ML20129J271
| ML20129J271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1985 |
| From: | Westafer G FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| OF0785-12, OF785-12, NUDOCS 8507220399 | |
| Download: ML20129J271 (2) | |
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p Power C ORPO R ATIO N July 17,1985 3F0785-12 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Alternative Shutdown Capability
References:
1)
FPC letter to NRC, #3F1082-32, dated October 29,1982 2)
NRC letter to FPC, #3N0183-05, dated January 6,1983," Crystal River Unit 3 Safety Evaluation Report Appendix R to 10 CFR 50" 3)
FPC letter to NRC, #3F0585-ll, dated May 17,1985
Dear Sir:
By Reference 1, Florida Power Corporation (I PC) proposed design features of a Dedicated Remote Shutdown Panel (DRSP) to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Sections Ill.G.3 and III.L. In Reference 2, the NRC staff provided a safety evaluation of FPC's proposed design, concluding that the Remote Shutdown Panel satisfied those requirements with one exception. The exception was resolved with FPC's commitment to install a source range neutron flux monitor at the Remote Shutdown Panel.
In Reference 3, FPC provided clarifying information relative to the Remote Shutdown System design described briefly in your Safety Evaluation Report.
Ongoing review of our total effort for compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Sections Ill.G, 3, L and O has raised concern that additional clarification is required.
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US 717 PDR GENERAL OFFICE 3201 Thirty-fourth Street South.P.O Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 813-866-5151
.,o July 17,1985 3F0785-12 Page 2
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FPC has installed a Dedicated Remote Shutdown Panel with alternative shutdown capability essentially as described in Reference 1, meeting the requirements of Appendix R, Sections III.G.3 and III.L.I.
The panel also contains additional capability provided for operator flexibility and process monitoring which exceeds the minimum requirements and necessary to perform the functions listed in Section III.L.I. Not all the redundant capability and control provided by the panel for functions over and above the minimum required have been protected for all fire scenarios. Specifically, a cable spreading room fire may disable some of the components. Regardless of the scenario, FPC has provided a Dedicated Remote Shutdown Panel that assures at least one train of equipment will remain operable for a fire in the control room, cable spreading room, or HVAC equipment room concurrent with a loss of offsite power; two trains will remain operable for certain scenarios.
FPC is confident that our Dedicated Remote Shutdown Panel meets the requirements of Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.L and exceeds the minimum acceptable capabilities for alternative shutdown. We are concerned, however, that without this clarifying information, the safety evaluation report description of our Remote Shutdown System may be interpreted to indicate that FPC has provided redundant shutdown capabilities for all scenarios. Should you have any questions or require further information, please contact this office.
Sincerely, s
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G. R. Westafer Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management SCP/feb 1