05000315/LER-1985-016, :on 850412,w/RCS in Mode 3,vent Inside Containment Opened to Drain Header & Vent Outside Containment Opened to Drain Hxs,Creating Flow Path from Inside to Outside Containment.Procedure Revised

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:on 850412,w/RCS in Mode 3,vent Inside Containment Opened to Drain Header & Vent Outside Containment Opened to Drain Hxs,Creating Flow Path from Inside to Outside Containment.Procedure Revised
ML20127L055
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 05/09/1985
From: Baker K
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML20127L031 List:
References
LER-85-016, LER-85-16, NUDOCS 8505220254
Download: ML20127L055 (2)


LER-1985-016, on 850412,w/RCS in Mode 3,vent Inside Containment Opened to Drain Header & Vent Outside Containment Opened to Drain Hxs,Creating Flow Path from Inside to Outside Containment.Procedure Revised
Event date:
Report date:
3151985016R00 - NRC Website

text

soflC Form 308 U E. feUCLEhd LEGULATORY C-APPROVE D Oese seO. 3190-4104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAASE (Il DOCRE't feueASER (2)

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Astir ACT ILomrt to 1400 soeces o.e. ecoreenmetery Mreen erngse noece tycoororten kneel l191 ON 04-I2-85 AT I030 HOURS, WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM IN MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY),

AN EQUIPMENT CLEARANCE WAS BEING PLACED ON TIE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM FOR RESTORATION FOLLOWING A HYDRO TEST. A VENT INSIDE CONTAINMENT WAS OPENED TO DRAIN TIE HEADER, SIMULTANEOUSLY A VENT WAS OPENED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT TO DRAIN TIE HEAT EXCHANGERS. THIS CREATED A POTENTIAL FLOW PATH FROM INSIDE TO OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.

THIS IS NONCONSERVATIVE WITH RESPECT TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.I.I.

THE TOTAL TIME OF THIS EVOLUTION WAS 45 MINUTES. TIE POTENTIAL FOR OBTAINING THIS FLOWPATH ALSO EXISTED DURING PREPARATION FOR TIE TEST, HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT NOTED AT THAT TIME.

TO PREVENT RECURRENCE TIE HYDRO PROCEDURE HAS BEEN REVISED T0; I) REQUIRE THE EQUIPMENT CLEARANCE TO INCLUDE GUIDANCE ON BOTH THE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF THE BLANK FLANGES UTILIZED TO CONDUCT TIE TEST, AND 2) INCLUDE AN ADDITIONAL PRECAUTION ON MAINTAINING CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING TIE TEST.

THERE WERE NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES DUE TO THIS INCIDENT.

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r 80RC Form 304A U.S. NUCLE AR KE1ULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ueRoveo Ove No aiso-oio4 EXPlRES 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME (1)

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U 9 D. C. COOK - UNIT-1 olsjojoloj3[1[5 8l5 0l1l6 0l0 0l2 OF 0 l2 TEXT (# more space is requesd. use eddaanat NRC Form J56rs1(In ON 04-12-85 AT 1030 HOURS, WITil THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM IN MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY),

AN EQUIPMENT CLEARANCE WAS BEING PLACED ON TIE RESIDUAL lEAT REMOVAL (RliR) SYSTEM (IEEE/BP) IN ORDER TO REMOVE BLANK FLANGES WilICII WERE INSTALLED ON TIE SAFETY VALVES FOR A IIYDRO TEST. A LICENSED OPERATOR INSIDE CONTAINMENT WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE UNIT SUPERVISOR TO VENT AND DRAIN TIIE SYSTEM INSIDE CONTAINMENT SO TIIE SAFETY VALVE INSIDE CONTAINMENT COULD BE REINSTALLED. A LICENSED OPERATOR OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT WAS INSTRUCTED TO VEN'f AND DRAIN THE RIIR HEAT EXCIIANGER SO TIE SAFETY OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT COULD BE REINSTALLED.

TIIE OPERATOR INSIDE CONTAINMENT NOTICED A GREATER FLOW OF WATER THAN WAS EXPECTED AND NOTIFIED THE UNIT SUPERVISOR. TIE UNIT SUPERVISOR DIRECTED TIE OPERATOR OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT TO CLOSE TIE VENT AND DRAIN IN ORDER TO STOP THE FLOW. THE OPERATOR INSIDE CONTAINMENT TIEN CLOSED THOSE VENTS AND DRAINS.

THOUGH TIE SYSTEM NEVER COMPLETED DRAINING, A POTENTIAL FLOWPATH WAS ESTABLISIIED BETWEEN CONTAINMENT AND TIE OUTSIDE ATMOSPIERE. THIS IS NONCONSERVATIVE WITli RESPECT TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.1.

TIE TOTAL TIME OF THIS EVOLUTION WAS 45 MINUTES. THE POTENTIAL FOR OBTAINING TilIS FLOWPATl! ALSO EXISTED DURING THE INSTALLATION OF TIE BLANK FLANGES, HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT NOTED AT T11AT TIME.

TIE SHIFT SUPERVISOR REALIZED CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY IIAD BEEN BROKEN AT 1235 IIOURS DURING AN ANALYSIS OF TIE EVENT. THE REQUIRED FOUR HOUR NOTIFICATION WAS MADE TO TIE NRC AT 1359 HOURS.

TIIERE WERE NO ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES DUE TO THIS INCIDENT. TIE OPERATORS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT WERE STATIONED SUCH THAT THE VALVES COULD IIAVE BEEN IMMEDIATELY CLOSED IN TIIE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT. THE UNIT WAS IN MODE 3 AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT, ENTERED MODE 4 AT 1115 IIOURS, AND WAS CONTINUING TO C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZE AS PART OF TIE UNIT SIIUTDOWN.

TO PREVENT RECURRENCE TIE HYDRO PROCEDURE IIAS BEEN REVISED T0; 1) REQUIRE TIE EQUIPMENT CLEARANCE TO INCLUDE GUIDANCE ON BOTll TIE INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL OF TIE BLANK FLANGES UTILIZED TO CONDUCT THE TEST, AND 2) INCLUDE AN ADDITIONAL PRECAUTION ON MAINTAINING CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING TIE TEST.

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