ML20133B863

Insp Rept 50-458/85-31 on 850403-08.Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Adequate Procedure to Conduct Integrated Leak Rate Test

ML20133B863
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	08/01/1985
From:	Jaudon J, Tapia J, Whittlesey K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133B828	List: ML20133B825 ML20133B851 ML20133B863
References
50-458-85-31, NUDOCS 8508060277
Download: ML20133B863 (6)

See also: IR 05000458/1985031

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7 APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/85-31 License /CP: CPPR-145

' Dock'et: 50-458

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Licensee: Gulf States Utilities

P. O. Box 2951

y j.g c\ Beaumont, Texas 77704

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1 Facility Name: River Bend Station

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Inspection At: River Bend Station, St Francisv111e, Louisiana

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/ Inspection Conducted: April 3-8, 1985

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Inspebtors: J/ 7

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- K. A. W itt16sef,'Re ' tor Inspdgtor, Project Date

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.- - Sect on A, Reactor P o ect Branch 2

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"f4*fi.- J. apid, Rdact@ Inspector, Project Branch B Date

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'_ Approved: /7//[ M 8/

l' - J./P. paudg6, Chief, Project Section A, Reactor 'Dat'e

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted April 3-8, 1985 (Report 50-458/85-31)

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8508060277 350002

PDR ADOCK 05000458

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L Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of containment structural -

integrity test and integrated leak rate test. The inspectiontinvolved 51

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inspector-hours ~onsite by two NRC inspectors.

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Results: Within the two areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure.

to provide adequate procedure, paragraph 3). '

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

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Gulf States Utilities (GSU)

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~*C.-M. Coones, Civil Engineer

• T. L.L Crouse, Manager Quality Assurance

• P.~J. Dautel, Licensing Staff Assistant

• J. C. Deddens, Vice President

• P. E. Freehill, Superintendent Startup and Test

• E. R. Grant, Supervisor Licensing

J. E. Lo'zes, Senior' QC Inspector

• G. R. Kimmell, Supervisor Operations Quality Assurance

• G. V.' King, Plant Services Supervisor

• E. R. Oswood, Quality Assurance Engineer

C. D. Payton, Field Quality Control Level II

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager

J. E. Redmond, Senior QC Inspector

• T. E. Suhrke, Manager Project Planning and Coordination

Stone and Webster

• R. H. Bernier, Senior Advisory Engineer

• J. L. Busa, Assistant to the Chief Engineer

• F. W. Finger III,' Project Manager, Preliminary Test Organization

• R. I. Parry, Supervisor, Mechanical Test Engineering

• Indicates presence at exit interview conducted April 8, 1985.

2. Structural Integrity Test (SIT)

The purpose of the SIT is to demonstrate the ability of the containment

vessel to withstand internal loads imposed by pressurizing to 1.15 times

the design pressure of 15 psig. Preoperational Test Procedure No. 1

PASIT.001, Revision 1, " Pressure Test of the Steel Containment," was

reviewed and determined to meet NRC requirements and licensee connitments

listed in the' Final Safety Analysis Report. The test, already in progress

at the time of the NRC inspector's arrival on site, was being conducted in

accordance with the reviewed and approved test procedure.

The inspectors reviewed the procedure for ultrasonic monitoring of

electrical penetrations (attachment 10.2 to 1 PASIT.001) to be performed

under step 7.19. The ultrasonic leak detection method was implemented in

lieu of local pneumatic tests of the circumferential butt welds in'

electrical penetration nozzles. Calibration of acoustic monitoring

equipment on a mockup in the annulus area was observed prior to

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, commencement o'f the: ultrasonic inspection by field quality control

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personnel. The NRC inspectors observed and independently monitored ,

inspection of several penetrations and noted that no leaks were detected. '

The. method for discerning the equipment response to leakage from response

to background noise was described to the inspectors as well asr ,

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demonstrated.

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< At the comple't ion of the SIT, the containment was depressurized.

-3. -Integrated Leak Rcte Test

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The preoperational containment integrated leak' rate test conducted in

, accordance with Preoperational/ Acceptance Test Procedure 1-PT-57-1

~" Integrated Leak Rate Test," was addressed during this portion of the.

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. inspection. The inspection included procedure and records review,=' test

witnessing, and independent calculations by the NRC inspectors. .The

inspection was performed in order to ascertain whether testing was

y fconducted in accordance with approved procedures and, satisfied the

specified acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J and,the Final

Safety Analysis Report.

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1 After-a period of time at atmospheric pressure to allow for degassing of

, -structures and components inside containment subsequent to the SIT,

pressurization of the containment vessel for the ILRT commenced.

Stabilization commenced.after internal pressure reached 8.6 psig (23.3 -

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psia), the compressors were shut down and isolated. . The atmosphere is

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considered stabilized when the rate'of change of containment temperature-

averaged over the last 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> minus the rate of. change in containment-

temperature averaged over the last hour is less than 0.5*F/ About

11:00a.m.onApril5,1985,theNRCinspectorswereadviseb#.that

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containment atmosphere stabilization had been achieved and the official

24-hour test had begun. . Iaitial calculated leakage was excessive and

attempts to identify the leakage source resulted in the following sequence

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of. events.- ,

ILRT configuration includes a pneumatic block of main steam isolation

valves-(MSIVs). An increasing pressure trend was noticed on the pressure

, gauge on the outboard MSIVs indicating leakage across the inboard MSIVs.

After the: piping between inboard and outboard MSIVs equalized with

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containment pressure, the downstream piping was sealed at a pressure of

8.5 psig to minimize the effect of this leakage. It should be noted that

L the MSIVs are supplied with-a positive leakage control system, which would

be pressurized above peak postulated accident pressure in the event of'a

J ' design basis accident. Additionally, Valve 1 RHS-V15, an instrument root

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. valve on Residual Heat Removal'B pump discharge piping was found out of

w position and leaking a steady stream of water. Although the valve lineup

sheet and control room tagout log both indicated the valve to be in the

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closed position, it was found open by the licensee. The importance of

compliance with tagging procedures was discussed at the exit meeting,

although this was considered an isolated case. The valve was closed, but

calculated leakage remained excessive, indicating a remaining unidentified

leakage source. Further investigation by the licensee identified a direct

leakage path from the containment vessel to the annulus via three

instrument lines associated with the containment to annulus differential

pressure monitoring portion of the annulus pressure control system.

Instrument root, isolation, and equalization valves were open for 1

HVR*PDT G0A,1 HVR*PDT 60C, and 1 HVR*PDT 60E. This allowed a direct

leakage path from containment to the annulus because six differential

pressure instruments were omitted from the ILRT valve lineup. The subject

instrument and associated root valves were added to the ILRT lineup via

Minor Change Request (MCR) Number 4; a correct lineup was achieved, and

the ILRT was restarted.

After the restart of the test, motor operated valve 1 DFR*MOV 146, a

designated containment isolation valve, was determined to be in the closed

condition. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J requires that closure of containment

isolation valves for the ILRT be accomplished by normal operation. In

this case, normal operation would indicate response of the valve to a

containment isolation signal. However, the valve, having been recently

installed under authorization of Engineering and Design Coordination

Report Number P13043B, was not yet connected to electrical supply so it

could not be closed by normal means. The valve had been hand closed prior

to initiation of the test, and it was not included in the ILRT valve

lineup, although the expressed intent had been to call 1 DFR*MOV 146 open

in the lineup and rely on check valves 1 DFR*V131 and 1 DFR*V132. The

omission of differential pressure instruments 1 HVR*P0T 60A, 1HVR*PDT 60B,

1 HVR*PDT 60C, 1 HVR*PDT 60D, 1 HVR*PDT 60E, and 1 HVR*PDT 60F and the

omission of 1 DFR*MOV 146 from the valve lineup for 1-PT-57-1 constitute a

violation for failure to have adequate procedures (458/8531-01).

1 DFR*MOV 146 was opened, and the test continued. There was no noticeable

perturbation in the test data which could be attributed to the valve

manipulation, and open drain valves outboard showed no sign of water

leakage. It should be emphasized that as a portion of the reactor

building floor drain system for pump back suppression pool water

inventory, the referenced valve would be exposed to a water seal rather

than directly exposed to containment atmosphere. Pending final acceptance

and test demonstrating a fluid leakage rate within technical specification

limits for 1 DFR*M0V 146, this item remains open. (485/8531-02).

Continuation of the test indicated convergence of the calculated leak rate

and the upper confidence limit below the allowable leakage. At completion

of the 24-hour test, the superimposed leak verification portion of the

test was performed with results between the calculated and imposed

leakages within the 25% La limit.

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Subsequent to the performance of the test, the NRC inspectors obtained the

. raw data and computed the leakage rate in accordance with the Mass Point

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Data Analysis' technique. The computations performed by the NRC inspector

. were, compared with the licensee's results for!the purpose of. verifying-the

. calculational procedure and confirming the results. This' analytical .

v technique confirmed _the acceptability of thefresults obtained by the-

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licensee.

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4. Exit Interview

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The NRC-inspector met with the licensee representatives ~ denoted in

, paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection.- The NRC inspector

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summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

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