ML20128K376

Discusses 960925 Meeting Conducted at Plant on 960925 Re Upcoming Refueling Outage Currently Scheduled to Begin 961012.W/agenda,attendance List & Viewgraphs

ML20128K376
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	10/02/1996
From:	Dyer J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Schnell D UNION ELECTRIC CO.
References
NUDOCS 9610110048
Download: ML20128K376 (150)

Text

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g" "' %< 4 UNITED ST ATES

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,k NUCLEAR REGULATOPY COMMISSION I

REGloN iv f

611 RYAN PLAZA oRIVE, SUITE 400

'%...*..,F AR LINGToN, TE XAS 76011 8064 OCT 2 1996 Donald F. Schnell, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Union Electric Company P.O. Box 149 St. Louis, Missouri 63166

SUBJECT:

CALLAWAY PLANT REFUEL NUMBER 8 This refers to the meeting conducted at the Callaway Plant on September 25,1996. This meeting related to the upcoming refueling outage for the Callaway Plant currently schcduled to begin on Octobu 12,1996. Major topics discussed were the scope and schedule for the outage with specific presentations on contractor support, steam generator work, reactor coolant pump work, and balance-of-plant system work. The meeting was

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beneficial in providing Union Electric the opportunity to describe the scope of activities planned for the refueling outage, and for Region IV managers to better understand the preparations and controls in place for coordinating outage activities.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely, k

J. E. Dy r, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30

Enclosures:

1. Agenda

2. Attendance List

3. Licensee Presentation cc: Union Electric and attendees w/ enc 1 1 & 2 only Professional Nuclear Consulting, Inc.

19041 Raines Drive Derwood, Maryland 20855 9610110048 961002 PDR ADOCK 05000483 P

PDR

Entergy Operations, Inc. Gerald Charnoff, Esq.

Thomas A. Baxter, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N. Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037 H. D. Bono, Supervising Engineer i

Site Licensing Union Electric Company P.O. Box 620 Fulton, Missouri 65251 G. L. Randolph, Vice President Nuclear Operations Union Electric Company P.O. Box 620 Fulton, Missouri 65251 Manager - Electric Department Missouri Public Service Commission 301 W. High P.O. Box 360 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 Ronald A. Kucera, Deputy Director Department of Natural Resources P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 Neil S. Carns, President and Chief Executive Officer Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Dan 1. Bolef, President Kay Drey, Representative Board of Directors Coalition for the Environment l

6267 Delmar Boulevard l

University City, Missouri 63130 i

i

Entergy Operations, Inc. Lee Fritz, Presiding Commissioner Callaway County Court House 10 East Fifth Street Fulton, Missouri 65151 i

Alan C. Passwater, Manager j

Licensing and Fuels

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Union Electric Company j

P.O. Box 149 l

i St. Louis, Missouri 63166 J. V. Laux, Manager Quality Assurance i

Union Electric Company P.O. Box 620 Fulton, Missouri 65251

Entergy Operations, Inc. bec to DMB (IE45) bec distrib. by RIV:

L. J. Callan Resident inspector DRP Director DRS-PSB Branch Chief (DRP/B)

MIS System Project Engineer (DRP/B)

RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

Leah Tremper (OC/LFDCB, MS: TWFN 9E10) i Director, WCFO PAO SLO DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DRPDIR\\CW9-25. SUM To receive copy of document, indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy PE:DRP/B E

D:DRP/BQM/ D:DRP DNGraves;cng WDJohn(o67)

JEDyer(j&

10/ p /96 V~

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10/ S /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

N Entergy Operations, Inc. bec to DMB (IE45) bec distrib. by RIV:

L. J. Callan Resident inspector DRP Director DRS-PSB Branch Chief (DRP/B)

MIS System Project Engineer (DRP/B)

RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

Leah Tremper (OC/LFDCB, MS: TWFN 9E10)

Director, WCFO PAO SLO DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DRPDIR\\CW9-25. SUM To receive copy of document, indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy PE:DRP/B lE D:DRP/B()S/ D DRP _l l

DNGraves;cm n WDJohn(o6p)

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10/ 4 /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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I 110001

1 Callaway Plant Refuel 8 Outage Briefing l

l September 25,1996 l

8:00-11:00 arn., EOF l

l l

0800 Introduction D. F. Schnell 0805 Outage Safety R. D. Affolter 0810 Outage Overview M. E. Taylor

+ Schedule

+ Gutage Resiew Board

+ Critical Path (s) l i

+ Scope

+ Sequence

+ Objectives

+ Organization 0840 Contractor Support Organization / General Contractor W. A. Witt l

0850 Steam Generators W. A. Witt 0905 Fuel Handling Activities / Reactor Vessel Headwork K. W. Kuechenmeister 0920 Reactor Coolant Pumps J. A. McGraw

+

'D' RCP Motor Replace:nent

+

'D' RCP Internals Replacement

+ Other RCP Work 0935 Turbine Generator J. A. McGraw l

0940 LP Heater Replacement K. W. Kuechenmeister 0945 BREAK l

Group #1 1000 Operations Activities R.T. Lamb Group #2 1000 Shutdown and Startup Chemistry R. R. Roselius 1025 Submicron Filtration Program R. R. Roselius 1035 Health Physics Issues M. S. Evans s

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Otliswcy Plint Refuel 8 Outage Briefing September 25,1996 8:00-11:00 a.m., EOF 0800 Introduction D. F. Schnell 0805 Outage Safety R. D. Afblter 0810 Outage Overview M. E. Taylor

+ Schedule

+ Outage Review Board

+ Critical Path (s)

+ Scope

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+ Objectives

+ Organization 0840 Contractor Support Organization / General Contractor W. A. Witt 0850 Steam Generators W. A. Witt 0905 Fuel Handling Activities / Reactor Vessel Headwork K. W. Kuechenmeister 0920 Reactor Coolant Pumps J. A. McGraw

+

'D' RCP Motor Replacement

+

'D' RCP Internals Replacement

+ Other RCP Work 0935 Turbine Generator J. A. McGraw 0940 LP Heater Replacement K. W. Kuechenmeister 0945 BREAK Group #1 1000 Operations Activities R.T. Lamb Group #2 1000 Shutdown and Startup Chemistry R. R. Roselius 1025 Submicron Filtration Program R. R. Roselius 1035 Health Physics Issues M. S. Evans

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+ Containment Power Upgrade s

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+ Approximately 25 Additional: Mods m.

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WEFUEL 8 DOCUMENTS a

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+ Diesel Generator Testin8 me,gg pe

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RF7 OUTAGE OBJECTIVES NUCLEAR SAFETY STATUS None of the following:

Unplanned releases None Unplanned reactivity additions None Loss of radioactive fluid resulting in an unanticipated 2

increase in airborne / surface contamination Loss of RCS level control or indication None at reduced inventory Loss of offsite power None Fuel handling incidents involving misplacement None or damage to fuel assembly or core component Loss of decay heat removal ability None Fire requiring activation of fire brigade None Loss than 3 LER's and no Level 3 NRC violations 1 LER PERSONNEL SAFETY Manrem exposure total s 185 160.787

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and s 200 PCI (vendor and UE) 147 and No exposures exceeding our administrative or regulatory limits None Recordable injuries s15 (vendor and UE) 11 No fatalities or life threatening injuries None EFFICIENCY Outage duration does not exceed 36 days 47.95

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Outage window schedule adherence 2 85%

43%

Post refuel operations -- 100 days without trip or forced

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outage due to outage work activities or an item that could reasonably have been identified and corrected

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Outage cost does not exceed $23.9 million 24.2 Radwaste generation (DAW) s 7,500 cubic feet 4,81 */

RF8 OUTAGE OBJECTIVES NUCLEAR SAFETY STATUS None of the following:

Unplanned releases Unplanned reactivity additions l

Loss of radioactive fluid resulting in an unanticipated increase in airbome/ surface contamination Loss of RCS level control or indication at reduced inventory Loss of offsite power Fuel handling incidents involving misplacement or damage to fuel assembly or core component Loss of decay heat removal ability Fire requiring activation of fire brigade Less than 3 LER's and no Level 3 NRC violations PERSONNEL SAFETY Manrem exposure total s130 man-rem and No exposures exceeding our administrative or regulatory limits Recordable injuries s 3 (vendor and UE)

No fatalities or life threatening injuries EFFICIENCY I

Outage duration does not exceed 30 days Outage window schedule adherence 2 85%

Post refuel operations - 100 days without trip or forced I

outage due to outage work activities or an item that could reasonably have been identified and corrected Outage cost does not exceed $18.6 million

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Radwaste generation (DAW) s 4,500 cubic feet

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T65.0260.8 960828 VENDOR TRAESIS~G SOS's/ INDUSTRY EVENTS

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS Table of Contents i

INT RO D U CT I O N................................................................................................

SOS's-GENERAL......................................................................................................2 AIRFITTINGS.......................................................................................................2 WPAPROBLEM.....................................................................................................2 P I P ES S H IFTE D ON TRUC K................................................................................ 2 O I L C LOTH VRS HE RCUL ITE.............................................................................. 2 H OT P A P.T!C L E O N S H O E................................................................................... 2 S E l S MI C RFCO RD P L ATES.................................................................................. 3 TOOLS LE FT ON SCAFFO LDING...................................................................... 3 QC, Q A, JO B VI S ITO RS......................................................................................... 3 S TRAINE D B AC K INJURY.................................................................................... 3 CONTROL OF IGNITION SOURCES / SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES....... 3 TOO L ROO M P RO B L E M S................................................................................... 4 POO R PAPERWO RK P RACTIC ES...................................................................... 4 B RO KE N TO RQ UE WRE NC HES......................................................................... 4 P LA STI C B AG IN E S W P UMP.............................................................................. 4 SUPERVISOR DID NOT SIGN IN ON RWP, MISSED POSTING........................ 4 PRESSURE BOUNDARY DOOR BLOCKED OPEN............................................. 5 OPENING IN GRATING NOT TAPED OFF.......................................................... 5 f

NEAR MISS/TWO WORKERS INSIDE RADIOGRAPHY BOUNDARY.............. 5 SUBMARINE REMOVED FROM CAVITY WITHOUT HP SURVEY.................. 6 TEMP. SHIELD SCAFFOLD POLE BLOCKED VALVE...................................... 6 INDIVIDUAL CONTAMINATED, DID NOT SEE POSTING............................... 7 WORKERS NOT TIED OFF - IMPROPER FALL PROTECTION......................... 7 WO RKE RS NOT WEARING HARD HATS........................................................... 8 WRENCH FOUND OUTSIDE RCA SHOULD NOT HAVE LEFT RCA AREA.... 8 f

BEAM CLAMP NOT REMOVED FROM JOB UPON COMPLETION OF WORK 8 PIPING D AMAGED BY DROPPED FLANGE....................................................... 9

(

RADIOLOG'. CAL POSTING MISSING OR OBSCURED FROM VIEW............... 9 Q UART E RL Y QC RE PO RT................................................................................. 10 POST IS S UE INS PECTION T AG S....................................................................... 10 FOREIGN MATERIAL EXCLUSION PROBLEMS............................................ 10 DE B RIS IN CONTAINMENT /RHR SYSTEM.................................................... 10 TOOL CONTROL POLICY NOT FOLLOWED................................................. I 1 T65.0260.8 i

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SIINDUSTRY EVENTS Table of Contents (Cont.)

(FME) PAPER WIPE FOUND IN INSTRUMENT PORTS.................................13 CHEWING GUM AND CIGARETTES FOUND IN CONTAINMENT...............13 FOREIGN MATERIAL FOUND IN VALVE......................................................... I 3 EATING / DRINKING / S MOKING ISSUES....................................................... 14 ACCES S TO RC A HAS CHANG E D!.................................................................... 14 S O S 's - E L ECTRICIAN S............................................................................................ 15 j

SOS 93-1566 (INCLUDE SEGR 9 3 - 1 1 -001 )........................................................... I 5 UNSAFE WORK PRACTICES SOS 9 3 - 2 1 09....................................................... 1 5 ENTERING WRONG BREAKER CUBICLE SEGR 92-01 -00 8............................ 15 WRONG TERMINATION LUGS USED SOS 9 5 -0715......................................... 15 LIGHTING BALLAST'S FOUND CO 'AINING PCB'S SOS 96-0695.............. 16 S O S 's - C ARP ENT E RS............................................................................................ I 7 CRUSHED SCAFFOLD TUBES SOS 9 3 - 1 8 94..................................................... 1 7 CA-#937,94-104, S C AF. P E RMIT....................................................................... I 7 S O S 's - P A INT E RS.................................................................................................... 1 SOS 94-0583...........................................................................................................I8 PERMIT NOT PROPERLY OBTAINED SOS 9 5 -02 5 3......................................... 18 S O S 's - P IP E F ITTE RS.............................................................................................. 19 SOS 93-1420..........................................................................................................19 HP NOT CONTACTED WHEN CUTTING PIPE SOS 9 5 -06 69........................... 19 S O S ' s - O P E RATO RS..........................................................................................

SOS 93-1778..........................................................................................................20 FORKTRUCK USED TO LIFT OVERWEIGHT OBJECT OVER GATE SOS 95-1895........................................................................................................20 RADIOACTIVE BOXES DROPPED FROM TRUCK SOS95-214 8..................... 20 S O S 's - WE L D E R S............................................................................................

SOS 93-1617.......................................................................................................21 INPO OE 6633.......................................................................................................21 WELDING VERIFICATIONS NOT MADE SOS 9 5 -063 3.................................... 21 S O S ' s - IN S UL AT O RS......................................................................................

INSULATION AROUND STEAM TRAP SOS94-123 2...................................... 2 2 SOS's - RIGGING & LIFTING / CRANE OPERATORS.............................................. 23 DROPPED LOAD - JIB CRANE IN CONTAINMENT SOS 95-0410................... 23 T65.0260.8 ll Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS Table of Contents (Cont.)

BOX MOVED OVER RX VESSEL IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURE SOS 95-0803......................................................................................................23 OBJECT DROPPED IN CONTAINMENT WHILE BEING LIFTED SOS 95-0891.......................................................................................................24 SOS 's - WORK COORDINATORS /CS O STAFF....................................................... 26 DNR NOT NOTIFIED WHEN DIESEL ENGINES USED ON SITE I

SOS 95-0879..........................................................................................................26 POOR ACCESS TO RX HEAD / POOR PREPLANNING SOS 95-0912............... 26 INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONTAINMENT STAY TIMES l

SOS 95-1937......................................................................................................27 RE VI E W Q UE S TION S...................................................................................

RE F E RE N C E S.......................................................................................

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS INTRODUCTION Introduce self.

Find out how many have been here before this outage.

Ask for help if anyone has personal knowledge ard wants to add pertinent info.

Purpose of review is to prevent items from happeiiing again, especially due to not knowing about them. We are not pointing fingers!

Things have changed since last outage. Wheeling of electrical power is becoming a realistic threat to all utilities. If you could buy electricity cheaper from someone else, would you? UE intends to be the lowest price producer of electricity, we need your help!

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL AIR FITTINGS SOS 93-1902 show example ofhanded a:r line.

Air hose fitting found on air line without being banded.

Others also found with screw clamp instead of band. Both create a potential missile when hose is turned on or used.

WPA PROBLEM SOS 93-1858 Note that the OSHA Electrical Safety Video, Part 1, has WPA precautions.

Workmen started, but Foreman was not signed on protection. Pump was started. Operations made announcement. but could not be heard. Workers must at least check basic protection items such as breakers off, valves closed, etc.

WPA has 3 levels of personnel associated with them.

1. Responsible for signing on/off.

2. Working under WPA program.

3. None of the first two, but respect of tagging system.

Communications is very important.

PIPES SHIFTED ON SOS 93-1194 TRUCK Pipes being unloaded from truck shifted causing a near miss to one of the workers. Due to how warehouse loaded them or how they were off-loaded.

Doesn't make a difference if someone gets hurt. Look job over, control your own work.

OIL CLOTH VRS SOS 93-1242 HERCULITE CANNOT use oil cloth on Stainless Steel! Weld curtains show example, are of same material, but are allowable for that use. Oil cloth is no longer stocked. Rhino cloth is now used for trapping HOT Particles minimizing contamination. Note!

Use what is prescribed. If you do not know, Ask!

HOT PARTICLE ON SOS 93-1508 SHOE Worker was very careful when dressing out and picked up hot particle on bottom of foot.

When in RCA, this can happen! Watch where you step!

Don't forget to frisk bottom of feet.

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

SEISMIC RECORD SOS 93-1604 PLATES These are magnetic tape " scratch plates" contained in small Shon erample of har boxes. They produce a permanent record of seismic events, but can be damaged by bumping, hammering, etc.

I This can destroy any records contained on them. Watch out for them in Containment.

l TOOLS LEFT ON SOS 93-1612 SCAFFOLDING Scaffolding need to be kept cleaned up. Whenjob is over, clean tools, etc., from scaffolding. Scaffold builders l

should not have to do this. Good way ofloosing tools!

Scaffold materials will be taken down soon afterjob completion, so at least get the items off the scaffolding, I

tag / bag as necessary.

I QC, QA, JOB VISITORS.

SOS 93-1707 People showing up at yourjob site may bejust curious or there for many different reasons. Normally QC, QA, NRC, I

etc. introduce themselves, but may not. All have the right to question you about thejob. Respond with what you know, don't guess; tell them you do not know if you don't.

l You should not be asking any of these on how to do your job If vou do not know ask your supervisor first!

STRAINED BACK SOS 93-1727 INJURY FCI has a back injury prevention tape that will be shown.

Improper lifting techniques will surly result in this. Very I

common problem. Protect yourself. Lift with legs; get help if necessary.

CONTROL OF IGNITION SOS 93-1994 l

SOURCES / SUPERVISOR I

RESPONSIBILITIES All supervisors are required to complete HOT WORK FIREWATCH COURSE and requal each year if not on site

.s o rE.' S4permors as n e// a., t ra/i for over 12 months. If not trained, see your Supervisor, have specific responsubs/ sties' You cannot prop a door open!

Transient combustibles must be logged / permitted. Crates, palates, cable spools can be source of problem! NO UNTREATED WOOD IN RCA!!!

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

i TOOL ROOM SOS 93-2022 PROBLEMS Many tools were " dumped" at the tool room door with multitude of problems. M&TE items missing stickers, damaged equipment, especially rigging and lifting equipment (special requirements for inspections and tagging). Some were even placed back on the racks for re-issue. If damaged, you may be setting someone up for a problem. You may also cause extra work for no reason and cause an injury. Tag and/or mark damaged tools. Tell the Tool Room personnel or your supervisor of condition problems. Tools are suppose to be issued by Tool Room personnel!

POOR PAPERWORK SOS 93-2064 PRACTICES SEE SOS FOR DETAILS--

More on thi: will be covered in a WORK REQUEST SEMI. VAR that will be gir en later BROKEN TORQUE SOS 94-0105 WRENCHES Eight broken in short time frame. All were 50-250 ft/lb.

Repair parts were available and they were fixed after the Show example of a torque urench and a breaker bar. Start off by outage. These are not breaker bars! Use them as intended.

aski ig group to ident@ each item Proper use should be in the middle 1/3 of the range congradulare group bret let them (200/3=66, proper range is approx. 100 - 200 ft/lb.) Don't know someone did not know the use for 250 ft/lb torqueing job or to break the bolts loose!.

difference!

PLASTIC BAG IN ESW SOS 94-0154 PUMP A plastic zip-lock bag was found frozen in the ice above the "B" ESW pump suction. Divers also found numerous items. Scluding grinding wheels, electrical cable inst n, conduit, crawdad trap, etc. New FENCE should help. er housekeeping? Wind can blow items such as plastic bags into the UHS pond. Put items in proper place!

SUPERVISOR DID NOT SOS 95-0261 SIGN IN ON RWP, When monitoring work, a supervisor inadvertently entered MISSED POSTING a radiological work area. A sign was posted on the open door, but the rope across the door was down due to the work taking place in the room. The supervisor violated the rad program controls by not signing in on the RWP and complying with the instructions on the permit.

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

Lesson learned: Before entering areas where work is taking place, look close for postings. If a rope is down, make sure the area is not posted before entering. Do not set someone else up by obscuring postings or by not replacing the rope after entering a radiological area.

PRESSURE BOUNDARY SOS 95-0378 DOOR BLOCKED OPEN On 3-22-95, the NRC resident inspector called to inform the Control Room that door 1101I was blocked open with an air hose running through it and no maintenance personnel in the area. A check of the EOSL revealed that the activity had been identified and an EOSL generated on 3-21-95, but that this was a pressure boundary door had apparently been missed. An hourly Firewatch had been initiated as required, but the need to remove the hose and close the door when workers were not in the area was not I

identified. This was apparently an oversight by either the work group supervisor or the STA.

I Lesson Learned: Any blockage of doors that would prevent them from closing poses potential risks. The door may be required for maintain a pressure boundary such as this one did or it may provide additional fire protection or serve other functions. Do not block doors open if possible.

Remove any blockage as soon as practical. Before l

blocking a door open, assure proper paperwork has been generated to allow the door to be 'olocked.

OPENING IN GRATING SOS 95-0480 NOT TAPED OFF Grating was removed from the Seal Table Flux Map Drive Box Area and the floor opening was taped off with yellow barricade tape. When a floor opening is made, a positive I

barrier such as handrailing needs to be installed. Until the handrailing is installed, red barricade tape must be installed.

NEAR MISS/TWO SOS 95-0699 I

WORKERS INSIDE Near miss. Two workers were found inside the RADIOGRAPHY Radiography Boundary following posting. After BOUNDARY boundaries were set up on the radiography posting plan for the 8949A radiography, Health Physics Personnel noticed flashes from arc welding inside the posted area. Notified Radiography Supervisor by Gaitronics to immediately stop T65.0260.8 5

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

i the radiography and cleared the workers from the area.

Reverified the posted areas to ensure that all personnel had cleared the area. Workers were welding, they stated that they had been in their work area since noon. Discussed the boundary verification with the Radiography Supervisor.

Two personnel verified the boundaries when the postings were placed. One was a Radiographer, one was a Union Electric Health Physics Technician. Following posting the Radiography Supervisor walked the posted area down. The workers were on a scaffold below the 2068 level about 8 feet. Verified with the Radiography Supervisor that no irradiations had been made with personnel inside the posted area.

SUBMARINE REMOVED SOS 95-0801 FROM CAVITY WITHOUT Following the vessel FOSAR, personnel removed a remote HP SURVEY operated submarine from the Reactor cavity without i

notifying Health Physics personnel prior to doing so. This l

resulted in the submarine and cable being removed from the Reactor cavity without Health Physics survey or rinse and wipedown.

The following apply to anyone working with the RCA.

l. Anytime personnel remove items from the Reactor cavity or Spent Fuel pool, Health Physics should be contacted to arrange for support.

2. Removing items from the water without rinse down and survey could result in elevated dose rates or personnel overexposure due to hot particles on the material.

3. Removing items from the water without rise and wipe down could result in elevated contamination levels on the equipment and immediate area.

TEMP. SHIELD SOS 95-0868 SCAFFOLD POLE During RF-7, an Operating Supervisor called to inform HP BLOCKED VALVE that operations removed temporary shielding to operate a valve in the plant. The head EO tried to operate the valve -

which would not open. Shielding was removed to see a scaffold pole interfering with knocker valve.

Health Physics was not contacted to assess dose rates prior to shielding removal and what effect the removal would have on the crew assigned to work on the valve. In this T65.0260.8 6

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS i

SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

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case the shielding removal did not significantly increase dose rates.

j Lessons learned:

1. Personnel that approve and/or build scaffolding must assure the scaffolding is not interfering with the 3

operation or accessibility to plant equipment.

i

2. Personnel are not to remove shielding without contacting HP for an evaluation.

3. Personnel are not to alter scaffolding without contacting the scaffolding coordinator to assure the scaffolding will perform its required function.

l INDIVIDUAL SOS 95-0976 a

CONTAMINATED, DID During RF-7 an activity coordinator in Containment was NOT SEE POSTING asked to find some missing parts. One of the storage boxes j

was already open and the coordinator leaned over and l

moved some of the contents around inside of the box to j

search for the missing items. Unfortunately the box had been in the lower cavity and contained highly contaminated i

equipment, resulting in the coordinator also becoming i

contaminated. The box had been posted on the outside but several things had been piled on top of the posting. When 4

another individual opened the box, he did not see the i

posting and the box was left open.

Lessons learned: Postings are a valuable part of our i

contamination control program. Do not block or obscure any posting.

WORKERS NOT TIED SOS 95-1294 i

OFF -IMPROPER FALL During RF7, there were 32 Trend Only SOS's which l

PROTECTION documented instances of personnel working at heights of 6 feet or greater that were not tied off. This is not consistent with our fall protection program and these workers were at a

l risk of falling. This is a serious safety concem that results in serious injury and death throughout the US.

j Additionally, this is not consistent with the OSHA requirement in 29 CFR 1926.501(b)(1) which states "Each l

employee on a walkway / working surface (horizontal and i

vertical surface) with an unprotected side or edge which is i

6 feet or more above a lower level shall be protected from i

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

falling by the use of guardrail systems, safety net systems, or personal fall arrest systems".

WORKERS NOT SOS 95-1296 WEARING HARD HATS During RF7,there were 33 Trend Only SOS's which

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documented instances of personnel working without using head protection (hard hats). This is not consistent with our head protection program. This is a serious safety concern.

Use of head protection protects workers from the risk of material falling and striking the head, bumping into structural steel, uni-struts and other equipment, and the burns and current associated with an electrical accident.

The number of SOS's involving lack of head protecuon indicates a trend that this is an area where improvement is needed. This SOS is written to document this unfavorable trend to ensure action are taken to significantly reduce or eliminate recurrences of these types of events.

WRENCH FOUND SOS 95-1965 OUTSIDE RCA SHOULD Adjustable wrench designated for radiological controlled NOT HAVE LEFT RCA area (RCA) use was discovered outside of the RCA.

AREA Wrench had been painted designating it as being potentially contaminated.

BEAM CLAMP NOT SOS 95-1981 REMOVED FROM JOB While in Containment to tighten some flange / packing UPON COMPLETION OF leaks, Maintenance personnel noticed that a beam clamp WORK was attached to the structural steel below elevation 2068'-

8". The plant was at power (Mode 1) and all miscellaneous equipment not evaluated for permanent storage in j

Containment was to be removed as part of the Containment close-out. A Containment entry was later made to remove the beam clamp. An in-process tag was found attached to I

the 3-ton adjustable beam clamp. The beam clamp was initially installed by craft during RF-6 and was used during the spectacle flange evolutions for the Containment purge system. It was inadvertently left installed at the end of the i

job, and because ofits location, was missed during several post job inspections and Containment cleanups.

i Lesson Learned: Postjob cleanup is very important to i

assure events such as this do not take place. Unnecessary T65.0260.8 8

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

exposure to maintenance craft was a result of this oversight, as well as a costly engineering evaluation to determine in the beam clamp posed a seismic risk to the plant. (It did not).

PIPING DAMAGED BY SOS 95-2022 DROPPED FLANGE During a routine Containment entry, a dent was noticed in a 10"line. It appears the dent was caused from am impact from an object such as a blank flange (a blank flange similar to what would have caused the dent is located approximately 7' above the dented piping).

Lesson Learned: Be careful to avoid dropping equipment.

Ifit does happen, notify you supervisor to assure an evaluation is promptly made. This could have been a very costly problem to repair.

RADIOLOGICAL SOS 96-0475 POSTING MISSING OR During a short debriefing with the WCNOC NRC Resident OBSCURED FROM VIEW Inspector, the Inspector noted the following Posting discrepancies.

1. The posting surrounding the SEG Frac Tanks outside the RW Building had apparently blown down and could have been crossed inadvertently.

2. There were numerous boxes of RAM adjacent to the Contaminated Area on the FB-2000 level which blocked / obscured the posting such that the posting of the area was not readily apparent.

3. The Contaminated Area posting around the small Contaminated Area on the Waste Gas Recombiner skid was tied off to tubing, thereby promoting a poor practice of securing ropes, etc., to small diameter piping. This could lead to this practice extending to Safety Related tubing.

These items have been corrected and discussed with HPOPS technicians and supervisors This SOS should be sent to training to be incorporated into HPOPS retraining and vendor technician initial and retraining.

CAUSES:

1. The postings in the FB Truck Bay were obscured by plant personnel moving material into the building.

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

Cause was inattention to detail or unfamiliarity with HP Postings.

2. The postings around the Frac tanks was blown down by the wind.

3. The WG recombiner sign was attached to tubing many years ago and personnel did not believe that this was l

not acceptable.

ALL THREE ITEMS INVOLVE ATTENTION TO DETAIL DURING SETUP OR MrNTENANCE OF POSTED N

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r POST ISSUE CA-#937, 94-92 INSPECTION TAGS Craft are responsible upon reviewing materials to show example ofiag determine if a certificate of Verification is attached to the l

SIR. Inform QC when a PIT is required. (Tag notifies holder that a " POST ISSUE INSPECTION" is required.)

f FOREIGN MATERIAL OE 6802 EXCLUSION PROBLEMS Qual Cities Unit 1.(111. across river from Davenport, IA.)

RHR pumps had items found after outage. Wire wheel, l

strip of metal (piece of conduit). Required pump disassembly. ALWAYS cover any open system when not actively working on it. It could be a very expensive fix.

I Pumps have very tight clearances and can become damaged easily!

DEBRIS IN NRC NOTICE 94-57 CONTAINMENT /RHR LaSalle Unit 1 - divers found strainers clogged - hard-hat, SYSTEM coveralls, tygon tubing,3 nuts, piece of duct tape, pieces of l

hose,2x4 wood, flashlight.

River Bend - hammer, grinding wheel, slugging wrench, socket, hose clamp, bolt, nut, step-off pad, ink pens, antenna, scaffold knuckle, rope, used tape. All found in suppression pool.

Quad Cities - as listed above.

All could have affected safe shutdown during a LOCA or other incident. All should have been controlled.

T65.0260.8 10 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SIINDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

TOOL CONTROL SOS 95-0675 POLICY NOT This SOS concerns tool control for the Reactor vessel and FOLLOWED the primary and secondary sides of steam generators for Refuel 7. UE and contractor personnel have been observed violating tool control procedures as follows: Some of these violations seem to be honest mistakes where personnel have taken tools or other metallic articles into posted tool control areas not recognizing the requirements, while i

others have been situations where personnel have violated tool control procedures after having been briefed on the procedures. It seems that the time restrictions imposed by tool control personnel to comply with tool control procedures are undesirable and untimely in the minds of 1

many personnel and activity coordinators, who are very focused on the completion of specific jobs and the completion schedule for those jobs. Examples of some of the occurrences where tool control has been either compromised or violated are:

1. Health Physics personnel have not allowed tool control personnel to observe open secondary handholes on steam generators with remote video monitors positioned for that purpose.

2. Contractor personnel have removed secondary manways from steam generators without tool control personnel being present or monitoring in any way.

i

3. More than one secondary handhole on opposite sides of a steam generator has been opened at a time without the capability of remotely monitoring both openings simultaneously.

4. Health Physics personnel have required the displacement of tool control personnel to areas where activities in tool controlled areas could not be observed, while other personnel were allowed access to perform i

work where tools were taken into tool controlled areas without controls.

5. Health Physics personnel shouted at, physically shoved, and other-wise restricted tool control personnel from their duties ofinforming workers of tool control procedures and logging tools into and out of tool control areas.

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t VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SIINDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

6. Personnel working on the refueling crane repeatedly handed items across the tool control boundary without logging them in with tool control personnel. Even after being confronted and informed by tool control personnel, they continued to violate the procedures necessitating the vigilant observation of each activity and person who crossed the tool control boundary by tool control personnel.

6

7. A supervising engineer requested that tool control procedures be suspended for inspection and repair activities associated with the fuel assembly gripper.

This activity involved a diver taking a bucket full of loose tools into the refueling cavity and other support personnel taking loose tools into the tool control area without tool control procedures being followed. The Tool Control Coordinator discussed the significance of this action with the supervising engineer, and was subsequently requested to suspend tool control activities in the interest of time.

8. A supervising engineer and senior Reactor operator jointly removed an item from the inside of the refueling crane mast and took it outside of the tool control area without logging it out, even after approached by tool control personnel regarding it's accountability.

9. Durmg shift walkdowns of the tool control areas, many items have been found within those areas, in close proximity to the refueling cavity. These items include wire, screws, bolts, nuts, glass, wire lugs, metal shavings, video cord connectors, grease fittings, pipe plugs, welding rod ends, and many soft items such as rope, clear and yellow plastic, plastic wire ties and an abundance of unused red duct tape.

10. Several occurrences involve personnel removing tools from a tool control area that have been logged in, but were not logged out. After an inspection of the tool control area, tool control personnel have located the

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tools outside the area an ' subsequently logged them out. Several logged-in tools are presently unaccounted for in the area. Tool control personnel suspect that they have been brought out of the area without being logged out by the personnel who brought them in.

T65.0260.8 12 Authorized Gateway Customer

I VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SIINDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

(FME) PAPER WIPE SOS 95-0886 l

FOUND IN INSTRUMENT During performance of the ECCS flowbalance, erratic and PORTS unexpectedly high readings were being observed. I&C l

troubleshooting revealed that a paper-like material had become wedged into the low side instrument port of the flanged connection. The engineer observed that the material resembled a white Chemwipe type of material.

The material was removed and flowbalance testing resumed. Erratic readings were again observed later.1 &

C checked all four of the instruments. Paper-like material was found in both the high and low ports for the instruments installed at EMFE0924 and EMFE0925. No paper was found at EMFE0926 or EMFE0927. Following removal of the paper, all readings became stable and flow balance testing was re-initiated.

Possible cause was the introduction of the foreign material after the previous Refuel 6 ECCS flow test. The test results placed the ECCS bit throttle valves at the same positions in RF6 as RF7, once the sensing lines were cleared of the debris. On 4/25/95. I&C did not believe their technicians would have added the material to the sensing lines in their work practices. But they did offer up the possibility that contracted deconners may have done so to preclude any potentially contaminated water in the sensing lines from dripping out.

Lesson Learned: Do not introduce foreign material into piping and/or tubing without following correct FME practices.

CHEWING GUM AND SOS 95-1272 ClGARETTES FOUND IN Chewing gum and cigarettes were found during the Reactor CONTAINMENT Building close-out inspection around the Containment recirculation sumps. The material appeared to have been placed inside the Containment as recently as Refuel seven.

The Callaway Plant policy is clear. Absolutely no eating, drinking, or smoking is allowed in the RCA FOREIGN MATERIAL SOS 95-1398 FOUND IN VALVE Two NRC violations identified. Contrary to the OQAM, the licensee failed to prevent the entry of foreign material into SR systems. Contrary to MDP-ZZ-MH004, a box T65.0260.8 13 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SIINDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - GENERAL (Cont.)

weighing approx. 450 lbs. was moved over the Reactor Vessel. The individual responses to the concerns are being handled by other SOS's. Only the NRC response information should be included in this SOS. Areas around safety rela ted systems were ineffective. Training of plant staff and vendors prior to Refueling Outage 7 was ineffective. Item 1 - The glove was removed from the valve and the foreign material was removed from the sumps. Following the incident involving foreign material in the Containment emergency sumps, the resultant need for improvement in housekeeping and FME was conveyed to plant personnel at daily outage meetings and in the plant newspaper. QA performed a surveillance of housekeeping during the refueling outage to assess effectiveness of the FME Program. An extensive cleanup of Containment was conducted prior to startup. A multi-discipline task team has been formed to identify actions to guard against introduction of foreign objects into plant systems. FME requirements and expectations will be reviewed at an Outage Review Board meeting prior to Refuel 8. The Activity Coordinator checklist utilized for ORB presentations contains an item for FME/ housekeeping to ensure that Activity Coordinators factor this concern into their preplanning and preparations.

EATINGIDRINKINGl SOS 93-1849 SMOKING ISSUES Policy needs to be clear. If not specifically told you can, you cannot!. Plant is not posted for NO SMOKING. This is not allowed inside most buildings. FCI will cover their policies with the craft 1

ACCESS TO RCA HAS You will need RWP AND WR number. You will need to CHANGED!

know them, there may not be anyone other than a clerk there to help you.

T65.0260.8 14 Authorized Gateway Customer f

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1 VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - ELECTRICIANS SOS 93-1566 (INCLUDE This involved problems with WPA, communications, and SEGR 9311-001) attention to detail involving live electrical circuits.

Have electricians read /SEG A CMP was being worked by FCI Craft. The job included HPES revien of the event.

protection involving a " HOLD OFF" and a " LOCAL CONTROL". The craft may not have been as familiar with the differences in the protection each of these provide. The Work Document did not reference the Local Control and it was not hung at the start of thejob.

Lessons learned include: Know how you are being protected (tags are different and provide different ways to protect you.) Check your protection, don't assume the pr'otection is OK.

UNSAFE WORK Some practices were witnessed during RF-6 that need to be PRACTICES addressed with Electricians coming in for Refueling SOS 93-2109 Outages. Due to the high voltages on site, sometimes special precautions need to take place. Examples provided are the following: Using a high voltage hot stick bare handed (should have used H.V. Gloves). High voltage gloves were used without the LEATHERS' that go along j

with them. Installing grounds on a 345 kv line bare handed I

instead of using a " hot stick".

Other basic safety practices when working around 4 kv or higher voltages are the following:

ENTERING WRONG During a Refueling outage at another plant, an Electric BREAKER CUBICLE Maintenance Technician mistakenly entered a breaker SEGR 92-01-008 cubicle that contained energized stabs from one of the station transformers. The electrician contacted the stabs causing severe burns.

During an outage, the breakers can always contain i

energized parts. This may be due to backfeed or how the protection was arranged on the breaker. You need to know what is energized and what has the potential to be energized!

WRONG TERMINATION While performing a breaker changeout the QC Inspector LUGS USED discovered Amp type lugs installed on the leads for this SOS 95-0715 breaker that were crimped on with a Burndy crimper.

4 These Amp lugs look similar to the Burndy lugs and if used in safety-related applications could have been crimped T65.0260.8 15 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SIINDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - ELECTRICIANS (Cont.)

with a Burndy crimper in error. At this time the only lug qualified for general use in the plant per E-21013 is the Burndy lug. The misuse of these lugs was a direct result of the similarity of the two brands. Except for minor differences in the shank dimensions, the lugs appear identical. Crimper to be a secure termination. It is recommended by Nuclear Engineering that the Amp lugs be used only on applications that require Amp lugs to maintain equipment qualification, and that the proper crimper be used. Burndy lugs should be used for typical plant terminations. MCS description has been changed to inform the user that Amp lugs are not to be used "for various plant splicing".

Lesson Learned: Make sure the parts you are about to install are what is called for. Compare with what is being removed. Contact your supervisor with any questions.

LIGHTING BALLAST'S Investigation by Radwaste and Engineering personnel FOUND CONTAINING determined some ballast in the DIC office building to PCB'S contain PCB's. Input from UE corporate personnel on SOS 96-0695 6/5/96 indicated that fluorescent ballast manufactured prior to 1980 contain PCB's and should be disposed of as PCB waste. It further stated that if a ballast is not labeled "No PCB's", it is to be assumed to contain PCB's. A dedicated collection container for PCB ballast has been located in the OMF electrical shop T65.0260.8 16 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SIINDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - CARPENTERS CRUSHED SCAFFOLD The Genie scaffolding erected in AREA 5 uses fiberglass TUBES tubes. When bracing the scaffolding with steel tubes, the SOS 93-1894 clamps were tightened too tight, resulting in damage to the fiberglass sections. Do not tighten so tight that damage could result!

CA #937,94-104, SCAF.

Callaway now has a Scaffold Permit system that is a PERMIT planning / tracking method utilizing the CPROD application on the mainframe computer.

This system will link erection and removal of plant scaffolding with the WORK REQUEST system used at Callaway, although the permit may be " stand alone".

Personnel needing to use this system will be provided training on the application.

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1 VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - PAINTERS SOS 94-0583 PERMIT NOT PROPERLY A contractor working on a circulating water pump OBTAINED informed Chemistry personnel that painting would take SOS 95-0253 place during the motor overhaul. Permit numbers were issued, but placed on hold until the paint cold be placed in the hazardous material program. Due to miscommunications, the vendor proceeded to paint without the area being posted and having a valid permit. Workers were exposed to unknown levels of Xylene.

Lesson Learned: Posted permits are required for painting.

Communications must be made with all parties involved in this type of activity to assure a safe environment is maintained.

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1 T65.0260.8 18 Authorized Gateway Customer

8 VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SIINDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - PIPEFITTERS SOS 93-1420 HP NOT CONTACTED During Refuel 7, an individual was using a bandsaw to cut

.g WHEN CUTTING PIPE into a pipe in the RCA. The craftsman received g

SOS 95-0669 contamination in the form of a hot particle (3000 NCPM) above his right eye.

.g The RWP he was working under requires HP notification 3

prior to the use of power tools on this work. HP was not contacted and no precautions were taken prior to breaching the system.

I Lesson Learned: Know the system you are about to breach. Before making a cut, assure your RWP allows for I

this evolution and if not, make the proper notifications. HP will make the needed evaluations to assure your chances of being contaminated are minimized or eliminated. Ask questions, if you are not sure of what you are doing.

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SOSM - OPERATORS 1

SOS 93-1778 FORKTRUCK USED TO While moving boxes of radioactive material from the LIFT OVERWElGiff radioactive material storage area in the DIC warehouse, it OBJECT OVER GATE was noticed that the gate to the radioactive materials SOS 95-1895 storage area is not wide enough to allow same of the larger boxes to pass through. If this activity is within the operating limits of the forklin, then this would not be considered to be a safety concern, as long as we follow the manufacturer's recommendations. The box was listed as weighing 7200 lbs. A 7000 lb fork lift was used. The box contained power packs for the outage. The forklift weight limit is 7000 lbs at 12 feet. The forklift was stable during j

this lift, but was overloaded by 200 lbs. This was a safe lift as far as stability was concerned, but could have damaged the forktruck. An RFR has been submitted to evaluate changing to width of the gate.

RADIOACTIVE BOXES A delivery to return thrt.e LSA boxes from Long-term DROPPED FROM TRUCK Radioactive Material Storage resulted in dropping a box SOS 95-2148 from the truck. A stakebed truck was used with the stakes removed from the passenger side. The stakes were removed to facilitate loading the box and were not replaced for transport. One of the three boxes has wheels, which were locked on two points. The load ws.s planned to pin the wheeled box in an area boundaried by a larger skid bottomed box to the rear and to the passenger side. The stakes barricaded the driver side. The box shifted during transport to the front and then to the passenger side to fall from the truck. When the box fell the lid sprung and part of the contents were exposed.

Lesson Learned: Failure to secure RAM loads is a recurring problem. You need to tie down loads even for what appears to be a short transport.

T65.0260.8 20 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - WELDERS SOS 93-1617 INPO OE 6633 WELDING While performing welding oflug to pipe on WR# C558300 VERIFICATIONS NOT (FW01), the welder did not record the welder ID and Filler MADE Material Issue Slip numbers on the weld control record.

SOS 95-0633 Also, the welder did not obtain Pre-weld verifications by QC prior to welding out FW01 on the weld control record.

When asked why this occurred, the welder stated that he did not realize that he needed to obtain these verifications.

He thought that a final visual was all that was required.

j The weld control record was in the package at the time of welding operations, and the Hanger Special Instruction Sheet stated " weld lug (Item 5) to pipe using attached Weld Control Record: Use FW01.

"IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN: The welding engineer (Bruce Newton) was contacted to advise of this situr. tion.

The welder foreman (Tim Murphy) and general foreman (Mark Fohey) were notified and the welder was pulled off of welding on WR# C558300 and any other welding activities until this SOS is dispositioned. The welding supervising engineer (Dave Hollabaugh) and pipe fitter superintendent (Jamie Linder) were notified of the problem.

T65.0260.8 21 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - INSULATORS INSULATION AROUND An unplanned entry into Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 was made due I

STEAM TRAP to a steam trap not working properly. Upon investigation, SOS 94-1232 it was determined that the trap had been insulated, along I

with the associated piping. After removal of the insulation, the strap started functioning properly. The high level alarm annunciator cleared and the system was declared operable.

I Lesson Learned: Be careful to note the location of removed insulation to help determine proper placement.

Plant drawings should be used as necessary to assure proper placement.

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VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SIINDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - RIGGING & LIFTING / CRANE OPERATORS DROPPED LOAD - JIB This SOS documents the failure of the pressurizerjib crane CRANE IN wire cable while in the process oflifting a steam cleaner CONTAINMENT from the Reactor Building 2047 level to the 2068 level.

SOS 95-0410 Tbc lift was straight vertical, although two ropes were attached to guide the lift After several short jogs, the steam cleaner was about 3-1/2 feet above the 2047 level.

As the operator then started to raise, the cable parted and the load fell. Prior to the failure of the wire rope, the operator noted it was winding correctly on the drum.

Engineering investigated this event for Root Cause. The following data was found from a~ field investigation:

1. The Cable showed marks which implied rubbing.

2. The hoist drum, block and general cable condition were good.

3. Rub marks were apparent along the grating support beam at Elevation 2068.

4. The cable break / fray location appeared crushed and flattened.

5. The break location, combined with the height of the load and sling length, is consistent with the block being near or against the grating support beam, which showed rub marks.

The conclusion of these fLidings is the break occurred because the block caught on the grating support beam and crimped the cable as it tried to rotate. The off set load combined with the cable crimping caused the failure in the cable.

Lesson Leamed: Jib cranes of this type are designed and rated using vertical pulls (within 5 degrees) and with static loading. Contact with an object restricting free movement of the wire rope cable can result in sudden failures. We were lucky no one was hurt!

BOX MOVED OVER RX A box was inadvertently moved over the Reactor vessel by VESSEL IN VIOLATION the polar crane while the vessel was open and contained OF PROCEDURE about 21 fuel assemblies. The box was essentially empty SOS 95-0803 with only packing materials in the box. This is in violation of MDP-ZZ-MH004, Control of Heavy Loads and Special Lifting Devices, Attachment 1, Heavy / light loads with the internals removed (fuel in the vessel).

T65.0260.8 23 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - RIGGING & LIFTING / CRANE OPERATORS (Cont.)

This was the first box moved by this polar crane operator since fuel was returned to the vessel. He had moved many boxes in the last several days with no fuel in the cavity, therefore no restrictions on load paths existed. The Containment coordinator immediately redirected the polar crane operator and reminded him of the safe load path requirements with fuel in the vessel. The operator was 5 ery familiar with these requirements and simply forgot.

The FCI operator has worked every outage since 1989 arcf is one of the most experienced FCI operators. He had not made any picks since fuel reload had began and simply lost track of the plant conditions that prohibited his action The lesson plan for polar crane operators will be revised to include this SOS. This item was discussed with Bob Rehmeier. The polar crane operators will be instructed by their supervision and training to contact the Containment Coordinator upon entry into Containment and prior to traversing a load over an open vessel. This action will confirm current status of refueling operations. This training will be completed by October 10,1996. This item was discussed with Bob Rehmeier.

OBJECT DROPPED IN During Refuel Outage 7, craft personnel were removing CONTAINMENT WHILE materials used in chemical cleaning of the Steam BEING LIFTED Generators from thejobsite in Containment. The SOS 95-0891 equipment was being lifted using slings and a chainfall.

One of the steel members ( ~ 6 ft. long and weighing ~

350lbs.) was dropped and fell approximately 50 feet and landed on a lower platform. During the fall, observers at the scene believe that the structure may have hit plant equipment and structural supports. More importantly, there were individuals working in the vicinity who may have been seriously injured had they been struck by the falling object CAUSE: The worker operating the chainfall lost sight of the choker contact point as the load was being lowered.

The choker caught on a piece of scaffold, the steal tube slipped out of the choker and fell.

Lessons Learned:

T65.0260.8 24 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - RIGGING & LIFTING / CRANE OPERATORS (Cont.)

1. When losing sight of a load, the operator must stop until he has regained sight of the load or he takes signals from someone that is maintaining eye contact with the load.

2. Double wrapping a choker can greatly decrease the chances of an object slipping out of the sling.

3. Personnel must be cleared from underneath a load being lifted.

I T65.0260.8 25 Authorized Gateway Customer

l VENDOR TRAINING SOS'SilNDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - WORK COORDINATORS /CSO STAFF DNR NOT 140TIFIED During a walkdown of plant areas, it was discovered that WHEN DIESEL ENGINES two 450 HP diesel engines to be used to power pumps for USED ON SITE pressurization of water to clean the main condenser were SOS 95-0879 on site. No notification to Mo. DNR had been sent describing the use of these pumps per state requirements.

UE is required to notify the DNR of the operation of this type of diesel engine prior to use.

POOR ACCESS TO RX On April 17, I&C was given a WR to work the HEAD / POOR thermocouples on top of the Reactor head. The cavity PREPLANNING coordinator was notified that access to the head was SOS 95-0912 required. Upon arriving at the entrance to the cavity, we were put on hold until Operations could vent the head for mid loop. We discussed with Ops our concerns about the

" gang plank" across the Rx cavity to the Rx head. A piece of aluminum scaffolding platform with the hooks at each end had been laid across the chasm. This platform was not tied off at either end, with no handrails or cable tie-off and was extremely unstable. Upon crossing the gang plank, you had to scale the visqueen erected to protect the Rx head while spraying the cavity. This put you in an awkward and unsafe position. After further discussion with O.S., E. Stewart, it was decided that this platform was indeed unsafe and arrangements were made to use the manbasket with the polar crane. Upon finishing the job, the polar crane was unavailable. Whereupon a laborer was sent with two retractable safety lanyards which were attached to the safety cable along the cavity wall. He then crossed the platform and had us attach the lanyards to our safety belts whereupon we were led across the abyss to safety. At the very least these retractable lanyards shtmid have been in place prior to the job. Realistically, a.nuch safer platform with appropriate handrails should have been installed. Hopefully any future outages will address this concern more appropriately.

This SOS to look at including the following things into the appropriate outage retraining in the future: 1) The inappropriate use of a plank without handrails or mid-rails and not secured in place, and 2) the inappropriate use of the retractable lanyards.

T65.0260.8 26 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TnAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS SOS's - WORK COORDINATORS /CSO STAFF (Cont.)

INDIVIDUALS Recommend the establishment of a site wide guideline on RESPONSIBILITIES FOR length of time to stay in Containment. We view the CONTAINMENT STAY employee as being the focal point of our industrial safety TIMES program, with selfidentification and awareness, and SOS 951937 individual responsibility for one's own safety as being the first line of defense. Heat stress is not unlike other safety hazards which must be recognized and dealt with based upon the specific circumstances at the time. In it is recommended that heat stress information continue to be covered with plant personnel prior to major outages to ensure personnel are aware of the options available to them, as well as the symptoms caused by heat stress. This SOS will be assigned to the Training department to ensure heat stress related information is placed in pre-outage training.

This SOS is in routing for CDF and has been identified as a priority 1 item for T68.1200.6. It has been reviewed for GET badging and does not affect these courses.

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T65.0260.8 27 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/ INDUSTRY EVENTS REVIEW QUESTIONS I

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1. WPA must be signed on be every worker involved with each job. True or False?

False. But the worker is responsible to assure his l

supenisor or other qualified person is signed on I

the protection for the job he is working.

2. When unloading material from a vehicle, who is I

responsible for assuring it is loaded properly, the person loading or the person unloading?

Both are responsible.

3. Tools may be leR on ScatTolding platforms aRerjob completion ifit is to keep them up, out of the way. True or False?

l 4.

It is permissable to prop doors open in the RCA. True or False False -- Most doors in the RCA are a barrier of some l

son. Permission will have to be obtained and a tirewatch will mormally have to be assigned to the area.

5. Beam clamps may be left on thejob upon job completion ifit is securely fastened to a plant structure.

True or False False -- It could pose a seismic risk and must be removed at the completion of thejob.

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l T65.0260.8 28 Authorized Gateway Customer

VENDOR TRAINING SOS'S/lNDUSTRY EVENTS i

REFERENCES As noted in lesson plan.

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l Full length bobbin coil 100% in 2 S/G's

~300 tubes in 2 S/G RPC, concentrated in sludge pile and by most susceptible heat numbers

+ Refuel 7 expanded to 100% MA600 tubing

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CALLAWAY STEAM GENERATOR TUBE PLUGGING STATUS OD ID OD ID Unknown OD Inspection AVB Cire Cire Axial Axial Axial Volumetric Period Wear UDI MBM Crack Crack Crack Crack Crack Indication Other Total Preservice 1

24 25 Refuel 1 0

Spring 87 5

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13 Refuel 4 22 22 Refuel 5 29 1

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AVB Wear: Anti-Vibration Bar Wear UDI:

Undefined Defect Indication MBM:

Manufacturer's Burnish Mark

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~ ~ ~ ~ ~ NUMBER OFPERSONNEL = Ap q A w A Mi4 Fuel Handling !prmanL =af 2-3 Union Electric management per shift ta i !L3%y=# 10-12 Master-Lee contract personnel per shift 7 ,w w Y i 1 refuel machine vendor rep per shift &:.: g S ' S. ; hi~ + Headwork wl 15 Master-Lee contract personnel per shift fflj 5 Union Electric management oversight per !P shift m1 h$0 ma

a DURATION ...e ......,........ +. ..s, s.. 4,: - y n fE;w4 Fuel Handling [ Offload - scheduled 44 hours Reload - scheduled 48 hours J + Headwork e ? Disassembly-2-1/2 days Reassembly - 3 days Guide funnel welding - 3 days

REGULATORYISSUES s l' lg.' 47 [$ pvar~}g Fuel Handling [ Drag testing of high burn-up RCCAs. Scope of I testing under discussion with hRC. l + Headwork Head penetration guide funnels will be welded in place as a precautionary measure based on information contained in Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter 94-002 and Information Notice 94-40. l

ALARA

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..-...........~.,.........,....~.,..~..........,....>...-.>.~..r .......,..e ....... -.,. s s. h@ h5ff -F 3-w Headwork tri 8.0 Man Rem goal for headwork 2.0 Man Rem goal for guide funnel welding (robotic) w M Xote: Refuel 5 headwork = 24.4 Man Rem Refuel 6 headwork = 17.2 Man Rem Refuel 7 headwork = 8.05 Man Rem i i

X. s k r S o C s-w Ro n l b r l a ood r jr n i .s f d e a o e. e p un m l ia s o e t c R e s,e d nd n a oioy t t t d) M ai e v c uia e 0 df c u i 2 edh n g y s og i nl omu e d o t i t n d l t r a nn o m ah s i o ni sl t (c a x npt c I o o ,e gupf I r i t A l e p c n p uind e n al R uA di e a e e 5 A F rl u T,. Rt cf }} . y. p1 ^. . Ea1g,f3[i 4$

s. c ir t s yc g e n bl i f dE e e n r i t c o b ui d n b nU o od j-s. c e n r r a p a ns o r t i o mt n e a o w g s n it i i ncd d i i f r l i o da d c o G npe c n 1 a s y i L^ I t s i yi I v s aiO N i l d e cR h t I u1 aS T A F R. T. hh ' = kA* gh . hB[ii[b, r u

TS4INING (continued) ~ x em fp, r!**awq! Headwork [ 4 day specific training (formal lesson plans) i} conducted by activity coordinators s1 - This covers all aspects of headwork disassembly and y reassembly - Mock-up training for several areas (CETNAs, stud hole plugs, stud turning, cavity seal, etc.)

LESSONS LEARNED gn...........,....,..........,,....................... t bMi 'Esib 7:4 ; M !! La? ! Headwork y i [ Increased UE oversight and pre-job briefing / 3 [ training for higher risk evolutions such as: - CETNAs, bulletnose installations a - Cleanliness of O-ring seating surfaces a B} - Reactor vessel closure stud handling + Fuel Handling i Improved equipment reliability 24 hour coverage by refuel machine vendor

FOREIGNMATERIAL - EXCLUSION ~ .i5..* ,i,ii,,.,n.. i,-... ' 's ci I'[..,.,, ., '...i ' 'i.. .,%i- - ' - ' < N P a5 < g - < - -a i- -- ' '-' ..-=ii,. iE2;. f ll 4 *id Refuel Cavity t [ Pre-engineered lanyarded tools staged in area r' Covers made for CRDM duct openings a 1 Debris seals to be installed around CETKA e i bulletnoses Nylon housekeeping cover to be installed over upper cavity when no activities scheduled after fuel offload

? ( t %b cn 4 N, 2 "M r a 4 l b 3 e b4 43 Cl$ 2 E O 4 0 Mg Ng Omo 9 3 C t C W t T 4

l ^ s t l L, o b -+ e g n a l s f l a n n oi n i a r t t e n a m t +? e c n d i i mf n d i t p e d a l n c o o m a s e mlt f m u l t s o p n p od t I e e l b r o uS n c e t n ms b gt I o a s il a n t p e l ^: l a e ih 3 c e o c a n n s t e r ui T pl ol r a owV c p e v s a t r e h d n e o r n g l i i e a s r nla c nS p t 2 c o pi mrn e a r C m a t sl e E e o V u r u u1 p t P MP T# r nT P e I O D C: ' d S = ) , $i ap j l!

S{' OPE (continued)

n -

!gi ning

;; a._

:tiegg}l 'A' reactor coolant Pump i seJi..

Inspect #1 seal housing for leaks. s [ If there is no evidence ofleakage, the seal g ring bolts will be replaced with studs in i RefuelIX with pump internals '[r replacement. m 'E i

MANNING ~ 3: gi <x.<

• e

+-x yy e r jrt?11

Management by Nuclear Engineering n

[ Westinghouse performing pump swap i i Lnion Electric craft performing pump seal and I/C work x e* + Total management, contractor, and craft persons assigned is 57

oi o o r-DURATION m

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~> > t_ +Jr .ada 1

e'

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x diL! ? (:1FAP Pump internals s 36 hours during the 50 hour drain down [ Currently expected to start on 10/20/96 ~ u... n e + Motor changeout 195 hours Start scheduled for 10/16/96

I 1;ll1ll li lIil a p a w + s s la + t n r t e ne n m i p e m v o Y u p m T g n u le E ir f F u g d n A i d r = e u S d d a R o ro n l A t a f o E w f o m L e P ro C C C R Ua M N =. L' b s

3pi

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t

I1 l' sr e k I r S o w I l d a n v yr a o a ms la s e e g v g r c n o u g ei m l l n nd pi n n e t r d ua l l o s e fh b o l a gi s n nh r rl s o a a r i f e d d e n t l n .ie n s l r i a r c e h e t t n r d v ni s o ni et f e a d mo r .n t sa h s c nh A r i i d r a g ~. e yl t t n ma e c ni R r i e o ur a ph A C S S E Cd l L + + A ha/ y

1 j,

, ar 1 s ,jei

u A[ ARA (continued)

a 7,.

[dia 148 je , Conversion to studs from bolts ll RCS clean-up I Estimate 4 Man Rem for motor work sa + Estimate 5 Man Rem for pump work 1 + Estimate 12 Rem / hour for contact on the pump internals 1

LESSONS LEARNED !!l% ^,4! ^ ~ ^~ ~ ~ " ~ ' ^ ~ ~ ~

$6

~ ~ p *% 4! M!!) Seabrook observed ~ t [ Sequence of activities [ Job scope Laydown problems lj Extensive coordination required l + Observed Vogtle internals replacement Pre-refuel preparation Pump rigging Incomplete draining of CCW Procedure problems with main flange bolt x

TRAINING -( . a4 .hs$[f...!Ik. fh.Y' CSO training matrix [ Pump internals crew training M.otor training for electricians + RCP mock-up training for seal 4 removal / replacement

FOREIGNMATERIALS EXCLUSION n, g, . ::c: a lii:L4 FME covers on new internals i Shield plug will act as FME cover VT-3 and FOSAR will inspect internals for foreign material + Pre-job brief/ training

%b N o @4 s5 O B "g O g o-E 4 Wo js O ~ m 1-3 Cu

8, 8, ~ 8 s r e t a s e nh o e i ~. t r c r e o p t s s a n r r r a o e +. i t g p a n m r e e r o v s e e a t nh s, l o a e t c s r v r e E P u g x y e s L mt s nt C P

r a

i i a e o a e H B O T MMHE tS C$ + + + +,, N cIs.4 i S. f p c . n _+ y Qal$ j; s [ i j yd g ! a ;

s l e n no sr e e c p n a ro n t e c t t a n n r e it a n m Mco t e c g a t a r nd t a n n a nl a o P mc t c n i e g c t ni n m2 r i t a e0 r c l e t g1 G e l e A a s N i e ad nE ni I gl r n a a me N E e nl g r n a n a t i N UGC T a E e r o ss A M4. M,? + i i ._&n~V 3 jl sin

y a y d a / d s / r s s u r y o u a h o d h 0 5 2 0 2 2 d ro nd f a n a d s e y s l a y u d a d d e 7 6 h k c r h s o ta y wpl N tn h l t a e 0 pi r a c r 1 l i t u 1 a r c c c k A i n-r t o ir o R C N W U,

ao trM D

?

,; xj .li[B 4

i LESSONS LEARNED a ..e. ,mm ld s s lEi$5eDove tail inspections, expect to find 2 or 3 l i minor cracks i l Key way inspections, expect to find no cracks g + Overhead crane inspection and PMs completed

I -l M a e C 3 .sd n g 'A. m %g% O a y o 4 alQ,, ~ _ - - - - -

l r. I H s. E V B s U T L T N E r e E R Mt s U E i T E e F A C m EA n E e H L h P c R EE e Y RR u UE K A S L W W S D E R N n e A PU K L W B L O s. L s. 1 dr% , Ip sy r-s'+ s2 se s A, , ~,, s' I, 7 e E 1

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Cl et d ri m 2 ne n m d uv u nb oe E a e rh P Abumf pt O m 2 t

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Ca saS d i S ag gr; ;,lEli g-e f

\\ l r P -sx m e l p g o n i e t L p r o s 5 p K 6 p N l u y s N m;. e s t r a e O m e n S x i i o g R r n K p E pa c P ir e t m z c F i e s l O w E e nt R r oc c i e K r nj o Uro R dn e p M h e ve i U, V Ft m a$ N, J b f i;y st s i ; ! [ S[

lllll 69 f =_ 9 o 1 sy 0 a 2 d re 0 b 2 m t s e r t if p e s i S k s r n o ig w e f b o k n ro o N w itr O e o I g pl e a l u T t af u c e A o i r t e i r r e R h P Ct U, h!A D h) [i ' ~ n - 2M ,[E[aPtN f-p y i$ ) r p

REGULATORY / NUCLEAR ^ SAFETY /ALARA ISSUES a wn

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!pMJ ) There are no concerns associated with this i; i 1 [ ! Project. a b q

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cn a N r + 3 k e X Y a 4 4 e, .n Q l_ N 9 M [f b i a 2 L-1 4 i O f/. y -2s o .m

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,\\ ': i,i e ', \\ ;, ',, ; L,,, j j chs g.,'c *1? ' p z ' : v <llA ' "}f d n; y> V y, a. &g, ^3>: N', }' 'V, ~, ~,: <cpr> 5

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,+' - >> m, <, ;,.,, >,g<' hs ' 3 h,c ~ :., / : ~ s< 7,,,,, y ~ >n g ,,, ~, -, 4 ><,y', .c,,. q,,,4 ' v [^ j' 1s',3) ',s $ c e }'rijft $M l, * ' .~~,. },,;,s.J , ',,.,, ;' ' '._,, u, _wn._,,,n-w, ' - ,_.7,, _ ,o ,,,, u y? 'y ;- j', j.,]flgg :'j'l;'_ & a,,,,ga.a,,kj_Ql,QQ n, ' ' ' JLs n>'- ,p 'l e,, c, ,, s,, h . w '",' ,... <,u ~.., 3 2 _.7.u

A,mNew 0 eratin& Methods 1 P j-PVJDMe>JiisniE _ CIF im a a s-ta n ^ M n e:i % x essams; 4%% Men

• 312: aserse<!aahee:vw m:'-

's 2.iuia s ' mm m:s Ett.t -I$$ !&E o v%,..c ,.sw m# sir % w & s itggg,n Team Obj.ective:

• y A&E:$3?,

s

en fss=wa_ne_s_sFind safe and efficient operating

_PO fnf3 methods which will enhance plant lJ[R $a] operating techniques and reduce y4 outage critical path time. a.I /s I \\ s t

l 1 l qTASK TEAM 1 s

s is s

-) s ![iJJ Team was formed in October,1995, 1 w: ;e m@ E @: a sponsored by the Plant Manager, with a m;W members from Operations (3), Outages, i M m !M Chemistry (2), Training, Systems its Lsp Engineering (3), Licensing, Safety nEs Analysis, and Quality Assurance. a a N k' v< 1

q L'm

'! Team Recommendations ' ~ ,d i ~ o ai . ; awa=, a== amamu.

m wawscaw a=ma

m

=

== ~l ' bc] N+ t,,,. -y,,g~ plant operations:[ Eliminate Reac - >, - w gag w e ,~ yp,> ':,~

!; V:' C Eliminates t:ae necessity to maintain solic. plant aw;

[yp pressure control while performing the Mode 5 ~,e heatup anc cooldown. '@;2 Eliminates the necessity of starting reactor coolant pumps while so..ic.. Rec uces iquic. waste by two pressurizer ~ i:3 volumes (29,000 gallons). (continued) v/ w L

\\ Team Recommendations s

i

s w=uwa,,, u a za,= a nam, a naunwen mw

=n' - m [' p% ,'? J + Eliminate reactor coolant system solid lant P m ' ' ^ "l ^ ',, '/ g p ',, y, ^ '. x Av s - %g operations (continuedj: n-aem 4 af Requires ac.c.itional contro.s and coordination %c~ iJyfj to ensure effective degasification. !@aa Requires the use of Auxiliary Spray for heatup i Y: - and cooldown Pressure control. t.- w N m

l iTeam Recommendations a . -u n w ww w = m,= a nna ma.

__ =

aa e m

',. 1

,O;:::3 Enhance operating procedures to eliminate m[ M S RHR operation above 250 F and minimize op z %]l} 5 operating time above 200 F: 1 3,7 ]l K,u Reduce the effect of the thermal cycle when placing RHR in a cooldown mode. ,e !fT Eliminate the need to cooldown and vent the RHR v& q system prior to placing it in an ECCS injection lineup. e, Requires condenser vacuum and steam dumps available ( in Modes 4 and 5 for reactor coolant temperature >l control.

• )

v. 'bb

,1 a 1 ) Team Recommendations s om, em - ,m ;mamms meu. m, m ~m m m + 1 is $s1 1 3; - ',s g K=f,;;) Format General Operating Procedures to spigg include a flow chart that is easily adapted to m~C individual outa8e re9uirements: T dim mym =- * = L t e w/>s l Nai 5 h c0<' ', [alM Assist the plant staffin maintaining the " Big , w gm Picture" and look ahead to ensure preparations j are made to adequately support the evolution. y~ ^-

e\\ Team Recommendations MQ -w 1 5bbY$ihN!50U5'h b4hNiv)NNN,5h E bsh / Y)hhEN /i!h.hkbikhkhh!h MNbSESNh!: Yhh!$h hk5$18'v h[h)$ )NN5 $ E'EY ENNSNE $$EL EN$'b>b'1 !$2') 'o ) ^ t / a e eu y s s q L-* b):N ,g s3 $, { ;N, Review surveillances for performance m; a amec> durm. ( ) , c, ,e g moc e descending,, m. stead of n, c'> m: a va s mode ascension,,: na :: w w t, 5 : - ~ I ~ 'I s c.,:a 't ^'s >'s r %n:-2: ts Provic.e for better equalization of Control ng" la, - Room activities. 1 s / v4> + .4 N

• r Y,

s

r,

L

~ j l 1 / JTeam Recommendations 1 s 1 " GLEN x,,- du?Zniweixas; ussli>mfiaWis,JMW %MBL msa is: 3,2eIsmsM%#L > MsisG21ses CF" W 963 GM 431' Q M3 1 l' i t .,s j ' c 4 Change methodology of Secondary Plant . f.' - g ',, ", ( 1 g'g;'ga steam drain operation ::o conserve primary ng; j - rg;5_3. heat. m [ c:v~55 ' > is' ~ J i L::i' 3,:: '> h 6: Provides for more heat to support steam [7, generator blowc.own anc main turbine warming i activities. h~1

a

, 'l + s 'l 4% ~ 1 ', sek.dwe

f /ResultingActions m_.. _ m_ N? ,~ ^' !} ( 1 w. ~g Procedure revisions with supporting Requests for ! M,~ m? $ e

j w!Wi Resolution, Safety Analysis, and FSAR change i3%

'l

k%MW^"#9notices were presented to the On-Site Review d?

y;w; committee (ORC) in June: < a gi [' 'j i s, 7 ORC requested Quality Assurance perform an lj[y independent in-depth review of all procedures and Of supporting documentation, completed 8/22/96.

j ORC requested an independent outside review of the procedures controlling reactor coolant system p

degasification, completed 9/23/96. Q Final ORC approval is expected 9/26/96. mb

i r [ ;}Resulting Actions ~ _. _. = ?l y'$ 3 i t',t . ?2 <, !E ? 4 Procedures were presented to all y;am lfsE?$ Operations, Chemistry, and Radwaste nww y,ig;g personnel. Alllicensed operations personnel n Qg will have performed the new procedures in i, the simulator by 9/27/96. .E5 Comments for improvement will be q 1mp. emented and reviewed with final procedure il approval and issue 10/6/96. '? e / A

2ls

aMajor Changes To General / ::) Operating Procedures $2 $k 's! ~ i ~ ~' l (G

~

M+.,e,3, Xo solid plant operations: h'k"; $zh !!!?6;].'> f;gyV'1':S:autc own - vent hydrogen to the pressure relief 9fs w : :au E 0fst tani and collapse the pressurizer bubble using L;vwm aux spray for cooling and m.trogen purge to j%jj i; g3l maintain positive pressure during collapse. [j# y,g^v. Startup - establish pressurizer bu able at the

1. g in rjj completion of vacuum fill.

,r: p, 0

_ m

Major Changes To General

-%aOperating Procedures ,= ., a: smn xx m,~ vse mwnu wzsxxxmuanze taumammm ' ^ mm aw= nr2 7

d j 1-mh Reduced NPSH requirements for RCPs to 250 psig.

s;iRlg.skL (Allow RCP operation utilizing aux spray.) ow l[ ' M Use of steam dumps for RCS cooldown to <120 F. a -, m l[q y/e;; (Support operating RHR at reduced temperature.) iw[M + Use of aux spray for pressurizer cooldown and RCS [$ pressure control. (Supports effective RCS degasification.) , um 6[ nh + Remove RHR from service prior to exceeding 205 F i;) during RCS heatup. (Eliminates requirement for forced hl; cooldown of RHR train prior to ECCS lineup.) J + Place RHR in service at less than 250 F cooling down. l;1 (Reduces effect of thermal cycle.) l

+

' :4 A

Major Changes To General

• il Operating Procedures

= ,~, -,~,,na m n, =, a waa = w,,u u a x,,uawa a,. m a n.,x a s m, a ,w - =w. ~ um . b C) x !)[ I s emf No RCS cynamic vent requirements and only e. static vent. (Eliminates RCP starts while solid for . h,,,+,,, s ;

f if RCS venting.)

y xm:s jI_ f "+ Rec.ucec. su acoo. ing requirements from 100 F to t h, me 50 F for heatup and cooldown. eh t i: ~,

lisi,

+ Secure CRDM cooling fans at 200 F (allow start pw": of head c.isassembly sooner). Y rl , p; bE

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ' ~ ^t si a a %h 4 i a W H l N W D mg g $)

4 7

g 4 </ w j n cn M g x 8 D b a 1* sx W m V,:lhe ' 5b Mis???ggggy-g**, > s + m , e <,3 'el ; ? ' !-$l,#'* ',,,,:,, ^ >- ,g 's,, y ,,,y 7 j L{3)' 'g ^'d,"r> r 'O.& , 5 { '<; j q,,@J~ Fi , y~ :., b ':'l c s g u,'^%~<j;syy l',9+t 9 ~<s' s L , ',,, u < ; M, > c J 'n ,, ~ r, $ 'E ',f', j>f,, <L ' v, w,, ' s, aQ M ,4 ~ ,'a ,,, a.' a'.'ss: 6!,-.bu,,,i]*d> l A A, +: e:~ , ;~, < ' <, t b 'g, ', s w>n,n>rs,, p, n. i u- ' AksWw ~' s,nn yo><- , i <,., +w-w,o u~ w t

5 ' 00BJECTIVES + a < + < 299 b', ~ a s &4 sx Niisji2 SetiFissiise:i:f:2!3fii :3,G5 SSIE s;ndses: JsMi: isms fig ^ x set:

1. Cu: JA4

'?M:? - 4N" M60 -

1. 4 14

<t.,, '{ A [^f ? ! 3 '$. 1R T4 Maximize solubilization of crud. en x u m a, ~8 OgM3i,4 Maximize RCS c.ean-up ofradioisotopes !u&g,p??m following forced oxygenation. i,w s a iB + Maximize nicke remova to reduce radiation

eat

'e source term. + Minimize refuel pool and biosaield dose rate. ?- + Optimize refuel pool clarity. h + Efficiently degas tae RCS of hyc rogen for refuel ~_ ~ maintenance activities.. ) i r ) 't-i _ _ = _ _ _ _.

SHUTDOWN-9KEYELEMENTS a ~, a m s . dl ( !$ Remove Li to <0.2 ppm prior to shutdown. a NENN$b ENh ^$ l ep; ~;;m1; 2nergize pressurizer heaters to maximize g 1 p4MRs pressurizer spray for clean-up. .4liU + Immediate borate to >1000 ppm upon !em ej4 shutdown to ini:iate solubilization of crud. e; ?, + Add H2O2 for forced oxidation crud burst. hh m; Et Eh! nas hh a

SHUTDOWN-w AKEYELEMENTS (continued) n rs a 3 ... ss, m, sm.,,,a m, ym em .:- m s s -=.=:-, wm y; '}I

'< 'f f

t g< lb QM Run RCPs for up to 24 hours after RCS forced I nwmo

t= g

ag oxidation to maximize clean-up.

a awww HE MwA Maximize lei:down flowra':e and optimize RCS ,a n,m c-e u filter sizing. ! Es Si + Perform RCS caemical degas to minimize n li operator involvement and distractions. '}j + Moni:or and assis : in removing hydrogen from f pressudzer vapor space. ~o' w !M Q

STARTUP - 3:{KEYELEMENTS e 2 m mmw m: =m s ,em . mm i w 23 m. f t f i,% Coordinate de-oxygenal: ion of':he pressurizer !L:'j!Mia and RCS. i pn g g i Maximize letdown during entire startup i: i evolution. LL' + Maximize use of CVCS mixed bed and cation bed for nickel removal. x q hgj + Delay lithium addition as long as possible to maintain soluble conditions and to allow P extended operation of the cation bed. L

1:s

h$

e liREFUEL 7 PERFORMANCE e <a s ,e .:m _m m. o mom mmm. mm ~ ~ ~ ~s _m_m x ,w (*,. \\ if ::0 i4 Co-58 prior to flood up: m m.

• x,a., e)W:w, :;w::;m:::;-

a p., -

al R + m =m RF6 RF7 GOAL ig .094 006 <.05 ( pCi/ml) w ,k. 1h:y + On average, RF7 dose rates inside bioshield were 30% to 50% lower than RF5. e m Sh! A "dt d

1 REFUEL 7 PERFORMANCE e (continued) 3Yis a a. " Es4 2$s52%5!

• ^' iYYUiss '

w>& Azs A

T'

!M Refuel pool dose rates >~ I k ' l' ' ',,'.

p 'i'c4 (?,

ik~ s Ihgj,,,g,7,1g RF6 RF7 ig llwg 50 10 (mrem /hr} r k,c;~s Ip} + Chemical degassing successfully reduced 1 RCS hydrogen from 37 to 2 cc/kg in less s than 1 hour. = Nij! ip l7 $0

REFUEL 7 Co58 CRUD i;q 8BURSTAND CLEANUP Q ~.,

A s w

~ + w: s sisw ag;am;a a s x W m ige RF 7 - CoS8 Crud Burst and Cleanup 7

f. !

+ J8!@: " s shkjfll}$f!$klfh.<.4-;.bh ll. P _ H2O2 Add for Forc & RCP Off "~ U RCP fffall RCP's riow off) .[+:: ' :.3$::f.:2:kNE%fN ~ Jogged RCP U

p. 7g ::g: ;: - -

H202 Add-Chemcal ((; Ms'" ~ g * " Degassicaton of RCS Commenced Drameg PZR I $Ni;i . hk l l 3 i C RCP Off ls!!MT.p4Mqgl. Yl 1.E 'A' RCP Off EMl1 f

1. SE

.jtij Tsyg; E k24 hr RCP Run =$ O.1 - Y----k h! Floodsp k 1 Mode 5 3r t ~e. 4 0 01 Mode 3 Immedete g, Borate /ManualRx Trp CoreOff Load RxPwr decrease Mode 2 l l l at 10% Air l4 % 4-> y ESFAS A ESFAS 3 j i l 0.001 ci:- 8 8, 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 ,8 8 ,8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 e e e e e e e e e imn R s a s a s a a a a g s a a g g s a s B

-l, IREFUEL 8 CONCERNS m a ~ m ue m,. rw ~ w - m x = sa i 93jy'i Cycle 8 axial offset anomaly increases risk !? } $d 3 ofless effective cleanup and higher dose rates. [_ <f j + Increase monitoring to determine effects on [f3 k cleanup. + Changes in the shutdown method will i require additional controls and coordination 3 to ensure effective degassification. x 1

EQUIPMENTLAY-UP 1 1 nMEASURES a w un , = wen m , xa :w,== n m

J a

m ll: - - N Key Elements g g. 1:lij Layup requirements anc. metnoc.s are governec a~ H:g:n? by a c.ec icatec. procedure (CDP-ZZ-00350). hum

t-n lg:

Layup planning and implementation is c irected lh g by a c.ec icatec. layua coordinator. l Layup activities are integrated into tae outage [d;> schedule milestones and tae water plan. x' a,' 5< 'd:3 503 di

EQUIPMENTLAY-UP l MEASURES (continued) ,__m m z _m ~_ 's Nq b Steam Generators n l 4 1

] f WJ Caraohyc.razic.e anc ETA wi 13e used as layup v,:

. a Aw

ja c.e-ox anc. passivation chemicals.

yg j;g De-oxygenatec. water (<100 pp 3) will be used tad as fill source for steam generators. Draining will 3e performed under a nitrogen ?,, alanket. I: + Main Condenser

.-y Dry layup with dehumidified forcec. air.

a l

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,s ~ vm ~, ~ ,,v I /k ' ' d s,,,, ^ J [ n%1[*f' I werw > + >,>7,, wen, :;' w/ < 7 ,n ae'.u.;A h a m;cca'7d',,n,a n s.nu,.:>na<,>'-s' 4'~'r m>' s c' > s '6 u , e, >%.. -,-,u. na--- _s< t-

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l ? REFUEL 7RESULTS a :a m~ ne m = m a n. - n +use ~ s= ~ mn : s eum, a ^ s w :,. v l: lid + Expenc ed five 0.45 micron filters in RCS letc.own o:n,m w c.uring forced oxic.ation anc. cruc burst. n a

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) !(Nkh 30 filters expended during outage in RCS anc. I ~'" SWI. e "gj + 10 filters used in spent fuel pool cleanup system p<$n Q + Total of 55 filters used during the outage. ? + 168 Curies / 7,270 grams removed. o_a + Total cost of S98,000 on replacement filters.

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f f RFO 8 HP RELATED GOALS I sxwamawamss.sswus.n. & man.~sx auna ms s.a:.s-n aa:..eam mum.ma,.+ns.usaa a s... ... ~.. ,x Exposure Goal $a . 130 Manrem - Exceationa. Performance i . m?,,.170 Manrem - Acceptable Performance ?? ~"'"+ Zero Unplanned Releases i pj + Zero Loss of Radioactive Fluid resulting in n a g_1 an unexpected increase in airborne or .=[i contaminated areas >a s Va,i I! ( i kJ

l OUTAGE DOSE TRENDS i ..,.y, ,y,, y gg,% yty, g,y,%,y,,sy..y. .. s,,ws, ,.v. ,s y,.. .,y,sy. .s. s sw x, s,w s,,.. ..w.- c,.ggg.4pg,g .,.,.,,ggs , s Agg,,g ggr,, ygegygs,gggggq(wm,yg. .s PERSON-REM BY TLD g g- ~ip' 430. / 416.5 y

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MAJOR ACTIVITIES - DOSEESTIldATES (Manrem) Task Best RFO 8 Est. ,j RB General Access 23.600 18.000 jjj Modifications N/A 5.000 Wl Funnel Welds N/A 3.000 ~a i;j RV Head Activities & Refueling 9.910 10.000 j S/G Maintenance 32.120 41.000 .I ISI Activities 1.370 3.000 i Excess Letdown Repair N/A 5.000 i Ihj RV Annulus work N/A 4.000 ? RCP work 6.100 9.000 hl } ISI Bolted Connections N/A 11.000 / gH 6 I h!s$4

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RFO 8 HP CHALLENGES 3,, ,y,m.33r3,.y.amey, ug..s gjagum x.,.g.,.ag ygg, a gg, a:ygsax gma-2,2,3s.y,,2_gs s...,,,,,.,.. _ _,..,,, i 'D' RCP motor replacement, internals inspection t wK anc rep.acement ^ a i]j+ S/G ECT, sluc ge lance, plug removal, and sleeving

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