ML20128K914

Insp Repts 50-348/85-20 & 50-364/85-20 on 850402-0510. Violation Noted:No Charging Pumps Operable While Irradiated Fuel Assemblies Removed from Reactor Core & Spacers Not Installed as Required

ML20128K914
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	05/24/1985
From:	Bradford W, Cantrell F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128K846	List: IR 05000402/2005010 ML20128K842 ML20128K914
References
TASK-2.B.3, TASK-TM 50-348-85-20, 50-364-85-20, NUDOCS 8507110162
Download: ML20128K914 (10)

See also: IR 05000348/1985020

Text

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p REco UNITED STATES

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1. o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

-[" REGloN 11

g j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

• c A TLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

%...../

Report Nos.: 50-348/85-20 and 50-364/85-20

Licensee: Alabama Power Company

600 North 18th Street

Birmingham, AL 35291

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: April 2 - May 10, 1985

Inspector:

W. H. Bradf4fd -

e _ k b_ 5/43/ F5

' 1 j' Uate Signed

Approved by: ,

,h. f r/97

F. S. Cantrell, SecE16n p ief

~

Ddte Signed

Division of Reactor Prbjects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 170 inspector-hours on site

in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, monthly surveil-

lance observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verifica-

tion, independent inspection effort, Licensee Event Reports, station batteries,

Allis Chalmers 4160V Breakers, and action on previously identified station items.

Results: Four violations were identified: two violations involved violation

of Technical Specifications; one violation involved 10 CFR 50 Appendix B,

Criterion II; one violation involved failure to follow procedures.

8507110162 850610

gDR ADOCK 05000348

PDR

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted:

J. D. Woodard, Plant Manager

D. N. Morey, Assistant Plant Manager

W. D. Shipman, Assistant Plant Manager

R. D. Hill, Operations Superintendent

C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Superintendent

R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Superintendent

L. A. Ward, Maintenance Superintendent

. L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Superintendent

W. C. Carr, Assistant Operations Superintendent

J. E. Odom, Operations Sector Supervisor

B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Sector Supervisor

T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor

J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor

L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor

-R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor

L. M. Stinson, Plant Podification Supervisor

W. G. Ware, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations

personnel, mechanics and I&C personnel, security force members, and office

personnel.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management

interviews throughout the report period and on May 9,1985, with the plant

manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were

discussed in detail.

The inspector reviewed certain drawings, manuals and procedures which were

identified as proprietary. None of the proprietary material is included in

this report.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Closed (Violation 364/85-11-01). Violation of over temperature delta

temperature Technical-Specifications. Licensee response dated May 1,1985.

Procedures have been revised to ensure potentiometers are reset when

required and for periodic re-check.

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed and reviewed Technical Specification required

surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance

with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that

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limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria and

were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test;

that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed

and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that personnel

conducting the tests were qualified.

The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

FNP-1-STP-40.0 - Safety Injection with Loss of Offsite Power Test

FNP-2-STP-7.0 -

Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Calculation

FNP-2-STP-80.1 - 2 B Diesel Generator

FNP-2-STP-9.0 - RCS Leak Rate

FNP-2-STP-1.0 - Operations Daily and Shift Surveillance Requirements

FNP-2-STP-22.5 - AFW System Flow Path Verification

FNP-2-STP-64.0 - Safeguard Systems Locked Valve Verification

FNP-1-STP-29.2 - Cycle VII Shutdown Margin Calculation (TAVG 547 F)

FNP-1-STP-11.7 - Verifying RHR Relief Valve Isolation is open

Unit 1, Cycle VII Refueling Procedure FP-ALA-R6 and Fuel Inspection

Procedure FNP-1-ETP-3636.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were

observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with

approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and

were in conformance with Technical Specifications.

The following items were considered during the review: limiting conditions

for operations were met while components or systems were removed from

service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities

were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as appli-

cable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to

returning components or systems to service; quality control records were

maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and

materials were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented;

and fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to

assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

which may affect system performance. The following maintenance activities

were observed / reviewed:

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Steam generator IC eddy current testing

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Steam generator IB AVB modification

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Unit I auxiliary containment hatch

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Steam generator Sludge Lancing

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Unit 1 MSIV Inspection

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Main steam valve room snubbers and snubber inspections

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IC CCW heat exchanger

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IB service water pump

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Service water batteries and UPS batteries spacer installation

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Units 1 and 2 containment tendons

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Unit 1 local leak rate testing

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Turbine driven auxiliary feed pump turbine overhaul

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IE Inverter - 7.5 KVA inverter inspection per Westinghouse

Technical Bulletin 84.08

Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.

6. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report

period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency

systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of

affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, diesel, and turbine buildings

were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including fluid leaks

and excessive vibrations.

The inspectors - verified compliance with selected Limited Condition for

Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance tests. The verifica-

tions were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation,

valve positions, switch positions and review of completed logs, records, and

chemistry results. The licensee's compliance with LC0 action statements

were reviewed as they happened.

The following systems and components were observed / verified operational:

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Station electrical boards in the control room and various electrical

boards throughout the plant for proper electrical alignment.

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Certain accessible hydraulic snubbers.

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Accessible portions of service water and component cooling water

systems.

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Units 1 and 2 suction and discharging piping and valves on auxiliary

feedwater system.

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Diesel generators and support systems.

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Certain accessible portions of CVCS piping and valves to and from the

charging /high head safety injection pumps.

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Certain portions of RHR and containment sp' ray systems.

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Portions of various other systems (safety-related and nonsafety-

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j The following violations were identified: l

a. On April 15, 1985, Unit I was in the Mode 6 refueling outage with fuel

movements in progress.in the reactor core. At 2:37 a.m. the licensee

determined that there was no charging pump operable in the boron flow

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path as required by Specification 3.1.2.1 and capable of being powered '

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from an operable emergency bus.

> 1A charging pump was tagged out and became inoperable at 10:42 p.m.

i on April 14, 1985. 1B charging pump was . tagged out previously to

permit work on the pump seals. IC charging pump was inoperable due i

to a tagging order on B train service water which made 2C and 1C

. diesel generators inoperable to supply power to the emergency bus.

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Fuel movements continued from 11:03 p.m. on April 14 until 2:37 a.m. on

April 15.

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The shift foreman and two licensed operators knew the status of the

unit and should have known the charging pump requirements and brought

this to the attention of the shift supervisor.

The licensee immediately suspended all fuel movements at 2:37 a.m.

i' until IA charging pump was declared operable at 4:24 a.m. on April 15,

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1985. Charging pump 1A was inoperable for a period of six hours.

This is a violation (348/85-20-01).

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b. On May 6,1985, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 both trains of Residual Heat

Removal (RHR) cooling were lost. Loss of RHR was observed in the -

control room and immediate action was taken to correct the problem.

' At 9:20 a.m. the power available light on the MCB energized on MOV-

8701B and the valve began to close. The A train RHR pump .was tripped

and B train RHR pump was started. Valve 8701B would not reopen. At

about 9:24 a.m. the power available light on MOV-8702 B energized and

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the valve closed. B train RHR pump was tripped resulting in a total

loss of RHR. Action was taken immediately to open the breakers for

each valve and manually open valves 8701B and 8702B. RHR was restored

at about 10:12 a.m.

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The loss of RHR occurred due to two procedures being performed

simultaneously and incorrectly. The Shift Supervisor (SS) had earlier

approved clearing a tag-out on electrical penetration 38. The approved

tagging order directed removal of the tags and closing the breakers

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associated with the penetration. The (SS) should not have approved

energizing the breakers for MOV 8701B and 87028. The electrician

! following the tagging order,' removed the tags and closed the breakers

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associated with electrical penetration 38. When the breakers for

MOV-87018 and 87028 were closed the valves closed resulting in the loss

of RHR. The valves closed when the circuit was energized because they

were receiving a system inlet pressure signal exceeding 700 psig.

Investigation revealed the 700 pound signal resulted from STPs 201.16A

and 201.17A, Reactor Coolant Loop Pressure Wide and Narrow Range

Calibration, being performed. As part of the surveillance tests

pressure transmitters PT-402 and 403 were placed in test position.

Step 5.10 of the Precautions and Limitations section of the procedure

had not been adhered to which stated "the interlock with RHR valves and

RCS pressure will be disabled and inoperative." This resulted in the

700 psig test signal, closing the RHR valves and rendering both trains

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of the RHR system inoperable.

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This is a violation (348/85-20-02).

The licensee has initiated the following corrective action:

(1) Caution tags will be placed on the RHR valve electrical breakers

when RCS temperature is 180 F.

(2) STPs 201.16A and 201.17A have been changed to require a sign-off

to assure the interlock between RCS pressure and RHR valves is

disabled and inoperable.

c. On April 15, 1985, at 10:20 a.m. the licensee discovered the inner and

outer doors of Unit I containment building auxiliary hatch open. The

unit was in Mode 6 refueling outage with the core being unloaded. The

licensee immediately stopped fuel movements until the auxiliary hatch

doors could be closed and secured. The hatch doors were closed at

10:25 a.m.

The licensee performed an investigation of the incident and interviewed

all personnel who had been logged into and out of Unit 1 containment

on the previous shift. The licensee found that a sub-contractor

employee, involved in steam generator sludge lancing had used the

auxiliary hatch to exit the containment building. He should have used

the main personnel hatch. He did not close the inner door to make up

the interlock on the outer door. He used excessive force which allowed

him to open the outer door.

A security guard had been posted outside the auxiliary hatch but due

to building structure configuration he could not directly observe the

outer auxiliary hatch door. Anyone going to or from the containment

door must pass directly by his desk. The person who existed through

the hatch came by the guard after clearing the controlled area. The

guard asked him where he had come from. He told the guard he had been

inside containment and had just come through the auxiliary hatch. The

guard directed him to go to the main personnel hatch where he had

entered contsinment and check out through security and health physics

personnel.

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The containment hatch door is an alarmed security door and alarms in

the central alarm station (CAS). There was no response to the alarm

because a security officer was posted at the door. The alarm stayed in

until the auxiliary hatch door was closed.

During shift turnover at 7:00 a.m. " board walk-down" by the oncoming

and offgoing reactor operators-it was noted that the refueling cavity

water level was about two inches low. At that time- the oncoming

operator made preparations to add water to the refueling cavity. This

required boron concentration samples. At about 10:20 a.m. the operator

.noted that the refueling water level had returned to normal. However,

no water had been added.

When the containment building is closed for refueling operations and

the containment ventilation system is in operation, if a containment

door is opened, there is a delta pressure created between the contain-

ment building through the refueling canal into the spent fuel building.

This delta pressure was sufficient to cause the refueling cavity to

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The inner and outer doors were both open for a period of about four

hours prior to discovery by operations personnel.

Technical Specifications Section 3.9.4.(b) require a minimum of one *

door in each airlock to be closed during refueling operation.

This is a violations (348/85-20-03).

Licensee corrective action: 3 ,

Both doors of the containment building auxiliary hatch were closed

and locked with break away locks.

7. Independent Inspection Effort (92706)

The inspectors routinely attended meetings with certain licensee management

and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisors, shift

foremen, and licensed operators. These meetings and discussions provided

. a daily status of plant operating, maintenance, and testing activities in

progress, as well as discussions of significant problems.

During a routine inspection tour of the Unit I auxiliary building 121'

and 100' floors on May 2,1985, by NRC Resident Inspectors the following

occurred: The inspectors descended the . stairway, adjacent to the boric

acid batch tanks, from the 121' level to the 100' level of the auxiliary

building. The stairwell area was wet from water leakage and a large number

of plastic booties had been spread on the floor at the bottom of the stairs

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covering the water leakage. A significant amount of boric acid powder also

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covered the 100' floor adjacent to the tanks. There were no contamination

signs or other postings on the stairs to indicate the area below was

contaminated. The inspectors walked through the boric acid tank area and

through a hallway leading to a main corridor adjacent to the charging / safety

injection pump rooms. At the end of the hallway a contamination sign was

posted and a step-off pad placed on the floor. Contamination levels were

posted at 2000 dpm/100 cm2 Br. The area the inspectors had passed through

had been identified as a contaminated area at one point of access and not at

the other. The licensee later stated that postings had been placed at the

top of the stairs on the 121' level, but had been removed. At the control

, point it was determined the inspectors shoes were contaminated. The

licensee immediately posted contamination signs at the top of the stairs on

the 121' level as required by licensee procedures.

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The contaminated area should have been conspicuously posted at both access

points as directed by procedures FNP-0-RCP-0, General Guidance to Health

Physics Personnel and FNP-0-RCP-29, Contamination Guidelines. FNP-0-RCP-0

sections 5.11.4.1 and 5.11.4.2, states that a contaminated area is any area

which exceeds the limits specified in FNP-0-RCP-29 (1000 dpm/100 cm 2ST) and

if any area is found to exceed the above limits it should be posted

conspicuously.

This will be carried as an * Unresolved Item 348/85-20-05 pending review by

regional radiation protection personnel.

8. Station Batteries

Units 1 and 2 Service Water Batteries and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed

Pumps Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) batteries.

On March 28, 1985, the inspector found the spacers missing between the cells

on train A and train B 125 V DC service water batteries, and Unit 1 and

Unit 2 (UPS) 48 volt DC batteries. The spacers had not been inserted

between the cells at the time of original installation of the batteries.

The inspector questioned the ability of the above systems to meet seismic

qualifications and remain operable without the spacers installed between the

battery cells during a seismic event. The licensee agreed to perform a

safety evaluation to determine if the spacers were required for seismic

qualifications.

The inspector previously identified this as an Unresolved Item

(348-364/85-18-01) pending a review of the safety evaluation.

The inspector has completed a review of the safety evaluation conducted by

Southern Company Service, Inc. , Bechtel Power Corporation, and Allied C&D

Power Systems. The conclusion of the safety evaluation is that the service

water batteries and UPS would meet seismic qualifications without the

spacers installed between the cells.

• An Unresolved Item is a matter about~ which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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The manufacture drawing No. U-184416 for the service water batteries, and

drawings No. 263216 and 216919 for the UPS batteries (these drawings are

marked proprietary), show spacers installed between the cells.

The UPS Vendor Manuals U-263212 and U-216914, Section 12-600-1C of vendor

manual, "C and D Installation and Operating Instructions for Safety

Batteries," 3.2.3 - Earthquake Protected Racks Assembly, Item #7 states,

" Install cells, noting special requirements, place the furnished plastic

spacer between each cell (spacing 1/2 inch approximately).

The above manufacture drawings clearly indicate that the spacers provided

should be inserted between each cell. The spacers had not been installed

between the cells at the time of original installation as required. The

licensee failed to carry out the quality assurance program in accordance

with written policies, procedures or instruction as required by 10 CFR 50

Appendix B, Criterion II.

This is a violation (348-364/85-20-04).

Licensee corrective action: The licensee has procured and installed the

spacers between the battery cells.

9. Allis Chalmers 4160 Volt Breakers

On May 6,1985, the licensee was performing preventive maintenance on 2B

diesel generator output 4160 V. breaker. After completion of the mainten-

ance, the tagging order was released and the breaker was returned to service

by energizing the charging motor. The charging motor started and as the

breaker neared its fully spring charged position, the breaker closed

, prematurely and immediately tripped to the open position.

Evaluation indicates a set screw on the X-W link had changed position enough

to allow the breaker to close on charging and to trip fee.

The breaker is a Allis Chalmers type MA 350 C stored energy operator. There

are about 120 breakers of this type at Farley. Not all are used on safety

related equipment.

The licensee has initiated an inspection of other breakers of this type to

determine if this same set screw problem exists. To date the 28 diesel

generator breaker is the only one with this problem.

The licensee has found other problems on this type breaker. These problems

consist of loose bolts and screws and scorec linkage springs. The licensee

is continuing their evaluation.

A Vendor Representative is scheduled to be on site on May 13, 1985, to

participate in the inspection.

The inspector will continue to follow this evaluation (IFI-348/85-20-06).

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10. Licensee Event Report

The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential

generic problems to determine trends; to determine whether information

included in the report meets the NRC reporting requirements; and to consider

whether the corrective action discussed in the report appears appropriate.

Licensee action, with respect to selected reports, were reviewed to verify

that the event had been reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required

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by the Technical Specification; that corrective action was taken by the

licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety settings and LCOs, were

not exceeded. The inspector examined selected incident reports, logs and

records and interviewed selected personnel. The following reports are

considered closed:

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Unit 1 LERs

84-05 -

Unit 1 feedwater nozzles indications

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84-14 -

Inadequate procedure for input from NI-43 to OT delta T

85-02 -

Reactor trip

85-06 -

Steam generator tubes plugging

Unit 2 LERs

84-11 -

OT delta T

85-05 -

Failed containment field anchors

85-06 - Inoperable containment sump level recorder

85-07 -

Missed fire watch

85-08 -

Reactor trip

85-09 - Reactor trip

11. Action On Previously Identified Items (92701)

(Closed) 348-364/84-29-01 and 348-364/84-02. The inspector has reviewed the

licensee's safety evaluation and the results of a special ventilation test

which was performed on the penetration filtration system.

The inspector had no further questions.

12. TMI Action Item II.B.3

(Closed) Item II.B.3, Post-accident Sampling, is closed for both units

based on completed safety evaluations issued by NRR dated October 11, 1984,

and March 26, 1985.

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