ML20133E677

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Summary of 961231 & 970103 Telephone Conference Between J Winters of W,J Holmes & D Jackson of NRC Re Certain Unresolved Open Items Involving Std Safety Analysis Rept Section 9.5.1 & 9A
ML20133E677
Person / Time
Site: 05200003
Issue date: 01/08/1997
From: Diane Jackson
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
NRC
References
NUDOCS 9701130106
Download: ML20133E677 (8)


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%* UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066-0001 i

January 8,1997 j k %* * * [

APPLICANT: Westinghouse Electric Corporation FACILITY: AP600 1

SUBJECT:

SUMARY OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCES TO DISCUSS WESTINGHOUSE AP600 l FIRE PROTECTION ANALYSIS OPEN ITEMS l

The subject telephone conferences were held on December 31, 1996, and Janu-ary 3, 1997, between Jim Winters of Westinghouse and Jeff Holmes and Diane Jackson of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss certain unresolved open items related to standard safety analysis report (SSAR) Section 9.5.1 and 9A in preparation for an upcoming meeting on January 7, 1997. The open item tracking system (0ITS) should be updated to reflect these telephone conferences.

OITS# 306 - Action Westinghou:e (a) Westinghouse is continuing to investigate the change to the passive containment cooling system (PCS) discussed at the November 19, 1996, meeting. The non-safety-related, high flow, firemain would be the initial water supply for fire protection, rather than the PCS tank. A manual valve would be available to supply water from the PCS. A COL action item would be added to instruct the operator to open the connec-tion valve.

(b) Westinghouse clarified for the staff the sefe shutdown evaluation demon-strated that safe shutdown can be achieved by utilizing safety related systems after a " worst case fire," that is the fire in an entire fire area that is the worst area. Westinghouse will revise the wording in SSAR 9A.2.7.1.

(c) The staff requested clarification on SSAR 9A.2.7.1, " Availability of Non-safety Related Systems," to include a list of fire areas how the safe shutdown evaluation considers the fire areas. Westinghouse pointed out the Emergency pesponse Guidelines instructs the operator to use the "available non-safety related equipment." The staff would like to know what equipment that would be given a fire in any given fire area.

Westinghouse stated that this was not required. The staff will discuss.

Action N (d) The staff expressed a concern regarding non-safety related cabling f affecting safety related cabling. Westinghouse clarified that no non- M O g safety related cabling was located in a IE cable tray outside of the U main control room. The staff expressed a specific concern that the emergency lighting for the main control room and the remote shut down panel should be independent. g I I l

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I OITS# 309 - Action Westinghouse

I i (a) j On December 30, 1996, Westinghouse provided a draft markup (attached) of i the S3AR on the definition of the " zone of influence." It did not i address all of the staff concerns. It needs to clearly state that the term, " zone of influence" is only used inside containment. And inside i

containment, zone of influence is defined as a fire zone. Westinghouse should state, in the SSAR, fire areas that are not separated by fire  ;

d barriers and how they use other fire protection or separation methods, '

such as distance. Westinghouse should also include a definition of fire area and fire barrier in the SSAR.

(b) Westinghouse is continuing to work on a description of fire zone separa- l tion for Appendix 9A, including a discussion of 3-hour fire barriers around main cable runs. Westinghouse will include a definition of fire area and fire barrier in the SSAR.

(c) Westinghouse is continuing work on the sketch of the automatic l depre surization system (ADS) module indicating the valve arrangement and structural steel thickness.

(d) Westinghouse is continuing work to review the SSAR description to ensure the use of 3-hour fire barriers that are non-combustible inside the containment.

OITS# 308 - Action Westinghouse The staff expressed a concern regarding the assurance of sufficient fire protection water designated in post-72 hour consumables. Westinghouse is continuing to work on this response.

OITS# 312 - Action Westinghouse Westinghouse will provide a description of the cabling routing inside of the containment.

OITS# 314 - Action Westinghouse Westinghouse will provide a written response with the justification why PCS water should be considered a dedicated source of water following an earth-quake.

OITS# 316 - Action NRC The staff has questions regarding this open item and will discuss them with Westinghouse at the upcoming meeting.

OITS# 317 - Closed This item is administrative 1y closed. The issue will be technically resolved under DSER 9.5.1.3-4 (0ITS# 1996).

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January 8, 1997 OITS# 319 - Action Westinghouse Westinghouse will revise the SSAR to indicate that the main control room and l the remote shutdown workstation are on different and physically separated cir-cuits. ,

1 OITS# 321 - Action NRC The staff has concerns ragarding the turbine building fire zones, specifically the areas that contain the air compressors and fire pumps. These concerns will be discussed at the upcoming meeting.

OITS# 322 - Action NRC The staff has concerns regarding this open item and would like to discuss these at the upcoming meeting.

OITS# 323 - Action Westinghouse The staff requested clarification of the design considerations for smoke control. Westinghouse is continuing working on this concern.

OITS# 1114 - Action Westinghouse Resolve related open items OITS# 1120 - Action Westinghouse Resolve OITS #321 OITS# 1122 - Action NRC Staff will discuss open. item at upcoming meeting.

OITS# 1124 - Ac'. ion NRC Staff will discuss concerns at upcoming meeting.

QJIS# 1919 - Resolved SSAR revision acceptable.

OITS# 1921 - Resolved SSAR revision acceptable.

OITS# 1996 - Action Westinghouse Westinghouse will revise SSAR 3.4.1 to address f A 'ag from the main control room to the remote shut down panel area.

l January 8, 1997
OITS# 3438 - Resolved Westinghouse response acceptable.

QllSf 3439 - Action Wcstinghouse

Westinghouse will revise RAI response 280.10 (0ITS# 3439) i OITS# 3440 - Resolved Westinghouse response acceptable.
OITS# 3442 - Action NRC OITS# 3443 - Action NRC 3 OITS# 3444'- Action NRC l OlTS# 3445 - Action HRC i OITS# 3446 - Action NRC OITS# 3447 -~ Action NRC OITS# 3448 - Action NRC OITS# 3456 - Action NRC OITS# 3457 - Action NRC OITS# 3458 - Action NRC OITS# 3459 - Action NRC OITS# 3460 - Action NRC original signed by

Diane T. Jackson, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No.52-003

Attachment:

As stated cc w/ attachment:

See next page DISTRIBUTION: See next page DOCUMENT NAME: A:SPL FP T. SUM (A AP600 DISK)

Ta receive e copy of this document,in3ceteh the bes: 'C' = Copy without ettechment/er. closure *E' = Copy wMh attachment / enclosure *N* = No copy 0FFICE PM:PDST:DRPM _ SPLB:DSSA, D:PDST:DRPM l 7 NAME DJackson:sg 1/v JLyons //sv'/m TRQuay -Th'6 l DATE 01/>/97 /> 01/ 7 /97 01/4 /97 l OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

1 l Westinghouse Electric Corporation Docket No.52-003 cc: Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager Mr. Frank A. Ross l Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42

, Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Office of LWR Safety and Technology i

) Westinghouse Electric Corporation l d 19901 Germantown Road 1 P.O. Box 355 Germantown, MD 20874 l Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. Ronald Simard, Director j Mr. B. A. McIntyre Advanced Reactor Program Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Nuclear Energy Institute l

] Westinghouse Electric Corporation 1776 Eye Street, N.W.

Energy Systems Business Unit Suite 300 l

Box 355 Washington, DC 20006-3706 '

j Pittsburgh, PA 15230 j Ms. Lynn Connor Mr. John C. Butler Doc-Search Associates

! Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing Post Office Box 34 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Cabin John, MD 20818 Energy Systems Business Unit Box 355 Mr. James E. Quinn, Projects Manager Pittsburgh, PA 15230 LMR and SBWR Programs GE Nuclear Energy Mr. M. D. Beaumont 175 Curtner Avenue, M/C 165 Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division San Jose, CA 95125 Westinghouse Electric Corporation One Montrose Metro Mr. Robert H. Buchholz 11921 Rockville Pike GE Nuclear Energy Suite 350 175 Curtner Avenue, MC-781 Rockville, MD 20852 San Jose, CA 95125 Mr. Sterling Franks Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.

U.S. Department of Energy Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott NE-50 600 Grant Street 42nd Floor 19901 Germantown Road Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Germantown, MD 20874 Mr. Ed Rodwell, Manager Mr. S. M. Modro PWR Design Certification Nuclear Systems Analysis Technologies Electric Power Research Institute Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company 3412 Hillview Avenue Post Office Box 1625 Palo Alto, CA 94303 Idaho Falls, ID 83415 Mr. Charles Thapson, Nuclear Engineer AP600 Certification NE-50 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, MD 20874

' ' '* 412 374 4837

,, DEC 30 '96 13:59 F R Of1 AP600 DESIGN CERT TO NRC p AM . 001 Westinghouse FAX COVER SHEET i

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i RECIPIENT INFORMATION SENDER INFORMATION l

OATE: Decemo ot 30,/996 NAME: L kj,m a

TO: LOCATIOti: ENERGY CENTER - l TAcescu EAST (

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FACSIMILE: PHONE: Omes: 4/2-3 7V-rz90 1

PHONE:

Facsimile: win: 284 4887 l COMPANY:

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! Cover + Pages 1+/

I The following pages are being sent from the Westinghouse Energy Center, East Tower, Monroeville, PA. If any problems occur during this transmission, please call:

WIN: 284 5125 (Janico) or Outside: (412)3744125.

COMMENTS:

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I bEC 30 '96 13:59 FROM AP600 DESIGN CERT TO NRC PAGE.002

- TA. Fire Proeection Aanlysis A= "' y Systems -

5 Any damage which the fire is capable of causing is assumed to occur immediarely. No , .Jcredit is taken for proper operation of equipment or proper positioning of valves wh;ch are not protected from the effects of a postulated fue,

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Zone of Influence V'p9 '^ p ., od '" p.,

O areas outsis i the I A postulated fire does not exceed the boundary of the fire area.

I main control room, remote shutdown workstation, and containment fire areas, a!! equipment I in any one fue area is assumed to be rendered inoperable by the fut and re-entry into the fire I

area for repairs and operator actions is assumed to be impossible. However; no credit is taken for complete fue damage in cases in which complete damage is benafwial and partial damag is not. Chases for electrical cables, piping or ducts that pass fthrough the fire area but are W y C, fuem I e separated from it by 3-hour fire barriers are inf I ,%outsMe ws the zone $,Jt.luence for that area Y -

1 Inside the containment fire ama, potential fire damage is evaluated by fire zo i equipment in any one fire zone is assumed to be randered inoperable by the fire unle I

fire protection analysis demonstrates otherwise. Class IE electrical cables that are lo I

or pass throu5 h the fire zone but are separated frun it by a 3-hour fire barner are outs I zone of influence for that frie zone.

Independence of Affected Mre Areas l

i Only systems, cea.yoscots, and circuits five of fire damage are credited for achievin l I

shutdown for a given fue. Systans, components, and circuits outside the zone of influence '

1 are considered free of fue damage if the effects of the fue do not prevent them from I performing their required safe shutdown functicas.

Event Assumptions l

Plast accidents and severe natural phenomena are not assumed to occur concurwntly wi post alated fire. Furthennore, a concurient single active cv %.est failure (ind fue) is not assumed.

Ottsite Power i

A loss of offsite power is assumed concurrent with the postulated fue only when the shutdown evaluation indicates the fire could initiate the loss of offsite power.

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Availability of Nonsafety Related Systems I ,

I Only safety-related components and systems are assumed to be availab e (This is more stringent than required by B'IP CMES 9.51.) Fire 1 shutdown functions.

i protection and smoke control systems are assurned to function as desig i mitigate the effects of the fue.

Revision: 8 Jane 19,1996 9A-5 y Westingh0Use

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l c DISTRIBUTION w/ attachments: l iDocket file PUBLIC PDST R/F DTJackson l TKenyon JSebrosky l BHuffman i JHolmes, 0-8 D1 I JLyons, 0-8 D1 l DISTRIBUTION w/o attachments: l FMiraglia/AThadani, 0-12 G18 i RZimmerman, 0-12 G18 l

BSheron, 0-12 G18 '

TMartin DMatthews TQuay l EJordan, T-4 D18 ACRS (11)

! JMoore, 0-15 B18 l i

WDean, 0-17 G21 4

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