ML20133F789
| ML20133F789 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1985 |
| From: | EQE, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133F781 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8510110230 | |
| Download: ML20133F789 (107) | |
Text
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e THE APPLICATION OF EXPERIENCE DATA TO SEISMIC INTERACTION AT THE
- 41LLSTONE Ill NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 8421-01 l
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EQE Project No.
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6 LIMITED RIGHTS LEGEND 838630 with This " proprietary data," furnished under Purchase Order No.
Northeast Utilities Service Company, may be du' plicated and used i
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Utilities Service Company with the express limitations that the "pr data" may not be discle' sed outside Nortneast Utilities Service C h
used for other purposes or projects without prior permission of t e Contractor, except that further disclosure or use may be made sole i
following purposes:
This " proprietary data" may be disclosed for evaluation A.
purposes under the restriction that the proprietary data be retained in confidence and not be further disclosed; This " proprietary data" may be disclosed to other contractors B.
participating in Northeast Utilities Service Company's program of which this contract is a part for information or use in connection with the work performed under their contracts and d
under the restriction that the " proprietary data" be retaine I
in confidence and not be further disclosed.
f Tnis legend shall be marked on any recroduction of this dat i
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CONTENTS-Page i
ABSTRACT.....................................................
I
. INTRODUCTION......'................................................
l.
3 THE APPLICATION OF SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA T 2.
Summary of the Seismic Qualification Utilities 1
2.1 3
Group Program...........................................
Application of Experience Data to the Seismic
. 7 2.2 5
y Interaction Study.......................................
.7-7 4
SUMMARY
OF THE D ATA BASE.....................................
i 3.
9 Power Plants............................................
3.1 13
]
3.2 Substations.............................................
i 13 Petrochemical Facilities................................
3.3 45
?
SEISMIC INTERACTIONS BASED ON EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE 1
45 4.
f Sliding Equipment.......................................
4.1 45 4.2 F alli ng Ceiling F i xtures................................
47 P ipi n g Lapa ct...........................................
4.3 j
63 5.
THE SEIsu.IC IKTERA.T. ION C3 PIPING.................................
Tne El Centro 5 team Plant and the 1975 Imaerial 4
5.1 5E Vaiiey Ear:nqunxe.......................................
69 J
5.2 Piping in the El Centro Plan:
I
/s s.3 9.1smic Damage to Piping................................
76 Review of Piping Syste=s z: :ne El Centre Piat.:
l 5.1 1
J COnctusIDs5 n a RECo mENaAT m s rer. a.: E7.:A......................
l 5.
..r-Picing Syste=s..........................................
5.1 5/
.eillag-Mounts: -::irmen:
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5.3 Sliding er Ove-:urnin; Eceiomer.:
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CONTENTS (Continued)
TABLES Pace
~
. Summary of Sites Reviewed in Compiling the Seismic Experience 3-1 10 Data Base........................................................
15 Summaries of the Performance of Selected Data Base Facilitie 3-2 46 Seismic Interaction at Data Base Facilities......................
4-1 Results of the Piping Interaction Study for a Portion 9
e 1
5-1 78 of the El Centro Power Plant.....................................
3 FIGURES n
8 Eartnquake location and magnitude for data base f acilities.......
i 3-1 50 Sliding boilers at the Olive View Sanatorium.....................
4-1 51 Sliding of unanchored tanks at the Shell Water Treatment Plant...
4-2 52 Sliding of unanchored drill at the Wiltron Electronics Facility..
4-3 53 A typical ceiling-mounted light fixture at the El Centro Plant...
4-4 54 Fallen suspended ceiling panels at the Main Oil Pumoing Plant....
i 4-5 55 Fallen light fixtures at the Pleasant Valley Pumping Station.....
i 4-6 56 l
Fallen light fixture at the Kettleman Gas Comaressor Station.....
4-7 57
.'j 4-3 Typical lign: fixtures at tne Gates Suostation.........._......
58 1
j at the Gates Substation..........
4-9 Fallen louver froc an HVAC det:
59
, 10 Fallen ducting at tne Wiltron Eier:ronics Fa ility...............
60 4-11 Ceiling-mounted air-conditioning units at the San Martin Winery..
n Ce.11ng-suspenced unit het:ers in Ine Evergreen voccani:y c.o n repe llege 52 1
4-13 Typical wall-:acunted ecuip:aer.t at the Evercreen Conraunity Co 53 d
4-14 Piping at the El Centro P l ant....................................
o-c rowe-P. nt................................
-l. Piping at ne a n ban..
sa o
5E pian:.................................
4-15 Pirin; a :ne M ::ci : Bay 55 4/
111:y.....................
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Pipino at tne Snel,i dater ireatmen:. a:
/
nion Oil E :ane.. ant.............................
ri
-,,o ricing at :ne U..
70 F.at Of :ne I=cerial Valley Area LO:ating :ne El Centro :lan:
71 5-1
.........~.....................
5-2 hestern View Cf :ne El Cen:rc Pian!
72 Reg. Ecice 1.53.
Cs:sa-isen of El Centro N.S Res:cnse Soe::ru: ::
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. W -es00nse ODer!rur :O neg c010e..:J
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1 CONTENTS (Continued)
FIGURES (Continued)
Pace Compa'rison of El Centro Vertical Response Spectrum to 5-5 74 Reg. Guide 1.60..................................................
Probable locations of seismic interaction between insulated 5-6 80 pipes at the El Centro Plant.....................................
Probable locations of seismic interaction between insulated
-i 5-7 81 and non-insulated pipes at the El Centro Plant Probable locations of seismic interaction between d
5-8 82 non-insulated pipes at the El Centro Plant.......................
Probable locations,of insulated and non-insulated pipes i
.5-9 83 at the El Centro Plant...........................................
' 10 Probable locations of seismic interaction between small-bore 5-84 non-insulated pipes at the El Centro Plant.......................
5 Probable locations of seismic interaction between small-bore non-insulated pipes and large insulated pipes at the E5 El Centro Plant..................................................
5-12 Probable locations of seismic interaction between small-bore 85 non-insulated pipes at the El Centro Plant.......................
o..2 rrobable locations cf seismic intera : ion between non-insula ad I
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i pines, concuit, table trays and s:-u :u al steel a: :ne
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El Centre Plan:..................................................
5-24 Probable lo:ations of seis=ic intera:: ion between insulated pipes, non-insuiated pipes and stru:tural steel a ne SS El Cer.:-o Plant..................................................
J 5-15 dable locations of seismic interaction between insulated53 pipes and st u::u-ai steel at the El Cen ro Pian................
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5-15 Vaive :: era: Ors I : ed adjace
- -i-i.; :- :: ; : -ti :e-E3 a: he El Centro Plant...........................................
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5-17 Air-cDerated Valves lo:a:ed neX: !C pi inE CT s: u:: ural steel s
El at the El Centro Plan:...........................-....--..---...
92 5-15 Failed air-coerated valve a: :he Ei :en:ro Pian:
53 5-15 Dented :iDe insulation at :ne Ei cen:rt. Pian:
i
i ABSTRACT This report is part of the seismic interaction study for the Millstone III Nuclear Power Plant and was developed by EQE [ncorporated for Northeast A seismic interaction study assesses the poten-Utilities Service Company.
tial hazard caused by items in the plant that have not been specifically It is of ten assumed that these items spatially designed for seismic loads.
interact, interfere with or cause the f ailure of Category 1 items within the These potential interactions are identified in a seismic interaction
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plant.
study.
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The purpose of this report is to incorporate data.on the performance of conventional power plants and other industrial f acilities during past1 ear quakes (seismic experience data) into the seismic interaction study of This application of seismic experience data is based on the l Millstone III.
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assumption that the past history of earthquake damage provides the Tnost The use of seismic credible indication of actual hazards and non-hazards.
experience data will allow the Millstone III interaction study to focus on the areas that are most likely to be sources of actual hazards and to give minimal attention to areas that are most unlikely to be sources of hatards.
This use of seismic experience data would typically take place during a inis report does no: contain detailed inspection or walk-cown of the plant.
This reco-: does contain recommendaticas the results of such an inspe::ior.
on 1:et:s and areas to De examined during su n an inspe::ior.
Tne seismic experien:e cara was toc:siist :nicugn a stu:S Of ne effe: 5 Tnese ea hcuakes affected q
d several strong motion eartnouakes in California.
desens of facilities that contain ecuipment and other items that are i
Tne study srikinpiy similar :: :nese fou:e in nu: lear power piants.
=,j neavi.;. sr.acen eas r# arch ea-t::uaks The en :ne mes:
generalb #::use:
cf :ne stuoy (vaien is ongcing) is a cascriction of :ne De-fo-man;e p-ocut:
an inven:Ory of various types of c uioment, instalia:icns and structures 3
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ioacs co strarie to or in excess of :nese to
- na: nave encerience: seismi Tne ca:a nas seen su:::arized for a num2er
,l w.itn Miiistone III is cesigned.
Of f a ilities.
n.
ii Our recmunendations focused on tnree areas for review in the interaction study for Millstone Ill:
e Piping Systems Ceiling-mounted Equipment e
Sliding or Overturning of Equipment e
In summary, we concluded that piping systems are not a credible source of
~j damaging interactions; some ceiling-mounted equipment could be hazardous but the hazard is minor; unancho*ed or weakly anchored equipment is the most
.q qj likely source of important interactions, w
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INTRODUCTION This report is part of the seismic interaction study at the Millstone III Nuclear Power Plant. This seismic interaction study focuses on the poten-tial hazard of installations in the plant that have not specifically been designed for seismic loads, i.e., Non-category I installations presenting a t
hazard to nearby Category I installations.
In most cases this hazard could come about from seismic interaction, that is an impact or spatial interfer-L ence between the category I and the Non-category I item.
The purpose of 1
this report is to incorporate the available data base of past earthquake
'.i
. experience of power plants and industrial f acilities into the seismic inter-It is important that the Millstone III interaction study
~
action study.
reflect the seismic hazards that have been observed in comparable f acilities in past earthquakes, and that minimal attention be given to hazards that have not been observed.
This seismic experience cata has been compiled tnrough a study of several strong motion earthouakes in California. Tnese earthouakes have affected dozens of f acilities containing equipment similar to tnose found in nuclear plants. In general the focus of the study is the most heavily shaken areas of each earthquake. Tne product of this ongoing study is an inventory of various types of equipment, installations, and structures that have experi-enred seis=i: loacs coc3 arable :: c-in excess c' : nose to wnien a nuclear plant su:n as Millstone III =ust be designet l
ir. era::1:n Tne a;:lica:icn of ne seis=i: ex,erience ca:a to :ne seismi:
5 study at the Millstone III Plant is based on the assum, tion tnat tne cas:
history of ea-thouake damage provioes the clearest indication of actual
~j seis=i: nazards.
Tne res:.1s : :anizet ts foiions. Cr.c er 2 tis:usses.ne resear:n rog-a :nrcegn wnich ne seismi exoerien:e data :ase was colle::e:.
l Sarsies of :ne exoerience sa:a in :abula-f:-: a-e :resene: in :na :er 3 for easy review. Cna::er : discusses tne instan:es :f seis-i carage na:
- an :E :naranerized as cue :: seis::: inte-aniens.
.a::er E :-esents an Ca:a Lase sites evit e, f Cusin?
exa :-le ;f One Cf :ne m: e it::-tar.:
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specifically on piping interactions. Chapter 6 presents general conclusions L
' based upon a review of experience data. A series of recommendations of how l
the data base can be applied in the Millstone III review is also presented I
in Chapter 6.
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3 2.
THE APPLICATION OF SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 2.1 Sumary of the Seismic Qualification Utilities Group Program In December of 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) designated Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 to address the question of the seismic qualification of equipment in licensed and operating nuclear power plants.
As a result of USI A-46, the NRC is expected to issue a set of requirements to the operators of.the plants to demonstrate that their critical equipment is adequate to withstand postulated earthquakes.
i il Much of the equipment in operating nuclear power plants was installed at a 7
l time wnen seismic analysis and design requirements were much less stringent than currently applicable standards. Tne seismic oualification or requali-
)
fication of safety related operating equipment using procedures applicable to plants currently under design is impractical and economically unfeasible.
In 1981, the 5eismic Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG) was formed by an initial group of 16 utilities (now 27 utilities) for the purpose of develop-ing a practical alternative to the conventional seismic qualification of equipment. Tnis alternative is based on a thorough review of the perfor-l mance in past earthquakes of aculpment that is representative of typical nuclear power plant eouipment. Tne 500G orogram also aedressed a more basi:
cuestien - Is seismi cualifi:ation o' all e=1:xnen: classes even ne: essa y in view of tne performance of inese classes in past destructive en-thouakes?
n Most of the e uipment consiocred i=0-tant to nu: lear plant safety can also be found in any conventional power plant c-large in:ustrial f acility.
7 j
Typi:a1 me:nanical syste=s =. sis: c pu=s, pipin;, control valves, nea; e
en=ance s, ant enks. Tnese me=a-i r pT e-s r-e :we ed er,d :en :lled oy trans*c mers, s.ri.= pear, me::r-con rei centers, an: instru:nen a:1=
panels. Over tne years, c:st Of tnis e:utomen nas teen s=clied by a li=ited nu=ne :# :n. 'z:.e ers, :::n in nu: lea- :Fe Di ants an: in : ner f a:ilities. Ecutomen cesigns generally sr.o-linie variation a==g
=an f a:=rers and li=le change sin:e ne ea-ly 1EEh.
4 Over the past 20 years, "a number of U.S. earthquakes have affected power Detailed records plants and industrial f acilities, primarily in California.
are typically taken of any damage or problems the f acilities encountered as a result of the earthquake.
Damage to properly anchored equipment was rare.
The equipment was typically found to be functional following the earth-quakes. Therefore, an extensive data base is available on the experience of typical power plant equipment in major earthquakes, In January of 1982 EQE Incorporated launched a pilot program to demonstrate i
the feasibility of using past earthquake experience in lieu of conventional j
seismic qualification of equipment. An extensive and detailed seismic experience data base for equipment was compiled from reviews of power l
plants, electrical distribution centers, and industrial f acilities which i
were affected by the following earthquakes:
1 1.
The 1971 San Fernando earthquake (magnitude E.5) 2.
The 1973 Point Mugu earthquake (magnitude 5.7) 3.
The 1975 Eureka earthquake (magnitude 5.5) 4.
The 1978 Santa Barbara Earthquake (magnitude 5.7) 5.
The 1980 Eureka Earthquake (magnitude 7.0) 6.
Tne 1979 Imperial Valley eartnquake (magnitude 6.6) 7.
Tne 19S3 Coalinga earthouake (magnitude E.7) i E.
The 193 Mc pan Hill earthcuake (magnituce Ee2)
The areas most severely shaken by these ea-thouakes were toured and a nucher
- powe pizn s and indus:-iai f a:ilities revie,rer.. Mos: ::ner large ear:n-d cuakes that have occu red anywnere in the w:rld within the las: 20 years were also briefly studied to cete mine if these data would affect the
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conclusions of the study. Initially, tne colle::ed e:uipment exaerience da:a W e intence: :: :: Eiz:e sei =i: : t.a r s ". 7 re Ein : a anc-irti s O
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l'. was to olcer eOuipmer.t, to eOuipmen; froc, ce-Eir. manUf aZu*ers, e.:.
found, CDWVer, na: ca ape :O an n= red e:Ci3 -en C a*:y kind was ra e, even in eartnouakes Inat were m;.:On str:':ger :nar. :ne Desi;T. Dasis f0r m0s!
nuclear PIar.!S. Ine f ea instantes Of CZ.zge ae UsuaII.V rel ate: 20 inaC+-
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5 equipment normally contiriues to function during an earthquake as long as power is not lost at the f acility. The primary conclusions of the research program are that seismic damage to equipment is rare as long as reasonable precautions for anchorage arc taken. Conventional qualification is unneces-sary, with.certain limitations, for many types of equipment.
Data collection activities were closely monitored by senior members of the NRC Staff and by their consultants, including the Lawrence Livermore
-l National Laboratory (LLNL).
Tnrough the course of the pilot program, numerous meetings and discussions were held between the SQUG, EQE, the NRC, and LLNL regarding the direction of the program, various details of focus, and the general conclusions of the surveys. Representatives.from all involved organizations toured several of the affected power facilities to t
f amiliarize themselves with the equipment and interview plant personnel wno
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experienced the events.
3 Tne initial phase of tne program was completed in the Fall of 1982 and a report summarizing the program was suomitted to the NRC for review and conment.
Numerous meetings were held among the NRC and the SQUG in 1983, to discuss the NR"'s comments and cuestions.
Followino these discussions, the NRC issued a general endorsement of the use of experience data in lieu of I
conventional cualification of ecuiprent in coerating nu: lear power plants.
1 Tnis endorsement was puolisned in :ne rean-:, "Seismi: Dualifications o' Ecuipment in Dae ating Plan:s, A Sta us Ras : en L'n asolved Sa's:y Issue A-45," NUREG-101E, Septemaer LCE2. In this repo-, tne NRC conciuoes:
I
"(Ou-) assessment lea:s to the conclusich -hat the use cf e nerience data for enuis ent cualification provides the 7j cnly reasonacie alte nz:ive :: On-en: -iteria."
EXDerience Da E TO :ne Seis-i: Ir.Ie a !ior. 5:uCy 1.2 ADOlicatiOr C#
NO-!neas: LTilities Service CoC3any, One agent f:r One 'iills:One Mr plar., is a rr.aer cf :ne 53U2. Tne seismi exoe-ien:e ca:a Orse Int: nas Deen :Clie:!e: in One 3 CUE ::r:g am Or: vices im3:rtar. id C-7Eti2n fOr One
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6 seismic interaction study currently being performed for Millstone Unit Ill.
The experience data base has the following applications:
l 1.
The SQUG program, to date, includes isits to over 40 sites of industrial facilities and power plants located in the heavily shaken areas of recent California earthquakes. Most of these sites contain inventories of equipment that can be compared to the Millstone Unit 111 installations. The general performance I
of these f acilities in the earthquake, and the type and frequency of occurrence of seismic damage provides an indica-1 d.
tion of the actual hazard presented by earthquakes of the design-basis level for the Millstone Plant or larger.
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2.
Damage tnat can be liberally categorized as due to seismic
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interaction can be extracted from the seismic damage that c: curred at each site From these instances, an assessment can be made of the type of seismic interactions tna have caused (or might have caused) problems in past earthquakes.
Tne occurrence of various interaction scenarios is indicated as well as the approximate level of seismic motion that is the threshold for occurrence.
Pernaps more important is an indi-
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cation of the types of inte-a:: inn scenarins that no no: c cur in ea-incuekes. Interaction sce n -ics wnich have no histo *y c' om - ente in past ea neuakes shoulf ns-justify a 1a-e proportion of the resources devoted to :ne interaction study
- c. the Milistorr2 Plant.
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3.
By studyin_: the ce ails of various :ynes of interactions 1
J incluced in :ne seisti: exnerience ft:a base, :-iteria can ne es Iblirnet f r rescivi-@ ::e -.E' Ste-a--irr s en!-its I;
- ne f.ilistone Flan:
Tnese criteria fo : a Dasis fcr resolving interaction scenaries oy en_ineerin: juagv.En:, c-cy si::le Calculation, Wnen EOecuate sirila-i 7 Can De 0"--STP strate: :: CO:n;0n intera ~i:n scena-its in the eX3erience CZta 4
Case.
s' 3.
SUMMARY
OF THE DATA BASE The seismic experience data base consists of a review of over 40 sites drawn from the higher ground motion areas of eight earthquakes which occurred in California over the last 15 years (see Figure 3-1). The sites include power generat'ing stations, substations, and a variety of industrial f acilities such as oil refineries and chemical plants. These f acilities include a wide variety of equipment that is representative of critical nuclear plant systems.
j A list of the more important f acilities reviewed in compiling the experience data base is presented in Table 3-1.
This list includes the peak ground j
acceleration either estimat.ed or m'easured at the site. Table 3-2 presents detailed summaries of some of tne more important sites from each earthquake j
studied. These sites are the larger, more heavily damaged f acilities, located in the areas of highest ground motion. These detailed summaries provide examples of the more comon seismic damage, including damage that could be classified as due to seismic interaction.
The site sumaries in Table 3-2 are organized in the following manner. Tne name of the earthcuake and affe::ed facilities are listed first. The es-imated peak ground acceleration (PGA) at the site is listed next.
The estimates of FEA were made by EDE, or by consultants to EDE, based on tne ground rrction re ctd nearest to One si:E.
In a few cases ; cent cc:icn records were taken at the site; tnese measured PEAS are denoted by an asterisk. A general des:-iption of tne f t:ility isiloss. Inis ces:ription I*
incluces the' size and type ef strucures and the ecuipment installations
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found at the site.
A description of :ne camage caused by ne ea :ncuate is t;
nen esented. Damage ee: ails are cased on w-i an recc-es such as coe a-tiens lots and en intervie,.s e.:n :ne -la
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The larger proportion of'the f acilities included in the data base are of the i
7 foilowing types:
l 4
1.
Fossil-fueled power plants j
2.
Substations 3.
Petrochemical facilities.
Within each of these three types of f acilities, the equipment installations j
i tend to be very similar.
In the sections below a generic description is presented of the typical construction and equipment installations for each j
of the three types of facilities.
The site-specific description presented l
in the tables need then only include details spegific to the,particular site.
]
3.1 Power Plants J
Power plants that have been affected by earthquakes in California are Generating units f
typically fired by natural gas with an oil fuel backup.
range in size from about 10 MW up to 750 MW; however, most of the units in j
the data base are around 40 to 80 MW. Most of the equipment is not seismi-cally oesigned although it is ancho-ed. The structures were usually built Piping is
.o the unifom Buildino Code current at tne time of constru: tion.
t nc mally sussenoed 10- dead load only, resultin; in flexible r'.ms wnien are very likely to sustain i=sa::s cu-in; en-tncuakes.
A generating uni: typically in:1uces :tre foiio r.ng types of e: ipmen::
a lage boiler and canoenser, two or inree large boiler feed ou:::ss, several additional ve-tical o-ho-izontal nu==s for ranging from about 10 to 200 no-sepowe, fecovate-neate-s, la ge no-izor.tal and ve-ti:al tanks fer oil
- '040.11 57: CI and con ensate s:: rape, and ent :- :- t tor'i ; to r L are in:iuse: fer :ocaonen: :solin; water, intri:ation, ccaressed air, and
~ :n uni :ysi;tiiy centains on :ne D* Do 'er f er vital insw.menta icn.
a
- an:: - ?: int.I orcer cf 100 uns c' pisin; (a run rein; fic: an:n=r ::in ranging from 1 : 20 in:nes in diz ster. Picin; systems in:lude many air-O.ives vi:n asss:tated :ner:ati: :- tie:~-ial ::: -:I er1:c:cr-coerate:
Sys~e.s w.itn a e tie: :: 7ti :- I::.al : -:I 3 anti!..
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I TABLE 3-1 l
SUMMARY
OF SITES REVIEWED IN COMPILING THE SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE t
i Estimated Peak Ground l
Earthquake Facility Type of Facility Acceleration l
San Fernando Sylmar Converter Large electrical substation 0.50-0.75 Earthquake, Station for converting high voltage i
l 1971 DC power transmitted over the Pacific Intertie to AC power l ~j for use in the Los Angeles
(
1 area.
l 7
j Rinaldi Receiving Large electrical substation 0.50-0.75 i
Station 1
Olive View Sanatorium Large hospital complex 0.50-0.75 l
Valley Steam Plant Four unit gas-fired power plant 0.40 Burbank Power Plant Six unit gas-fired power plant 0.35 Glendale Power Plant Five unit gas-fired power plant 0.30 l
I Pasadena Power Plant Four unit gas-fired power plant 0.20 t
t l
Saugus Substation Electrical substation 0.35 l
Vin:ent Substation Ele::rical suostation 0.20 l
P in Mucu Cnnond Sea:n Power Laroe two uni: cii-fired : owe-0.20 Earthouaie, Plant plan l
l Die Santa Clara Suostation Ele::rical suostation 0.10
- Fernaale humoold: Bay Power Two cas-fired units, one 0.25
- l }
Ez_:ncuake, Plant nu: lear uni-l 3
aso l
\\
Sa-.t Ea-:r z E:la t lu:: t-3:-
,g:
- :t.
.;; :,t-.,:.,
- ,;I -
l l
Ee-ncuake, 157S Ellwood Peaker Flant small c.as ursine c.lant 0.25
' Ground a::tierati:n osasured by an it.s~. u~st.*. at ne sitt m
m.
11 TABLE 3-1 (Continued)
Estimated Peak Ground Earthouake Facility Type of Facility Acceleration Imperial Valley El Centre Steam Four unit gas-fired power 0.51
- Earthquake, Plant plant 1979 Drop-IV Two unit hydroele:tric plant 0.40 l
l Magmamax Geothermal Small geothermal power pla'nt 0.30 Plant 0.25 1
.I Humboldt Humboldt Bay Power Two gas-fired units, one Earthquake, Plant nuclear unit 1980 I
Coalinga Main Oil Pumping Plant Pumping station feeding oil 0.60 pipeline from Coalinga area Earthquake, l
1983 Union Oil Butane Plant Petrochemical facility 0.60 to extract butane and propane from well waste gas Snell Water Treatmen; Petro:nemical fa:ility to 0.60 Plant demineralize water prior to steam inje: tion into oil wells Ii Coalinga Feed Lot Feed mill for cattle yard 0.60 Pc tble wate pu-ification 0.60 I
Coalinea Wate-T*ea ment Plant fa:ility icuco-Eas Me ering Ins: ume.:atier. station cr.
0.50 Station a natural gas pipeline Coalinga Nose hall plan-for extra =ing 0.60 b
Dehy3 ration Station moisture frz. natural gas Coalinga Subs ation
~1e=rical sucstation 0.60 h:. 2
- .C*
int'.'. 'ank Ta-- h:.. IE
- .:- a; t. :-l. ' t -
Pleasant Valley Pe sin; s:::i:n :: s= ply water 0.59 '
Fu::cing Pian:
f-c nt San uts :: :ne
- caiir.;a : anti
- E-:ur.: aneie-ati:n r*.asu-e:L O,*
a, ins:.:-4--
a- :na I t
--a
12 i
TABLE 31 (Continued)
Estimated Peak Ground Earthauake Facility Type of Facility Acceleration s
Coalinga Shell Dehydration Petrochemical facility for 0.40 extracting water from oil i
Earthquake, Plant l
1983 (Continued)
Chevron Oil Cleaning Petrochemical facility for 0.40 Plant treating crude oil a
!7 Coalinga Substation Ele:trical substation 0.40 l
No. 1
( o(,
0.35 San Luis Canal Pumping AgricuItural pumping plants 3
Plants (20) taking wa'ter from the San
.)
Luis Canal t
0.30 Gates Substation large electrical substation 0.20 Kettleman Compressor Natural gas pipeline booster t
Station station l
0.50 l
Morgan Hill United Technologies Large research facility for l
L Earthouake, Chemical Plant missile systems development 7
1984 0.45
- l IBM / Santa Teresa Large computer f a:ility for 8
Facility software development 0.40 l
'l San Martin Winery Winery I
Wiltron Ele::ronics Ele::ronics manufa::uring 0.43 i
1 Plan:
ft:ili:y t
G.40 Mc::alf 5:ssta:ien Large eit::-i:al se:s t:icn i
+
0.20 l
J Evergreen Com: unity Large college cocolex vitn self-contained HVA: and Colleoe-ele::rical power plants
~
C.20
- 'ine y Mirtsso Winery 0.05
':s Sanos 5::sta:ien Ele::ri:ai suestatior.
I
' Eroun: 2::elera:icn nessure: Dy an instrumen a :ne s;;e 1
i
13 t <
at least one set of 480 volt and
)
following electrial equipment is found:
one set of-2.4 or 4.16 kV switchgear witn associated transformers, and i-Each unit of the plant has several control i-several motor control centers.
A multi-story steel boiler support
- panels located in a main control room.
Tne turbine y
L.
j structure typically houses the boiler and forced draf t system.
and condenser system are located in a two-story steel-framed concrete 4
turbine building.
3.2 Substations These normally consist Tne data base also includes a number of substations.
d d
of a control house, which is a one-story concrete block or pref abricate The control h'ouse c'ontains' several conEr61' and relay concrete building.
)I panels containing a variety of electric relays, recorders, annunciato Also in the control house are distribution panels switches, and indicators.
The switchyards include
]
and battery racks with associated battery chargers.
a variety of high voltage equipment -- oil filled transformers and circui I
breakers, ceramic comoonents such as lightning arrestors, and steel supporting transmission lines.
3.3 Petroenemical Facilities _
- -t A greater diversity of s:;ci;r.nen: exists in tne re:roch :ical f a:ilities s ehJ Occorred :: powe plan s er substniens. Tnis visited in tne SQUG prog-a:
diversity is due both to variations in f acility size, and variations in :ne
',1 are P. st of tne oe:-cenecical f t:ili:ies revie e:
fun:: ion of tne f acility.
Ic:ned in :ne area of tne 1953 Coalin;a Earthcuake, cien is the hea-v Most of tne eauip-ji the la-oes on-shore oil producing region in California.
level. Tnus aan; in a petrochemical f a:ility is is:ne:: ca:sioe, n groun
- ::: :::irr by a ::iid-l
}
ine en:e-::infy :f :ne r::1i' eni:n/'t M-n1:n :# : onro:neci:ti e:ui:. -:n:.
ing s:-u::ure is eliminate: for mes: grouno-:cente l
Pe:rc:nt:ical f t:ilities typi:aily contain large green:-mean ed :ii c-wa 1
I vessels. Mes:
s:Orage tanks, as well as a variety of striier tanks an:A large a:: ant :f
~ f a:ilities in:le:e hen ex:nangers f:- wa - n; cil.
- 5aives, inter::nna::ing :i:ir.; is in:ia:e:, serve: ry :u : s, a; -::e-ne:
.._,1 14 and associated air-comprissors. Most piping is supported for dead load A one-story control-only, typically on overhead steel racks or pedestals.
f house is usually present at each site, typically e'ither a pref abricated steel building or a concrete block building. 'The control building will normally house a small control panel, switchgear, transformer, and motor An emergency power system in the form of a battery rack and control center.
charger are sometimes also found.
,i t
!q l
em e9 '
4 6
e l
l
15 TABLE 3-2 i
SUMMARIES OF THE ij PERFORMiiCE OF SELECTED DATA BASE FACILITIES
.4
.s J
.2 O
16 ed EARTHQUAKE:
SAN FERNANDO FACILITY:
SYLMAR CONVERTER STATION
- PGA:
0.50G T0,0.75G DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION Converts power transmitted through pacific intertie at e
.?
80 kV to usable AC pwer supplied to the greater Los I-Angeles area.
0 DATE BUILT j
e 1970.
a BUILDINGS
]
Three-story station building has brated steel frame with e
metal deck roof and walls. Contains offices, control eouipment and 42 large mercury-ar: converter (DC to AC) valves.
Swit:nyard intludes two sections located on either side e
of station building within metal screen enclosures (300 X 366 X 65 feet).
gg.
gs;~ men :ntnourc Rail-no:lhted transformers fell :#f 5 :::
Dads and s
ove :::rned. (Seitenyard)
.e AC na-monic filter reat:crs pulie.d or snapped an:nor l
e
?
' bolts and ove-:u ned. (Sai :nyard)
Dil-fillet transfomers slid due te sheared an:nor e
- j
'::1 s.
j In:t:- ::' t :-
' ti ve :a--k; ::::::r- :: i c-.s snt:: t:
CDn e e peces ai and ove~ U~Dec. (Sa-i tnyard) i my e
age om aem A::xiliarv poser transf r-s s'.ic on su:certin;) On: rate e
oa:s. 5 de :enne::in; 0:5: Cit C ir- (5 i :nyard O
17
' Spare' control cabinets overturned and suffered severe e
damage. - (Control buiIding)
Motor control center slid several inches. (Control e
building)
CEILING OR WALL-MOUNTED FIXTURES AC mercury-arc rectifiers were destroyed due to f alling e
current div_iders suspended from ceiling. (Control building)
]
Acoustical tile suspended ceiling collapsed in control e
l room. (Control building)
- j MISCELLANE0US 1.
Porcelain columns supporting air-blast circuit breakers s
snapped. (Switchyard)
AC and DC harmonic filter capacitor rack collapsed due i-e to f ailure of porcelain insulators and aluminum welcs.
Lign:ning arrestor snapoed. (Switchyard) e D: voltaoe dividers f ailed at junction of porcelain e
cole =n aiid steel. pedestal. (Svitenyard)
Power f actor capacitor racks f ailed. (Switchyard) e Desk =cented c~-.rci etnseles slid several inenes.
e (Cen:=1 teilding)
Air ecoier units jumaed cff spring isolation meurts.
e (Controi cuilding) 4 3
5:atio' was shut cown for many contns due to errensive
'n 03 ERA 511.ITY:
e
].
svitenyad and valve nail damaps.
41 e
- m
F t
18 l.
EARTHQUAKE:
SAN FERNAND0
[-
r FACILITY:
VALLEY STEAM PLANT PGA:
0.40G e
DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION Four unit 513 MW electrical generating station.
e 1L, DATES BUILT i
k 1954, 1954, 1955 and 1956.
e I
BUILDINGS Main structures include braced steel frames supporting e
boilers, concrete foundations for turbine-generator units, and concrete-surf aced decks in the steel framed turbine building.
DAMAGE:
PIPING AND COMPONENTS Several Unit 4 condenser circulation water tubes e
ruptured, causing feeowater contamination.
I Insulation crushed on main steam line.
1
~
L,-,.....-..-
- -ucu=
Lign ning a-es :- b-n e ir sd.t:nya-d.
-_s
~
Automatic controi con:conents joked ou cf nlitration.
_j '
e Some meter lini: ages cis::nnene:.
une Doi ser un1 SurTere: a $ 21Cn: Dunge.
e COERA51'.m:
A: :ne : r4 :d :ne ear:n: a.;e ur.i:s _, 2 an: I were en line. Units 1 an: 4 trieved off line aue to anuation Cf Sudoen cressure islays aES: Cia:St with :ne high V:l-
- ace s.ti::nvar: e:uisten Units. and 4 ics: s:E:icn
- oker.
Unii 3 stays: :n line fellowin; :ne ear:ncuake cu: ics: =as fue; cue :: :irsin: Of control val ve a::i-vate: cy ier ni: s-n :r..
2ni: ~3 ::i'.er reli: ~ 5 cine es
- n :s. ant
- sere creugn: ack :n afte ea-:n::ake.
lird T. E.: 4E --ir._*si af e-tre el-:n uare resOenivel,*..
=
.?
m-
19 EARTHQUAKE:
POINT MU6U FACILITY:
ORMOND. BEACH GENERATING STATION PGA:
0.20G DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION e
Two unit 1500MW electrical generating station.
DATE BUILT
.i e
Unit 1 built 1970.
l, e
Unit 2 under construction.at time of earthquake.
3 MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
]
200-foot high steel structural tower support boilers.
e Steam turbines and generators located on separate e
concrete pedestal adjacent to towers.
DAMAGE:
PIPING AND COH)MENTS Small fire started next to windbox of unit I due to e
i separation of dowmeomer from windoox. Minor repairs recuired to insulation.
a Due to excessive say c' a steam line, a ter-inch e
suppo-t rod on one z=bient noise hydraulic snubber buckied a 20 eegret angie.
Insulation on several verti:a1 pipes slumped downward, e
exposing up to 2 inches of pine.
1 e
Fo:: to 100-fc:t-len: ve-:ical stez= pipes swayed tr te Ir ir. n et, : 11itif.: 4:.: ca valks and "-" ~ "- > l
~
stesi men:e ;.
le.s. i a:::i 11 :intet ::: :i: :
recuire repair. inis amount of sway was a:Iributed to tne extreme length of the pipin; witnoa norizontal support.
DFERAEILITY:
Uni: I was caeratin: a tire f ear n uake.
I: :-ione:
Off line curin; :ne'even; and sne: cown n:rmally.
o
20
- EARTHQUAKE:
~ FERNDALE FACILITY:
HUMBOLDT BAY POWER PLANT
- PGA:
0.35G*
' DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION e
Three unit electrical generating station, i
DATE BUILT e
Units 1 and 2 built in 1956 and 1958. Fossil-Fueled.
e Unit 3 built in 1963.
Nuclear.
]
i MISCELLANE0US Unit 3 designed to 0.25G and 0.50G SSE.
e l
DAMAGE:
e None.
OPERABILITY:
Units 1 and 2 -
Operating at time of earthcuake.
Beth trimd off line r
e by spurious relay a:'ica de-energi:ing generz c-field.
Both c;uickly returnec to se vice.
lmit 2 -
e Snu: dow. for refuelin: an:' =rintenzr.:s at tir-e cf
~
-i ear:n=ra$e.
Ew gen y crztin; prc;E:re 21 was j
u....ates c-an c::urance cunng reTuehTip moos.
n J.
b N
D gay y
eE 30 m
e e
g
' Me m
21 SANTABki(BARA EARTHQUAKE:
FACILITY:
GOLETA SUBSTATION 0.28G*
PGA:
DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION 220kV substation.
e DATE BUILT
,q' 1968.
e J
BUILDINGS One-story reinforced concrete block control building
~i houses control equipment and instrumentation.
e MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EOUIPMEt,T i
Switchyard contains typical hign voltage equipment.
l-e 1
I DAMAEE:
e Hone.
5:z: ion re= tined on line follmin-earthcuake.
5 ODERASILITY:
e
-l.
'7
- s A
l Weak cround acceleration measured zt site.
1
- 4 i
I I.
I
~~
~
22 EARTHOUAKE:
HUMBOLDT ' COUNTY FACILITY:
HUMBOLDT BAY POWER PLANT PGA:
0.25G T0,0.27G DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION Three unit electrical generating station.
i e
]
DATE BUILT Units 1 and 2 built in 1956 and 1958. Foss,il-f ueled.
e Unit 3 began operation in 1963.
Nuclear.
1 e
~
1 MISCELLANEOUS Unit 3 designed to 0.25G OBE and 0.50G SSE.
a l
e L
DAMAGE:
PIPING AND COMPONEhTS A badly corroded four-inch-diameter steel attemperator e
pipe leaked. (Unit 1)
A badly corroded bolt on Grinnel vertical spring hanger e
]
fer =rin steam line sneared.
(Uni: 1)
Leaks found in curied 39-in:n diameter concrete e
ci-culatin; wa:e-line and in a tra aite fire water line.
3 t
J STRuntPIS-Chipped paint en boiler sway trate stru::ttre indicated i
e 2,
slipoaoe. (Uni: 2)
" af er s: =aten y.:t'.'
t--:: y ::i: CI: Sine In::.
s e
MIS
- ELL ARE0"5 e
Disio: ate: internal me:nanis: Of air-fios meter.(Uni 1) heat exchar.ge- :::e endie, -eigning aso : 7000 poun:s, e
s::re: en wes:er, :-1::in;, ;. tete: c::.: 15 intnes.
j l
i 1
~
23 OPERABILITY:
Units 1 and 2 -
Operating at time of eartnquake.
Unit 1 tripped by e
differential relay. Unit 2 experienced transient cutoff of fuel and was tripped bf operator.
Unit 3.
Shut down for seismic upgrading at time of earthquake.
e 5
.d p
I t
24 EARTHQUAXE:
IMPERIAL VALLEY FACILITY:
EL CENTR 0 STEAM GENERATING PLANT PGA:
0.51G*
DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION Four unit natural gas or oil-fired plant.
e Units 1 thru 4 are 20, 30, 44 and 80 MW.
e DATES BUILT l
1949, 1952, 1957 and 1968.
s j
BUILDINGS Turbine buildings, turbine pedestals, boiler structures e
constructed on reinforced concrete floating raft f oundations.
Each unit structurally independent above foundation.
Rrft foundation of unit 4 isolated frte other units.
e Reinforced concrete turbine pedestals isolated from
(
canent-resistinc steel frame stru::ures of tu-oine e
t
~
buiiding.
Ea h boiler s:n::: e is s:n::t:.rai s eel :-z:ed f-z:ne, e
with boiler suspended at top of frzre.
~
s 2
DAMAF.E:
ANCHDRED EDUIPMENI An:ne-bolts on str.:ks for units 1, 2, 3 stre::ne::.
l e
i A.:n:- del s fr- : e.sfe-:e s s:-c:: net One e
rtnsfer c- :::: * ::: ret.
' Peak crount a::eleration measured I; sitt.
L i1: ;
.i 25 l
I PIPINGANUCOMPONENTS Seismic stops mounted to structure to limit movement of e
boiler bent.
r Badly corroded hydrogen cooling water lines cracked.
e (Unit 3) 1 Several 3 and 4-inch generator exciter cooling water and e
hydrogen cooling water lines cracked at corrosion points and at points previously weld-repaired. (Unit 4) 2-inch component cooling water line cracked at Vitraulic I
e coupling. (Unit 4)
Yoke of air-operated valve on steam supply line to h
e
. evaporator f ailed due to repeated impacts of operator on adjacent steel column. (Unit 4) 1 Main steam lines impacted adjacent girders and walkways.
e Insulation dented but no piping damage. (Unit 4)
I STRUCTURES Steel supports of roof-mounted feedwater heater bent.
e (Unit 2)
Cracked and spalled concrete at interfaces of units.
e Steel plate covering gap between turbine decks of units e
I and 2 buckled due to differer.tial building movement.
Buckling and yielding of unit 4 boile-structure.
e Diz;onal Dra:ing in boiler stru:ture bu:kled at three e
locations.
Concrete support pad for unit
- nir preneater crushet
.j Wall cracks in chemical labora:ory.
d
' O CEILING Op. WAL!. ".3UNTED ~IXTIRES j
Asses::s panels er :::i;r.:. :D-T 1 <n::hef Of'-
e 5
UNAN*H"E D E0"IDv.Eh7 e
Unan:nore: tur:ine oil :coier slid en pedestal. (Uni: 3)
26 MISCELLANE0US Two grounding insulators failed.
e-Lightning arrestor in switchyard broken. (Unit 1) e Guide Bracing on mud drum bent. (Unit 2) e OPERABILITY:
Units I and 2 -
. Shut down for scheduled-maintenance at time of
]
e A
Units 3 and 4 -
N Operating at time of earthquake.
Both units tripped.
e 1-Unit 3 brought back on line 15 minutes after event.
e
[
Unit 4 required repairs to generator excitor cooling e
water lines.
Brought back on line 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after event.
,j I
4 e
6 g
e m
27 EARTHQUAKE:
C0ALINGA '
FACILITY:
MAIN OIL PUMPING PLANT PGA:
0.60G DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION Plant serves as main collection point for oil produced e
in Coalinga area and pumped into main pipeline towards refineries in San Francsico area.
i DATE BUILT l
Built originally in 1967, expanded in 1980.
e j
)
BUILDINGS 2
Four buildings contain control house and shop, four e
large ground-mounted oil storage tanks and three water
-]
storage tanks.
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EOUIPMENT e
Plant includes: Exposed and buried pipe, oil and water pu=cs, heat exchangers, globe and gate operated valves, m :cr-cw..; ol centers and switchgear.
D M GE:
AN~-!G3.ED EDUPMENT Three oil neaters sli::>ad :neir an:ncrage and siid e
seven1 in:nes. A:: acned small core piping Droke.
Swit:nyard transfer pulled loose from an:nor bolts e
and s Hd several in:nes an its concrete cac,. breaking
~
eie :rical : nner: ions.
5 i :nycrd tr ntfr-scr Ins sc: :# 1.W. 5 ".::npez-in e
slan; yard sli: sed from an:n - chas and slic one in:-
E:uip:nen: was endanzgsd.
Cm MCC pulled its an:hcr boi:s and slid severai e
in:nes.
4.*
28 a
i 4 kV'switchgear assembly pulled or sheared its anchor o
bolts and slid into conduit flange embedded in floor, denting bottom channel and cabinet walls of switchgear.
Switchgear remained operational.
Instrument rack in switchgear room f ailed its anchor e
bolt,s.
Instrucments slid from their mountings.
UNANCHORED EQUIPMENT Unanchored portions of control board moved.
e j
3 Two unanchored computer cabinets overturned.
e
,I.
e One unanchored MCC slid several inches.
A 1
PIPING AND COMPONENTS
.]
One oil storage tank leaked at junction of tank wall and e
buried discharge line causing oil spill at base of tank.
_i Second tank found to have cracks in tank wall and e
connected piping.
About 2/3 PVC conduit carryin g power cable out of underground lines into pumps and motor operated valves 7, _
suffered cracking or rupture.
i
{
STRUCTUE5 1-Some :-a: king in con:-ete tio:k :::: cl building.
e i
MISCELLANEDUS Sar:ery rack hekin; 12:eral restraint los: batteries.
f 4
d fr.-ing et-:ncuake, swit:hyard transforiner se:obing 0:17,ASILITY:
e cower :: :lan: r. lief its an:ner 5:1:s anf siit,
- -eak n: c'.e::ricai ::nte::::ts an: :i: ::::r; ::-~e" #:-
a:GG ID nour5.
b mQ Q Qs
29 1
l i
EARTHQUAKE:
COALINGA:
l FACILITY:
PLEASANT VALLEY PUMPING PLANT t
l PGA:
0.59G*
DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION Pumping plant draws water from San Luis canal through a e
branch canal, lif ts it about 200 feet and discharges it to Coalinga canal about 1 mile west of plant for
]
agricultural and domestic use.
j )
f; DATE BUILT I
e 1969..
I I
i i
i BUILDINGS One-story rigid (unbraced) steel-framed building e
supported by massive reinforced concrete basement and raft foundation.
/,
One inen expansion joint runs north-south along shorter e
dimension of structure, rougnly at midpoin of building.
i l-i i
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EOUTPMENT 5: eel superstru:::ure nouses nine ele::ri: pu:n motors, e
eie::ricai :=n:-ci a::t orc e::ive ecuipmer.: and operato 's service bay.
M:::c-fiocr n::ses 2G-en oyerneat rane ia:ated 22.5.
feet above finisned fleer.
l Basemen floo- (ou== flocr) houses nine ve-tical nuu:as e
l and suppo ing me:nant:a1 e:uismen and strin;.
D M EE:
ACMG:.ED ECUI M C Five to ten stuc ::oits en rail sa:o::-tin; 2G-en : rant e
- o'.en n exsansien j:in and near : rant.
Orane stayed r
on rails.
9 eak g oun: a::elerati:n netsurc: n site 1
Y*.
l l
o.
a 30 e
Large transformers located adjacent to building broke loose from anenor bolts and slid. Remained operational, o
Stretched anchor bolts found on vertical backwash tank.
CEILING OR WALL-MOUNTED FIXTURES Several " egg-crate" light fixtures fell from ceiling of e
main operating bay and broke plastic face of one electrical relay and glass face of ammeter.
Both remained operational.
STRUCTURES e
Permanent lateral deformations of 1/4 ' inch to 1 inch noted between norther.n and southern parts of bui.lding at.
expansion joint.
MISCELLANEOUS e
One monitor in main control panel intermittently malfuntioning since earthquake.
Discharge gate into Coa 11nga canal f ailed to operate e
af ter earthquake due to ground slumping on canal embankment wnich severed power supply conduit to gate.
OPERABILITY:
o Plant in operation at time of earthouake. Restarted about 40 minutes after event.
e 89 9
h
31 EARTHQUAKE:
C0ALINGA SHELL WATER TREATMENT PLANT FACILITY:
r 0.60G PGA:
DESCRIPTION:
FilNCTION_
Plant demineralizes and filters water before it is injected as steam into oil wells in area.
e DATE BUILT 1981.
]
e I
BUILDINa5_
f 'l Main control house in one-story steel building.
e 1
!3 l'i MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL E00TPMENT tanks, pressure vessels, Ground-mounted oil storage demineralizers, filters, vertical tanks, horizontal e
water and oil pun:ss, heat exchangers, air compressors, piping and air operated valves.
l l~
....j ~:n :noIP 9 E j'
oil ner.e-s 51,,,,,
n as 2 in:nes ElthDUEh "#**~'
Tall verticpjije[9,.355 fjh,3
[r cf e e.anks I
e
. g.
walls and E. v.P,"2
,, caused stretching an.,.ailure of an:nor colt 5-
,3.j'.
, ~,
Many anics and etne',IE',%,I
[g3 nfe
.:ne-o c.,
.:-c %,ia ;r -- a.m.: u _. m.. s.= - u -
231,5 cr.: scal a ga e
as am a
- ,i h
s 32
~
UNANCHORED EQUIPMEN1 l
Ten inches on concrete foundation pads, severir.; shot t f
sections of attached line.,
e
,I PIPING AND COMPONENTS t
l Two inch pipe serving as level indicator came loose from
(
e vertical fiberglass tank.
Piping, with no lateral restraint, showed scratch marks, indicating displacements of several inches.
e I
u l
MISCELLANEOUS
],
One ground-mounted nil storage tank suffered an Other
- elephant's foot" buckle near base of wall.
e m]
tanks experienced sloshing of oil through roof vents.
Supoort structure of diatomaceous earth silo required e
~.1 replacement, o'
Power lost to plant during earthouake and all
- 1 OPERABILITY:
e
,j shut down.
days were required for repairs.
.J wx: :.
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i i
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33 e
i 4
EARTHQUAKE:
C0ALINGA a
UNION OIL BUTANE PLANT t
FACILITY:
i PGA:
0.60G i
i DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION Plant extracts gas from nearby wells, separates butane and propane by cryogenic liquef action process, and e
i
.I reinjects gas into wells.
1 a
m 4
DATE BUILT J
Built in 1946 originally, expanded in 1981
~
a e
l l
i BUILDINGS r
One-story concrete block laboratory and office.
1 e
Cryogenic systems controlled from small steel framed J-e building.
Several 1940's vintage one and two story steel framed buildings contain shops and large pas powered e
compressors for reinjection of gas into wells.
+
i MECHANI*A' A?O ELECTEICAL EOUISMENT l,
Ele =rical control systems, cryogeni: :nille-s, neat exchance-s, gas storage tanks, comaresse-s, f ans, air-e
}
valves, cu=2s, it-;s =:iin; tonr, and :131:5 coerate:
se:correc overnead on steel ra:ks an: columns.
i.
l j
AN"FS.ED EOUID"ENT_
- i DAMAEE:
heat ex:ntnpe- :cen ed en r: eel ar.d =asenry suroe-:9 n f 1 ~..
- re n t t 5 -e nne: ns ts:n:- ::.:1 ;- :t:
6 One main gas line ju=3ed 1- = s: ring pedestal supper b
}
e j
- ented en steek : ole =r..
?
IIEINE A?C *@DO'@i I
~
t tme i,:n ven ittes :r :-::tnef:::tne tan <s :-oke ir :.<:
l 11:es :n :: sit:in; an: -::cir; :# :In(s.
e
-- : -=
M k k
34 Piping routed near ground and supported on short steel L
pedestals resting on concrete pads experienced sliding e
of supports up to one inch.
Piping supported on overhiad racks or high steel columns e
displaced up to 6 inches on supports.
CEILING OR WALL-MOUNTED FIXTURES Suspended celining in control room failed.
e
~;
.1 STRUCTURES Ground settlement in plant yard caused spalling and 9
damage to several concrete pedestals of horizontal e
Ground settlement under butane / propane storage tanks.
Pipe was steel column left main gas line unsupported.
undamaged.
j Wooden cooling tower suffered internal damage to beams e
I and columns.
..I Reinf orced concrete block office and laboratory buildin5
l had extensive cracking in walls and permanent e
displacements of its shear walls.
Control house experienced separation of unreinforced l
infill brick walls from steel frame.
e Spalling of crout observed in foundations of tank and e
ecuipment installations.
t Eartncuake caused plant to sn= cown cue to anuation o' vibration sensors on steam turnine generators used to 03ERASILITY:
e Piant re=ained shu--d x orovioed poer to sc::ior-en
~
for ten days for inspection and repair.
- $J j
35 EARTHQUAKE:
MORGAN HILL UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CHEMICAL SYSTEMS PLANT FACILITY:
PGA:
0.50G l
DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION Research center for missile components.
e a
71 OATE BUILT 1960's. Expanded recently.
a; 1
BUILDINGS One-story steel and concrete tilt buildings.
e MECHANICAL ELECTRICAL EOUIPMENT_
Eighty cranes and hoists, many of them large cranes of e
size found in power plants.
- 1 1
DA'4AEE:
ANCHORED EQUIPMEtU Tall, verical licuid oxygen tank sheared its anchor s
")'
bolts and slid abc::: 6 in:nes.
Nitrogen betries c:cunted nc-izontally in steel rack snetred tneir weised =nneni::.s to rack ar.d siir_.
e Transfc-rers and s=i::npear slid sc: O s undt::: aged.
e
,p -
UNAN~dG:.ED EOUIPMEPG li La ge steel cter ranks = nili =s =cved en i
d founcati=r., due :: ia:k :' en:n= rape.
A-least ons e
l.
- n; ::nnnt::ic
.its :-xtr..
'l l
1,
> ~
e
.1
36 PIPING AND COMPONENTS Thirty-seven breaks reported in buried piping. Pipe e-diameters range from 6 to 10 inches buried at depths of 5 to 10 feet.
Most breaks occured in cast iron or concrete lined pipe, primarily at connections and were attributed to ground failures.
CEILING OR WALL-MOUNTED FIXTURES Suspended ceiling panels fell.
e Acoustical ceiling fixtures (such as lights) were e
reported to dislodge or fall.
Rod or chain suspended light fixtures in warehouses and e
~i' shops fell.
-j At least one case of f allen sheet' metal, ducti,ng occured.
e This impacted and damaged fire sprinkler piping.
l Roof mounted air conditioners slid. Air conditioning e
units were restrained with wrap-around plastic straps which did not have sufficient strength to resist horizontal seismic loads.
One cable tray failed.
e j
i sTau:TURES Steel building experienced stretched anchor bolts, i
e popped screws in steel siding and buckled diagonal bra:inc.
Con: rete tilt-up ouiicines experientec crackinc cf walls, b-oken weic connehions and one s:-mn; *iaiol e
panel.
1 MISCELLANEOUS Traile-s used as recoorary effice fa:ilities were e
- j kne:ked off suppo-: ja:xs.
_2 5e 1ar;t :iate ;i1:s
'n:o-I ~ nt: :.*. '.:s 3 - are.
and sna::ered usan i:::310 witn f10 r.
Lacoratories i :: glassware fro: shelves vitn sursecuen creakage.
Many 5:oktases, snelves and filin; :arine:s :c: pie:.
e e
Desk ::: e=isr:e.: sii :: #ic.
37 OPERABILITY:
Power lost to f acility f or several hours. Approximately two days required to bring fa:ility back to normal operation.
4 m
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9 J-m i
= _. _ _
i s
I
~
~
38
- +
f EARTHQUAKE:
MORGAN HILL i
l..
i i
FACILITY:
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINE, SANTA i
TERESA LABORATORY 2
f' PGA:
0.45G*
DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION r
t Large computer center for software development.
e i
1M DATE BUILT e
1977.
m
. j BUILDINGS 3
Each of eight ductile moment resisting four-story steel e
frame towers are crucifom in plan with four wings.
i Towers connected to main circulation and service areas
- ?
l by a single story structure.
Structures are on alluvial plane varying from 40' to e
r 100' deep.
J Curtain wall panels suspended at two points to allow for e
ra: king as building defle::s.
i
..i MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICA'. EDUIDMEh~t l
Piping througnou: f t:ility recently retrofitted with l
e seismic tra:1:;.
i
~
DAP/J.E:
PIPIfiB A!;D CO@0NI!CS l
=
One 2* plasti: pipe bu-ied in patic area brose.
d e
i t
CEILING GE **AL'.-MC's" CEC FIX~id.ES i
Several suspen:cd :tilin; ti'ies ocoped out.
e Itak g*;'.*rst L;; tier 1 $ 7 l*.
t.
= 1.
=
=b.1::".
+
39 STRUCTURES' Scraping at expansion joints between towers.
e ho outside power loss despit some damage to nearby e
Metcalf substation s
No outside power loss despite some damage to nearby OPERABILITY:
e Metcalf substation.
6 1
I G
esa i
9 e
m
- =
l
i 40 4
i
[
1 EARTHQUAKE:
MORGAN Hil,L FACILITY:
WILTRON ELECTRONICS FACILITY j
l'
~
PGA:
0.30G TO 0.40G i
4 l
DESCRIPTION:
FUNCTION l
Manuf actures microwave connunication equipment.
e 1
(
i i 7 DATE BUILT i
- \\
e 1970's.
l I
4 l
BUILDINGS l
Fifteen year old reinforced concrete tilt-up building e
with plywood diaphram roof. Roof supported with glu-lam i
giroers, wood beams, steel columns. Beams supported by i
i steel seats. Beams and girders positively anchored to tilt-up walls.
4 DAMEE:
CEILING OR WA!.L-MOUNTED FIXTURE.S i
a Tiles fell from suspended ceiling.
s i
I Two circular du::ing f ailures e
Several suspenned inmunrial lign: fix.utes feli.
e j
sMw.Es 1
Recking of exterior building walls cracked t'jacent e
i interior walls.
I
~1 e
Roof cracking.
I I
r M* S:E'.1 AN!0L'S heoprene wintos git:in; it. scme neel mulliens c::Det e
cut.
i I
Soloer sloshed est c' anc=t:sc s:1cerer, sclesnin; en l
negrey walls, ceilin; an: fi::.
e a
j i
i
?
F s
41 EARTHQUAXE:
MORGAN HILL FACILITY:
METCALF SUBSTATION PGA:
0.30G d
DESCRIPTION:
BUILDINGS Two one-story concrete block control houses and one I
e
'l switchyard.
MECHANICAL ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ij Control houses contain electrical cabinetry with relays, e
-l ammeters, annuciators, switches, battery racks, charger and distribution panels.
All cabinetry is anchored.
~
e Switchyard eouipment includes silicon nextflouride e
circuit breakers and oil-cooled transformers.
I DAKAGE:
MISCELLANEOUS i
Ceramic column on ene silicon flouride circucit breaker i
e broke.
Ligntning arrestor on transformer broke.
e O
la
.Ia h
J T.?
- *.=
u
o 42 EARTHQUAKE:
MORGAN HILL FACILITY:
SAN MARTIN WINERY PGA:
0.30G DESCRIPTION:
DATE BUILT e
Between 1930 and 1940.
I i
BUILDINGS Buildings include a wood-f rame wine tasting building, a j
e reinforced brick bottling building with a wood roof housing tall unanchored redwood tanks, a small sheet 7
metal clad building housing tne boilers, a wood frame 3
compressor building with sheet metal walls and roof supported by wood truss system, and a single story cold i
l room building.
The cold room building was constructed in two stages e
between 1979 and 1982 and house.s several dozen large stainless steel wine tanks.
l PICHANICAL ELECTRICAL EQUIPFiNT Tank f arm consists of numerous thin-walled stainless l
e steel tanks an:nored to a emierete slab.
l DA*/Ji:
ACIORED EQUIPuih*T At tank f arr, 40,'100 tanks had bu:kled walls,13/200 e
itaked, rany :.ani r, Duliet at:nct solts.
I J
FIFINIANDCOMDONEhT5 hall no-e steam pipin; deveicoed lents due to excessive e
- L.. ssier.
Mine-leaks in va:er and gas lines.
OEI' ING G8. A' t-MOUNTED FIYTb?.E5 h:s c:uipment untre. aged in:1cd1n; HVA", cenveyers, e
coc:oressors, refrigeratier., wine :en:r fuges an: small d
D:::::s. Ec: nun; HVA: units and lign: fix:::res di: n::
1all.
D.'.CJ:.E!
l
.:
22
=
.,L4M f
43 In b5ttling building, wall pulled away from roof in e
several locations and loosened bricks in pilasters.
Several tall unancnored redwood tanks slipped from their supports and tilted but were essentially undamaged.
Bottling conveyer shif ted'several inches but was undamaged.
In tioiler room, old, unreinforced firebrick insulating e
structures of the boilers collapsed. Boilers were replaced.
in compressor building, roof truss developed tears.
e Back wall bowed outwards about 8 inches. One steam line e
fell due to failure of support.
l ]it in laboratory butiding, minor cracking and loosening of e
plaster from lath backing.
lq l
.)
MISCELLANEOUS In cold room building, wine tanks suffered wall buckling, spalling of concrete support pads at anchor e
i locations and impact between tanks, catwalks, columns and walls.
j In wine tasing building, about half of bottles fell from e
shelves and broke.
y In barrel room building, few bassels fell.
e In case goods warehouse, wine cases shifted but did not i
e fall.
t
],
a I
1a I
~
3:
E C -4.3
44 EARTHQUAKE:
MORGAN HILL FACILITY:
EVERGREEN COMMUNITY COLLEGE PGA:
0.10G TO,0.20G DESCRIPTION:
BUILDINGS Several 9 year old precast concrete structures.
~
e
]
DAMAGE:
PIPING AND COMPONENTS 01 Movement of rod hanger.s scratched supported welded pipe.
e
- l
-)
CEILING OR WALL-MOUNTED FIXTURES Several suspended ceiling mounted return air grills 4
7 e
.)
popped open.
Ceiling tiles around perimeter of building fell.
e
]
J STRUCTUPIS Old cracks in suspended concrete walkway widened.
I o
1 7
i MISC ' I Ah~DUS.
Bo::le of femaldenyne fell frts counter top in lan.
e Five thousand books fell f tc shelves in library.
e Several hundred.casset_es fell ="f rolling rzck wnien l.
e
~'
had. tipped over.
L Cocouter ins: pt*,e-d=-ing edeuake.
j orgy;3-Tv-1 M
e MS,
=
- OC
~
45 4.
SEISMIC INTERACTIONS BASED ON EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE Various seismic interaction scenarios can be studied from the seismic experience data base.
The term seismic intera'ction is liberally defined here as any potentially damaging occurrence that results from impact or interference of adjacen't equipment during an earthquake.
Seismic interac-tions that have been observed in past earthquakes are discussed below in the order of their rate of occurrence and the apparent hazard they create.
A l
summary of interaction scenarios is presented in Table 4-1 which condenses the relevant seismic damage observed at the various data base sites.
-d 4.1 Slidine Eauipment t
I e
The most comon. fann of seismic damage to equipment in earthauakes is due to sliding or (less frequently) overturning. Examples of sliding equipment causing extensive damage are seen at several sites affected by the Coalinga earthquake, at the Main Oil Pumping Plant and at the Shell Water Treatment P l ant. In the San Fernando earthquake, much of the damage in the Sylmar Converter Station, and at the Olive View Sanatorium occurred because of j
shding or overturning equipment. Extensive equipment sliding was also observed at the United Technologies Chemical Plant after the Morgan Hill erthcuake. Tne most common form of damage caused by sliding equipment is the tea-ing cf attached piping c conduit which has inadecuate flexibility to at ocr;odate tne i=acsed displacement. A few cases Of slidinc equipment in:carring adjacent eouipment have been seen, as at the Olive View Sana:c-iu=. In nearly all cases, damage due ::. sliding er ove :rned e: i;-
I. -
' inent can be trated To a lack of an:no age for ne ecuig.ne.a c mewrepe whien was grossly unae sized for he experienced seis=ic loads. Figures 4-1
}
- n-ougn 2-3 include pho:rprtshs cf ecuipment that slid at various sites in One SOU; da a base.
i
~
4.? Fallin: Ceiline Firtures Ceiling fixtures in:1cce any installation r eteinment se:certed froc a te.iiing, i.e, suspenced a:custi:al :silings, H'.*C cc::in;, air ::nditi:ning
- - heate
- i_s, and lign: fix_ es. By far :ne =:s: co=:n seismi: ca= age
46 i
TABLE 4-1 SEISMIC INTERACTION SCENARIOS AT DATA BASE FACILITIES Falling Ceiling Pipe / Valve unancnored Anchored or Wall Eartnauake Facility Structure Ecut wnent Ecuiomant Fixtures l
San Fernando Burbank Fawer Plant Glendale Power Plant Olive view Senatorium x
x x
Pasaoena Power Plant j
Rinaldi Aeceiving Station x
h Saugus Substation Sylmar Converter Station x
x x
Valley Steam Plant x
)
Vincent Sunstation x
Point hugu Oneond Beacn Gen. Station x
Santa Clara Sunstation Humboldt County humboldt Bay Power Plant Santa Barbara Ellwood Peaker Power Plant Goleta Suestation Fe ndale humooldt Bay Power Plant laoerial Valley El Centro Steam Gen. Plant x
x x
}
hagmsmax Gecttve-zial Piar.
i toalinga Anmee-Gas hete-ing 5:ztien Chevron Cleantg Plant x
Coalinga Feed fr-d x
x Coalinsa hase Leny= ration 1:2: ten x
l Coalinga Sunstation 2 x
Coelinga Sansmion 2 x
sah=:a az.e-Fih z:t== Fle=
x
- ., _,c i.wien x
te:tiema. &as Lac esse-1.z:ttr.
hain Dil hacing Pla:.
x x
Pl=e. Valley hacing 21r-t x
San Ms r 4 h==:t=; 1:z:1or.s 2
3 Sneli Leny= z: ion Fle=
2 r
Snell wzte-irez: men: Plant x
x te:ter: Dil : ma Pla=:
x
]
herpen eff11 p s Inna.-=ity Celicoe x
IP. - S m Te esa Lase z c x
i=s W Sc=s:z:2:r.
cW Sc=:.z:w-
- . ass:..::.r Sa= r.e-:t: V:ne y x
tr.i.ec Ternnelogies Plan.
x x
Wil: m Eie::v.::s F::ility x
x 9
e g#
e e
r-w~
47 to ceiling fixtures is f a'lling suspended ceiling panels. These acoustical ceiling panels are sufficiently light that they rarely cause damage, and are regarded as more of an inconvenience than a real hazard. One exception was seen at the Sylmar Converter Station where the' entire suspended ceiling fell (including steel supports) in the control room. Even in this instance, however, the control pan'els were undamaged. Falling ceiling-mounted equip-ment is rare, in spite of the f act that such equipment is usually suspended by very flexible rod hangers. In the Morgan Hill earthquake ceiling-4j suspended HVAC ducting at the United Technologies Chemical Plant was reported to have f allen on fire sprinkler piping, resulting in water leaks.
].
At the nearby Wiltron Electronics Facility a cantilevered section of ducting separated from the main plenum and fell.
In the Coalinga Earthquake,
]
ceiling-suspended light fixtures fell in.the Pleasant Valley Pum;5ing Planti-resulting in superficial damage to'the control panels. Witnin the f acili-
~;
ties that have been-investigated in the SQUG program, no instances have been reported of falling ceiling-suspended heating or air-conditioning units, or of similar equipment such as intercom speakers or emergency lighting.
With the exception of suspended ceilings (which careful design of suspension j
systems would mitigate), the hazard presented by f alling ceiling fixtures is relatively rare based on past earthquake experience. Examnles of f alling ceiling fixtures are seen in Figures ' ' though t--13 from various sites in the date Aase.
4.3 Pinine I:ma:t t
.L
-e a VZs uuca.
6y UT p 6p usy ~1n 1 WTUe TangE
.i ine exDe*1tnce Gata base Lvuic.a443 cf sizes, configurations, and operating conditions. Each power plan unit
,j contains on the order of 100 runs of pipin_:. Within tne 30 units that have been inves'i,med in T.ne SOUE :-cg a,- Se invent y cf rising is es-i=ated I
n 3300 rurd
(~ run of piping is cefine as a se:: ion of line from antnor point to anchor point, e.g., from a cu:0 to a tank. Each run of piping would re:uire a separne analy-ical cel if lot:s were calcula en.) ine aeditional pe reche=ical facilities, pu= sing piants, and : ner inouscrial ficilities na: nave been investi;a:e: ine ease :ne eni nec cipin: inven-
- y : a cand 5000 :.s.
..u: sf :nis izin; is ::ite re:reseniniye Or
a 48 less braced than piping configurations of the Millstone III plant, in particular the Non-seismic piping. Almost all of the piping systems in the experience data base were not specifically designed for seismic loads, and are often quite flexible.
Most of the data base f a'cilities experienced earthquake ground motion well in excess of the Safe Shutdown Event (SSE) for the Millstone site (refer to Table 3-2). The seismic loads on piping would, in general, have been much l
higher than the SSE loads on Millstone piping systems.
In spite of these high seismic loads, damage to piping systems is almost always associated The j
with sliding heavy equipment creating differential anchor movements.
a few inertial f ailures of piping seem to be associated with excessive corro-sion. As long as piping is provided at least with minimal restraint for dead load, as in compliance with some standard such as the National Fire Protection Code or the American National Standard ANSI B3L1, and is reason-ably well maintained, piping appea-s to be inmune from seismic damage due to inertial loads, e
Tne impact of piping with adjacent piping and with adjacent structures is a comuon occurrence in tne earthquakes that were studied. 6fnere the piping is insulated, with a light sheet metal lagging wrapping the insulation, dents I
are often seen where piping icoa:Is c: Curred. The presence of these insela-i tion dents provide an indication of One defle:: ion of Ine piping during ne ea-tncuake, based on the clearance between the dented piping and the ad.i.a-Cent structure where contact was made. Deflections of seve-al intnes are
- =n:en io-fiexi51e uns c' pioin_:.
In spite of tne large invento y of piping in the data base, its lack of seismic desien, and tne hign levels cf seismic motion tnat have been experi-
~
enced, instances c' rising c.asag-e are ra e h causes =he-Inan sliding e ui: ment. In oa-ticciar, piping in no-er piants rareiy f ails in spite Of Muen Ine high coerating temperatures anc pressures of many of :ne systems.
of the piping is rc :ed in nign censity Ocnfituraticas si:n fiericie lines running very close tope:ner c even in Ocnta:. IDans curing ear ncuakes a e then unavoida:ic. Tnere is a very hign carpin ir :ipin; svs e_. s Ic aOsOTD :nese "l:3a= lCats, =0 = = I :nei n:M al Dead IGad, Oe ati:r.al 6
yy
m 49 loads (temperature and pressure), and the inertial loads induced by the earthquake.
It is important to note that pipe systems include not just the piping, but also the pipe supports and pipe-mounted components such as valve operators and instrument transducers. The high' tolerance for seismic loads in piping systems extends to the operability of pneumatic and motor-operated valves. With the exception described below, the data base includes no instances of pipe-supported components rendered inoperable during an earth-quake, or of equipment such as pumps or heat exchangers damaged by the seismic reactions of attached piping. Table 3-2 provides details on the performance-of piping systems in the larger and more heavily shaken data base f acilities.
.1 Out of the hundreds of instances of seismic interaction of piping systems
- that would be included in the experience data base, only one instance of a damaging interaction has occured. This instance was the failure of the cast iron yoke of an air-operated valye at the El Centro Steam Plant in the Imperial Val 1Yy earthquake. The yoke failure was due to impact of the valve operator with an adjacent steel column (see Figure 5-18).
Figures 4-14 through L-18 illustrate some of the typical piping systems contained within f acilities that have been investigated. A more detailed treatment of piping interaction is presented in the following chapte.
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Diring systets a e si::tia :: :n:se foun: i- :ne El "en:re clan:.
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68 5.
THE SEISMIC INTERACTION OF PIPING To illustrate the margin inherent in piping systems to impact loads during earthquakes, the El Centro Steam Plant is studied in greater detail. The
~
El Centro Plant is chosen as an example for the following reasons:
3 1.
The plant was the most heavily shaken, and the most heavily damaged of the seven major power plants reviewed in detail in the SQUG program.
y 2.
A ground motion record of more than 0.50g peak horizontal ground acceleration was taken at the site.
3.
The plant includes four fossil-fueled units, ranging in size from 20 MW to 80 MW, and in vintage from 1949 to 1968. A wide variety of piping configurations is present only a few of the primary piping systems in the newest unit are designed for seismic loads.
1 A brief description of the power plant and the 1979 Imperial Valley earth-i quake which affected the plant are provided in tne section below.
I 5.1 The El Centro 5:ez= Pla :t and the 197Mw ial Valie &ar-lauake Tne In:perial Valley earthauake occu red on 0 coe-15,1979_near the town of El Centro, Calife nia. Tne area affer:ed oy :ne ea :ncuake is illes-j.
trated in rign e 15-1. Tne ain event trad 1 magnitude of 6.6 with strong zo:iorr lz3 ing amou 15 seconas. Asproximately 50 strong motion recorcs 1
were taken at distances frac 4 tc 2 miles from the epicenter, wnich *Es J
10:a:ed just south of :ne Mexica-b:-cer. Seve al -e rds e e taker 1 oc ins. ruren s less nan C.5 =i.ies irm :ni :.::.u e: flu i;. A vertical a :ei-e ation of 1.74, tne hignest ever rece :!ed, was measured a: Inis location.
5 Tne sa:ne area na: Deen struck by an ea Incuake on May 1E, 1940. The record taken a: El Centro from ina: ea.n:.:a<.e nas neen use: in :ne seis=1:
analyses ar.:' designs ::f several na:'.sar ::~cr slants in :ne 2 and a:r:Id.
59 Detailed data were collected by EQE at tne El Centro Steam Plant, which is the principal electric-power-generating f acility of the Imperial irrigation District. The plant is about 3 miles from the causative fault and about 16 miles from the earthquake's epicenter (see Figu're 5-1).
The soil at the site consists of very deep alluvial deposits composed primarily of stiff to hard clay interlain with laminations of silty clay ' loam and sandy loam.
The El Centro Plant is shown in Figure 5-2.
It has four natural gas-fired j
units with oil fuel as a backup. Units 1, 2, and 3 were designed by Gibbs and Hill and were built in 1949,1952, and 1957, respectively. Unit 4 was oesigned by Fluor and was built in 1968. The turbine buildings, turbine pedestals, and boiler structures are constructed on reinforced-concrete
'j floating-raf t foundations. Each unit is structurally isolated from the 8
otners. Each boiler structure is a structural-steel-braced frame. The boiler is suspended.from the top of the frame.
The seismic design criteria for the Unit 4 structure is based on a lateral static force equivalent to 20 percent of the dead and live loads. Seismic design criteria for the structures of Units 1, 2, and 3 were not" located, 1
but they were probably similar to those for Unit 4.
The equipment at the a
plant is generally anchored. Tnere are no special seismic design provisions otner tnan anchorages.
A strong motion instrument recorded the ground I
accelerations from tne Imoerial Valley Eartnquake, at a location about 10E yards froc tne plant. Peak ground at:elerations of 0.51c (no-th-soutn),
0.37g (east-west), and 0.91g (vertical) were recorded. Tne response spectra asse:iated vi:n th:se e ound c:c: ion re cres a t snoc ir. Figu es 5-3 n ough j
5-5.
Tne design-basis spectra for Tne Millstone III P12ntire suyo.. gused for cocoarison purposes.
2 i
E.? Dirine ir os ET t ? e P17-:
s In general, seismic loads were not considered in the design of piping or pine su:co-ts 10 any of tne El Centro :ian: units. An exces: ion is :ne pri ary piping systems of Uni: 4 - tne main steam and feenwater lines.
Tnese syste=s were designed fer a 0.2't; static n:ri: ntal load to a:: Uni 10 seis=i: die::s. Alioeable 1:ars e_re tken frcs :ne ASI' ~;ce E22 y
,,.--_--.r--
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75 for power plant piping. As a result, a few hydraulic snubbers are found on the Unit 4 main steam lines. Piping in the older units, has no sign of any seismic consideration in design; the piping is supported for dead load only.
Pipe supports are primarily rod or spring hangers.
Piping ranges from essentially rigid to very flexible, depending on length of run. Piping runs were found with response frequencies as low as 1 Hz. Most piping is carbon steel, although a few stainless steel lines are associated with the water j
demineralization systems. The piping includes both threaded connections in the low pressure lines, such as in the component cooling or fire water 7
systems; or a combination of welded and flanged connections in the high g
pressure systems such as steam or feedwater.
Piping ranges in size from a
]
large inventory of pneumatic instrument tubing (typically 1/2-inch -
diameter), up to 18-inch lines in the main steam system. All high tempera-ture lines are insulated, typically with a 1-1/2-inch to 3-inch layer of calcium silicate wrapped in sheet metal lagging, or an equivalent insula-Pressures range up to 1800 psi for the feedwater piping, or 1500 psi tion.
At the for the main steam lines, with temperatures of up to 1000 degrees F.
time of the earthquake, Units 3 and 4 were operating, so that piping was subjected to normal operational loads, as well as seismic-induced loading.
5.3 Seismi Damace to Picin:
Following :ne ea-the.uake, an inspection was made of :ne plant to locate In the days obvious damage prior to restoring the plant to the power g-id.
Inat foliowed :ne ea-:heuakt, ::n e Incrcegn inyesti;a icas we e renc:: Ed, both by theylant Sperara-s, znd by vz-ious i:ngineering vi uugs Inzt visited tne plant to collect seismic performance ca:a. Tnese groups included a cocbined tezm cf E and Lawrence Live more National Laboratcry engines s.
A n:r:De cf octalled a::ours a e de-de e avtilable en seis=ic damage a-
- ne cian, intiuding :ne pian:. opera:ior.s io; a :ne time cf :ne event.
j Damace to piping can be sumarized as follows (refer again to Table 3-2):
Several L-in:n lines in :ne Ltnits 3 and 4 ny::cgen and i
e penera:cr ex:ite-tooling tate sys;e s re::-ene: =c osi:n
.i. acks L*ia nad beer. t-eVi:: Sly veIf racaire'
.I
l
. g.
76
-d A two-inch component cooling water line cracked at a Victraulic e
An unanchored filter tank slid, breaki6g a small attached line.
e The impact of in'sulated lines, such as the main steam line, on e
adjacent steelwork, caused dents in the sheet metal lagging wrapping the insulation.
No damage to the piping occurred.
i 1
The cast-iron yoke on an air-operated valve located on a very e
. )'
flexible steam extraction line on the third floor of Unit 4
-3 broke due to impact with an adjacent steel column.
Only the last item in the list of piping damage could be classed as a non-trivial seisn.ic interaction.
5.4 Review of Pioino Systems at the El Centro Plant i
In tne course of data collection activities at the El Centro Plant for the SQUG program and other related projects, a survey of much of the piping in the four units was performed. This survey consisted of a walkdown of the majo piping systems in each unit. During this walkdo,(n photographs were taken of the major se= ions of line, and ae: ails recorded on the piping Inis construction (size, type of hangers, locations of coc:conents, e::.).
review c' piping systems is organized in a series of cara books wnien inciudes photographs s' pe-hars nalf ne runs Of pip n in ne four units of the p' lint.
Tc illus rzte tne general resistance cf piping systems to seismic intera:-
tion czmaos, a sz=cle seis=i: riring iteracien study es Oe-f~"~' "
- El Centro Pian:. inis in;eracion stucy reoresens ne progra: : ~entiy being performed for the Millstone III Plant, considering tne interaction of Non-Category I pipin: on Categcry I siping. Tne Ei Ce= ro intera= ion study is based on a review of tne nundreds Of photogra ns F:fpin_: runs in:luded in tne pla= cata books. Pc ential in:eranion s:ent-irs were inenified m~1erever Ci3ing a ;eare: :: De fleXi;le and a74ere 00$} i iew in n-Is 6
- m..
(
n 77
~
clearance between adjacent piping or structures exists. From dents in sheet metal lagging on insulated lines, it is known that flexible piping (i.e.,
piping with response frequencies of 2 or 3 Hz), swayed as much as 6 inches during the earthquake. The purpose of the El Centro interaction review, therefore, is to locate instances where piping impact probably occurred during the earthquake. This compares with the review of the Millstone III piping which locates potential interactions that could occur during a design-basis earthquake.
s Seismic interaction scenarios were identified and grouped into the following ten categories:
J 1.
Impacts of adjacent insulated lines of the same size
}
2.
Impacts of adjacent insulated lines of different sizes 3.
Impacts of adjacent non-insulated lines of the same size Impacts of adjacent non-insulated lines of different sizes 4.
5.
Impacts of non-insulated lines on insulated lines of the same size 6.
Impacts of non-insulated lines on insulated lines of a different size 7.
An insulated line impacting an adjacent steel structure 8.
A non-insulated line i=oa::ing an adjacent structure S.
A pipe cocoonent such as a valve nperator icaa :ing an adjacen: stru=u' e
- 10. A pipe cocoonent impacting an adjacent line A total of TneTesults of the interaction study z e stma ;z=d it. Tabit 5-1.
290 potential interactions' were identified, ei her of piping potentially i=oacting adjacent piping or potentially icoacting adjacent stru.ves.
Only a DC-tion o' Oe piping in W. 01a= is included in -he uno ograstic re:cras avaiiasie Tne seismic in era = ion review is nerefore conserva-1 Out of tne tively low in identifying all potential interanion scenarios.
samle of 290 icentified potential intera= ions, one interaction a=ually A similar iead to camage - :ne broken yoke on the air-coerated valve.
i=eranien study could be made f r ea:n tf :ne seven :aser piants inciuced
--m
o 78 TABLE 5-1 RESULTS OF THE PIPING INTERACTION STUDY FOR A PORTION OF THE EL CENTRO' POWER PLANT J
DESCRIPTION OF INTERACTION NO. OF INTERACTIONS 77 l
INSULATED PIPE SAME SIZE
~
INSULATED PIPE DIFFERENT SIZES 27 y
32 l
NON-INSULATED PIPE SAME SIZE 6
i NON-INSULATED PIPE DIFFEREENT SIZES 20
-INSULATED /NON-INSULATED PIPE SAME SIZE 31 INSULATED /NON-INSULATED PIPE DIFFEPINT SIZES 31 I4 INSULATED PIPE /STRUCTUPI I
a NON-INSULATED PIPE /5TRUCTUPI 21 i
4 4'
YALE /STRICTUPI 3
VALYE/ PIPE i
aus;*_ XI?EER C3 INTEEA~TIONS IDEhTIFIF_D
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79 in the data base. Each piant would contain comparable amounts of piping of similar construction. For reference all power plants are listed below:
Earthquake Plant No. of Units San Fernando Valley Power Plant 4
Burbank Power Plants 6
Glendale Power Plant 5
Pasadena Power Plant 3
1 Point Mugu Ormond Beach Plant 2
Eureka Humboldt Bay Power Plant 3
Imperial Valley El Centro Power Plant 4
I o
An approximate measurement of the intensity of seismic motion experienced by l
each of these plants is provided by the peak ground accelerations listed in
~
Table 3-1.
~.
Figures 5-5 :nrougn 5-19 in:lude pnotographs of typical piping installations at :ne El Cent-o Plant, in:luding icer.:ified potr.:s Of Orc:: ale seisti:
intefaction during the Imperial Valley ea-tnquake.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOPMENDATIONS FOR CRITERIA From the review of the experience data base provided in the previous l
chapters, several conclusions can be formulafe'd with respect to various types of seismic interaction important to the Millstone III Plant.
L1 Pipino Systems
==
Conclusions:==
Several thousand runs of piping are included at various facilities within i
These data base piping g
the seismic experience data base (see Section 4.3).
systems range from relatively stiff lines routed near the ground, to j
flexible piping routed through the upper floors of steel support boiler In general the range of characteristics of the data base piping structures.
}
Based on the systems envelope piping sytems installed in Millstone III.
measured or estimated ground motion at the various sites, the data base j
piping systems were subjected to seismic loads and excitation comparable Seismic loads or greater than what would be expected for the Millstone SSE.
were usually not considered in the design or installation of most of the
)
j As a result, much of tne piping is quite flexible, and data base piping.
l frequently routed in dense configurations where in:oa:t between adjacent piping, e piping and adja:ent stru::ures is a cournon occurrence during I
In spite of these farts, seismic damage due to the
]
strong an d queat interaction of piping systems is almost unknown. Only one instance of a seisci: ally-in:iuted f ailure due c i=sa:: has c:: red in over 40 dt:a base Piping syste=s in general have a very high titerance t-f acilities reviewed.
fa-interaction du-ing earthquakes.
Ed in Tne di:r,la:crent of :iping cu-in; ea-: ::akes is frc:vently c'le::
oents found on insulation wnere pipin; i=sa::e: aca:en steel stru=ures
]
Piping displacements of up to 6 inches are co::rr.on fer flexible lines (1 R:
~
fundamental response fre:;uen:y) in some cf :ne :cre heavily snamen ca:a base Tnese levels of plans, such as the four units of tne El Cen:rc Plant.
seis=1: resconse are co., arable to :ne =axi=== leveis c' rese:nse sna: :ne Millstone I~2 :ia= :cuid realistically ene:: =rin; its oesi?-basis
r 7
e 95
~
earthquake. For flexible piping these displacements correspond to peak response velocities of about 30 inches /second. This velocity corresponds to the speed of a slow walk (2 miles / hour).
It is not surprising then that
l seismic damage due to pipe impact is essentiafly unknown. The experience data base indicates that piping has sufficient margin to absorb impact loads associated with these levels of seismic response motion, even in combination with normal gravitational, operational, and inertial seismic loads.
'"1 Reconnendations:
]
The observations discussed above can be applied to the review of the Millstone III Plant where a potential seismic interaction has been identi-
]
fied involving pipe impact. ' Based on the experience data base the following recommendations are,made:
1
- 1..The impact of Category I piping on adja:ent structures should J
not be considered a credible hazard with respect to loss of
}
fluid contents or restriction of flow area. The impa::t or interference of Hen-category I piping on Category I piping should not be considered a credible hazard unless both of the following conditions exist:
1-a.
The ratio of dianpu-s of the piping is _reate-tnan 3 to 1, c
e.c., a 6-in:h Mon-catego y I line intera: ting with a 1-in:h.
Catego y I line.
1-b. Tne Cdcey 7 piping has insufficient flexibility to acconno-d$tte the marinum credible displacement of the imoa: ting hon-1]
cztega y I piping. ror exa= ale, if tne icaa::ing horr-category 2nd
! ri:ing has a maxi:::s :-e.fitle di::1a:ere ;; Of 4 in:hES,
]
t is routed :nrougn a poin:. 3 in:nes 1ro: a :tteg y I 1 int.,
the Category I line should be able to displa:e 1 inen withou
~
loss of safety fun: tier ine flexibility f ne Ca.eg: y I piping can be assessed by hand ex:itation de-ing the plan walkcoc Tne maxi =:.:a credinie dit:.a:erar.: Of pi;ing cJring
~
o e I
r 96 the design-basis earthquake can be determined in one of the following ways:
Experience has shown that piping displacement e
(sway) during earthquakes will almost never exceed 6 inches.' This conclusion is based on the perfor-n mance of piping in power plants subjected to ground motion that far exceeded the predicted ground motion of the Millstone design-basis event. A seismic displacement of 6 inches is therefore a reasonable limit for maximum credible displacement i
(also see Item 3 below).
The displacement of moderately stiff piping (3 Hz e
S frequency or greater), should not approach 6 1
3 inches. A method for estimating piping disp 1 ace-ment that takes credit for piping stiffness is outlined below. Estimates or measurements of the fundamental frequency of the piping can be mt.de by hand excitation during the plant walkdown. The floor response spectra for the particular area within the plant will provide estimates of the piping response displacement corresponding to ne lowest pipe frequen:y. The use of response spectra
~~
corresponding to 5 percent damping is reconrnended.
re ces: a eas vi:nin :ne F.i11s:.:ne III P1an: mese
)
spectral tfisplacements do not r.coroach 6 inches for piping frequencies aDove 2 Itz.
_1 2.
Tr>e f ailt. e o' ;i:in; a: t:v e-1, it. pr.1:u l a-v al ve cperators is a cretisle (al:ncugn unlicely) na: art, case: on the one seismic interaction f ailure of :ne cas -iron yoke of
~
an air-operato-at he El Centre Pla.:.
Par:icular at:.ention should be given to ace:ua:e :learan:e between valve operators and adjaren: s:-u::::-es, e: intent, an: cipin;.
Ase:uate
- learan:t snoul: de ju:;.t: ry :ne ruit :na: seis i: oefle:-
f~l 97 tions of piping will not exceed 6 inches. Other attachments to piping that should also be checked include thermocouples and instrument tubing connections.
3.
Experience shows that support systems for piping will remain intact under the design-basis seismic loads for the Millstone Plant, whether or not seismic loads were considered in the pipe support design. Failures of pipe hangers are almost d
unknown in past earthquakes, even though only gravitational and operating loads are normally considered in their design
~ly
$see Section 4.3).
6.2 Ceilino-Mounted Eouipment
==
Conclusions:==
J Suspended ceilings frequently loose acoustical panels during even moderate t
)
earthquakes (see Section 4.2). Fallen panels rarely present a hazard due to their light weight.
On occasions, entire suspended ceilings have collapsed, including the light steel framework. Few Category I areas within the Millstone III Plant contain suspended 1.ings, with the exception of the Main Control Room. As long as latera nads or'Tateral sway were considered in the installation of sne suspended ceiling, tnere should be no sipificant hazard.
7 Ceiling suspensed lipt fixn: es c=tsientily fall, er lese flue escen E
tubes during earthquakes. Falling lignt fixtures have not caused signifi-cant damage to equipment in any of the data base facilities reviewed.
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Ceiling- : wall-cou=ted e=i:ne= s::e. Es :.it bette-s, zir conditione s, 1
iner:ac speasers, tiar=s, c amergency 11pting are cascon finures in tne data base sites reviewed. Mos: ceilino-mounted ecuipmenc is suspenned on
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rod hange-s. Ac:w.11y tnet e is no censiocration Of seis=i: lotes in tne oesip o-installation of this ecuismen. In spite of tnis f t:, tnere are no instances in.ne experience at:t etse :f f allen :eilin;-:cened e=ipment c' :ne tysts lis:Ed abovt.
f s3 98 m.
Reconnendations:
.e A check should be made to insure that seismic loads have been tj considered in the installation of suspended ceilings in Category I areas, l
e Where light fixtures are suspended over impact-sensitive Category I equipment, such as electrical cabinetry, instrument racks, or instrument tubing, safety chains should be provided as a redundant restraint against f alling.
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e There is no evidence in the experience data base to indicate that ceiling-or wall-mounted equipinent, such as unit heaters, l
will present a crediIle falling hazard in the Millstone III
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design-basis earthquake. However, where ceiling-mounted equip-J ment is located directly over Category I equipment, a simple test could be made. The response spectrum corresponding to the i
supporting ceiling will define a conservative level of seismic excitation for a single-degree-of-freedom (SDOF) system.
f Typical ceiling-mounted equipment supported on rod hangers approximates an SDOF system. To avoid predicting unreasonably conservative levels of excitation, the use of response spectra u
.--.uing to 5 p..cuia damoing is recammmoed.
If during tne plant walkdown the ceiling-=ounted eauinment can be excited l
by hand to the response levels indicated by tne local floor resconse spectra (:.:p.c 2; for 10 seconcs), it is reasenzale to
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assume that,the equipment would not fall du-ing the design-basis earthquaka. The measurement of equipment excitation and a,j fundamental frecuency can be facilitated inrough tne use of
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ressor.se acceir omete s ac. :.et on the ec.*ionent.
If the l
ceiling-mour.:ed equioner.c canns De safeiy excited to tne a
levels predicted by the local response spectra, added bracing or srf ety enains may be justifief b
7 99 Slidino or Overturnina Eauipment 6.3
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Conclusions:==
The primary cause of serious damage to equipment in past earthquakes has been due to equipment siiding (see Section 4.1).
In particular, sliding of heavy equipment such as tanks or transformers often will break short sections of attached piping or conduit. Two credible sources of damage to j
Category I equipment or piping due to sliding of Non-category I equipment include:
1 A
If the sliding equipment f ails attached piping, a water spray, e
s This could present i
or local flooding of the area could result.
1 a hazard to adjacent electrical equipment unless design has provided for water contamination. The data base includes a J
number of cases of sliding equipment breaking piping with j
subsequent loss of water (or oil). This has never lead to a case of water damage to adjacent equipment, A less credible scenario is impact damage of Category I equip-e ment from adjacent Non-category I equipment, or impact or interference from attached piping or conduit wnir.h is carried witn the sliding ecuipment.
Re:txcendations:
hon-atego y I entrtpment adjacent to Category I eauioment should be checked to insure that at least minimal anchorage is provided wnere the Category I j
itec is vitnin sliding or ove-turning ranos A::a:rsnents netween :ne two itec:s su:.h e.s conduit o cipin; shocid be n: ed i# a load oath ::ald be provioc: :nrouen :ne atta:nemen:
If a eneu is c de :20e of an:ncrage
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adecuacy for the Non-category I ite.1, a static load :alculation assuming the zero perio: a:celera: ion (IDA) froc :ne 10:a1 fic:r re:::nse sae::ra tnrougn the eouioment center cf p avity vill be su*ficient.
hen-:ategory I eculp-en sncuid n:: nave o be an:ncred at:c-:ing to ne: lear in::s: y an:h: rage l
1
o 100 standards for Category I. equipment simply to mitigate a potential seismic interaction hazard.
Wnere equipment overturning is not a credible-hazard (due to low center of gravity), impact of equipment due to sliding should not be considered credibleifthegapbetYeenequipmentexceeds12 inches.
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