ML20133A135

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Special Rept:On 850611,Fire Door 1011-1 Determined Inoperable Due to Failed Closure Mechanism & Subsequent Failure of Frame Anchors.Continued Inoperability Beyond 7 Days Caused by Delayed Receipt of Replacement Door
ML20133A135
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 07/18/1985
From: Andrews R
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To: Martin R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
LIC-85-310, NUDOCS 8508050351
Download: ML20133A135 (2)


Text

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  • d Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha. Nebraska 68102 402/536 4000 i

July 18, 1985 LIC-85-310 Mr. Robert D. Martin Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285

Dear Mr. Martin:

Special Report on Inoperability of Fire Barrier Fire Door 1011-1 The Omaha Public Power District, holder of Operating License DPR-40, submits this special report pursuant to the requirements of Fort Calhoun Station Unit No.1 Technical Specification Section 2.19, " Fire Protection #ystem".

Fort Calhoun Station Unit No.1 Technical Specification Section 2.19(7) re-quires that all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall be functional (intact). With a penetration fire barrier nonfenctional, within one hour, either establish a continuous firewatch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the penetration and establish an hourly firewatch patrol. Restore the nonfunctional penetration to functional status within seven days, or pre-pare and submit within an additional 30 days a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification Section 5.9.3.

On June 11, 1985, fire door 1011-1 was determined to be inoperable due to a failed closure mechanism and subsequent failure of the frame anchors. The fire detectors on both sides of the door were checked for operability and an hourly firewatch patrol was established. Standing Order G-28, " Station Fire Protection Plan" directs personnel on the necessary actions to take in the event of a fire.

l The seven days of inoperability expired on June 18, 1985.

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Mr. Robert D. Martin Page Two The cause of continued inoperability was due to the fact that a new door and frame assembly had to be procured and did not arrive on-site until June 20, 1985. The new door and frame assembly was installed in accordance with manu-facturer's directions, and the fire barrier declared operable on June 28, 1985. The hourly firewatch patrol was terminated. This is the first known occurrence of a fire door failure that required purchase of a new door and frame assembly since initial installation of fire doors in fire barrier walls in 1979. Because there are so many variables associated with procurement of a given fire door as to size, hardware locations, etc., a " standard" replace-ment fire door and frame cannot be kept on hand. For these reasons, any future fire door failures will be handled on a case-by-case basis with expedited delivery of replacements.

S b R. L. Andrews Division Manager Nuclear Production RLA/JEL:rge cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036 Mr. E. G. Tourigny, NRC Project Manager Mr. L. A. Yandell, Senior Resident Inspector l

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