ML20129F183
| ML20129F183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1996 |
| From: | Woodard J GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GL-89-10, GL-95-07, GL-95-7, TAC-M88736, TAC-M88737, NUDOCS 9610290051 | |
| Download: ML20129F183 (17) | |
Text
Georgia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue
,. Atlanta. Georgf a 30308 Telephone 404 526-3195 Mailing Address 40 inverness Center Parkway Post Othce Box 1295 i
Birmingham. Alabama 35201 Telephone 205 668-5086 J. D. Woodard tN mut'+m eccre srstem Senior Vice President October 21, 1996 Docket No. 50-321 HL-5240 50-366 TAC Nos.
M88736 M88737 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Scope Expansionfor Generic Letter 89-10 Program and Generic Letter 95-07 SunnlementalInformation 1
i Gentlemen:
By letter dated October 16,1995, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) relative to the scope of the Plant Hatch Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 program. The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the GL 89-10 scope expansions discussed below and also supplement the information provided to the NRC in Georgia Power Company's (GPC's) 180-day response to GL-95-07, dated February 12, 1996.
Based upon GPC's review of the NRC's SER, the following additions were incorporated into Plant Hatch's GL 89-10 program:
1.
All motor-operated valves (MOVs) listed by Master Parts List number in the SER were added to the program scope.
2.
Several containment isolation valves with the active safety function to close were also added to the program. (Reference paragraph "p" of the SER.)
3.
Of the MOVs added to the program, the gate valves with the active safety function to open were evaluated to assess their potential to experience pressure locking and n00058 thermal binding, per the requirements of GL 95-07, " Pressure Locking and Thermal
~
Binding of Safety Related Power Operated sate Valves," dated August 17,1995.
Of the valves evaluated against the criteria of GL 95-07, none were found g h,r susceptible to thermal binding. However, residual heat removal minimum flow 9610290051 961021 PDR ADOCK 05000321 P
Georgia Power d U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 October 21, 1996 valves 2El1-F007A&B were found susceptible to pressure locking under certain conditions. Because the scenario under which pressure locking can occur is beyond any design bases event, the valves' ability to perform their safety function during a design basis event is not affected. Accordingly, the valves can be considered operable. However, as a conservative measure, GPC plans to modify the valve disks during the next refueling outage. The enclosure provides the evaluation sheets for each of the valves evaluated per the guidance of GL 95-07.
Should you have any questions in this regard, please contact this oflice.
Sincerely, J.
. Woodard OCV/sp
Enclosure:
Generic Letter 95-07 Evaluation Sheets cc: Georgia Power Company Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr., Nuclear Plant General Manager NORMS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. D. C.
Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U. S. Nuclear Reentatorv Commission. Region H Mr. S. D. Et neter, Regional Administrator Mr. B. L. Holbrook, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch
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Enclosure Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Scope Expansionfor Generic Letter 89-10 Program' and Generic Letter 95-07 SupplementalInformation Evaluation Sheets for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding Assessment
.of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Gate Valves
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GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET 1
1 System: lEl1 Residual Heat Removal / RHR Valves: 1El1-F007A/B Valve Function: RHR Minimum Flow Bvpass Valve Manufacturer: Walworth Valve Type: Solid Wedge / Gate a
Normal Position:
Open Post Accident Position: Both l
Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes 0 No O If Yes, what mode (s):
Open if closed to provide pump bypass flow. All modes.
Normal Fluid Temp:
260 0F Press: 20 PSIG 1_
Operating Fluid Temp:
260 0F Press: 20 PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp:
358 0F Press: 450 PSIG i
Normal Atmosphere Temp:
100 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
100 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG i
Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
A:148 0F Press: A:14.7 PSIG j
B:215 B:15.9 i
Location:
A: Southeast Diagonal - RLR13. B: Northeast Diagonal - RLR02. El. 93'.
]
Normal distance from heat source:
NA l
Post accident distance form heat sources:
NA i
r i
Valve Inservice Testing:
Frequency of IST:
Quarterly I
System Functional Testing:
42SV-Ell-001,004.005 IS
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Frequency of Functional Test: Once every fuel cycle, not to exceed 18 months.
j
References:
P&lD A: H 16330 Physical / ISO: A: H-16113 / H 16848 l
B: H-16229 Valve Drawing:
S Il472 Physical / ISO: B: H 16113 / H-16849 i
Other information:
1 Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O
NO O Accept. Criteria TB-4 i
Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO O Accept. Criteria PL-1 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: Nonc
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GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: lEl1 Residual Heat Removal / RHR Valves:
lEl1 F021A/B Valve Function: RHR Containment Spray Inboard Isolation Valve Manufacturer: Walwonh Valve Type: Solid Wedge / Gat.e Normal Position:
Closed Post Accident Position: Open Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes 0 No O If Yes, what mode (s):
Containment Spray Normal Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: 50 PSIG l
Operating Fluid Temp:
120 0F Press: 170 PSIG l
Post Accident Fluid Temp:
205 0F Press: 210 PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp:
100 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
100 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
210 0F Press: 15.4 PSIG Location:
A: Reactor Bldg. SE. El.160' RHR09. B: Reactor Bldg NE. El.146', RHR07.
Normal distance from heat source:
NA Post accident distance form heat sources:
NA Valve Inservice Testing:
34SV-Ell-002-IS Frequency of IST:
Quanerly System Functional Testing:
42SV-Ell 002-IS Frequency of Functional Test: Once each fuel cycle. not to exceed 18 months.
References:
P&lD H-16329. H-16330 Physical / ISO: H-16116 / H 16834 Valve Drawing:
S-Il475 Physical / ISO: H-16117 / H 16833 Other Information:
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO El Accept. Criteria TB-4 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO O Accept. Criteria PL-1 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: None GAA 7/2 /96
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GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: IE21 Core Spray Valves:
IE21-F031 A Valve Function: Core Spray Pump Minimum Flow Valve Manufacturer: Walworth Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Open Post Accident Position: Both Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes B No O If Yes, what mode (s):
Open if closed to proside pump bypass flow. All modes.
Normal Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: 50 PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: 50 PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp:
210 0F Press: 300 PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp:
100 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
100 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
148 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Location:
Southeast Diagonal. El.100'. RLR13.
Normal distance from heat source:
Over 66' from the Torus.
Post accident distance form heat sources:
Same as normal.
Valve Inservice Testing:
34SV-E21-002-IS Frequency of IST:
Quarterly System Functional Testing:
42SV-E21-001-IS Frequency of Functional Test:
Once each fuel cycle, not to exceed 18 months.
References:
P&lD H-16331 Physical / ISO: H-16121/ H-16864 Valve Drawing:
S-27563 Physical / ISO:
Other Information:
Post accident fluid and atmosphere temperatures can potentially reach 210 and 148 degrees F, respectively. However, pressure locking due to boiler efIcct is not a concern as follows:
1 Prior to the event. the core spray pump minimum flow valve is in the open position.
I The core spray pumps will automatically start on high drywell pressure or low reactor water level. The pumps will operate on minimum flow bypass until the reactor is depressurized to the point where the injection valves open and injection is possible. The I
bypass valve will close on high flow.
Accident analyses and the core spray system operating procedures assume that once the pumps are started. they will not be shut down until they are no longer needed.
Operating procedures require that the system not be shut down until adequate core cooling is assured. The system will not be shut down unless other systems are available to provide core cooling. The core spray pumps will not be required to be re-started and the minimum flow valve will not be required to operate. Therefore, pressure locking is l
not a concern.
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO O Accept. Criteria TB-4 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO O Accept. Criteria PL-5 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes None fbdA4 7 SI $4 O o YTLL knTA f
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GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: lE21 Core Spray Valves: IE21-F031B Valve Function: Core Spray Pump Minimum Flow Valve Manufacturer: Walworth i
Valve Type: Solid Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Open Post Accident Position: Both Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes 12!
No O if Yes, what mode (s):
Open if closed to provide pump bypass flow. All modes.
1 Normal Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: 50 PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: 50 PSIG i
Post Accident Fluid Temp:
210 0F Press: 300 PSIG l
Normal Atmosphere Temp:
100 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
100 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG l
j Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
215 0F Press: 15.7 PSIG Location: Northeast Diagonal. El.100', RLR02.
Normal distance from heat source:
Over 67' fnom the Torus.
f Post accident distance form heat sources:
Same as normal.
4 Valve inservice Testing:
34SV-E21-002-IS Frequency of IST:
Quanerly System Functional Testing:
42SV-E21-001-IS Frequency of Functional Test:
Once each fuel cycle, not to exceed 18 months.
4 j
References:
P&lD H-16331 Physical / ISO: H-16121/ H 16863 Valve Drawing:
S 11471 Physical / ISO:
Otherinformation:
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO 9 Accept. Criteria TB-4 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO 9 Accept. Criteria PL-1 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: None
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i GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET 4
l System: 2 Ell Residual Heat Removal / RHR Valves: 2 Ell-F007A Valve Function: RHR Minimum Flow Bmass Valve Manufacturer: Walworth Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Open Post Accident Position: Both Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes O No D if Yes, what mode (s):
Open if closed to provide pump bypass flow. All modes.
Nonnal Fluid Temp:
70 0F Press: O PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
_ 70 0F Press: 5 PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp:
409 0F Press: 10 PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp:
104 0F Press: 14.7 PSid Operating Atmosphere Temp:
104 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
145 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Location:
Northeast Diagonal - RLR14. El. 98'.
Normal distance from heat source:
The connection to the pump discharge line is approximately 17 feet from the valve.
Post accident distance form heat sources:
Same Valve inservice Testing:
34SV-Ell-002 2S Frequency of IST:
Quarterly System Functional Testing:
42SV-Ell-001. 004. 005-2S Frequency of Functional Test: Once every fuel cycle, not to exceed 18 months.
References:
P&lD H-26015 Physical / ISO: H 26112 / H-26829 Valve Drawing:
S-27507 Physical / ISO:
Other information:
The valve is only 17' from the RHR pump discharge line, which would be the heat source in an accident. It is also over 4' above the heat source.
The valve is normally open. The RHR pumps will start in the LPCI mode on high drywell pressure or low reactor water level. The valve will close on a high flow signal, trapping relatively cool torus water in the bonnet. As LPCI continues to operate, the fluid temperature and the atmosphere temperature can potential'f ncrease to 209 and i
145 degrees F, respectively. The potential exists to increase the bonnet temperature.
LPCI operation will be terminated when it is no longer required. If the pumps are restarted in another mode of RHR. pressure locking due to boiler effect could occur.
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes D NO O Accept. Criteria TB-4 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO O Accept. Criteria Condition under which valve is susceptible:
The RHR pumps are required to be restarted after the initial run is terminated.
Proposed fixes: Drill a hole in the disc on the downstream side.
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GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: 2El1 Residual Heat Removal / RHR Valves: 2El1-F0078 Valve Function: RHR Minimum Flow Bypass Valve Manufacturer: Anchor / Darling Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Open Post Accident Position: Both Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes B No O If Yes, what mode (s):
Open if closed to provide pump bvpass flow. All modes.
Normal Fluid Temp:
70 0F Press: 0 PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
70 0F Press: 5 PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp:
209 0F Press: 10 PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp:
104 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
104 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
145 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Location:
Southeast Diagonal - RLR24. El. 98'.
Normal distance from heat source:
The connection to the pump discharge line is approximately 17 feet from the valve.
Post accident distance form heat sources:
Same Valve Inservice Testing:
34SV Ell-002-2S i
j Frequency of IST:
Quarterly System Functional Testing:
42SV-Ell-001. 004. 005-2S Frequency of Functional Test: Once every fuel cycle, not to exceed 18 months.
References:
P&lD H-26014 Physical / ISO: H-26112 / H-26829 Valve Drawing:
S-61509 Physical / ISO:
j Other Information:
The valve is only 17' from the RHR pump discharge line, w hich would be the heat j
source in an accident. It is also over 4' above the heat source.
The valve is normally open. The RHR pumps will start in the LPCI mode on high drywell pressure or low reactor water level. The valve will close on a high flow signal, trapping relatively cool torus water in the bonnet. As LPCI continues to operate, the fluid temperature and the atmosphere temperature can potentially increase to 209 and i
145 degrees F, respectively. The potential exists to increase the bonnet temperature.
LPCI operation will be terminated when it is no longer required. If the pumps are restarted in another mode of RHR. pressure locking due to boiler effect could occur.
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO E Accept. Criteria TB-4 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes E NO O Accept. Criteria Condition under which valve is susceptible:
The RHR pumps are required to be restarted after the initial run is terminated.
Proposed fixes: Drill a hole in the disc on the downstream side.
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j GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: 2 Ell Residual Heat Removal / RHR Valves: 2 Ell-F021 A Valve Function: RHR Containment Spray Inboard Isolation 1
Valve Manufacturer: Walworth 1
Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Closed Post Accident Position: Open I
Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes E No O if Yes, what mode (s):
Containment Spray Normal Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: 0 PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: O PSIG i
Post Accident Fluid Temp:
205 0F Press: 240 PSIG l
Normal Atmosphere Temp:
105 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
105 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG l
Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
215 0F Press: 16.5 PSIG Location: Personnel Access Room El.139', RJR20.
Normal distance from heat source:
NA Post accident distance form heat sources:
NA Valve inservice Testing:
34SV-Ell-002 2S Frequency ofIST:
Quarterly System Functional Testing:
42SV Ell-002 2S Frequency of Functional Test:
Once each fuel cycle, not to exceed 18 months.
References:
P&lD H-26015 Physical / ISO: H-26111, / H-26821 Valve Drawing:
S-27501 Physical / ISO:
l Other information:
The distance from the tonn is excessively large upstream of the valve. The containment spray header is downstream of the valve and is not a heat source. Fluid temperature will not cause boiler effect.
Containment spray is manually initiated to condense steam in the drywell in the event of a break inside containment. The post accident temperature in the personnel access room could potentially reach 215 degrees F. However, this temperature is the result of a break outside containment. In the event of a break outside containment, containment spray would not be required. Therefore, pressure locking due to boiler effect is not a concern.
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO E Accept. Criteria TB 4 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO E Accept. Criteria PL-3 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: None
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GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: 2 Ell Residual Heat Removal / RHR Valves: 2El1-F021B Valve Function: RHR Containment Spray Inboard Isolation Valve Manufacturer: Walworth Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate t
Normal Position:
Closed Post Accident Position: Open Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes 12!
No O If Yes, what mode (s):
Containment Spray Normal Fluid Temp:
40-90 0F Press: 0 PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
40-90 0F Press: 0 PSIG l
Post Accident Fluid Temp:
177 0F Press: 340 PSIG Normal Atmciphere Temp:
90 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
90 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
217 0F Press: 15.06 PSIG Location:
RWCU Heat Exchanger Room. El.166', RHR22.
1 Normal distance from heat source:
NA Post accident distance form heat sources:
NA Valve inservice Testing:
34SV-Ell-002 2S Frequency of IST:
Quarterly l
System Functional Testing:
_42SV-Ell.002-25 l
Frequency of Functional Test:
Once each fuel cycle, not to exceed 18 months.
References:
P&lD H 26014 Physical / ISO: H 26114 / H-26827 Valve Drawing:
S-27501 Physical / ISO:
Othar Information:
The distance from the torus is excessively large upstream of the valve. The containment a
spray header is donstream of the valve and is not a heat source. Fluid temperature will j
not cause boiler effect.
Containment spray is manually initiated to condense steam in the drywell in the event of t
a break inside containment. The post accident temperature in the RWCU heat exchanger room could potentially reach 217 degrees F. However, this temperature is the result of a break outside containment. In the event of a break outside containment, containment spray would not be required. Therefore, pressure locking due to boiler effect is not a concern.
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO 121 Accept. Criteria TB-4 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO E21 Accept. Criteria PL-3 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: None
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GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET
' System: 2E210:re Spray V:lves: 2E21-F031 A Valve Function: Core Spray Pump Minimum Flow Valve Manufacturer: Powell i
Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Open Post Accident Position: Both j
i Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes El No O If Yes, what mode (s):
Open if closed to provide pump bypass flow. All modes.
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Normal Fluid Temp:
95 op Press: O PSIG j
Operating Fluid Temp:
95 op Press: 0 PSIG l
Post Accident Fluid Temp:
195 op Press: 300 PSIG i
i 4
Normal Atmosphere Temp:
104 op Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
104 op Press: 14.7 PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
145 o;;
Press: 14.7 PSIG Location:
Northeast Diagonal. El. 92', RLR14 Normal distance from heat source:
Over 78* from the Torus l
Post accident distance form heat sources:
Same as normal.
Valve inservice Testing:
34SV-E2A-002-2S Frequency of IST:
Quanerly System Functional Testing:
42SV-E21001-2S Frequency of Functional Test: Once cach fue! cycle. Not to exceed 18 months.
References:
P&lD H-26018 Physical / ISO: H-26118 / H-26836 Valve Drawing:
S-43006 Physical / ISO:
i Other Information:
Post accident fluid and atmosphere temperatures can potentially reach 195 and 145 degrees F, respectively. However, pressure locking due to boiler effect is not a concern as follows:
Prior to the event, the core spray pump minimum flow valve is in the open position.
The core spray pumps will automatically start on high drywell pressure or low reactor l
water level. The pumps will operate on minimum flow bypass until the reactor is j
depressurized to the point where the injection valves open and injection is possible. The
^
bypass valve will close on high flow.
Accident analyses and the core spray system operating procedure assume that once the pumps are staned, they will not be shut down until they are no longer needed.
Operating procedures require that the system not be shut down until adequate core cooling is assured. The system will not be shut down unless other systems are available to provide core cooling. The core spray pumps will not be required to be re-started and the minimum flow valve will not be required to operate. Therefore, pressure locking is not a concern.
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO El Accept. Criteria TB-4 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO El Accept. Criteria PL-5 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: None lY [kw 7lZ3 h 6 o "~^)D J 4/d*%
REVIEWER
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GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: 2E21 Core Spray Valves: 2E21 F031B Valve Function: Core Spray Pump Minimum Flow Valve Manufacturer: Walworth Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Open Post Accident Position: Both Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes E No O If Yes, what mode (s):
Open if closed to provide pump bypass flow. All modes.
Normal Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: 0 PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: o PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp:
195 0F Press: 300 PSIG Nonnal Atmosphere Temp:
104 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG i
Operating Atmosphere Temp:
104 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
145 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Location:
Southeast Diagonal. El. 92*. RLR24 Normal distance from heat source:
Over 78' from the Torus Post accident distance form heat sources:
Same as normal.
Valve inservice Testing:
34SV-E21-002-2S Frequency of IST:
Quanerly System Functional Testing:
42SV-E21-001-2S Frequency of Functional Test: Once each fuel cycle, Not to exceed 18 months.
Referencest P8ilD H 26018 Physical / ISO: H 26118 / H 26837 Valve Drawing:
S-27563 Physical / ISO:
Other information:
Post accident fluid and atmosphere temperatures can potentially reach 195 and 145 degrees F, respectively. However, pressure locking due to boiler effect is not a concern as follows:
Prior to the event, the core spray pump minimum flow valve is in the open position.
The core spray pumps will automatically start on high drywell pressure or low reactor water level. The pumps will operate on minimum flow bypass until the reactor is depressurized to the point where the injection valves open and injection is possible. The bypass valve will close on high flow.
Accident analyses and the core spray system operating procedure assume that once the pumps are started, they will not be shut down until they are r o longer needed.
Operating procedures require that the system not be shut down until adequate core cooling is assured. The system will not be shut down unless other systems are available
{
to provide core cooling. The core spray pumps will not be required to be re-started and i
the minimum flow valve will not be required to operate. Therefore, pressure locking is not a concern.
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO E Accept. Criteria TB-4 Valvw susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO E Accept. Criteria PL-5 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixe - None (f/. (kg41 2/2.3/%
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System: 2T49 Post LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner Valves: 2T49-F001A/B Valve Function: Open for operation of the Hydrogen Recombiner in Post LOCA conditions.
Valve Manufacturer: Powell Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Closed Post Accident Position: Open Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes E No O If Yes, what mode (s):
Hydrogen Recombiner operation in post LOCA conditions.
Normal Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: 0 PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
215 0F Press: 15 PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp:
310 0F Press: 62 PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp:
90 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
90 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
205 0F Press: 15.04 PSIG Location: Reactor Building, El.193', RHR19 Normal distance from heat source:
N/A Post accident distance form heat sources:
N/A Valve inservice Testing:
34SV-T49 003-2S Frequency of IST:
Once / 92 days System Functional Testing:
34SV-T49-001-2S 34SV-T49-002-2S Frequency of Functional Test: Once /18 months Once / 6 months
References:
P&lD H-26068 Physical / ISO: H-26270 / H 26933 Valve Drawing:
S-31049 Physical / ISO:
Other information:
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO E Accept. Criteria B1 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO E Accept. Criteria B1 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: None Add 7 2f 96 ORN M TOR
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GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: 2T49 Post LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner Valves: 2T49-F002A/B Valve Function: Open for operation of the Hydrogen Recombiner in Post LOCA conditions.
Valve Manufacturer: Powell Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Closed Post Accident Position: Open Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes 9 No O If Yes, what mode (s):
Hydrogen Recombiner operation in post LOCA conditions.
Normal Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: 0 PSIG Operating Fluid Tamp:
215 0F Press: 15 PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp:
310 0F Press: 62 PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp:
90 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp:
90 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
205 0F Press: 15.04 PSIG Location:
Reactor Building. El.193'. RHRl9 Normal distance from heat source:
N/A Post accident distance form heat sources:
N/A Valve Inservice Testing:
34SV-T49 003-2S Frequency of 15T:
Once / 92 days System Functional Testing:
34SV-T49-001-25 34SV-T49-002-2S Frequency of Functional Test: Once /18 months Once / 6 months
References:
P&lD H-26068 Physical / ISO: H-26270 / H-26933 Valve Drawing:
S-31049 Physical / ISO:
Other information:
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO O Accept. Criteria B-1 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO E Accept. Criteria B1 Condition underwhich valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: None A7Ad 7 20 $C
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4 GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: 2T49 Post LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner Valves: 2T49-F004A/B Valve Function: Open for operation of tne Hvorogen Recombiner in Post LOCA conditions.
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Valve Manufacturer: Powell Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Closed Post Accident Pnsition: Open i
Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes E No O j
If Yes, what mode (s):
Hydrogen Recombiner operation in post LOCA conditions.
Normal Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: O PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
215 0F Press: 15 PSIG 2
Post Accident Fluid Temp:
310 0F Press: 62 PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp:
105 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG l
Operating Atmosphere Temp:
105 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG 4
Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
216 0F Press: 16.74 PSIG Location: Torus Room. El.122'. A: RFR14. B: RFR24 Normal distance from heat source:
N/A Post accident distance form heat sources:
N/A Valve Inservice Testing:
34SV-T49 003-2S Frequency of IST:
Once / 92 days i
System Functional Testing:
34SV-T49 001-2S 34SV-T49-002-2S Frequency of Functional Test:
Once /18 months Once / 6 months
References:
P&lD H 26068 Physical / ISO: A: H-26268 / H-26931 Valve Drawing:
S-31049 PhysicaillSO: B: H-26268 / H-26932 Other information:
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O NO O Accept. Criteria B-1 Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO O Accept. Criteria B-1 Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: None
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i GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET System: 2T49 Post LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner Valves: 2T49-F005A/B Valve Function: Open for operation of the Hydrogen Recombiner in Post LOCA conditions.
Valve Manufacturer: Powell i
Valve Type: Flex Wedge / Gate Normal Position:
Closed Post Accident Position: Open Does valve need to open to perform safety function?
Yes li5 No O if Yes, what mode (s):
Hydrogen Recombiner operation in post LOCA conditions.
Normal Fluid Temp:
95 0F Press: O PSIG Operating Fluid Temp:
215 0F Press: 15 PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp:
310 0F Press: 62 PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp:
105 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG
)
Operating Atmosphere Temp:
105 0F Press: 14.7 PSIG i
Post Accident Atmosphere Temp:
216 0F Press: 16.74 PSIG Location: Torus Room. El.122'. A: RFR14. B: RFR24 Normal distance from heat source:
N/A Post accident distance form heat sources:
N/A Valve inservice Testi.~.g:
34SV-T49 003-2S Frequency of IST:
Once / 92 days System Functional Testing:
34SV-T49-001-2S 34SV-T49-002-2S Frequency of Functionas Test: Once /18 months Once / 6 months 1
References:
P&lD H-26068 Physical / ISO: A: H-26268 / H-26931 Valve Drawing:
S-31049 Physical / ISO: B: H-26268 / H-26932 J
Other information:
Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes O
NO E Accept. Criteria B-1 1
l Valve susceptible to pressure lock:
Yes O NO E Accept. Criteria B-1 f
Condition under which valve is susceptible:
None Proposed fixes: None t
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