ML20129B390
| ML20129B390 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129B388 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-96-08, 50-346-96-8, NUDOCS 9609230023 | |
| Download: ML20129B390 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000346/1996008
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
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Docket No:
50-346
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License No:
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Report No:
50-346/96008
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Licensee:
Toledo Edison Company
Facility:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
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Location:
5503 N. State Rte. 2
Oak Harbor, OH '43449
Dates:
June 24 - July 11 and August 14-15, 1996
Inspector:
D. Schrum, Reactor Engineer
Approved by:
R. N. Gardner, Chief, Engineering Branch 2
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9609230023 960912
DR
ADOCK 050003 6
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Report Details
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IV. Plant Suonort
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F1
Control of Fire Protection Activities
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F1.1 Motor Operated Valve (M0VF Hot Shorti
a.
Insoection Scoce
The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding a potential-
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condition outside of the facility's Appendix R design basis. The
condition involved plant fires which could cause a loss of remote
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shutdown capability due to fire-induced spurious energization of MOVs to
a stalled condition, thus damaging the valves and preventing subsequent
. manual operation from outside the control room to achieve and maintain
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safe shutdown. This issue was previously identified as Unresolved Item-
50-346/96002-05(DRP) in Inspection Report 50-346/96002.
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b.
Findinas and Observations
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In the mid-1980's, the licensee identified the potential for hot shorts
to adversely effect MOVs during postulated plant fires. The licensee
-had identified such MOVs in the safe shutdown procedures and Fire
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Hazards Analysis Report (FHAR); however, the licensee had assumed that
manual actions could be taken to reposition valves during and following
the fire.
On February 28, 1992, the NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 92-18,
" Potential for loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room
Fire." This IN identified a potential common mode failure mechanism of
MOVs in which a postulated fire could cause hot short damage to the
valve control circuit in such a way as to bypass the valve protective
features (i.e., valve limit switches and torque switches).
The
resulting fire-induced spurious operation of a valve could result in
physical damage to the valve operator or the valve itself.
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The licensee's initial evaluation of IN 92-18 was performed in April
1994.
Davis-Besse followed Nuclear Energy Institute's (NEI) (formerly
NUMARC) recommendation not to take corrective actions for IN 92-18
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because NEI considered a fire in the control room a low probability
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event.
The licensee stated in its evaluation that certain safe shutdown
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MOVs were susceptible to hot short damage; however, the licensee took no
action and cited NEI guidance as its basis.
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In March 1996, after the NRC stated that the licensee's response to IN
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92-18 was not adequate, the licensee initiated further evaluations of
-circuits associated with MOVs credited for safe shutdown in the event of
a fire. The licensee performed an evaluation of its MOVs using weak
link / valve actuator thrust data. The potential for body-to-bonnet bolt
failures was also evaluated. The evaluation indicated that no valve
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body-to-bonnet bolt failures would occur, which would result in the loss
of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary.
However, 41
valves were identified as susceptible to damage.
These valves could be
damaged such that they would fail open or closed, and they could not be
manually repositioned during a design base fire. Therefore, this valve
damage puts the plant outside of the Appendix R post-fire safe shutdown
design basis.
The licensee's corrective actions included:
(1) modifications to ensure
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that a hot short in the valve circuit does not cause valve damage or
affect its ability to be repositioned from emergency control stations;
(2) procedure changes to take credit for alternative valves to achieve
shutdown; (3) evaluations to show certain valves were not needed; and
(4) identification of those valves not needed early during the shutdown.
From the original population of 41 valves susceptible to damage, 25 were
eliminated from the list due to the effects of plant changes made since
original Appendix R evaluations were completed.
Listed below are the
most significant valves identified during the resolution of the hot
short issue and the potential consequences during a fire,
b.1 Plant Modifications
The following four valves required a circuit wiring modification to
ensure that they are available following a design base fire.
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1.
M0V AF3870 - Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump 1 Discharge to Steam
Generator (SG) 1
This M0V could have been damaged during a control room fire. A valve
failure in the closed position would have resulted in a loss of
This was the only SG assumed available in the event
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of a control room fire.
The licensee stated that there was an altarnate
path that could be used to add water to the SG; however, the alternate
path was not identified in the licensee's Appendix R safe shutdown
analysis as being free of fire damage,
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2.
M0V HP31 - High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pump 2 Recirculation Valve
This valve could have been damaged during a fire in fire area AB.
The
fire scenario assumes a Safety Feature Actuation Signal start of the HPI
pump and the loss of both Makeup (MU) pumps. A valve failure in the
closed direction would cause the HPI pump to overheat and fail in
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approximately five minutes.
The plant would be in a forced cooldown to
allow reactor coolant water to be added using core flood tanks and Low
Pressure Safety Injection.
This could result in the plant's subcooling
margin being exceeded.
The licensee stated that the control room is
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manned during this fire, so operators may have been able to identify
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that the HPI pump was running and shut it off.
In addition, there may
have been sufficient time to establish an alternate recirculation path
or the HPI pump could have remained turned off until reactor coolant
pressure was below the pressure required to inject water.
A mitigating
circumstance for this event is the raised loop design which would give
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additional time (hours) to restore an alternate source of water before
core damage.
However, this alternative shutdown method has not been
analyzed and, therefore, its availability due to potential fire damage
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has not been fully demonstrated.
3.
MOV MS106 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine (AFPT) 1 Main Steam (MS)
Isolation Valve.
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This MOV could have been damaged during a control room fire or a fire in
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other areas. A valve failure in the closed direction would have
resulted in no steam being available to power the turbine driven AFW
pump.
In addition, damage was also assumed for MS106A, which is the
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steam cross-tie from the second SG.
The potential existed for the
licensee to use alternate steam paths or use the motor driven feedpump;
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however, these measures were not analyzed for potential fire damage and
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their availability has not been fully demonstrated in the licensee's
safe shutdown analysis.
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4.
MOV RC11 - Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve
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This M0V could have been damaged during a control room fire.
In this
fire scenario, the PORV is assumed to fail open.
Consequently, a
failure of valve RCll in the open direction would result in a blowdown
of the reactor vessel (equivalent to a Loss of Coolant Accident).
Operator response involving feed / bleed activities would be assumed to
maintain core cooling; however, these actions were not included in the
licensee's safe shutdown analysis. The license stated that the
consequences of block valve damage were reduced by steps in the safe
shutdown procedure to shut the PORV block valve prior to abandoning the
control room during a fire and by guidance to depower the valve to
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prevent valve damage soon after leaving the control room.
b.2 Procedure Chanaes
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For the following four valves, procedure changes were required to
describe operator actions to accomplish the indicated function following
a design base fire.
1.
M0V AF 3869 - AFW Pump 1 Discharge to SG 2
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This M0V could be damaged during a control room fire.
Damage to this
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valve would result in an overfill of SG 2 and damage to AFW pump 1
turbine (steam is used from SG 2 to power the AFW pump).
However, plant
operators would have greater than 21 minutes to take actions to prevent
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SG overfill by taking control of AFW pump speed and/or taking steps to
isolate feed system valves.
2.
MOV MU6419 - MU Discharge Valve
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This M0V could be damaged during a control room fire.
Damage to thi_s
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valve could result in the loss of MU capability.
However, this event
would involve a slow inventory loss problem and operators would have
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reactor coolant pump seal injection available as well as alternate
injection paths.
3.
MOV SW1399 - CW Heat Exchanger (HX) in Header Isolation Valve
This MOV could be damaged during a control room or fire area BF fire.
Damage to this valve could result in a diversion of service water (SW)
to the non-safety related equipment and inadequate cooling of the safety
related equipment.
Safety related safe shutdown equipment could be
damaged.
However, the staff could ideatify this problem during the
implementation of the shutdown procedure and close the manual isolation
valve, which is located in the same area as this valve.
4.
M0V MS107 AFPT 1 MS in Isolation Valve
This MOV could be damaged during a control room fire or a fire in other
areas. A valve failure in the closed direction would result in no steam
being available to power the turbine driven AFW pump.
A procedure
change provided instructions to use an available redundant steam path in
the same area.
b.3 Lono Term Actions
The following valves were determined not to be time-line critical in
that manual operations of these valves could be performed in the long
term during post fire shutdown.
M0V Decay Heat (DH) 2733 DH Pump 1 Boiling Water Storage Tank (BWST)
Suction Valve
MOV DH 2734 DH Pump 2 BWST Suction Valve
MOV SW1366 Containment Air Cooling (CAC) 1 in Isolation Valve
MOV SW1367 CAC 2 in Isolation Valve
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MOV SW1368 CAC 3 in Isolation Valve
MOV SW1382 AFW Pump 1 Suction Valve from SW
b.4 Root Causes
The following root causes contributed to the licensee not identifying
and correcting the MOV hot short problem:
1.
The licensee's initial reviews of Appendix R hot short requirements were
not adequate in identifying the MOV problems discussed in this report.
2.
The licensee performed a minimal review of IN 92-18.
In aadition,
operability determinations were not made for the conditions described in
the IN. Also, ins were given a lcw priority for review, so ins were
reviewed one to two years after they were issued.
3.
NEI (formerly NUMARC) issued a memorandum which stated that corrective
actions for hot shorts that cause valve damage were not necessary
because it was such a low probability event.
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c.
Conclusions - Licensee Immediate and Lona Term Corrective Actions
After the NRC identified that the response to IN 92-18 was not
acceptable, the licensee initiated an evaluation to determine which MOVs
were susceptible to damage during a fire. Subsequently, the licensee
took corrective actions to ensure that the plant could safely shut down
following a design base fire.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's M0V
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modifications, alternative actions for potentially damaged M0Vs, and the
licensee's analysis for the remaining valves that were not required for
safe shutdown during a fire. The inspector had no concerns with the
remaining six valves which were included on the licensee's long term
corrective action list.
The inspector reviewed the changes to the FHAR
and safe shutdown procedures to ensure that applicable changes had been
made to implement actions required for safe shutdown. Also, the
inspector concluded that adequate improvements had been made to the
licensee's IN review process to prevent these types of problems not
being identified in the future.
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However, prior to April 16, 1996, the licensee did not have alternative
shutdown capability, because potential fire-induced hot shorts put the
plant outside of its Appendix R safe shutdown design basis necessary to
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achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. This is an apparent
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violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3, Fire Protection of
Safe Shutdown Capability.
The corrective actions to resolve these
Appendix R post-fire safe shutdown deficiencies will be reviewed during
subsequent NRC inspections.
F1
Control of Fire Protection Activities
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F1.2
Inoperable Thermo-laa Radiant Enerav Shields
a.
Insoection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of radiant heat energy shields
installed in the containment and containment annulus areas.
This issue
was previously identified as Unresolved Item 50-346/96003-06(DRP) in
Inspection Report 50-346/96003,
b.
Findinas and Observations
In 1990, the licensee submitted an exemption request from Appendix R,
Section llI.G., regarding the use of radiant energy shields in the
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annulus surrounding the containment. This request was based on the lar:k
of separation for safe shutdown cables. At that time, the licensee
believed that radiant energy shields constructed of Thermo-lag were
acceptable.
Approximately 170 linear feet of Thermo-lag energy shields
were installed in the containment and containment annulus.
Appendix R,Section III.G., precludes the use of combustibles to
(1) provide separation of redundant safe shutdown trains or (2) provide
radiant energy shield protection for shutdown components inside
containment. On December 15,1992, IN 92-82, "Results of Thermo-lag
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330-1 Combustibility Testing," was issued to alert licensees that, based
on ASTM testing, Thermo-Lag fire barrier material was found to be
combustible. On May 31, 1995, IN 95-27, "NRC Review of Nuclear Energy
Institute, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Evaluation Methodology Plant
Screening Guide," was issued.
This document stated that the NRC did not
accept the use of the NEI guide to justify the use of Thermo-lag
materials where noncombustible materials are specified by NRC fire
protection requirements or to assess the combustibility hazards
presented by Thermo-lag materials.
A fire in the containment and containment annulus could affect the
ability to safely achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The probability
of fire occurring in these areas is low due to the lack of an ignition
source and low combustible loading.
However, the safety consequences of
a fire in these areas could be high.
The radiant energy shields in containment are installed on electrical
circuits for CAC power and pressurizer level instrumentation.
The
radiant energy shields in the containment annulus protect electrical
circuits, including CAC power, pressurizer level instrumentation, high
point vent control, PORV power and PORV block valve power.
Appendix R
safe shutdown would be affected by the loss of these circuits; however,
the licensee has indicated that actions could be taken to reach cold
shutdown without the affected equipment.
b.2 Root Causes
The following root cause contributed to the failure to identify the
containment and annulus Thermo-lag radiant energy shields as
unacceptable and take compensatory measures for the impaired barriers.
The licensee performed a minimal review of ins. Also, ins were given a
low priority for review, so ins were reviewed one to two years after
they were issued.
c.
Conclusion - Anoarent Violation of Anoendix R
IN 92-82 and IN 95-27 gave the licensee prior opportunities to declare
the Thermo-lag radiant energy shields in the containment and in the
containment annulus areas inoperable and take adequate compensatory
measures until these barriers were replaced.
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Based on the combustibility of Thermo-lag and the fire resistant ratings
being indeterminate, most licensees who had Thermo-lag inside
containment implemented the required compensatory measures for
inoperable rac'iant energy heat shields.
Davis-Besse did not implement
compensatory measures for the containment and the containment annulus
until after a conference call with the NRC on April 16, 1996.
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.f., requires radiant heat shields
to be constructed from noncombustible materials.
In addition, Generic Letter (GL) 86-10, Enclosure 2, Response to Question 3.7.1, provided
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additional guidance pertaining to the design of radiant energy heat
shields inside containment.
GL 86-10 specifies that these shields
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should be capable of directing convective energy for the fire away from
the protected division or train and the material used to construct these
shields should have a fire rating of 1/2 hour.
The failure to meet the this requirement is an apparent violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
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Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspectors met with licensee representatives after the inspection on
August 15, 1996, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection.
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During the exit meeting, the inspectors discussed the documents and
processes reviewed by the inspectors during the conduct of this
inspection and the likely informational content of the inspection
report.
Licensee representatives did not identify any such documents or
processes as proprietary.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Centerior Enerav/ Toledo Edison
J. Stetz, Senior Vice President, Nuclear
J. Wood, Vice President, Nuclear
J. Lash, Plant Manager
T. Myers, Director, Nuclear Assurance
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L. Dohrmann, Manager, Quality Services
D. Eshelman, Manager, Operations
J. Rogers, Manager, Plant Engineering
R. Zyduck, Manager, Design Basis Engineering
J. Michaelis, Manager, Maintenance
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J. Freels, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
E. Bergner, Manager, Nuclear Training
D. Wuokko, Regulatory Affairs Supervisor
M. Leisure, Regulatory Affairs Senior Engineer
K. Byrd, Senior Design Engineer
P. Smith, Regulatory Affairs Supervisor
A. Migas, Senior Design Engineer
M. Murtha, Fire Protection Engineer
V. Patton, Fire Protection Advisor
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R. Gardner, Engineering Branch Chief
S. Stasek, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Schrum, Reactor Inspector
K. Zellers, Resident Inspector
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
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Plant Operations
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Engineering
Onsite Engineering
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Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and
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Preventing Problems
Followup - Engineering
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DEFINITIONS
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Unresolved Items
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Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required in order
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to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
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Unresolved items are discussed-in Paragraphs F.1.1.a and F.1.2.a.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AFPT Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine
BWST Boiling Water Storage Tank
Containment Air Cooling
DH
Decay Heat
FHAR Fire Hazards Analysis Report
GL
Generic Letter
High Pressure Injection
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Heat Exchanger
IN
Information Notice
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150
Isolation
Motor Operated Valve
MS
MU'
Makeup
NEI
Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PORV Power Operated Relief Valve
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34386
Federd Register / Vol. 60, No.126 / Friday, Jun) 30, 1995 / Notices
factors in arriving at the appropriate
is not held, the licensee will normally
is a matter of public record, such as an
severity level will be dependant on the
be requested to provide a written
adjudicatory decision by the
circumstances of the violation.
response to an inspection report,if
Department of Labor. In addition, with
However,if a licensee refuses to correct issued, as to the licensee's views on the the approval of the Executive Director
a minor violation within a reasonable
apparent violations and their root
for Operations, conferences will not be
time such that it willfully continues, the causes and a description of planned or
open ta the public where good cause has
violation should be categorized at least
implemented corredive action.
been shown after balancing the benefit
at a Severity LevelIV,
During the predecisional enforcement of the public observation against the
D. Violotions of Reporting Requirements conference, the licensee, vendor, or
potentialimpact on the agency's
other persons will be given an
enforcement action in a particular case.
The NRC expects licensees to provide opportunity to provide information
As soon as it is determined that a
complete, accurate, and timely
consistent with the purpose of the
conference will be open to public
information and reports. Accordingly,
unless otherwise categorized in the
conference, including an explanation to observation, the NRC will notify the
the NRC of the immediate corrective
licensee that the conference will be
Supplements, the severity level of a
actions (if any) that were taken
open to public observation as part of the
violation involving the failure to make
following identification of the potential egency's trial program. Consistent with
a required report to the NRC will be
violation or nonconformance and the
the agency's policy on open meetings,
based upon the significance of and the
long-term comprehensive actions that
" Staff Meetings Open to Public,"
circumstances surrounding tne matter
were taken or will be taken to prevent
published September 20,1994 (59 FR
that should have been reponed,
recurrence. Licensees, vendors, or other 48340), the NRC intends to announce
llowever, the severity level of an
persons will be told when a meeting is
OPen conferences normally at least to
untimely report, in contrast to no report, a predecisional enforcement conferencu. working days in advance of conferences
may be reduced depending on the
A predecisional enforcement
throu8 (1) notices posted in the Public
h
circumstances surrounding the matter.
conference is a meeting between the
Document Room,(2) a toll free
A licensee will not normally be cited for NRC and the licensee. Conferences are
telephone recording at 800-952- 9674,
a failure to report a condition or event
normally held in the regional offices
and (3) a toll-free electronic bulletin
unless the licensee was actually aware
and are not normally open to public
board at 800-952-9676. In addition, the
of the condition or event that it failed
observation. However, a trial program is NRC will also issue a press release and
to report. A licensee will, on the other
hand, normally be cited for a failure to
being conducted to o(le conferences for notify appropriate State liaison officers
n approximately
25 percent of all elig
that a predecisional enforcement
r: port a condition or event if the
public observation, i.e., every fourth
conference has been scheduled and that
licensee knew of the infonnation to be
eligible conferenco involvin8 one of
it is open to public observation.
reported, but did not recognize that it
three categories of licensees (reactor,
The public attending open
was required to make a report.
hospital, and other materials licensees)
conferences under the trial program may
V, Predecisional Enforcement
will be open to the public. Conferences
bserve but not participate in the
Conferences
will not normally be open to the public
conferenco. It is noted that the purpose
Whenever the NRC has learned of the if the enforcement action being
of conducting open conferences under
lated.
the trial program is not to maximize
contegould l$e taken against an
public attendance, but rather to
sxistence of a potential violation for
(1)
which escalated enforcement action
appears to be warranted, or recurring
individual, or if the ac' ion, though not
determine whether providing the public
nonconformance on the part of a
taken against an individual, turns on
with opportunities to be informed of
whether an individual has committed
NRC activities is compatible with the
vendor, the NRC may provide an
doing.
NRC's ability to exercise its regulatory
wron$nvolves significant personnel
and safety responsibilities. Therefore,
opportunity for a predecisional
(2)
enforcement conference with the
licensee, vendor, or other person before failures where the NRC has requested
members of the public will be allowed
that the individual (s) involved be
access to the NRC regional offices to
ttking enforcement action. The purpose present at the conference;
attend open enforcement conferences in
of the conference is to obtain
information that will assist the NRC in
(3)is based on the findings of an NRC accordance with the " Standard
Office ofInvestigations report; or
Operating Procedures For Providing
determining the appropnata
(4) Involves safeguards information,
Security Support For NRC Hearings And
enforcement action, such as:(1) A
Privacy Act information, or information Meetings," published November 1,1991
common understanding of facts, root
which could be considered proprietary: (56 FR 56251). These procedures
causes and missed opportunities
In addition, conferences will not
provide that visitors may be subject to
associated with the apparent violations, normally be open to the public if:
personnel screening, that signs, banners,
(2) a common understanding of
(5) The conference involves medical
posters, etc., not larger than 18" be
corrective action taken or planned, and
misadministrations or overexposures
perrnitted, and that disruptive persons
(3) a common understanding of the
and the conference cannot be conducted may be removed.
significance ofissues and the need for
without disclosing the exposed
Members of the public attending open
lasting comprehensive corrective action. Individual's name: or
conferences will be reminded that (1)
If the NRC concludes that it has
(6) The conference will be conducted the apparent violations discussed at
sufficient information to make an
by telephone or the conference will be
predecisional enforcement conferences
informed enforcement decision, a
conducted at a relatively small
are subject to further review and may be
conference will not normally be held
licensee's facility.
subject to change prior to any resulting
unless the licensee requests it. However,
Notwithstandmg meeting any of these enforcement action and (2) the
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an opportunity for a conference will
criteria, a conference may still be open
statements of views or expressions of
p
normally be provided before issuing an
if the conference involves issues related opinion made by NRC employees at
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order based on a violation of the rule on to an ongoing adjudicatory proceeding
predecisional enforcement conferences.
Deliberate Misconduct or a civil penalty with one or more intervonors or where
or the lack thereof, are not intended to
is an unlicensed person,if a conference the evidentiary basis for the confemnce represent final determinations or beliefs.
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Federal Register / Vol. 60, No.126 / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Notices
34387
Persons attending open conferences will to be under oath. Normally, responses
management involvement in licensed
be provided an opportunity to submit
under oath will be required only in
activities and a decrease in protection of
written comments concerning the trial
connection with Severity Level I, II, or
the public health and safety.
program anonymously to the regional
III violations or orders.
office.These comments will be
The NRC uses the Notice of Violation
1. Base Civil Penalty
subsequently forwarded to the Director
as the usual method for formalizing the
'fhe NRC imposes different levels of
of the Office of Enforcement for review
existence of a violation,lasuance of a
penalties for different severity level
and consideration.
Notice of Violation is normally the only violations and different classes of
When needed to protect the public
enforcement action taken, exmpt in
licensees, vendors, and other persons.
health and safety or common defense
cases where the criteriefor issuance of
Tables 1A and 1B show the base civil
and security, escalated enforcement
civil penalties and orders, as set forth in penalties for various reactor, fuel cycle,
action, such as the issuance of an
Sections VI.B and VI.C. respectively, em materials, and vendor programs. (Civil
immediately effective order, will be
met. However, special circumstances
penalties issued to individuals are
taken before the conference. In these
regarding the violation findings may
determined on a case-by-case basis.) The
cases, a conference may be held after the warrant discretion being exercised such structure of these tables generally takes
t
j
escalated enformment action is taken,
that the NRC refrains from issuing a
into account the gravity of the violation
y tice of Vi lation. (See Section VII.B.,.)
as a primary consideration and the
VI. Enforcement Actions
Mitigation of Enforcement Sanctions.
ability to pay as a secondary
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This section describes the
In addition, licensees are not ordinarily consideration. Generally, operations
enforcement sanctions available to the
cited for violations resuking from
i"" 1'i"8 8 *
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' rial
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NRC and specifies the conditions under matters not within their control, such as
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which each may be used.The basic
equipment failures that were not
n
ces to
b a dlicensee
enforcement sanctions am Notices of
avoidable by reasonable licensee quality
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i high
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'"P { Reg rding the secondary
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Violation, civil penalties, and orders of assurance measures or management
(nal
various types. As discussed further in
controls. Generally, however, licensees
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Section VI.D. related administrative
are held responsible for the acts of their lic
to y the civi pena
it is
actions such as Notices of
employees. Accordingly,this policy
not the NRC intention that the
s
Jonconformance, Notices of Deviation, should not be construed to excuse
4
economic impact of a civil penalty be so
Con nna
Ac n
i'e
letters of
personnel errors,
,
,
ds
severe that it puts a licensee out of
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rmation am used to supplement the
B. Civi/ Penolty
business (orders, rather than civil
enforcement program. In selecting the
A civil penalty is a monetary penalty
Penalties, are used when the intent is to
suspend or terminate licensed,s ability
activities)
enforcement sanctions or administrative that may be imposed for violation of (1)
!
actions, the NRC will consider
certain specified licensing provisions of
or adversely affects a licensee
enforcement actions taken by other
the Atomic Energy Act or
to safely conduct licensed activities.
'
I
Federal or State regulatory bodies
supplementary NRC rules.or orders; (2)
The deterrent effect of civil penalties is
best served when the amounts of the
1
having concurrent jurisdiction, such as
any requirement for which a license
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in transportation matters, Usually,
may be revoked; or (3) reporting
Penalties take into account a licensee's
whenever a viobtion of NRC
requirements under section 206 of the
ability to pay. In determining the
4
requirements of more than a minor
EnergyReorganization Actl Civil
amount of civil penalties for h,censees
,
for whom the tables do not reflect the
j
con::em is identified, enforcement
penalties are designed to deter future
i
action is taken. The nature and extent of violations both by the involved licensee ability to pay or the gravity of the
the enforcement action is intended to
as well as by other licensees conducting violation, the NRC will consider as
j
reflect the seriousness of the violation
similar activities and to emphasize the
necessary an increase or decrease on a
-
involved. For the vast majority of
need for licensees to identify violations case-by-case basis. Normally, if a
licensee can demonstrate financial
!
violations, a Notice of Violation or a
and take pro npt comprehensive
Notice of Nonconformance is the normal corrective action.
hardship, the NRC will consider
4
action.
Civil penalties are considered for
Payments over time, including interest,
.
Severity Level 111 violations. In addition, rather than reducing the amount of the
i
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A. Notice of Violotion
civil penalties will normally be assessed
civil enalty, flowever, where a licensee
P
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A Notice of Violation is a written
for Severity Levell and 11 violations and claims financial hardship, the limnsee
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notice setting forth one or more
knowing and conscious violations of the will normally be requhed to address
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violations of a legally binding
reporting requiremants of section 206 of why it has sufficient resources to safely
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requirement. The Notice of Violation
the Energy Reorganization Act.
conduct licensed activities and pay
i
normally requires the recipient to
Civil penalties are used to encourage
license and inspection fees.
provide a written statement describing
prompt identification and prompt and
2. Civil Penalty Assessment
,
(t) the reasons for the violatior. or, if
comprehensive correction of violations,
2
contested, the basis for disputing the
to emphasize compliance in a manner
In an effort to (1) emphasize the
,
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violation; (2) corrective steps that have
that deters future violations, and to
importance of adherence to
been taken and the results achieved; (3) serva to focus licensees * attention on
requirements and (2) reinforce prompt
'
corrective steps that will be taken to
violations of sigulficant regulatory
self-identification of problems and root
prevent recurrence; and (4) the dets
conoam.
causes and prompt and comprehensive
when full compliance will be achieve 1.
Although management involvement,
carrection of violations, the NRC
'
The NRC may waive all or portions of
direct or indirect, in a violation may
reviews each proposed civil penalty on
a written response to the extent relevant lead to an increase in the civil penalty,
its own merits and, after considering all
information has already been provided
the lack of managem6nt involvement
relevant circumstances, may adjust the
to the NRC in writing or documented in may not be used to mitigate a civil
base civil penalties shown in Table 1A
en NRC inspection report.The NRC may penalty. Allowing mitigation in the
and 1B for Severity IAvelI, H, and III
{
require responses to Notices of Violation latter case could encourage the lack of
violations as described below.
}
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