ML20133G479

Insp Repts 50-338/85-16 & 50-339/85-16 on 850603-0707. Violations Noted:Outlet Valves Open W/Chiller Secured, safety-related Controlled Welding Matl on Floor & Emergency Lights Not at Required Height

ML20133G479
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	07/19/1985
From:	Branch M, Elrod S, Luehman J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133G456	List: IR 05000603/2007007 ML20133G454 ML20133G479
References
50-338-85-16, 50-339-85-16, NUDOCS 8508080700
Download: ML20133G479 (11)

See also: IR 05000338/1985016

Text

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p reog, UNITED STATES

[ o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGloN 18

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$ j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

• 2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-338/85-16 and 50-339/85-16

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company

Richmond, VA 23261

Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NPF-7

Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2

Inspection Conc'ucted: June 3 - July 7, 1985

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SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection involved 226 inspector-hours onsite in the areas

of licensee event reports (LER), previously identified items, licensee action on

previous inspection findings, engineered safety features walkdown, operational

safety verification, monthly maintenance, monthly surveillance and inspection of

manual reactor trip circuit location.

Results: One violation was identified: multiple examples of failure to follow

procedure, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• E. W. Harrell, Station Manager

• A. L. Hogg, Jr., Quality Control (QC) Manager

G. E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager

• E. R. Smith, Assistant Station Manager ~

M. L. Bowling, Assistant Station Manager

R. O. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations

• J. R. Harper, Superintendent, Maintenance

A. H. Stafford, Superintendent, Health Physics

• J. A. Stall, Superintendent, Technical Services

G. J. Paxton, Supervisor, Administrative Services

J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator

J. P. Smith, Engineering Supervisor

D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

E. C. Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor

R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor

F. T. Terminella, Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor

R. C. Sturgill, supervisor Engineering

• G. H. Flowers, Nuclear Specialist

J. H. Leberstein, Licensing Coordinator

• T. R. Maddy, Station Security Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,

mechanics, security force members and office perscnnel.

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 3,1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The licensee acknowledged the i

inspectors findings. '

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

(Closed) Deviation 338, 339/84-27-02 Inoperable Radiation Monitor for

Service Water (SW) Discharge to the SW Reservoir. The inspectors reviewed

the licensee's response to this deviation dated September 26, 1984, and the

supplemental response dated April 2,1985. The inspectors have inspected

the radiation monitor and the associated pump and piping, which are now .

operating. The licensee has committed to including an inspection of the

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radiaticn monitor pump and piping in the periodic maintenance performed by

the instrumentation technicians on the radiation monitor electronics.

(Closed) Violation 338, 339/84-27-03 Failure to Take Required Grab Samples

While Discharging SW to Lake Anna With the Radiation Monitor Inoperable.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to this violation dated

September 26, 1984. Additionally, the inspectors have verified the licensee

has in place a radiation monitor status update system to keep plant manage-

ment aware of any significant problems with any of the plant radiation

monitor systems.

(Closed) Violation 338/84-44-01 Lockout of the IB Charging Pump. The

inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to this violation dated

March 12, 1985. As was stated in the response, the licensee did undertake a

program to reduce the number of lighted annunciator panels in the control

room. During the first few months of this program, the number cf lighted

panels was significantly reduced; however, during the last couple of months,

the number has steadily risen again. The inspectors have re emphasized to

plant management that in order for such a program to be successful it must

be a continual effort.

.(Closed)' Violation 338, 339/85-61-04 Failure to Properly Conduct Technical

Specification (TS) Required Channel Check Surveillances. The inspectors

reviewed the licensee's response to this violation dated March 25, 1985.

The licensee has revised the method by which the required Channel Checks are

conducted on the auxiliary shutdown panel wide range steam generator level

indicagors and the inspectors verified this by reviewing 2-PT-41.1 dated

April 23, 1985. The periodic rescaling of the overtemperature and over-

pressure delta T indications has been included in a Performance Test.

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(Closed) Viciation 339/84-38-03 ' Inadvertent Draining of the Casing Cooling

Tank. The inspectors verified that 2-PT-66.3 has been revised by the '

licensee as required by the response to this violation dated January 2,

1985. As stated above, the problem with lighted control board annunciators

has not been solved by the licensee but that work is continuing.

(C,losed) Violation 339/84-44-01 Failure to Inspect Service Water Piping at

the Frequency Required. The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's

response to this violation dated March 12, 1985, and have verified that the

piping inspection frequency has beer changed to conform with the require-

ments of the applicable license condition and referenced Regulatory Guide.

4. Unresolved Items .

An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is

required to dttermine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or

deviation.

One unresolved item was identified during this inspection and is discussed

in paragraph 13.

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5. Plant Status

Units 1 and 2:

On June 13, 1985, at 4:35 p.m. with both units at 100 percent power, a

radiological release occurred through the boron recovery waste gas stripper

surge tank relief valves. The relief valves lifted after the stripper surge

tank filled with water, reducing it's volume while the gas compressor was

still running. The radioactive gas went from the valves into the process

vent system downstream of the filters then out the process vent. The

release was terminated at 4:39 p.m. with an unusual event (UE) being

declared at 5:05 p.m. State and local authorities were informed. The UE

was terminated at 5:24 p.m. after a detailed dose assessment indicated that

the gas release was well within TS limits, i.e., 1.21% of the instantaneous

limit.

At 6:50 p.m. on July 4,1985, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent power,

control rod B-10 (Control Bank A, Group 1, peripheral rod, located near

Power Range Nuclear Instrument Channel N-42) dropped to the fully-inserted

position due to a blown fuse in a power supply cabinet. A negative flux

rate reactor trip signal was received only on channel N-42, Tave decreased

about 0.5 degrees F, and reactor power decreased about 15 megawatts (MW)

thermal. Licensee personnel initiated the requirements of TS 3.1.3.1 Action

c, and at 8:31 p.m. on July 4, 1985, the rod was completely withdrawn and

declared operable. During the course of the event, licensee personnel

discovered that the present shutdown margin calculation procedures,1 and

2-PT-10, were not well suited for the calculation of shutdown margin with a

dropped rod. The licensee has committed to writing a dropped rod shutdown

margin calculation procedure and making it part of the Abnormal Procedures

for a dropped rod. This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item (IFI)

338, 339/85-16-01.

l Units 1 and 2 operated at or near 100 percent power during the entire

inspection period.

l 6. Licensee Event Report Follow-up

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l The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that

reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; corrective

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r. ions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; and

I the LER forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by

asterisks, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee

had reviewed the event; corrective action had been taken; no unreviewed

safety questions were involved; and violations of regulations or TS condi-

tions had been identified.

338/85-06 Fire Suppression Water System Inoperable, Loss of Both High

Pressure Pumps.

• 339/83-77 Failure of a Fire Damper in the Safeguard Area Ventilation

System (SAVS).

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338/84-09 Rev. 1, Fire Suppression Water Supply Inoperable

• 338/83-07 High Head Safety Injection Throttle Valve Found Out-of-Alignment

• 338/84-20 Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip-Improper Procedure Sequencing

• 338/85-07 Fire Barrier Penetration Left Unsealed Without Fire Watch

(Closed) LER 339/83-77 Failure of a Fire Damper in the SAVS. This item was

discussed with licensee management, and the results of that discussion were

documented in the closure of IFI 338, 339/84-09-01 in Inspection Reports

338, 339/85-12,

(Closed) LER 338/83-07 High Head Safety Injection Throttle Valve Out-of-

Alignment. The inspectors verified that 1 and 2-PT-61.3 have been updated

to require system throttle valves be set in accordance with the system

operating procedure valve lineup.

(Closed) LER 338/84-20 Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip-Improper Procedure

Sequencing. The inspectors reviewed 1 and 2-0P-15.1 and verified that a

caution note was added, instructing the operator to perform the Overspeed

Protection Controller test with the turbine on the turning gear or at low

rpm and with the controller in throttle valve control.

(Closed) LER 338/85-07 Fire Barrier Penetration Left Unsealed Without Fire

Watch. The inspectors have reviewed this report and the corrective action.

The penetration that was left unsealed is located in the bottom of Unit 1 B

service water pump (1-SW-P-18) breaker cubicle and, because of the location,

it is understandable why the breached penetration went undetected during

routine operations and fire protection inspections. Because the event was

identified by the licensee it was evaluated against and found to meet the

criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C; therefore, no Notice of Violation

will be issued.

7. Follow-up of Previously Identified Items

(Closed) IFI 338/81-11-02 Followup of Licensee Administrative Controls of

Procedure Revisions. The licensee has in place a group of document control

procedures that outline not only the required distribution of procedure

revisions but also such detaili as proper marking and disposal of the old

copies.

(Closed) IFI 339/81-07-03 Modification of Two Motor Operated Valves (MOV) in

Accordance With Vendor Recommendations. The recommended changes were made

under Design Change 81-S33 which das installed in May of 1981.

(Closed) IFI 339/81-12-02 Licensee .ang Term Corrective Actions for Failure

of a Volume Control Tank (VCT) Level Indicator. The licensee's actions on

this item are being tracked ander LER 338/81-42.

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(Closed) IFI 338, 339/DRP 00-01 Station Battery Inspection. The required

inspection is documented in luspection Reports 338, 339/85-05.

(Closed) IFI 338/83-08-01 Revision of the Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance l

Procedure, Electrical Maintenance Procedure (EMP) EMP-P-EP-7. This item was

closed for Unit 2 in inspection report 339/85-01 and, since the procedure is

common to both units, this item is considered closed for Unit 1.

(Closed) IFI 338, 339/85-03-04 Required Procedure and Log Changes

Identified During Routine Safety Inspection. The licensee reemphasized to

operations personnel the importance of ensuring breaker charging switches

are in the correct position. Further inspections have revealed no other

such charging switch misalignments. The rescaling of the delta temperature

indications has been incorporated by the licensee into a performance test

that will be accomplished during each refueling. The four log problems

identified in this item have been corrected by the licensee and verified by

the inspectors.

(Closed) IFI 338, 339/84-19-02 Correction of Motor Operated Valve Operator

Torque Switch Settings. After the initial problem was identified the

licensee checked the torque switch settings of selected valves. This check

revealed some additional problems and the licensee decided to check the

settings on all safety-related MOVs. Some additional improper settings were

discovered as well as some incorrect setting requirements in the plant

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setpoint document. Tne switches that needed resetting were reset and the

errors in the setpoint document have been corrected. Additionally,

retraining for station electricians has been conducted in the training

center on a Limitorque valve operator much like those actually used on plant

M0V's.

(Closed) UNR 338, 339/84-44-02 Chemical Effects on SW Piping and the Proper

Method of Pipe Procurement. In a memo dated March 25, 1985, the Superinten-

dent of Technical Services was informed by the corporate office that the

, concentration of sodium hypochlorite in the SW was sufficiently low that it

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would not be a problem for the SW piping. Discussions with Calgon (the

supplier of other SW chemical additives) about the effects of their

chemicals on SW piping are documented and state that none of the additives

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will have any adverse effects. The followup of the procurement of SW piping

will be done as part of UNR 338, 339/84-41-06.

! (Closed) IFI 338, 339/84-06-14 Clarification of North Anna Power Station

Fire Protection Plan, section 3.5.2. The licensee has chcsen to use

administrative procedures for the control of the fire loading in particular

areas due to transient combustibles. Any transient combustibles brought

into an area must be attended and removed when the work is not in progress

or has completed.

8. Monthly Maintenance

Station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and

components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that the activities were

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conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and

industry codes or standards and that those activities were in conformance

with Technical Specifications. Activities inspected during this monthly

inspection included the electrical repair of service water pump 1-SW-P-1B

under work order number (No.) 5901009234 using EMP-C-PH/PL-15, General

Trouble Shooting and Repair of Electrical Motors. During the performance of

the work, the inspectors independently verified (using North Anna Specifica-

tion 1010 as the reference) the bolt torque values used by the electricians

to make the connections in the pump breaker cubicle. Additionally, the

inspectors closely followed the mechanical cleaning of the service water

piping in accordance with Design Change 84-74 as well as reviewing for

technical adequacy. Mechanical Maintenance Procedure (MMP)-C-SW-5,

Permanent Repair of the Service Water Spray Header Piping, and MMP-C-RC-9.1,

Flux Thimble Tubing Ferrule Replacements.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Monthly Surveillance

The inspectors observed / reviewed technical specification required testing

and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate proce- .

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dures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions

'for . operation (LCO) were met and that any deficiencies identified were

properly reviewed and resolved. Some of the activities reviewed / inspected

included on June 11, 1985, observing performance of a portion of 1-PT-85,

D. C. Distribution Systems, which involved station electricians checking the

voltage and electrolyte level for the diesel fire pump 24 volt batteries.

Additionally, 1-PT-172.2, Monitoring of the Early Warning System Sirens

Activation Test, was reviewed for technical adequacy.

No violations or deviations were identified. '

10. ESF System Walkdowns

The following selected ESF systems were verified operable by performing a

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walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the systems on June 20,

1985:

Unit 1

Casing Cooling (1-0P-7.10A dated 7-13-83)

Unit 2 .

Casing Cooling (2-OP-7.10A dated 5-30-85)

Upon completion of the walkdowns, the inspectors had the following comments:

a. On both units, with the chiller secured, the outlet valves (1-RS-165

and 2-RS-144, respectively) were found open. The valve lineups and the

operating procedures for the systems require that both the chiller

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inlet and outlet valves be shut when the chillers are secured.

Although these value positions do not effect system operation, the

improper valve lineup is the same type of lineup problem that was

documented concerning the Unit 1 casing cooling system in Inspection

Reports 338,339/83-13 and on the refueling water storage tank system in

Inspection Reports 338, 339/85-03.

b. 2-OP-7.10A has been revised to require a second verification of valve

positions while 1-0P-7.10A only requires single verification. The

licensee subsequently revised 1-0P-7.10A to require a second verifica-

tion of valve positions.

Item a. is an example (item 2) of the violation for failure to follow

procedure (338, 339/85-16-02).

11. Routine Inspection

By observations during the inspection period, the inspectors verified that

the control room manning requirements were being met. In addition, the

inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system

status was maintained. The inspectors periodically questioned shift

personnel relative to their awareness of plant conditions.

Through log review and plant tours, the inspectors verified compliance with

selected TS and LCO.

During the course of the inspection, observations relative to Protected and

Vital Area security were made, including access controls, boundary

integrity, search, escort and badging.

On a ragular basis, radiation work permits (RWP) were reviewed and the

specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being

conducted per the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were

periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency was

veri fied.

The inspectors kept informed, on a daily basis, of overall status of both

units and of any significant safety matters related to plant operations.

Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the

operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of operating logs

and data sheets were reviewed daily.

The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the

control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in

progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and

equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings,

annuciator alarms and housekeeping.

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During a plant tour on June 25, 1985, the inspectors noted the following l

items while in the post sccident sample system sample sink area of the

auxiliary building:

. One stick of bare welding wire, identified as No. 21960/308-1/16, a

safety-related controlled welding material, was found on the floor and

was not being properly controlled per the December 4, 1984, revision of

station Administrative Control Procedure (ADM)_9.6., Control of Welding

Materials.

. Plant Operating Procedure 1-0P-12.3, High Radiation Liquid Sampling

System, completed on May 16, 1985, was still in the area when, in fact,

it should have been reviewed and filed in Station Records as required

.by the November 8, 1984, revision of station ADM 6.5.

. Mechanical Danger tag No. 403180 for tag-out N1 203091 was found on the

floor and the tag was still active and required.

.The above items are further examples (items 4, 3 and 1) of the violation for

failure to follow station procedures (338, 339/85-16-02).

During the inspection period, excessive seat leakage past both Unit 2

primary power operated relief valves (PORV) has resulted in both PORV

Limitorque block valves, MOV-2535 and MOV-2536, being shut. Additionally,

when attempts to open the block valves failed, power was removed from their

operators. It appears the high differential pressure across the seat (ie,

2235 psig) is causing the torque switch to actuate; thereby, cutting off

power to the electric motor before the valve can open. The inspectors

consulted the North Anna Setpoint Document and determined the setpoint are

inconsistent between valves and appear to be low when considering the high

differential pressure across the valve seat. It should be noted that the

block valves being shut and deenergized is required by Technical Specifi-

cations whenever control of the block valves is lost.

12. Design, Design changes and Modifications (37700) \

The inspectors reviewed Design Change Package (DCP) 84-26, Addition of

Emergency Lighting North Anna 1 and 2, and some of the work performed as

part of the design change. After reviewing the sections of the DCP

involving the auxiliary feedwater pumphouses and inspecting the lighting as

installed, the inspectors had one concern. The note at the beginning of the

" Instruction" subsection required that all the lamp heads be installed eight

feet above finished floor (AFF) with a tolerance of plus or minus one foot.

It was clear by observation that this note had not been followed as a number

of lamp heads were mounted either below seven feet or above nine feet AFF.

When site engineering personnel were asked about this apparent problem, they

explained that eight feet was merely a recommended height and that area

walkability and readability of equipment indications were the actual

criteria against which lamp head mounting height needed to be judged. It

appears that the height requirements specified in the design change should

have been deleted by a field change in accordance with section 3 of the

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VEPC0 Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance Manual if, in fact, they had

no technical basis and could not be adhered to due to space considerations.

During a general walkdown of the emergency lighting installed in various

areas of the plant, including the auxiliary feedwater pumphouses, the

inspectors noted that the straps that secured a number of the emergency

lighting battery packs to their mounting brackets had loose or missing

fastening nuts or washers or both. This problem, when brought to the

licensee's attention, was quickly corrected and it appeared that such

conditions arose due to frequent battery pack relocation during installation

testing. If frequent battery pack movement continues once the lighting is

turned over to the station, proper securing of the straps should be

addressed to ensure all seismic requirements in safety-related areas are

met. Additionally, during the walkdown the inspectors noted one battery

pack that had failed and a number of others on which the battery charge

indicator was inoperable or installed improperly. Though the latter two

conditions do not affect battery operability, they would hinder periodic

checks to ensure operability. The licensee determined the failed battery

pack. was probably due to a failed circuit card rather than a defective

battery and that a number of other battery packs have had circuit cards

replaced. The failed cards will be examined by the licensee to determine if

any potential generic problem exists. The other conditions noted were

corrected prior to the completion of the inspection.

The failure to locate the emergency lights at the required eight plus or

minus one foot height as required by the DCP is another example (item 5) of

the violation for failure to follow station procedures (338, 339/85-16-02).

13. Location of Manual Reactor Trip Circuit in Westinghouse Solid State

Protection System (SSPS). Temporary Instruction 2500/14.

As required by the inspection instruction, the inspectors verified the

actual location of the manual trip circuit in relation to the SSPS

undervoltage (UV) output transistors Q3 and Q4. The actually installed

system is as shown on revision K to sheet 13 of Westinghouse drawing 108H41

with the manual reactor trip circuit downstream of output transistors Q3 and

Q4. Additionally, the inspectors requested that the Westinghouse site

representative verify, through record review and field inspection, that

documentation exists to support the actual installation. The Westinghouse

review revealed that the system was modified on July 18, 1977, and April 18,

1978, by field changes VRA/FCN-10609 and VRA/FCN-10593 for Units 1 and 2,

respectively.

The inspectors also verified that the SSPS technical manual has been

updated, and the drawings that depict the manual reactor trip circuit were

correct at the time of inspection. However, it should be noted that current

station procedures do not require updating of vendor reference drawings

contained in technical manuals. The licensee has committed to issuing a

notice to be inserted in all technical manuals stating that drawings

contained in the manuals are for reference only and that controlled station

drawings should be consulted for details. The licensee further stated that

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control of tect.aical manual drawings is still an open issue and a change to

their- current policy is under review. The failure to include vendor

drawings. as part of technical manual update and control appears to be

inconsistent with the intent of Generic Letter 83-28 recommendations and is

considered to be Unresolved Item (338, 339/85-16-03), pending review by

NRC-Regional and Headquarters personnel.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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