ML20128F000
| ML20128F000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1985 |
| From: | Johnson E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | William Cahill GULF STATES UTILITIES CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8507080083 | |
| Download: ML20128F000 (2) | |
Text
s JUL 2 1985 In Reply Refer To:
Docket:
50-458 Gulf States Utilities ATTN: William J. Cahill, Jr.
Senior Vice President River Bend Nuclear Group P. O. Box 2951 Beaumont, Texas 77704 Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency state and local agency Exercise Report for the River Bend Station emergency exercise held January 16, 1985.
Please review the report and be prepared to cooperate with stete and local officials as necessary during their efforts to correct the of' site deficiencies identified.
In addition, you should give particular attention to Section 2.4 of the report which indicates that some offsite deficiencies were caused or compounded by the onsite operations.
Sincerely, Crtinal s cred m; F:. H. : " v c E. H. Johnson, Chief Reactor Project Branch
Enclosure:
FEMA report dated April 5, 1985 cc w/ enclosure:
Gulf States Utilities ATTN:
J. E. Booker, Manager-Engineering, Nuclear Fuels & Licensing P.
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.,2x 2951 Beaumont, Texas 77704 Louisiana State University, Government Documents Department Louisiana Radiation Control Program D-ector RIV:EPS B
C:PSA C:RPB AI 85-321 JBBaird:
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R. L. Bangart, DRSS EP&RPB bec distrib. by RIV w/ enclosure:
J. B. Baird, EPS-RIV-File l
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FINAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT Nuclear Power Plant: River Bend Nuclear Generating Station Applicant: Gulf States Utilities Location of Plant: State of Loulslana West Feliciana Parish St. Francisville, Louisiana
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.Date of Exercise: January 16,1985
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State of Louisiana West Feliciana Parish
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East Feliciana Parish Pointe Coupee Parish
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- East Baton Rouge Parish West Feliciana Hospital
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f CONTENTS A B B R E VI ATI O N S........................................................... i v EX E R C IS E SU M M A R Y....................................................... v 1 I NT R O D U C TI O N......................................................... I 1.1 Ex ercise Be c kgro und.................................................. 1 1.2 F e de ral E v alua t o rs................................................... 3 1.3 Exe rcise O bj ectiv es.................................................. 3 1.3.1 Gulf States Utilities Objectives.................................. 3 1.3.2 State of Lousiana Obj ectives..................................... 7 1.3.3 P aris h O bj ec t i v e s.............................................. 9 1.4 Exercise Guidelines and Participant Information......................... 12 1.5 Scenario Narrative Su m mary.......................................... 15 1.6 Evalua tion C rit eria.................................................. 18 2 E XE R C IS E E VA L U ATIO N................................................ 2 0 2.1 Lousiana Stat e Operations............................................ 2 0 2.1.1 StateEOC...................................................20 2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility.................................. 23 2.1.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Operations......................... 27 2.1.4 Media Relations - Joint Information Center...................... 30 2.2 Local Governm ent Operations......................................... 3 6 2.2.1 West Feliciana Parish EOC..................................... 3 7 Traf fic C o n trol............................................... 4 2 2.2.2 East F eliciana Parish EOC...................................... 4 3 2.2.3 Pointe Coupee Parish EOC..................................... 4 6 2.2.4 West Baton Rouge Parish EOC.................................. 53 2.2.5 East Baton Rouge Parish....................................... 5 6 East Baton Rouge Parish EOC................................... 57 Reception Center - Riverside Centroplex......................... 61 Decontamination - Zachary High School.......................... 63 2.3 M edic al S up po r t..................................................... 6 5 2.4 U t ili t y S up po r t...................................................... 6 6 3 DEFICIENCY TRACKING AND SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS...... 70 4 EV ALU ATIO N O F O BJ ECTIVES........................................... 81 4.1 Sum mary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met...................... 81 4.2 FEMA Objectives Met or Yet to be Achieved............................ 85 TABLES 1 Remedial Actions for January 16; 1985 Ex e rc is e............................. 71 2 Summary of FEM A Objectives Remaining to be Met.......................... 32 3 FEMA Objectives Met or Yet to be Achieved................................ 86 iii
ABBREVIATIONS ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross Department of Energy DOE Department of Transportation DOT Emergency Broadcast System EBS Emergency Operations Center EOC EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA GSU Gulf States Utilities HHS Health and Human Services Joint Information Center JIC KI Potassium todide LNED Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness LOEP m R/h Millirems per hour NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PAS Protective Action Section PIO Public Information Officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RADEF -
Radiological Defense RBS River Bend Station RCS Reactor Coolant System RDO Radiological Defense Officer REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness SOP Standard Operating Procedure USDA United States Department of Agriculture
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EXERCISE
SUMMARY
The initial qualifying radiological emergency preparedness exercise was conducted January 16, 1985, for the River Bend Station (RBS) located in St. Francisville, Louisiana. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluated the off-site radiological emergency response capabilities of the State and local officials.
On January 17, 1985, two meetings were held - a morning meeting with the 19 member Federal evaluation team to conduct a preliminary evaluation; and an afternoon meeting with Federal, State, local and utility participants to present preliminary findings. A critique for the general public was also held on January 17,1985, at the Town Hall in St. Francisville, Louisiana.
This document provides narratives, deficiencies, areas for improvement and recommendations for each of the jurisdictions and field activities tested in the exercise.
Each deficiency with corresponding recommendation is described by jurisdiction in Section 2 of the report.
Areas for improvement, which are not considered deficiencies, are also described in Section 2. Section 3 provides a summary listing of "A" deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and "B" deficiencies, including those needing priority attention. This summary is in tabular format and provides space for State and local jurisdiction responses to the deficiencies. There were no category "A" deficiencies found during the evaluation of this exercise.
The following provides a brief overview of the exercise performances of the State of Louisiana and the local Parish governments. More explanatory discussions of the performances of individual agencies are provided in Section 9. of the report.
State of Louisiana Operations Several agencies of the State of Louisiana participated in this initial River Bend Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise. The Louisiana Office of v
s Emergency' Preparedness (LOEP) and the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED), both located at the State Emergency Operating Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, demonstrated an adequate level of readiness for dealing with a radiological emergency.
The EOC was staffed by all major departments required by the plan.
Direction of operations was well managed by the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, and his staff was involved in decision making.
Physical aspects of the EOC were adequate to support continuous operations.
The management of the EOC and the concepts utilized in exercise activities were reasonable and appropriate for meeting the State EOC's role during an emergency at RBS.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS Five parishes have portions of their boundaries within the 10-mile EPZ of River Bend Station.
Radiological Emergency Preparedness plans exist for each parish, and elected and volunteer officials of each parish participated in the exercise.
Facilities for each of the Parishes were adequate and equipped with necessary furniture, communication equipment, maps and displays. A new EOC for West Feliciana Parish is being constructed which will provide expanded space for future operations.
As will be discussed in the detailed narrative section of the report, each of the parishes actively participated and demonstrated during this exercise that they are capable of making effective emergency response decisions to protect their residents should an accident occur at RBS.
Generally, the local decisions and activities adequately met the objectives of the exercise. Specifically, however, deficiencies in performance were identified at several of the activity locations. Also, evaluators have provided recommendations for improving future exercises or effectiveness in a real emergency in areas or activities where I
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performances were less than desirable during this exercise. These are grouped as Areas for Improvement and discussed in the narrative evaluation for each location.
For a more thorough evaluation of activities and accomplishments at the local parishes, the narratives in Section 2 should be reviewed.
A narrative summary is provided of some of the utility problems which should be addressed because of their impact upon the offsite emergency response efforts of the State and parish governments.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,
1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead role responsibility for all offsite nuclear power faellity planning and response.
FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Response Planning include:
Taking the lead in offsite emergency response planning and in the e
review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans ensuring that the plans meet the Federal criteria set forth in NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 (November 1980).
e Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise conducted by the appropriate emergency response jurisdictions.
e Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved Federal agencies. Representatives of these agencies listed I
below serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissien (NRC) i U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) i U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) l U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) l U.S. Department of.4griculture (USDA) l r
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The January 16, 1985, REP exercise was River Bend Station's initial qualifying exercise. The exercise was conducted between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.
The 19-member evaluation team included representatives from FEMA Region VI staff, the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL).
The exercise was evaluated using the FEMA modular format evaluation forms. This report format reflects the use of the modular format which provides for a more objective, detailed recording of evaluations.
Following the exercise, the Feceral evaluators met on January 17,1985, at 8:30 a.m. to present their preliminary findir.gs to the FEMA /RAC Chairman. At 1:00 p.m. a critique was conducted at River Bend Station for State, local, and utility officials. At this critique the FEMA RAC Chairman and selected FEMA, RAC evaluators presented a short overview of the preliminary results of the exercise. The public critique of the exercise followed at 3:00 p.m. at the Town Hall, St. Francisville, Louisiana.
A Public Meeting was held on January 21,1985, at the St. Francisville Town Hall for residents of the five parishes. This meeting was held to acquaint residents living around the River Bend Station with the emergency response plans, to answer questions concerning contents and exercising of the plans, and to receive suggestions for their improvement.
The findings presented in this report were reviewed by the RAC Chairman of FEMA Region VL FEMA suggests that State and Local jurisdictions take remedial l
actions in response to each of the defielencies indicated in this report and that the State l
submit a schedule for addressing the identified deficiencies. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that deficiencies identified during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.
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1.2 FEDERAD EVALUATORS Ninetee, federal evaluators participated in evaluating the January 16, 1985, qualifying exercie. These individuals, their agencies, and their evaluation location (s) are listed below.
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EVALUATORS i AGENCY EVALUATION LOCATION John Benton FEMA State EOC - Baton Rouge Bob Conley USDA State EOC - Baton Rouge Hank May EPA Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Al Lookabaugh FEMA Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Hank Gilliam FEMA Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
(Observer)
Harry Harrison FEMA RADEF Monitoring Team #1 Bob Barton DOE RADEF Monitoring Team #2 Jimmy Owens DOE RADEF Monitoring Team #3 Gary Sanborn NRC Joint Information Center (EOF)
Maryetta Cunningham FEMA Joint Information Center (EOF)
Phyllis Degler FEMA Joint Information Center (EOF)
(Observer)
Gary Jones FEMA West Feliciana EOC (St. Francisville)
Don Fingleton ANL West Feliciana EOC (St. Francisville)
Jim Cox DOT West Feliciana Parish-Traffic Control Point Kim Suchy ANL East Feliciana EOC (Jackson and Clinton)
Bill Gasper ANL Pointe Coupee EOC (New Roads)
Penny Wallingferd ANL West Baton Rouge EOC (Port Allen)
Gary Kaszynski ANL East Baton Rouge EOC (Baton Rouge)
Travis Ratellff FEMA East Baton Rouge Parish (Baton Rouge)
Tom Goertz FDA West Feliciana Hospital (St. Francisville)
Decontamination and Reception Center (Baton Rouge)
Grace Fossati FEMA Reception Center (Riverside Centroplex-Baton Rouge) 1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1.3.1 Gulf States Utilities Objectives The River Bend Station emergency planning exercise objectives are based on NRC requirements provided in 10 CFR 50.4~, " Emergency Plans." and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, " Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization
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Facilities." Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1,
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0696, " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities," and " Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737-1-Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (Generic Letter 82-33)" was utilized in developing the objectives.
A.
As a result of coordination between GSU, the State of Louisiana, the Parishes of East and West Feliciana, East and West Baton Rouge, Pointe Coupee, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the following objectives have been developed for the GSU exercise:
1.
Demonstrate emergency response integrated capabilities by activating the emergency organization and staffing the RBS Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), including the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, and the Joint Information Center and by implementing access control to these facilities.
2.
Demonstrate the adequacy of ERFs and their personnel, documents, and equipment to support, direct, and control emergency operations.
3.
Demonstrate the reliability and effective use of onsite and offsite emergency communications equipment and procedures.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of appropriate individuals to direct the required emergency organizations and maintain continuity in the implementation of the emergency plan using the emergency plan implementation procedures.
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Demonstrate the ability of the emergency organization to assess the initiating conditions for determining which emergency action level has been reached and properly classifying the accident, i
6.
Demonstrate the ability to perform dose calculations utilizing radiological and meteorological information to determine the magnitude of and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment and make appropriate recommendations for offsite protective actions utilizing all relevant factors.
7.
Demonstrate the ability of offsite field monitoring teams to use emergency equipment in performing radiological surveys and report results and the effective sharing of field team data among j
- emergency response organizations.
8.
Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining onsite radiation levsis.
9.
Demonstrate decision-making for appropriate onsite protective actions based on radiological information.
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10.
Demonstrate adequate facilities, equipment, and procedures for decontamination of onsite emergency workers and equipment, as required.
11.
Demonstrate the ability of the RBS emergency organization to provide the Joint Information Center with accurate and timely information so reports may be made to the news media.
12.
Demonstrate the capability of developing clear and accurate public information releases in conjunction with state and local representatives at the' Joint Information Center.
13.
Demonstrate the organization's ability to control rumors.
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Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control exposures to GSU personnel within the Plant.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to perform search and rescue, as required.
16.
Demonstrate the ability to plan recovery operations and identify the need for additional resources as required.
17.
Demonstration of shift relief capabilities will be limited to a display of personnel assignment schedules.
18.
Demonstrate response to a medical emergency onsite and offsite medical support personnel and agencies.
19.
Demonstrate decision-making and coordination with offsite agencies in de-escalating and terminating the emergency.
B.
Areas of the RBS Emergency Response Planning which will g be demonstrated during this exercise:
1.
Accountability following evacuation of the Protected Area. A limited number of evacuees will be designated to demonstrate personnel monitoring and decontamination at the Assembly Area.
2.
Post Accident Sampling System Operations.
Simulated post accident sampling results will be included to demonstrate core damage assessment in the ERFs.
3.
Actual shift turn-over in each ERF will not be demonstrated for long-term staffing.
Long-term shift assignments will be demonstrated.
4.
ERF evacuation and activation and operation of the Alternate Emergency Operations
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5.
Relocation of the Joint Information Center.
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Off-hours augmentation of the ERFs.
7.
Offsite fire support agency.
1.3.2 State of Louisiana Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert State agencies emergency response personnel, activate and staff State EOC.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
3.
Demonstrate that the State EOC is adequate to support emergency functions.
4.
Demonstrate communications capabilities among the following facilities:
- a. RBS
- b. Parish EOCs
- c. State EOC
- d. EBS Station
- f. LNED 5.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate with State dispatched field personnel.
6.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy field monitorin't teams.
7.
Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
8.
Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airbor'ne radioiodine.
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Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for collection of environmental samples.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to project plume exposure pathway doses and to determine appropriate protective measures.
11.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
- 12. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate public information releases with Parish and utility representatives at the Joint Information Center.
- 13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate press releases between the Joint information Center and the State EOC.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate rumor control between the Rumor Control Center and the State EOC.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and request i
Federal assistance.
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16.
Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure.
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- 17. Demonstrate decision-making and coordination with the Parishes l
and the Utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to monitor Emergency Classifications levels at the State EOC.
19.
Demonstrate the capability to process incoming messages in a timely manner at the State EOC.
FEMA OBJECTIVES APPLICABLE TO STATE EMERGENCY OPERATION THAT WILL NOT BE DEMONSTRATED 1.
24-hour EOC operation and staffing will not be demonstrated.
2.
Backup communication systems will not be tested.
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3.
The ability to determine the need for issuance of KI and the ability to distribute El will not be tested.
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Ingestion pathway dose projections and determination of protective measures will not be tested.
5.
The ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards will not be tested.
6.
The ability to analyze environmental samples in the laboratory will not be demonstrated.
1.3.3 Parish Objectives 1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert Parish emergency response personnel, activate and staff Parish EOC.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to alert the staff and activate a reception center.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4.
Demonstrate that the Parish EOCs are adequate to support emergency functions.
5.
Demonstrate communications capabilities among the following facilities:
- a. RBS
- b. Parish EOCs
- c. State EOC
- d. EBS Station
- f. Local Special Facilities
- g. LNED Demonstrate communi~ ations between the Parish EOC and Parish 6.
c dispatched field personnel.
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7.
Demonstrate decision making and coordination of the alerting process for the public within the affected area.
8.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of part of the plume EPZ.
9.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation.
- 10. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to the evacuated area.
11.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to evacuate mobility-impaired Individuals within the affected area.
- 12. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
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- 13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate public.Information releases with State and Utility representatives at the Joint Information i
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14.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate press releases between the Joint Information Center and the Parish EOCs.
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- 15. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate rumor control between the Rumor Control Center and the Parish EOCs.
- 16. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
- 17. Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency vehicles.
- 18. Demonstrate the adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for responding to a Utility request for transporting a contaminated injured individual.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling a contaminated injured individual transported from RBS.
- 20. Demonstrate decision making and coordination wit State and the Utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency.
- 21. Demonstrate the ability to monitor Emergency Classifications levels at the Parish EOC(s).
- 22. Demonstrate the capability to process incoming messages in a timely manner at the Parish EOC(s).
FEMA OBJECTIVES APPLICABLE TO PARISH EMERGENCY OPERATION THAT WILL NOT BE DEMONSTRATED 1.
The ability to fully staff reception centers in response to a complete evacuation of the plume EPZ will not be demonstrated.,
2.
The activation of all reception centers will not be demonstrated.
3.
24-hour EOC and reception center operation and staffing will not be demonstrated.
4.
The ability to issue protective action orders will not be tested in all Parishes.
5.
Backup communication systems will not be tested.
6.
The prompt notification system will not be activated.
7.
The ability to alert the public in the event of a failure of the prompt notification system will not be tested.
8.
Congregate care facility (shelters) operation will not be tested.
9.
Ability and resources necessary to evacuate schools within the plume EPZ will not be tested.
- 10. Ability to distribute KI will not be tested.
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- 11. The adequacy of ambulance and hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated local emergency workers or the public will not be tested.
(See item V.C.18 and 19 for medical emergency drill.)
- 12. The ability to relocate to and operate an alternate EOC will not be tested.
NOTE: During a meeting with the State of Louisiana on January 8,1985 the No.17 Parish objective for decontamination of vehicles was expanded to include equipment and individuals.
1.4 EXERCISE GUIDELINES AND PARTICIPANT INFORMATION This exercise is the required annual emergency preparedness exercise to demonstrate the readiness of the Plant to respond to an abnormal plant situation. The following information should be understood by the " participants prior to beginning the exercise.
1.
It should be understood that the circumstances simulated for this exercise are unrealistic in certain aspects, which should not be construed as flaws in the scenario. Moreover, it is due to the reliable design and construction of nuclear power facilities that requires unrealistic assumptions to be made in order to generate a problem that can affect the public. Thus, in order to achieve a sequence of events that will lead to a significant offsite radio-logical problem, the exercise scenario must contain an incredible plant situation, an unlikely series of equipment failures. or an improbable series of events combined with equipment failure.
2.
The purpose of the ex'ercise is to demonstrate actual integrated emergency response capabilities, including the use of emergency
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facilities and equipment. Personnel knowledge of the Emergency Plan and Emergency implementing Procedures is the primary aspect of evaluation. Demonstration of detailed knowledge of plant systems and equipment is of secondary importance for the exercise, since the plant conditions are simulated. For a real emergency this would not be the case.
Although personnel knowledge of the plant is not being tested, the system evaluations and investigations should not be eliminated from discussions during the exercise since this adds to the realism of the response.
3.
All emergency communications that relate to the exercise shall be identified as part of the drill. Verbal communications should be initiated and closed by the statement, "This is a drill."
Note: Care should be taken to assure that individuals who may I
overhear or see exercise activities are not misled into believing that an actual emergency exists.
4.
Manipulation of any plant operating systems, valves, breakers or controls in response to this Exercise are only to be simulated.
There are to be no alterations of any plant operating equipment, systems or circuits during the response to this Exercise.
5.
Any motor vehicle response to this exercise, whether it be ambulance, fire fighting equipment, police / security vehicles or field monitoring teams, should observe all normal motor vehicle operating laws including posted speed limits, stop lights / signs, one way streets, etc.
6.
Should any onsite security actions be required in response to this Exercise, exercise participants are to cooperate as directed, and l
l security representatives are to be prudent and tolerant in their l
actions.
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Participants shall inject as much realist.: into the exercise as is compatible with the safe performance of such exercise, using caution to neither under-react nor over-react since media attention and public protection are both key aspects of the exercise.
Exercise Guidelines To meet the exercise objectives, the following guidelines have been developed:
1.
The exercise is designed to be a " free-play" exercise. Prewritten or command messages are inserted by the exercise Controller /
Evaluator at given times to cause or influence particular emergency actions or responses. All other exercise actions are determined by participants' response to the simulated emergency conditions.
2.
Participants will respond to scenario conditions and take appropriate actions to protect workers and the general public.
Mitigation or degradation of scenario conditions will not be allowed in the interest of controlling licensee, state, and local l
Involvement in the exercise.
3.
The Exercise will be conducted as scheduled in Section IV.D.
4.
The exercise will commence with a postulated plant condition necessitating the declaration of an Unusual Event with plant conditions deteriorating to the extent that a General Emergency will be declared.
5.
The postulated accident conditions will result in a simulated radiological release which necessitates the consideration of protective actions for the general public.
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Exercise participants will perform, as appropriate, mobilization of the emergency response organization, radiological monitoring and dose assessment, accident assessment, notifications to offsite agencies, protection action recommendations for emergency workers and the general public, and dissemination of simulated emergency information to the news media.
1.5 SCENARIO NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
Initial Conditions:
1.
The reactor is at 100% power, and the core has been operated for 300 full-power days.
2.
HPCS pump E22-C001 is out of service due to a bearing problem causing excessive vibration. A 7 day LCO has been in effect since noon yesterday.
3.
A reactor coolant leak rate test is in progress to determine whether an existing 2 gpm leak has become significantly worse.
4.
Willow Glen Unit I has been taken off the grid as of 0800 this morning due to problems with EHC system. Downtime is expected to be no longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
In the meantime, the Load Dispatcher has requested that River Bend Station provide full power to the grid to avoid industrial load shedding.
Previous notice of any power reduction has been requested.
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16 Time Scenario Time Event Before" 1000
-00/00 Initial conditions established.
1000 00/00 Results of the completed leak rate test indicate that the unidentified Reactor Coolant leak rate is 6.5 gpm.
AN UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared in accordance with EIP-2-001, Unusual Event No. 5.2; exceeding primary coolant leak rate Tech. Spec. limits. Notifications to offsite agencies and activation of the on-shift Emergency Response Organization should be accomplished.
After discussions with the Load Dispatcher, operators will commence controlled reduction in power.
10L5 00/15 Indications in the Control Room indicate that the leak rate has increased to 35 gpm.
Condenser hotwell level has begun to fluctuate slowly, but remains within operational limits.
1030 00/30 Indications in the Control Room indicate that the leak rate has increased to 53 gym. Controlled shutdown continues.
AN ALERT should be declared in accordance with EIP 001, Alert No. 2.1, primary coolant system leak rate greater than 50 gym with reactor at operating temperature and pressure. Notifications to offsite agencies and activation of augmented Emergency Response Organization designated for Alert (including TSC, OSC, part of JIC) should be accomplished.
1045 00/45 The primary system leak rate has leveled out at approximately 55 gpm; however, the hotwell level has dropped considerably in the last half hour. The Control Room is continuing a unit shutdown.
1130 01/30 The condenser hotwell level drops rapidly ilue to malfunction of the makeup valve from the Condensate Storage tank, causing a low suction pressure trip of the condensate pumps,
- and subsequently the reactor feedpumps.
The total loss of feedwater causes the reactor level to drop very rapidly below the HPCS/RCIC automatic initiation setpoint (level 2, -30").
The HPCS system is out of service; and, though RCIC auto starts, the pump does not deliver rated flow to the reactor.
Indications in the Control Room are that the turbine governor is not properly controlling the discharge pressure of the pump.
The reactor scrams and the recirculation pumps trip.
Containment isolation is successful.
MSIVs remain open (level 1 isolation).
SBGT auto starts. The Division !!! diesel is secured and does not start.
17 Time Scenario Time Event 1135 01/35 Within two minutes of the scram the reactor level has dropped to -145", causing the MSIVs to shut and the Division I and II diesels to start. The LPCI/LPCS pumps auto sta-t and run on minimum flow. The reactor level is steady, but pressure remains high.
1150 01/50 An operations / maintenance team checking the RCIC turbine governor finds that the governor will have to be replaced.
before before 1200 02/00 The operations / maintenance team in the RCIC equipment area checking the turbine governor observes a steam leak through a crack in the upstream pipe to valve body weld on E51-F045. The crack is beginning to worsen and a large puddle is forming on the floor. The Shift Supervisor and Emergency Director are notified.
1200 02/00 The RCIC turbine steam supply line crack widens rapidly.
All personnel move to rapidly exit the area; however, a technician trips and falls in the puddle. He is unconscious and bleeding from the back of his head.
Indications are received in the Control Room that the RCIC turbine steam supply line has ruptured. In addition, position indication for RCIC steam line isolation valves F063 and F064 is lost. The reactor level begins to drop slowly, as only CRD pumps A and B provide makeup to the reactor.
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared in accordance with E!P-2-001, Site Area emergency No. 3.3; Steamline break outside containment without isolation.
Offsite agency notification and activation of the entire augmented Emergency Response Organization should be accomplished.
1205 Approx.
02/05 Attempts to depressurize the reactor using ADS are unsuccessful due to an ADS logie failure.
1230 02/30 It has been determined that the injured individual is contaminated and does require transportation to the hospital for medical examination.
1300 03/00 Reactor level is still dropping slowly with reactor pressure dropping, but remaining higher than LPC1/LCPS pump shut off head.
1330 03/30 Reactor level has dropped to the top of active fuel (TAF),
with pr' essure remaining far above RHR/LPCS capability.
The steam release is being vented through the Aux. Bldg.
ventilation system. Operators may divert the flow through SBGT system at this time because of the impending release.
18 Time Scenario Time Event A
GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared in accordance with EIP-2-001, General Emergency No. 2.3; loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with potential for loss of the third.
1345 03/45 RE-213, Auxiliary Building RCIC Area ARM begins to show elevated radiation levels and the Aux. Bldg. Ventilation and Main Plant Exhaust Duct Monitors show indications that a racioactive release is in progress. Reactor pressure remains in excess of low pressure ECCS shut off hern.t.
1445 04/45 Reactor pressure has dropped to RHR/LPCS pumps shut off head.
Reactor level has decreased to -190".
Severe cladding damage has occurred and the radiological release is still in progress. Low pressure ECCS is initiated.
1500 05/00 The core has been reflooded.
The release continues as operators attempt to depressurize the reactor.
1600 06/00 Emergency Repair team successfully shut RCIC steam line outboard isolation valve. The release is terminated.
j 1615 06/15 Reactor pressure drops below shut down cooling upper limit. RHR system is aligned for shut down cooling.
A storm is brewing in the vicinity of River Bend Station and meteorological conditions change rapidly.
1645 06/45 The plume is blown out of the 10 mile EPZ by the increasing winds. The Emergency is de-escalated.
1715 07/15 Offsite doses are returned to background.
1730 07/30 Emergency terminated. Recovery organization established.
1745 07/45 Recovery planning is discussed, with long term organization and response plans formulated.
1800 08/00 Terminate the exercise.
1.6 EVALUATION CRITERIA The. River Bend Station exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Sec. II of NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (November 1980). After the narrative for each jurisdiction or evaluated activity, deficiencies and areas for improvements are presented with accompanying recommendations. Deficiencies are presented in two categories. Category A lists only
19 those deficiencies that caused a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living near the site in a radiological emergency. These are deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding. A negative finding would be based on at least one deficiency in this category.
Category B lists all other deficiencies. These include those deficiencies where demonstrated performance during the exercise was evaluated and considered faulty and corrective actions are considered necessary but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that in a real radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. Deficiencies in this category should be relatively easy or straightforward to correct in comparison with those deficiencies in Category A.
Category B deficiencies are numbered consecutively in Section 2 and are correlated with Tables 1,2 and 3.
Areas for improvement are also listed as appropriate for each jurisdiction or evaluation activity. These items are not deficiencies but are suggestions for improved performance.
FEMA Region VI evaluated the exercise using a modular format questionnaire that permitted objective and detailed recording of observations and assured more uniformity among observation points.
Federal evaluators were instructed to mark sections of the module "not applicable" if they did not correspond to the objectives for the exercise.
i I
I i
20 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1/Rev.1 (November 1980), and exercise objectives and observations, an evaluation of the January 16, 1985 exercise of the River Bend Station has been performed. This evaluation, 3.ncluding deficiencies, areas for improvement, and recommendations, is presented herein.
FEMA Region VI will maintain close liaison with the State and local governments in determining the corrective actions (including time frames) needed to resolve the deficiencies in accordance with established criteria and guidelines.
2.1 LOUISIANA STATE OPERATIONS The following includes evaluations of the operations of the Louisiana Offlee of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) and the Loulslana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) at the State EOC in Baton Rouge; LNED operations at the EOF (River Bend Station); the activities of the three Radiological Field Monitoring Teams; and the media relations of State / Parish representatives at the Joint Information Center.
2.1.1 State EOC Narrative The State EOC, located in the Natural Resources Building in Baton Rouge, has the necessary resources for supporting a continuous operation, although round-the-clock staffing was not an objective nor was it demonstrated during the exercise.
Communications for alerting and activating staff consist of commercial landline telecon call down by the Office of Emergency Preparedness. A list is available of home, work and alternate phone numbers of all personnel. The EOC was activated in response to a call at 11:06, and staffing was' completed by 1:00 p.m. following the declaration of site area emergency at 12:15 p.m.
Agencies represented at the EOC were: Office of
21 Mental Health, Department of Education, Office of Hospitals, ARC, Emergency Medical Services, Department of Agriculture, Office of Family Services, Louisiana State Police, Deoartment of Corrections, Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Office of Health and Environmental Quality, Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division and Office of Emergency Preparedness. Additional representatives were called and placed on standby.
Management and operational concepts deployed from the EOC were practical and adequate to maintain an operational capability during an emergency.
All maps were not displayed or posted in the EOC. However, each staff member had personal copies for referencing as needed.
It is recommended that at least population maps and evacuation route maps be developed and displayed for the entire EOC. These are important for explanation and clarity during briefings. The large display map containing meteorological data and portions of the sectors evacuated was used but was not visible to all staff members. For decision-making and operational activities this information should be located where it can be seen by the EOC staff.
Communications and message handling were conducted professionally and competently.
Equipment included an operational hotline (blue phone), commercial telephone, radio, facsimile machine, teletype, ham radio and the law enforcement communications system. Noise levels were very low throughout the Communications j
Center. All incoming calls were received in this room and relayed to the appropriate personnel via intercom. This method proved efficient for reducing noise from otherwise frequently ringing telephones at the various desks located in the EOC room. A runner was responsible for delivering messages to the varicus individuals throughout the EOC.
l All equipment was operated competently and all personnel appeared to be well trained.
Evaluators at the parish EOCs documented a lack of coordination by the State EOC with the parishes on matters relating to formulation of the EBS message, timing of i
the EBS message with simulation of stren sounding, etc. These actions, according to l
(
some of the parishes. did not take place. From the viewpoint of parish EOC staff and I
e
22 evaluators assigned to the parishes, better coordination is necessary from the State EOC. The State should involve the local parishes more frequently and much earlier in the process of development of the EBS and other messages relative to their parish. The EBS message flow chart shows this coordination but its implementation was not observed at the local EOCs.
A ham radio operator and the State Police Communications Specialist participated in the exercise. The evaluators recommend that future scenarios provide for actions which could involve them and their expertise.
Generally, most exercise objectives assigned to the State EOC were met with exception of the following:
" Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities."
The need for better coordination and involvement with the local EOCs was identified as necessary for proper fulfillment of responsibilities assigned to the parisher.
" Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and request Federal assistance." The scenario did not include conditions of sufficient severity to necessitate calling upon the Federal government for assistance.
Also, " Demonstrate decisionmaking and coordination with the parishes and utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency'," as it relates to recovery and reentry problems were not tested by the State EOC or coordinated with the parishes at the conclusion of the exercise.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES 1.
==
Description:==
Coordination and interaction by the State EOC with the five local parish EO'Cs was inadequate for meeting the needs of the parishes especially with regard to concurrence on EBS message
e
~
23 development and timiny of the messages with the parishes' responsibilities for simulation of siren sounding, alerting, etc.
(NUREG-0654, A.2.a.).
Recommendations:
Procedures and requirements should be reviewed relating to concurrence with parishes on development of the EBS messages and for coordinating the issuance of messages with sounding of sirens.
During the next exercise better coordination and interaction should be demonstrated between the five parishes and the State EOC.
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
e
==
Description:==
Room-size population maps and evacuation route maps were not available or displayed in the EOC, although Individual, small-scale copies were provided to staff members.
The large display map of meteorological data and sectors evacuated, although used, was not visible to all staff members.
Recommendation: Develop and provide at front of briefing room, j
population and evacuation route maps to clarify and support l
Information given during the staff briefings. Place maps, including meteorological and sector data maps, where they can be viewed by all staff members, l
1 2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) l Narrative The EOF is located at the River Bend Training Center. A separate room was set
~
aside for the State emergency response personnel, where the following activities were performed: dose assessment analysis field team coordination and communication with i
24 fleid teams. The accident assessment advisor and dose assessment advisor were located immediately outside this room so they could coordinate with the utility personnel and nave better access to all the utility data, charts and maps that were displayed. The room had adequate space, furniture, lighting and telephones to accommodate the staff. The noise level in the room at times was high and interfered with communications with the field teams.
The field team locations could be displayed better on the visual maps. Colored pins were set up but this method was unworkable because of the plastic plume " key-hole" which required an unobstructed map.
The accident and the dose assessment advisors and field team coordinator l
generally demonstrated their ability to get the job done. They demonstrated correct rationales for the decisions made, with the following few exceptions: One rationale used in judging whether to evacuate to 5 miles versus 10 miles was questionable. The dose assessment analyst performed unessential and time consuming calculations. Also, the field teams dosimeter ranges are questionable.
Recovery manager briefings were very competently conducted, timely, and informative without going into extraneous detail.
There was very close coordination between the utility, state field teams and coordinators.
Also, there was very close coordination between accident and dose assessment advisors, especially when accident classification changes were about to be made. Before they were dispatched, utility field teams were given a very thorough briefing which included their maximum dose for the day (500 millirems).
Contacts were made regularly with deployed field teams to remind them to check and record dosimeter readings.
Periodic radiation screening in the EOF was initiated when potentially contaminated people started coming'in.
"This is a drill" message was used very frequently over the radio to prevent any misunderstanding in case the messages were intercepted.
r s
25 The State field team controller was aware of dose limits established for the field team members - graded responses at 1,5 and 25 rem.
Activation of State staff was done at the LNED headquarters in Baton Rouge and the team members arrived at the EOF at 1:25 p.m. about 10 minutes before the General Emergency was declared. They coordinated protective actions with the utility prior to their issuance.
Good communications were available between the EOF, State and parish EOCs.
Primary communications were by a dedicated line with secondary communications by radio. Conferencing was available for all (EOF, State and locals). Hard copy devices were also available at the EOF, state and local EOCs. There were delays in sending hard copies from the EOF. This will be discussed further under the Utility Support Section.
The scenario was adequate to provide enough activity for the state personnel at the EOF. They were kept busy throughout the day dealing with the changing conditions and coordinating actions with other officials.
Coordination was demonstrated between the decis,a makers for the utility and State EOF representatives in the de-escalation and termination of the exercise.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS e
==
Description:==
Dosimeter ranges are questionable if field members are expected to report in at i rem as the evaluator was told. It is difficult to tell i rem from li rem, for example, on a 0-20 rem dosimeter.
t
26 Recom mendation:
Consideration should be given to the proper range dosimeters which are needed by field teams. The State should coordinate with the utility, which appears to have a different philosophy.
e
==
Description:==
Consideration was given, at approximately 2:15 p.m.,
to evacuating out to 10 miles instead of 5. The decision (5 miles) q was supported by three rationales: (1) an extremely long (8 hr) default time, (2) anticipated wind shift, and (3) radiation release rate had already started to dec!!ne. The third rationale, according to the evaluator, was improper since the plant was still not under control and was, in fact, headed for a meltdown until 3:00 p.m., at which time the reactor core was successfully reflooded.
I Recommendation:
Decision makers should review the kinds of mi:Igating circumstances which are appropriate to use in judgment calls.
e
==
Description:==
Field team locations were difficult to discern on the displays. Colored pins were set up but this method was unworkable l
because of the plastic plume " key hole" which required an unobstructed map.
Recommendation:
Improve graphics display to show present location of field teams, en-route status, etc.
e
==
Description:==
The ' dose assessment analyst spent practically the
(
entire time going through the calculator program. The complete program was run through each time even when almost all the new data were unchanged.
I Recommendations in many cases the new results could be estimated with suffielent precision for decision making. This was
27 discussed at the end of the exercise and corrected by the players without prompting.
e
==
Description:==
Background noise in the EOF interfered with field team communications.
Recommendations: Either improve noise insulation or isolate the two (utility and state) field team radios.
The partitions used throughout the EOF make the walls essentially transparent to noise.
2.1.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Operations Narrative Three teams were involved during the exercise. An overview summarizing their performance is provided below. The field teams were activated and mobilized at the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division Office. Since the exercise occurred durhg office.
hours, team members did not need special call-up procedures. The special call-up method is as follows: Each member has a call-up list at home as well as at the office.
The state EOC (mar.ned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day) also has a list of these members, and they can be paged at anytime day or night. A call-out list is then used to mobilize the staff at the LNED office.
The LNED chief did assemble his staff following each change in i
Emergency Action Levels (EAL) to inform them of tne current status at the plant. The briefings were clear, precise and complete. Several briefings were held to keep teams informed of cur ent conditions. When teams were dispatched, they were reminded of special procedures (communications back-up, exposure control, contamination control, etc.). These briefings also were exceptionally good and complete.
Equipment and supplies were pre-packaged, but a check list was used as they were checked out to the monitoring' teams prior to deployment. The kits were complete and contained miscellaneous items that could prove useful in the monitoring t
i
28 environment. One kit had only one set of anti-C clothing. Sets should be provided for both team members.
All teams had the required equipment for taking samples. The equipment is used routinely by the team members; it is calibrated and checked on a regular schedule.
The vehicles used could be operated in off-road activities if necessary.
All procedures were reviewed for measurement of airborne radiolodine and for collection of environmental samples. The air sampling technique was adequate and demonstrated proficiently. Due to a heavy thunderstorm at the time, sample collections were not actually made; however, each team explained in detail the requirements and their procedures for collecting these samples. All evaluators agreed that all three teams could have satisfactorily accomplished the sample collection activities and should be given credit for them.
No monitoring techniques were demonstrated other than in-vehicle readings due to the weather.
Communications were generally good. All personnel were well trained in this area. Background noise at the EOF made it difficult to understand some transmissions.
Team #2 had some trouble " keying" the radio to make sure they were transmitting; however, they watched for the deflection of the alternator gauge on the instrument panel to assure that they were transmitting.
All teams were well trained and conscientiously tried to keep exposure to an I
absolute minimum. Attention was given to reading pocket dosimeters although they did not have the low-range models. Very good training of the teams was reflected in all their activities.
They were aware of their locations in relation to the plume and potential exposure. At one point, the team leader directed Team #1 to proceed to a " low background area." The team responded with a request for verification of the direction and location of this " low background area" rather than proceed unknowingly.
The scenario appeared to *be adequate for exercising the monitoring team activities: however, there were several times of inactivity.
The scenario provided
29 reallsn in the " maximum release rate of 32 curies per second and the resulting dose projections downwind." The weather conditions prevented the collecting of soll and vegetation samples.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS t
C ATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCY - NONE C ATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCY - NONE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS e
==
Description:==
Only one set of " Anti-C" gear 'vas available in the monitoring kit of Team #2. If it were needed, both monitors would probably be required to suit up.
Recommendation: Two " Anti-C" suits should te placed in each kit.
e
==
Description:==
The survey meter was not turned on until the-monitoring Team #2 arrived in the vicinity of the plume path. This practice could result in the team being in a rrtdiation area without realizing it due to errors, getting lost, etc.
Recommendation: The survey meter should te turned on when the vehicle is moving in response to such a radiolcgical emergency.
e
==
Description:==
Background noise at the EOF created some difficulty in receiving messages by the field team.
t Recommendation: Recommendations for correction are addressed under the EOF section of this report.
1
30 4
2.1.4 Media Relations - Joint Information Center Narrative 1
All media relations, including issuance of press releases and press briefings by State and local governments and the utility, emanate from a Joint Information Center 1
(JIC) established at the GSU Training Center, St. Francisville. Representative Public 5
Information Officers (P!Os) from each of the five parishes, LOEP, LNED and the 1
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency are located during an exercise or real event, in one room set aside for off-site media activities.
i The structure of media activities has been designed so that control is assumed by GSU. A GSU staff member serves as the JIC Director. He conducts all press briefings and makes all verbal announcements to the PIOS in the off-site coordination room.
1 Coordination within this room of all PIOS is handled by a GSU employee designated as the Off-Site Coordinator. She reports directly to the JIC Director.
The physical arrangement of the room was adequate for the exercise. Sufficient telephones were available. There was a need for more than one typist, particularly at j
those times before press briefings when the P!Os, upon advice from the coordinator, j
prepared their news releases. One typist and typewriter served the five parishes and three State agencies (LNED, LOEP, Mississippi Division of Emergency Management).
i The call-up procedures provide for each Parish or State EOC dispatcher to notify their PIOS at the Site Area Emergency. At that time they report either to the JIC or l
EOC, depending upon their assignment. Full staffing and round-the-clock capabilities I
were not planned, but all agencies were represented by one or more PIO.
Activation and staffing were accomplished in a timely manner.
A call to activate the JIC was placed at 10:43 a.m. and arrival of PIOS began with the 11:06 a.m.
arrival of the West Feliciana Parish P!Os.
The plan is to staff the JIC with representatives from each Parish, 'with another PIO located in each Parish EOC for liaison between the EOC and the JIC. In some of the parishes, the P!O was the telefax i
-r
_--.c
~, -,-.. _., _ - -, _. _ -.
.,...,_.__.,.--.m._-.
.._.__,..__..._____v,_-
-,_m m_,
t 31 m,
operator. Additional training is needed especially for those PIOS assigned to the EOC.
Reports received from evaluators at the local EOCs show that these representatives need additional training and guidance in their P!O duties if they are to capably fulfill the liaison role between the P!Os of the JIC and the EOCs.
All P!Os at the JIC appeared to function cooperatively together. Evaluators at
.the parish EOCs noted that in many cases, the P!Os at the EOCs were not aware of what was taking place at the JIC.
Communications capability from the JIC off-site coordination room consists of individual desk commercial telephone lines for each agency and telefax equipment located in the information production room across the hall. As soon as they reported for duty they telephoned their representative agencies to give their phone and telefax numbers and activate their stations at the JIC. Contact by LOEP is made to the Interagency Government Affairs Representative who has direct contact with t,he Governor.
The LNED PIO contacts the Administrator or Manager of Nuclear Projects Section until the EOF is activated. Demonstration of secondary communication methods was not planned for this exercise.
Rumor control, another media activity, is also conducted from the JIC.
A separate room with a GSU coordinator and five telephone operators manned the
+
activities. The staffing consisted of only GSU employees, but it was stated that parish representatives have been obtained for future exercises or a real event. These parish l
I representatives should be called upon to serve during the next exercise since State and local agencies also have a responsibility, by their plans, for rumor control.
l The Rumor Control Center functioned extremely well. It was well organized and l
very effectively manned.
Rumors or questions were taken by the Rumor Control f
Coordinator to the appropriate representative PIO for verification or answers, and then 1
the problem (with the answer provided to the public) was written on large paper and l-l taped around the room for quick, ea'sy reference by the staff. The design and operation l
32 of the joint rumor control function provided a model for achieving a workable, united effort in controlling rumors and answering the concerns of the citizens within the area.
The overall concept of a Joint Information Center (utility-state-local) for conducting media activities is excellent. Five parishes and three state agencies worked cooperatively together.
However, there were several problems observed during the functioning of the JIC. They need attention and correcting, but they should not negate the effectiveness of a joint media center for coordination of all information to the new.
media.
The utility assumed the primary role for all activities at the JIC. This included management of the Off-Site Coordination Room where all P!Os were located. There was a tendency on the part of the P!Os to await leadership of GSU rather than to initiate actions on their own. This fact may have contributed to the excessive delays in issuance of press releases by the P!Os, as well as other problems noted. Both State and local PIOS should initiate an active role in the operation of media functions during future exercises in order to fulfill the primary responsibility role assigned to them in the State and local plans. Specifically, a coordinator for the Off-Site Coordination Room should be selected from the State and local PIOS to serve in a leadership role for those P!Os both at the JIC and the five parishes. This would ensure that off-site P!O activities are carried out in accordance with responsibilities set forth in the plans.
A status board at the front was used to document events, but entries on this board did not contain the time of the entry on the board or the time the announcement was made to the PIOS. For example, the JIC Director verbally announced to the P!Os at 2:25 p.m. that the General Emergency was declared at 1:35 p.m. The entry on the status board showed only the 1:35 p.m. declaration time. A lapse of 50 minutes before the Director announced this to the P!Os is excessive. The 12:15 Site Area Emergency was not announced to the P!Os until 12:55 p.m.
Press briefings, although sufficient in number, should have been more frequent according to need.
For example, the JIC
33 Director and P!Os were in a press briefing from 1:15 to 1:40 p.m. during which time a General Emergency was declared. The press briefing concluded at 1:40, but another press briefing, at wnich time the General Emergency was announced to the media, did not take place until 2:50 p.m.
PIOS were reminded before briefings to check with their own EOCs and draft their releases for the upcoming joint briefing. According to the state plan (Ch.4, !!B, p.
- 44) " Emergency public information will be accomplished through news releases by the facility and key response organization spokespersons." The State and local REP plans provide that the news media will be promptly and completely informed by the facility and appropriate governmental agencies.
Each parish spokesperson (PIO) has primary responsibility for releasing information to the news media regarding his parish.
Another problem noted was the location in the room of the evacuation sector and EPZ maps. They were leaned against the walls inside the entrance and were not easily visible to the representatives. They should be placed in direct view of the PIOS and formally referred to by whoever is addressing the group on Protective Action Recommendations during the exercise.
Televisions for viewing press briefings had been placed in the Rumor Control and Off-site Coordination rocms for those staff members remaining in the rooms during l
briefings. The staff membars were to monitor the questions asked by the media such as requests for statistical and other data. The problem with this arrangement was that no one could hear or understand the questions from the audience attending the briefing. An audience microphone should be used in future exercises or a real event to correct this problem.
Another problem noted was in coordination between the parish PIOS at the local EOCs and the PIOS stationed in the off-site coordination room at the JIC. According to the plan the parish PIOS are to coor'dinate with the PIOS at the JIC and vice versa in all actions relating to media relations. Evaluators at the parish EOCs reported that several l
34 of the PIOS were confused concerning their own roles and the role of the counterpart PIO at the JIC. In some of the parishes, the telefax operator served as the Parish PIO. These problems could be corrected by selecting a PIO as coordinator of all PIOS, by involving all PIOS in joint training session to delineate responsibilities, and by the PIOS at the JIC initiating an active leadership role in media relations.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS e
==
Description:==
The media activities of the PIOS at the JIC were directed by GSU. The State plan (Ch. 4, IIB, p. 44) identifies that State and Parish PIOS have responsibilities as spokespersons for providing emergency public information through the news releases to the media. Their dual assignments include: Developing news releases from accurate, up-to-date information from their respective Parish EOCs as well as obtaining from those EOCs concurrence with reports and data generated from the JIC; and providing the news media with prompt and accurate information relative to their parishes.
Recommendation: Coordination of State and Parish P!O activities at the Joint Information Center should be directed by either State or local PIOS. In this role, the PIOS should aggressively initiate more timely actions such as coordination with Pios at EOCs, development of press re' leases, and public briefings.
35 e
==
Description:==
Important information to the media was delayed to the extent that when presented it was not, in some cases, the most up-to-date information.
Press briefings, although sufficient in number, were not timely to serve the media needs in a real situation.
Recommendation: Press briefings should provide information that is timely and representative of the situation as it exists at that time. State / local P!Os at the JIC should request press briefings when needed rather than await the discretion of the JIC Director who may not have knowledge of the state / local need for a press s
conference.
e
==
Description:==
Questions from the press during news briefings could not be heard over the TV sets in PIO room or Rumor Control Center; thus, those representatives remaining in room during briefings could not determine the needs for d&ta (such as number of people affected, potential rumors) which they needed to ot.+.nin from the EOCs, etc. The Rumor Control personnel were using these news briefings to obtain questions on rumors for which they could prepare responses to people calling in.
Recommendation:
Obtain an audience microphone for press briefings and require media to use it; or have responder repeat questions asked before attempting to respond.
e
==
Description:==
EPZ and sector maps were not placed where they could be easily referenced by PIOS. Question regarding PARS for Sector 16 could have been clarified by use of the maps.
Recommendation: Place appropriate maps at front of PIO room and formally reference them when leading discussions with PIOS.
36
==
Description:==
No copies of State and local plans were provided in room.
Recommendation: Provide one or two reference copies of State and local plans for use by PIOS.
e
==
Description:==
Facilities for the media while reasonably adequate for exercise, probably would be crowded during a real event; typing needs in PIO room during a real event would require more than one typist and typewriter.
Recommendation: Expand facilities in future for use by media; provide an additional secretary and typewriter in offsite coordination room during future exercises.
e Description Rumor Control was handled exclusively by GSU employees, although State and local plans assign responsibilities for Rumor Control to the representative PIOS as well as the utility.
Recommendation: Provide trained Parish personnel to staff Rumor Control Center jointly with GSU personnel.
2.2 LOCA'L GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS Evaluations of local government operations include the following: West Feliciana Parish EOC and Traffic Control Points; East Feliciana Parish EOC; Pointe Coupee Parish EOC; West / Baton Rouge Parish EOC; East Baton Rouge Parish EOC and Traffic Control Points; and monitoring, decontamination and registration procedures at the Reception Center at Riverside Centroplex, East Baton Rouge; and decontamination activities at Zachary High School.
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37 2.2.1 West Feliciana Parish EOC Narrative At 10:15 a.m. the utility notified the Sheriff's office jail via " hotline" that an
" unusual event" had been declared. The Sheriff's office immediately contacted the Civil Defense (CD) Director via telephone to alert him of the situation. The Sheriff's Office jail received another call from the plant via the hotline at 10:40 a.m. notifying them that the incident at the plant had been escalated to an " alert status." The communicator at the Sheriff's office again passed this message on to the CD Director via telephone. After calling the CD Director, the communicator then relocated to the EOC. A hotline is also available at the EOC. The EOC was activated by the CD Director and operational in a short period of time.
Commercial telephone and radio are available as backup for alerting and notification. The staff can be contacted at any hour. The remaining staff were notified by telephone and soon began arriving at the EOC. The EOC was fully staffed with volunteers at 12:07 p.m. The EOC received the " Site Area Emergency" at 12:37 p.m. and the " General Emergency" at 1:56 p.m.
Upon activation of the EOC, two PIOS were sent to the Joint Information Center (JIC) at the EOF to represent West Feliciana Parish. The EOC also had a designated PIO who would communicate with the two PIOS at the JIC.
Staffing of the EOC included the CD Director, Assistant CD Director, Police Jury, Mayor, Communicator, Radef Officer, Transportation, PIO, Sheriff's Department, Police Department, Fire Department, School Board, Security and GSU liaison. Other staff were put on stand-by status.
The Police Jury President was in authority; however, as called for in the plan, the CD Director directed the EOC Operations.
He was firmly in charge and demonstrated good management capabilities. Periodic briefings were held, and some of the staff were involved in decision inaking as necessary. However, other staff were not asked to provide input at the briefings. Had this been done, the entire EOC staff would w---n.e,
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have been aware of all activities that were taking place rather than only those directly involving them. A copy of the plan was available as were written procedures, checklists, and a scenario book. Message handling was adequate; however, a master message log (in and out) was not kept. Messages would be distributed, and the CD Director would then announce them to the EOC staff. Access to the EOC was controlled by a local police officer, and m.. puple entering the EOC were signed in and given a badge.
The West Feliciana EOC is located in the St. Francisville Town Hall. The EOC had adequate space, lighting, furniture, and telephones.
Backup power and sleeping facilities were not available; however, this will not be a proolem when the new EOC is completed next door at the fire station. The new EOC being built is more than adequate to support their emergency operations. A status board was effectively displayed and kept us, 'o date. Maps illustrating the EPZ with sectors labeled and evacuation routes were also displayed. Other required maps were available and used by EOC staff.
The EOC has a direct line (hotline) to the utility.
However, as mentioned previously, initial notification prior to an " alert status" is via hotline from the utility to the Sheriff's Office Jail. Once the EOC is activated, commun! cation is switched to the EOC.
Generally, the communications worked well with various back-up systems available (commercial telephones, FAX, sheriff's radio, fire radio, CD radio). There were several problems with the FAX system; messages were lost or were very late. Further-more, the time the message was sent was of ten not shown. Also, the message form indicated that the information being sent was good up to 11:50 a.m.
This time never changed from message to message even when it was clear that the message was from a much later time. There was no communications between local EOCs. This becomes a problem when one EOC takes action that could affect emergency operations at another EOC.
The local EOC has little res'ponsibility for public alerting other than sounding the l
sirens at the time designated by the state. Sirens were activated (simulated) at 2:15 p.m.
I
39 prior to EBS activation. EBS messages are written by the State and the message is then to be confirmed at the local EOC for concurrence before broadcasting. This never took place. There needs to be more coordination and more involvement from the local EOC concerning the procedure, etc. for activation of sirens and EBS messages. This was very obvious from the local EOC level. Messages that were broadcast involved description of evacuation and shelter areas by familiar boundaries and landmarks.
The local EOC has no responsibility for dose projections or making protective action recommendation.
1 Access control points were promptly activated as protective actions were ordered. Although they do not have enough local manpower to totally control access, assistance is available from the State police upon request. The State police used their boats to stop river traffic until the Coast Guard could respond.
It is the responsibility of the state to activate reception centers. The State plan states that they will activate at the site area emergency. The local EOC called the reception center to verify that it was open and advise them of an approximate number of people to expect.
At this time, the location of mobility-impaired individuals is not known. They are currently collecting information to verify those individuals. A call was placed to the local hospital to determine how many people would have to be evacuated and if special transportation arrangements would be necessary. There are not enough local school buses to evacuate all school children but arrangements have been made to request assistance from other school districts to ensure a sufficient number of buses will be available if needed. The parish agricultural agent would work with farmers and food processing people to implement all necessary protective actions.
Radiological exposure control was demonstrated. The EOC was equipped with 0-20 R and 0-200 R direct reading dosimeters, dosimeter chargers, record keeping cards and survey meters.
Permanent re'eced dosimeters were not available but have been ordered. Direct reading dosimeters were zeroed and distributed, along with simulated
40 9
permanent record dosimeters, record keeping cards and instructions to all emergency workers.
The RADEF officer also instructed workers on how often to read their dosimeters (every half hour) and to record the readings on their cards. Every half hour a set timer rang to remind all staff to read and record their dosimeters.
Periodic surveying was also done by the RADEF officer. The EOC did not have KI but the State would provide if it was necessary.
Little information was available to emergency workers on decontamination procedures.
The State would be expected to handle decontamination.
The RADEF officer did not start to monitor people entering the EOC until two hours after there had been a release of radioactive materials.
When he did start, emergency workers were allowed into the EOC before they were monitored for contamination.
Therefore, the EOC and other workers could be unnecessarily contaminated.
It is clear that there is too much work for one person to handle.
Additional RADEF personnel are needed to assist in the RADEF areas of responsibilities.
Recovery and reentry procedures were not demonstrated. The local EOC would expect help from the State and the local agricultur.al agent during this time. It is evident that additional training on these procedures is necessary.
The local exercise objetetives assigned to West Feliciana Parish were adequately met with exception of the fehowing objectives: (1)" Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure;" (2) " Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to evacuate mobility-impaired individuals within the affected area." Also the objective for recovery and reentry, " Demonstrate decision making and l
coordination with the State and Utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency,"
was not tested.
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41 DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY "A" - NONE C ATEGORY "B" -
2.
==
Description:==
The RADEF officer did not survey emergency workers for cor.tamination until two hours after there 'was a release of radioactivity from the plant. Furthermore, emergency workers were allowed to enter the EOC before being surveyed; thus the EOC and its staff could be unnecessarily contaminated (NU REG-0654,II., K.3.a.).
Recommendation:
Emergency workers should be surveyed for contamination outside the EOC after there has been a release of radioactive materials from the River Bend Plant.
3.
==
Description:==
A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish had not been completed; therefore, demonstration of this exercise objective was not accomplished (NUREG-0654, J.10.d).
Recommendation:
Complete process of obtaining listing of all mobility-impaired within Parish and demonstrate means for j
evacuation during next exercise.
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AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION l
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Description:==
The RADEF Officer had too much work to be effective in his job. He had to zero 30-50 dosimeters, fill out record cards, survey the building and personnel as well as other duties.
Recommendation: Additional RADEF personnel are necessary to j
provide adequate radiological exposure control at the EOC.
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==
Description:==
Department Heads were not requested to give periodic briefings of their activities. Others in the EOC were not aware of each other's activities. This could cause problems when one's actions affect the operations of another.
Recommendation: The CD Director should require his Department Heads to give status reports at periodic briefings throughout an event to keep everyone at the EOC abreast of all activities.
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Description:==
There was little communication between EOCs. This became a problem when one EOC learned that river traffic had been blocked by a barge. This had an effect on one of the possible evacuation routes for West Feliciana Parish.
Recom mendation: EOCs should be in contact with each other and update each other regarding activities that may effect another EOC.
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Description:==
Little knowledge of recovery and reentry procedures was known or discussed.
Recommendation: EOC staff should be provided more training on recovery and reentry procedures, i
Traffic Control l
One access control point was established by the Sheriff of West Feliciana Parish l
l at the intersection of Highway LA-10 and Bains Road. According to the deputy, the i
emergency personnel arrived at this location at 2:39 p.m.
Other access control points were listed in the scenario and were marked on the RBS 10-mile EPZ map.
The deputy at the check point did not have evacuation route maps with him but stated they were available.
Equipment to keep the route open consists of three l
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43 commercial wreckers. However, no clearing of traffic obstruction was demonstrated.
Personnel at the location were familiar with the evacuation routes and location of reception centers. They were able to communicate with the EOC by radio. Actual problems which occurred during the exercise were handled capably by the sheriff and local police.
The EOC staff demonstrated capability for handling traffic control should a real emergency occur at RBS.
DEFICIENCIES, AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT - NONE 2.2.2 East Feliciana Parish EOC Narrative East Feliciana Parish, located within the 10-mile EPZ, had adequate facilities and resources for performing emergency response functions. Maps of evacuation routes and relocation points were clearly visible to all participants. They did request desk-size maps for individual use during future exercises. A call to activate the EOC was received at 10:40 a.m. The es11 was verified and mobilization procedures initiated using an up-to-date calllist. Call-up system consists of a phone, pagers and tone-alert radios.
Staffing was completed at 11:17 and was adequate for the exercise. Proper delegation of authority was demonstrated by the Civil Defense Director. His duties during the exercise were performed well.
He demonstrated ability to locate or determine procedures to effectively carry out the emergency response plan for unusual situations, i.e., train wrecks or house fires.
44
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There is adequate availability of communication equipment (both primary and backup).
Personnel efficiently demonstrated capabilities for operation of all equipment. Primary communication devices were the dedicated hotline, telefax, radios, tone-alert radios and telephones. Backup communication equipment was the same as primary; however, utilization would vary depending upon the source and recipient of the information. It was observed that the sheriff's phone does not have a direct connection to the sheriff's office in Clinton. Present capabilities require calling a third number to contact someone in the sheriff's office.
Times documeisted for notification to the EOC of key actions or events of the exercise are as follows: Alert - 10:35 a.m.; Site Area Emergency - 12:40 p.m.; General Emergency - 2:00 p.m.
In response to the General Emergency, the Parish EOC sounded the si' ens (simulated) at 2:15, activated the EBS, dispatched vehicles, and called the school, recreational facilities, and other special institutions at 2:15, and activated tone alert radios at 2:18 p.m. Evacuation was advised for Sector 9 and sheltering for Sector 8.
Protective actions were the strongest facets of this EOC's participation in the exercise. The players demonstrated adequate capabilities in setting up road-blocks, evacuating school pupils, and locating and assisting handicapped persons. The State would be responsible for sheltering and administering KI to 1200 persons in'the hospital and state prison located within East Feliciana Parish.
The East Feliciana EOC maintained the proper dosimetry equipment. Radio-logical exposure control equipment consisted of low and high range dosimeters, chargers, record keeping cards and permanent record dosimeters. No potassium iodide was on hand as distribution and actual administration would be handled by State officials, as explained by the Civil Defense Director.
The role of public information officer at the Parish EOC was filled by the telefax operator. He read information received via the Omnifax and distributed hard copies in a timely manner after receipt. The machine was not transmitting properly however, and
45 messages took about 25-30 minutes to transmit at times. The utility attributed this to the new installation of the equipment. The roles should be clarified of the East Feliciana P!Os assigned to both the parish EOC and the Joint Information Center. Training should be provided in these roles and coordination improved between PIOS at the two locations.
According to the plan, the PIO has the primary responsibility for interfacing with the media on all news releases. The PIO at the parish would be removed from that role, providing only liaison duties, by virtue of placement of another East Feliciana P!O at the JIC. Delays in communication between the two may have resulted in some of the delays noted in media activities.
The attention at the EOC to recovery and reentry procedures consisted only of a brief discussion.
The planners did appear to possess knowledge of their respective responsibilities during recovery and reentry.
The evaluator reported the situations of the scenario were adequate for testing the capabilities of East Feliciana emergency response personnel and equipment.
With exception of the deficiency in communication capabilities, all objectives t
were met. The objective for recovery and reentry," Demonstrate decision making and coordination with State and Utility in de-escalating and terminating the exercise," was not tested.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES 4.
==
Description:==
The sheriff's phone at the EOC does not have a direct l
line to the sheriff's office in Clinton. He must use an alternate number and have messages forwarded (NUREG-0654.F.1.a).
Recom mendation: A direct line should be provided between either the Sheriff's Office or the EOC and the Sheriff's Office in Clinton.
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46 AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT e
==
Description:==
An excessive delay was experienced in receiving information through the Omnifax at the EOC.
Recommendation:
Determine the source (or sources) of all' transmittal delays and correct the problem.
2.2.3 Pointe Coupee Parish EOC Narrative The Pointe Coupee Parish EOC is located in the courthouse in New Roads, Louisiana. The sheriff's squad room is used as the Emergency Operations Center. This area is used for day-to-day sheriff / police duties, with the sheriff's office and communications room located adjacent to the EOC room. Following completion of the new, planned sheriff's building, the emergency operations center will remain set up and ready for activation at any time. All appropriate amenities were available for use by the Staff. The required maps and displays were all available - either posted on the wall, in the written procedures, or in the resource reference booklet.
The Emergency Classification Status Board depleting classification, wind speed, sectors affected, time, etc. was updated and maintained throughout the exercise; but the " Emergency Action Log" posted on the wall was not used during this drill. It should have been kept current t
with activities, responses and all EOC generated actions such as simulated siren sounding, tone alert, activation and route alerting.
l The facility is equipped for extended operations. All resources for operating the I
parish jail (located at the courthouse) are available for use by the EOC staff (bunks, showers, clothing, etc.). A full kitchen facility is also available. Back-up power to the
(
police station and the EOC would be provided by the emergency diesel generating equipment located at the courthouse. At various times, the communications officer had l
l considerable difficulty hearing incoming calls because of excessive noise.
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Timely activation of the Pointe Coupee EOC was demonstrated. The EOC had been set up and equipped prior to the arrival of the staff. The direct, dedicated hotline to the utility (RBS) is used to receive the initial notification call. This line is manned on a 24-hour basis by the Parish Police dispatch / communications center. Upon receipt of the notification call, the communication officer relocated his operation to the EOC room. The initial activation call was received at the EOC at 10:17 a.m. from the RBS EOF and verified through the dedicated line.
A call-down procedure was then implemented using a current, written call list available in the procedures booklet. A complete staff was present by 12:50. The first shift staff appeared to be adequately trained, knew their functions and duties, and displayed a professional and concerned attitude throughout the exercise. However, during one instance, written procedures were not sufficiently followed by the EOC Director.
Second shift staffing was not an objective for the exercise and was not demonstrated.
Trained, qualified back-up personnel for all agencies and departments at the EOC have not yet been obtained. The roster shows numerous second-shift positions which have not been filled. Staff members are attempting to find qualified persons to serve as second shift personnel. The key EOC l
I staff positions do have trained back-up personnel available; many of these people were i
active at the EOC during the exercise.
Management operations at the EOC were effective. The EOC Director was in charge of operations and received adequate support from his staff. Periodic briefings were held which contained updated information and current status reports from all agencies and departments at the EOC. The Director informed staff members of any changes which would impact on their duties. Proposed actions and alternatives were I
discussed openly among the me mbers.
Written procedures were available for referencing; however, the staff appeared to know their responsibilities and duties, and seldom needed to reference the wiitten plans. Copies of messages were kept by the
4g communications operator, and equipment was available to reproduce copies for distribution. Message logs were not kept although copies of all messages were.
The communications officer provided incoming messages directly to the EOC director. Free play actions were injected into the exercise by the controller at various times. These were dealt with as seriously as were the actual scenario activities.
A problem in message content was observed in the protective action recommendations and corresponding.'AS (Protective Action Sectors). The 1:56 message of the General Emergency included inaccurate and confusing information on the evacuation sectors and protective action recom mendations.
There was no recommendation to shelter the 5-mile radius not involved in the 5-mile downwind evacuation. The sectors involved in the evacuation were not correctly communicated to the staff at the EOC. This problem was not picked up by the EOC staff but when pointed out by the observer, the EOC director (at 2:45) requested clarification of the message from the EOF. This verification message was received at the EOC at 3:30,45 minutes after the request was made. The cause of this problem was not known at the EOC. It appeared that the communications officer did not record the message transmission properly, perhaps due to the excessive noise levels present in the EOC.
Communications systems at the EOC are excellent. Multiple, redundant and back-up systems are available and functioned well during the exercise.
Primary communication with the RBS is via the dedicated hotline (Blue Phone). In addition, this system can be used to talk with any or all of the Parish EOCs, the JIC and the State.
Back-up communications with RBS could be through any of the numerous systems available - four dedicated telephone hard lines, commercial telephones, CD radio (provided to the EOC by RBS), pollee radio, facsimile machine over dedicated telephone line, and teletype machine. Additionally, a ham radio is connected through a repeater in Baton Rouge. It has the capability to communicate through any other ham radio or
49 through commercial telephones. The above systems are used as primary and back-up systems between all the participating agencies and various locations.
The equipment available and the personnel operating it adequately demonstrated ability to communicate with all required locations, organizations, and field personnel.
Although not an exercise objective, back-up communication systems were available and utilized by the staff.
For reasons unknown, verification of four messages were held and not transmitted over the fax machine as they were generated from the EOF. These messages were all transmitted simultaneously along with the General Emergency message at 2:17.
A similar problem occurred at 3:30 when messages 8, 9,10, and 11 all came in at one time, with verification message 8 arriving 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> late. Message flow was minimal between the local Parish EOCs. Improved communications would provide an increase in capabilities of the EOC's emergency responses.
Although simulated, the Pointe Coupee EOC was required to play an active role in public alerting. They are responsible for sounding the sirens located within the Parish boundaries as well as activating the tone alert radios located at the schools, nursing homes, power plants and the state park. The initiating call for protective actions was received from the EOF at 1:56 alerting the EOC of the declaration at 1:35 and providing them with protective action recommendations. These recommendations were incomplete and erroneous; they did not include the shelter message for the 5-mile sectors not involved in the evacuation. Also, evacuated sectors were not accurately described - the exact message read as follows:
" Evacuate 2 mile radius sector 4 and 9-1, 5 mile downwind 2-9."
A clarification message was requested at 2:52 but not received until 3:30. It read: " evacuate 2 mile radius (PAS 1), Evacuate 5 mile downwind (PAS 4-9)
Shelter 5 mile radius (PAS 2,3,8,16). Alert schools, institutions, recreational areas 5 mile radius." The EOC staff did not dete'et the errors in the initial message and neglected to (simulate) activate the siren system and the tone siert radios; there were no follow-up
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s 50 messages received concerning the sounding of the sirens.
The EOC staff simply overlooked the siren (simulated) activation, tone alert radios and any follow -up verification messages.
Protective action activities at the Pointe Coupee Parish were minimal. All demonstrations were by simulation at the EOC level. There were no planned field activities required by the scenario. According to the staff, appropriate resources are available to provide personnel and equipment for traffic control, access contres, and maintenance of evacuation routes. A mail-in survey form to identify mobility-in paired persons and establish' a written list has been initiated and will soon be coripleted.
Provisions were adequately addressed for transporting school children if an evacuation t
order is declared. Buses are owned by their drivers, and the drivers are notifiltd by the school principals by commercial telephones.
Radiological exposure control at this EOC was adequate. All requireri dosimetry equipment is available (Hi-range, Mid-range, and TLDs). This equipment war distributed during the exercise to all appropriate field personnel and EOC staf f members.
Dosimeters are charged and maintained by a RADEF officer on a six-menth periodic maintenance schedule. Instructions for their use and record cards for recording readings l
were distributed along with the dosimeters at Site Area Emergency,12:29.'4 Numerous dosimeters were not properly zeroed when they were issued. This was known by the RADEF Officer and he cautioned the players to be aware of it and make appropriate readings. KI and its use was not an exercise objective and was not demonstrated.
Although it was an exercise objective, recovery and reentry were not discussed or addressed by the Pointe Coupee Staff. There were no messages received from the State instructing them on any procedures or precautions.
The scenario activities were adequate for activating and establishing EOC operations. However, there were not enough activities to keep a continuous emergency response going at the EOC. All activities were simulated (except activation) thereby not
r..,
-u 51 providing enough actions to adequately test the full potential of the emergency staff.
Free play messages were injected by the controller to provide some additional activities for EOC personnel during some of the exercise dead times. It is recommended that future scenarios provide more activities requiring activation of the field personnel in Pointe Coupee Parish which would result in greater activity at the EOC as well. It was learned during the exercise that public information brochures have not been received by all residents requiring them.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES
~ 5.
==
Description:==
One of the exercise objectives was demonstration of
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coordination among the parishes and State EOC. Effective ecordi-nation was not demonstrated among Pointe Coupee and the other EOCs and RBS in public alerting and instructions. This w.s not simulated at Pointe Coupee Parish (NUREG-0654,A.2.a,E.5,6.).
Recommendation:
Coordination with other agencies during the public alerting and notification activities should be demonstrated and evaluated at the next exercise.
6.
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Description:==
Protective action recommendations were not correct l
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or complete; sheltering recommendations were not included in the initial message. Request for clarification and correction was made but no response received until 43 minutes later (NUREG-0654,E.).
Recommendation:
Protective action recommendations should include all appropriate and correct information for the local s
parishes. The source o't this error in the PAR and the reason for
. - + -
52 the delayed correction should be investigated and corrective measures initiated to prevent its recurrence.
7.
==
Description:==
A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish has not been completed; therefore, demonstration of this exercise objective was not accomplished (NUREG-0654,J.10.d).
Recommendation:
Complete process of obtaining listing of all mobility-impaired within Parish and demonstrate means for evacuation during next exercise.
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS e
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Description:==
Crowding and noise control were problems in the EOC operations room. At numerous times the communications officer had to request the staff to reduce the noise level so that transmission could be heard.
Recommendation: Provide noise reduction system and relocate the security guard outside the main EOC room to provide additional room.
o
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Description:==
A log of incoming / outgoing messages was not maintained.
Hard copies of incoming / outgoing messages were available but were not logged for easy reference.
Recommendation: EOC staff should initiate a logging system to record messages, and should demonstrate this sytem during next exercise.
o
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Description:==
The Emergency Action Log Board in the EOC was not used during the _ exercise.
The use of this board is needed to improve operations.
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53 Recommendation: The Emergency Action Log Board should be used to record all significant response events during future exercises and any real event.
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Description:==
There was no interaction between the local Parish EOCs. Communication flow and discussion would have improved emergency responses.
Recommendation:
Establish procedures and provide training to improve the flow of information between the five parish EOCs.
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Description:==
A list of alternatives and bac't-up personnel was not complete. All emergency staff positions were not provided with adequate back-up assignments in case of a real emergency.
Recommendation:
Complete the process already initiated to obtain qualified personnel as back-up staff.
2.2.4 West Baton Rouge Parish EOC Narrative The West Baton Rouge Parish EOC is located in the Civil Defense Office, Port Allen, Louisiana.
Only a small portion of the parish lies within the 10-mile EPZ.
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Coordination was very effectively administered by the Civil Defense Director. He held briefings, delegated responsibilities and consulted with his staff members.
Each staff member had a workbook for the exercise whien contained directions and related checklists. This appeared to be an efficient method with exception of the designation of the area for vehicle decontamination. According to the RADEF Officer's Workbook, this area was to be selected by the EOC Director. In another workbook, the location had been written in by hand.
The communications system' consists of a dedicated landline (hotline) connecting the Parish EOC with RBS. It is continuously monitored, and rings in the dispatcher's l
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54 Back-up communication capabilities are present office as well as the EOC office.
i d by through use of the facsimile system and commercial telephones. Calls were r l Event and the police dispatcher at 10:16 and 10:35 to inform the Parish of the Unusua There was a period of time when the EOC was unable to Alert classifications.
C communicate with the EOF via the facsimille but commun remained intact.
Staff mobilization procedures were effectively demonstrated using a c The EOC was staffed by the Civil Defense Director, Public Information O Dispatcher / Communicator, RADEF Officer and members of the polic l
mayor's office and police jury. Later the arrival of representatives from school district, council on aging and the utility extention office, sanitary district, company completed the staffing for the exercise. Although round-the-c In many not demonstrated, the parish plan lists both primary and back-up members.
All EOC staff appeared cases, both representatives participated in the exercise.
The number of telephones, while adequate for this scenario's adequately trained.
activities, could prove inadequate under a situation that stressed th'e E Coordination should be improved among the EOCs with respect to ale instruction. The Public Notification System was not yet operational. How f
could have simulated this activity to test their activation process and their demonstrating coordination with the other parishes and the State EOC. T direction of the plume did not necessitate demonstration of any protective The staff members did discuss as sheltering, evacuation, or traffic and access control.
handling traffic control, general population evacuation, and special evacu Addresses of the approximately 90 residents residing within the EPZ and bus available, as were the locations of the two individuals requiring special assistan Concern for their Both high-range and low-range dosimeters were available.
adequacy was raised; but it was decided the number was sufficient g7
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v 55 dosimeters could be easily obtained if needed. The confusion as to which group, and under what conditions, could receive specific doses of radiation was resolved by consulting the plans and the RADEF Officer.
Any briefings to the media center at the Joint Information Center were made through the facsimile equipment. The parish had a PIO in the EOC to serve as liaison with the WBR representatives at the JIC.
A staff member conscientiously kept the status board updated with all major undertakings of the EOC, as well as with all emergency action levels. Other necessary maps were posted.
These showed the EPZ on which the plume was tracked and protective action sectors, evacuation routes and relocation centers noted. Only two roads within the parish provide access to the EPZ. Reference, using the map, was made to the locations of the two mobility-impaired residents within the parish.
The exercise objective which relates to recovery and reentry, " Demonstrate decisionmaking and coordination with the State and Utility in de-escalating and terminating the exercise," was not tested.
'With exception of the exercise objective to " demonstrate decisionmaking and coordination of the alerting process" other objectives assigned to West Batca Rouge Parish were demonstrated.
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l DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMENDATIONS CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE l
CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE i
I AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION e
==
Description:==
One exercise objective was demonstration of effective coordination among the parishes and State EOC.
Effective coordination was not demonstre.ted among the other L
56 EOCs and RBS in public alerting and instructions. This was not simulated at the West Baton Rouge Parish EOC.
Recommendation:
Coordination with other agencies during the public alerting and notification activities should be demonstrated and evaluated during the next exercise.
e Descriotion: The times for some messages were not logged on the message sheet.
Recommendation: Assure that all message sheets have a space for showing the time of the message and advise staff members to complete it.
2.2.5 East Baton Rouge Parish Participation in the exercise related to East Baton Rouge Parish EOC functions and reception center activities at Riverside Centroplex (including monitoring, decontamination and registration efforts). Each of these activities will be addressed individually according to location. Generally, assigned objectives were met with the following exceptions:
(1)
" Demonstration of ability to make appropriate decisions and to coordinate emergency activities."
(See deficiency under Reception Center Section.)
(2)
" Demonstrate organizational ability and resources necessary to evacuate mobility-impaired individuals within the affected area."
l (Identification of locations of mobility-impaired not yet developed.)
The follow.ng exercise objectives for East Baton Rouge Parish were not tested:
(1)
" Demonstrate decistori making and coordination with the State l
and utility in de-escalating and terminating the emergency."
57 Only in-house discussions were - conducted of general recovery / reentry problems.
(2)
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation.
(3)
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to the evacuated area.
East Baton Rouge Parish EOC Narrative The East Baton Rouge EOC is an excellent facility for responding to a radiological emergency.
More than sufficient furniture, space and amenities were I
available to maintain operations over extended periods of time; back-up power was also available. All appropriate maps and status boards were available and updated as the conditions changed.
1 Activation and staffing of the EOC were performed in a timely fashion. The initial call from the utility over the blue phone hotline was received at 10:13 I
(Notification of Unusual Event). Some staffing occurred initially at this time, and the EOC was fully staffed at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The transfer of r,esponsibilities between the EMS dispatcher to the CD dispatcher should include a briefing so the CD dispatcher is aware of the current status of the situation. All appropriate emergency response organizations were present, and the Civil Defense Director was in telephone contact with the Mayor / President.
The East Baton Rouge EOC management and staff were excellent. The EOC contains the fire, police and EMS communication / dispatcher as well as a civil defense system. The staff for the most part, was well trained; procedures were followed and l
checklists were available to each ' department and were used during the day.
The l
l operation office gave briefings as situations changed. The CD Director was in charge l
and was informed of what was going on.
~
58 1
Fire, police, EMS, and civil The EOC has an excellent communications system.
hot line defense communication systems are alllocated within the EOC. The EO mittals were late telephone to the EOF with a facsimile back-up system. Some fax trans iff's in receipt at the EOC. Radio and telephone capabilit:es exist to the The EBS radio station is office, local EOCs; and, telephone capability exists to LNED.
Communications by radio are available to hospitals and ambu located in the EOC.
i h schools in (HEAR system) and to school buses. Tone alert radios are to be install For some incoming messages, the CD communication disp the near future.
i d in not verify the information received; this was evident in sector design classification of events.
OC.
An excellent system for protective action recommendations ex il ble to Based on the dose projections and meteorological data, a scenario in i
ctions.
easily and clearly identify predefined evacuation and sheltering protect ve The EOC played a role in public alerting since the broadcas They did not notify the EBS l
within the EOC are used for release of EBS messages.
lling EBS station of any upcoming need for a broadcast although they did simula It was not observed Lt this EOC if when the message was ready to be broadcast.
fh 2:26 p.m. EBS coordination among all of the EOCs occurred regarding development o t e I
A better understanding needs to be demonstrated in the ne d timing of EBS massage.
regarding the coordination of messages with all parish directors an messages with siren sounding at alllocal EOCs.
Evacuation of school children was simulated by having some i The sheriff's office has responsibility for road blocks, the Centroplex in Baton Rouge.
i h support from Baton traffic flow and control points in East Baton Rouge Parish w t Procedures are adequate Rouge police, the public works departments and State police.
Traffic control and personnel and equipment are s'ufficient to control an evacuation h.
efforts, an exercise objective, was simulated'at the EOC.
^
J m
(
b
59 The location of mobility-impaired individuals is not currently known; however, the utility has sent out questionnaires to all individuals within the ten-mile EPZ asking them to respond if they need help. Arrangements to evacuate these individuals are made and responsibilities assigned by the department within the EOC. The only schoolin East Baton Rouge Parish (sector 13) is a private, child care school. The EOC has a call-down procedure to this school and buses are available to evacuate the students if necessary.
The Georgia Pacific Plant is located in sector 14; the EOC also has a call down procedure to this plant.
All appropriate radiological exposure control equipment was available and dispensed to both EOC personnel and the emergency workers. The supply of dosimeters was adequate, and the emergency response staff reported their individual exposures to the RADEF officer every 30 minutes.
The EOC has a public affairs office at the EOC and a utility liaison public information officer. The PIO stays in telephone contact with the parish PIO at the Utility Joint Information Center (JIC), and all press releases are made from the JIC. No l
press briefings are made from the EOC; thus, no space is set aside in the EOC for the i
press. Information was slow in receipt from the JIC to the EOC, especially on situation changes.
General recovery and reentry issues were discussed during the closing critique.
However, as they related to the assigned exercise objective, they were not tested.
Overall, the participants felt the scenario was adequate to test the objectives and emergency staff at the East Baton Route EOC.
60 DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS CATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES:
8.
==
Description:==
A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish had not been completed; therefore, demonstration of this exercise objective was not accomplished.
(NUREG-0654, J.10.d)
Recommendation:
Complete process of obtaining listing of all mobility-impaired within Parish and demonstrate means for evacuation during next exercise.
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS e
==
Description:==
The Civil Defense Dispatcher was not aware of the current status of activation of the EOC and the plant when he bagan dispatching activities.
Recommendation: Brief the Civil Defense Dispatcher on the major status conditions (staff activation level, plant status, etc.) before he assumes the responsibility for obtaining information frocn the utility over the hotilne, o
==
Description:==
There appeared to be some confusion over coordination of simulation of siren sounding and EBS message dissemination within the EOC and between all parish EOCs.
Recommendatien: Review procedures and include a full testing of procedures for coordination of siren sounding and EBS dissemination at the next exercise.
State and parishes should review the action of titis exercise to determine what agency was responsible for the breakdown in coordination.
c
61 I
e Descriotion:
Message copying errors were identified, i.e.,
the wrong emergengy action level and sector designation were checked on the message form.
i Recommendation:
Identify why message copy errors occurred; devise verification system and/or use the phonetic alphabet for sector letter designations.
o
==
Description:==
The EBS stations were not notified during initial or follow-up notif' cations. (NUREG-0654, E.5.)
Recom mendation: Include, as the SOPS state, the EBS stations as part of the initial and follow-up notifications.
Reception Center - Riverside Centroplex Narrative The demonstration of staffing went well despite the absence of a vital resource, 4 men;ger.
Staff arrived and were able to set up their sections; but they lacked leadership from sormr,r 10 give direction, answer questions and work with the staff of the Centroplex. Regardless, the groups worked together exceptionally well. The Red Cross group had previously worked on disasters with registration and case work. The Family Service and the Council on Aging personnel were knowledgeable of their duties.
The Red Cross workers addressed the need for a nurse at the center in the event I
l any evacuees became ill. As it turned out, nursing support was being simulated by the Health Department but this was unknown to the controller and evaluator.
- The registration process went very well. The form developed for registration is one of the best the evaluator has seen; its use was effectively demonstrated. Positive attitudes. professional management and flexibility were demonstrated by all emergency response personnel.
The Centroplex is an exceptional facility and would allow registration of many evacuees without crowding.
62 l
l Appropriate monitoring and decontamination procedures were demonstrated during the exercise. A bus and private vehicle were both monitored and decontaminated at the reception center. Initial screening of the private vehicle showed that both the evacuee and his vehicle were contaminated.
Excellent discussion of procedures and methods for improved performance accompanied the decontamination of the evacuee.
Procedures for wash-down of the vehicle were also reviewed, as were the proper procedures for handling the radioactive wastes (clothing, washwater, etc.). Overall, a l
very good display of capability was demonstrated.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS C ATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE C ATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES i
9.
==
Description:==
There was a lack of direction, leadership, and 1
information to the Centroplex Reception Center Sta'f. (NUREG-0654, !!, A.1.d)
Recommendation: A manager for this large center is necessary for coordination of volunteers and emergency response activities. A manager is needed to ensure that communications flow is accurate and timely; that messages are reported to proper staff, and content explained when necessary.
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMM'ENDATIONS e
Descriotion: Sultable seating was not available during registration for evacuees and for emergency response personnel.
Recommendation:
Provide adequate seating arrangements for evacuees and emergency response personnel.
i 1
i J
63 Decontamination - Zachary High School Narrative The wash down (decontamination) facility is located at the Zachary High School, approximately half way between the River Bend Station and Baton Rouge, LA.
Decontamination procedures were demonstrated for vehicles and personnel during the exercise. The surveys were made using the standard CD survey meter CDV-700. If higher than background.01 mR/Hr is detected, the vehicle or person is decontaminated.
l Scans of the interior and exterior of the vehicle were made and were adequate to detect any contamination. Contamination was removed from the interior of the vehicle with a portable vacuum and tape. The contaminated exterior then was washed with a fire hose. The decontamination area was roped off and radiation area warning signs posted. It was noticed that during the wash down some water splashed on one of the workers. He left the area without being surveyed to see if he was contaminated.
Equipment and standard decontamination procedures were demonstrated and were adequate. The facility is adequate and can handle approximately 10 vehicles and 12 persons per hour.
Contaminated water from the showers goes directly in the Zachary sewer system. An old swimming pool which has been filled with sand and gravel is used for washdown of vehicles. Water from the wash down filters down into the sand and gravel and does not run off. Contaminated sand and gravel can be removed if needed after the e mergency.
The Zachary Fire Chief was handed a message by the controller that one of his men reported that his dosimeter had a reading of 35R. The firechief then declared the man dead. It was determined later that by " dead" he was in effect removing the man from duty.
According to the chief he removes all workers from duty when SR of exposure are reached.
64 4
At a critique before leaving the staging area, the evaluator discussed with the Fire Chief that he was looking for a response which provided the following: (1) A determination of the areas where this emergency worker has been, (2) whether other personnel were with him, (3) their dosimeter readings, (4) whether a radiological survey 4
had been made of the worker, and (5) whether the worker was actually contaminated or the reading due to a possible equipment failure?
After the chief had declared the emergency worker " dead," the controller provided him with a message that the worker had dropped his dosimeter.
The Zachary Fire Chief was handed a message by the controller that one of his men had a 2R reading on his 0-20R dosimeter, and a O reading on his 0-200R dosimeter.
The chief responded to the problem that he would just ce "zero" the 0-20R dosimeter. At the critique the evaluator expressed that he was looking for a response similar to the above response and that it would be difficult to read 2R on a 0-200R dosimeter.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS C ATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE C ATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES - NONE AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION e
==
Description:==
One worker who had been splashed with possibly contaminated water left the area without being surveyed. Also, it was not determined in another instance whether the equipment failed or a worker was contaminated.
e Recommendation: Offer additional training to the Zachary " wash-down" facility staff on the correct procedures of decontamination and the use of dosimete'es.
i.
4 4
65 2.3 MEDICAL SUPPORT West Feliciana Hospital Narrative The West Feliciana Hospitallocated in St. Francisville was requested to respond to and treat an injured, contaminated patient. The Parish hospital also operates the local ambulance service which has two vehicles. Staffing of the ambulance is by emergency room personnel.
There is a communications base station located within the nurses station. Also, a
" hotline" is installed with a direct link to the plant. Communications exist between hospital and ambulance. A sheriff's radio is also available within the hospital and in each ambulance.
The hospital was notified at 12:12 p.m. to send an ambulance in response to a contaminated, injured person at the plant. The ambulance crew responded immediately.
Excellent communications took place from the ambulance personnel to the hospital personnel concerning patient information and estimated time of arrival. The ambulance arrived with the patient at approximately 12:40 p.m. The ambulance crew members were wearing protective clothing and dosimeters. There was one problem observed followir.g the removal of the patient from the ambulance; and that related to the fact that no one surveyed the vehicle. and not all ambulance crew members were surveyed for contamination. Good security measures were demonstrated around the vehicle outside the hospital.
l The injured, contaminated patient was accompanied by a utility health physicist who was wearing protective clothing.
The hospital had an excellent radiological management room set up with outstanding equipment available to them. The radiological management room (RMR) had a separate entranee and was very well designed.
A physician was in charge of proced'ures. Both he and his hospital staff demonstrated excellent training techniques and procedures in (1) preparing the radiological emergency
66 management area and wearing protective clothing and dosimeters; (2) establishing good communications with the patient; (3) decontaminating the patient; (4) " hotline" procedures (not contaminating the remainder of the room); (5) excellent communication between physician and utility H.P.; (6) patient surveying techniques by the utility H.P.,
and (7) exit procedures in removing protective clothing.
Also, proper disposal and security of contaminated clothing, etc., was handled effectively.
Overall, the emergency room staff and ambulance crew (with exception of one problem mentioned previously) were well trained and are capable of handling a radiological emergency in an adequate manner.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS C ATEGORY "A" DEFICIENCIES - NONE CATEGORY "B" DEFICIENCIES 10.
==
Description:==
The ambulance vehicle which transported the injured, contaminated patient was not surveyed. Also, not all of the ambulance crew members were surveyed for contamination following exchange of patient to hospital staff. (NUREG-0654, II., L.4)
Recommendation:
Ensure during next exercise that both ambulance vehicle and all ambulance crew members are surveyed.
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS None 2.4 UTILITY SUPPORT l
A summary is provided below of some of the Gulf States Utilities' problems l
which relate to or impact upon the off-site activities performed by the various Louisiana l
l
67 State and local Parish participating agencies. This is presented because the Federal evaluators determined that several of the problems encountered at the off-site locations were caused or compounded by deficiencies in the Utility operations during the exercise. FEMA realizes that we cannot designate a Category "A" or "B" deficiency against the Utility. However, these noted deficiencies need to be addressed by the NRC and/or Utility to prevent their recurrence during future exercises or a real emergency at River Bend Station, and to allow for a full demonstration of off-site emergency preparedness capabilities.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS e
Descriotion: Issuance to State and local agencies of messages (EBS, Follow-Up Notifications, Protective Action Recommend-ations, and other needed hard copy verifications) was excessively delayed due to the inoperability of the facsimile machine.
Transmittals were often so late that their meaning was inappropriate by the time they were received. A request from one of the Parishes for verification of the Protective Action Recommendations for that Parish took 43 minutes before the verification was received. (See Pointe Coupe Parish.) Likewise, issuances were excessively late to other Parishes when they were awaiting verifications of verbal instructions from the State, the EOF, and other Parishes.
Recommendation: Determine the problems which caused break-down of the equipment; have checked and operaole before next exercise. Maintain readiness in case of a real incident at RBS.
e Descriotion: In one Parish, Public Information Brochures had not been fully distributed to all residents of the Parish within 10 miles from the plant.
,e a
- - - -. ~ -.
68 Recommendation: Determine those areas where full distribution has not been made and provide brochures.
e
==
Description:==
State and Parish media activities at the JIC were directed by the Utility, rather than by the PIOS as provided for in the State / Parish plans. It was documented that liaison between the PIOS at the parishes and the JIC did not function as intended; that in some cases the PIOS at the parish did not know what their duties were. State and Local PIOS have assignment by their plans to provide emergency public information through prompt and accurate information to the news media.
This ~
not was demonstrated effectively during the exercise. Likewise, Rumor Control, while very efficiently handled by GSU, is a responsibility assigned by their plans to the State and Parish governments.
Recommendation: Training which previously has been provided'by the Utility to the PIOS should be expanded to include all PIOS -
both at the parishes and the JIC - and should include, perhaps in the form of Standard Operating Procedures, delineation of their duties during an exercise or emergency.
Leadership of the State / Parish media relations at the JIC should be provided by State or Parish PIOS. Additionally, Parish representatives should be assigned to Rumor Control functions at the JIC. Or, if the present arrangement of Utility leadership in all media functions at RBS has been given to GSU by the State of Louisiana, the State and Parish radiological emergency preparedness plans should be revised to show media relations as a utility responsibility.
,y m
--_n,r.
69 e
==
Description:==
The ambulance vehicle which transported the injured, contaminated patient was not surveyed. Also, not all of the ambulance crew members were surveyed for contamination following exchange of patient to hospital staff. (NUREG-0654, II., L.4)
Recommendation:
Ensure during next exercise that both ambulance vehicle and all ambulance crew members are surveyed.
l l
t
(
i l
l l
l L
s'
4 70 3 DEFICIENCY TRACKING AND SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Section 2 of this exercise report has provided a listing of deficiencies with recommendations noted by federal evaluators during the most recent exercise conducted on January 16, 1985. The evaluations were based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of the NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (November 1980) and exercise objectives.
The FEMA Region VI director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies noted in the exercise will be corrected and such corrections will also be incorporated into the emergency response plans as appropriate.
FEMA Region VI may request that the State of Louisiana and local jurundictions participating in the River Bend exercise submit measures that they will take or intend to take in correcting those deficiencies found by the federal evaluators. If corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region VI will request that a detailed plan, including dates for scheduling and implementing remedial action, be provided if remedial action cannot be instituted immediately.
Table 1 provides a consolidated summary of all deficiencies by jurisdiction. The table is designed so that space has been allowed to add: (1) the proposed corrective actions that have been recommended and (2) the projected and actual date of completion.
The listing has been broken down in the table by category "A" and "B" deficiencies. As noted, there were no Category "A" deficiencies found in the River Bend off-site radiological emergency response preparedness exercise.
-c-.
---w
TAllI.E I Remedial Acilons for the January 16,1985 River llend Exercise FEMA Evaluation of State and Local 0
Deliciencies and FEMA /MAC State (S) and Local (I.)
Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Recommendations for Proposed Corrective Compl et ion And Determination of Compl et ion i
Corrective Actions Actions Date Adequacy or inadequacy Date i
9 tjr STATE EOC:
i S
Category "A" Deficiencies:
None Category "B" Deficiencies:
1.
Desc ri pt ion: Coordination and, interaction by the State EOC with the five local parish EOCs was in-adequate for meeting the needs of the parishes espe-u" cially with regard to con-currence on EBS message development and timing of the messages with the pa ri shes ' responsibilities
}
for siren sounding, alert-ing, etc.
(NUREC-0654, A.2.a.)
Recommendation: Procedures Develop methods to expe-Prior to Will evaluate at next and requirements should be dite message flowl modify next exercise.
reviewed relating to con-procedures for use of exercise.
l currence with parishes on precanned messages for development of the EMS all five parishes and the
' messages and for coor-hotline conference call dinating the issuance of to the parishes for ad-messages with the sounding visement and concurrent of sirens, etc.
This coor-on the EBS message and dination should be demon-time of sounding of strated between the five sirens prior to EMS parishes and the State EOC.
broadcast.
6
5?,fp;a. F, y -
7 W.
- .1
- w:
<:g
]ShSO es '.:.
v.
TAlli.E I (Cont'd)
-f-FEMA Evaluation of-State and 1.ocal Actual Corrective Actions And Deterinination of Compl et i on State (S) and Local ( L)
Proposed Compl et ion Deficiencies and FEMA /NAC Proposed Corrective Adequacy or inadequacy Date Date Reconenendations f or Actions Corrective Actions t
WEST FELICI ANA PARISil EOC s
Category "A" Deficiencies:
- ~,-
None Category "ll" Deticiencies:
E,q.
2.
the sc ri pt ion: The RADEF
^f ollicer did not survey 3
emergency workers for con-
@5 Lamination until two hours y
alter there was a release
[lh, of radioactivity from the Furthermore, emer-pl ant.
gency workers were allowed to enter the EOC before beiug surveyed; thus, the EOC and its staf f could be unnecessarily exposed.
(NUREC-0654, K.3.a.)
Will evaluate at next Prior to llave revised procedure exercise.
Reconenendation: Emergency next for the RADEF officer exercise.
workers should be surveyed which will reflect the f or contrmination outside need to survey workers i ;
the EOC after there has prior to entry into the D
been a release of radio-EOC; additional support active materials from the personnel wiii be identi-func-River llend Plant.
fied to assure that tions such as zeroing dosimeters, surveys, etc are accomplished in a
~
j timely fashion,
i TAlli.E I (Cont'd)
FEMA Evaluation of State and 1.ocal Deficiencies and FEMA /MAC State (S) and Local (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Recommendations for Proposed Corrective Compl et ion And Determination of Compl et ion Corrective Actions Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy Date WEST FEl.ICI ANA PARISil:
(Cont'd) 3.
==
Description:==
A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within the Parish had not been completed.
(NUREC-0654, J.10.d.)
Hecommendation: Compl et e Mobility-impaired resi-Prior to Will evaluate at next j
process of obtaining dents' listing will be next exercise.
O listing of all mobility completed, and responses exercise.
impaired within Parish and used by thEP to generate i
demonstrate means for master list with a copy evacuation during next to be provided the exercise.
parishest listing will also be included in EAST FEI.ICI ANA PARISil appropriate implementing procedure and referenced Category "A" Deficiencies:
in scenario data books.
None Category "H" Deficiencies:
4.
De sc ri pt ion: The Sheriff's phone at the EOC does not have a direct line to the Sheriff's office in Clinton, lie must use an alternate number and have messages forwarded.
(NUREC-0654, F.I.a.)
4
.m.
u,.
F TAlllE I (Cont'd)
FEHA Evaluation of State and Local Deficiencies and FEHA/RAC State (S) and I.ocal (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Act ual Recousnendations f or Proposed Corrective Compl et ion And Determination of Completion Corrective Actions Actions Date Adequacy or inadequacy Date EAST FEl.ICI ANA PARISil (Cont'd) s Recommendation: A direct Will discuss with CSU a Resolved Will reevaluate at next Iine should be provided proposal to include an prior to exercise.
het ween either the Sher-alternate direct line at next if f's Of fice -- or the EOC the EOC for direct com-exercise.
-- and the Sheriff's office munication between the in Clinton, sheriff's office in y
Clinton and the EOC.
l'OINTE COUPEE PARISil Category "A" Deficiencies:
None Category "B" Deficiencies:
i 5.
De sc ri pt ion: Effective coordination cannot he assured between Pointe I
Coupee Parish and the other EOCs and RBS in public alerting and instruc-Lions. This was not simu-lated at Pointe Coupee Parish. (NUREC-0654, A.2a.; E.5,6) f I
TAlli.E I (ContNI)
~
FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Deliciencies and FEHA/RAC State (S) and Local (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Hecommendations for Proposed Corrective Compl et ion And Determination of Compl et inn Corrective Actions Actions _
Date Adequacy or inadequacy Date Recomunenda t i on : Coordina-Develop methods to expe-Prior to Will evaluate at next tion with other agencies dite message flow; modify next exercise.
during the public alerting procedures for use of exercise.
and notification should be pre-canned messages for demonstrated and evaluated all five parishes, and at the nemt exercise.
the hotline conference call to the parishes for advisement and concur-rence on the EBS message j
and time of sounding of sirens prior to EBS hroadcast.
i R
i
~ ~,
~
a t
TAllt.E I (Cont'd)
FEMA Evaluation of State and I.ocal Deficiencies and FEMA /MAC State (S) and Local (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Recommendations for Proposed Corrective Complet ion And Determination af Completion Date Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy Corrective Actions t'
PulNT COUPEE PARISH (Cont'd) 6.
Desc ri pt ion: Protective Action recommendations were not correct or complete; shel tering recommendations were not included in the
-.4 initial message. Request or for clarification and correction was made but no response received until 43 minutes had elapsed.
(NUREC-0654, E.)
Heconenendat i on: Protective Are presently revising Prior to Will evaluate at next exercise.
the notification forms; next Action Recommendations must
- exercise, include all appropriate and problem with fax machines correct information for the traced to a telephone line problem; have in-local parishes. The source of this error in the PAR st ruct ed parish person-and reason for the delay in nels in the two mecha-nisms for clarif ying correcting should be PAR's - hotIine between investigated and measures taken to prevent its parishes, LNED, and CSU conclusion of notifi-at recurrence.
cation; and contact to the State EOC to request clarification; training and drills in future will include this guidance.
TAllt.E I (Cont'd)
~
FEHA Evaluation of State and Local lieticiencies and FEMA /RAC State (S) and Local (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Hecommendations for Proposed Corrective Completion And Determination of Compl et ion Corrective Actions Actions Date Adequacy or inadequacy Date POINTE COUPHE (Cont'd) 7.
A listing of the locations of mobil i t y-impa i red res,idents within the Parish had not been completed; theref ore, demonst ration of the exercise objective was not accomplished. (NUREC-
's 0654, J.10.d.)
Hecommendation: Compl et e Hobility-impaired resi-Prior to Will evaluate at next process of obtaining dents' listing will be next exercise.
listing of all mobility-completed, and responses exercise.
impaired within Parish and used by LOEP to generate demonstrate means for master list with a copy evacuation during next to be provided the par-exercise.
ishes; listing will also be included in appro-priate implementing procedure and referenced in scenario data books.
l 4
TAllt.K I (Cont'd)
FEMA Evaluation of State and Local peticiencies ar.d FEMA /RAC State (S) and Local (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Recommendations for Proposed Corrective Complet ion And Determination of Completion Corrective Actions Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy Date EAST BATON ROUCE PARISil Category "A" Deficiencies:
None Category "B" Deficiencies:
8.
Desc ri pt ion: A listing of the locations of mobility-impaired residents within y
the Parish had not been completed. Therefore, demonstration of this exercise objective was not accomptished. (NUREC-0654,J.10.d.)
Recomunendat ion : Compl et e Mobility-impaired Prior to Will evaluate at next process of obtaining residents' Iisting wilI next exercise.
listing of all mobility-be completed and exercise.
impaired within Parish and responses used by IDEP to demonstrate means for generate master list with evacuation during next a copy to be provided the
- exercise, parishes; listing will also be included in appropriate implementing procedure and referenced in scenario data books.
TAlli.l? I (Cont'd) f i
FEMA Evaluation of State and I.ocal Deficiencies and FENA/RAC State (S) and I.ocal (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Hecommendations for Proposed Corrective Compl et ion And Determination of Compl et ion Corrective Actions Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy Date i
RECEI'rION CENTER - RIVERSIDE CENTROPl.EX Category "A" Deliciencies:
None Category "B" Deficiencies:
9.
Desc ri pt ion: There was a lack of direction, leader-g ship, and information pro-vided to the staff of the Metroplex Riverside Centro-plex cue to lack of a manager.
(NUREC-0654, A.I.d.)
Recommendation: A manager Cent roplex manager has Prior to Backup manager should be is necessary for coordina-been briefed on his next trained in duties. Will tion of volunteers and duties as Director of
- exercise, evaluate at next exer-emergency response activ-reception center; he has cise.
ities and to provide indicated availability direction to the staff for participation in members.
future exercises; hackup manager has been iden-l tified f rom EOC staf f.
?
I I
..a lt
,t.
l l
TAlli.E I (Cont'd)
FEMA Evaluation of State and Local Deliciencies and FEMA /RAC State (S) and I.ocal (L)
Proposed Corrective Actions Actual Proposed Corrective Complet ion And Determination of Completion Date Actions Date Adequacy or Inadequacy stecommendations f or Corrective Actions WEST FELICI ANA 110SPITAI.
Category "A" Deficiencies:
None Category "B" Deficieneies:
10.
==
Description:==
The ambulance vehicle which 8
transported the injured, contaminated patient was not surveyed. Also, not all of the ambulance crew members were surveyed for contamination following exchange of the patient to hospital staff. (NUREC-0654, l. 4.)
Recommendation: Ensure This problem cannot be Prior to After determination of whose responsibility it resolved until a formal next during next exercise that discussion with CSU is exercise.
is and written notifi-both the ambulance vehicle cation of I'EHA, FEMA arranged after report is will reevaluate at next and all ambulance crew members are surveyed for finalized.
exercise.
contamination.
i
81 4 EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 4.1
SUMMARY
OF FEMA OBJECTIVES REMAINING TO BE MET Table 2 provides a listing of those FEMA objectives which, according to the FEMA RAC Chairman, have not been satisfactorily met or tested and which should be incorporated into the exercise objectives by the fifth year of the five-year period in which all the objectives should be tested. These should be considered in the develooment of future exercise objectives; as well as those FEMA objectives which, although previous 1v tested and satisfactorily demonstrated, must be tested and evaluated during any exerei e of off-site State and Local response capabilities.
o I
t l
i l
l i
- ::n 82 TABLE 2 Summary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met Jurisdiction and Deficiency (if applicable)
FEMA Objective & NUREC Reference State and Parishes Demonstrate ability to fully staff Not Tested 1-16-85 2.
facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
(A.2.a A.4)
State & Parish:
Demonstrate ability to make decisions State EOC Def #1
^
3.
and to coordinate emergency activities.
Pointe Coupee (A.l.d.,
e., A.2.a)
EOC Def #5 State & Parishes Demonstrate ability to communicate with E. Feliciana EOC Parish 5.
all appropriate locations, organizations, Def. #4 Partially met by State & all and field personnel.
(F.)
other Parishes (No backup communications tested.)
Partially met by State and Demonstrate appropriate equipment 1-16-85 9.
and procedures for collection, trans-(Sample analyzation not analysis of samples of soil, water and milk.
(I.8) tested)
- port, vegetation, snow, 5 -.
Not tested 1-16-85 State:
Demonstrate ability to project dosage to 11.
the public via ingestion pathway expo-sure, based on field data; and to deter-mine appropriate protective measures based on PAC's and other relevant (I.10., I.11., J.11) factors.
State and Parishes Demonstrate ability to implement pro-Not tested 1-16-85 12.
tactive actions for ingestion pathway hazards.
(J.9., J.11)
Parishes: Pointe Coupee Demonstrate ability to alert the public Def. #5; Not tested by 13.
witin the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate East Bacon Rouge and an initial instructional message within West Baton Rouge Parishes (E.6, Append 3) 15 minutes.
1,.
t '
3
[
ua.'. '
,4" > -
21...
?hT[M.
'-****r%
WWe+-+9-y.
83 TJUBLE 2 (Cont'd)
Jurisdiction and Deficiency FEMA Objective & NUREC Reference (if applicable) 14 Demonstrate ability to formulate and dis-S:ste ard Parishes tribute appropriate instructions to the Not tested public in a timely fashion.
(E.5., E.7)
- 15. Demonstrate organizational ability and Parishes: Not tested by East resources necessary to manage an orderly Baton Rouge Parish, West evacuation of all or part of the plume Baton Rouge Parish, Pointe EPZ.
(J.9., J.10.a., g.)
Coupee Parish 16.
Demonstrate organizational ability and Parishes: Not tested 1-16-85 resources necessary to deal with impedi-by East Bacon Rouge, E.
ments to evacuation, as inclement weather Feliciana, Pointe Coupee, or traffic obstructions.
(J.10.k)
West Baton Rouge Parishes 17.
Demonstrate organizational ability and Parishes: Not tested by resources necessary to control access to East Baton Rouge, West Baton an evacuated area.
(J.10.j.)
Rouge, East Feliciana, Pointe Coupee Parishes 18.
Demonstrate organizational ability and Parishes:
Deficiency #3, resources necessary to effect an orderly West Feliciana Parish; evacuation of mobility-impaired Def $7, Pointe Coupee Parish; individuals within the plume EPZ.
Def #8 East Bacon Rouge (J.10.d)
Parish i
19.
Demonstrate organizational ability and Parishes: Not tested 1-16-85 resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.
(J.9., J.10.g) 20.
Demonstrate ability to continuously Parishes: West Feliciana monitor and control emergency worker Parish Deficiency d2; Not exposure.
(K.3.a.,b.)
tested by other parishes 21.
Demonstrate ability to make the decision, State: Not tested 1-16-85 based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.
(J.10.f)
84 Tid 3LE 2 (Cont'd)
Jurisdiction and Deficiency FEMA Objective & NUREC Reference (if applicable) 22.
Demonstrate ability to supply and State / Parishes:
Not tested administer KI, once the decision has 1-16-85 been made to do so.
(J.10.e.)
23.
Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly State: Not tested 1-16-85 evacuation of onsite personnel.
(J.2) 28.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for State /Pa rishes : Not tested mass care of evacuees.
(J.10.h) 1-16-85 29.
Demonstrate adequate equipment and pro-Parishes: West Feliciana cedures for decontamination of emergency Hospital Deficiency #10 workers, equipment and vehicles.
(K.5.a.,b,)
32.
Demonstrate ability to identify need for, State: Not tested 1-16-85 request, and obtain Federal assistance.
(C.l.,a.b.)
- 33. Demonstrate ability to estimate total State: Not tested 1-16-85 population exposure.
(M.4) 34 Demonstrate ability to determine and State / Parishes: Not tested implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.
(M.1)
- 35. Demonstrate the ability to effectively States / Parishes:
Not tested call upon and utilize outside support agencies when local capabilities are exceeded.
(C.4)
- 38. Demonstrate capability to effectively Parishes:
Not met by Pointe process all incoming messages in a Coupee Parish i
timely manner.
(E.)
85 4.2 FEMA OBJECTIVES MET OR YET TO BE ACHIEVED Table 3 provides a comprehensive summary of FEMA objectives, NUREG-0654 reference elements, River Berd Station, State, and Local exercise objectives and jttrisdictional responsibility for demonstration.
Additionally, it identifies those objectives which were satisfactorily met, those which have not been tested to date, and those forwhich a deficiency was documented during the past exercise.
-.----.-w--
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=
TAlel.R 3 Objectives RBel er Yet le be Aehleved - N1ver llenel Stallon NOTE: Parish identificellen Code West Fellclana = WFell East Fellelano = E. Fell Pointe coupee = P.Cou.I East Italon Rouge = EllRI West flaton Rouge a WitR Page I of 16 Deficiency Dat e Jurisdictional Not ed
- N i.,..t!%,
IfuREC-0656 Jawary 16. 1985 Responsibilit y Date of (8y Deficiency Met PPJt4 Object ives Reference Esercise objective State I.oc al Esercise Tracking too.)
St at e 1.nc el I.
Demonstrate ability to mobiliae E.I. E.2 Demonstrat e the ability to alert I
l-86-05 l-16-85 stall and activate facilities l5&Ll St at e agencies' emergency response promptly.
personnel, activate and staf f Parieh EOC.
(Objective for ednich capability el.ne.ld be demonstrated during Demonstrate the abilit y to alert I
l-16-85 l-16-85 each esercise)
Pa r i elt emergency response personnel, activate and staff Parish EOC.
Demonstrate the ability to alert the I
l-16-85 l-16-85 staf f and activata a reception center, 2.
Demonstrate ability to fully A.2.a.
evalf facilities and maintain A.6 etaffing around the cloch.
l5&t.l 3.
Demonstrate ability to esbe A.I.d.e.
Demonstrate the ability to aske I
I l-16-85 Deficiency fl -
Blot met Not Het decisions and to coordinate A.2.s appropriate decisions and to State EOC Rece pt ion emergency activites.
lS&L) coordinate emergency activities.
Deficiency #9 Center Reception Ctr R.C.
(01s)ectives for wInich capability should be demonst rated during Demonstrate decision making and I
l-16-85 Deficiency f5 Mot Met each eserciee) coordination of the alerting process Pointe Coupee P. Cou.
for the public within the af fected EOC area.
Not Te st ed Erit Whd
. e TA8N.8! 3 (CoalW)
Page 2 of 14 Deficiency Date Jurisdictional Noted Objective Numec-6654 January 16, 1985 Neo pens ibil it y Date of (Ny Deficiency Met FEMA Ob}ectives Reference Esercise Objective State Loc al Esercise Tracking No.)
State 1.oc al 4
D.monst rate adequacy of C 3.a.,
Demonst rat e that the State EOC is I
l-16-85 1-16-85 f acilities and displays to N.3 adequate to support emergency support emergency operations.
(S&Ll functions.
(Ob ject ive for which capability Demonstrate that t he Parish EOCs are I
l-16-85 l-16-85 should be demonstrated during adequate to support emergenc y each esercise) func t i on s.
5.
Atmonst rate a eilty to commu-P Demons t rat e communicat ione cap-I l-16-85 Partially nicate with all appropriate IS&Lj abilities among the following Met locat ione, organlaatione and facilities RBS, Parish E0Co, State field personnel.
BOC, EBS Station, Joint Information Cent er, & IDED (No backup coassunica-(Ob jectives for which capability tion tested) should be demonstrated during each esercise) bemonst rate the abilit y to commu-I l-16-85 Partially nicate with State dispatched field Met personnel.
s Demonst rat e communicat ione cap-I l-16-85 Deficier.cy f4 abilities among the f ollowing East reliciana
. Partially met by facilities:
- WFel, LOC, EBS Station, Joint Information ERE, WBR,
Center, Local Special Pacilities, LNED P. Cou.
(No backup communication demonst rated)
Not met by E.Fel Demonstrate communicat ions bet ween t he I
l-16-85 l-16-85 Parish EOC and Parish dispatched field
~
pe rs onnel.
k
e O
TAlti.E 3 (Coel%I)
Page 3 of 14 De ficiency Dat e Jurisdictional Noted Objective
.j NUREC-0654 January 16, 1985 Res pons i bil it y Date of (By Deficiency Met FEMA Objectives Reference Esercise Objective State Loc al F.s erci se Tracking No.)
State Local 6.
Demonst rate ability to mobiliae 1.5 Demonstrate abilit y to mobilize and I
l-16-85 I-16-85 I
and deploy field monitoring l5&L) deploy field monitoring teams.
teams in a timely f ashion.
b (Objective far which capability should be demonstrated during each esercies)
F.
Demonst rate appropriate equip-I.S. l.Il Demonstrate appropriate equipment and I
l-16-85 1-16-85 i
ment and procedures for deter-
{l.5-5&L]
procedures for determining ambient mining ambient radiation levels.
fl.II-Sl radiation.
(Objective for which capability should be demonstratesi during each esercise) 8.
bemonst rate appropriate equip-I.9 Demonstrate appropriate equipment and I
l-16-85 l-16-85 ment and procedures f or l5&Ll procedures f or measurement of measurement of airborne radio-airborne radioindine.
loJine cancentratione se low as 80'I eCi/CC in the presence of noble gases.
(Objective for which capability should be demonstrated during each esercise) l t
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t wat Ff t e t cio e
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TAftl.E 3 (CoalW)
Page 6 et le Deficiency Dat e Jurisdictional Weted Ob jec t ive NIstEC-8654 January 16, 1985 acapansibilit y Date of (sy ceficiency mt FEMA objectives Reference Esercise Objective State 1.oc al Esercise Tracting 18o.)
St at e Local 15.
Demonst rate organisational J.9, Demonstrate the organlaational I
I-16-85 ht by ability and resources necessary J.10.a.s ability and researces necessary to P.cou.
to manage en orderly evacuation lS&Li manage an orderly evacuation of E.Fel of all or part of the plume EPI.
part of the plume RP2.
W.Fel Not (Objective for which capability Te st ed should be demonstrated during each esercise)
E BR.W#R 16.
Demonstrate organisational J.le.k Demonstrate the organlaational I
l-16-85 Met by ability and resources necessary lS&L) ability and resources necessary to W.Fel to deal with impediment s to deal with impedimente to evacuation.
Het Tested evacuation, se inclement Otter weather or traffic obetructions.
Parishes 17.
Demonstrate organlaational J.10.]
Demonstrate the organizational I
l-16-85 Met by i
W.Fel.
ability and resources necessary lS&Ll ability and resources necessary to to control access to en control access to the evacuated Not Tested evacuated area.
area.
E.Fel.
P.Cou.,
' ESA,W84 1
l
_m
- e. s..
.n v.
TAltf.F. 3 (Cont' ell Page 7 of 14 Deficiency Dat e Jurisdictional Noted Ob jec t i ve WimEC-0654 January 16, 198)
Responsibility Date of (Ry Deficiency Met FDfA Objectives Reference Esercise Objective State i.ec al Esercise Tracking alo.)
State Loc al 13.
Demonstrate organlaational J.10.4 Demonstrate the orgenlaational I
l-86-85 Deficiency f)
Not Met W.Feliciana EOC W.Fel.
ability and resources necessary 15&L]
ability and resources necessary to to elfect an orderly evacustices evacuate mobilit y-impaired Ps.inte coupee #7 P. coupee of subility-impaired individuale individuals within the af f ected East seton E.n.m.
Rouge EOC #8 Met by wit hin the plume EP2.
eres.
FFel W.B.R 19.
Deswanstrate organizational J.9, abilit y and resources necessary J.it.g to ellect an orderly evacuation 15&l.l 3
of sci.ools within the plume Er2.
73.
Demunnst rat e abilit y to cont in-K.3.e,b Demonstrate the abilit y to continu-I I
l-16-8)
Ikficiency #2 1-16-85 Not W.Feliciana Mes W.Fel uenssly monitor and control lS &l.]
ously monitor and cont rol emergency EOC Not emergency worker esposure.
worker esposure.
Te st ed E.Fel (Ohicct ive f or which capability W.R.F nieuuld be demonstrated during E.B.R enth esercise)
P. Coupee
TAltf.E 3 (Cont'd)
Page 8 el 14 14ficiency Date Jurisdictional Noted Ob jec t ive NUR EC-0654 January 16. 1985 Res pons i bil it y Date of (By Deliciency Met FEMA Objectives Reference Emercise Objective State Loc al Escroire Tracking No.)
St at e I.ac al 28.
Demonst rate ability to make the J.le.f deciolon, based on predetermined l5&L]
criteria, whether to issue El to emergency workcre and/or the general population.
22.
Demonst rate ability to supply J.lO.e and administer KI. ence the 15&Ll decision has been made to do so.
e 25.
Demonstrate ability to elfect an J.2 orderly evacuation of onsite l5&L]
personnel.
24.
Demonst rate ability to brief C.3.a.
Demonst rate abilit y to coordinat e I
l-16-85 l-16-85 the media in a clear, accurate C.4.a public inf ormation releases with and t imel y manner.
l5&Ll Parish & Utility representatives at the Joint Inf ormat ion Ct r
~_----
Demonst rate the ability to coordinate I
l-16-85 l-16-85 press releases between the Joint Inf ormat ion Ct r and the State EOC S
r TAltf2 3 (Cont %I)
Page 9 of 14 beficiency Dat e Jurisdictional Not ed Ob jec ti ve NUR EC-0654 January 16. 1985 Res pons ibil it y Date of (8y Deficiency Met FEMA Objectives Relerence Esercise Object ive State I.oc a l Esercise Tracking No.)
State Loc al Demonstrate abilit y to coordinate X
l-86-8) l-86-8%
public information releases with State and Utilit y representatives at the Joint Information Ctr Demonstrate abilit y to coordinate I
l-16-85 l-16-8%
press releases between Joint Information Car and Parish EOCs.
2).
Demonst rate ability to provide C.4.b Demonstrate ability to coordinate I
l-16-85 l-16-85 advance cuerdination of lS6LI public inf ormation releases with information released.
Parish & Utility representatives y
at the Joint Information Ctr Demonstrate the ability to coordinate I
l-16-85 l-86-85 press releases bet ween the Joint Informat ion Ct r and the St at e EOC.
Demonstrate ability to coordinate I
l-16-8) 1-16-85 publ ic information releases with State and Utilit y representatives at t he Joint Information Ctr Demonstrat e the ability to coordinat e I
l-16-85 l-16-85 press releases between the Joint Information Center and Parish EDCs.
e-A TAllt.it 3 (Cont'al)
Page 10 of 14 Deficiency list e Juriedietional Not ed Ohjettive NUR EC-D654 January 16, 1985 Resg.onsibil it y Date of (Ry Deficiency Met FEMA Object ives Reference Esercise Oh)cctive State local Esercise Tracking No.)
State f.oc al
~
26.
Drnuinst rate ability to establish C.4.c Demonst rate the abilit y t o coordinate X
l-16-85 l-16-85 and eg.e r a t e r umor c ont rol i n a l$4Lj rumor cont rol between t he Rumor coordinat ed f ashis:n.
Cont rol Cent er and the St at e EOC.
Demonst rat e the abilit y to coordinate I
l-16-85 1-16-85 rumur cont rol b+ tween the Rumor Control Center and the Parish EOCa.
27.
Demonstrate adequacy of pro-J.12 lkmonst rat e t he adequacy of pro-I l-16-85 l-16-85 cedures leur regist rat ion and l 541.)
cedure s for regi st rat ion and radio-endiological monitoring af Innical menaitoring of evacuees.
evacueco.
y f eb ject ive f or uhich capabilit y should be demonst rated during each esercise) 28.
Demonst rate adequacy of f acili-J.10.h t ies f or mese care of evacuees.
l S &l. l 29.
Demonst rate adequate equipment K.S.a b Demonstrate the adequacy of equi ment I
l-16-85 Deficiency fl0 Not l
and procedures for decontamina-l S &l.l and procedures for decontamination.
Ed Feliciana Het tion ni emergency workers, llospital -
equig. ment cnd vehicles.
EMS (Ob ject ive for which capability shuuld be demonstrated during each estrcise)
r TAltf2 3 (Cont'd)
Page 18 al 14 heliciency Dat e Jurisdictional Not ed Ob jec t i ve NUNEC-0654 January 16, 1985 R es pons ibil i t y Date of (By Deficiency Met FEMA object ives Reference Esercise Objective state Local Esercise Tracking No.)
State I.ac a l 10. Demonst rate adequacy of RMS L.4 Demonst rate the adequacy of ambulance I
I-16-85 I-16-e5 t ransport at ion, personnel, and lS&L) facilities and procedures for respond-procedures for handling con-ing to a Utility request f or t rans-t eminated individuate including porting a contaminated injured proper decont amination of individual.
vehicle and equipment.
(Dbject ive f or uhich capability should be demonstrated during each esercise)
II. Demonst rate adequacy of hospital L.!
bemonstrate the adequacy of hospital X
l-15-85 l-16-85 gg facilities and procedures for lS&LI facilities and procedures for handling contaminated indi-handling a contanineted injured viduale.
Individual t ransported f rom R85.
(Objective for uhich capability should f e demonst rated during each esercise) 12.
Demonst rate ability to identify C.I.a,b Demonstrate the abilit y to ident ly I
l-16-85 Mot need for, request, and obtain lSl the need f or and request Federal Tested Federal assistance.
assistance.
31.
Demonstrate ability to estimate M.4 Demonstrate the ability to est imat e K
l-16-85 put t ot al popul at ion es posure.
lSj total population esposure Tested l
i
l 1
~
TAnf#. 3 (Cont'd)
Page 12 of 14 f4ficiency Dat e Jurisdictional Noted Objective NUuRC-0654 January 16, 1985 Res ponsibil i t y Date of (ey Deficiency Met FR A Objectives Reference Esercise Objective State Loc al Esercise Tracking No.)
State Lncal 14 Demonst rate ability to determine M.I Demonst rat e deci sion making and co-X l-16-85 Not and implement appropriate lS6Ll mentation et recovery operation.
Tested measures f or controlled recovery ordination with the Parishes and and reent ry.
Ut ilit y in de-escalating and terminat ing the emergency.
Demonstrate decision making and co-X l-16-85 Not ordination witti the State and the Tested Utility in de-escalating and t erminating the emergenc y.
15.
bemonstrate the ability to C.4 us ef f ectively call upon and lS&Ll utillas out sida support agencies when local capabilities are esceeded.
16.
Demonst rate t he adequacy, opera-P.1 Demonstrat e connunications cap-X l-16-85 l-16-85 bilit y and ef fective use of lS&L) ebilities among the following emergency communication equipment facilitiest RBS, Parish EDCs State and t he adequacy of communica-EOC, EBS S t a t i on, Joint Information t io.s procedures and methods.
Cent er, & LNED met hods.
Demonstrate the abilit y to comou-X l-16-85 l-16-85 (Objectives for which capability cate with Stath dispatched field should he demonstrated during personnel each esercise) e
t TAltIE 3 (Cont'd)
Page 13 of 16 Deficiency Dat e Jurisdictional Noted Objec tive NUAEC-0654 January 16, 1985 Responsibilit y Date of (By Deficiency Met FEMA Objectives Reference Esercise Object ive State 1.oc al Esercise Tracking No.)
State Loc al Demonstrat e connunicat ions cap-X l-16-85 l-16-85 abilities among the following facilitiest 885, Parish EOCs.
State EOC, EBS Station, Joint Information Center, local Special Facilities, LNFD.
Demonstrate communications between X
l-16-85 l-16-8) the Parish EOC and Parish dispatched field personnel. (NO BACKUP COMMU-NICATION TO 8E TESTED) 17.
besonst rate ability to monitor D.4 Demonstrate the ability to monitor X
l-16-85 l-16-89 Emergency Classification levels l56L]
Emergency Classifications levels at cont inuousl y and implement the St at e FUC.
procederes in a timely manner.
Demonst rate the ability to monitor X
l-86-85 l-16-8)
((M,}ective f or which capability Emessency Classificatica levels at should be demonst rated during the Parish EOCS.
each esercine) 18.
Demonst rate capability to E
Demonstrate the capability to process I
l-86-85 1-16-89 ef f ectively process all lS6L]
incoming messages in a timely nenner incoming messages in a timely at the state EOC.
manner.
Demonstrate capability to process in-X l-16-85 Deficiency #6 Not Met coming messages in a timely manner at Pointe Coupee P. Coupee the Parish EDCS.
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