ML20133G479
| ML20133G479 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1985 |
| From: | Branch M, Elrod S, Luehman J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133G456 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-85-16, 50-339-85-16, NUDOCS 8508080700 | |
| Download: ML20133G479 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1985016
Text
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UNITED STATES
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-338/85-16 and 50-339/85-16
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
Richmond, VA 23261
Docket Nos.:
50-338 and 50-339
License Nos.:
Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2
Inspection Conc'ucted: June 3 - July 7, 1985
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SUMMARY
Scope: This routine inspection involved 226 inspector-hours onsite in the areas
of licensee event reports (LER), previously identified items, licensee action on
previous inspection findings, engineered safety features walkdown, operational
safety verification, monthly maintenance, monthly surveillance and inspection of
manual reactor trip circuit location.
Results: One violation was identified: multiple examples of failure to follow
procedure, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- E. W. Harrell, Station Manager
- A. L. Hogg, Jr., Quality Control (QC) Manager
G. E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager
- E. R. Smith, Assistant Station Manager ~
M. L. Bowling, Assistant Station Manager
R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations
- J. R. Harper, Superintendent, Maintenance
A. H. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics
- J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services
G. J. Paxton, Supervisor, Administrative Services
J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator
J. P. Smith, Engineering Supervisor
D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
E. C. Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor
R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor
F. T. Terminella, Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor
R. C. Sturgill, supervisor Engineering
- G. H. Flowers, Nuclear Specialist
J. H. Leberstein, Licensing Coordinator
- T. R. Maddy, Station Security Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members and office perscnnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 3,1985, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The licensee acknowledged the
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inspectors findings.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
(Closed)
Deviation 338, 339/84-27-02 Inoperable Radiation Monitor for
Service Water (SW) Discharge to the SW Reservoir.
The inspectors reviewed
the licensee's response to this deviation dated September 26, 1984, and the
supplemental response dated April 2,1985.
The inspectors have inspected
the radiation monitor and the associated pump and piping, which are now .
operating. The licensee has committed to including an inspection of the
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radiaticn monitor pump and piping in the periodic maintenance performed by
the instrumentation technicians on the radiation monitor electronics.
(Closed) Violation 338, 339/84-27-03 Failure to Take Required Grab Samples
While Discharging SW to Lake Anna With the Radiation Monitor Inoperable.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to this violation dated
September 26, 1984. Additionally, the inspectors have verified the licensee
has in place a radiation monitor status update system to keep plant manage-
ment aware of any significant problems with any of the plant radiation
monitor systems.
(Closed)
Violation 338/84-44-01
Lockout of the IB Charging Pump.
The
inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to this violation dated
March 12, 1985. As was stated in the response, the licensee did undertake a
program to reduce the number of lighted annunciator panels in the control
room. During the first few months of this program, the number cf lighted
panels was significantly reduced; however, during the last couple of months,
the number has steadily risen again.
The inspectors have re emphasized to
plant management that in order for such a program to be successful it must
be a continual effort.
.(Closed)' Violation 338, 339/85-61-04 Failure to Properly Conduct Technical
Specification (TS) Required Channel Check Surveillances.
The inspectors
reviewed the licensee's response to this violation dated March 25, 1985.
The licensee has revised the method by which the required Channel Checks are
conducted on the auxiliary shutdown panel wide range steam generator level
indicagors and the inspectors verified this by reviewing 2-PT-41.1 dated
April 23, 1985.
The periodic rescaling of the overtemperature and over-
pressure delta T indications has been included in a Performance Test.
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(Closed) Viciation 339/84-38-03 ' Inadvertent Draining of the Casing Cooling
Tank.
The inspectors verified that 2-PT-66.3 has been revised by the
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licensee as required by the response to this violation dated January 2,
1985. As stated above, the problem with lighted control board annunciators
has not been solved by the licensee but that work is continuing.
(C,losed) Violation 339/84-44-01 Failure to Inspect Service Water Piping at
the Frequency Required.
The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's
response to this violation dated March 12, 1985, and have verified that the
piping inspection frequency has beer changed to conform with the require-
ments of the applicable license condition and referenced Regulatory Guide.
4.
Unresolved Items
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An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is
required to dttermine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or
deviation.
One unresolved item was identified during this inspection and is discussed
in paragraph 13.
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5.
Plant Status
Units 1 and 2:
On June 13, 1985, at 4:35 p.m. with both units at 100 percent power, a
radiological release occurred through the boron recovery waste gas stripper
surge tank relief valves. The relief valves lifted after the stripper surge
tank filled with water, reducing it's volume while the gas compressor was
still running. The radioactive gas went from the valves into the process
vent system downstream of the filters then out the process vent.
The
release was terminated at 4:39 p.m.
with an unusual event (UE) being
declared at 5:05 p.m.
State and local authorities were informed.
The UE
was terminated at 5:24 p.m. after a detailed dose assessment indicated that
the gas release was well within TS limits,
i.e., 1.21% of the instantaneous
limit.
At 6:50 p.m. on July 4,1985, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent power,
control rod B-10 (Control Bank A, Group 1, peripheral rod, located near
Power Range Nuclear Instrument Channel N-42) dropped to the fully-inserted
position due to a blown fuse in a power supply cabinet.
A negative flux
rate reactor trip signal was received only on channel N-42, Tave decreased
about 0.5 degrees F, and reactor power decreased about 15 megawatts (MW)
thermal. Licensee personnel initiated the requirements of TS 3.1.3.1 Action
c, and at 8:31 p.m. on July 4, 1985, the rod was completely withdrawn and
declared operable.
During the course of the event, licensee personnel
discovered that the present shutdown margin calculation procedures,1 and
2-PT-10, were not well suited for the calculation of shutdown margin with a
dropped rod.
The licensee has committed to writing a dropped rod shutdown
margin calculation procedure and making it part of the Abnormal Procedures
for a dropped rod. This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (IFI)
338, 339/85-16-01.
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Units 1 and 2 operated at or near 100 percent power during the entire
inspection period.
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6.
Licensee Event Report Follow-up
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The following LERs were reviewed and closed.
The inspector verified that
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reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; corrective
r. ions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; and
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the LER forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by
asterisks, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee
had reviewed the event; corrective action had been taken; no unreviewed
safety questions were involved; and violations of regulations or TS condi-
tions had been identified.
338/85-06
Fire Suppression Water System Inoperable, Loss of Both High
Pressure Pumps.
- 339/83-77
Failure of a Fire Damper in the Safeguard Area Ventilation
System (SAVS).
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338/84-09 Rev. 1, Fire Suppression Water Supply Inoperable
- 338/83-07 High Head Safety Injection Throttle Valve Found Out-of-Alignment
- 338/84-20 Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip-Improper Procedure Sequencing
- 338/85-07 Fire Barrier Penetration Left Unsealed Without Fire Watch
(Closed) LER 339/83-77 Failure of a Fire Damper in the SAVS. This item was
discussed with licensee management, and the results of that discussion were
documented in the closure of IFI 338, 339/84-09-01 in Inspection Reports
338, 339/85-12,
(Closed) LER 338/83-07 High Head Safety Injection Throttle Valve Out-of-
Alignment. The inspectors verified that 1 and 2-PT-61.3 have been updated
to require system throttle valves be set in accordance with the system
operating procedure valve lineup.
(Closed)
Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip-Improper Procedure
Sequencing.
The inspectors reviewed 1 and 2-0P-15.1 and verified that a
caution note was added, instructing the operator to perform the Overspeed
Protection Controller test with the turbine on the turning gear or at low
rpm and with the controller in throttle valve control.
(Closed) LER 338/85-07 Fire Barrier Penetration Left Unsealed Without Fire
Watch. The inspectors have reviewed this report and the corrective action.
The penetration that was left unsealed is located in the bottom of Unit 1 B
service water pump (1-SW-P-18) breaker cubicle and, because of the location,
it is understandable why the breached penetration went undetected during
routine operations and fire protection inspections.
Because the event was
identified by the licensee it was evaluated against and found to meet the
criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C; therefore, no Notice of Violation
will be issued.
7.
Follow-up of Previously Identified Items
(Closed)
IFI 338/81-11-02 Followup of Licensee Administrative Controls of
Procedure Revisions. The licensee has in place a group of document control
procedures that outline not only the required distribution of procedure
revisions but also such detaili as proper marking and disposal of the old
copies.
(Closed) IFI 339/81-07-03 Modification of Two Motor Operated Valves (MOV) in
Accordance With Vendor Recommendations.
The recommended changes were made
under Design Change 81-S33 which das installed in May of 1981.
(Closed) IFI 339/81-12-02 Licensee .ang Term Corrective Actions for Failure
of a Volume Control Tank (VCT) Level Indicator. The licensee's actions on
this item are being tracked ander LER 338/81-42.
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(Closed)
IFI 338, 339/DRP 00-01 Station Battery Inspection. The required
inspection is documented in luspection Reports 338, 339/85-05.
(Closed) IFI 338/83-08-01 Revision of the Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance
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Procedure, Electrical Maintenance Procedure (EMP) EMP-P-EP-7. This item was
closed for Unit 2 in inspection report 339/85-01 and, since the procedure is
common to both units, this item is considered closed for Unit 1.
(Closed) IFI 338, 339/85-03-04
Required Procedure and Log Changes
Identified During Routine Safety Inspection.
The licensee reemphasized to
operations personnel the importance of ensuring breaker charging switches
are in the correct position.
Further inspections have revealed no other
such charging switch misalignments. The rescaling of the delta temperature
indications has been incorporated by the licensee into a performance test
that will be accomplished during each refueling.
The four log problems
identified in this item have been corrected by the licensee and verified by
the inspectors.
(Closed)
IFI 338, 339/84-19-02 Correction of Motor Operated Valve Operator
Torque Switch Settings.
After the initial problem was identified the
licensee checked the torque switch settings of selected valves. This check
revealed some additional problems and the licensee decided to check the
settings on all safety-related MOVs. Some additional improper settings were
discovered as well as some incorrect setting requirements in the plant
setpoint document.
Tne switches that needed resetting were reset and the
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errors in the setpoint document have been corrected.
Additionally,
retraining for station electricians has been conducted in the training
center on a Limitorque valve operator much like those actually used on plant
M0V's.
(Closed) UNR 338, 339/84-44-02 Chemical Effects on SW Piping and the Proper
Method of Pipe Procurement. In a memo dated March 25, 1985, the Superinten-
dent of Technical Services was informed by the corporate office that the
concentration of sodium hypochlorite in the SW was sufficiently low that it
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would not be a problem for the SW piping.
Discussions with Calgon (the
supplier of other SW chemical additives) about the effects of their
chemicals on SW piping are documented and state that none of the additives
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will have any adverse effects. The followup of the procurement of SW piping
will be done as part of UNR 338, 339/84-41-06.
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(Closed) IFI 338, 339/84-06-14 Clarification of North Anna Power Station
Fire Protection Plan, section 3.5.2.
The licensee has chcsen to use
administrative procedures for the control of the fire loading in particular
areas due to transient combustibles.
Any transient combustibles brought
into an area must be attended and removed when the work is not in progress
or has completed.
8.
Monthly Maintenance
Station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and
components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were
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conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and
industry codes or standards and that those activities were in conformance
with Technical Specifications.
Activities inspected during this monthly
inspection included the electrical repair of service water pump 1-SW-P-1B
under work order number (No.) 5901009234 using EMP-C-PH/PL-15, General
Trouble Shooting and Repair of Electrical Motors. During the performance of
the work, the inspectors independently verified (using North Anna Specifica-
tion 1010 as the reference) the bolt torque values used by the electricians
to make the connections in the pump breaker cubicle. Additionally, the
inspectors closely followed the mechanical cleaning of the service water
piping in accordance with Design Change 84-74 as well as reviewing for
technical
adequacy.
Mechanical
Maintenance
Procedure
(MMP)-C-SW-5,
Permanent Repair of the Service Water Spray Header Piping, and MMP-C-RC-9.1,
Flux Thimble Tubing Ferrule Replacements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Monthly Surveillance
The inspectors observed / reviewed technical specification required testing
and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate proce-
dures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions
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'for . operation (LCO) were met and that any deficiencies identified were
properly reviewed and resolved.
Some of the activities reviewed / inspected
included on June 11, 1985, observing performance of a portion of 1-PT-85,
D. C. Distribution Systems, which involved station electricians checking the
voltage and electrolyte level for the diesel fire pump 24 volt batteries.
Additionally, 1-PT-172.2, Monitoring of the Early Warning System Sirens
Activation Test, was reviewed for technical adequacy.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
ESF System Walkdowns
The following selected ESF systems were verified operable by performing a
walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the systems on June 20,
,
1985:
Unit 1
Casing Cooling (1-0P-7.10A dated 7-13-83)
Unit 2
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Casing Cooling (2-OP-7.10A dated 5-30-85)
Upon completion of the walkdowns, the inspectors had the following comments:
a.
On both units, with the chiller secured, the outlet valves (1-RS-165
and 2-RS-144, respectively) were found open. The valve lineups and the
operating procedures for the systems require that both the chiller
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inlet and outlet valves be shut when the chillers are secured.
Although these value positions do not effect system operation, the
improper valve lineup is the same type of lineup problem that was
documented concerning the Unit 1 casing cooling system in Inspection
Reports 338,339/83-13 and on the refueling water storage tank system in
Inspection Reports 338, 339/85-03.
b.
2-OP-7.10A has been revised to require a second verification of valve
positions while 1-0P-7.10A only requires single verification.
The
licensee subsequently revised 1-0P-7.10A to require a second verifica-
tion of valve positions.
Item a. is an example (item 2) of the violation for failure to follow
procedure (338, 339/85-16-02).
11.
Routine Inspection
By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that
the control room manning requirements were being met.
In addition, the
inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system
status was maintained.
The inspectors periodically questioned shift
personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions.
Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with
selected TS and LCO.
During the course of the inspection, observations relative to Protected and
Vital Area security were made, including
access controls, boundary
integrity, search, escort and badging.
On a ragular basis, radiation work permits (RWP) were reviewed and the
specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being
conducted per the RWPs.
Selected radiation protection instruments were
periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency was
veri fied.
The inspectors kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of both
units and of any significant safety matters related to plant operations.
Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the
operations staff on a regular basis.
Selected portions of operating logs
and data sheets were reviewed daily.
The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the
control
room.
Observations included: witnessing work activities in
progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and
equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings,
annuciator alarms and housekeeping.
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During a plant tour on June 25, 1985, the inspectors noted the following
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items while in the post sccident sample system sample sink area of the
auxiliary building:
One stick of bare welding wire, identified as No. 21960/308-1/16, a
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safety-related controlled welding material, was found on the floor and
was not being properly controlled per the December 4, 1984, revision of
station Administrative Control Procedure (ADM)_9.6., Control of Welding
Materials.
Plant Operating Procedure 1-0P-12.3, High Radiation Liquid Sampling
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System, completed on May 16, 1985, was still in the area when, in fact,
it should have been reviewed and filed in Station Records as required
.by the November 8, 1984, revision of station ADM 6.5.
Mechanical Danger tag No. 403180 for tag-out N1 203091 was found on the
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floor and the tag was still active and required.
.The above items are further examples (items 4, 3 and 1) of the violation for
failure to follow station procedures (338, 339/85-16-02).
During the inspection period, excessive seat leakage past both Unit 2
primary power operated relief valves (PORV) has resulted in both PORV
Limitorque block valves, MOV-2535 and MOV-2536, being shut. Additionally,
when attempts to open the block valves failed, power was removed from their
operators.
It appears the high differential pressure across the seat (ie,
2235 psig) is causing the torque switch to actuate; thereby, cutting off
power to the electric motor before the valve can open.
The inspectors
consulted the North Anna Setpoint Document and determined the setpoint are
inconsistent between valves and appear to be low when considering the high
differential pressure across the valve seat.
It should be noted that the
block valves being shut and deenergized is required by Technical Specifi-
cations whenever control of the block valves is lost.
12.
Design, Design changes and Modifications (37700)
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The inspectors reviewed Design Change Package (DCP) 84-26, Addition of
Emergency Lighting North Anna 1 and 2, and some of the work performed as
part of the design change.
After reviewing the sections of the DCP
involving the auxiliary feedwater pumphouses and inspecting the lighting as
installed, the inspectors had one concern. The note at the beginning of the
" Instruction" subsection required that all the lamp heads be installed eight
feet above finished floor (AFF) with a tolerance of plus or minus one foot.
It was clear by observation that this note had not been followed as a number
of lamp heads were mounted either below seven feet or above nine feet AFF.
When site engineering personnel were asked about this apparent problem, they
explained that eight feet was merely a recommended height and that area
walkability and readability of equipment indications were the actual
criteria against which lamp head mounting height needed to be judged.
It
appears that the height requirements specified in the design change should
have been deleted by a field change in accordance with section 3 of the
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VEPC0 Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance Manual if, in fact, they had
no technical basis and could not be adhered to due to space considerations.
During a general walkdown of the emergency lighting installed in various
areas of the plant, including the auxiliary feedwater pumphouses, the
inspectors noted that the straps that secured a number of the emergency
lighting battery packs to their mounting brackets had loose or missing
fastening nuts or washers or both.
This problem, when brought to the
licensee's attention, was quickly corrected and it appeared that such
conditions arose due to frequent battery pack relocation during installation
testing.
If frequent battery pack movement continues once the lighting is
turned over to the station, proper securing of the straps should be
addressed to ensure all seismic requirements in safety-related areas are
met. Additionally, during the walkdown the inspectors noted one battery
pack that had failed and a number of others on which the battery charge
indicator was inoperable or installed improperly.
Though the latter two
conditions do not affect battery operability, they would hinder periodic
checks to ensure operability.
The licensee determined the failed battery
pack. was probably due to a failed circuit card rather than a defective
battery and that a number of other battery packs have had circuit cards
replaced. The failed cards will be examined by the licensee to determine if
any potential generic problem exists.
The other conditions noted were
corrected prior to the completion of the inspection.
The failure to locate the emergency lights at the required eight plus or
minus one foot height as required by the DCP is another example (item 5) of
the violation for failure to follow station procedures (338, 339/85-16-02).
13.
Location of Manual Reactor Trip Circuit in Westinghouse Solid State
Protection System (SSPS). Temporary Instruction 2500/14.
As required by the inspection instruction, the inspectors verified the
actual location of the manual trip circuit in relation to the SSPS
undervoltage (UV) output transistors Q3 and Q4.
The actually installed
system is as shown on revision K to sheet 13 of Westinghouse drawing 108H41
with the manual reactor trip circuit downstream of output transistors Q3 and
Q4.
Additionally, the inspectors requested that the Westinghouse site
representative verify, through record review and field inspection, that
documentation exists to support the actual installation.
The Westinghouse
review revealed that the system was modified on July 18, 1977, and April 18,
1978, by field changes VRA/FCN-10609 and VRA/FCN-10593 for Units 1 and 2,
respectively.
The inspectors also verified that the SSPS technical manual has been
updated, and the drawings that depict the manual reactor trip circuit were
correct at the time of inspection. However, it should be noted that current
station procedures do not require updating of vendor reference drawings
contained in technical manuals. The licensee has committed to issuing a
notice to be inserted in all technical manuals stating that drawings
contained in the manuals are for reference only and that controlled station
drawings should be consulted for details. The licensee further stated that
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control of tect.aical manual drawings is still an open issue and a change to
their- current policy is under review.
The failure to include vendor
drawings. as part of technical manual update and control appears to be
inconsistent with the intent of Generic Letter 83-28 recommendations and is
considered to be Unresolved Item (338, 339/85-16-03), pending review by
NRC-Regional and Headquarters personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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