ML20128D297
| ML20128D297 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/02/1992 |
| From: | Harold Denton NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-92-399, NUDOCS 9212070217 | |
| Download: ML20128D297 (26) | |
Text
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y a o c o e o o s e c o o e r> e o 9 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 POLICY ISSUE (Notation Vote)
December 2 1992 sncy_92-399 1
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lho Commissioners Ltom:
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of International Programs Mdtci:
DOE SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT REQUEST TO RETRANSFER PLV10NIUM FROM FRANCE TO BELGIVM FOR FABRICATION INTO M0X FUEL FOR EURATOM POWER REACTORS EurJ!an:
To obtain Commission approval of a proposed response to the Department of Energy (DOE).
This case is being forwarded to the Commission because the plutonium will join EURATOM's inventory and the U.S. will be unable to track its possible future r..ovement within the Community. This is an issue in respect to reports to Congress.
Dhtunhn:
DOE has requested the views of the NRC on a subsequent arrangement request which involves the transfer of 215 kilograms of plutonium from france to Belgonucleaire, Belgium for fabrication of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (M0X) fuel assemblics for use in EURATOM power reactors within the Community (Attachment 1). The plutonium was recovered through the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel from Swiss power reactors.
The transaction is part of a loan /
replacement arrangement between Belgonucleaire and Swiss reactor operator Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerk AG, to replace an equivalent amount of fissile plutonium, not of U.S. origin, that EURATOM had loaned to Switzerland, Swiss authorities say the loan was necessary because of delays by the U.S. in approving earlier Swiss retransfer requests.
The transfer of the plutonium from france to Belgium for M0X fuel fabrication falls within the category of retransfers for which the Commission, by staff requirements memurandum of June 30, 1992, authorized the staff to handle without Commission consultation (SECY-92-204, dated June 3, 1992).
That authorization covered spent fuel transfers from
- 31003r, Switzerland to france or the UK for reprocessing, transfer to
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move the recovered plutonium to facilities for fabrication of M0X fuel assemblies, and the related M0X fuel transfers to Switzerland for use in Sviss power reactors.
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0 The Commissioners 1 The last step in the present case is for the completed M0X fuel to remain in EURATOM for use in power reactors within the Community, and not be transferred to Switzerland. The practice of recycling plutonium into M0X fuel for the EURATOM commercial nuclear program has been occurring on a 1&rge scale for some time.
The staff notes, however, that the U.S.
will be unable to track, with any assurance, the disposition of the plutonium as Inng as it remains within the Community, becausenoU.S.Governmentconsentrightisrequired,under the current U.S./ EURATOM Additional Agreement for Cooperation, for subsequent transfers of materials within the Community.
The same circumstance applies, of course, to any U.S. uranium exported directly to EURATOM and to the plutonium produced by that uranium.
EURATOM's legal right, under their agreement with the U.S., to transfer imported materials within the Community without prior U.S. approval and with no requirement to report transfers has, for example, frustrated past efforts by DOE to report to Congress the country-by-country or facility-by-facility location of previously. exported U.S.-
origin highly enriched uranium, it remains a factor in respect to NRC's charge under the Energy Policy Act to take the lead in a new effort to 3rovide such information to Congress by-late January. Tais effort is underway at the present time.
Section 133 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, applies to the subject transfer.
This section requires the Secretary of Energy to consult with the Department of Defense (D0D) regarding the adequacy of the physical protection of the separated plutonium during its-retransfer from France to Belgium. 00D staff has-indicated a preliminary view that it does not object to the transfer, although-its formal views have not yet been sent to D0E. The case cannot be approved until D0D has communicated its final assessment to DOE.
==
Conclusion:==
The staff believes all statutory requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, will be met when D00 sends its final assessment to DOE confirming the adequacy of the physical protection. The staff believes the subject case is consistent with U.S. policy and would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the U.S.
Accordingly,-the staff finds no basis for the NRC to object to the present case, with the understanding that the NRC's finding is contingent on DOE's receipt of formal, non-adverse comments from D0D.
ED0 concurs in the paper. OGC has no legal objection,
o The Connissioners i Recommendation: That the Connission approve the proposed response to DOE at.
/
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of International Programs Attachments:
- 1. DOE ltr & analysis dtd 10/8/92
- 2. Proposed response to DOE Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB T_uesday, December 15, 1992.
Commishion Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Tuesday, December 8, 1992, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISThIBUTION:
Commissioners OGC OCAA OIG IP OPP EDO r
SECY B
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. Department of Energy -
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7 007 s1992
'92 OCT 14 : P6 :09 bMRANDUM To:
Mr.- William Clements, Director b c (0 -
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Office of Technology and Policy Analysis h
L Department of Commerce OTPA-Room 4069A Washington, D.C.
20230 Defense Nuclear Agency Nuclear Security Division-6801 Telegraph Rd.
Alexandria,:Va. -22310-3398 Attn: Mr. William Witter Mr. Carlton Thorne OES/NEC Department of_ State Washington, D.C.
20520.-
4 Mr. Michael D. RLsenthal U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency NWC/INA, Room 4678 Washington,.D.C.
20451 Mr. Ronald D. Hauber Office of International Programs Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,.D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
Request for Subsequent Arrangements Under the NNPA of;1978 Enclosed for your review is a draft FederalLRegister_ notice concerning a proposed subsequent arrangement,'as well_ as an analysis and a-copy of the incoming request. We would appreciate your comments within 20 days.
7 M
r Salvador N. Ceja
[
Acting Director.
Office of Nonproliferstion Policy (AN-20)
Office of Arms Control & Nonproliferation 4
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- Attachment l W
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' k DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY t
Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policy PROPOSED SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT-Pursuant to Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2160), notice is hereby given of a proposed " subsequent arrangement" under the Agreement for Cooperation between the1 Government'of the United States of Aner:ca and the Government of Switzerland concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy; as amended, and the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between 'the Government of the United States of America and the European Atomic Energy Community-(EURATOM) contarning Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, as amended.
The subsequent arrangement to be carried out under the above-mentioned agreements involves the delivery of 215 kilograms of fissile plutonium from France to Belgium for use in the fabrication of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (M0X) fuel for use as power reactor fuel within the European. Community.
This fissile plutonium, which is subject to United States consent-rights, will be used to repay-the loan of plutonium from Belgonucleaire-in Belgium to-Switzerland of an equivalent amount of fissile' plutonium which was not subject to United States consent rights. The-United-States will consent ltoLthe use of this plutonium within the European Community forlthe above-mentioned purpose.
In accordance with:Section 131 of the Atomic-En +ey. Act of-1954; as-amended, it has been-determined that-this subsequent arrangement'will not be.
inimical to the common defense acd security.
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-9 This subsequent arrangement will take effect no sooner than fifteen days after the date of publication of this notice and after fifteen days of continuous session of the Congress, beginning the day after the date on which the reports required by section 131(b)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42' U.S.C. 2160), are submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House-of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
The two time periods referred to above shall run concurrently.
Issued in Washington, D.C. on Salvador N. Ceja Acting Director Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
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ANALYSIS Of PROPOSED SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING THE TRANSFER Of PLUT0NIUM FROM FRANCE TO BELG0NUCLEAIRE, DESSEL, BELGIUM FOR FABRICATION Of MIXED URANIUM PLUTONIUM OXIDE FUEL WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1.
Nature of Proposed Subseouent Arrana m ni The Government of Switzerland has requested U.S. approval for the transfer of 215 kilograms of fissile plutonium that has been recovered through the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent power reactor fuel in France to Belgonucleaire, Societe france Belge de fabrication de combustibles (FBFC), Dessel, Belgium for fabrication of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (M0X) fuel assemblies for use within the European Community.
The plutonium in france is subject to U.S. consent rights for the transfer or re-use.
The material has been recovered via reprocessing in framt, previously approved by the Department of Energy.
This material is intanded to replace plutentum not subject to U.S. consent rights which was loaued to Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerk AG (NOK) by Belgonucleaire in Belgium, 11.
Stjttfunsp1 of United States Policy The policy of the United States on peaceful nuclear cooperation with other nations and its relationship to the nonproliferation of nuclear explosives was outlined by President Reagan in his statement of July 16, 1981.
He stated that:
"The United States will cooperate with other nations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including civil nuclear programs to meet their energy security needs, under a regime of adequate safeguards and controls...
Wo nun re-establish this nation as. a predictable and reluble partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation under adequate safeguards. This is essential to our nonproliferation goals, if we art < hot such a partner, otiter countries will. tend to go their own ways and our influence will diminisn. This would reduce our fif fectiveness in gaining the support we need to deal with proliferation problems.
To attain this objective, I a:
o instructing the Executive Branch agencies to; undertake immediate efforts to ensure expeditious action on export requests and 1
l approval requests under agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation where the necessary statutory requirements are met.
o Requesting that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission act expeditiously on these matters.
o The Administration will also not inhibit or setback civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development abroad in nations with advanced nuclear power programs where it does not constitute a proliferation risk."
This policy has been consistently applied since 1981 and has not been changed by this Administration.
111.
Leaal Framework of this Subseggent Arranaement This analysis serves to review the proposed subsequent arrangement under applicable criteria of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act).
In particular, under section 131 it will consider whether approval of the proposed subsequent arrangement would result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the present time.
In this analysis, and as required by section 131b(2) of the Act, foremost consideration is given as to whether the activities will take place under conditions which will ensure timely warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at which any diverted material could be transformed into a nuclear explosive device.
Further, and as required by section 131a(1) of the Act, a determination will be made as to whether the approval of the proposed subsequent arrangement would be inimical to the common defense and security.
Finally, the criteria contained in sections 127 and 128 of the Act will be addressed.
IV.
Analytical Method The Atomic Energy Act (section 131b) establishes the standards to be applied in the consideration for transfers of any plutonium in quantities greater than 500 grams resulting from reprocessing.
These standards incorporate the requirement that the Secretary of Energy reach a judgment that the reprocessing or the subsequent retransfer of any plutonium to a non-nuclear-weapon state "will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that which exists at the time that approval is requested "
Among all the factors to be considered in reaching this judgment, the Secretary of Energy is required to give " foremost consideration...to whether or not the... retransfer will take place under cnnditions that 2.
l
will ensure timely warning to the United States of any diversion well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear-weapon state could transfsrm the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device."
The following sections are intended to provide information relevant to consideration of this " timely warning" factor. Although the statute does not specify in any detail the information to be considered under the " timely warning" factor, it is clear that a wide variety of technical, political and other matters can be relevant.
The nature of the effort that would be required to develop a nuclear explosive device is considered. The analysis next discusses the availability of technical, industrial, material. and human resources available were a diversion decision to be implemented.
Thereafter, the analysis focuses on indicators that could provide timely warning of such a step, including the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in these countries.
The analysis also treats in some detail the strong political and other indicators, which taken together could provide an early alert to the United States of activities attendant to a national decision to abrogate these commitments and, in the words of the statute, "t-ansform diverted material into a nuclear explosive device."
V.
Analysis of Activities to be Performed at the Belaonucleaire Fabrication fic1Ltty in Belaium A.
Nuclear Facilities and Proarams of Belaium Belgium is an original partner in the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The nations of EURATOM have some of the world's most extensive and advanced nuclear programs encompassing the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium enrichment facilities through reprocessing, breeder programs and the recycling of plutonium in light water reactors (LWR). Belgium's significant nuclear programs also include facilities for the fabrication of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel. The Belgian nuclear sector has played a very important role in the development of Belgium's economy by providing reliable electric power and the attainment of greater energy self-sufficiency.
During the period 1975-1985, a rapid growth of the Belgian nuclear program occurred. Six power reactors were commissioned for a national total of eight and, a total capacity of 5,148 MWe for the country.
In France, near the Belgian border, two additional power plants jointly owned by both France and Belgium are being built and are scheduled for operation in the early and mid-nineties.
The electricity generated by these reactors (Chooz B1 and B2) will be shared by France and Belgium.
Because of this tremendous surge in nuclear capacity, nuclear-generated electricity accounts for more than half of the total 3
electricity produced in Belgium. Since 1986, this share has remained around 67 percent. Around the turn of the century, two plants will be decomissioned, so the percentage of nuclear-generated electricity might drop to 50 percent of totel electricity plants mentioned above.pon the coming-on line of the other nuclear production, depending u Since the early stages of its nuclear program, Belgium has been a provider of selected nuclear services for its partners in EURATOM.
It was the site of Europe's first pilot civil reprocessing plant (EUROCHEMIC), which has hen in a shut-down status for several years.
Belgonucleaire is a 28-year old commercial firm that has acquired extensive ca) abilities in the areas of fuel fabrication.
Included in its work 1as been the fabrication of plutonium fuels for use in breeder reactors and recycle ex)eriments in the European development program in cooperation wit 1 other European countries (Federal Re)ublic of Germany and France).
Belgonucleaire is also expert in 11e field of radioactive waste disposal.
In addition, the three largest Belgian utilities are associated under the firm Synatom, which provides commercial fuel cycle services for irradiated fuel as well as financing for these operations.
In summary, Belgium has a mature, full-service nuclear industry which provides over 60 percent of the country's electricity needs, and is closely linked to the European nuclear activities through the provision of the fuel cycle services.
B.
Beloonucleaire's M0X Fuel Fabrication Operations At Dessel As was mentioned earlier, Belgium has over a quarter-century's experience with plutonium fuel fabrication, first on a laboratory scale, and since 1973 at Belgonucleaire's plant at Dessel, near Mol.
This is an industrial plant designed to allow a production capacity of 30-35 tons of heavy metal (HM) per year but has not operated at full capacity.- It has fabricated M0X fuels both for recycle in thermal reactors and for fast breeder reactors.
Since 1980,~
Belgonucleaire has been a French Commissariat A l'Energie Atomique (CEA) licensee for the fabrication of fast breeder reactor (FBR)-
fuels, and as of 1983 produced a total of some 25,000 mixed oxide fuel rods, equivalent to the handling of about two tons of plutonium.
Its primary customer for FGR fuel has been the SNR-300 Kalkar breeder reactor in the FRG, which is a joint British, Belgian, West German project still awaiting start-up approval.
Belgonucleaire has also supplied FBR fuel to experimental breeder reactors including the German KNK reactor, the French MASURCA, RAPSODIE and PHENIX and the English Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) and Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR).
4
C.
Evaluation of the Risk of increased Proliferation with Reference to
" Timely Warnino" - Fabrication at Belaonucleaire 1.
Weapons Related Research. Development and Production In examining the requirements for a nuclear weapons program, it is first appropriate to discuss briefly the process of developing nuclear weapons and a description of various types.
The complexity and difficulty of producing nuclear weapons increases considerably from the relatively simple fission devices to the advanced thermonuclear devices.
Nuclear weapons can be categorized as being one of three general types:
fission (gun, or implosion), boosted, and thermonuclear. The technical requirements, skills, numbers of.
personnel, equipment, materials, facilities and the financial organizational and managerial resources that are required to develop, produce and test the three types are quite different.
As concluded in a 1977 report prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment of the Congress, " Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards," even a minimal program to clandestinely produce, without testing, low technology fission weapons --
given the availability of fissionable material at the outset --
would still call for specific org:.nizational structures and dedicated resources of personnel, equipment, and funding.
2.
Industrial Canacity as Related to Weapons Research. Develonmen_t and Production Proarams Belgium is a modern highly industrblized nation with an.
advanced commercial nuclear industry.
Its nuclear-related facilities include research and power reactors, and fuel fabrication (including M0X facilities).
Construction of Belgium's first power reactor, the BR3, 10.5 MWe unit, began in-1955.
It was Europe's first Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).
In its nuclear power program, Belgium'has often benefitted from -
international joint ventures.
For example, the Chooz and the Thihange 1 reactors are France-Belgium power stations (50 percent-50 percent), and two units currently under construction, Chooz B1 and B2, are also jointly owned with Electricite de. france (75 percent) and the Belgian utilities (25 percent) (this ratio also. defines the participation of Belgian industry in the construction of these units).-
Fabrication of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and some assembly of M0X fuel assemblies is performed by the French company (FBFC) which is presently owned by the French firms Uranium Pechiney (50 percent), Framatome (25 percent) and Cogema. (25 percent). - The Dessel plant fabricates fuel for commercial reactors.
5
Similarly, Belgian participation in the European breeder program has been substantial. A cooperation agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands led to the construction of the SNR-300 breeder reactor at Kalkar in Germany, now awaiting its final o>erating license. Belgium's main contribution to the SNR-300-las been the fabrication of the fuel-by Belgonucleaire.
In addition, a series of -
cooperative agreements with France beginning in 1977, led to Belgian participation in the Superphenix-fast breeder reactor.
Even with this industrial capability, however, there are major technologies that are unique to a nuclear weapon program, and which are not present in Belgium. These _ technologies would be needed for initiating a nuclear weapons program.
Such key technologies include enrichment facilities, for which Belgium does not have an indigenous program.
Assuming a source of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), a number of skills, technologies, and processes must be orchestrated in order to turn special nuclear material (SNM) into a weapon. Some of these skills and technologies can be developed or derived from work conducted in the nuclear fuel cycle, such as neutron physics computer codes.
Others may derive from the military or industrial sectors and be adapted for nuclear weapons development.
These technologies include high energy explosives,; precision detonators ano firing sets, hydrodiagnostic testing equipment, such as flash x-rays and high speed cameras, and precision machine tools.
It-is evident that Belgium has th. :e requisite skills, technologies, and processes in its nuclear, industrial, and military sectors.
But while possession is important, what is critical is that these skills, technologies, and processes be organized and managed effectively toward the goal of weapons development.
For example, in the United States there is a basic seven step process by which nuclear weapons are produced:
1.
Concept formulation formulation of a military.
requirement for a weapon of a specific yield, configuration,_
delivery mode,' etc.
2.
Preliminary design technical design of a concept to meet.the military requirement..
3.
Experimental testing a' comprehensive multi-phase test series' including non-nuclear high-explosives testing to ascertain design problems.
l 6
l l
l I
actual production of a 4.
Fabrication prototype device.
nuclear testing of the 5.
Testing prototype device.
production of the required 6.
Production number of weapons for deployment.
retirement and disassembly of 7.
Retirement the weapons.
Although a potential proliferant's approach probably would not mirror-image the United States, an organized, methodical, step-by-step process would be required to harness the various skills and resources in the various sectors of a country to produce nuclear weapons. Depending on the type of program, there would likely be indicators to provide warning time for increased vigilance or diplomatic action.
Should Belgium make the decision to implement a weapons program, activities which reveal these types of organizations could serve as an indicator of a weapons effort. After an evaluation of information available to the United States, Department of Energy (DOE) has concluded that no such effort is underway in Belgium.
3.
Availability of Plutonium and Hiahly Enriched Uranium Although Belgium does not possess the national capability for enrichment or active reprocessing facilities, it does possess significant quantities of SNM. The U.S.-EURATOM agreements for cooperation in the field of ')eaceful uses of atomic energy permit reprocessing within tie European Community (EC) of U.S.-
origin material exported by the United States, directly to the Community and, as well, the reuse of the SNM (uranium and plutonium) recovered from such reprocessing. There are significant amounts of such separated plutonium and uranium within the Community (which includes Belgiem).
In addition to material of U.S.-origin, which is subject to peaceful uses assurances in the Agreements for Coo)eration, there are significant quantities of SNM not su) ject to the U.S.-EURATOM Agreement, as detailed below.
Some of the separated plutonium available includes plutonium separated from spent fuel discharged from nuclear power.
reactors.
Plutonium recovered from this source to date-is of high burn-up and not especially attractive for nuclear explosive purposes.
7
In addition, considerable amounts of plutonium remain in unreprocessed spent fuel at Belgian reactors.
For plutonium, this amount will increase through the end of the century, while for HEU this amount is likely to decrease steadily through the end of the century, as new low-enrichment research fuels are introduced. Some of this plutonium could, in principle, be recovered and used for nuclear weapons, although it is under safeguards and has a high PU 240 content.- The United States also su) plies Belgium with HEU which is used exclusively for researci reactor fuel.
In summary, Belgium has the technical capability to engage in the production of nuclear wea)ons and possesses sufficient amounts of SNM to support suc1 a program, witheitt the need to divert the material covered by this case. - Furthermore, it is the opinion of DOE that the activities involved in acquisition or diversion of material and development of nuclear weapons would be difficult to accomplish without detection. Such activities could, as noted above, provide clear indication of plans to acquire nuclear weapons relevant to " timely warning."
4.
Information Concernina Warnina Time. Includina Political Indicators Even given its technical capabilities, a decision by Belgium to enter into a nuclear weapons development program would necessarily require a political decision to do so.
Accordingly, an examination of the political indicators that could serve to give notice of such a decision is appropriate in reaching a conclusion with respect to the proposed subsequent arringement.
Belgium has, since the end W World War II, demonstrated its overall political stability through several changes in government. There has been support for nonproliferation and no significant voice has been raised in favor of_ a nuclear weapons program.
Belgium is a party of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and all of its nuclear facilities are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and EURATOM safeguards.
It is a member of the Zangger Committee,-
which is a central element in implementing the nonproliferation regime, and is also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and a member of the IAEA.
Belgium's democratic, open society makes it likely that any shift in its nonproliferation policy would be evident. The consistently strong support of the Belgian Government and all 8
I
leading Belgian political parties to the principle of nonproliferation are important considerations in-considering the timely warning provision.of the Atomic Energy Act. There is no basis for believing that Belgium will not respect its NPT or EURATOM commitments of engage in nuclear weapons related activities. Any such move would become known within Belgium's political circles in a relatively short period, and it is expected that the strongest possle opposition would arise in u
those vocal elements in Belg12n society that favor reductions in nuclear arsenals. Any Beigian move to acquire nuclear weapons, however inconceivable, would also most likely create an extremely serious breach o' Belgium's relations with a number of other countries (in;1uding the United-States and Belgium's EC partners) that are strongly committed to nonproliferation values. Al? of the foregoing factors suggest that the United States would reeive an early indication of activities in Belgium pointing ttaards development of a nuclear explosive program.
The United States and Belgium have 4 close diplomatic and military relationship, with U.S. military forces (including nuclear missiles) being stationted there.
Belgium is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
These factors, plus Belgium's members ip in the EC (with its interrelated economic and political tics), should make any decision to divert nuclear material or to develop nuclear explosives obvious long before the fact.
5.
Riscussion of Safeauards at the Bela2nucleaire Facility in Dessel. Belaium As noted, earlier, the plutonium that is the subject of this-proposed subsequent arrangement is to be fabricated into M0X fuel at the Belgonucleaire facility.
Such fuels have been fabricated in this facility since 1973. This facility has a capacity of 30 35 tonnes of heavy metal-per year.
Belgonucleaire has a formal IAEA safeguards facility attachment in place and is subject to both EURATOM and IAEA safeguards.
The facility is subdivided into a large number of working units for which individual nuclear accountancy records are maintained and the specific physical location of items included in the inventory at any time are available for safeguards purposes.
Belgonucleaire's-plutonium fuel fabrication plant is subject to joint IAEA-EURATOM safeguards inspection.
These are presently preformed by a joint IAEA-EURATOM team in accordance with the IAEA facility attachment.
Because of the presence of 9
significant quantities-of weapons-usable material, and the fact that Belgonucleaire is a bulk handling facility, timeliness of safeguards information is an important criterion.
To minimize interference by the safeguards regime with the production activities, the Belgonucleaire accountancy system is based on the following principles:-
1.
For safety as well as for accountancy reasons, the plant is -
subdivided into a large number of so-called " working units" for which individual nuclear material accountancy files are kept.
Since the records of the working units involved are immediately updated to reflect any movement of material into or out of such units, the nuclear material accountancy system can produce at any moment a complete book inventory of the nuclear materials in the plant, specifying their location, quantity, quality, measuring codes, etc.
2.
For inspection purposes, the plant is subdivided into storage areas (input and output) and process areas whero a limited number of check points (strategic points) are defined and where all the nuclear materials present in the process can be checked by the inspectors.
The inventory quantities of SNH in storage and the nature of the fabrication process at Belgonucleaire dictate a high frequency of safeguards inspections. Therefore, a variety of nuclear materials inventory controls are organized by the IAEA/ EURATOM Joint Team:
1.
"Short-term detection" activities for flow verification take place on a weekly basis, usually a two-day inspection of input and output records of storage facilities. This type of inspection sometimes interrupts the fabrication process.
2.
"Short-term detection" activities concerning in-process inventory take place every two weeks and aim at estimation of the plant's inventory of nuclear material. The detection goal is a quantity of 8 kg PU (significant quantity) including the quantities which at the time of the inspection are temoorarily not able to be verified within a period of four wee (s.
3.
" Physical inventories" are performed twice a year and consist of a detailed physical inventory during which all nuclear material present at the plant is verified.
Safeguards experts have considered that the application of adequate verification techniques are most complex and difficult 10
at bulk handling facilities, such as plutonium fuel fabrication plants.
Nevertheless, the ap)11 cation of joint IAEA-EURATOM safeguards at Belgonucleaire las not revealed significant unresolved problems of safeguards application at the facility._
6.
Conclusion DOE believes that the foregoing )aragraphs address the wide variety of matters relevant to tie fabrication of M0X fuel at Belgonucleaire and that, take7 together, they give evidence that the United States would han timely warning of any diversion of the material to oc transferred to Belgium as
,envisionedinsection131b(2).
D.
Evaluation of the Risk of Increased Proliferation With Reference to Other Factors The standard set forth in section 131b(2) of the Act for this case is whether an approval would result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that' existing at the time of the request. Having given " foremost consideration" in the foregoing paragraphs to tl1e issue of " timely warning," the following section addresses other relevant factors that have been considered, 1.
Overall U.S.-Belaian Relhtionshios Belgium is an ally of the United States with respect to defense, trade, and financial issues and a member of NATO.
The substantial ties between Belgium and the United States are also demonstrated by the strong support given to the IAEA and the NPT.
The strong relationships between the two countries would clearly be jeopardized if Belgium were to take steps to develop a nuclear weapons program.
2.
Nonoroliferation Credentials -
Belgium is a party to the NPT and is a firm supporter of_the international nonproliferation regime.
In the IAEA, Belgium has supported the safeguards program. Belgium is also a member of the Zangger Committee and-a member of the NSG. Belgium has a modest program of-technical; assistance to safeguards with the IAEA.
It is the view of DOE that Belgium's nonproliferation credentials support a conclusion that approval of this-transaction will not give rise to a significant proliferation risk.
11
3.
Economic / Trade Factors Belgium is a member of the EC and, as such, has close and important ties to other member states. Any indication that Belgium was entering into a nuclear weapons development program would seriously affect its relationships with other EC states.
The c:onomic growth and health Belgium is to a large degree-dependent on its continued good relations _within the EC. This factor alone is sufficient reason for believing that there is little incentive (and powerful disincentives) for a decision to develop nuclear weapons.
4.
Military / Security Factors Belgium has been e strong supporter of U.S. military policies in Europe, in spite of well-organized objections from some segments of its society.
Belgium is an active and supportive member of NATO.
The national security benefits to Belgium resulting from its-NATO membershi) are of vital importance to Belgium. A Belgian decision to em) ark on a nuclear weapons program would jeopardize these benefits.
5.
Extent and Ouality of Information 00E believes that the information about Belgium's nuclear programs and intentions fully support the conclusions reached in this analysis.
6.
Physical Security Factors Belgium has accepted IAEA INFCIRC 225/ REY. I " Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" and INFCIRC 254 (pertaining-to nuclear transfers), and has a government prog am to see that effective physical security measures are implemented at all-facilities in Belgium having Category I, II and III materials.
Based on the discussions with the Belgian government, nuclear facility personnel and the opportunity to visit representative nuclear facilities having Category I material, DOE believes that physical security measures _in Belgium are consistent with standards and recommendations contained in_INFCIRCs 225/Rev. I and 254 and are-fully adequate.
7.
Conclusion Based on our review of the relevant factors, as they relate to Belgium and the activities to be undertaken under this proposed subsequent arrangement, it is concluded that approval of this 12
request will-not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation 'as contemplated under section 131b(2) of the Act.
In reaching this conclusion, foremost consideration was given to whether or not the United States would have timely warning of any diversion of the nuclear material, well in advance of the time it could be transformed into a nuclear explosive device.
VI.
Safeauards Imolementation The IAEA Secretariat has noted in its Annual Report for 1991 in carrying out the safeguards obligations of the Agency in 1991, the Secretariat did not detect any event which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of nuclear material placed under Agency safeguards --
or, with regard to certain agreements, the misuse of-facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material subject to safeguards -- for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or for any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device, or for-purposes unknown.
Inspection activities carried out pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 revealed that Iraq has not complied with the obligations under its safeguards agreement to declare certain nuclear activities and place all relevant nuclear material under safeguards. However, it is considered reasonable to conclude that the nuclear material placed under Agency safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for.
The Executive Branch has no reason to believe that the IAEA Secretariat's report is not valid.
In the light of this and other factors associated with the proposed transfer, the Executive Branch believes the framework of commitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purpose of this proposed transfer.
VII. Section 127 of the Atomic Ene-av Act of 1954, as amended with respect to Belaium (EURATOM)
Section 127(4) provides that the United States may approve a retransfer only if the recipient agrees that the transfer will be subject to the same condition set forth in that section that would apply to export from the United States in the quoted export criteria. -Therefore, the word
" export" (or a variation thereof) in the following discussion is used as an equivalent to the word " retransfer" (or a variation thereof).
A.
Criterion (11 IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported and subject to the applicable agreement 13
1 l
for cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
All of the non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) members of the EC and the United Kingdom are parties to the NPT.
Each of these ten states (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) thus undertook the obligation in Article 111(1) of the NPT to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in all its peaceful nuclear activities and to enter into an agreement with the IAEA to that effect.
As permitted by Article 111(4) of the NPT, those ten states elected to adhere to a single agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/193).
Since as parties to EURATOM community, they had assigned to EURATOM the responsibility and authority to apply safeguards within their territories, EURATOM is also a party to that agreement.
The agreement, after approval by the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the EC and ratification by each of the original seven non-nuclear-weapon member states, entered into force February 2, 1977.
As in the case of all safeguards agreements between ths IAEA and NNWS pursuant to Article 111(1) of the NPT, the agreement with EURATOM and the ten non-nuclear-weapon member states includes a provision for the completion by the parties of " Subsidiary Arrangements," setting forth in detail the manner in which the safeguards procedures called for in the agreement are to be carried out.
Spain, a NNWS that is a member of the Community, is now a party to the NPT.
U.S. exports directly to Spain, and previously exported material and facilities subject to the U.S.-Spain peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, are and will continue to be subject to that agreement and its provisions (Article XII) for the application of IAEA safeguards agreement.
Since Spain is a member of the nuclear common market established by the EURATOM Treaty, nuclear material and equipment subject to the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community may be transferred to Spain while remaining subject to the provisions of the Additional Agreement.
Such nuclear material and equipment will be subject to IAEA safeguards either under the U.S.-Spain-IAEA safeguards agreement or under another agreement providing for IAEA safeguards. This is ensured because the Delegation of the Commission has assured the U.S. Government that (1) IAEA safeguards apply, de facto, to all peaceful nuclear activities in Spain, and (2) safeguards will be applied in Spain under a full scope safeguards agreement with coverage equivalent to that of INFCIRC/193.
14
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Consequently, IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the NPT will' be applied to any material and facilities exported to EURATOM, to any material and facilities previously exported and subject to the Additional Agreement, and to any SNM used in or produced through the use thereof.
As nuclear-weapon-states (NWS), France and the United Kingdom arei not subject to IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty. Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (1) is met with respect to exports to France and the United K gdom.
In addition, all member states are obligated to accept EURATOM safeguards a) plied to nuclear material. equipment and devices subject to t1e Additional Agreement in each of the member states of the Community, including France, the United Kingdom,_and Spain.
Under Article V of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation of 1960, as amended, which incorporates Article XI, XII, and Annex B of the -
November 8, agreement, EURATOM has the responsibility for establishing and implementing a safeguards and control system designed to give maximum assurance that any material supplied by the United States or generated from such supply will be used solely for peaceful-purposes (EURATOM Safeguards System).. The Community is bound to consult and exchange experiences with the IAEA with the objective of establishing a system reasonably compatible with that of the safeguards system of the Agency. -The Community is responsible for establishing and maintaining a mutually satisfactory and effective safeguards and control system in accordance with-stated principles.
EURATOM safeguards are being applied to material and_ facilities previously exported and subject to the Additional" Agreement and to 5NM used in or produced through the use thereof. The agreement requires these safeguards to be applied to such material and facilities and SNM produced through its use.-
We would note that EURATOM. safeguards system, because of. its continuing accountancy and materials control. function for the..
EURATOM Community countries, will-remain one of the factors: relevant to the Judgment of the Executive Branch, under Section 126(1), that.
a proposed export to one of these states will-not be inimical to the common defense and security.-
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (1) is met-l _
with respect _to Belgium and the United Kingdom.
B.
Criterion (2) l No such material, facilities, or sensitive L
nuclear technology proposed to belex)orted or L
previously exported and subject to t1e appif r.able agreement for cooperation, and no l
15
special nuclear material produced-through the use of such material, facilities or sensitive nuclear technology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device.
The proposed export,-and any SNM produced through its use, is subject to the Additional Agreement for Cooperation. ArticleXI(1) and (3) of the November 8,1958, Agreement for Cooperation provide that "No materials, including equipment and devices, transferred pursaant to this Agreement" and "no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of material, equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this Agreement... Will be used for atomic-weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons or for any other military purpose."
The United States -- with the support of most other major nuclear-supplier states -- consistently has taken the position that nuclear explosive devices are " atomic weapons," within the meaning of this guarantee, regardless of the intended end use of such devices.
The United States and other major nuclear suppliers have agreed in the London Nuclear Supplier Guidelines to authorize the export of trigger list items "only upon formal governmental assurances from recipients explicitly excluding uses which would result in Any nuclear explosive device" (underlining supplied), and each notified the IAEA to this effect. On November 20, 1984, the members of the Community adopted a common nuclear export policy accepting the London Nuclear Supplier Guidelines and stated that the principles of the Guidelines form a basic common discipline for the member states for their nuclear exports.
This undertaking evidences the fact that all these nations equate any nuclear explosive device, regardless of function, as essentially equivalent to an " atomic weapon."
Each NNWS of the Community is a party to the NPT. As such, they are pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices for any purposes.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (2) or its equivalent is met with respect to Belgium and the United Kingdom.
C.
Criterion (3)
Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
Following the effective date of any regulation promulgated Commission pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, physical 16
security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the official regulations.
It is the judgment of the Executive Branch that Belgium and the United Kingdom have established physical security measures which, as a minimum, meet those recommended in the IAEA's INFCIRC/225/Rev.2, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material." Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (3) is met.
D.
Criterion (4)
No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior aaproval of the United States is obtained for suc1 retransfer.
In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be -
subject to the conditions required by this section.
Article XI(2) of the November 8, 1958, Agreement for Cooperation, which the Additional Agreement for Cooperation incorporates by reference by Article V, provides that no material (including equipment and devices) may be transferred beyond the control of the EURATOM Community, unless the United States agrees.
Articles I Bis D of-the Additional Agreement for Cooperation provides that SNM produced through the use of U.S.-supplied material may be exported to any nation outside the Community or to a group of-nations, provided that such nation or group of nations has an appropriate Agreement for Cooperation with the United States'or guarantees the peaceful use of the produced material under safeguards acceptable to the Community and the United States.
The EC's interpretation.of this language is set cut 'in an April 15, 1977, letter to the Department'of State from Fernand Spaak, Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities. This interpretation is that the European Community Supply Agency will, prior to any proposed transfer, consult with the United States to find out whether, in the view of the United States, the proposed recipient of such produced special nuclear material has an Agreement for Cooperation with the United States which is " appropriate."
17
During discussions with representatives of the Comunity held in Washington on November 1,1978, the EC confirmed that material subject to Article I Bis D could not be transferred outside of the Comunity unless the U.S. agreed that the recipient countries or group or nations had an appropriate Agreement for Cooperation with the U.S. or safeguards acceptable to both parties.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that, with regard to the proposed export and SNM produced through its use, criterion (4) is met. The United States will also be providing requisite consent as a part of this subsequent arrangement to permit the transfer of the material from Belgium or from the United Kingdom to Switzerland.
With respect to transfers within the Comunity, it should be noted that the use of the word " group of nations" in criterion (4) makes clear that no retransfer consent right is required within a group of nations under this criterion. With respect to this provision the Senate report states:
It should be noted that under the U.S.-EURATOM Agreements, the U.S. does have a right of prior approval on retransfers of certain material outside of the EURATOM Community.
It should also be noted that paragraph 4 does not require prior approval with respect to transfers within the Comunity, consistent with United States policy of treating that Comunity as a single entity.
The Congressional intent not to require U.S. consent rights for transfers within the Comunity is also clear in section 123a(5) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, since it requires that the United States seek a guarantee "by the cooperating party" (which in this case is EURATOM as a whole).
E.
Criterion (5)
No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed and no irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration.
The proposed retransfer does not involve reprocessing.
Criterion (b) is, therefore, not applicable.
18 l
.c F.
Criterion (6)
No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be a) plied to _any nuclear material or equipment whic1 is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear technology.
The proposed retransfer does not involve sensitive nuclear technology. Criterion (6) is, therefore, not applicable.
XII. Analysis of Section 128 Section 128a(1) of the Atomic Energy Act establishes the following additional criterion:
As a condition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the export.
Belgium as a party to the NPT, has agreed to accept IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities and have implemented that commitment through agreement with.the IAEA.
19
n 91
~
.i J.
- D_R A F T i
Mr. Salvador N. Ceja Acting Director Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy-U.S.= Department of Energy Washington, DC -20585
- Ref:
Your 10/8/92 Memo to WClements, et al.; Request for subsequent-Arrangements Under the NNPA of 1978
Dear Mr. Ceja:
. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reviewed the subsequent arrangement l request from-Switzerland for the-transfer of 215 kilograms of plutonium, derived from U.S.-origin material, from France to Belgonucleaire,. Belgium:for fabrication of mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (M0X) fuel assemblies:for use as power reactor fuel within the European Community.
We understand the plutonium1 is intended to replace an equivalent amount of fissile-plutonium,- not of-U.S.
- origin, that previously was loaned by Belgonucleaire:to Swiss reactor-operator i
Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerk AG (N0K).
~
The Commission understands that the-Department ofl Defense has completed.a-preliminary. review under:Section 133 sof the Atomic Energy Act and has. no objection to.the approval.of the subsequent l arrangement, but' has not yet communicated. formal comments to this effect. The also' understand-that this subsequent arrangement will not be approved until the: Secretary of Defense or-
' his' designee has made this communication.
Based on'this' understanding,Ethen Commission does not object-to the )roposed subsequent arrangement.. We would flike to be notified, however, if tie Department of Defense identifies:any-
_ problem with the subject' request.
Sincerely, Ronald D. Hauber,7 Assistant Director Exports, Security, and Safety Cooperation-Office of International Programs.- ~
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