:on 961212,liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Monitor Was Not Set Per Requirements of Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Review of Present Liquid Radwaste Discharge Sys Lineup Will Be Conducted to Determine Configuration| ML20133G439 |
| Person / Time |
|---|
| Site: |
Millstone  |
|---|
| Issue date: |
01/10/1997 |
|---|
| From: |
Robert Walpole NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
|---|
| To: |
|
|---|
| Shared Package |
|---|
| ML20133G424 |
List: |
|---|
| References |
|---|
| LER-96-065, LER-96-65, NUDOCS 9701160046 |
| Download: ML20133G439 (4) |
|
text
i
~
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95)
EXPtRES 04/30/98 EO A'1 0 C LECTION RO ST 60 RS E
TED NS nM"'?o^"44."! "^"o%Ka M!a%f" fen ^~84!:
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 15m^"u'? '"u's?""#ot"u?o%,"4o"As"s^#%"E'es" e
!?in?!b'~~fol E!.*U#!"#ETM'.%?M"8?M&' *
(See reverse for required number of digits / characters for each block)
Ft.CILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Uidi 1 05000245 1 of 4 TITLE tel Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Monitor Not Set Per Requirements of Technical Specifications EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (B)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER
' ' ' " ~ '
12 12 96 96 065^
00 01 10 97 OPEHATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE HEQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE m N
20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 000 20.2203(a)(2Hi) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
.,......,.../.................. -
20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER or en NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
I NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (mclude Area Codel Robert W. Walpole, MP1 Nuclear Licensing Manager (860)440-2191 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE To NPRDS TO NPRDs SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION g
YES NO (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
i ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On December 12, 1996, with the plant in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition, a procedure review by a System Manager discovered that the Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line monitor setpoints were not being set correctly. The
)
monitor setpoints were set using a less conservative background level. The mon: tor was declared inoperable until a proper method for obtaining the background level is determined. Technical Jpecifications requires that if the trip sstpoints are set less conservatively than the methods specified in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM),
cither release of effluents shall be suspended, the setpoints shall be changed to a proper conservative value, or the monitor shall be declared inoperable. Historically, however, releases continued with the improper setpoints; therefore, this event is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Although the trip setpoints were set higher than intended, an evaluation was conducted which determined that additional conservatism in the trip setpoint method ensured that the background changes seen were not high enough to allow discharges which exceeded 10CFR Part 20 limits; therefore, no consequences resulted from this event and the safety significance is low. The corrective actions includes a review of the present Liquid Radwaste Discharge system lineup to determine the appropriate configuration. The discharge procedure will be modified accordingly, as determined by this review, to ensure a proper background levelis accounted for whi,e discharging effluents.
9701160046 970110 PDR ADOCK 05000245 s
PDR
._ _.- _ _ _. _, _ _.... _ _ _ - ~ _ _ -. _ _ _. - _
.m
____...._m J
o eU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4-95)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3) j YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION
]
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000245 NUMBER NUMBER 2 of 4 96 065 00 1
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC form 366A) f17) l i
1.
Descriotion of Event
)
On December 12,1996 at 1110 hours0.0128 days <br />0.308 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.22355e-4 months <br />, with the plant shutdown and the reactor in the COLD SHUTDOWN i
I condition, a procedure review by a System Manager discovered that the Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line i
j monitor setpoints were not being set correctly. Specifically, use of improperly obtained background level l
reading resulted in setpoints which were less conservative than intended. Technical Specifications require l
that the trip set points for the Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line monitor be set in accordance with the ODCM, which provides a method to calculate the Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line monitor trip points. Then the ODCM j
requires that they be added to the background radiation level indicated on the monitor. This background reading is taken just prior to discharge, and the trip points are set accordingly. In the system configuration t
j prior to discharge, however, the section of monitored piping is drained, resulting in reduced detector j
shielding from external sources, and a subsequent higher background reading then during the subsequent i
discharge.
s j*
This section of piping was drained to prevent leakage past the discharge isolation valves, which had been I
identified in December of 1991. Due to the possibility of an inadvertent discharge, if the system piping upstream of the leaky valves were to become pressurized, the radwaste system valve lineup had been revised to depressurize this section of piping. The revised system lineup was not consistent with the j
system lineup shown in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); however, the change was not treated as a change in the operation of the system as defined in the UFSAR, and subsequently did not receive an adequate level of review to determine adverse effects on other plant systems nor was a 10 CFR l
50.59 safety evaluation performed. As a result of this change, the section of piping adjacent to the radiation j
monitor is drained between discharges. During discharge, the piping fills with water, and the background present during the discharge is actually lower than the background reading prior to discharge due to the j
additional shielding provided by the water.
Therefore, although the trip points are set sufficiently 4
conservative to prevent exceeding discharge limits, the trip points present during the discharge are set less conservatively than if the background value during discharge had been used. Since the monitor setpoints
[
were set using a less conservative background level, the Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line monitor was declared inoperable until a proper method for obtaining the background level is determined. Technical Specifications i
specifies that if the trip setpoints are set less conservatively than the methods specified in the ODCM, either l
l release of effluents shall be suspended, the setpoints shall be changed to a proper conservative value, or the j
monitor shall be declared inoperable. Historically, however, releases continued with the improper setpoints; l
therefore, this event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
j
11. Cause of Event
5 The cause of the event has been determined to be personnel error in that a failure to properly assess the effects of a procedure change on a plant system lineup as specified in the UFSAR, which resulted in an j
inadequate review of the effects of the change on other plant equipment.
The cause of the problem going unnoticed is attributable to the discharge evolution being a multi-discipline effort. A single organizational entity responsible for the overall effective operation of radiation monitors and j_
cognizant of the entire discharge evolution did not exist.
!s
,_m o
'U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
(4 95)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) i TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUddER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
)
l YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION i
l Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000245 NUMBER NUMBER 3 of 4 l
96 065 00 l
TEXT (11more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17}
1 111. Analysis of Event i
j Per UFSAR, section 11.5.1, the process effluent radiation monitoring system (RMS) provides a means for compliance with 10CFR20; 10CFR50 Appendix A, Genera! Design Criterias 60, 63, and 64; as well as Regulatory Guides 1.21,1.97, 4.15, and 8.8. Per UFSAR, section 11.5.1, monitoring the radiation level in i
the radioactive liquid discharge effluents, and closing the valves in the discharge line if setpoints are exceeded, is a nonsafety-related functional requirement.
The non-safety related Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Gross Radioactivity Monitor continuously monitors, measures, and records the activity level in the liquid radioactive waste discharged from the station via the liquid effluent line to the discharge canal to Long Island Sound. These liquids are combined with dilution flow that will result in concentrations less than allowable limits at the plant discharge. The radioactive waste monitor will alarm in the main control room when radiation levels reach the high setpoint. The monitor on this discharge line will also alarm in the main control room if the established Hi-Hi radiation setpoint is exceeded and close the discharge valves in the line, prior to reaching allowable release limits. The system is composed of a shielded scintillation detector positioned on a section of the process liquid piping.
In accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.A.1, the setpoints are to be determined in accordance with methods and parameters as described in the ODCM, which requires calculation of the maximum allowable discharge rate based on the dilution flow rate and a multiplier based on the actual concentration as a factor of the concentration limit for the identified isotope. The dilution flow rate which will be present during the discharge is determined by the number of circulating and service water pumps in operation. The Required Reduction Factor is based on the actual concentration obtained during grab sample as a fraction of the Maximum Permissible Concentrations (MPC) for isotopes in the grab sample. The calculated maximum discharge rate is then reduced by a factor of ten for added conservatism. The ODCM then directs the setting of the effluent line monitor trip points to be whichever is greater, a factor of two times the sampled activity or a minimum stated concentration, and then adds the background level. By discharging at the specified flow rate, these trip points would ensure that the discharge concentration is no greater than one fifth the Technical Specification limit, which is the applicable MPC specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B.
The background reading is taken prior to discharge, added to the calculated trip settings, and the monitor Hi and Hi-Hi setpoints are set accordingly. Due to several leaking valves in the Radwaste system, procedures were revised to direct the draining of discharge piping upon completion of the discharge evolution. When the piping is drained, shielding, provided by the water in the pipe, is removed from around the detector, which results in an increased background indication. During discharge, the piping fills with water which results in a reduced background level during the time the release is being monitored. Since the trip points have been determined with the higher pre discharge background reading, the trip setpoints during the j
discharge are at a level which is less conservative than that which would be determined using background during discharge.
The setpoints are determined by the Chemistry department, and are based on the sample they obtain. The Chemistry department records the background reading, prior to any involvement of the Operations department, and adds the background to the values obtained as a result of the grab sample. The Operations department obtains the setpoint values from the Chemistry department, sets the monitor trips accordingly on the monitor, and performs the actual discharge. Operations personnel have noticed that the monitor reading decreased when the discharges begin; however, the effect was known to be due to the pipe filling with water.
Since the Chemistry personnel determine the setpoints and Operations is not familiar with Chemistry's methods, the effect on the setpoints was never questioned. The Chemistry Department was
._.____..__m_.
i i
o
,U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISelON (4-951 t
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION i
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000245 NUMBER NUMBER 4 of 4 96 065 00 i
TEXT fff more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) l not aware that the background level they had utilized to calculate the setpoints would be different during the j
i discharge, and hence never suspected that their trip points were not accurate.
Since neither affected
)
department was knowledgeable of the entire evolution, the interrelationship of the setpoints, valve lineup, l
and background level was not fully realized.
a l
Although the trip setpoints were set higher than they would if a representative background level had been i
used, an evaluation was conducted which determined the conservatism in the ODCM method ensured that l
3 the background changes seen were not high enough to allow discharges which exceeded 10CFR Part 20 i
limits; therefore, no consequences resulted from this event and the safety significance is low, i
i l
IV. Corrective Action
i e
+
l A review of the present Liquid Radwaste Discharge system lineup will be conducted to determine the I
appropriate configuration. The discharge procedure will be modified accordingly, as determined by this j
)
review, to ensure a proper background level is accounted for while discharging effluents. This will be complete by March 31,1997.
t j
lt is the expectation of the Station Qualified Reviewer Program to ensure that personnel designated to screen procedure changes for the necessity of a safety evaluation have received the appropriate training.
i 1
j Recently established expectations of system managers provide individuals assigned to specific systems, who j
are responsible to communicate with other plant departments to ensure that their assigned systems, such as l,
the radiation monitors, are operated in accordance with the design basis. This role will enhance the review of j
system changes, as well as increase the level of overall system monitoring. The implementing document for this role will be approved by March 31,1997.
i V.
Additional Information
1 i
i 1
l
Similar Events
]
None 1
I j
Manufacturer Data j) -
None i
1 f
4 I
a
~.
..r-
|
|---|
|
|
| | | Reporting criterion |
|---|
| 05000336/LER-1996-001, :on 960625,discovered Reactor Coolant Sys Heatup Rate Exceeded Tech Spec.Caused by Design & Procedural Weaknesses Re Plant Heatup Controls.Revised Plant Operating Procedures & Heatup/Cooldown Computer Program |
- on 960625,discovered Reactor Coolant Sys Heatup Rate Exceeded Tech Spec.Caused by Design & Procedural Weaknesses Re Plant Heatup Controls.Revised Plant Operating Procedures & Heatup/Cooldown Computer Program
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-001-02, :on 960120,supplementary Leak Collection & Release Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Equipment Failure of Door Latch.Door Repaired & Plant Returned to 100% Power |
- on 960120,supplementary Leak Collection & Release Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Equipment Failure of Door Latch.Door Repaired & Plant Returned to 100% Power
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-002, :on 960108,determined That Ice Plug in Common Line Resulted in Inability to Backwash Svc Water Strainers. Caused by Mod to Backwash Line Piping.Ice Plug Removed, Restoring Ability to Backwash |
- on 960108,determined That Ice Plug in Common Line Resulted in Inability to Backwash Svc Water Strainers. Caused by Mod to Backwash Line Piping.Ice Plug Removed, Restoring Ability to Backwash
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000423/LER-1996-002-02, :on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Identified. Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedures Revised |
- on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Identified. Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000423/LER-1996-002, :on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Occurred Due to Procedure Inadequacy.Changes Will Be Made to Technical Requirements Manual |
- on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Occurred Due to Procedure Inadequacy.Changes Will Be Made to Technical Requirements Manual
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1996-003, :on 960111,discovered Existing Anchorage of EDG Day Tank Not Seismically Adequate.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Anchorage of EDG Tank Will Be Graded to Meet Design Basis of Seismic Load Requirements |
- on 960111,discovered Existing Anchorage of EDG Day Tank Not Seismically Adequate.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Anchorage of EDG Tank Will Be Graded to Meet Design Basis of Seismic Load Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1996-003-01, :on 960205,failed to Recognize Requirement to Enter TS LCO 3.0.3 Following Discovery of Ice Blockage. Caused by Inadequate Problem Identification Methods.Design Basis Summary Documents Have Been Prepared Re TS Safety Sys |
- on 960205,failed to Recognize Requirement to Enter TS LCO 3.0.3 Following Discovery of Ice Blockage. Caused by Inadequate Problem Identification Methods.Design Basis Summary Documents Have Been Prepared Re TS Safety Sys
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1996-003-02, Forwards LER 96-003-02 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 960111,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made in Ltr,Submitted | Forwards LER 96-003-02 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 960111,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made in Ltr,Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-003-01, :on 960312,temporary I-Beams Located Overhead of Recirculation Spray Sys HXs Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Work Control Procedures Revised |
- on 960312,temporary I-Beams Located Overhead of Recirculation Spray Sys HXs Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Work Control Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-004-01, :on 960319,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Were in Noncompliance W/Ts.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Revised Operating Procedure to Preclude cross-connected Sys Alignment |
- on 960319,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Were in Noncompliance W/Ts.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Revised Operating Procedure to Preclude cross-connected Sys Alignment
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-004, :on 960131,svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys Susceptibility to Freezing Following Loss of Intake Structure non-vital Heating Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design.Design Change Implemented |
- on 960131,svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys Susceptibility to Freezing Following Loss of Intake Structure non-vital Heating Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design.Design Change Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-004-02, :on 960316,auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Noncompliance W/Ts Occurred.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Event Reviewed W/Station Personnel to Caution Others on TS Surveillance Requirements |
- on 960316,auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Noncompliance W/Ts Occurred.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Event Reviewed W/Station Personnel to Caution Others on TS Surveillance Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1996-005-01, :on 960212,discovered PEO Improperly Utilized to Replace Automatic Backwash Function of Svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys.Caused by Failure to Enter TS Action Statement. Revise Procedures for IST SWS Pump Operability |
- on 960212,discovered PEO Improperly Utilized to Replace Automatic Backwash Function of Svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys.Caused by Failure to Enter TS Action Statement. Revise Procedures for IST SWS Pump Operability
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-005-02, :on 960321,service Water Booster Pump Auto Start Discovered Disable.Caused by Inadequate Review.C/A: Bypass Jumper Removed & Mod Initiated |
- on 960321,service Water Booster Pump Auto Start Discovered Disable.Caused by Inadequate Review.C/A: Bypass Jumper Removed & Mod Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-005-03, :on 960321,design Noncompliance Noted for High Temp Automatic Start Feature of SWS Booster Pumps.Caused by Weakness in Design Control Process.Operating Procedures Revised |
- on 960321,design Noncompliance Noted for High Temp Automatic Start Feature of SWS Booster Pumps.Caused by Weakness in Design Control Process.Operating Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-006-01, :on 960207,service Water Pump Motor Flood Protection Not Provided.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Administrative Controls Established |
- on 960207,service Water Pump Motor Flood Protection Not Provided.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Administrative Controls Established
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-006-02, :on 960330,plant Shutdown Required by TS for AFW Containment Isolation Valves Declared Inoperable.Caused by Opened Valves Outside Containment.Unit Was Shutdown in Orderly Manner |
- on 960330,plant Shutdown Required by TS for AFW Containment Isolation Valves Declared Inoperable.Caused by Opened Valves Outside Containment.Unit Was Shutdown in Orderly Manner
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000423/LER-1996-007, :on 960403,containment Recirculation Spray, Quench Spray & Safety Injection Sys Were Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Design Reviews of Rss,Qss,Si & Other Sys Will Be Performed |
- on 960403,containment Recirculation Spray, Quench Spray & Safety Injection Sys Were Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Design Reviews of Rss,Qss,Si & Other Sys Will Be Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1996-007, :on 960220,discovered RCS C/D Rate Exceeded TS Limit.Caused by Use of Wrong Temp Sensor.Plant Operating Procedures,Heatup/C/D Monitoring Computer Program & Operator Training Involving These Events Revised |
- on 960220,discovered RCS C/D Rate Exceeded TS Limit.Caused by Use of Wrong Temp Sensor.Plant Operating Procedures,Heatup/C/D Monitoring Computer Program & Operator Training Involving These Events Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-007-01, :on 960403,CRS & Qs Sys Found Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Restored Sys to Appropriate Design Basis Requirements Prior to Declaring Sys Inoperable |
- on 960403,CRS & Qs Sys Found Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Restored Sys to Appropriate Design Basis Requirements Prior to Declaring Sys Inoperable
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000423/LER-1996-007-02, Forwards LER 96-007-02 Which Supplements Rept Submitted on 960502,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B&D), 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B&D).Commitments in Response to Event, Encl | Forwards LER 96-007-02 Which Supplements Rept Submitted on 960502,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B&D), 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B&D).Commitments in Response to Event, Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-008, :on 960222,concluded That Condition of Wire Mesh Screen Encl Over Two Containment Recirculation Suction Pipes Outside Design Basis.Caused by Const/Installation Error.Screen Encl Being Replaced |
- on 960222,concluded That Condition of Wire Mesh Screen Encl Over Two Containment Recirculation Suction Pipes Outside Design Basis.Caused by Const/Installation Error.Screen Encl Being Replaced
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-008-01, :on 960412,reactor Protection Sys Lead/Lag Time Constants Found non-conservative.Caused by Failure of Vendor to Identify Conservative Calibr Requirements.Tss Changed to Correctly Identify Direction of Conservatism |
- on 960412,reactor Protection Sys Lead/Lag Time Constants Found non-conservative.Caused by Failure of Vendor to Identify Conservative Calibr Requirements.Tss Changed to Correctly Identify Direction of Conservatism
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1996-009, :on 960423,inoperable Shutdown Margin Monitors from Low Count Rate Occurred Due to Inadequate Design Control.Reduced SMM Setpoint |
- on 960423,inoperable Shutdown Margin Monitors from Low Count Rate Occurred Due to Inadequate Design Control.Reduced SMM Setpoint
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1996-009-01, :on 960109,isolation Condenser Makeup Water Temperature Below Design Basis Limit,Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design Specification.Preliminary Assessment of non-ductile Failure of Isolation Condenser Sys Performed |
- on 960109,isolation Condenser Makeup Water Temperature Below Design Basis Limit,Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design Specification.Preliminary Assessment of non-ductile Failure of Isolation Condenser Sys Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-009-01, :on 960216,post LOCA Contianment Pressure Prevented Timely Extraction of PASS Air Sample & H Sample. Caused by Inadequate Assessment of Revised Post LOCA Response Analysis.Implemented Design Change |
- on 960216,post LOCA Contianment Pressure Prevented Timely Extraction of PASS Air Sample & H Sample. Caused by Inadequate Assessment of Revised Post LOCA Response Analysis.Implemented Design Change
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-009-02, Submits Table of Commitments Re LER 96-009-02 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) | Submits Table of Commitments Re LER 96-009-02 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1996-010, :on 960222,identified That Containment Hydrogen Monitor Flow Could Not Be Established W/Containment at Atmospheric Pressure Due to Improper Setting of Sys Pressure Regulators.Sys Calib Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 960222,identified That Containment Hydrogen Monitor Flow Could Not Be Established W/Containment at Atmospheric Pressure Due to Improper Setting of Sys Pressure Regulators.Sys Calib Procedure Will Be Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-010-02, :on 960425,determined That Potential Failure Mode of Rod Control Sys Acopian Power Supplies Could Create Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Design Review. Reset Feature Will Be Deleted |
- on 960425,determined That Potential Failure Mode of Rod Control Sys Acopian Power Supplies Could Create Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Design Review. Reset Feature Will Be Deleted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000336/LER-1996-011-01, :on 960222,required Time to Enter Mode 5 Exceeded.Caused by Effective Action Not Being Initiated to Revise SDC & Cooldown Rate Monitoring Procedures.Operating & Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 960222,required Time to Enter Mode 5 Exceeded.Caused by Effective Action Not Being Initiated to Revise SDC & Cooldown Rate Monitoring Procedures.Operating & Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-011-02, :on 960512,determined That Both Trains of CR Envelope Pressurization Sys Inoperable Due to Imbalance in air-conditioning Sys.Cr air-conditioning Sys Rebalanced.W/ |
- on 960512,determined That Both Trains of CR Envelope Pressurization Sys Inoperable Due to Imbalance in air-conditioning Sys.Cr air-conditioning Sys Rebalanced.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-012, :on 960515,containment Leakage in Excess of TS Limits Noted,Due to Valve Leakage.Containment Spray Line Penetration 100 Flushed to Remove Any Boron Deposits.W/ |
- on 960515,containment Leakage in Excess of TS Limits Noted,Due to Valve Leakage.Containment Spray Line Penetration 100 Flushed to Remove Any Boron Deposits.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1996-012-01, :on 960228,SIS Drain Stop Valves Failed to Meet Functional Requirements of Ts.Caused by Personnel Error & Inadequate Retest Requirements.C/A:Valve 2-SI-618 Modified & Safety Related Solenoid Valves Inspected |
- on 960228,SIS Drain Stop Valves Failed to Meet Functional Requirements of Ts.Caused by Personnel Error & Inadequate Retest Requirements.C/A:Valve 2-SI-618 Modified & Safety Related Solenoid Valves Inspected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-012-02, :on 960515,containment Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Boric Acid Residue.Performed Flush of Line to Remove Boron Deposits |
- on 960515,containment Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Boric Acid Residue.Performed Flush of Line to Remove Boron Deposits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000423/LER-1996-013, :on 960612,design Deficiency in Rhrs.Caused by Inconsideration That Failure Mode of RHS Flow Control Valves Could Create High RHS Heat Exchanger CCP Discharge Temps. Actuators for Heat Exchanger Valves,Modified |
- on 960612,design Deficiency in Rhrs.Caused by Inconsideration That Failure Mode of RHS Flow Control Valves Could Create High RHS Heat Exchanger CCP Discharge Temps. Actuators for Heat Exchanger Valves,Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1996-013-01, :on 960314,assessed Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitors Nuclear Instrumentation Channels A,B,C & D as Inoperable Due to Potential Susceptability to Common Mode Failure.Replaced Failed Power Supply |
- on 960314,assessed Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitors Nuclear Instrumentation Channels A,B,C & D as Inoperable Due to Potential Susceptability to Common Mode Failure.Replaced Failed Power Supply
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-013-02, :on 960515,determined Design Deficiency in Residual Heat Removal System (Rhs).Caused by Original Plant Design.Corrective Actions Will Be Described in Supplement |
- on 960515,determined Design Deficiency in Residual Heat Removal System (Rhs).Caused by Original Plant Design.Corrective Actions Will Be Described in Supplement
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000336/LER-1996-014-01, :on 960311,weekly TS Surveillances Missed. Caused by Personnel Error W/Respect to Scheduling.C/A: Implemented Requirements of Surveillance Procedure Sp 2614A-3 |
- on 960311,weekly TS Surveillances Missed. Caused by Personnel Error W/Respect to Scheduling.C/A: Implemented Requirements of Surveillance Procedure Sp 2614A-3
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1996-014-02, :on 960516,surveillances for Emergency Diesel Generator Performed During Operation,Versus Shutdown.Caused by Misinterpretation of Shutdown Stipulation.Surveillances Performed During Shutdown |
- on 960516,surveillances for Emergency Diesel Generator Performed During Operation,Versus Shutdown.Caused by Misinterpretation of Shutdown Stipulation.Surveillances Performed During Shutdown
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-015-05, Forwards LER 96-015-05,documenting Event That Occurred at Plant,Unit 3 on 960610,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted | Forwards LER 96-015-05,documenting Event That Occurred at Plant,Unit 3 on 960610,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-015-04, Forwards LER 96-015-04,documenting Condition Determined at Unit 3 on 960610.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | Forwards LER 96-015-04,documenting Condition Determined at Unit 3 on 960610.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000336/LER-1996-015-01, :on 960312,failed to Perform Action Requirement for TS LCO 3.3.1.1.Caused by Failure to Recognize Applicability of TS During Abnormal Equipment Configuration. Revised Procedures |
- on 960312,failed to Perform Action Requirement for TS LCO 3.3.1.1.Caused by Failure to Recognize Applicability of TS During Abnormal Equipment Configuration. Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-015-02, Forwards LER 96-015-02 Re Inadequate Electrical Separation Between Redundant Protection Trains Associated W/Reactor Trip Switches & Reactor Trip Breaker Indicating Lights | Forwards LER 96-015-02 Re Inadequate Electrical Separation Between Redundant Protection Trains Associated W/Reactor Trip Switches & Reactor Trip Breaker Indicating Lights | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000423/LER-1996-016-02, :on 960619,switchgear Cabinet in Noncompliance W/Seismic Design Basis & Subsequently Inadvertent Esfa Signal Occurred.Personnel Did Not Latch Known Seismic Latches as Required.Engaged Latches |
- on 960619,switchgear Cabinet in Noncompliance W/Seismic Design Basis & Subsequently Inadvertent Esfa Signal Occurred.Personnel Did Not Latch Known Seismic Latches as Required.Engaged Latches
| | | 05000336/LER-1996-016-01, :on 960312,common Power Supply Cable to 4 Condenser Pit Level Switches Found Improperly Connected. Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Cable Properly Connected & Trip Circuits Tested |
- on 960312,common Power Supply Cable to 4 Condenser Pit Level Switches Found Improperly Connected. Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Cable Properly Connected & Trip Circuits Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-017, :on 960320,discovered That Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Does Not Meet Single Failure Criterion by Reg Guide 1.97.Caused by Failure to Adequately Consider Sys Design Basis Requirements.Design Change Modified |
- on 960320,discovered That Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Does Not Meet Single Failure Criterion by Reg Guide 1.97.Caused by Failure to Adequately Consider Sys Design Basis Requirements.Design Change Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-017-02, :on 960621,determined Design Deficiency Existed in Tornado Protection Ventilation Dampers,Could Have Affected EDGs Following Tornado.Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Const Design.Procedure Revised |
- on 960621,determined Design Deficiency Existed in Tornado Protection Ventilation Dampers,Could Have Affected EDGs Following Tornado.Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Const Design.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000336/LER-1996-018-01, Forwards LER 96-018-01,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Unit 2 on 960319.LER Suppl Provides Update on Analyses & Investigation of Condition.Attachment 1 Is Clarification of Original Commitment Associated W/Ler | Forwards LER 96-018-01,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Unit 2 on 960319.LER Suppl Provides Update on Analyses & Investigation of Condition.Attachment 1 Is Clarification of Original Commitment Associated W/Ler | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000336/LER-1996-018, :on 960316,gaps Discovered in Encls Door Seals for Motor Control Ctrs B51 & B61.Caused by Weakness in Existing Program to Inspect & Verify Integrity of Environ Protective Barriers.Doors for MCC B51 & MCC B61 Replaced |
- on 960316,gaps Discovered in Encls Door Seals for Motor Control Ctrs B51 & B61.Caused by Weakness in Existing Program to Inspect & Verify Integrity of Environ Protective Barriers.Doors for MCC B51 & MCC B61 Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-019-02, :on 960627,RCS PORV Block Valves Were Determined to Be Unable to Perform Intended Safety Functions.Caused by Structural Design Deficiency.C/A Will Be Provided in Supplement to Rept |
- on 960627,RCS PORV Block Valves Were Determined to Be Unable to Perform Intended Safety Functions.Caused by Structural Design Deficiency.C/A Will Be Provided in Supplement to Rept
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
|