ML20129D762
| ML20129D762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1985 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Williamson J TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129D766 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-85-071, EA-85-71, NUDOCS 8507160645 | |
| Download: ML20129D762 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000409/2005031
Text
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July 12, 1985
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Docket No. 50-346
EA 85-71
Toledo Edison Company
ATTN:
Mr. John P. Williamson
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Edison Plaza
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, OH 43652
Gentlemen:
This refers to the safety inspection conducted by Messrs. W. Rogers, D. Kosloff,
and M. Ring of the Region III staff during the period April 9 - May 31, 1985
of activities authorized by Operating License No. NPF-3 for the Davis-Besse
Nuclear Power Station.
Three violations of Technical Specification and
procedural requirements, as well as other failures to comply with NRC regulatory
requirements, were identified during this inspection.
The results of this
inspection were discussed on May 24, 1985 during an Enforcement Conference
held in the Region III office between Mr. R. P. Crouse and others of your
staff and myself and others of the NRC staff.
Violation I in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of
Civil Penalty (Notice) involved a failure to effectively implement a program
in which the operating status of equipment was to be made known to cognizant
plant personnel at all times.
This failure was a result of inadequate
communications between security and operations personnel.
Specifically, on
April 9, 1985, the security-fire / radiation computer was taken out of service and
the shift supervisor was not notified at the time the computer was actually
shutdown.
The shift supervisor did not learn of the computer shutdown until
he discovered it two hours later.
As a result, while the computer was shutdown,
the shift supervisor was unable to take timely compensatory measures to ensure
adequate fire protection controls were maintained.
We are aware that additional
compensatory measures were not actually necessar3 because measures had already
been taken in response to other problems related to fire protection.
However,
the pre existing compensatory measures do not excuse the inadequate communications
between the security and operations personnel.
Violation II in the enclosed Notice involves failure to monitor pipe leakage
from the Startup Feedwater Pump / Turbine Cooling Water systems.
Monitoring was
specifically required by a License Condition because pipe leakage or rupture
in this area had not been analyzed for the effects of jet impingement, pipe
whip, and flooding upon the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
On April 24, 1985,
the non-licensed operator who had been assigned to monitor the Startup Feedwater
Pump / Turbine Plant Cooling Water piping status in the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
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Toledo Edison Company
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July 12, 1985
Room was found by an NRC inspector to be asleep.
Therefore, he would not have
been able to perform his required function which was to trip the Startup Feedwater
Pump locally or notify the Control Room operator to trip the pump if leakage
occurred.
We are also concerned that corporate management was not promptly
informed of this incident by site management.
Violation III in the enclosed Notice involves the failure to maintain proper
reactor power for the indicated reactor coolant flow rate.
On April 19 and 20,
1985, the licensee recorded reactor coolant flow rate values approximately 2%
below the Technical Specification flow rate limit.
Licensee personnel failed
to recognize that a valved-out component continued to provide erroneous input
to the computer heat balance calculation.
This affects the operator's primary
indication of thermal power and as a result, the thermal power was not reduced
to the correct thermal power limit required by Technical Specification requirements.
To emphasize the importance of effective communications within your organization
to ensure that when problems are identified, root causes are found and adequate
corrective actions are taken, I have been authorized, after consultation with
the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice
of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the cumulative amount
of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000).
These violations are categorized
as a Severity Level III problem in accordance with the " General Statement of
Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C
(1985).
The base civil penalty for a Severity Level III problem is $50,000.
However, the base amount has been increased by 100% because of Davis-Besse's
previous poor performance discussed below.
During a September 23, 1982 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP),
we identified weaknesses in the licensee's ability to recognize requirements
for equipment operability.
In March of 1983, as a result of an Enforcement
Conference, the licensee committed to implement a Comprehensive Corrective
Action Program to address these and other concerns.
These concerns were
expressed again during an October 28, 1983 SALP.
However, actions taken to
address these concerns were ineffective and similar violations were identified
which resulted in the issuance of a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition
of Civil Penalties in November 1984.
This enforcement action was based on
failures to ensure that the status of plant equipment was understood by the
responsible individuals and failure to take adequate corrective actions.
The
air conditioning portions of both trains of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation
System were removed from service without complying with station procedures,
thus rendering the system inoperable in violation of Technical Specification
requirements.
In addition, removal of one of two Number One Emergency Diesel
Generator ventilation fans for maintenance made the Number One Emergency Diesel
Generator inoperable and Technical Specification action statements could not
be satisfied due to the failure of the licensee to recognize this condition.
Problems were also identified with the Startup Feedwater Pump System, yet the
licensee failed to ensure that adequate actions were taken to correct the
problems identified and to preclude repetition of the problems.
.
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Toledo Edison Company
-3-
July 12, 1985
The causes of the previous violations were similar to some of the failures identified
during the April 1985 inspection which are the subject of the enclosed Notice,
and it appears that the licensee still has not developed adequate management
controls to ensure that problems are communicated to the appropriate responsible
individuals so that root causes can be identified and generic corrective actions
taken.
As is evident from the recent events which occurred on June 9, 1985,
problems continue to exist at Davis Besse and additional enforcement action may
be required.
You are required to respond to the enclosed Notice and you should follow the
instructions specified therein when preparing your response.
Your reply to this
letter and the results of future inspections will be considered in determining
whether further enforcement action is warranted.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and
the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter and the accompanying Notice are not subject
to the clearance procedure of the Office of Management and Budget as required by
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
Sincerely.
Oricinal 3ig,ed by
00 Gs Vm plar
James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1.
Proposed Imposition of
Civil Penalty
2.
Inspection Report
No. 50-346/85018(DRP)
cc w/ enclosures:
R. P. Crouse, Vice President Nuclear
S. Quennoz, Station Superintendent
DMB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII
James W. Harris, State of Ohio
Robert H. Quillin, Ohio
Department of Health
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Toledo Edison Company
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July 12, 1985
Distribution
SECY
CA
JTaylor, IE
RVollmer, IE
JKeppler, RIII
JAxelrad, IE
JCollins, IE
ABBeach, IE
JLieberman, ELD
VStello, DED/ROGR
Enforcement Coordinators
RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV
HDenton, NRR
BHayes, 01
SConnelly, OIA
FIngram, PA
JCrook, AE00
EJordan, IE
JPartlow, IE
BGrimes, IE
ES File
EA File
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