ML20133H873
| ML20133H873 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1985 |
| From: | Mangan C NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| (55(E)85-24), (NMP2L-0506), (NMP2L-506), NUDOCS 8510180157 | |
| Download: ML20133H873 (2) | |
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,, 0 Y NIAGARA NUMOHAWK NBAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION /300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE. N Y.13202/ TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 October 2,1985 (NMP2L 0506)
Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I Division of Reactor Projects i
631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Starostecki:
Enclosed is a interim report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning acceptance of soldering installations that are rejectable.
This problem was reported via tel-con to R. A. Gramm of your, staff on July 24, 1985.
Very truly yours, C. V. Mangan Senior Vice President CVM/GG/cla (1241H) xc:
Director of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 R. A. Gramm, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 1
8510100157 851002 j
PDR ADOCK 05000410
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NIAGARA M0 HAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-410 Interim Report for a Problem Concerning Acceptance of Soldering Installations That are Rejectable (55(e)85-24)
Description of the Probifm A surveillance inspection performed by Niagara Mohawk Quality Assurance identified unsatisfactory soldering connections that were previously accepted by Field Quality Control. A reinspection was performed by Stone & Webster Field Quality Control which confirmed the unsatisfactory conditions which were subsequently documented on inspection reports E5A20475 and ESA20703. A followup investigation determined that the inspection procedures provide adequate accept / reject criteria to allow the inspector to identify the unsatisfactory condition.
The initial acceptance of the unsatisfactory condition is attributable to a failure by one inspector to properly verify the accept / reject criteria.
The problem included soldered connections on 32 indicating lights installed in reactor water cleanup and recirculation control board panel 2 CEC *PNL602.
Analysis of Safety Implications Based on the condition that the solder connections had been final accepted by Field Quality Control, there appears to be a breakdown in the implementation of the Quality Assurance program.
The 32 indicating lights monitor the status of the containment isolation valves for the hydraulic units to the recirculation control valves.
Any failure mode of the soldered connections at the indicating lights would not prevent the valves from performing their safety function, i.e., closing on a containment isolation, because these valves are fail-safe (fail closed).
Therefore, if the subject condition had remained uncorrected, it would not have adversely effected the safety of operations of the plant.
Corrective Action All above identifled connections were reworked via Nonconformance and Dispo-sition Report 12187 and completed on July 3,1985. An evaluation of the extent of the inspection problem is continuing and a final report will be issued by January 31, 1986.
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