ML20129J540

Proposed Change 22 to Tech Specs to Reflect Addition of Halon Fire Suppression Sys in Station Svc Water Pump Room as Part of App R Fire Protection Program

ML20129J540
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	05/31/1985
From:	NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20129J456	List: ML20129J540 NLS8500120, Application to Amend License DPR-46,consisting of Proposed Change 22 to Tech Specs,Reflecting Addition of Halon Fire Suppression Sys in Svc Water Pump Room as Part of App R Fire Protection Program.Fee Paid
References
NUDOCS 8506100120
Download: ML20129J540 (9)

Text

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Revised Technical Specifications for Halen Fire Suppression System Revised Pages: 111 216j 216m 216f 216k 216g 216k1 (new page)

Reference:

1) NPPD Letter, J. M. Pilant to D. B. Vassallo, " Fire Protection Rule 10CFR50, Appendix R" dated June 28, 1982

2) USNRC Letter, D. B. Vassallo to J. M. Pilant, " Exemption Requests - 10CFR50.48 Fire. Protection and Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50" dated September 21, 1983 In Reference 1, the District requested an exemption to Appendix R requirements for the ~ service water intake structure because of inadequate separation criteria between service water pumps.

As part of the exemption request the District committed to provide an automatic fire suppression and detection system to cover all parts of the fire area.

In Reference 2, the NRC granted this exemption and issued a safety evaluation report concluding the District's

. proposal satisfied safety requirements.

In order to meet its Appendix R deadline, the District will be constructing and testing the halon fire suppression system in the near future.

Accordingly, the District requests that limiting conditions for operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements for the halon system be added to the Cooper Nuclear Station Technical Specifications.

In particular, the following changes are proposed:

1.

Table. of Contents, page 111, add the words "AND HALON SYSTEM" to Section 3.17.

2.

Addition of applicable LCO's and surveillance requirements for the halon system in Sections 3/4.17 on pages 216f and 216g.

3.

. Addition of the words "E = Halon 1301" to the legend at the bottom of page 216j.

4.

Addition of six smoke detectors and six thermal detector instruments for the service water pumps on page 216k.

5.

Add mention of the halon system to the bases of Sections 3.15-3.18/

4.15-4.18 " FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS" on page 216m.

The LCO and surveillance requirements were based on the example given in NUREG-0123 Revision 3,' standard Technical Specifications for General Electric BWR's, Specifications 3.7.7.4 and 4.7.7.4.

The requirement to verify at least once per 31 days that each valve in the flow path is in its correct position was not included because the system includes only check valves and explosive-actuated discharge valves.

8506100120 850531 PDR ADOCK 05000298 p

PDR l

Q Evaluation of this Revision with Respect to 10CFR50.92 A.

The enclosed Technical Specification change is judged to involve no

.significant hazards based on the following:

1.1 Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Evaluation:

The proposed amendment addresses the addition of a halon fire suppression system in the service water intake structure and as such does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

In fact, the amendment would reduce the consequences of a fire in the service water intake structure by increasing the number of fire detectors and supplying a halon system to suppress any fires in the area.

2.

Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

' Evaluation:

The proposed amendment does not introduce any new mode of operation so it does not create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3.

Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Evaluation:

The proposed ' amendment addresses the addition of a halon fire suppression system and _ fire detectors and hence will increase the margin of safety for a fire in the intake structure.

B.

Additional basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

The commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists by providing certain examples (48FR14870). The examples. include:

"(11) A change that constitutes an additional limitation, restriction, or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications.

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4 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Pace No.

.SCRVEILLANCE.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS

_3.12. ADDITIONAL SAFETY PILATED PLANT CAPABILITIES 4.12 215 - 215f A.

Main Control Rocm Ventilation A

215 B.

Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System.

B 215b C.

Service Water System C

215c D.

' Battery Room Vent D

215c.

-3.13 RIVER LEVEL 4.13 216

- 3.14 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM 4.14 216b 3.15 FIRE SUPPPISSION WATER SYSTDI 4.15 216b 3.16 SPRAY AND/OR SPRINKLER SYSTEM

~

~(FIRE PROTECTION) 4.16 216e 3.'17' CARBON DIOXIDE AND HALON SYSTEMS 4.17 216f l

3.18-FIRE HOSE STATIONS' 4.18 216g 3.19. FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION FIRE SEALS 4.19 216h 3.20 YARD FIRE HYDRANT AND HYDRANT HOSE HOUSE 4.20 2161

. 3.21 ENVIRONMENTAL / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS 4.21 216n 5.0- MAJOR DESIGN FEATURES 5.1 Site Features 217 5.2 Reactor 217 5.3 ~ Reactor Vessel 217 5.4 Containment 217 5.5 Fuel Storage 218 5.6 Seismic Design 218 5.7 Barge Traffic

.218

' 6.0 -^ ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.1 Organization 219 6.1.1 Responsibility 219 6.1.2 Offsite 219.

6.1.3 Plant Staff - Shift Complement.

219 6.1.4 Plant Staff - Qualifications 219a

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 3.16 (cont'd) 4.16 (cont'd)

SPECIFICATIONS SPECIFICATIONS A.

The Automatic Sprinkler Systems pro-A.

The Automatic Sprinkler Systems pro-tecting the Cable Spreading Room, tecting the Cable Spreading Room, Cable Expansion Room, and Northeast Cable Expansion Room, and Northeast Corner - 903 Ft. Elev. of Reactor Corner - 903 Ft. Elev. of Reactor Building shall be operabic.

Building shall be demonstarted to be operable by:

'B.

If the requirement of 3.16.A cannot be met, establish a continuous fire 1.

At least once per 12 months by watch with backup fire suppression cycling each testable valve in equipment for the unprotected area the. flow path through at least within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; restore the system one complete cycle of full to OPERABLE status within 14 days travel.

or prepare and submit a Special 2.

At least once per 18 months:

Report to the Commission within the next 30 days outlining the a)

By performing a system action taken, the cause of the functional test which inoperability and the plans and includes simulated schedule for restoring the system automatic actuation of to OPERABLE status.

the system, and 1)

Verifying that the I3.17CARBONDIOXIDEANDHALONSYSTEMS automatic valvesvin APPLICABILITY the flow path actu-ate to their correct Applies to the operational status of the positions on a test High Pressure Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing signal, and System protecting the Diesel Generator 2)

Cycling each valve in Rooms and the Halon Suppression System the flow path that is protecting the Service Water Intake not testable during Structure, plant operation OBJECTIVE through at least one To assure continuous Automatic Fire Pro-y tection for the Diesel Generator Rooms b)

By inspection of the spray l and the Service Water Intake Structure.

headers to verify their SPECIFICATIONS integrity.

A.

The High Pressure Carbon Dioxide 4.17 CARBON DIOXIDE AND HALON SYSTEMS l

Extinguishing System protecting APPLICABILITY the Diesel Generator Rooms shall

-be operable.

Applies to the operational status of the High Pressure Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing B.

The Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System protecting the Diesel Generator System protecting the Service Rooms and the Halon Suppression System Water Pump Room shall be operable protecting the Service Water Intake with at least one storage tank Structure.

having at least 95% of full charge weight and 90% of full charge SPECIFICATIONS Pressure.

A.

The High Pressure Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing System protecting the Diesel Generator Rooms shall be demonstrated operable by:

1.

At least once per 6 months, the High Pressure Carbon Dioxide storage cylinders should be weighed.

L

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e LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION' SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

-3.17.(cont'd):

4.17 (cont'd)

C.

If the-requirement ofL3.17;A and:

2.

At least once per 18 months by 3.17.B cannot be met:

verifying the system valves,.

alarms, and associated venti-1.

Establish a continuous r, ire lation motor interlocks.and watch with backup fire'suppres-dampers actuate to a simulated sion equipment for the unprotected automatic and manual actuation area (s)-within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; restore the signal. A brief air flow test

system to OPERABLE status within -

(" Puff Test").shall be made ' to 14 days or prepare and submit a verify flow from each nozzle.

Special Report to the Commission within the next 30 days outlining B.

The Halon 1301 Fire Suppression Sys-the action taken, the cause of the tem protecting the Service Water inoperability and the plans and

. Pump Room shall be demonstrated schedule for restoring the operable:

-system to OPERABLE status.

1.

t least once per six months by

-3.18 FIRE HOSE STATIONS weighing and recording the pres-APPLICABILITY sure of each Halon storage tank.

Applies to the~ operational status of.the 2.

At least once per 18 months by

' Fire Hose Stations in-the Control and verifying the system valves, Reactor buildings..

alarms, and associated venti--

a m

e s and

-OBJECTIVE dampers actuate to a simulated To assure continuous manual fire fighting automatic and manual actuation capability provided by existing Fire Hose signal. A brief. air flow test

. Stations.

(" Puff Test") shall'be made to SPECIFICATIONS' A.

The Fire Hose Stations.shown in Table 3.18 shall be operable.

APPLICABILITY B.

I_f th'e requirement of 3.18.A cannot Applies to the operational status of the be met,' route an. additional hose to Fire Hose Stations in the Control and

-the area protected by the inoperable Reactor Buildings.

Fire Hose Station from an operable SPECIFICATIONS

-Fire Hose Station of equivalent capacity within i hour.

A.

. The' Fire Hose Stations in the Control Building and Reactor Building shall be demonstrated to be operable by:

1.

At least;once per,31 days by:

a)

Visual inspection to assure all required equipment.is at the station.

2.

At least once per 18 months by:

a)

Removing the hose for in-spection and re-cacking, and

[:

b)

Replacement of all degraded.

gaskets in couplings.

3.

At least once per 3 years by:

p a)

Partially opening each hose

(

station valve to verify valve OPERABILITY and no

1. 1ow blockage, and t-l 216g-y,-

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TABLE 3.14' FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENT ID NO.

1

Reactor Building L859 &'881 Elev.

FD-TD-18-2 2(Covers RCIC, FP-TD-18-3 Core Spray,.RHR, and FP-TD-19-2 HPCI Pumps)

FP-TD-19-3

' FP-TD-20-2 FP-TD-20-3 FP-TD-20-4 FP-TD-20-5 FP-TD-21-2 FP-TD-21-3

'903 Elev.

FF-SD-18-1 FP-TD-18-4 FP-SD-19-1 FP-SD-20-1 FP-SD-21-1 93'1 Elev.

- FP-SD-23-1 FP-SD-23-2 FP-SD-23-3 s

FP-SD-23-4 958 Elev.

FP-SD-24-1 FP-SD-24-2 FP-SD-24-3 FP-SD-24-4

- FP-SD-24-5 FP-SD-24-6 976 Elev.

FP-SD-26-1 Covers Standby FP-SD-26-2 Liquid Control Pump and FP-SD-25 Standby. Gas Treatment FP-SD-25-2 FP-SD-25-3=

-FP-SD-25 FP-TD-25-5 1001~Elev.

FP-TD-26-3

'Also Fuel FP-TD-26-4 Storage Area FP-TD-25-6 FP-TD-25-7 Legend

.FP - Firc~ Protection H = Halon 1301

- l TD = Thermal Detector CO2 = Carbon Dioxide

. FD = Flame Detector DG = Diesel Generator

~SD = Smoke Detector 1st Digit Instr. ID No. = Zone 2nd Digit Instr. ID No. = Instr. No.

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M

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e.:

INSTRUNENT LOCATION-INSTRUMENT ID NO.

2 Control' Room

~

FP-SD-17-1 FP-SD-17-2 FP-SD-17-3 3

Cable Spreading Room FP-SD-16-1 FP-SD-16-2 FP-SD-16 FP-SD-16-4

~

FP-SD-16-5 FP-SD-16-6 Cable Expansion Room FP-SD-16-7 FP-SD-16-8 S'itchgear' Rooms

'4 w

~DC Switchgear Rooms FP-SD-15-2 FP-SD-15-3 Critical Switchgear Room FP-SD-22-1 FP-SD-22-2 5-

. Station Battery Rooms FP-SD-15-1 FP-SD-15 FP-SD-15-1A FP-SD-15-4A

.6' Diesel' Generator Rooms FP-SD-10-1 FP-SD-10-2 FP-SD-10-3

+

FP-SD-10-4 CO2-SD-DG-1A CO2-SD-DG-1B CO2-SD-DG-lC

'CO2-SD-DG-1D CO2-SD-DG-2A CO2-SD-DG-2B CO2-SD-DG-2C CO2-SD-DG-2D 7-Diesel Fuel Storage Rooms CO2-TD-DG-1A

'C02-TD-DG-1B

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-INSTRUMENT. LOCATION INSTRlaiENT ID NO.

. 8 Safety'Related Equipment not in Reactor Building RHR-Service Water Booster Pumps FP-SD-14-3 Emergency.' Condensate Storage Tanks FP-SD-14-1

Service. Water Pumps.

.FP-SD-32-1 FP-SD-32-2 FP-SD-32-3 FP-SD-32-4 FP-FD-32 FP-FD-32-6=

HSW-SD-H1 HSW-SD-H2 HSW-SD-H3

. HSW-SD 'I4 HSW-SD-H5 HSW-SD-H6 HSW-TD-H11 HSW-TD-H12 HSW-TD-H13 HSW-TD-H14 HSW-TD-HIS HSW-TD-H16

- 9 Auxiliary Relay Room & Reactor Protection System Rooms.

. Auxiliary Relay Room:

-FP-SD-15-9 Reactor Protection System Room 1A FP-SD-15-7 Reactor Protection System Room 1B FP-SD-15-8 h

e:

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3.14-3.19/4.14-4.19 BASES 3.14/4.14 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire detectica instrumentation ensures that adequate

[-

warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This cap-i ability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages.

Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection l

program.

l In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is in-operable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is

[

required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is returned to service.

I 3.15-3.18/4.15-4.18 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS I

f THE OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires cccurring in any-portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located. The fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers,'CO '

2 Halon 1301, and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire l

suppression systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety related equipment and is 'a major element in the facility fire protection program.

In the event that portions of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the affected equipment can be restored to service.

In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, im-mediate. corrective measures must be taken since this sytem provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant. The requirement for twenty-four hour report to the Commission provides for prompt evaluation of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adequate fire suppression capability for the continued protection of the nuclear plant.

3.19/4.19 FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetration seals ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguish-ment. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

During periods of time when the~ seals are not functional, a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected seal until the seal is restored to functional status.

Fire barrier penetration seals include cable penetration barriers, fire doors, and fire dampers.

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