ML20133E820
| ML20133E820 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1985 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8508080027 | |
| Download: ML20133E820 (3) | |
Text
_
/
t il.t. t. - D et, woe; Duxz Powra COMPANY P.O. Box 33189 ce' a =' 'vrzz, n.c. naa4e MAI. 5. TUCKER m.....
TrtarMoxx m
u.
(to4) 07a-4asi June 28,1985 Dr. J. Nelson Crace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street. NW. Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Re: RII:JLM/CAS/MT/KW 50-414/85-12
Dear Dr. Grace:
Please find attached responses to Violation No. 414/85-12-01 and violation No. 414/85-12-02, as identified in the above referenced inspection report.
The two events from which these violations originated were previously reported to you under 10CFR 50.55(e), as Report No. SD 414/85-06, dated May 22, 1985 and Report No. SD 414/85-08, dated May 31, 1985.
Very truly yours, n GLa Hal B. Tucker LTP/mj f Attachment cc: NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Robert Cuild, Esq.
P. O. Box 12097 Charleston. South Carolina 29412 Palmetto Alliance 21351s Devine screet Columbic. South Ccrc*ine 29203
..r. Jesse L. F.11r.
Ct.rolinc Environter.:0 Study Grc.:p 654 lienley Fir.cc dtD 0B10130 Charlotte, North Can11nt. 26207 8508080027 850628
~
~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~
PDR ADOCK 05000414 ggtt0 21 G
PDR ZEolV)
~
E
- d 2t:01 50/21/40 I
eenele3-pas gogg l
l DUKE FOWER COMPANY CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION VIOLATIONS:
1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and the accepted Quality Assurance (QA) program, Topical Report Duke 1A, require that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by and accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, on April 19, 1985, temporary operating instruction TOI/2/A/6150/01, Initial Filling and Venting of the Reactor Coolant System and Control of NC System for NC Cold Hydro, was inadequate and was not followed during Unit 2 cold hydrostatic testing activities in the following instances:
It was not identified in TOI/2/A/6150/01 that there was a.
1 no overpressure protection for a portion of the Residual 7
Heat Removal (RHR) system in that the header into which l
RHR relief valve 2ND31 discharged was isolated and not alternate rulief path had been provided.
b.
k, )
Motor-operated valves 2NI17EA and 2NI178B were not closed as required by TOI/2/A//6150/01 when the reactor coolant system (RCS) was being pressurized, thereby allowing RCS pressure into the RHR system.
Items a. a'd b. above resulted in various piping, valves, and n
equipment in portions of the RHR system, boron recycle system, sampling system, and chemical and volume control system being overpressurized to approximatcly 2000 psig for approximately three hours on April 19, 1985.
2.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and the accepted QA program, Topical Report Duke 1A, require that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedurcs,' drawings...
Contrary to the above, on April 20, 1985, TOI/2/A/6150/01 was inadequate in that it did not identify that there was no overpressure protection for the Volume Control Tank (VCT) due te the header into which VCT relief valve 2:r/2 23 di.ccha rged being isclated, ar.d ne e ' tcrr.etc re'ief pt:r he " te ct.
Frtvided.
Thi s r e s ul te d i r. t e t e.. c e r.t r u:: i c r. c f ib / ;; vber.
it was inadvertently everrrcssu:1:c; ar.d rupturce curir.,
hydrcstatic testing activitict.
U
n P 'd 10101 P
'd CC:Cl S8/21/L0 eene163-3dN WOdd S
i
RESPONSE
(. )s l
1.
Duke Power Company admits the violations.
2.
These violations occurred as a result of poor communication, 2
a lack of familiarity with existing administrative controls, and an error in technical judgement by key management 3
personnel.
These items are detailed as follows:
J Operations management personnel with Unit Two a.
responsibility had not adequately communicated with the Unit One personnel in evaluating the effect of Unit one operations on Unit Two startup.
This was due in part to a
a deficiency in technical training of the Unit Two personnel.
' ~-~ ' " '
i b.
Unit Two management personnel gave the operations shift personnel directions different from normal requirements for the use cf procedures, specifically when the same procedure is to be utilized more than once.
This was i
due in part to an unfamiliarity with existing administrative controls.
j c.
Following the initial overpressurisation event, a survey was made to determine what additional piping and components may not have ade As a result of the survey, quate overpressure protection.
two relief valve discharge headers were cut and vented to assure relief protection prior to recommencing reactor coolant system cold hydro.
1 j
However, due to a deficiency in the t'echnical training of l
the reviewer, the volume control tank' relief valve discharge was overlooked.
3.
The individual whose primary responsibility was management of Unit Two operations during the pre-operational stage had not had adequate training and plant experience to properly fulfill his responsibilities.
This position has been reassigned to a individual with extensive plant experience who holds a current SRO license for Unit one.
The need to comply with established ad=inistrative controls has been re-emphasized.
4 4.
The actions described in (3) above shculd prevent re. urrence
]
cf thcsc prcbler.r.
5.
Catawbt it in full cc pliancc at this tint.
A U
_