ML20128P530

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Plant Protection Sys Surveillance Test Interval Extension
ML20128P530
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/07/1996
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20128P527 List:
References
NUDOCS 9610170289
Download: ML20128P530 (24)


Text

..

r PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES 9610170289 961007 PDR ADOCK 05000360 P

ppy

l TABLE 1.2 FREQUENCY NOTATION NOTATION FREQUENCY l

1 S

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

D At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

i i

W At least once per 7 days.

f M

At least once per 31 days.

Q At least once per 92 days.

TA At least once per 123 days.

l SA At least once per 184 days.

4 R

At least once per 18 months.

i i

S/U Prior to each reactor startup.

i P

Completed prior to each release.

N.A.

Not applicable.

1 1

4 i

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 1-9 Amendment No. 60,

-. _. - _ - -. ~ _ _ - - _ -.

TABLE 3.3-1 (continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 2 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 2

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the inoperable channel is bypassed for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the desirability of maintaining this channel in the bypassed condition shall be reviewed at the next regularly scheduled PSC meeting in accordance with the QA Manual Operations. The channel shall be j

returned to OPERABLE status prior to startup following the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed 1.

Linear Power Linear Power Level - High (Subchannel or Linear)

Local Power Density - High DNBR - Low Log Power Level - High*

2.

Pressurizer Pressure - NR Pressurizer Pressure - High Local Power Density -High DNBR - Low 3.

Containment Pressure - NR Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

Containment Pressure - High (ESEAS)

Containment Pressure - High-High (ESEAS) 4.

Steam Generator 1 Pressure Steam Generator 1 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2) 5.

Steam Generator 2 Pressure Steam Generator 2 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2) 6.

Steam Generator 1 Level Steam Generator 1 Level - Low Steam Generator 1 Level - High Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1) 7.

Steam Generator 2 Level Steam Generator 2 Level - Low Steam Generator 2 Level - High Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2),

8.

Core Protection Calculator Local Power Density - High DNBR - Low

  • Only for failure common to both linear power and log power.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. M, M9,

TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TESTS REQUIRED 1.

Manual Reactor Trip N.A.

N.A.

S/U (1)

N.A.

2.

Linear Power Level - High S

D(2,4),

TA(10) 1, 2 l

M(3,4),

Q(4) 3.

Logarithmic Power Level - High S

R(4)

TA(10),

1, 2, 3, 4,

5 S/U(1) and

  • 4.

Pressurizer Pressure - High S

R TA(10) 1, 2 l

5.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

R TA(10) 1, 2

,3*,4*,5*

l 6.

Containment Pressure - High S

R TA(10) 1, 2 l

7.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low S

R TA(10) 1, 2

,3*,4*,5*

l 8.

Steam Generator Level - Low S

R TA(10) 1, 2 l

C.

Local Power Density - High S

D(2,4),

TA(10),

1, 2 R(4,5)

R(6) 10.

DNBR - Low S

S(7),

TA(10),

1, 2 D(2,4),

R(6)

M(8),

R(4,5) 11.

Steam Generator Level - High S

R TA(10) 1, 2 l

12.

Reactor Protection System Logic N.A.

N.A.

TA(10) 1, 2

,3*,4*,5*

l 13.

Reactor Trip Breakers N.A.

N.A.

M 1, 2

,3*,4*,5*

14.

Core Protection Calculators S

D(2,4)

TA(9,10),

1, 2 R(4,5)

R(6) 15.

CEA Calculators S

R TA (10),

1, 2 R(6)

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. G4,49,M,-149,

l

\\

TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS With reactor trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.

(1)

If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2)

Heat balance only (CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST not included), above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; adjust the Linear Power Level signals and the CPC addressable constant multipliers to make the CPC AT power and CPC nuclear power calculations agree with the calorimetric calculation if absolute difference is >2%.

During PHYSICS TESTS, these daily calibrations may be suspended provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching each major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau.

(3)

Above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the linear power subchannel gains of the excore detectors are consistent with the values used to establish the shape annealing matrix elements in the Core Protection Calculators.

(4)

Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(5)

After each fuel loading and prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the incore detectors shall be used to determine or verify the shape annealing matrix elements used in the CPCs.

l (6)

This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of simulated process signals into the channel as. lose to the sensors as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm

)

and/or trip functions.

(7)

Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by either using the reactor coolant pump differential pressure instrumentation (conservatively compensate for measurement uncertainties) or by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties) and if necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow coefficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to the actual flow rate.

The flow measurement uncertainty may be included in the BERR1 term in the CPC and is equal to or greater than 4%.

i (8)

Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties).

(9)

The CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include verification that the correct values of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC.

(10) -

On a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. G4,49,74,

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION 5.

CONTAINMENT COOLING (CCAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 sets of 2 1 set of 2 2 sets of 2 1, 2, 3,

4 9

b.

Containment Pressure -

High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3

10,11 c.

Pressurizer Pressure -

Low 4

2 3

1, 2, 3(a) 10,11 d.

ESFAS Logic 1.

Matrix Logic 6

1 3

1, 2, 3

12 2.

Initiation Logic 4

2 4

1, 2, 3,

4 9

?

e.

Automatic Actuation Logic 2

1 2

1, 2,

3, 4

13 i

6.

RECIRCULATION (RAS) a.

Manual (TRIP Buttons) (c) 2 sets of 2 2 sets of 2 2 sets of 2 1,2,3,4 9

s i

b.

Refueling Water Tank - Low 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 10,11 j

c.

ESFAS Logic 1.

Matrix Logic 6

1 3

1, 2, 3 12 2.

Initiation Logic 4

2 4

1, 2, 3, 4

9 d.

Automatic Actuation Logic 2

1 2

1, 2, 3, 4

13 l

h t

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. -144,-1-69, p

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION l

7.

LOSS OF POWER a.

4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) 2/ Bus 1/ Bus 2/ Bus 1, 2, 3

9 b.

460 volt Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) 1/ Bus 1/ Bus 1/ Bus 1, 2, 3

9 8.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a.

Manual (Trip Switches) 2 sets of 2 2 sets of 2 2 sets of 2 1, 2, 3,

4 9

l i

per S/G per S/G per S/G b.

SG Level and Pressure (A/B) - Low and AP (A/B) - High 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2, 3,

4 10,11 i

c.

SG Level (A/B) - Low and No S/G Pressure -

Low Trip (A/B) 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2, 3,

4 10,11 d.

ESFAS Logic 1.

Matrix Logic 6

1 3

1, 2, 3,

4 12 2.

Initiation Logic 4

2 4

1, 2, 3,

4 9

e.

Automatic Actuation Logic 2

1 2

1, 2, 3, 4

13 ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. 444, M9, i

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continutd)

TABLE NOTATION (a)

Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is 2 500 psia.

(b)

An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c)

Remote manual not provided for RAS.

These are local manuals at each ESF auxiliary relay cabinet.

ACTION STATEMENTS

{

ACTION 9

- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within I

the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 10 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of Char.nels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

If the inoperable channel is bypassed for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the desirability of maintaining this channel in the bypassed condition shall be reviewed at the next regularly scheduled PSC meeting in accordance with the QA Manual Operations. The channel shall be returned to l

OPERABLE status prior to startup following the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Functional Unit Bypassed

1. Containment Pressure - NR Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

Containment Pressure - High (ESEAS)

Containment Pressure - High-High (ESEAS)

2. Steam Generator 1 Pressure Steam Generator 1 Pressure - Low

)

Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2) l l

3. Steam Generator 2 Pressure Steam Generator 2 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

4. Steam Generator 1 Level Steam Generator 1 Level - Low Steam Generator 1 Level - High Steam Generator 1 AP (EFAS 1)
5. Steam Generator 2 Level Steam Generator 2 Level - Low Steam Generator 2 Level - High Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2) l l

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. M 4,M G,

TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL EUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE EUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED 1.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Containment Pressure - High S

R TA(2) 1, 2,

3 c.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

.R TA(2) 1, 2, 3

d.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

TA(1,2) 1, 2,

3 2.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Containment Pressure -

High - High S

R TA(2) 1, 2,

3 c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

TA(1,2) 1, 2,

3 3.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Containment Pressure - High S

R TA(2) 1, 2, 3

c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

TA(1,2) 1, 2, 3

4.

MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION (MSIS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low S

R TA(2) 1, 2, 3

c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

TA(1,2) 1, 2,

3 ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 5/4 3-21 Amendment No.

__m m...

. = _

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED 5.

CONTAINMENT COOLING (CCAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Contairanent Pressure - High S

R TA(2) 1, 2, 3

c.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

R TA(2) 1, 2, 3 d.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

TA(1,2) 1, 2, 3 6.

RECIRCULATION (RAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) (a)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

l b.

Refueling Water Tank - Low S

R TA(2) 1, 2, 3 c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

TA(1,2) 1, 2, 3

7.

LOSS OF POWER a.

4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)

S R

R 1, 2, 3 b.

460 volt Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)

S R

R 1, 2, 3 8.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a.

Manual (Trip Switches)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

l b.

SG Level and Pressure (A/B)-low and AP (A/B) - High S

R TA(2) 1, 2, 3 l

c.

SG Level (A/B) - Low and No Pressure - Low Trip (A/B)

S R

TA(2) 1, 2, 3

d.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

TA(1,2) 1, 2, 3 ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-22 Amendment No.

1 Trble 4.3-2 (Centinutd)

TABLE NOTATION j

2 1

4 i

i (a)

Remote manual not provided for RAS.

These are local manuals at each ESF auxiliary' relay cabinet.

4 (1)

The logic circuits shall be tested manually at least once per 123 l

days.

(2)

On a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

l s

1 1-i i

4 4

l 1

i

?

i l

i l

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-23 Amenndment No.

l I

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)

INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) suf ficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of tervice for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is naintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The triannual channel functional testing frequency is to be performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This testing methodology is based on the reliability analysis presented in topical report CE NPSD-576, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation For 120 Day Staggered Testing".

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time nay be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.

Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

RTD response time is defined as the time interval required for the RTD output to achieve 63.2% of its total change when subjected to a step change in RTD temperature. The RTD response time for the Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS) is expressed as an effective time constant.

For hot leg I

temperatures, the effective time constant for a given CPC channel is defined as the mean time constant for averaged pairs of hot leg RTD inputs to the channel. This is done because the CPCS utilizes the mean hot leg temperature in its calculations. The maximum hot leg effective time constant allowable for use in the CPCS is 13.0 seconds.

For cold leg temperatures, the effective

{

time constant to be used in Figure 3.3-1 is the maximum time constant of the two cold leg RTD inputs for a given channel.

The CPCS utilizes the more conservative cold leg temperature in the various DNBR and LPD calculations.

j The maximum cold leg effective time constant allowable for use in the CPCS i

is 13.0 seconds.

i i

I ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 43,49,

)

e e P

e MARKUP OF CURRENT ANO-2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (FOR INFO ONLY) 1 s

_. ~ _.. _ _. _. _.,. _ _. _, _ _ _ -...

-.m__.-

TABLE 1.2 FREQUENCY NOTATION NOTATION FREQUENCY S

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

D At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

W At least once per 7 days.

1 M

At least once per 31 days.

Q At least once per 92 days.

I6_

dt least once per 123 days.

l l

SA At least once per 184 days.

R At least once per 18 months.

S/U Prior to each reactor startup.

P Completed prior to each release.

N.A.

Not applicable.

l i

l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 1-9 Amendment No. 60,

o TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) i' ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 2 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total Number of i

Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within i

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

If the inoperable channel is bypassed for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the desirability of maintaining this channel in the bypassed l

condition shall be reviewed at the next regularly scheduled PSC meeting in accordance with Sp::ificatier. 5. 5.1.' - the OA Manual Operations.

l i

The channel shall be returned to OPERABLE status prior to startup d

following the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Ptocess Measurement Circuit Punctional Unit Bypassed 1.

Linear Power Linear Power Level - High (Subchannel or Linear)

Local Power Density - High DNBR - Low Log Power Level - High*

2.

Pressurizer Pressure - NR Pressurizer Pressure - High Local Power Density -High DNBR - Low 3.

Containment Pressure - NR Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

Containment Pressure - High (ESEAS)

Containment Pressure - High-High (ESEAS) 4.

Steam Generator 1 Pressure Steam Generator 1 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2) 5.

Steam Generator 2 Pressure Steam Generator 2 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2) 6.

Steam Generator 1 Level Steam Generator 1 Level - Low Steam Generator 1 Level - High Steam Generator 1 AP (EFAS 1) 7.

Steam Generator 2 Level Steam Generator 2 Level - Low Steam Generator 2 Level - High Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2) 8.

Core Protection Calculator Local Power Density - High DNBR - Low

  • Only for failure common to both linear power and log power.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. M, M9,

_~

TABLE 4.3-1 REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBPATION TESTS REQUIRED 1.

Manual Reactor Trip N.A.

N.A.

S/U(1)

N.A.

2.

.r Power Level - High S

D(2,4),

MM 1, 2 l

M(3,4),

Q(4) 3.

Logarithmic Power Level - High S

R(4)

MTA (10). end 1, 2, 3,

4, 5 l

S/U(1) and

  • 4.

Pressurizer Pressure - High S

R MTAL101 1, 2 l

.5.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

R MTA(10) 1, 2

,3*,4*,5*

l 6.

Containment Pressure - High S

R MTA(10) 1, 2 l

7.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low S

R MTA(10) 1, 2

,3*,4*,5*

l 8.

Steam Generator Level - Low S

R MTA(10) 1, 2 l

9.

Local Power Density - High S

D(2,4),

HTM,-M4F 1, 2 R(4,5)

R(6) 10.

DNBR - Low S

S (7),

MTA (10 ),-M4) r 1, 2 D(2,4),

R(6)

M(8),

R(4,5) 11.

Steam Generator Level - High S

R MTA(10) 1, 2 l

l 12.

Reactor Protection System Logic N.A.

N.A.

MTA(10) 1, 2

,3*,4*,5*

l

'. 3.

Reactor Trip Breakers N.A.

N.A.

M 1, 2

,3*,4*,5*

S -Wf9F D(2,4)

MTA(9,10), "(6),1, 2 14.

Core Protection Calculators 7

R(4,5)

R(6)

MT,_A,11,0 ),,

", ' S ),

1, 2 0

15.

CEA Calculators S

R R(6)

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. 24,49, M, M9,

1 TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS With reactor trip breakers in the closed position and the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal.

)

(1)

If not performed in previous 7 days.

(2)

Heat balance only (CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST not included), above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER; adjust the Linear Power Level signals and the CPC addressable constant raultipliers to make the CPC AT power and CPC nuclear power calculttions agree with the calorimetric calculation if absolute difference is >2%.

During PHYSICS TESTS, these daily calibrations may be suspended provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching each major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau.

(3)

Above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the linear power subchannel gains of the excore detectors are consistent with the values used to establish the shape annealing matrix elements in the Core Protection Calculators.

(4)

Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(5)

After each fuel loading and prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the incore detectors shall be used to determine or verify,,,the shape cnealing matrix elements and-used in the CPA Gere P:ctcction Calculater chall use thc : clemente.

(6)

This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of simulated process signals into the channel as close to the sensors as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

(7)

Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by either using tb

_eactor coolant pump differential pressure instrumentatic (conservatively compensate for measurement uncertainties) or by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties) and if necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow coefficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to the actual flow rate.

The flow measurement uncertainty may be included in the BERR1 term in the CPC and is equal to or greater than 4%.

(8)

Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by calorimetric calculations (conservatively compensated for measurement uncertainties).

(9)

The CPC CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include verification that the_ correct values of addressable constants ch:ll bc cerified ec be are_ installed in each OPERABLE CPC.

(10) -

On a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. G4, 49, -74,

e 3

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE /CTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION i

MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION 5.

CONTAINMENT COOLING (CCAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 sets of 2 1 set of 2 2 sets of 2 1, 2, 3, 4 9

L b.

Containment Pressure -

High 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 10,11 c.

Pressurizer Pressure -

Low 4

2 3

1, 2, 3(a) 10,11 j

d.

ESFAS Logic t

1.

Matrix Logic 6

1 3

1, 2,

3 12 2.

Initiation Logic 4

2 4

1, 2, 3,

4 9

e.

Automatic Actuation Logic 2

1 2

1, 2, 3, 4

13 t

6.

RECIRCULATION (RAS) a.

Manual (TRIP Buttons) (c) 2 sets of 2 42 sets of 2 2 sets of 2 1, 2, 3, 4

9 per train pcr train L

b.

Refueling Water Tank - Low 4

2 3

1, 2, 3 10,11 c.

ESFAS Logic j

1.

Matrix Logic 6

1 3

1, 2, 3

12 2.

Initiation Logic 4

2 4

1, 2, 3, 4 9

i d.

Automatic Actuation Logic 2

1 2

1, 2, 3,

4 13 j

t I

I ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. 444,449,

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

~1.

LOSS OF POWER a.

4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) 2/ Bus 1/ Bus 2/ Bus 1,

2, 3

9 b.

460 volt Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage) 1/ Bus 1/ Bus 1/ Bus 1, 2, 3 9

8.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a.

Manual (Trip "utt r.

Switches)2 sets of 2

+2 sets of 2 2 sets of 2 1,

2, 3,

4 9

l per S/G per S/G per S/G b.

SG Level and Pressure (A/B) - Low and AP (A/B) - High 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2, 3, 4

10,11 c.

SG Level (A/B) - Low and No S/G Pressure -

Low Trip (A/B) 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1,

2, 3,

4 10,11 d.

ESFAS Logic 1.

Matrix Logic 6

1 3

1, 2, 3,

4 12

(

(

2.

Initiation Logic 4

2 4

1, 2,

3, 4

9 e.

Automatic Actuation Logic 2

1 2

1, 2,

3, 4

13 i

t i

I ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. 444,469, t

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continund)

TABLE NOTATION (a)

Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure is below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is 2 500 psia.

(b)

An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c)

Remote manual not provided for RAS.

These are local manuals at each ESF auxiliary relay cabinet.

ACTION STATEMENTS l

ACTION 9

- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable chann ' to l

OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HO7 STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN

.n j

the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 10 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Total l

Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

If the inoperable channel is i

bypassed for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the desirability of maintaining this channel in the bypassed condition shall be reviewed at the next regularly scheduled PSC meeting in accordance with Spccif4ccticn 5.5.1.' nthe QA Manual Operations. The channel l

shall be returned to OPERABLE status prior to startup following the next COLD SHUTDOWN.

With a channel process measurement circuit that affects multiple functional units inoperable or in test, bypass or trip all associated functional units as listed below.

Process Measurement Circuit Punctional Unit Bypassed

1. Containment Pressure - NR Containment Pressure - High (RPS)

Containment Pressure - High (ESEAS)

Containment Pressure - High-High (ESEAS)

2. Steam Generator 1 Pressure Steam Generator 1 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

3. Steam Generator 2 Pressure Steam Generator 2 Pressure - Low Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)

Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

4. Steam Generator 1 Level Steam Generator 1 Level - Low Steam Generator 1 Level - High Steam Generator 1 AP (EEAS 1)
5. Steam Generator 2 Level Steam Generator 2 Level - Low Steam Generator 2 Level - High Steam Generator 2 AP (EEAS 2)

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 34,M9,

= -.

e

~

O 5

i TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL RINCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED 1.

SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) i a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

l b.

Containment Pressure - High S

R MTA(2) 1, 2, 3

c.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

R M_TA M 1, 2, 3

i d.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M jT(It d 1,

2, 3

i 2.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS) l a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

[

b.

Containment Pressure -

High - High S

R MTA(2) 1, 2, 3

i c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M_TA(It d 1, 2, 3

3.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS) a.

MMnual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Containment Pressure - High S

R MTA(2) 1, 2,

3 c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M_TA(It d 1, 2, 3

4.

MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION (MSIS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

b.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low S

R MTA(2) 1, 2,

3 c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

MJT(It d 1,

2, 3

l i

i i

i ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-21 Amendment No.

i r

r i

P TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH l

CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED 5.

CONTAINMENT COOLING (CCAS) a.

Manual (Trip Buttons)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

l b.

Containment Pressure - High S

R M RT 1, 2, 3 c.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

R M RT 1, 2, 3

d.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M JT(1+ d 1, 2, 3 6.

RECIRCULATION (RAS) f a.

Manual (Trip Buttons) M N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

l l

b.

Refueling Water Tank - Low S

R MTA (2 )

1, 2, 3 i

[

c.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

M JT(lt d 1, 2, 3

7.

LOSS OF POWER l

a.

4.16 kv Emergency Bus i

Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)

S R

R 1, 2, 3

b.

460 volt Emergency Bus I

Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)

S R

R 1, 2, 3

8.

EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFAS) a.

Manual (Trip Eutt== Switches)

N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

l b.

SG Level and Pressure (A/B)-low l

and AP (A/B) - High S

R MTA(2) 1, 2, 3 l

[

c.

SG Level (A/B) - Low and No l

Pressure - Low Trip (A/B)

S R

M RT 1,-2, 3

j d.

Automatic Actuation Logic N.A.

N.A.

MTA(It d 1, 2, 3 L

h I

f i

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-22 Amendment No.

,w,-

2

-. - -. - - -. - -.. - ~. =. _.. - -. - -.. -.-

,,e*

Teble 4.3-2 (Continusd)

TABLE NOTATION i

j (a)

Remote manual not provided for RAS.

These are local manuals at each ESF auxiliary relav cabinet.

(1)

The logic circuits shall be tested manually at least once per 4-1m l

]

days.

(2)

On a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

l l

1 1

i i

i 4

4 i

I 1

l a

w ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-23 Amenndment No.

, g so 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ( ES F)

INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) ~ the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reacnes its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the ndnimum frequencies are suf ficient to demonstrate this capability. The triannual channel functional testina frecuency is to be performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

This testinc methodoloav is based on the reliability analysis presented I

in topical report CE NPSD-576, "RPS/ESrAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation For 120 Day Stacceted Testina".

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies prcvides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.

Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

RTD response time is defined as the time interval required for the RTD output to achieve 63.2% of its total change when subjected to a step change in RTD temperature. The RTD response time for the Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS) is expressed as an effective time constant.

For hot leg temperatures, the effective time constant for a given CPC channel is defined as the mean time constant for averaged pairs of hot leg RTD inputs to the channel. This is done because the CPCS utilizes the mean hot leg temperature in its calculations. The maximum hot leg effective time constant allowable for use in the CPCS is 13.0 seconds.

For cold leg temperatures, the effective time constant to be used in Figure 3.3-1 is the maximum time constant of the two cold leg RTD inputs for a given channel. The CPCS utilizes the more conservative cold leg temperature in the various DNBR and LPD calculations.

The maximum cold leg effective time constant allowable for use in the CPCS is 13.0 seconds.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 34,49,