ML20128C392
| ML20128C392 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1969 |
| From: | Moore V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Boyd R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9212040390 | |
| Download: ML20128C392 (8) | |
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MAR 27 E Roger 8. Boyd, Assistaat Mrester Ser Roseter Projects, 3RL TERD: Saul Imvine, Assistant Director for teneter Teeheelegy, DEL menna gTA258 PSER SSEdNT, BWTIdEIM WO5543 ammaaggs pidgr,-
UNIT ND. 1, 300EIT 50. 50 2633 6 EleTIas to IN8vn 4 mtATEM dND ELBCTRIC PO W R SISTR E m appusant has sewd the auselear system design abarseteristics of his plant with these of greedes 2/3 and M11stessi Perther, his.
souparises is entended to tastede plant differeness. 'With these comparisons in mind; and, with the initial revieve of Dresden 2/3 and Iti11 stone resently eempleted, I propose to request that the appli-cant identify and evaluate saly the differences in instrumentation design and/or design eriteria. h applicant's respease to this approach will be determined during the first'techatsal meeting and the instrumentation questions provided below may be modified to refleet his willingness to eseparate.; h electric power system designs, being unique to this plant, are not included in the comparisom. approach.
1.
You have provided in Table 1-6 2 of the FSAR a listing of plant systems which differ from the designs of Dresden, Units 2 and 3, and Millstone, Unit 1.
Please extend-this comparison to include the identification and evaluation of the differesses in your instrumentation designs and/or design criteria from those of Dresden for each of the systems listed belows a.
Reactor Containment and Reactor vessel isolation control system Emergency core cooling and automatic refinf systems c.
d.
Neutrea moeitering system imeloding the REN embeyoten.
MainSteamradiationmonitoring'shton a.
f.
Sefueling'interleeks e
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Reactor manual sentrol systen!,<
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haaster vessel instrummataties sectreuLattoncontroysystem l
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9212040390 690327 PDR ADOCK 05000263 A
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Roger S. Royd 4
MAR 2 71969
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- 15. There are two 345 kv and thrse 115 kv transmission lines emanating from the switchyard which are connseted to your grid system.
Pro-vide a description and an evaluation of the number of right-of-ways; number, type, and sine of towers per right-of way; and namsber of circuits per tower.
16.
submit a description and evaluation of (1) the switchyard circuit breaker controle and the power supplies for these controls sad (2) the automatic transfer from normal auxiliary to any of the reserve power sources. Your evaluation should show that no single failure can preclude the availability of offsite power to the engineered safety features.
State whether the switchyard controls are under the direct sontrol of the reacter operater..
The diesel loading sequence of Table 8-4=1 does not include LaihistAsa 17.
of the core spray system nor the initiation of emergency service water system necessary to cool the diesel generator. Please resolve these omissions.
- 18. The diesel generators are each rated at 2500 kw continuous, 2750 kw for 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />, and 3050 kw for 30 minutes out of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Sehesit and justify the bases used to determine the kw rating of each lead listed in Table 8-4-2.
Table 8-4-2 should be amended to' include all necessary emergency and shutdown loads and corrected to remove all inconsistencies. Further, submit a description of the preopera*
tional test and an analysis to show that each diesel generator is capable of sustaining the loss of the largest lead any time during a DBA or an emergency shutdown.
19.
Submit a description and an evaluation of the consequences of single failures on the design of instrumentation and controls (automatic relaying) of the diesel generator emergency power system.
20.
Submit an evaluation to show that electrical independence between redundant battery chargers and between diesel generators is not compromised by the circuitry which permits either battery charger to be energised from either diesel.
- 21. Evaluate the consequences of single failures on the instrumentation
- i which automatically transfers to the redundant 125 vde source upon failure of the normal source.
22.
The description of the physical independance of the battery systems l
is not consistent with the single battery room shown in Figure 12-2-2.
Please resolve.
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23.
Submit the design and your evaluatian of the lastrumentation which monitors and eentrols the esatrol room heating and ventila-tien system during er subsequent to a DBA.
- 24. The pSAR does not provide a deseription er evaluaties of the l
Lastrumentaties and sentrols of such vital auxiliary emergemey systems as plant air system, MR servies seter eyeten, emergemey service water system, seester batiding eeeltag seter system, etc.
i tuhmit your design ersteria sed a descriptima and analysis of the i
design to support your ariteria (esseermed with saly these portisms of these systems which ese assessary der safety).-
- 25. Provide e listing of these ease'ty getated finid systems ekteh require heat trasing to assuse acetimmed availability. Sahmit j
your design eriteria and a descripties and evaluation of the designs to support your criteria, i
- 26. Please submit test data er equivalent information ubich will
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provide assurance thatt 4
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The electrieel eenpements and embles 1esated in primary containment which are required for safety saa withstead the accident enviremment (eembined temperature, pressure and i
humidity) for the required tino period. Tour reopease should identify these sempements and the period of time each is j
required to be operable.
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b.
The seismic design requirements listed in the FgAR for the j
reactor protection system, sentainment isolation system.
engineered safety feature instrumentation and sentrol, and emergency power systeme are satisfied.
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The reactor level and pressure sensors can maintain the v
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. required accuracy and perform their. design' function during normal operation, espected transients and rapid depressuri-r sation (200 lbs/see).
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- 27. You have discussed, to varying degrees, eteetriaal emble testa 11e='
ties desissa ter a ammber of epostfie systems.- An enestrieal-fire
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da a muelaar power stattaa has emphasiand the taportanes of 'eeble Wesefeso,peevide.a::q#g$y g
installations for the 3333L plant dest y.
descriptieaMf the sable lastallatism eriteria belas sti11and
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to protect the reh=*y of the staater preteetten system and '
engineered safety feature circuits (power, eestrol and tastrumaa-tatten). For the purposa-of sable installation the protective i
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h Reger 8. Boyd 6
MAR 2 71969 functica circuits should be interpreted in their broadest sense to include:
1.
sensor to protective devios (scram breakers, solenoids, yents, valves, valve limit switches, etc.),
s.
Instrumentaties cables b.
Control cables 2.
Power from sourca through controller to protective devies a.
D.C. pour from batteries to protective device
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b.
A.C. power from diesel to protective device c.
Include starting or switching circuits where appropriate (e.g., diesel starting, battery switching)
The discussion of the cable installation criteria and bases should include but not be limited to the following:
A.
Cable separation (1) Redundant protective circuith separated by space and/or steel or concrete. Discuss cabla installation in suf-ficient detail to show that no physical event considered credible, could disable redundant channels in an unsafe direction.
(2) Power cables separate from control and instrumentation.
B.
Cable intermixing (1) Different plant parameter signals in same wireway.*
(2) Instrumentation and osotrol cables in sans wirevay.
C.
Containment penetrations (1) separation of penetratism areas (e) Distance and/or steel or concrete.
eWirevay is used here to include trays, ladders, junction boxas,
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MAR 2 71969 (2) Grouping of penetrations in each area.
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(a) Protection between penetrations.
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(3) separation of Protective functimas.
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3.
Design and spacing of wisosays
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j (1) Treye (a) landing i
(2) naddere u
(3) Osaduit l
(4) Other 2
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Types of embles = power, oentrol and instrummatation (1) Emeulaties i
l (2) Derating (3) Other F.
Overload and short circuit considerations C.
special considerations (1) Fire steps (2) Cables in hasardous areas (a) Centaitument (b) Diesel generater area (3) Temperature somitertag (4) Fire deteettom and peotesties (5) 'Neavital eabling - Dneeribe la entfietant-detail to show that imetallattaa of memvital embling does not -
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MAR 2 71969 1
compromise protective function cabling.
(6) Cable and wireway mattings (7) Aantaistrative reopensibility fer, and sentrol over, the foregoing during design and installaties.
Original signedby Voss A M*re 1
. Voss A. Meere, Chief Eastrumentatten & Power RT-276&
Technology Branch BEL 16Frs TAI Divistem of Roaster Lisemalag ect D. ak11er D. Vassalle bcct S. Levine R. DeYoung V. Moore T. Ippolito (Distribution:
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U.S.GovtRMMENT PRINTlh4 CFFICE : t>O 214 429