ML20129D552
| ML20129D552 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1985 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129D543 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8506060168 | |
| Download: ML20129D552 (6) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR GENERIC Lt11LR 53-78, ITLA 1.1 - PudI-TRIP REVIEW (PROGRAri DE5CRIFTION AND PRUCEDURE)
HCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UhlT5 1 A C 2
+ UDCKET N05.:
50-369/370 1.
INTRODUCTION On February 25, 1983, both of 'the scram circuit breaker s at Unit 1-of the SalemNuclearPowerPlantfeiledtoopenuponanautomSticreactor, trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident cccurred during thu plant start-up and the reactor was tripped manually t/y the operator about 30' seconds after the initie. tion of the autcmatic trip tignal. The failure of the circuit breakers has been determined to be related to,the sticking of the under voltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, cr? February 22,.1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem huc1Hr Power Plant, an automatic. trip signal has generated based on steen gererator lowelow level during plant start-up.
In this case, the reactor was tripped mar.ually by the optrator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip. Fo11c51ng these istderts, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations GCO), directed -
the staff to investigate and' report on tit 6 generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salesi Nuclear Power Plant.
The results of th'e staff's inquiry into the generic io,-lications of the Sal.em unit incidents are' reported in NUREG-1000, " Generic leplications of Mk's Events at sthe Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of.this investigatier,, the, Ccmission (t4RC) requested (by Generic Letter 63-28 dated July C,1983) all licensees of operating reactors, epplicants for an operating license, and holder:,.of construction permits to respond to certain generic conc' erns. These excerns are categorized into four areas:
(1) Post-Trip Review, (2) Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface, (3) Post-Maintenance Teqting, and (4) Reactor Trip Systen Reliability Improvements.
The first action item, Post-Trip Revi w, consists of Action Item 1.1,
" Program Description and Procedure" ano Action Item 1.2. " Data a'nd Infcrmation Capability." This safety evaluation ecport (3ER) addresses Action Item 1.1 only.'
8506060169 850530 POR ADOCK 05000369 P
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' REVIEW GUIDELINES The following review guidelines were developed after initial evaluation of the various utility responses to Item 1.1 of Generic Letter 83-28 and incorporate the best features of these submittals. As such, these review guidelines in effect represent a " good practices" approach to post-trip review. We have reviewed the licensee's response to Item 1.1 against these guidelines:
A.
The licensee or applicant should have systematic safety assessment procedures established that will ensure that the following restart criteria are met before restart is authorized.
The post-trip review team has determined the root cause and sequence of events resulting in the plant trip.
'Near term corrective actions have been taken to remedy the cause of the trip.
The post-trip review team has performed an analysis and determined that the major safety systems responded to the event within specified limits of the primary system parameters.
The post-trip review has not resulted in the discovery of a potential safety concern (e.g., the root cause of the event occurs with a frequency significantly larger than expected).
If any of the above restart criteria are not met, then an independent assessment of the event is performed by the P,lant Operations Review Comittee (PORC), or another designa>ted group with similar authority and experience.
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. I B.
The responsibilities and authorities of the personnel who will perform the review and analysis should be well defined.
The post-trip review team leader should be a member of plant management at the shift supervisor level or above ano should hold or should have held an SRO license on the plant. The team leader should be charged with overall responsibility for directing the post-trip review, including data gathering and data assessment and he/she should have the necessary authority to obtain all personnel and data needed for the post-trip review.
A second person on the review team should be an STA or should hold a relevant engineering degree with special transient analysis j
training.
.The team leader and the STA (Engineer) should be responsible to concur on a decision / recommendation to restart the plant. A nonconcurrence from eith'er of these persons should be sufficient to
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prevent restart until the trip has been reviewed by the PORC or equivalent organization.
C.
The licensee or applicant should indicate that the plant response to the trip event will be evaluated and a determination made as to whether the plant response was within acceptable limits. The evaluation should include:
A verification of the proper opcration of plant systems and equipment by comparison of the pertinent data obtained during the post-trip review to the applicable data provided in the FSAR.
e An analysis of the sequence of events to verify the proper functioning of safety related and other important equipment. Where possible, comparisons with previous similar events should be made.
. D.
The licensee or applicant should have procedures to ensure that all physical evi,dence necessary for an independent assessment is preserved.
E.
Each licensee or applicant should provide in its submittal, copies of the plant procedures which contain the information required in Items A through D.
As a minimum, these should include the following:
The criteria for determining the acceptability of restart The qualifications, responsibilities and authorities of key personnel involved in the post-trip review process The methods and criteria for determining whether the plant variables and system responses were within the limits as described in the FSAR
'The criteria for determining the need for an independent rev'iew.
7-III. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION By letter dated November 4, 1983, the licensee of McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, provided information regarding its Post-Trip Review Program and Procedures. We have evaluated the licensee's' program and procedures against the review guidelines developed as described in Section II. A brief description of the licensee's response and the staff's evaluation of the l
response against each of the review guidelines is provided below:
A.
The licensee has established the criteria for determining the acceptability of restart. We find that the licensee's criteria conform with the guidelines as described in the above Section II.A.and, therefore, are acceptable.
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. B.
The qualific,ations, responsibilities and authorities of the persennel who will perform the review and analysis have been clearly described.
The licensee indicated that the Superintendent of Operations, Shift Supervisor, or Operations Deputy Engineer, who base their decisions on the above cited restart acceptability criteria, shall have the final authority to grant or deny authorization of plant restart. We have reviewed the licensee's chain of command for responsibility for post-trip review and evaluation, and find it acceptable.
C.
With regard to the methods and criteria for comparing the event information with known or expected plant behavior, the licensee has indicated that the post-trip review program will include an assessment of the plant transient behavior that identifies any deviations from expected plant performance and an assessment of the performance of protection and engineered safety systems identifying any malfunctions or failures to perform as expected. We find that these actions to be taken
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by the licensee conform to the guidelines as described in the above
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Section II.C.
D.
With regard to the criteria for determining the need for independent assessment of an event, the licensee has indicated that if the cause of the trip cannot be determined, or any unresolved safety issues exist, or compliance with licensing requirements is in question, an independent assessment of the event will be perforned.
In addition, the licensee has established procedures to ensure that all physical evidence necessary for an independent assessment is preserved. We find that these actions to be taken by the licensee conform to the guidelines as described in the above Sections II.A. and D.
e E.
The licensee has provided for our review a systematic safety assessment program to assess unscheduled reactor trips.
Based on our review, we find this program acceptable.
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'M Based on our review, we conclude that the licensee's Post-Trip Review Program and Procedures for McGuire huclear Station, Units 1 and 2, are acceptable.
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