ML20133C262
| ML20133C262 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1985 |
| From: | Wilson R, Zech G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133C248 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-85-09, 50-285-85-9, NUDOCS 8508060420 | |
| Download: ML20133C262 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000285/1985009
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Report No.:
50-285/85-09
Docket No.:
50-285
License No.:
Licensee:
Omaha.Public Power District
1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102
Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1
Inspection At:
Omaha and Fort Calhoun, Nebraska
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Inspection Conducted:
April 29 to May 3,1985
Inspector:
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R. C. Wilson
Date
Equipment Qualification & Test Engineer
Also participating in the inspection and contributing to the report were:
U. Potapovs, Chief Equipment Qualification Inspection Section, I&E
H. Walker, Engineer, NRR
R. O. Karsch, Reactor Engineer, NRR
E. H. Richards, Member of Technical Staff, Sandia National Laboratories
M. W. Yost, Consultant Engineer, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
A. R. Johnson, Reactor Inspector, RIV
D. E. Norman, Reactor Inspector, RIV
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Approvedby:[uv
Gary 7. Zech, Chief
Date'
Vendor Program Branch
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
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0508060420 050726
ADOCK 05000285
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INSPECTION SUMMARY:
Inspection on April 29 to May 3,1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-285/85-09)
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Areas Inspected: Special, announced inspection to review the licensee's
implementation of a program per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 for
establishing and maintaining the qualification of electric equipment within the
scope of 10 CFR 50.49. The inspection also included evaluations of the
implementation of equipment qualification (EQ) corrective action commitments
made as a result of deficiencies identified in the January 11, 1983, Safety
Evaluation Report (SER) and the November 10, 1982, Franklin Research Center
(FRC) Technical Evaluation Report (TER).
The inspection involved 226 inspector
hours onsite.
Results: The inspection determined that the licensee has implemented a program
to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49, except for certain deficiencies
listed below. No deficiencies were found in the licensee's implementation of
corrective action commitments made as a result of SER/TER identified
deficiencies.
Name
Report Paragraph
Item Number
Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Items:
1.
Allis-Chalmers Pump Motors
4.D.(4)
50-285/85-09-01
2.
PAM Instrument Accuracy
4.A.(1).(b)
50-285/85-09-02
3.
Conax Electrical Penetration
Assemblies
4.D.(1)
50-285/85-09-03
4.
States Company Terminal Blocks
4.D.(2)
50-285/85-09-04
5.
Rockbestos Pyrotrol III Cable
4.0.(3)
50-285/85-09-05
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6.
Definition of Harsh Radiation
Environment
4.A.(1).(a)
50-285/85-09-06
Open Items:
1.
Completion of Procedures
4.A.(2).(a)
50-285/85-09-07
2.
Containment Ambient Temperature
4.D.(5)
50-285/85-09-08
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted:
1.1 Dmaha Public Power District (0 PPD)
- R. L. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Production
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- R. F. Mehaffey, Supervisor, I&C and Electrical, Technical Services
- J. J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuclear Reg. and Industry Affairs
- D. J. Munderloh, Licensing Engineer
- A. W. Richard, Supervisor Corporate QA
- J. K. Gasper, Manager, Administrative Services
- K. J. Morris, Manager, QA
- P. M. Surber, Section Manager, Gen. Station Engrg.
- S. K. Gambhir, Manager, GSE Electrical and Nuclear
- R. J. Mueller, Supv. I&C/ Electrical Maintenance, Station
- M. R. Core, Supervisor, Maintenance, Station
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- W. G. Gates, Plant Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
- R. L. Jaworski, Section Manager, Technical Services
- M. K. Prawl, Engineer, Electrical, Technical Services
1.2 OPPD Consultant
- R. K. Ho, EPM, Consultant to Nuclear Utility Group on
Equipment Qualification
1.3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- L. A. Yandell, Senior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun
- E. G. Tourigny, NRR, Project Manager for Fort Calhoun
- G. G. Zech, Chief, Vendor, Program Branch, I&E
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______________________
- Denotes those present at exit interview at Fort Calhoun
on May 3, 1985
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2.
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this inspection was to review the licensee's implementation
of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 and the implementation of committed
corrective actions for SER/TER identified deficiencies.
3.
BACKGROUND:
On March 23, 1984, the NRC held a meeting with OPPD officia s to discuss
OPPD's proposed methods to resolve the EQ deficiencies ide .tified in the
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January 11, 1983, SER and November 10, 1982, FRC TER. D'scussions also
included OPPD's general methodology for compliance with '.0 CFR 50.49 and
justification for continued operation for those equipmert items for which
environmental qualification was not completed. The minures of the meeting
and proposed method of resolution for each of the EQ deficiencies were
documented in a May 31, 1984, submittal from the licensee. The TER and
May 31 submittal were reviewed by the inspection team memb3rs and were
used to establish a status baseline for the inspection.
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4.
FINDINGS:
A.
EQ Program Compliance with 10 CFR 50.49
The NRC inspectors examined the licensee's program for establishing
the qualification of electric equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. The program was evaluated by examination of the licensee's
qualification documentation files, review of procedures for
controlling the licensee's EQ efforts, verification of the adequacy
and accuracy of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.49 equipment list, and
examination of the licensee's program for maintaining the qualified
status of the covered electrical equipment.
Based on the inspection findings, which are discussed in more detail
below, the inspection team determined that the licensee has
implemented a program to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49,
although some deficiencies were identified. The identified
deficiencies relate to the implementation of specific aspects of the
program.
(1) Qualification Files, General
The licensee addresses the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 through
an overall effort called the Qualified Life Program. This
program covers the following:
qualified equipment tracing
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qualification documents
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maintenance / refurbishment schedule
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breakdown maintenance
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future modification control
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Qualification documentation is arranged in the form of an
Electrical Equipment Qualification Manual (EEQ Manual) and a
Central File consisting primarily of binders for specific
component types. The EEQ Manual covers the following:
Users Guide
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Environmental Sumary
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Master List
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System Component Evaluation Worksheets
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Instrument Accuracy
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Operating Time
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Qualified Life Program Implementing Procedures
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The component binders contain component specific qualification
documentation including test reports, analyses, walkdown sheets,
etc. An Equipment Qualification Documentation Form (EQDF) is
included for each individual component.
The EQDF identifies the
maintenance and surveillance activities necessary to preserve
qualification of the component, and the schedule for these
activities.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the EEQ Manual and the component
binders for 14 equipment types.
Each equipment type
- orresponded to one of the " Items" in the FRC TER. The types
were selected in advance by the inspection team and identified
to the licensee during the entrance meeting. With a few
exceptions described later, the EEQ Manual and files were
well-arranged, complete, accurate, and error-free. -No generic
documentation deficiencies were found. Two deficiencies in the
EEQ Manual contents are described in this section of the
inspection report, and specific component-related concerns are
discussed in paragraph 4.D below.
(a) When OPPD began preparing its response to IEB 79-01B it
selected a borderline between harsh and mild radiation as
10E5 Rads total integrated dose. OPPD stated that this
selection was based largely on Appendix C of the D0R
Guidelines and discussions with various test laboratories.
OPPD's subsequent experience with component test results
and with actual in-plant experience with some electrical
equipment (such as solenoid valves) receiving doses of 10E5
Rads did not change their selection. OPPD stated that only
one component possibly subject to 10 CFR 50.49 and
containing active electronic parts is located where the
total dose is between 10E3 (clearly a conservative limit)
and 10E5 Rads; an OPPD letter dated April 29, 1985,
documents the qualification of this component, FT-238, for
more than 10E5 Rads.
The D0R Guidelines document does not, and is not intended
to, provide blanket endorsement of any specific threshold
value for harsh radiation environment. Appendix C states
that it contains a partial list of materials which may be
found in a nuclear power plant; the list is not intended to
be complete and it cannot be used to justify any particular
dose below which radiation effects can be ignored. The
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burden remains with the licensee to demonstrate that
equipment subject to 10 CFR 50.49 paragraph (b) is suffi-
ciently radiation-resistant. Recent guidance concerning a
threshhold value is included in R.G. 1.89 Rev. 1 dated June
1984, which suggests 10E4 as a threshold dose. Definition
of Harsh Radiation Environment is a Potential Enforcement /
Unresolved Item, 50-285/85-09-06.
(b) For several types of post-accident monitoring (PAM)
instruments, the EEQ Manual reports the High Energy Line
Break errors determined during qualification type tests
and states,that these errors are acceptable for the plant
service based on undocumented judgements. However, para-
graph (d)(1) of 10 CFR 50.49 and section 5.2.5 of the 00R
Guidelines require definition of performance specifications
or accuracy requirements based on plant safety analyses,
which then are to be compared with test results. This
concern does not apply to protection instrument functions,
which were properly treated in the EEQ Manual. PAM Instrument
Accuracy is a Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Item,
50-285/85-09-02.
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(2) EQ Program Procedures
The NRC inspectors reviewed the EEQ Manual, Rev. O, undated,
which describes the OPPD program for meeting 10 CFR 50.49 at .
Fort Calhoun.
It covers the bases for defining harsh environ-
ments, identifying equipment requiring qualification, and
selecting required qualification levels. The EEQ Manual also
describes the Qualified Life Program (QLP) and defines the
implementing procedures.
The QLP is implemented primarily by Standing Orders (50s), most
of which constitute revisions of existing 50s rather than new
procedures created specifically for EQ purposes. The NRC
inspectors reviewed the following procedures (each listed
procedure or the preceding revision also was provided for review
in advance of the inspection):
S0 C-2 Rev. 17, January 11, 1985, Fort Calhoun Station
Quality Assurance Records
S0 M-2 Rev. 8, April 16,1985, Preventive Maintenance
Program
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SO G-17 Rev. 33, April 16, 1985, Maintenance Order
S0 G-17A Rev. 1 April 16, 1985, Electrical Equipment
in a Harsh Environment
SO G-21 Rev. 21, April 16, 1985, Station Modification
Control
S0 M-26 Rev. 7, April 16, 1985, Calibration Procedures
S0 G-56 Rev. 4, January 31, 1985, Qualified Life Program
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The licensee's program was reviewed to verify that adequate
procedures and controls had been established to implement
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
Subject to the Open Item
described at the end of this section, the NRC inspectors
concluded that the procedures listed above, which were in effect
at the time of the inspection, s.e adequate for maintaining
qualification in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.
As part of the program review, the inspector conducted
discussions with the licensee's QA Manager to determine the QA
interface with the EQ program. QA for plant specific items was
determined to be implemented through the existing QA/QC program
by routine inspections, audits, and similar activities. QA
involvement at the program level had not been defined, but the
licensee indicated that QA overview would be made through audits
in accordance with the QA manual.
Training of plant personnel relative to the EQ program was
discussed by the inspector with an I&C and Electrical
supervisor. He stated that training had been accomplished by an
I&C and Electrical supervisor, and documented in lecture
records, for the following personnel:
I&C and Electrical Craft
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Mechanical craft (general, pipe fitters, and machinists)
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Station test engineers
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QA/QC personnel
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Selected CHAMPS maintenance clerks
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To aid the plant operators in identifying qualified equipment,
OPPD has placed an orange dot on the control board near the
indicators and controls for qualified equipment. This is an
example of the manner in which this licensee has integrated EQ
concerns and features into plant operation and maintenance.
The licensee stated that the EQ files were being re-baselined to
Rev. O, and their control will pass from Technical Services to
Generation Station Engineering by June 1.
Similarly, the major
procedures affecting EQ will pass from Technical Services to
Generation Station Engineering control at the same time. The
transition appeared to be well planned, and the Generation
Station Engineering personnel contacted during the inspection
were knowledgeable of the documentation as well as maintenance
aspects of EQ.
(a) Three deficiencies were identified during review of the
licensee's procedures. Although they constitute isolated
concerns within an otherwise acceptable program, they are
grouped into a single Open Item for ease of tracking. (1)
The top-tier administrative procedure for implementing the
SC'. sisted above was in draft form and was not provided
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for review during the inspection.
(2) In S0 G-21 the
provision for a design engineer to add equipment to the
Master List where appropriate is covered only in the
" definitions" section, and then only indirectly (as part of
the EEQ Manual) since the Master List is not specifically
mentioned.
(3) A provision to monitor all plant
modifications for EQ impact was lacking. Licensee action on
these concerns will be monitored in a future inspection as
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an Open Item, Completion of Procedures, 50-285/85-09-07.
(3)
10 CFR 50.49 List (EQ Master List)
The licensee is' required to maintain an up-to-date list of the
equipment that must be qualified under 10 CFR 50.49. This list
is documented as "0SAR #85-32 Electrical Equipment Qualifi-
cation Master List" dated April 29, 1985.
Considered in the
preparation of this list are technical specification limiting
conditions of operation, emergency procedures, and locations
within the plant subject to a harsh post-accident environment.
At present, formal procedures to maintain the accuracy and
completeness of the master list are only partially in place.
Six procedures will govern maintenance of the E.Q. Master List.
Four procedures are now in final form and were reviewed. Two
procedures are in draft form, one of which was available for
review and was to be implemented by May 6, 1985. The other is
addressed in paragraph 4.A.(2) above, and its completion is
being carried as an Open Item. The efficacy of the procedures
was discussed in detail with the Fort Calhoun personnel.
Included in these discussions were observations about delegation
of authority and departmental responsibility. The procedures
were determined to contain adequate administrative controls of
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the E.Q. Master List.
Twelve items were used as an audit sample to verify the
completeness of the current E.Q. Master List.
In order to
compile this audit sample, an extensive review was conducted of
the following Emergency Procedures and Piping and
Instrumentation Drawings (P& ids).
Emergency Procedures
Reactor trip Rev. 14, 2/12/85
Loss of Coolant Accident Rev. 27, 5/15/84
EP-5A Loss of Coolant Accident Rev. 23, 5/15/84
Uncontrolled Heat Extraction Rev. 22,5/15/84
EP-15 Waste Gas Incident Rev. 5, 6/30/83
EP-19 Loss of Instrument Bus Power Rev. 2, 6/9/83
EP-28 Reactor Cooling Leak Rev. 8, 12/7/82
EP-29 Steam Line Rupture with a Complete Loss of Off-Site
AC Power Rev. 22,5/15/84
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P& ids
E 23866-210-130 Rev. 32, SI & Containment Spray System
11405-M-7 Rev. 8, Waste Disposal System Flow Diagram
11405-M-6 Rev. 9, Waste Disposal System Flow Diagram
E23866-210-110 Rev. 30. Reactor Coolant System
The audit sample was selected to verify that those items
required to be on the list are in fact on the list. A check was
also made to determine that items which may be required for
implementation of R.G. 1.97, and are not on the list now, will
be added to the list as required consistent with the R.G. 1.97
review. All sample items required to be on the E.Q. Master List
were in fact on the list. Sample items not required to be on
the Master List were not on the list. The sample item for the
R.G.1.97 program, core exit thennocouples, was not yet on the
list but will be added to the list upon implementation of R.G.
1.97.
The licensee's methodology for defining the auxiliary
feedwater pump room as a mild environment was reviewed in detail
and found acceptable.
(4) EQ Maintenance Program
The Fort Calhoun EQ maintenance program is an integral part of
the Qualified Life Program for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. The procedures addressed in paragraph 4.A.(2) of this
inspection report provide programmatic direction. Required
maintenance, surveillance, and replacement activities for specific
equipment by plant ID number are defined in the Equipment
Qualification Documentation Forms addressed in paragraph 4.A.(1)
of this report.
Additional reviews were performed of maintenance-related
procedures for several selected equipment types, in conjunction
with the file review and plant walkdown inspection. These
reviews addressed the licensee's implementation of EQ-related
maintenance and surveillance requirements. For the Allis-
Chalmers component cooling water pump motors addressed in
paragraph 4.D.(4) below, the applicable. component-specific
maintenance procedure did not specify that maintenance was to
be performed, and appropriate vendor-recommended maintenance was
not performed. Based on the inspection team's review of other
components, these deficiencies appear to be isolated to the
Allis-Chalmers motors. With the exception of the deficiencies
related to the Allis-Chalmers motors, the licensee's EQ mainte-
nance prcgram and its implementation are considered adequate.
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B.
SER/TER Commitments
The NRC inspectors evaluated the implementation of EQ corrective
action commitments made as a result of SER/TER-identified deficien-
cies as stated in a licensee submittal dated May 31, 1984. This
submittal states that all equipment on the 10 CFR 50.49 Master List
is qualified except for certain equipment for which Justifications
for Continued Operation were submitted. The final SER, transmitted
February 15, 1985, identified that the only equipment still under JC0
was certain electrical penetration assemblies for which the JC0s are
acceptable pending completion of action by November 30, 1985, as
accepted by NRC letter of March 29, 1985.
In addition, the licensee
stated that the schedule to meet paragraph (b)(3) of 10 CFR 50.49 and
R.G. 1.97 is identified in a separate program.
Based on review of files and o' the 10 CFR 50.49 Master List, the NRC
inspectors identified no deficiencies in the implementation of
SER/TER commitments. Action on electrical penetration assemblies
need not be completed until November 30, 1985 as discussed above.
Review of selected instruments shown on the May 20, 1983 Master List
which perform post-accident monitoring functions showed that none has
been subsequently removed from the list; however, ongoing review of
R.G.1.97 implementation may re-alt in additional equipment being
added to the Master List.
C.
Plant Physical Inspection
The NRC inspectors, with component accessibility input from licensee
personnel, established a list of seven types of components for
physical inspection. All were accessible at the time of inspection,
during plant operation. The inspectors examined characteristics such
as mounting configuration, orientation, interfaces, model number,
ambient environment, and physical condition. No concerns were
identified during the physical inspection except for maintenance
deficiencies for the Allis-Chalmers motors described in paragraph
4.D.(4) below.
D.
Detailed Review of Oualification Files
The NRC inspectors examined files for 14 selected equipment types to
verify the qualified status of equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.
In addition to comparing plant service canditions with
qualification test conditions and verifying the bases for these
conditions, the inspectors selectively reviewed areas such as
required post-accident operating time compared to the duration of
time the equipment has been demonstrated to be qualified, similarity
of tested equipment to that installed in the plant (e.g., insulation
class, materials of components of the equipment, tested configuration
compared to installed configuration, and documentation of both),
evaluation of adequacy of test conditions, aging calculations for
qualified life and replacement interval determination, effects of
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decreases in insulation resistance on equipment performance,
adequacy of demonstrated accuracy, evaluation of test anomalies,
and applicability of EQ problems reported in IE ins / Bulletins and
. their r.esolution.
During its review of the component files the inspection team
identified four Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Items and one Open
Item, all described below. Each of these deficiencies involves a
specific concern. Generally, the files were found to be readily
auditable and they documented qualification of the plant equipment.
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(1) Conax electrical penetration assemblies, TER Item 99 - These
containment pen'etration assemblies have TFE Teflon seals and FEP
Teflon lead wire insulation; these materials have relatively low
radiation tolerance. The FRC TER did not accept OPPD's initial
efforts to qualify the penetrations because section 5.2.3 of the
D0R Guidelines requires that radiation testing precede or
accompany the HELB test for components containing materials
known to be susceptible to significant radiation damage at the
service condition levels; this was not done in the original type
tests. OPPD then proceeded to conduct additional testing.
OPPD's letter of July 3,1984, reported that failure occurred
during the post-radiation MSLB/LOCA test, which was attributed
to embrittlement and cracking of the teflon insulation on the
lead wires. OPPD then identified and initiated a program to
modify the penetration assemblies by sleeving the teflon wire
insulation with heat shrinkable tubing and sealing the joints
between the sleeves and the penetration body with room temperature
vulcanizing (RTV) silicone rubber. JC0s were submitted, and
OPPD's letter of February 14, 1985 requested a schedule extension
for completion of modification of the last penetrations until
Novembe 30, 1985 which was granted by NRC letter dated
March c9, 1985.
The inspectors conclude that insufficient basis exists for
establishing qualification of the modified penetration
assemblies. Specifically, section 5.1 of the D0R Guidelines
states that "As a minimum, the qualification for severe
temperature, pressure, and steam service conditions for Class 1E
equipment should be based on type testing."_ The RTV seals have
not been appropriately type tested in the actual configuration
to establish that the RTV will remain bonded through the
differential expansions and severe environment of the LOCA test.
Also, there is a possibility that the teflon laad wire deterio-
ration in the 1984 tests may have masked degradation of the
teflon seals. Alternatively, the penetration assemblies could be
replaced or further equivalent justification regarding the quali-
fication status of the actual configuration provided. All of
the electrical circuits for in-containment Master List equipment
must pass through penetration assemblies, and containment
boundary integrity may also be involved. Conax Electrical Pene-
-tration Assemblies is a Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Item,
50-285/85-09-03.
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(2) States Company terminal blocks (not addressed in TER) - The
concern with respect to these terminal blocks relates to small
leakage currents as addressed in IE Information Notices 82-03
and 84-47. The file contains a GE letter, G-EJ-9-17 dated
February 21, 1979, showing that insulation resistances for
uncoated blocks dropped from 10E10 to 10E4 ohms during LOCA
testing. The file also contains OPPD documentation addressing
the concern and defining a modification that has been
implemented, namely, sealing the electrical conductor paths
through the blocks with RTV silicone rubber. Analysis of
leakage current acceptability for specific circuits was not
presented. The. terminal block qualification deficiency is very
similar to the Conax penetration problem: analysis alone is not
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considered sufficient, and no type test has been performed on
the modified design. States Company Terminal Blocks is a
Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Item, 50-285/85-09-04.
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(3) Rockbestos (Cerro) Pyrotrol III cable, TER Item 85 et al.- The
licensee based qualification on 1969-1970 test reports for
Pyrotrol III cable and on testing of Rockbestos Firewall III
cable. The Pyrotrol III test reports were identified by IE IN 84-44 and NUREG-0040 as deficient because they lack supporting
test data and because no formal quality assurance procedures
were used for the tests.
Regarding the Firewall III tests, the
licensee had two letters from Rockbestos claiming similarity of
the two types of cable but had not obtained supporting
evidence such as material analyses or electrical properties. If
similarity could be established, then a plant-specific
evaluation of the Firewall III test results would be necessary.
Although there is no reason to believe that Pyrotrol III cable
would fail during a LOCA, the basis contained in the files is
not considered sufficient to document qualification.
It was
further noted that the files did not clearly show the relevancy
of the Firewall III testing, This was the only instance observed
by the inspectors of deficient file organization. Rockbestos
Pyrotrol III cable is a Potential Enforcement / Unresolved Item,
50-285/85-09-05.
(4) Allis-Chalmers component cooling water pump motors' TER Item 48 -
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Deficiencies were identified in both the qualified life deter-
mination and the maintenance of these motors. Qualification was
initially based on winding replacement at 18 years, based on
thermal aging analysis.
In 1983 after approximately 12 years
operation, the windings of motor AC-3B failed and were replaced;
Fiberglas Polyester Resin (thermoset, thermal H) insulation
replaced the original glass fiber fabric, H. R. insulating
varnish winding insulation. Although the claimed motor life
was extended to 40 years, based on the replacement insulation
properties, no analysis was performed to verify the extended
life.
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The qualification test report states that a six month check of
motor bearing lubricant quality and quantity is necessary to
maintain qualification. The Allis-Chalmers instruction manual
recommends regular cleaning of the motors, including removing
dirt and dust from the air intake and cleaning the windings; it
also stated that the motors are shipped containing a six month
supply of bearing grease; and recommended a replacement grease
type.
However, no licensee procedures required lubrication or
cleaning, and the EQDF does not address the lubricant. The
walkdown inspection revealed lack of maintenance in that intake
grills on all three motors were dirty, loose, and/cr lying on
the floor.
In addition to the premature winding failu e noted
above, bearings'in all three motors had been replaced because of
excessive vibration (April 30, 1979, April 15, 1983, and June
20,1983). The inspectors conclude that necessary maintenance
is not specified in procedures and has not been performed.
This
may have contributed to the premature need for corrective
maintenance. Allis-Chalmers Pump Motors is a Potential
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Enforcement / Unresolved Item, 50-285/85-09-01.
(5) Containment ambient temperature - During review of the qualifi-
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cation files for a replacement transmitter the inspector
discovered that a containment ambient temperature of 85 F was
used in the thermal aging calculation. Documentation in support
of this value was requested, but the item remained open at the.
close of the inspection. Containment Ambient Temperature is an
Open Item, 50-285/85-09-08.
E.
IE Information Notices and Bulletins
The NRC inspectors reviewed and evaluated OPPD's activities related
to the review of EQ-related IE ins / Bulletins. The inspector's review
included examination of OPPD's procedures and EQ documentation
packages relative to 12 ins and one Bulletin. The procedures review
determined that OPPD does have a system for distributing, reviewing,
and evaluating ins / Bulletins relative to equipment within the scope
of 10 CFR 50.49. During the review of individual component
qualification files the NRC inspectors evaluated OPPD's actions with
respect to ins / Bulletins. No concerns were identified during this
,
review except relative to Rockbestos cable as described in paragraph
4.D.(3) of this report.
i
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13
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, . .
Omaha Public Power District
July 26, 1985
DISTRIBUTION:
VPB Reading
DQAVT Reading
JTaylor
RVollmer
BKGrimes
UPotapovs
GHubbard
RWilson
GHolahan,ORAB/NRR
RKarsch, ORAB/NRR
RLaGrange,EQB/NRR
HWalker, EQB/NRR
ETourigny,DL/NRR
MYost, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
ERichards, Sandia National Laboratories
DHunter, RIV
AJohnson, RIV
DNorman, RIV
JThomas, Duke Power Company
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ABC/EQB:NRR
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RWilson: sam
UPotapovs
GHolahan
RLaGrange
DHunter
7/16/85
7/Q85
7/l6/8
7/16 /85
7/M/85
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h/VPB:DQAVT
g[JMTaylor
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