places the Commission on a slippery slope with respect to the degree of regulatory compliance that licensees are required to achieve. Where is the line to be drawn in specific situations such as the one at Maine Yankee and who is to be the person responsible for drawing such a line?
I again note that the Commission's failure to require Maine Yankee to be in substantial compliance with regulations runs counter to comments made by l you in an October 17 statement to NRC staff: j I want to address a few remarks toward our expectations of licensee i performance and the emphasis of our own regulatory oversight. I see a real l danger in being ensnared by false distinctions between safety and compliance l in our regulatory program. In fact, the concepts are bound tightly to each other. A licensee's compliance with our regulations and license conditions is fundamental to our confidence in the safety of licensed activities. As I have said any number of times, if there are requirements on the books that do .
not have to do with safety, we should remove them through the well-established I processes to make such changes. It is untenable as a regulatory agency to imply that regulatory requirements can be ignored. I recognize that, r an agency with limited resources and staff, we must make informed choice in i I
applying our resources to the most safety significant activities or i challenges requiring our oversight.
I I
i This drives the importance of a risk-informed approach to regulation. By l focusing our resources on those significant issues and maintaining high i expectations for licensees' adherence to existing requirements (until and :
! unless they change), we will strengthen the quality of our oversight and '
l public confidence in it. We will enhance consistency and objectivity in our evaluation and enforcement, and thereby help to ensure fairness to all.
[ Emphasis added.]
l I again call your attention to a critical element of this matter: the I fact that the NRC staff appears to have allowed Maine Yankee to operate at .
l 2440 MWt without having followed procedures for allowing the plant to operate l when it does not comply with requirements specified in TMI Action Plan Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31. I have tried several times to determine the Commission's position with respect to the staff's basis for allowing Maine Yankee to operate notwithstanding noncompliance with these TMI Action Plan Items. l 1
Your October 18 letter stated: "The Commission supports the action I of the Director of NRR in issuing the Order in accordance with his general delegated j authority to issue orders to power reactor licensees in order to protect public health and safety under the provisions of 10 CFR Parts 2 and 5, includirg the authority specified in 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2)." Since I remain unaware of documents indicating that the Commission has considered the January 3 Order (or its underlying rationale), I repeat my request for documents indicating the manner in which Commission support of the action of the i Director of NRR was discussed and/or expressed: e.g. documents including memoranda, meeting records, etc.
I request that the Commission note that a previous request for information with respect to staff reliance upon 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) sought documents indicating the dates on which this provision was first brought into the discussion. The staff produced no document indicating that the staff considered use of 10 CFR ,
50.46(a)(2) prior to late April 1996, nearly four months after issuance of the January 3 Order. The belated reference to 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) leads to the following questions I put forth on October 18 but were not addressed in your December 9 letter:
When the Director of NRR explained to you the basis for the January 3 Order (prior to issuance of that Order), did he explain the use of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) as a foundation for that Order?
When were the other Commissioners informed of the use of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) and its belated invocation?
I note that references made by you and staff regarding 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) do not indicate the nature of any analysis demonstrating, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2), that the reduced risk resulting from the 90% restriction compensates for the increased risk resulting from noncompliance with II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31. I have noted previously the seeming misapplication of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2).
l
In particular,10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) contains language that allows the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to impose restrictions on reactor operation if it is found that evaluations of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) cooling performance are not consistent with other provisions of 10 CFR 50.46. In its belated application of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) to Maine Yankee, the staff has cited the 2440 MWt limitation as the 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) restriction. The staff, however, in its reference to 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2), failed to note that ongoing noncompliance with II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 resulted in a level of safety less than the level that would exist were there compliance Zth these provisions, At this time, as far as I know, there exists no analysf s (performed under the constraints arising from the post-TMI findings that led to II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31, e.g. the findings that large-break loss-of-coolant accident analyses did not necessarily bound credible design-basis accidents) that demonstrates whether the total effect of the Order (as belatedly interpreted) is or is not a restriction as envisioned by the Commission when it promulgated 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2); i.e. it has not been established whether the 90% limitation (clearly a restriction) along with the decision to allow operations without have performed analyses required by II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 (clearly a relaxation) constitute a net restriction or a net relaxation of regulatory requirements.
4 Questions remain. What analysis undertaken under the constraints arising from the post-TMI findings that large-break loss-of-coolant accident analyses did not necessarily bound credible design-basis accidents has been conducted to demonstrate that (A) the 90% restriction in conjunction with (B) operations being allowed without compliance with the provisions of II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 together constitute a not restriction pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2)? And if the staff is indeed relying on the analysis cited in your October 18 letter, what is the regulatory basis for the NRC staff to use '
a mode of analysis (e.g. a mode that assumes the large-break LOCA to be the bounding event) when the TMI accident showed such reliance provided a false sense of security? Simply put, TMI demonstrated that small-break LOCA's could lead to consequences as dire as those resulting from large-breaks, and that prevention of such consequences required, among other things, analyses such as those specified in II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31; it is unfortunate, therefore, that the NRC staff seems intent upon conducting business as though TMI had not happened and that important lessons learned therefrom did not exist.
Again, with respect to the staff's belated invocation of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2), your October 18 letter stated: "The staff was satisfied that Maine Yankee would be operated safely at the reduced power level, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2), but did not perform an independent SBLOCA analysis because it was determined to be unnecessary with the restrictions to be imposed." How could the staff be satisfied that Maine Yankee could be operated safely at the reduced power level, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2), when all the available evidence indicates the staff did not even consider 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) until nearly four months after issuance of the January 3 Order?
In sum, with respect to the RELAP5YA matter, your October 18 letter statement that "... the licensee's approved large-break loss-of-coolant accident analysis bounded credible design-basis accidents" appears to contradict the NRC rationale for the imposition of the requirements of TMI Action Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31; e.g. requirements imposed because a lesson of the TMI accident was that large-break loss-of-coolant accident analyses did not necessarily bound credible design-basis accidents. If this is the case, how can it be that the reduction of Maine Yankee's power level to 2440 MWt means that the plant is sufficiently safe at this level? What analysis has the NRC staff done to develop a position regarding the power level at which the large-break analyses bounds credible design-basis accidents, thereby making the requirements of II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 superfluous.
In light of the totality of matters that have surfaced at Maine Yunkee in 1996, including allegations made by one former NRC Maine Yankee Project Manager and the placing on administrative leave of another such Project Manager, I urge that you and your fellow Commissioners address directly the question of whether at Maine Yankee the level of compliance with regulatory requirements has diminished to the point where protection of the public safety cannot be assured in the manner required by the Atomic Energy Act.
Finally, on page 6 of the December 9, 1996 issue of Inside NRC you are cited as having said that the NRC ISAT process included a review by a citizen's panel of its own. I assume this statement refers to the group convened by Governor King.
As far as I know, no documents describe this group's activities; its members decline to say anything in public about their findings or even whether they made findings with respect to the ISAT or anything else related to Maine Yankee. In any case, whatever they did, such a stealth group, with members hand-picked by the Governor, would by its nature not be a credible entity for dealing with citizen concerns about the ISAT inspection. Overall, persons critical of Maine Yankee and the Commission's regulation thereof have had no reai opportunity to participate in this process; e.g. to participate in a context where there has been detailed discussion between citizens and cognizant NRC officials with respect to the ISAT report specifics. The October 10 meeting in Wiscasset certainly did not constitute a forum for meaningful substantive discussion of the ISAT report with the public. In the event that NRC staff believe the October 10 meeting satisfied the agency's commitment to public discussion (at least as I understand that commitment), they are very much in error. In this vein, I request that the Commission offer an opportunity for presentations by interested citizens at its forthcoming meeting on Maine Yankee.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely, Henry R. Myers c: Commissioner Kenneth Rogers Commissioner Greta Dicus
~ . . - - . . - . . . - - - . . - . . . - . - . . -
i Commissioner Nils Diaz Commissioner Edward McGaffigan Northeast Utilities to outline nuclear plan l Source: Reuters HARTFORD, Reuters via Individual Inc. : Northeast Utilities said Monday it will tell federal regulators on Tuesday what steps it is taking to fix its ,
troubled <
Millstone nuclear power plants, but that it.will steer clear of giving exact re-start dates.
"We will . provide a projected schedule for the recovery plan for each of the Millstone units," said Deborah Beauchamp, a spokeswoman for Northeast.
She said it would be difficult for the utility to provide exact re-start dates i because of the complicated overhaul process which involves federal regulators and the public.
"That's intangible at this point because of the public hearing process and other unknowns," said Beauchamp.
The three Millstone plants in Waterford, Conn. have been closed for safety reasons since March of this year.
The meeting with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials starts at 1300 EST on Tuesday.
Bruce Kenyon, president and chief executive of Northeast Utilities Nuclear, will speak at the meeting.
"It's our piece of the schedule, as firmed up as it can be at this point --
but remember that we're only one player in the puzzle," said Beauchamp.
A spokesman for the NRC told Reuters on Monday he did not expect to hear exact re-start dates from Northeast on Tuesday.
i "They will give us a briefing on what remains to be done or what needs to !
be i done to get any one or all three of the Millstone plants back up," said Neil Sheehan.
After Northeast shook up its management and brought in Kenyon in September, I the utility said it hoped to have at least one of the three Millstone
plants back up in the second half of 1997.
"He's almost framed it as being a competition," said Sheehan. "Each unit is being run independently."
The NRC thinks that the repairs will be "a very long process," said Sheehan.
"We still have a number of issues we want to see resolved before they can re-start," he said. "There is a litany of safety and other issues that came up when they shut down."
Citizens' watchdog groups have demanded that the Millstone plants be permanently closed since the NRC began its probe.
The utility announced on December 4 that it was permanently closing its Connecticut Yankee nuclear plant in Haddam Neck, Conn., which had been shut down for repairs and refueling since July 22. -- Hartford newsroom (860) 727-0224 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX If any of you WB's are IEEE members, this may be of assistance.
Curtailing ethical harassment BY WALTER L. ELDEN Member, IEEE Member Conduct Committee Nearly all engineering and scientific codes of ethics proclaim that the overriding ethical obligation of a professional is to protect the public's safety, welfare and environment. The degree to which an engineer / scientist is capable of exercising this obligation will determine how close is the individual to attaining standing in society as a true " professional." I believe, based upon my personal professional experience of over 37 years in industry, that this goal has not been achieved and that an insidious practice of " ethical harassment" has existed for a long time.
Most engineering professionals practice through an employer, such as a corporation, university or research laboratory.
Usually, having no written contract, they are subject to what is called the
" employment-at-will doctrine." Under this arrangement, at times the ethical principles of the professional clash with the employer's short-term business objectives. When this occurs, and the employer applies direct or indirect pressure (intimidation or outright coercion) upon the employee to deviate from his or her ethical principles so as to align with the intentions of the employer, this is one form of " ethical harassment." Other instances might involve issues of upholding public policy, financial honesty, giving proper credit for engineering work, environmental matters, etc. When such an issue
or situation cannot be settled to the satisfaction of the employer, the result i generally is the firing of the professional. Not many engineers pressured by managers to behave unethically are likely to find a co-worker with the fortitude and ability to intervene on their behalf.
REMEDIES. What should the courts, the IEEE, the profession and the !
practitioner do to prevent this from happening?
In matters where litigation is not involved, the IEEE is empowered to provide several forms of support to its members.
For example, the IEEE might attempt mediation with the employer and might use the powerful tool of publicity via carefully written published reports.
When a matter does go to court, are there any legal or professional remedies '
one may turn to? In 1975 the IEEE took an historic step of establishing a legal precedent when it entered an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief in the Bay l Area Rapid Transit (BART) case in San Francisco. This involved a suit brought against the BART District by three engineers who had been fired for calling l attention to unsafe aspects of the BART. system design. These engineers were '
employed by a public entity and were engaged under the employment-at-will l doctrine.
The IEEE amicus curiae legal brief presented these points to the court:
"In any charge to the jury herein, this court should instruct the jury that 1 if it finds, based upon the evidence, that an engineer has been discharged '
solely or in substantial part because of his bona fide efforts to conform to recognized ethics of his profession involving his duty to protect the public safety, then such discharge was in breach of an implied term of his contract of employment."
PRECEDENT. While the BART case was settled out of court, without-the benefit of the judge making rulings or a jury rendering a decision, what the IEEE said to the court broke ethical practice silence in this area and set an IEEE precedent. Subsequently, many state courts have accepted the principles of !
the BART brief and ruled along its lines !
(and some have gone further by permitting tort actions). 1 In any matter of ethical harassment carried to a court case, the IEEE should exercise leadership for the profession by considering submitting an updated amicus curiae brief. Such action is authorized by IEEE Bylaw 112, Part 4.
It is my hope that a vigorous IEEE ethics support program will deter the practice of ethical harassment. However, if one is in need of support in any ethical harassment situation, they should contact the IEEE and request assistance. The IEEE Bylaws and Policy and Procedures documents spell out the proper procedures.
1 Walter L. Elden, a licensed professional engineer, is a senior member of the IEEE and a member of the Member Conduct Committee. He acknowleges the assistance of Stephen H. Unger in reviewing this article. Elden may be contacted by e-mail at "w.elden@ieee.org".
[12-16-96 at 18:31 EST, Copyright 1996, Reuters America Inc.]
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX NRC Names Merschoff Region 4 Administrator Source: THE ENERGY DAILY THE ENERGY DAILY via Individual Inc. : The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has named Ellis Merschoff as the new administrator of Region 4, which is headquartered in Arlington, Texas. His appointment takes effect in May.
Herschoff currently serves as director of the division of reactor projects NRC's Region 2 office in Atlanta; he succeeds Leonard Joe Callan, who recently was tapped by the commission to replace James Taylor as the agency's !
executive director of operations. '
In other changes, James Dyer has been named deputy regional administrator l for Region 4; he currently serves in Region 4's division of reactor projects.
Dyer succeeds Samuel Collins, who was recently named to replace William Russell as head of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).
Merschoff is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, and holds a master's i degree in mechanical engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He joined NRC in 1980. Dyer is a graduate of the University of California at
- Davis, where he earned a bachelor's degree in chemistry. After his graduation he served as an officer on a nuclear-powered submarine in the Navy. He joined NRC in 1983. l l
l Paul M. Blanch ,
Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350
9 l
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com> j To: WND2.WNP3(jaz)
Date: 12/18/96 4:30am i
Subject:
NEAC Letter 3 l Readers: i Here is a copy of Dr.' Jackson's letter I promised to send last nignt. ]
UNITED STATES !
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION WASHINGTON,~D.C. 20555-0001 *i December 16,' 1996 CHAIRMAN i
The Honorable-Terry Concannon Mr. Evan W. Woollacott Co-Chairs l Nuclear Energy Advisory Council Room 4035 !'
Legislative Office Building-Capitol Avenue i Hartford, Connecticut 06106
Dear Ms. Concannon and Mr. Woollacott:
I am responding to your letter of October 22, 1996, about the Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) imposed at Millstone by the i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) order of August 14, 1996. In your letter, you expressed concerns about three aspects of the ICAVP: team selection, the participation of the NRC, and the scope of the review.
The Commission agrees on the importance of a thorough and independent ICAVP process. In order to ensure that this goal is achieved, the August 14 Confirmatory Order and the NRC's oversight activities at Millstone have been structured to provide for both close scrutiny by the NRC and public openness.
For example, the August 14 Confirmatory Order directed the licensee to obtain the services of an organization and individuals who are independent of the licensee and its design contractors to form the ICAVP team.
The NRC will oversee closely the ICAVP process to ensure the quality and independence of the reviews and will review and approve the organization and the individual members selected for the ICAVP team. The factors that the NRC will consider in evaluating the independence of each team member will include, but not be limited.to, whether the individual has been involved in design reviews for the licensee and whether the individual has any financial interest in Northeast Utilities. The NRC also will evaluate and approve the ICAVP team's review plan before it is implemented. The ICAVP team concurrently will report its findings to the NRC and the licensee and will be
- - , < , e~-, e - . . - . . -
~ _- . ~. . - - . - - . _ - - - . . . - - . - . . _ . - . - . _ . - - . - - ~ - - . - . -
j- 1 i 1 required tn comment on the licensee's proposed resolution of the team's
- findings. To further ensure independence, the ICAVP team will conduct its i reviews, to the extent feasible, in the contractor's offices and not at the
! Millstone site. A protocol being developed by the NRC will control contact
- between the 'ICAVP team and the licensee. The NRC staff is preparing a plan for oversight of the ICAVP, including a plan for system selection that will 1 propose
- (1) an appropriate sampling methodology, (2) a process to evaluate findings, and (3) measures to ensure an unbiased review. The staff will
- submit this plan to the Comission before it is implemented.
l The ICAVP and all NRC activities relating to the Millstone oversight process j 'will continue to be open processes. The Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC) and. the State of Connecticut hEve been invited to observe
! implementation of the ICAVP at the Millstone site. The individuals you have i designated as observers will be kept apprised of the NRC's oversight of the ICAVP activities. The findings of the,1CAVP team will be made available to ,
members of the NEAC and the'public. We also understand that the NEAC has
! formed a subcomittee, which includes members of the public, to review the
! ICAVP contractor proposed by the utility. The NRC will make the final
) . decision regarding the suitability of the contractor organization and i individuals selected to conducii the ICAVP. However, any comments or
! observations by the NEAC subcommittee will be taken into consideration.
I I
The NRC plans to continue to meet periodically with the public on the status
- of the ICAVP, thereby providing a forum for public comment. For example, on
! September 24, 1996, the NRC staff met publicly with the licensee at the
! Millstone site and then met directly with the public that evening at the
! Waterford Town Hall to discuss the ICAVP. The NRC staff also met publicly with the NEAC on the evening of October 10, 1996, regarding the ICAVP.
- Additional public sessions will be scheduled as warranted.
In addition to requiring an ICAVP, the NRC recently issued an order reouiring
- Northeast Utilities to prepare and submit a plan addressing employee
- i. concerns. The order also requires the utility to form a second independent organization to. oversee and report on implementation of that plan, i To focus additional regulatory attention on activities at Millstone, including the ICAVP, the NRC has established a Special Projects Office within its Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. This new office is being managed i by Dr. William D. Travers. In addition to licensing and inspection activities, the Special Projects Office will be responsible for (1) oversight
!" of the ICAVP, (2) oversight of corrective actions by Northeast Utilities related to safety issues involving employee concerns, and (3) inspections
- necessary to implement NRC's oversight of the plant's restart activities.
The Comission appreciates the comments and concerns expressed in your recent letter. We believe that the current ICAVP process as detailed in the August 14 order, combined with other activities regarding public openness, is
! sufficient to ensure an independent process. The Commission is committed to j ensuring that the activities at Millstone, including the ICAVP and NRC's
- regulatory oversight programs, are conducted in a thorough and open manner.
l To that end, the Commission plans to meet publicly with Northeast Utilities j on a quarterly basis, with the first meeting scheduled in January. The NRC
- staff will continue to keep you apprised of developments concerning i
i P i
I '
i Millstone. If you have any further comments, questions, or concerns, please contact Dr. Travers at (301) 415-8500.
-Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson
! Paul M. Blanch l Energy Consultant i, 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 .
1 i i
t i
I 4
l l
I
( l From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0ix.netcom.com>
To: JOHN HANNON <JNH0nrc. gov >
Date: 12/20/96 9:40am l
Subject:
TODAY'S EDITORIAL ETC.
>From the New London Day by Maura Casey 12/20/96
- Reprinted by permission - Maura Casey "WE'RE NOT A SECRET SOCIETY" Why should Whistleblowers cooperate with NRC agents when they withhold transcripts, tapes of those Interviews?
It's almost an American Tradition to think of investigators as wearing white hats.
After all, if they are trying to get to the bottom of possible wrongdoing, they are usually interested in seeing justice served. That makes them the good guys - right?
Not so fast, according to some former employees and one present worker for Northeast Utilities. The NRC Office of Investigations has interviewed several recently, exploring wrongdoing at the Millstone and Connecticut Yankee plants. the workers found it unpleasant to deal with the office. l During interviews, investigators either tape record the employees' answers to questions or they bring along court stenographers to transcribe questions and answers. . That's reasonable enough because they want accurate records.
But the investigators routinely forbid the person they interview from making a tape recording as well, for his own records. The government keeps a tape, but the complainant may not. That's unreasonable.
After they finish the interview, the investigators meet with the person they questioned and ask him to sign written transcripts of what was said.
But that's all he's allowed to do; sign the transcripts. the copies go back in the investigators pockets, and the person interviewed isn't allowed to have a copy. ;
People interviewed are promised a copy after an investigation is complete. l Since it often isn't clear when investigations finally stop winding their way through government bureaucracies, the process can take years.
If the interviewee doesn't want to abide by the unreasonable ground rules of not getting a copy of his own words, the agents usually won't investigate his claim.
Those quizzed by the Office of Investigation are also left to wonder whether or not the transcripts might be altered or pages misplaced.
Even the lawyer for the person being interviewed isn't allowed to have copies of transcripts of what was said.
-~ .- - _ . - - - - . . . - .. - - _-
It's an old story to attorney Ernest C. Hadley, who has previously represented I many people interviewed by the Office of Investigation. "I've been fighting this battle for five or six years now." Mr. Hadley said.
He offered repeatedly to sign strict confidentially agreements as a condition of obtaining copies of transcribed interviews on behalf of clients. He has never been successful, i
l There's no malice on the part of the Office of Investigation, according to Deputy Director Roger Fortuna. He said federal law allows NRC agents to keep recordings and transcripts secret "for good cause". So the office keeps all such records secret to keep information from " trickling out" to members of the media, other potential witnesses in an investigation, or opponents, Mr.
Fortuna said. j But this answer begs the question: why would a person alleging wrongdoing at I a nuclear plant hand over his records to potential opponents? There is !
nothing to prevent these witnesses from giving to the news media the same l information they give to the NRC. It makes no sense to withhold records of 1 interviews from interviewees.
This is particularly relevant with regard to the NRC, an agency deservedly criticized for having too-cozy relationships between itself and the utilities it regulates. It makes one wonder why any nuclear worker with safety allegations would trust the Office of Investigations, given these self-serving and arrogant ground rules.
1 Congress, it ever comes close to aggressive oversight of the agency the public deserves, should tell the NRC this:
That any American citizen has a right to a record of his own testimony when questioned by government investigators of ANY department, agency or branch of government.
Maine Yankee nuclear plant review to last 3 weeks Source: Reuters NEW YORK, Reuters via Individual Inc. : Maine Yankee's review of the cabling at its 910 megawatt (MW) nuclear power station, necessary before the plant can return to service, will likely last well into January, the company said Thursday.
"We expect the review will take about three weeks," said Maine Yankee spokeswoman Maureen Brown.
l l Maine Yankee officials, in a statement issued earlier Thursday, said they l will l
present a thorough review of the cable separation issues to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) before restarting of the plant.
The plant, in Wiscasset, Meine, was shut December 6 when workers discovered two improperly installed electrical cables in the reactor control system that l did not meet the plant's safety requirements.
The cables serve the reactor trip breakers which are used to shut the plant l manually or automatically.
In a letter to the operator, NRC Region I Administrator Hubert Miller said that i
twice since the plant shut down, Maine Yankee's plan for determining the extent of the cable separation problem had been " insufficient."
l The company has since revised its approach to assessing the scope of the problem, NRC said.
NRC said it has sent three specialists to assess the extent of the problem.
Results of their findings, to be issued separately from those by the i company, l will be published early next year, NRC said. ,
1 Maine Yankee is 38 percent owned by Central Maine Power Co <CTP.N>, 20 )
percent each by New England Electric System <NES.N> and Northeast Utilities '
<NU.N>, seven percent by Bangor Hydro <BGR.N>, five percent by Maine Public Service Co < MAP.A> and 10 percent by other New England utilities.
((--New York Power Desk +1 212 859 1622)) I (12-19-96 at 15:48 EST, Copyright 1996, Reuters America Inc.] l POWER REACTOR l l EVENT NUMBER: 31481 l
+__________________________________+ +_______________________+
+________________________________________________+_________________________
____+
FACILITY: MAINE YANKEE REGION: 1 l NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/19/96
. UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ] STATE: ME l NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:30
[ET]l RX TYPE: [1] CE jEVENT DATE: 12/19/96
+------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TIME:
10:45[EST]l NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT MALONEY lLAST UPDATE DATE: 12/19/96 HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TR0 CINE
+_____________________________+
+______________________________________________.-+ NOTIFICATIONS l EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE
+_____________________________+
,10 CFR SECTION: lM0HAMED SHANBAKY RD0 l ,A0UT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS l
4 i
! l l l \
l
! l l l
2 I i , i i '
i i I
- l 1
+_____+__________+_______+-_______+______________+__+________+_____________
- ____+
UNIT l SCRAM CODEjRX CRITjlNIT PWRi INIT RX MODE lCURR PWRj CURR RX MODE I + ____+__________+_______+________+_________________+ _______+_____________
____+
i 1 l N N 0 HOT SHUTDOWN l 0 HOT SHUTDOWN ;
I !
- l >
- l l l F l .
- +_____+_____________________________________________+______________________
____+ 4 1
- EVENT TEXT '
+__________________________________________________________________________
- ____+
l DISCOVERY OF THE LACK 0F RELIEF VALVES FOR THE COOLANT MEDIUM FOR BOTH THE
' SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) AND COMP 0NENT COOLING WATER (CCW) HEAT EXCHANGERS i ;
i l
! l 1
' THE PIPING DESIGN FOR THE SFP HEAT EXCHANGER AND THE CCW HEAT EXCHANGERS 1
WAS FOUND TO BE OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE i
- ' FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR). THE FSAR STATES THAT THESE HEAT l EXCHANGERS BE ASME CODE SECTION VIII AND ANSI PIPING CODE B31.1. THESE
, CODES REQUIRE THERMAL RELIEF VALVE PROTECTION FOR THE HEAT EXCHANGER AND THE COOLANT PIPING IN THE EVENT THAT THE COOLANT SIDE IS ISOLATED BUT THE l
HEAT LOAD IS NOT ISOLATED. THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED THAT THERE WERE NO ,
, l \
- j THERMAL RELIEF VALVES ON THE SERVICE WATER SIDE (TUBE) 0F THE CCW HEAT !
! l 1 EXCHANGERS OR ON THE PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING (SHELL) SIDE OF THE SFP HEAT 2 1 i l
- EXCHANGER.
l
.i !
l THE HEAT EXCHANGERS ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERED TO BE OPERABLE AND ARE l
PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTIONS. THE LICENSEE IS MAINTAINING THE HEAT i EXCHANGERS OPERABLE VIA ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE COOLANT VALVE LINEUP
, BY LOCKING AND TAGGING THE VALVES IN THE OPEN POSITION. LONG-TERM l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW.
l :
l THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND MAY ISSUE A PRESS
\
l RELEASE. THE LICENSEE ALSO PLANS TO ISSUE A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT T0 l
l DOCUMENT THIS EVENT. ,
I l
+__________________________________________________________________________ l
____+
l Paul M. B1anch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350
1 i
4 l 1 li Date: 1 Sat,,21 Dec 96 04:44:53 UT !
4 From: :
XXXXXXXXXXXXX9msn.com> l To:
PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com CC:
102502.31250compuserve.com PAUL, You can add my name to list of whistleblowers who were denied copies of transcripts and tapes after being interviewed by the NRC Office of l Investigations. In fact I don't know what was the final result of the 01 ,
interview. Before the interview I had to take to oath to tell the truth under )
, thethreatofcrimina) indictment (perjury,etc).Duringmy0!interviewa ;
court stenographer was present recording everything and the interview was taped. I had to sign some statements and I do not remember receiving copies of what I had signed. The person from 01 who conducted my interview was Philip V.
Jourkoff (pronounced! jerk off, I believe). Whistleblowers should never go to the NRC or the utility. The safest policy is not to be a whistleblower. You will never gain anything. You can only lose. XXXXXXXXXXX A Region IV Whistleblower XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX December 20, 1996 FYI here is today's NU Nuclear News Daily. It is also attached as a Word document to print and post for those who do not have access to email. To save computer space, please delete the file after use.
NU Nuclear News Daily A Nuclear Communications
. One of NU's nuclear units is on-line; today's generation is 1208 MW of electricity NU Nuclear in the News l An article in today's New London Day reports that the NRC has rejected a Connecticut state advisory council's recommendation to add what the council calls a " fully independent" layer of oversight to the process of restart ing the Millstone plants. In a December 16 letter to the Nuclear Energy Advisory Council, NRC Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson said the NRC sees no reason to change the process, which she said "is sufficient to ensure an ind ependent (review)," the newspaper reported. To verify that the plants are safe to restart, the NRC several months ago imposed the Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP), under which NU must hire and p
ay for a contractor (subject to NRC approval) to evaluate and determine whether Millstone's problems have been solved prior to startup. In addition, the NRC will conduct its own inspections.
A Day editorial asks why should whistleblowers cooperate with NRC agents when they withholds transcripts and tapes of those interviews?
, The editorial says it's unreasonable for the NRC interrogators to tape record or tra nscribe interviews, but forbid those being interviewed from also tape recording the sessions or from obtaining copies of the NRC record until "after an investigation is complete" -- which the editorial says can take years
. The editorial reports that NRC Office of Investigation Deputy Director Roger Fortuna said federal law allows NRC agents to keep recordings and transcripts secret "for good cause" -- namely to keep information from leak ing and hampering investigations.
Two letters to the Day editor are critical of misinformation being propagated about nuclear power and Millstone efforts to make a comeback. In one letter, a CY control room operator writes about the safety measures in pl ace in the nuclear power industry and the level of training required to operate nuclear plants. He acknowledged that the nuclear industry is not without problems, and notes that "it's easy to point out problems.
Obvious ly some people would rather stay ignorant and spread hysteria than learn the facts. But those people shouldn't be rewarded with valuable space in the newspaper. That space should be reserved only for the truth." The at her letter notes that members of the Citizens Regulatory Commission always protest to being called anti-nuclear, "but if it waddles like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck, and no amount of protesting can change that." The author continues: "It's time for CRC and everyone else in this debate to move forward. That's certainly what NU is doing under the leadership of Bruce Kenyon and the top-notch team he's assembled from throug hout the nuclear power industry ... "
In the Industry NRC Issues Confirmatory Action Letter to Maine Yankee, Sends 2 Specialists to Plant -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has issued a letter to Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company confirming the company's agreement to complete a number of actions before restarting its Maine Yankee.
Maine Yankee officials also have agreed not to restart the plant without the concurrence of NRC Region I Administrator Hubert J. Miller.
The confirmatory action letter results from a number of cable separation and safety related logic testing problems found at the plant over the past several weeks. Two specialists, one from NRC headquarters and another fr om the regional office in King of Prussia, Pa., have been sent to Maine Yankee to assess the extent of the problem. Results of their findings will be published early next year.
Maine Yankee shut down the plant on December 5 after finding that certain cables did not have the proper separation required by the plant's design and licensing basis to protect them during accident conditions. The utili ty discovered the problem while conducting reviews called for by a generic letter the NRC sent to nuclear power plant licensees earlier this year.
In his letter to the company, Miller noted that, on two occasions since the
. plant's shutdown, Maine Yankee's plan for determining the extent of cable separation problems had proved insufficient. The company has since revi sed its approach to assessing the scope of the problem.
NRC's confirmatory action letter provides that prior to restarting the plant, Maine Yankee will:
- 1. Complete the initial review of the testing of safety-related logic circuits pursuant to NRC Generic Letter No. 96-01. The company had previously
, agreed to complete this review by the end of this year, and now will co mplete the review either prior to restart or by year's end, whichever comes first.
- 2. Develop a plan and methodology for ensuring that all safety significant cable separation problems are identified and appropriately resolved in accordance with the plant's licensing and design bases.
- 3. Evaluate the root cause of the problem in a way that will address all hardware deficiencies identified, and use this information to validate the comprehensiveness of corrective actions.
- 4. Meet with NRC representatives in the Region I office to describe the results and conclusions of its review.
Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350
l From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com>
To: DIANE SCRENCI <DPS@nrc. gov >
Date: 12/21/96 5:34am
Subject:
NEWS Etc.
This will be my last mail for a week. We are going to Vermont for a week of skiing with the entire family. Happy holidays and merry Christmas to everyone.
December 21,1996 To: Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson Under the US Constitution, US citizens enjoy many fundamental rights won through the blood, sweat, and tears of its founders and perpetuators. I would think that the least of these fundamental rights would include a person's right to their own words. Such is not the apparent right according to the NRC OI in the attached New London Day article by Maura Casey. Tell me Madam Chairperson, to what country does the NRC pledge it's allegiance?
An NU WHistleblower XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
>From the New London Day by Maura Casey 12/20/96 Reprinted by permission - Maura Casey "WE'RE NOT A SECRET SOCIETY" l
Why should Whistleblowers cooperate with NRC agents when they withhold transcripts, tapes of those Interviews?
It's almost an American Tradition to think of investigators as wearing white hats. After all, if they are trying to get to the bottom of possible wrongdoing, they are usually interested in seeing justice served. That makes I them the good guys - right? I Not so fast, according to some former employees and one present worker for Northeast Utilities. The NRC Office of Investigations has interviewed several recently, exploring wrongdoing at the Millstone and i Connecticut Yankee plants. The workers found it unpleasant to deal with the I office. During interviews, investigators either tape record the employees' answers to questions or they bring along court stenographers to 1 transcribe questions and answers. That's reasonable enough because they want ]
accurate records. l But the investigators routinely forbid the person they interview from making a tape recording as well, for his own records. The government keeps a tape, but the complainant may not. That's unreasonable.
After they finish the interview, the investigators meet with the person they j questioned and ask him to sign written transcripts of what was said. But i that's all he's allowed to do; sign the transcripts. the copies go back in the investigators pockets, and the person interviewed isn't allowed to have a
I
)
copy.
People interviewed are promised a copy after an investigation is complete.
Since it often isn't clear when investigations finally stop winding their way through government bureaucracies, the process can take years.
l If the interviewee doesn't want to abide by the unreasonable ground rules of l not getting a copy of his own words, the agents usually won't investigate his claim.
Those quizzed by the Office of Investigation are also left to wonder whether or not the transcripts might be altered or pages misplaced.
Even the lawyer for the person being interviewed isn't allowed to have copies l of transcripts of what was said.
It's an old story to attorney Ernest C. Hadley, who has previously represented many people interviewed by the Office of Investigation.
"I've been fighting this battle for five or six years now." Mr. Hadley said.
He offered repeatedly to sign strict confidentially agreements as a condition of obtaining copies of transcribed interviews on behalf of clients. He has never been successful. 1 There's no malice on the part of the Office of Investigation, according to Deputy Director Roger Fortuna. He said federal law allows NRC agents to keep ;
recordings and transcripts secret "for good cause". So the office keeps all 4 such records secret to keep information from
" trickling out" to members of the media, other potential witnesses in an investigation, or opponents, Mr. Fortuna said.
But this answer begs the question: why would a person alleging wrongdoing at a nuclear plant hand over his records to potential opponents? There is nothing ;
to prevent these witnesses from giving to the news media the same information !
they give to the NRC. It makes no sense to withhold records of interviews J from interviewees.
This is particalarly relevant with regard to the NRC, an agency deservedly criticized for having too-cozy relationships between itself and the utilities it regulates. It makes one wonder why any nuclear worker with safety allegations would trust the Office of Investigations, given these self-serving and arrogant ground rules.
Congress, if it ever comes close to aggressive oversight of the agency the public deserves, should tell the NRC this:
That any American citizen has a right to a record of his own testimony when questioned by government investigators of ANY department, agency or branch of government.
Subject:
01/J0VR0FF
l ,
I i
l l l
! From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
To: JZ <JAZWOL9aol.com>
Date: 12/21/96 10:07am )
Subject:
Relief Valves '
John: l Would you care to respond to this concern?
Subject:
l MY i
- Date
- !
21 Dec 96 12:52:42 EST
- From
To:
<PMBLANCH91x.netcom.com>
Hi Paul, I RE Event 31481 '
During the ISAT, they found an absence of pressure relief valves on on what I thought was the CCW. This finding should have caused a review as to 4 whether other required relief valves were all there, but apparently did not. l Another example of the ISAT being flawed in concept, implementation, or both.
FWIW.
l XXXXXXXXXXXXXX Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 'J6117 Tel: 860-236-0320 Fax: 860-232-935,1 CC: Hub Miller <HJM9nrc. gov >
_ - - -~. - - - - -. - . - . . _ - _ - - . . - _ _.
i From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz,jnh),TWD).TWP4(gam,wjs),ARDI.ARP1(dr...
Date: 12/30/96 4:34pm
Subject:
Another OIG Investigation ETC.
The following is a summary of a recent (4/22/96) NRC OIG =
Investigation. The report is redacted and even the investigators - names have been redacted. I did not make any attempts to guess the - names of any of the redacted persons. This docoment has been released - by my F0IA request. Due l to the extent of the redactions, the details - have been ommitted as they did not scan well. If anyone really wants - to read the details, give me a call and for a large price, I will - send a copy.
This investigation was initiated by Ernie Hadley after we found that - !
Mr. Herb Berkow had identified 9 of us to NU without our knowledge or - l permission.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CASE N0.96-45H DATED 4/22/96 l
THIS REPORT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL. - l IT MAY NOT BE PLACED IN THE. PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM WITHOUT WRITTEN = l PERMISSION. FREEDOM 0F INFORMATION/ PRIVACY ACT EXEMPTION (B) (5 6) = l (7) (C)
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The Office of the Inspector General (0IG) initiated this = investigation based on information received from Ernest HADLEY, - attorney for We the People, Inc.
Specifically, HADLEY advised the -
NRC that he represented six individuals who were requested to - participate in an NRC Independent Review Group (IRG). The IRG was - appointed to evaluate the manner in which Northeast Utilities (NU) - and the NRC staff had handled employee concerns and allegations - regarding licensed activities at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station -
(Millstone) from 1985 to present. According to HADLEY, the names of - the six individuals, along with the names of three other individuals - whom he did not represent, had been disclosed to NU. Further, HADLEY - advised the NRC that the identities of these individuals were - disclosed without their knowledge or consent. In addition, HADLEY - advised that the IRG Leader told one of the individuals that each of - the nine individuals had given him permission to -
release their names - to NU. According to HADLEY, this statement by the IRG Leader was not - true.
l l
The OIG interviewed each of the nine individuals who were requested - to participate in the IRG study. All nine individuals told the OIG = that they did not give permission to the IRG to release their names - to NU as a participant of the IRG study. With the exception of one - individual, all of the individuals said that they were not aware that - their names would be released to NU.
The OIG investigation determined that the IRG Leader improperly = released names of allegers to NU without first obtaining permission - from the individuals to do so. As part of-its evaluation, the IRG = selected nine former whistleblowers to interview in order to obtain - specific information about how the NRC and NU handled their concerns - and allegations. However, prior to contacting these individuals to = ascertain their willingness to participate in the review and their - desires regarding confidentiality, the IRG Leader provided their - names to NU. Two of the names released to NU were current NU - employees who had concerns about being associated with the IRG -
review, and one of these individuals had entered into a - confidentiality agreement with the NRC. The OIG investigation also - determined that the IRG Leader had no formal training or experience - in dealing with allegers.
BASIS The Office of the Inspector General (0IG) initiated this - investigation based j on a February 21, 1996, letter from Ernest -
HADLEY, attorney for We the People, Inc. In his letter HADLEY - advised the i NRC that he represented six individuals who had been - contacted by the-NRC Independent Review Group (IRG) which was - appointed to evaluate the manner in which Northeast Utilities (NU) ='and the NRC staff handled employee concerns and allegations regarding - Mcensed activities at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station -
(Mill stone) . HADLEY advised that he represented six of the nine - individuals who had been asked by the IRG to participate in the - study. In addition, HADLEY advised the NRC that the names of these = six individuals, along with the names of three other individuals whom -
HADLEY did not represent, had been disclosed to NU. According to -
HADLEY, the identities of these individuals were disclosed without - their knowledge or consent. In addition, HADLEY advised that the IRG =
Leader told one of the individuals that each of the nine individuals - had given him permission to release their names to NV. According to =
HADLEY, this statement was not true (Exhibit 1).
BACKGROUND In a December 12, 1995, memorandum, James M. TAYLOR, Executive -
Director for Operations (ED0), requested William T. Russell, -
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to conduct an =
independent evaluation of the history of NU and of the NRC staff s - handling of employee concerns and allegations related to licensed - activities at Millstone. In his memorandum, TAYLOR noted that:
Since the late 1980's Millstone Station has been the source of a high - volume of employee concerns and allegations related to safety of = plant operations
and harassment and intimidation of employees. NRC - has conducted many inspections and investigations which have - substantiated many employee concerns and allegations.
As the objective of the independent review, TAYLOR directed that:
For the period from 1985 to the present, critically evaluate both the -
licensee's and NRC staff s effectiveness in addressing -
Millstone-related employee concerns and allegations. Determine root - causes and common patterns for identified deficiencies and develop - recommendations for licensee actions related to the Millstone station - for improvements in ,
handling of employee concerns and for NRC staff - actions related to handling of allegations.
TAYLOR also directed that the review include in-depth evaluations of -
selected case studies of employee concerns and allegations to - identify root ;
causes and common problems between these cases (Exhibit -
2).
In response to the memorandum by TAYLOR, on December 20, 1995 -
XXXXXXXX NRR, advised RUSSELL of the formation of the Millstone -
Employee Concerns / Allegations Independent Review Group (IRG). The -
IRG planned to review licensee and NRC allegation files,10 Code of -
Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.206 petitions, inspections reports, =
Office of Investigation (01) and OIG investigations, enforcement - actions, Department of Labor (DOL) actions and prior NRC management - reviews. As part of this review, the IRG intended te select 6 to 12 - cases for in-depth evaluation. This evaluation included safety - significant technical connects and harassment and intimidation - issues. Additionally, the IRG planned to review NRC and NU files - relevant to these cases and to conduct interviews of the NRC staff - and licensee management, as well as the individuals who had reported - the safety concerns or allegations.
XXXXXXXX reported to RUSSELL that XXXXXXXX, a senior Executive -
Service (SES) manager in NRR would serve as the IRG Leader and XXXXXXXX the -
XXXXXXXX was assigned to advise the IRG. The IRG also included four - senior NRC staff members with expertise in areas such as inspections, - licensing and human resources.
None of the members of the IRG had been previously involved in - licensing activities at Millstone or with prior evaluations of safety - concerns or allegations (Exhibit 3).
XXXXXXXX at the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station, assisted the IRG - in the identification of case studies for evaluation. XXXXXXXX - reviewed the NRC Headquarters and Region I allegation files, and - identified approximately 30 cases which met the IRG-89s criteria for - case study. The IRG reviewed the 30 cases identified by XXXXXXXX - and selected nine of these cases for in-depth study (Exhibit 4 at -
3-5).
I FINDINGS The OIG investigation determined that XXXXXXXX improperly released - names of allegers to NU without first obtaining permission from the - individuals to do so. As part of its evaluation, the IRG selected - nine former whistleblowers to interview in order to obtain specific - information about how the NRC and NU handled their concerns and - allegations. However, prior to contacting these individuals to - ascertain their willingness to participate in the review and their - desires regarding confidentiality XXXXXXXX provided their names to -
NU. Two of the names released to NU were current NU employees who - had concerns about being associated with the IRG review, and one of - these individuals had entered into a confidentiality agreement with - the NRC. The OIG investigation determined that XXXXXXXX had no - formal training or experience in dealing with allegers.
Exhibits: '
- 1. Letter from E. HADLEY to NRC dated 2/21/96
- 2. Memorandum from J. TAYLOR to W, RUSSELL dated 12/12/95
- 3. Memorandum o W. RUSSELL dated =
12/20/95
- 4. Transcript 3/7/96
- 5. Report of Interview dated 3/15/96
- 6. Report of Interview dated 3/19/96 with attachment
- 7. Report of Interview dated 3/14/96
- 8. Report of Interview dated 3/14/96
- 9. Report of Interview dated 3/13/96
- 10. Report of Interview dated 3/15/96 lla. Transcript dated 2/27/96, with attachments 11b. Transcript 11c. Two Page Handwritten notes 12a. NRC Letter to XXXXXXXX 2/7/96, with attachments Exhibits (continued) 12b. NRC Letter to P. BLANCH dated 2/7/96, with attachment 12c. NRC Letter to dated 2/7/96, with attachment l 12d. NRC Letter o dated 2/7/96 l 12e. NRC Letter to dated 2/7/96 l 12f NRC Letter to. dated 2/7/96, with attachments l 12g. NRC Letter to dated 2/7/96 i 12h. NRC Letter to dated 2/7/96, with attachment 121. NRC Letter to, dated 2/7/96
- 13. Transcript dated 3/8/96
- 14. Report of Interview BLANCH dated 3/5/96
- 15. Report of Interview ( I dated 3/6/9
- 16. Report of Interview 96 !
- 17. Report of Interview dated 3/6/9 l
- 18. Transcript l
- 19. Report of Interview dated 3/7/96 j
- 20. Report of Interview dated 3/6/96 l
- 21. Report of Interview dated 3/19/96
- 22. Report of Interview dated 3/5/96
- 23. Transcript
l
- 24. NRC Management Directive 8.8, Section 0517-054, dated April 3, -
1990, " Management of Allegations"
- l PAUL:
l SLEEP WELL, FOR WE ARE FOREVER SAFE FROM THE FEARS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -
AND WASTE.
NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS: FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Jayne Brady, 202/586-5806 December 20, 1996 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TO SUBMIT LEGISLATION FOR EXTERNAL REGULATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY The Department of Energy (DOE) will submit legislation to transfer oversight of nuclear safety to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Secretary of Energy Hazel R. O' Leary announced today. The transfer will be phased in over a ten -year period according to-recommendations made to the Secretary by The DOE Working Group on External Regulation. O' Leary tasked the working group with determining the details on how to implement the transition from self regulation to external regulation of nuclear facilities and by what agency.
Earlier this year an independent committee, The Advisory Committee on External Regulation of Department of Energy Nuclear Safety, recommended that all aspects of safety at DOE nuclear facilities should be externally regulated by an existing agency.
"This decision moves the department a step closer to fulfilling the commitment made in the Strategic Plan to no longer regulate itself in the area of nuclear safety,"
said Secretary O' Leary. " Independent safety regulation will provide a safer and healthier environment for our workers throughout the complex and the public around our i sites." i A report issued by the working group carrowed eight I implementation options down to two. The option chosen by O' Leary, establishes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as the regulator of DOE nuclear facilities over a ten-year period and phases out the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Within the first five years of the transition, all Nuclear Energy and Energy Research facilities will be transferred to external regulation by the NRC or by the states. All Environmental Management nuclear facilities will be regulated by the NRC before the end of ten years. Defense Programs facilities would change to regulation by the NRC at the end of ten years.
i Until they change to NRC regulation, Defense Programs and Environmental Management nuclear facilities would continue to be regulated by the department with oversight by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
After 10 years all DOE facilities would be regulated by the NRC. Transition will start immediately after enabling legislation is passed.
"The working group has provided the department with a well organized transition plan that needs to be closely coordinated with the commission and the board so that we advance and do not impede the protection of safety, health and the environment," said O' Leary. "Outside regulation will lead to a" safety culture" comparable to what exists in commercial industry."
Under the Working Group plan, the Environmental Protection Agency and the states with authorized programs would continue with current roles and responsibilities regulating environmental issues at DOE nuclear facilities. The department estimates the cost of external regulation will be about $135 million annually when NRC regulation is fully implemented. However, J i
overall safety and health rosts for DOE nuclear l facilities are still expected to be significantly less than current costs due to a decrease in the number of nuclear facilities over the transition period.
Productivity improvements resulting from more stable ;
regulations and focused compliance activities are expected to further offset any added cost.
-DOE-R-96-182 l
l Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 !
l
l 1
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz),TWD1.TWP4(gam)
Date: 12/29/96 4:44pm
Subject:
News I'm back and here is the delayed news.
Subject:
l
- NEWS Etc. -Reply l Date
l Mon,23 Dec 199610:09:37-0500 From:
James Lieberman <JXL@nrc. gov >
To:
PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com I will be out of the office on leave until December 30,1996. If a = copy of my mail has not been sent to Mark Satorius (MAS) or Betty Summers (BTS), please = do so. If an urgent matter is involved , please call Mark Satorius.
Mail: P.O. Box 3393, Mission =
Viejo, CA 92692 Phone #: 714-768-0585 FAX: 714458-6455 l E-Mail: millsgien@msn.com i December 23,1996 Inspector General .
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C 20555-0001 l Reference 1: Letter dated December 13,1996, from L.J. Callan of the =
NRC to Glen R. Mills, Re: SONGS Spent Fuel Pool Leaks Dear Sir.
Prior to and after leaving SONGS (San Onofre Nuclear Generating =
Station) I had written the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) asking why they had = failed to discipline SONGS for failure to monitor the Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool =
(SFP) leak from 1981 to 1986. By failing to monitor the SFP leak for = approximately 5 years, the leak detection system over flowed resulting in local = contamination of the area outside the pool and may have resulted in an under ground radioactive plume moving toward the beach.
The poolis only about 200 = feet from a public beach and contains about 4 Plutonium assemblies in = addition to the normal assemblies. By means of Reference 1 i finally received l a = response from the NRC which gave the reasons for not taking disciplinary = action against l SONGS for negligence which has the potential for threatening public = health and safety.
I
If one reads Reference 1, it states that disciplinary action is not - taken against a utility for negligence provided there are no procedural -
requirements for monitoring the SFP for leakage, provided there are no regulatory requirements for monitoring the SFP for leakage and provided the FSAR = in effect at the time does not include a detailed description of the leak detection system and does not include requirements for monitoring for -
SFP leaks. In another words it is OK to threaten public health and safety - if the NRC hasn-B9t gotten around to issuing the specific requirements. Both - the utility and the NRC are negligent for failure to monitor the SFP leak - for 5 years with the resultant overflow of contaminated liquid into the -
environment outside the pool.
The NRC licensed approximately 110 nuclear plants knowing there was = no known technically feasible economic way to store and reprocess spent - nuclear fuel.
The hydrogen explosion which occurred at Point Beach Nuclear Plant in 4 Wisconsin while loading spent fuel in a cask for dry storage shows - that the NRC doesn-B9t understand the monster they created. Both the NRC and - the nuclear utilities must engage in continual deception to make the public -
believe there is no reason for concern.
One can only wonder what other events (critical to public health and - safety) have happened or are taking place now which are exempt have - disciplinary action because the NRC hasn-89t gotten around to writing the - regulatory requirements, procedures and FSAR material. We will never know since = both the utility and the NRC have a history of making it difficult to obtain information.
As the person overseeing the NRC, it is requested that you institute corrective action now to rectify the current negligence on the part - of the NRC. Obviously the NRC is looking out for itself first, the nuclear = utility second and the public last.
Sincerely, I
CC: Shirley Jackson l December 28, 1996 Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairwoman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 RE: GOVERN 0R ANGUS KING / MAINE YANKEE
Dear Dr. Jackson:
4 Governor Angus King has misled the media and the public by repeatedly - making
i l
i false statements as to the recent Independent Safety - I Assessment (ISA) of Maine Yankee. Announcing the inspection, Governor - i j King described it, and the media reported it, as a " nuts and bolts - review
)
from top to bottom" which would thoroughly review every system - at the plant to " cover all the bases." This falsely reassured Maine - residents and has led
- to alarm at the growing list of new problems - being identified at the plant.
David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists was the first to =
publicly dispel this myth by pointing out that the ISA only reviewed =
4 of 40 systems at Maine Yankee -- with 3,200 deficiencies noted. -
Immediately following a briefing by ISA team leaders Edward Jordan - and Ellis
! Merschoff, Governor King went on television declaring the = plant was safe and that it had just undergone the most comprehensive - inspection ever performed 2
on any nuclear power plant in the world.
l Those of us following the issue knew this inspection didn't even come - close i
to the U.S. inspection of Millstone, which covered 39 systems. -
The question arose, why is the Governor making these false - statements? Is he misinformed by his staff or the NRC?
Recently it came to my attention that the NRC fully briefed Governor =
King on the ISA inspection from the start -- informing him it would - target 4 key systems. At no time was he told this review would cover - all 40 systems or that it would be the most comprehensive inspection = ever done on any nuclear power plant in the world.
l Is it correct that the NRC fully informed Governor King that the ISA - would cover only 4 key systems -- not all -- at Maine Yankee and at - no time led him to believe this to be the most comprehensive review - conducted on any nuclear power plant in the world?
Thank you for your time, Dr. Jackson.
Sincerely, Box 88 Peaks Island, ME 04108 December 30, 1996 Hon. Shirley Jackson Chairwoman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmi:,sion Washington, D.C. 205550-0001
Dear Madame Chairwoman:
I am writing in reference to Maine Yankee where, during the past - twelve months, numerous noncomplying conditions have come to light. -
Some such conditions have existed for a long time and/or resulted in - plant shutdowns pending completion of corrective actions.
At present, neither the NRC nor the Maine Yankee licensee have been - willing or able to certify that the Maine Yankee plant is in - substantial compliance with NRC regulations; instead, the NRC employs - a rationalization that the
public safety is protected because the NRC = staff concluded that "....
overall performance at Maine Yankee was - adequate for operation."
In a December 13, 1996 letter to you I expressed my opinion that the -
Comission was allowing Maine Yankee to operate on the basis of a - relaxation of requirements imposed by the Atomic Energy Act. In that = letter, I referred to an August 14, 1980 memorandum sent to the -
Comission by Mr. Malsch on behalf of the General Counsel, Mr. -
Bickwit.
This memorandum addressed, among other things, the question of - whether the NRC might issue an Operating License (0L) without first - finding compliance with all applicable NRC safety regulations. The - memorandum includes the following statement: " .... Commission - adjudicatory decisions are clear that compliance with the Commission - regulations is essential to a determination of adequate protection of - the public health and safety under the Atomic Energy Act." The - memorandum refers to Section 185 of the Atomic Energy that provides - that Operating Licenses are issued "upon finding that the facility
- authorized has been constructed and will operate in conformity with -
... the rules and regulations of the Commission." (Emphasis added.)
In my December 13 letter I noted that while Mr. Malsch's memorandum -
addresses the question of the need to make a finding of compliance - prior to 0L issuance, such a finding implies that plant must comply - with regulations following OL issuance. I also said previously that, - if the Commission believes that licensed reactors may operate on the - basis of satisfying a reduced safety standard (e.g. "overall - performance is adequate for operation" notwithstanding the plant not - being in a state of substantial ,
compliance with regulations), I - believe the Commission has an obligation to i make a public statement - of this fact, along with a legal rationale as to why Mr. Malsch's = conclusions do not apply to reactors following OL issuance.
Finally, -
- I noted that adoption of the "overall performance is adequate for - operation" standard places the Commission on a slippery slope with - respect to the
- d1 gree of regulatory compliance that licensees are - required to achieve.
With respect to Maine Yankee's current status, there exists, as far - as I know, no public document containing a comprehensive enumeration - of specific noncomplying conditions identified at Maine Yankee during - the last 12 months. In the absence of a comprehensive listing of - noncomplying conditions, there can be no listing of regulatory - violations, root causes, corrective actions and generic implications.
How are the Commissioners able to consider the Maine Yankee matter if - they do not know the specifics of the deficiencies nor their causes, -
ramifications, and implications? It is noteworthy that the NRC staff - has failed over a period of many years to identify in a timely manner -
safety-significant deficiencies at Maine Yankee. In addition, the - failure of the NRC staff's 1996 Independent Safety Assessment (ISA) - to detect significant cable placement problems and missing valves - means that the ISA was flawed in concept and/or implementation.
Thus, the ISA did not achieve significant goals described in your -
October 7, 1996 letter to Mr. Frizzle where you stated the ISA's - purpose:
i l I
.... to determine whether Maine Yankee was in conformity - with its design and licensing bases; to assess operational safety - performance; and to evaluate Maine Yankee's self-assessment, = corrective actions, and plans for improvement."
Further questions about the NRC's performance at Maine Yankee are - raised by the facts that one former Project Manager was so lax as to - provoke severe criticism from the NRC's Inspector General and another -
Project Manager appears to have been suspended on grounds of - inappropriate l actions vis-a-vis the Maine Yankee licensee. I l
In sum, the NRC's Maine Yankee enforcement history does not provide a = basis for public confidence in the staff's oversight of this plant. = ,
If the Commission desires to be looked upon as an effective - regulator, it is 1 necessary that individual Commissioners become - sufficiently informed of the l Maine Yankee facts so that they are able - to ask the staff detailed questions l
l and to demand accurate and = complete answers. In this regard, I noted that Commissioners did not = receive complete information at the staff's October 18, 1996 = presentation.
Unless the Commission demands and receives accurate and complete -
information, the Commissioners will not be in a position to act other - than as a rubber stamp to the flawed NRC staff modus operandi that - bears much of the responsibility for the regulatory debacles at Maine =
l Yankee, Millstone and elsewhere.
Another step toward a Commission demonstration of a commitment to - confront directly the Maine Yankee situation would be to grant - requests from the public that Mr. Paul Blanch and David Lochbaum be - allowed to make presentations at the Commission's January 9, 1997 -
Maine Yankee meeting. Messers Blanch and Lochbaum are fully qualified - to translate into hard questions the kinds of concerns held by many -
Maine citizens; they are in a position to make significant - contributions to the dialogue and I urge the Commission to permit - their appearance.
Finally, I call your attention to Mr. Glen Mills' December 2,1996 - letter to you (attached hereto) with regard to performance of safety - systems following a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA). -
Mr. Mills' information may lead to a revelation of the reasons for - the inability of the Maine Yankee licensee to demonstrate compliance = with requirements of TMI Action Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31; such - noncompliance persists notwithstanding the April 1996 submittal of am - analysis performed using a code different from the disallowed (and - apparently discredited)
RELAP5YA.
I would hope that, at the January 9 meeting, the Commissioners will = seek a staff opinion as to the reasons for the licensee's failure to - comply with TMI Action Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31. With respect to - the SBLOCA aspect of this matter, I again note my belief that NRC - staff have not explained adequately the decision to allow Maine -
Yankee to operate without compliance with requirements of TMI Action -
Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31; the after-the-fact invocation of 10 -
CFR 50.46(a)(2) did not make sense in April 1996 and does not make - sense now.
l I will not repeat here the details of my concerns in this regard; - such details are specified in my letter of December 13, 1996. Since - this appears to be a situation in which NRC staff have used a - spurious provision of NRC regulations to help extract a licensee from - a difficult predicament, I assume the Commission has an interest in - addressing the points enumerated in my December 13 letter.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely, Henry R. Myers l
l l
Paul M. Blanch Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 1
1 1
I l
1 L
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com>
j To: WND2.WNP3(Jaz),TWD1.TWP4(gam) '
Date: 12/30/96 2:29pm
Subject:
Maineacs at war 1
1 Final version of letter to NRC follows. Sorry for sending the draft letter.
P.O. Box 88 Peaks Island, ME 04108 December 30,1996 Hon. Shiriey Jackson Chairwoman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 205550-0001
Dear Madame Chairwoman:
I am writing in reference to Maine Yankee where, during the past twelve months, numerous noncomplying conditions have come to light. Some such conditions have existed for a long time and/or resulted in plant shutdowns pending completion of corrective actions. :
At present, neither the NRC nor the Maine Yankee licensee have been willing or able to certify '
that the Maine Yankee plant is in substantial compliance with NRC regulations; instead, the NRC employs a rationalization that the public safety is protected because the NRC staff concluded that ".... overall performance at Maine Yankee was adequate for operation."
In a December 13,1996 letter to you i expressed my opinion that the Commission was ,
allowing Maine Yankee to operate on the basis of a relaxation of requirements imposed by the Atomic Energy Act. In that letter, I referred to an August 14,1980 memorandum sent to the Commission by Mr. Maisch on behalf of the General Counsel, Mr. Bickwit. This memorandum addressed, among other things, the question of whether the NRC might issue an Operating License (OL) without first finding compliance with all applicable NRC safety regulations. The memorandum includes the following statement: ".. . Commission adjudicatory decisions are clear that compliance with the Commission regulations is essential to a determination of adequate protection of the public health and safety under the Atomic Energy Act." The memorandum refers to Section 185 of the Atomic Energy Act that provides that Operating Licenses are issued "upon finding that the facility authorized has been constructed and will operate in conformity with
... the rules and regulations of the Commission."(Emphasis added.)
In my December 13 letter i noted that while Mr. Malsch's memorandum addresses the question of the need to make a finding of compliance prior to Operating License issuance, such a finding implies that plant must comply with regulations following OL issuance. I also said previously that, if the Commission believes that licensed reactors may ,
operate on the basis of satisfying a reduced safety standard (e.g. "overall performance is adequate for operation" notwithstanding the plant not being in a state of substantial compliance with regulations), I believe the Commission has an obligation to make a public statement of this fact, along with a legal rationale as to why Mr. Malsch's conclusions do not apply to reactors following OL issuance. Finally, I noted that adoption of the "overall performance is adequate for operation" standard places the Commission on a slippery
slope with respect to the deg ae of regulatory compliance that licensees are required to l achieve. Where on this slope is the " point of acceptable safety" to be placed, who is to place it, and on what basis?
't With respect to Maine Yankee's current status, there exists, as far as I know, no public
- document containing a comprehensive enumeration of specific noncomplying conditions identified at Maine Yankee during the last 12 months.
In the absence of a comprehensive listing of noncomplying conditions, there can be no listing of regulatory violations, root causes, corrective actions and generic implications. How are the Commissioners able to consider the Maine Yankee matter if they do not know the specifics of the deficiencies nor their causes, ramifications, and implications?
4
- it is noteworthy that the NRC staff has failed over a period of many years to identify in a J
timely manner safety-significant deficiencies at Maine Yankee. In addition, the failure of the i NRC staff's 1996 Independent Safety Assessment (ISA) to detect significant cable placement problems and missing valves means that the ISA was flawed in concept and/or implementation. Thus, the ISA did not achieve significant goals described in your October 7,1996 letter to Mr.
Frizzle where you stated the ISA's purpose: " ... to determine whether Maine Yankee was in conformity with its design and licensing bases; to assess operational safety performance; and to evaluate Maine Yankee's self-assessment, corrective actions, and plans
. for improvement." Further questions about the NRC's performance at Maine Yankee are raised by the facts that one former Project Manager was so tax as to provoke severe criticism from the NRC's inspector General and another Project Manager appears to have been suspended on grounds of inappropriate actions vis-a-vis the Maine Yankee licensee.
In sum, the NRC's Maine Yankee enforcement history does not provide a basis for public t
confidence in the staff's oversight of this plant. If the Commission desires to be looked upon as an effective regulator, it is necessary that individual Commissioners become sufficiently informed of the Maine Yankee facts in order that they are able to ask the staff detailed i questions and to demand accurate and complete answers. In this regard, I noted that Commissioners did not receive complete information at the staff's October 18,1996 presentation to the Commission. Unless the Commission demands and receives accurate and complete information, the Commissioners will not be in a position to act other than as a rubber stamp in relation to the flawed NRC staff modus operandi that bears much of the responsibility
- for the regulatory debacles at Maine Yankee, Millstone and elsewhere.
I Another step toward a Commission demonstration of a commitment to confront directly 4
the Maine Yankee situation would be to grant requests from the public that Mr. Paul Blanch i and David Lochbaum be allowed to make presentations at the Commission's January 9,1997 Maine Yankee meeting. Messers Blanch and Lochbaum are fully qualified to translate into hard questions the kinds of concems held by many Maine citizens; they are in a position to make significant contributions to the dialogue and I urge the Commission to permit their appearance.
Finally, I call your attention to Mr. Glen Mills' December 2, 1996 letter to you (attached hereto) with regard to performance of safety systems following a
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA). Mr. Mills'information may lead to a revelation of the reasons for the inability of the Maine Yankee licensee to demonstrate compliance with requirements of TMl Action items ll.K.3.30 and ll.K.3.31; such noncompliance persists notwithstanding the April 1996 submittal of an analysis performed using a code different from the disallowed (and apparently discredited) RELAP5YA.
I would hope that, at the January 9 meeting, the Commissioners will seek a staff opinion as to the reasons for the licensee's failure to comply with TMI Action items ll.K.3.30 and ll.K.3.31.
With respect to the SBLOCA aspect of this matter, I again note my belief that NRC staff have not explained adequately the decision to allow Maine Yankee to operat'e without compliance with requirements of TMI Action items ll.K.3.30 and ll.K.3.31; the after-the-fact invocation of 10 CFR 50.46(a)(2) did not make sense in April 1996 and does not make sense now. I will not repeat here the details of my concems in this regard; such details are specified in my letter of December 13,1996. Since this appears to be a situation in which NRC staff have used a specious provision of NRC regulations to help extract a licensee from a difficult predicament, I assume the Commission has an interest in addressing the points enumerated in my December 13 letter.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely, Henry R. Myers c: Commissioner Kenneth Rogers Commissioner Greta Dieus Commissioner Nils Diaz Commissioner Edward McGaffigan FRIENDS of the COAST OPPOSING NUCLEAR POLLUTION POST OFFICE BOX 98, EDGECOMB, MAINE 04556 207- 882 - 6000 FAX 207- 563 - 6302 December 26,1996 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Shirley A. Jackson Mail Stop O-16 G15 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738
Dear Chairman Jackson,
We received notice from NRC by copy-letter dated, December 12,1996 that "
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company has been scheduled to participate in a Commission meeting scheduled at headquarters for January 9,1997. The purpose of this i participation, according to the letter, signed by James M.
Taylor, is to brief the Commission on the licensee's response to the recently completed NRC l Independent Safety Assessment ( ISA). ,
l We ask that Friends of the Coast- Opposing Nuclear Pollution also be allowed time to '
i make a brief presentation, of approximately thirty minutes, to the Commission at this meeting.
I Our purpose would be to provide an informed citizen response to the ISA process and report.
Friends of the Coast is a non-profit education and advocacy organization incorporated in the State of Maine.
The large majonty of our four hundred-plus members reside within a ten-mile radius of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (
MYAPS) and, therefore, have a vested interest and standing in matters regarding nuclear safety at this facility.
We are proud to say that many of our members have educated themselves regarding MYAPS and have taken active roles on questions of regulatory interest. In mid-1995, Friends of the Coast had, based on public documents, plant history, and the collected anecdotal accounts of plant workers, publicly identified basic problems at MYAPS as resulting from an unwillingness on the part of owners to commit sufficient funds to stay ahead of safety-related !
issues. These observations were later echoed by the !
" root-cause" analysis of MY's Cultural Assessment Team report, and more directly, a year 1 later, by the ISA.
At an October 18 Commission briefing, ISA team members correctly characterized public comments at the ISA Exit meeting, held in Wiscasset, Maine on October 10, as largely rhetorical and broadly eclectic. We believe a shortage of informed dialogue was the result of a faulted process; one in which the interested public had little or no access to the ISAT Report until just a few hours before the meeting and therefore no time to prepare substantive questions.
We were also deeply concemed that the ISA results had become politicized by bombastic statements from our Govemors office regarding the depth, scope, and conclusions of the ISA Report before the public and the media had an opportunity to assay its contents.
There were no corrective or qualifying statements from the ISA team or NRC.
FRIENDS of the COAST / SHIRLEY A. JACKSON December 26,1996 The Govemors select citizen's panel made no public statement, published no findings and in no way engaged the media or their fellow Maine citizens to inform them on any aspects of the ISA.* Friends of the Coast, therefore, immediately announced a citizen's review of the ISA to be publicly discussed on November 19th and invited input from allinterested parties.
__ _. ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . ~ . _ _ __ __ ___ .
t Confirming NRC's stated policy of Responsiveness to the Public, we made it a point to invite representation at the November 19 meeting from NRC Jomrnissioners and Staff. The staff did send an observer from Region I who was, however, uninformed on ISA issues and declined to actually participate.
We were gratified to have present staff representatives of each member of Maine's Congressional delegation . This gesture of Congressional interest has stimulated ongoing and productive dialogue between our organization and our Congressional offices which we believe will ultimately lead to our participason in relevant oversight hearings.
However we remain concerned with what appears to be a hasty and lockstep ISA process, response, and resolution. We believe a key elements are missing in assessing and responding to safety questions at MYAPS; arnong them, significant and meaningful public l input. We believe that given but a brief window on the commission's January 9 agenda, Friends of the Coast can make that constructive contribution.
This letter is forwarded by electronic facsimile and by mail. The mailed copy is
- accompanied by an attached copy of , " Written Comments - A Citizen Review of the 1996 Independent Safety Assessment of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station", a compilation by Friends of the Coast which we hope you will find stimulating and informative.
i 4
Thank you for your kind attention.
l Anne D. Burt Corresponding Secretary 207- 882 - 6848 i
)
i CC. List Attached:
Raymond Shadis
-t
i information Coordinator l
207- 882 - 7801
- This statement remains true as of the date of this letter. As of the beginning of December, at least one panel member admitted not having read the ISAT report. Inclusion of a 1
' dummy' panel and exclusion of informed and interested citizens is damaging, wo believe, to the credibility of the State of Maine and the NRC. This may be, in part, remedied by the inclusion of Friends of the Coast and other interested voices in the January 9 Commission meeting.
FRIENDS of the COAST / SHIRLEY A. JACKSON December 26,1996 COPIES:
NRC Commissioners Kenneth C. Rogers, Greta J. Dicus, Nils J. Diaz, Edward McGaffigan, Jr. :
Cliff Garvey, Office of Senator-elect Susan Collins Mark Sullivan, Office of Representative-elect Tom Allen Darrell Fort, Office of Representative John Baldacci John Cummings, Office of Senator Olympia Snowe Jeff Duncan, Office of Representative Edward J. Markey Stephen Ward, Maine Public Advocate's Office Jeffrey Pidot, Maine Attomey Generars Office )
l David Stellfox, inside NRC, Nucleonics Week, McGraw-Hill Scott Allen, Boston Globe Ross Kerber, Wall Street Joumal Agis Salpukas, New York Times Michael Remez, Hartford Courant Susan Rayfield, Portland Press Herald, Maine Sunday Telegram Maine Local and Broadcast Media
From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz)
Date: 12/31/9612:04pm :
Subject:
More Maine Yankee ,
Maine Yankee says more info on nuke this i wk l
Source: Reuters l NEW YORK, Reuters via individual Inc. : Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co said <
l Monday it would provide more information later this week about the outage of ,
l its 910 megawatt (MW) nuclear generating station in Wiscasset, Maine.
"More information will be available later this week about how long Maine Yankee will be off line," the company said in a statement. l The Maine Yankee nuclear plant was shut December 6 to evaluate electrical cable systems after discovering that two cables serving the reactor protective -
system were routed improperly.
Maine Yankee and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have separately begun l review of the cable separation issues. The process willlikely continue into January.
In the meantime, Maine Yankee said it will conduct a test of circuitry that activates that plant's diesel generators as part of an industry-wide review of electricalissues.
To conduct the test, the plant will be taken from its current hot shutdown state to cold shutdown. This change lowers the temperature of the reactor core from about 500 degrees Fahrenheit to less than 210 degrees, and reduces emergency core cooling requirements, the company said.
The test concems circuitry that activates the diesel generators to supply power to the piant's emergency core cooling system, it explained.
Maine Yankee is 38 percent owned by Central Maine Power Co <CTP.N>,20 percent each by New England Electric System <NES.N> and Northeast Utilities
<NU.N>, seven percent by Bangor Hydro <BGR.N>, five percent by Maine Public Service Co < MAP.A> and 10 percent by other New England utilities.
((-New York Power Desk +1212 8591622))
[12-30-96 at 15:46 EST, Copyright 1996, Reuters America Inc.)
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- From
- PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH@ix.netcom.com> i 2
To: JZ <JAZWOL@aol.com>
Date: 12/31/9612:09pm
Subject:
SPENT FUEL POOL RISKS l
l John:
j Happy New Year. You may also want to think about this with respect to =
Maine Yankee.
i, 12/31/96 l John A. Zwolinski, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects-l/il Office of Nuclear Reactor i Regulation
' Washington IX;
Dear John:
I can=B9t begin to tell you how disappointed I was with the = performance of Wayne Lanning
- and Jacque Durr at the public NRC = meeting on December 17,1996. They still treat the general public as = though it reports to the NRC and the NRC is never wrong.
l During a NRC public meeting earlier this year, the public was led to = believe that the NRC had committed to provide a plant specific = analysis related to the risk of a loss of inventory of spent fuel = pool water at the Millstone plants.
4 i
At subsequent NRC meeting, Mr. Wayne Lanning publicly stated that the = consequences of this event are three times more severe then = previously analyzed (NUREG 1353) however, refused to provide anything = in writing, stating it would be a waste of taxpayers dollars. If Mr.
=
Lanning is billing his time at the rate of $250,000 per year to us, = we have the right to demand truthful and accurate answers. The public = will decide what information we want and not have !
- the NRC decide what = we should know and not know. He is well aware of the fact that the = l consequences of a loss of spent fuel pool inventory are many times = greater than what he {
j- publicly stated. I believe Mr. Lanning is = knowingly making inaccurate statements to the
! public. ;
l Not only does this previous analysis only assume one third of the = core is offloaded, but fails 4 to consider the accident occurs during = refueling, the most likely time this event would occur.
This would = result in the consequences of this high probability accident being = possibly orders of magnitude greater than previously assumed.
Mr. Lanning on December 17,1996 again repeated the NRC=B9s position = and that is there is no need to redo the analysis even though the = probabilities and consequences of this accident have increased = significantly.
What Mr. Lanning failed to mention to the public is that the sole = purpose of the study was to evaluate the cost effectiveness of spent = fuel pool modifications based on the risk to the public. If the risk = is now 100 times that previously assumed, then some type of =
I modifications may be cost justified. Further, the study did not = consider the population density l at Millstone but assumed an average = density within the United States. The additional information is that = now the NRC admits the probability of the loss of inventory of = greater than one foot is about 1 in 100 reactor years. While this = does not quantify the probability of a total loss of inventory, I am = sure this probability is orders of magnitude higher than a large =
break LOCA.
On August 21,1995, Mr. Emest Hadley submitted a 2.206 petition = requesting a detailed l independent analysis of offsite dose = consequences of the total loss of spent fuel pool water.
in the NRC = response to the petition dated December 26,1996 it stated: =B3The =
NRC=B9s actions to date in evaluating SFP accidents. . constitute a = partial grant of the Petitioners =B9 request to perform analysis of = such events.=82 Again, the NRC nas refused )
l i to provide accurate and = complete infomiation to the general public related to the potential = l risks of spent fuel pool accidents. Please direct me to an NRC = document that quantifies the l probability and the consequences of a = loss of spent pool inventory for the Millstone plants.
John, the public has the right to know the true risk of living near = these plants. It is our lives and our families placed in the paths of = these plants and for the NRC to tell us we have no right to this = information is irresponsible. For Mr. Lanning to falsely state the = risk is now three times greater than previously thought, is totally = irresponsible, intentionally misleading and inconsistent with the = mission of the NRC.
Mr. Durr added that this accident was =B3outside the design basis =B2 = due to its low probability of occurrence however has no basis for = this subjective statement. Based on a recent NRC document =
(AEOD/S96-02), the probability of this accident occurring is many = times that of a large break I LOCA and must be considered in the design = basis.
If what Mr. Durr stated is correct, then Millstone has and will = continue to operate outside its ,
design basis and this must be = reported under 50.72(b)(ii)(A)&(B). Please explain why the !
NRC has = failed to require reporting this, where by its own admission, the = plant is operating I
=B3ln an unanalyzed condition that significantly = compromises plant safety;=B2 and =B3ln a condition that is outside = the design basis of the plant;=B2 i formally request the NRC respond to these concems and those = addressed in my letter dated February 28,1995 (copy enclosed) in a = timely manner.
Sincerely, Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Rd. West Hartford CT. 06117 860-236-0326 February 28,1995 John A. Zwolinski, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects-l/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington DC 20555-0001 1
l
Subject:
Mr. Joseph Shea letter to Paul Blanch dated January 19,1995
l
Dear Mr. Zwolinski:
On January 26,1995 i requested the following information:
- "Section 5.2 of the draft safety evaluation states dose to the = population would be 8 x 10e8 j personrem assuming the accident occurred =
90 days after shutdown. Given this non-conservative assumption, = please provide exposure li information for my review assuming the event = occurs during refueling. I would like the dose i rate (onsite and = offsite) from direct and indirect shine from the exposed fuel and = also the
! calculated site boundary doses and dose rates due to the = release of short and long lived
) radioisotopes. It should be assumed = that the reactor is near the end of its 40 year life and a full core = offload is in the spent fuel pool. I also request that these = calculations receive
. Independent verification similar to design = calculations conducted by utilities."
Given this exposure data from the SER and the potential releases from = the spent fuel pool I am concerned about the long term effects of = this postulated accident and would like to clarify my previous = request. Please provide a response to the following questions.
- 1. With this event, (uncovery of the spent fuel) is the licensee = still in compliance with 10 CFR Part 100 limits. This must be = considered a credible event as discussed in Part 100.
Further, there = have been at least three precursors to this event over the past ten = years and two in the past 13 months.
- 2. What is the maximum dose and dose rate to an individual residing = at the site boundary assuming no evacuation?
- 3. What is the maximum dose and dose rate on the site?
- 4. NUREG-1353 estimates this event results in property damage in = excess of $20 i Billion. Assuming a 50 mile radius, this equates to = about $20,000 per acre. While this may 4 reflect an approximate value = of the land, does it . include homes, businesses and other personal = property? Is this a realistic assumption for an area such as that = surrounding Indian Point or Haddam Neck and are these sites bounded = by the results of this NUREG7
- 5. For a plant such as Indian Point or Haddam Neck, has the impact = upon the local rivers and water supplies for downstream population = been considered in these property damage calculations?
- 6. Does the $20 Billion assume the property is uninhabitable for a = finite period of time or does this assume the property is permanently = abandoned? The property damage from hurricane Andrew was about $30 =
Billion and was a much smaller and less populated area and did not = result in the abandonment of the land.
- 7. What is the total area effected by this event and how long is this = property contaminated before it can be retumed to unrestricted use? =
A plot of contaminated land area vs. time would be helpful to explain = the potential impact of this event. This plot would show the rate at = which contaminated land is retumed for
i unrestricted use.
Your prompt response will be appreciated.
Sincerely, Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Rd. West Hartford CT. 06117 .
l Paul M. Blanch !
Energy Consultant 135 Hyde Rd. ,
West Hartford CT 06117 Tet 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 l
l 1
l l
l From: PAUL BLANCH <PMBLANCH0ix.netcom.com>
To: WND2.WNP3(jaz)
Date: 12/31/96 12:04pm
Subject:
More Maine Yankee l
Maine Yankee says more info on nuke this wk Source: Reuters NEW YORK, Reuters via Individual Inc. : Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co said Monday it would provide more information later this week about the outage of its 910 megawatt (MW) nuclear generating station in Wiscasset, Maine.
"More information will be available later this week about how long Maine Yankee will be off line," the company said in a statement.
The Maine Yankee nuclear plant was shut December 6 to evaluate electrical cable systems after discovering that two cables serving the reactor protective l
system were routed improperly. )
Maine Yankee and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have separately begun )
review of the cable separation issues. The process will likely continue ;
into January.
In the meantime, Maine Yankee said it will conduct a test of circuitry that activates that plant's diesel generators as part of an industry-wide review of electrical issues.
To conduct the test, the plant will be taken from its current hot shutdown state to cold shutdown. This change lowers the temperature of the reactor core from about 500 degrees Fahrenheit to less than 210 degrees, and reduces emergency core cooling requirements, the company said.
The test concerns circuitry that activates the diesel generators to supply power to the plant's emergency core cooling system, it explained.
Maine Yankee is 38 percent owned by Central Maine Power Co <CTP.N>, 20 percent each by New England Electric System <NES.N> and Northeast Utilities
<NU.N>, seven percent by Bangor Hydro <BGR.N>, five percent by Maine Public Service Co < MAP.A> and 10 percent by other New England utilities.
((--New York Power Desk +1 212 859 1622)) l
[12-30-96 at 15:46 EST, Copyright 1996, Reuters America Inc.]
l
From: PAUL BLANCH <PM8LANCH91x.netcom.com> ,
To: JZ <JAZWOL9aol.com> l Date: 12/31/96 12:09pm
Subject:
SPENT FUEL POOL RISKS John:
Happy New Year. You may also want to think about this with respect to -
Maine Yankee.
12/31/96 John A. Zwolinski, Deputy-Director Division of Reactor Projects -I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington DC
Dear John:
I can-B9t begin to tell you how disappointed I was with the - performance of Wayne Lanning and Jacque Durr at the public NRC - meeting on December 17, 1996. They still treat the general public as - though it reports to the NRC and the NRC is never wrong.
During a NRC public meeting earlier this year, the public was led to - believe that the NRC had committed to provide a plant specific - analysis related to the risk of a loss of inventory of spent fuel - pool water at the Millstone plants.
At subsequent NRC meeting, Mr. Wayne Lanning publicly stated that the -
consequences of this event are three times more severe then - previously analyzed (NUREG 1353) however, refused to provide anything - in writing, stating it would be a waste of taxpayers dollars. If Mr. -
Lanning is billing his time at the rate of $250,000 per year to us, - we have the right to demand truthful and accurate answers. The public = will decide what information we want and not have the NRC decide what - we should know and not know. He is well aware of the fact that the - consequences of a loss of spent fuel pool inventory are many times - greater than what he peblicly stated. I believe Mr. Lanning is - knowingly making inaccurate statements to l the public, j Not only does this previous analysis only assume one third of the - core is offloaded, but fails to consider the accident occurs during - refueling, the most likely time this event would occur. This would - result in the consequences of this high probability accident being - possibly orders of magnitude greater than previously assumed.
Mr. Lanning on December 17, 1996 again repeated the NRC-89s position - and that is there is no need to redo the analysis even though the - probabilities :
and consequences of this accident have increased - significantly. !
What Mr. Lanning failed to mention to the public is that the sole - purpose of the study was to evaluate the cost effectiveness of spent - fuel pool modifications based on the risk to the public. If the risk - is now 100 times that previously. assumed, then some type of = modifications may be cost
i
! justified. Further, the study did not - consider the population density at ,
Millstone but assumed an average - density within the United States. The '
additional information is that - now the NRC admits the probability of the loss of inventory of - greater than one foot is about 1 in 100 reactor years.
! While this - does not quantify the probability of a total loss of inventory, I
! am - sure this probability is orders of magnitude higher than a large - break
- i. LOCA.
1 On August 21, 1995, Mr. Ernest Hadley submitted a 2.206 petition - requesting i a detailed independent analysis of offsite dose - consequences of the total i loss of spent fuel pool water. In the NRC - response to the petition dated l December 26, 1996 it stated: -B3The -
1 NRC-B9s actions to date in evaluating SFP accidents. . constitute a - partial
] grant of the Petitioners-B9 request to perform analysis of - such events.=B2 r
. Again, the NRC has refused to provide accurate and - complete information to ,
j the general public related to the potential - risks of spent fuel pool i accidents. Please direct me to an NRC = document that quantifies the j probability and the consequences of a - loss of spent pool inventory for the j Millstone plants.
j i John, the public has the right to know the true risk of living near - these plants. It is our lives and our families placed in the paths of - these plants :
I and for the NRC to tell us we have no right to this - information is !
- irresponsible. For Mr. Lanning to falsely state the - risk is now three times j greater than previously thought, is totally - irresponsible, intentionally
{ misleading and inconsistent with the - mission of the NRC.
i i Mr. Durr added that this accident was -83outside the design basis due to 1 its low probability of occurrence however has no basis for - this subjective I statement. Based on a recent NRC document -
- (AE00/S96-02), the probability of this accident occurring is many - times that j of a large break LOCA and must be considered in the design - basis.
I l
If what Mr. Durr stated is correct, then Millstone has and will = continue to
- operate outside its design basis and this must be - reported under l 50.72(b)(ii)(A)&(B). Please explain why the NRC has - failed to require i reporting this, where by its own admission, the - plant is operating -B3In an i unanalyzed condition that significantly - compromises plant safety;-B2 and
, =B3In a condition that is outside - the design basis of the plant;-82 i
i I formally request the NRC respond to these concerns and those - addressed in ;
my letter dated February 28, 1995 (copy enclosed) in a - timely manner. i Sincerely, 3
Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Rd. West Hartford CT. 06117 l- 860-236-0326 I
l February 28, 1995 ,
i i
i John A. Zwolinski, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects -I/II ,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j Washington DC 20555-0001 t
i - ,. . . - _
Subject:
Mr. Joseph Shea letter to Paul Blanch dated January 19,1995 ;
Dear Mr. Zwolinski:
On January 26, 1995 I requested the following information:
"Section 5.2 of the draft safety evaluation states dose to the - population would be 8 x 10e8 personrem assuming the accident occurred - i 90 days after shutdown. Given this non-conservative assumption, - please provide exposure information for my review assuming the event - occurs during refueling. I would like the dose rate (onsite and - offsite) from direct and indirect shine from the exposed fuel and - also the calculated site boundary
! doses and dose rates due to the - release of short and long lived i radioisotopes. It should be assumed - that the reactor is near the end of its 40 year life and a full core - offload is in the spent fuel pool. I also t request that these. -. calculations receive independent verification similar to l design - calculations conducted by utilities." ,
Given this exposure data from the SER and the potential releases from - the l spent fuel pool I am concerned about the long term effects of - this l j postulated accident and would like to clarify my previous - request. Please i provide a response to the following questions. i
! l
- 1. With this event, (uncovery of the spent fuel) is the licensee - still in j compliance with 10 CFR Part 100 limits. This must be - considered a credible '
event as discussed in Part 100. Further, there - have been at least three precursors to this event over the past ten - years and two in the past 13 months.
- 2. What is the maximum dose and dose rate to an individual residing - at the site boundary assuming no evacuation?
- 3. What is the maximum dose and dose rate on the site?
- 4. NUREG-1353 estimates this event results in property damage in - excess of $20 Billion. Assuming a 50 mile radius, this equates to - about $20,000 per acre. While this may reflect an approximate value - of the land, does it include homes, businesses and other personal - property? Is this a realistic assumption for an area such as that - surrounding Indian Point or Haddam Neck j and are these sites bounded - by the results of this NUREG7 '
- 5. For a plant such as Indian Point or Haddam Neck, has the impact - upon l the local rivers and water supplies for downstream population - been considered in these property damage calculations?
- 6. Does the $20 Billion assume the property is uninhabitable for a - finite '
period of time or does this assume the property is permanently - abandoned?
The property damage from hurricane Andrew was about $30 -
Billion and was a much smaller and less populated area and did not - result in the abandonment of the land.
- 7. What is the total area effected by this event and how long is this -
property contaminated before it can be returned to unrestricted use? -
A plot of contaminated land area vs. time would be helpful to explain - the
. . . . . - - - - .. . - . - . . . . . .__.~- ..- . - . . . - - - . --
=
l l
potential impact of this event. This plot would show the rate at - which '
contaminated land is returned for unrestricted use.
- Your prompt response will be appreciated. i
^
Sincerely, I
- l
- Paul M. Blanch 1 135 Hyde Rd. West Hartford CT. 06117 I
)
- Paul M. Blanch
, Energy Consultant i 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford CT 06117 Tel: 860-236-0326 Fax: 860-232-9350 4
3 1
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