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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20199L5301999-01-19019 January 1999 Special Rept:On 981214,seismic Monitor Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Spectral Analyzer Not Running.Attempted to Reboot Sys & Then Sent Spectral Analyzer to Vendor for Analysis & Rework.Upgraded Sys Will Be Operable by 990331 ML20237F0291998-08-27027 August 1998 Special Suppl Rept:On 960425,one Loose Part Detection Sys (Lpds) Was Identified to Be Inoperable.Initially Reported on 960531.Caused by Loose Parts Detector Module.Repairs Performed & Intermittent Ground No Longer Present ML20198S6621997-11-10010 November 1997 Special Rept:On 971009,during D21 EDG Monthly Surveillance Test,Engine Speed Was Cycling Unusually,Load Oscillations Observed on Control Room Indicators & Flame Emanated from Exhaust Stack.Caused by EDG Internal Forces.Repaired EDG ML20211H7951997-09-29029 September 1997 Special Rept:On 970828,EDG Failure Occurred Due to Fuel Oil Leak on Fuel Oil Return Header Tube at Number Four Cylinder. Interim Repair Performed by Removing & Replacing Damaged Section of Tubing ML20198E7391997-08-0404 August 1997 Special Rept:On 970703,diesel Generator Failed Surveillance Test Procedure ST-6-092-311-2.Caused by Motor Operated Potentiometer (Mop) Set Below Its Normal 60 Hz Position. Stroked Mop Through Full Travel While Monitoring Resistance ML20136H2101997-03-14014 March 1997 Special Rept:On 961001,suppl for Inoperability of loose-part Detection Sys Channel for More than 30 Days.Channel/Detector Malfunction Isolated to Instrumentation Contained within Inerted Unit 2 Primary Containment ML20136H1291997-03-10010 March 1997 Special Rept:On 970103,LPDS Declared Inoperable.Caused by Defective Latch Board.Board Replaced & ST Procedure Was Completed Satisfactorily on 970114 ML20134D2391997-01-30030 January 1997 Special Rept:On 970101,failure of Diesel Generator Occurred. Caused by Loose Wire.Removed Banana Jacks from Terminals, Tightened Wires on Terminal Block & Returned Diesel Generator to Operable Status ML20128H3391996-10-0101 October 1996 Special Rept:On 960828,channel/detector Which Monitors Acoustic Level on 'B' Main Steam Line Annunciated in Mcr. Channel/Detector Malfunction Was Isolated to Instrumentation Contained within Inerted Unit 2 Primary Containment ML20112F7921996-06-0606 June 1996 Special Rept:On 960507,D22 EDG Declared Inoperable.Caused by D22 EDG Crankcase Overpressurization Exhaust Backpressure. D22 EDG Exhaust Stack Scraped & Ion Oxide Scale Sheets Removed from Sidewalls ML20117J9751996-05-31031 May 1996 Special Rept:On 960425,inoperability of loose-parts Detection Sys Channel for More than 30 Day Identified. Work Order Initiated to Inspect Instrumentation ML20107L2501996-04-23023 April 1996 Special Rept:On 960312,two loose-part Detection Sys Channels Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Caused by Failure of Sensor.Repaired Control Rod Housing 02-31 Lpds Channel Sensor ML20101G7811996-03-25025 March 1996 Special Rept:On 960224,D21 EDG Declared Inoperable,Due to Inability to Control EDG Load.Loose Connection at Output of Motor Potentiometer Tightened ML20099L7651995-12-28028 December 1995 Special Rept:On 951130,EDG D21 Experienced Pressurization of Crankcase During Performance of Surveillance Tests.Analysis of Failure Continuing.Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence Will Be Developed & Implemented as Necessary ML20094M0141995-11-15015 November 1995 Special Rept:On 951017,valid Failure of EDG Occurred While Performing Surveillance Test Procedure ST-6-092-316-1.Caused by Overvoltage Permissive Relay in Output Breaker Closing Logic Not Picking Up.Relay Recalibr & Returned to Svc ML20086G5921995-07-0707 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950507 & 10,loose Part Detection Sys (Lpds) Channel Sensor Found to Be Not Mounted on Piping.Cause Not Yet Determined.Sensor Reattached to Pipe & Channel Returned to Operable Status ML20077E2511994-12-0505 December 1994 Special Rept:On 941124,accelerograph Sensor Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Seismic Recorder XR-VA-105 & Accelerograph Sensor XE-VA-105 Declared Inoperable on 941025.Loose Power Cable to Seismic Record XR-VA-105 Tightened ML20073F7451994-09-23023 September 1994 Special Rept:On 940810,describing Sequence of Events & Decisions Surrounding Potential Noncompliance W/Safe Shutdown Commitments ML20069D6961994-05-31031 May 1994 Special Rept:On 940422,noted Inoperability of loose-part Detection System for More than 30 Days.Caused by Tape Recorder Not Advancing in Play Mode.Tape Recorder Was Repaired,Tested & Declared Operable ML20062L6071993-12-23023 December 1993 Special Rept:On 930526,discovered That Triaxial Response Spectrum Analyzer (Trsa) Could Not Be Properly Calibr & Was Inoperable.Trsa Returned to Vendor on 930626 But Could Not Be Repaired Due to Lack of Spare Parts ML20128B9561993-01-28028 January 1993 Special Rept:On 930102,ST Procedure in Progress D21 EDG Kilowatt Output Was Erratic & Unstable.Caused by Loose Wire on D21 EDG Electronic Governor.Unit 1 EDGs Were Inspected & Verified Not to Have Same Conditions ML20126E8751992-12-18018 December 1992 Special Rept:On 921125,EDG D21 Output Began Erratically Increasing & Decreasing When Control Logic Converted to Isochronous Mode.Caused by Test Start Circuit Deenergizing. Damaged Wire Repaired & Shortened & Governors Inspected ML20115D8981992-10-16016 October 1992 Special Rept:On 920909,discovered That Channel 1 (Longitudinal Axis of Three Orthogonal Axes) of Accelerograph Sensor Failed Test Criteria.Cause Not Yet Determined.Maint Work Request Initiated on 920922 ML20114B9551992-08-25025 August 1992 Special Rept:On 920730,intermittent Operation of Speed Control Response Occurred While Attempting to Synchronize EDG D24 to 4 Kv Safeguard Bus.Caused by Loose Fuse Clip Contacts in 125-volt Dc Circuit.Contacts Tightened ML20083B9371991-09-18018 September 1991 Special Rept:On 910823,D23 Emergency Diesel Generator Declared Inoperable While Plant Personnel Performed Troubleshooting Activities to Resolve Discrepancy Between D23 EDG Local & Remote Kw Meters ML20153G3131988-09-0101 September 1988 Special Rept:On 880817,primary & Secondary Meteorological Towers Declared Inoperable.Caused by Towers Being Struck by Lightning During Thunderstorm.Tower Sensors Returned to Svc on 880823 & Air Temp Difference Sensors Being Replaced ML20151P1071988-07-12012 July 1988 Special Rept:On 880602,six Triaxial Time History Accelerographs Declared Inoperable Due to Inadequate Calibr Surveillance Tests.Tests Revised to Incorporate tilt-table Testing of Accelerographs ML20215C0781987-06-12012 June 1987 Special Rept:On 870518,triaxial Peak Recording Accelerograph XR-VA-151 Inoperable.Caused by Need to Remove Instrument in Support of Removing Vessel Head for Refueling.Recording Accelerograph to Be Reinstalled After Refueling ML20214X1071987-06-0505 June 1987 Special Rept:On 870505,diesel Generator Excitation Circuitry Failed.Caused by Loose Connection of Two Leads on Bottom of Relay K1.Relay K1 Contactor & Two Damaged Leads Removed & Replaced ML20210S3901986-09-29029 September 1986 Special Rept:On 860624,performance of Surveillance Test on Triaxial Response Spectrum Analyzer (Trsa) Indicated That Unit Inoperable.Caused by 240-ohm Resistors Overheating. Defective Amplifier Replaced.Related Correspondence ML20210S3531986-09-16016 September 1986 Special Rept:On 860903,north Stack Wide Range Accident Monitor Declared Inoperable Due to Failure of Sample Pump to Provide Proper Sample Flow.Caused by Torn Diaphragm.Pump Replaced.Related Correspondence ML20209G8171986-07-31031 July 1986 Special Rept:On 860624,discovered Triaxial Response Spectrum Inoperable During Semiannual Surveillance Test. Cause Unknown.Analyzer Will Be Shipped to Mfg for Repairs. Related Correspondence 05000000/LER-1986-009, Ro:On 860312,discovered That LER 2-86-04 & LER 86-009 Not Submitted to Nrc.Caused by Misplaced Repts.Repts Telecopied to Nrc.Procedure for Distribution of Repts Revised1986-04-14014 April 1986 Ro:On 860312,discovered That LER 2-86-04 & LER 86-009 Not Submitted to Nrc.Caused by Misplaced Repts.Repts Telecopied to Nrc.Procedure for Distribution of Repts Revised ML20203G0241986-03-24024 March 1986 Special Rept:On 860102,HPCI Sys Actuated & Water Injected Into Reactor Pressure Vessel Through Loop B Core Spray Nozzle Only.No Corrective Action Will Be Taken Since HPCI Operated as Designed to Control Level ML20155F2461986-03-0505 March 1986 Special Rept:On 860102 & 13,RCIC Sys Actuated & Injected to Reactor Pressure Vessel.Caused by Potential Low Water Level During Planned Turbine Trip & Decreasing Water Level, Respectively.Related Correspondence ML20140F1271986-02-28028 February 1986 Rev 1 to 860131 Special Rept:On 851109,HPCI Into Reactor Vessel Occurred.Rev Changes Reactor Parameter Entitled Coolant Pressure to Coolant Temp. Related Correspondence ML20141E6171986-02-12012 February 1986 Special Rept:On 851218,RCIC Sys Actuated & Injected Water Into Reactor Vessel During Startup Test Condition 6.Reactor Water Level Dropped & RCIC Quick Started Manually to Control Reactor Level.No Corrective Action Taken ML20154G0681986-01-31031 January 1986 Special Rept:On 851105 & 09,two HPCI Sys Actuations & Injections Into RCS Occurred During Startup Testing.No Adverse Effects Noted.No Corrective Actions Necessary ML20137C4861985-11-14014 November 1985 Special Rept:On 850816,0911,12 & 16 During Startup Testing, RCIC Sys Actuations & Injections Into RCS Occurred.Incidents Part of Startup Testing.No Corrective Actions Required ML20132D3701985-07-15015 July 1985 Revised Special Rept Re Cause & Corrective Actions for Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation.On 850626,test Results of Triaxial Response Spectrum Analyzer Satisfactory. Related Correspondence ML20128K1841985-06-13013 June 1985 Special Rept:On 850501,surveillance Test for Triaxial Response Spectrum Analyzer Revealed That Acceptable Limits for Specific Acceleration Input of Negative 0.05g Could Not Be Met.Cause Undetermined.Investigation Continuing ML20129J0081985-05-24024 May 1985 Special Rept:On 850227,0301,0403,06,09 & 12,during Startup Testing,Rcic Sys Actuations & Injections Into RCS Occurred. No Corrective Action Required ML20127E8001985-05-0101 May 1985 Ro:On 850131,full Reactor Scram Occurred.Caused by Operator Opening Instrument Isolation Valve on Jet Pump PDI-42-IR005. Shifts Notified That Valving on Racks to Be Done by or W/Instrument & Controls Technicians ML20113B8721985-03-18018 March 1985 Ro:On 850308,peak Acceleration Recorder Declared Inoperable Following Insp.Caused by Melting of Mounting Matl Used to Support Recorder Due to High Temp Inside Drywell Head Area.Recorder Replaced ML20114A0331984-12-27027 December 1984 Ro:On 841118,alarms Received in Control Room Indicating Downscale,Upscale & Inoperability of Source Range Monitor D & intermediate-range Monitors D & H Detector Channels. Caused by 20-volt Dc Power Shorted by Technician 1999-01-19
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217D1211999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Lgs,Units 1 & 2. with ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20212A8861999-09-13013 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing First & Second 10 Yr Interval Inservice Insp Plan Requestss for Relief RR-01 ML20212A4481999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20211E9891999-08-20020 August 1999 LGS Unit 2 Summary Rept for 970228 to 990525 Periodic ISI Rept Number 5 ML20210L7051999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20209G0211999-06-30030 June 1999 GE-NE-B13-02010-33NP, Evaluation of Limerick Unit 2 Shroud Cracking for at Least One Fuel Cycle of Operation ML20209D7741999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20207H8331999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to 1H61R, LGS - Unit 2 Core Shroud Ultrasonic Exam ML20195G4651999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Lgs,Units 1 & 2 ML20209D7791999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195B3021999-05-0606 May 1999 Rev 0 to PECO-COLR-L2R5, COLR for Lgs,Unit 2 Reload 5 Cycle 6 ML20206N2901999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195G4761999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Lgs,Units 1 & 2 ML20206D8971999-04-22022 April 1999 Rev 2 to PECO-COLR-L1R7, COLR for Lgs,Unit 2 Reload 7, Cycle 8 ML20205N8341999-04-0101 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Automatic Switch Co Nuclear Grade Series X206380 & X206832 Solenoid Valves Ordered Without Lubricants That Were Shipped with Std Lubrication to PECO & Tva.Affected Plants Were Notified ML20205N9311999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20204G9851999-03-11011 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Re Revised Emergency Action Levels for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20207J7461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Limerick,Units 1 & 2.With ML20199G2371999-01-31031 January 1999 Rev 0 to NEDO-32645, Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 SRV Setpoint Tolerance Relaxation Licensing Rept ML20199L5301999-01-19019 January 1999 Special Rept:On 981214,seismic Monitor Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Spectral Analyzer Not Running.Attempted to Reboot Sys & Then Sent Spectral Analyzer to Vendor for Analysis & Rework.Upgraded Sys Will Be Operable by 990331 B110078, Rev 1 to GE-NE-B1100786-01, Surveillance Specimen Program Evaluation for Limerick Generating Station,Unit 11998-12-31031 December 1998 Rev 1 to GE-NE-B1100786-01, Surveillance Specimen Program Evaluation for Limerick Generating Station,Unit 1 ML20205K0381998-12-31031 December 1998 PECO Energy 1998 Annual Rept. with ML20199F9611998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Limerick Generating Station.With ML20198C7151998-12-10010 December 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for LGS Unit 1,Reload 7,Cycle 8 ML20198A3871998-12-10010 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power- Operated Gate Valves ML20206N4061998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20199E3281998-11-23023 November 1998 Rev 2 to PECO-COLR-L2R4, COLR for Lgs,Unit 2,Reload 4,Cycle 5 ML20195C9771998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20154H5691998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20151X3511998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Limerick Generating Station Units 1 & 2.With ML20237F0291998-08-27027 August 1998 Special Suppl Rept:On 960425,one Loose Part Detection Sys (Lpds) Was Identified to Be Inoperable.Initially Reported on 960531.Caused by Loose Parts Detector Module.Repairs Performed & Intermittent Ground No Longer Present ML20237D1041998-08-17017 August 1998 Books 1 & 2 of LGS Unit 1 Summary Rept for 960301-980521 Periodic ISI Rept 7 ML20237A7761998-08-10010 August 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Response to NRC Bulleting 95-002, Unexpected Clogging of RHR Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode ML20236X7641998-07-31031 July 1998 Rev 0 to SIR-98-079, Response to NRC RAI Re RPV Structural Integrity at Lgs,Units 1 & 2 ML20237B4711998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236N6751998-07-0909 July 1998 Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Notification of Potential Safety Hazard from Breakage of Cast Iron Suction Heads in Apkd Type Pumps.Caused by Migration of Suction Head Journal Sleeve Along Lower End of Pump Shaft.Will Inspect Pumps ML20151Z4881998-06-30030 June 1998 GE-NE-B1100786-02, Surveillance Specimen Program Evaluation for Limerick Generating Station,Unit 2 ML20236P9781998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20196K1801998-06-30030 June 1998 Annual 10CFR50.59 & Commitment Rev Rept for 970701-980630 for Lgs,Units 1 & 2. with ML20249B3501998-06-11011 June 1998 Rev 1 to PECO-COLR-L2R4, COLR for LGS Unit 2 Reload 4,Cycle 5 ML20249A5331998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Limerick Units 1 & 2 ML20247M7071998-05-14014 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 128 to License NPF-39 ML20217Q5101998-05-0404 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 127 to License NPF-39 ML20247H5071998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Limerick Generating Station ML20216F3601998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217M0791998-03-31031 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 125 & 89 to Licenses NPF-39 & NPF-85,respectively ML20217D5701998-03-20020 March 1998 Part 21 Rept 40 Re Governor Valve Stems Made of Inconel 718 Matl Which Caused Loss of Governor Control.Control Problems Have Been Traced to Valve Stems Mfg by Bw/Ip.Id of Carbon Spacer Should Be Increased to at Least .5005/.5010 ML20216F9471998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Limerick Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20216F3471998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Limerick Genrating Station,Unit 1 1999-09-30
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F PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHIL.ADELPHIA. PA.19101 1215)848-4000 May 1, 1985 Docket No. 50-352 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator Region I
.U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Dr. Murley:
The purpose of this letter is to inform you of events which occurred at the Limerick Generating Station on Unit No.1 on Although these January 31, 1985 following a full reactor scram.
events were not considered to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.73, the following information (including the information concerning the. reactor scram which was previously submitted to the NRC in Licensee Event Report > 85-021-00) is provided due to the interest expressed by the Resident Inspector. These events were reviewed during NRC Combined Inspection 50-352/85-11 and 52-353/85-03.
Reference:
Docket No. 50-352 Event Date: January 31, 1985 Facility: Limerick Generating Station P.O. Box A, Sanatoga, PA 19464 Description of the Event:
1985, at approximately 8:05 p.m., with Unit No.1 On January 31, in the startup condition and at 3.5 percent power, while an operator was returning'the Jet Pump Developed Head Instrument, PDI-42-IR005, to service, a full scram occurred (no other safety systems actuated). An Unusual Event was declared at about 8:09 Investigation p.m. due to the unplanned reactor shutdown.the scram occurred when the opera indicated that The scram signals instrument isolation valve on PDI-42-IR005.
were reset-by 8:ll p.m..
the operators noted that 34 of the 185 Following the scram, control rods did not display a green full-in light on the full kDj52OO214 850501 S ADOCK 05000352 PDR
/ Q 91
Dr. Thom2c E.LMurley May 1,_1985 Page 2 core display panel or indicate full-in on the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) panel. However, all but control rod 42-27 were indicated to be at position 00 on the four-rod display and
.on the process computer. No position indication was available for control rod 42-27 which had been at position 08 prior to the scram because the rod position indication system was showing a data fault for_this rod. Using indications svailable on the RSCS panel, the operators determined that the rod had inserted to at least position 04. To obtain full-in indications and to verify that control rod 42-27 was fully inserted, the mode switch was placed in Refuel and the operator applied a manual insert signal to each rod which lacked its full-in indication. No rod withdrawals were performed while the mode switch was in the Refuel position. For each selected rod except 42-27, the rod briefly inserted beyond position 00, the full-in indication was obtained on both the full core display and the RSCS panel and the rod settled back to position 00 as expected. Technicians then determined that the data fault for rod 42-27 was caused by the reed switches for position 00 and 06 being closed at the same time.
While the rod position indication problem was being resolved, other operators were in the process of isolating steam flows from the reactor such as those for the steam seal evaporator and the steam jet air ejectors by aligning steam from the auxiliary boiler to these components. Other pathways of steam flow from the reactor at the time of the scram included one reactor feed pump turbine, a partially open bypass valve and the main steam line-drains. Because the cooling effects of the steam flow from the reactor coolant system exceeded the reactor decay heat, a higher than expected cooldown rate developed after the scram.
The main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) were closed at 8:42 p.m.
to slow the_cooldown rate. The reactor coolant system water temperature had decreased at a rate of about 113 degrees F per hour while the MSIVs were open.
On January 31, 1985, at about 9:05 p.m. , the Unusual Event was terminated since the cause'of the scram had been identified and the reactor coolant system cooldown rate had been decreased.
Conscouences of the Event:
As a result of the pressure transient on the RPS instrumentation sensing lines, the reactor protection system functioned as designed. Even though the 34 control rods did not indicate full-
.in on the full core display or the RSCS, the process computer and the four-rod display did indicate that all rods were at position 00 (fully inserted), excluding rod 42-27 which did not indicate position 00 due to a failed position indicating probe. The failure of the full-in indication on the full core display or the
Dr. Th: ag E. Murlcy May 1, 1985 Page 3 RSCS did not present a safety concern since there was sufficient indication that the rods were full-in as shown on the process computer and-four-rod display. Subsequent to resetting the scram, those rods that were not indicating full-in were driven in using normal' drive pressure (manual insertion) and a full-in green light indication was restored on both the full core display and the RSCS panel. Full shutdown was achieved since all control rods had fully inserted.
Analysis of the effects of the cooldown rate on the reactor pressure. vessel concluded that this event, in which the reactor coolant exceeded the 100 degrees F/hr. cooldown rate, was less severe than the design shutdown flooding event and therefore should be considered as an additonal shutdown cycle.
Cause of the Event:
Instrument PDI-42-IR005 had been blocked out-of-service to reverse the high and low pressure sensing line connections which were reversed during initial installation. As a result of the work to correct the sensing line connections, the process legs between the instrument isolation valves and the instrument rack isolation valves were not completely filled with liquid. While in the process of clearing the equipment tag-out block, the plant operator, with authorization from the licensed control operator, opened the instrument isolation valve, filling the instrument process line and momentarily causing a pressure reduction in the process line to other instruments on the same instrument rack.
The momentary pressure reduction affected level transmitters LT-42-lN080A and B which initiated a reactor scram signal based on perceived low reactor water level. The low level signals from LT-42-1N080A and B properly generated a full scram signal.
There are three separate reed switches which are used to provide full-in indications to various readout locations for each control rod. The position 00 reed switch (S-00) provides indication to the four-rod display and the process computer. Reed switches S-51 and S-52 are located approximately 0.38 in and 1.26 in.
respectively, above the S-00 switch and either one would provide full-in indication to the full core display and to RSCS.
Investigation indicated that the magnetic coupling between the control rod maanet and the reed switches was insufficient to maintain either S-51 or S-52 closed.
The identification of the unacceptoble cooldown rate (approximately 13 degrees F/hr. above the Tech. Spec. limit) was delayed due to the unavailability in the control room of the proper surveillance procedures normally used to monitor cooldown/hentup rates. Furthermore, clarification was needed regarding the heatup and ecoldown rate limits in Technical
fi; ~ -
- p. : .
TDrspThimaclE.$Murley1 May 1, 1985 Page:4
- s I
- SpecificationsLto identify whether the limits applied to. reactor th ; coolant' system l temperatures or to' reactor vessel-metal is temperatures.'
!=
l Corrective' Actions: _
l' r , ,
Instrument.and Controls Technicians are trained with respect-to-
- the proper. method for. returning _ instrumentation 1to'. service.- Each1 shift'has been notified that any: valving-to be-done on instrument racks should be done by an Instrument and-Controls Technician or-
.byLan operator with an I&C Technician in attendance.
Additionally, the process.of backfilling and venting instrument-L , process lines performed by I&C technicians has been formalized by written'andrapproved' procedure RT-ll-00467.
'Th'e position = indicating _ probe on control rod'42-27:was replaced.
Procedures were implemented in order to guide the operators
- reaction.to a loss of full-in rod position indications following; a' scram.- A memorandum was. issued to'each operating shift discussing-these procedures.
~
. A PORC Technical Specification Position was developed regarding the interpretation of the heatup and cooldown rate limits; checks of'both coolant temperature _and vessel metal temperatures are. required. A Technical Specification Amendment Request will be submitted subsequent to the issuance of the Full Power License for the purpose of clarification in accordance with the PORC
< ? position. LAn Operator Aid was. posted with the post-scram TRIP procedure cautioning the operators to be aware of high cooldown Erates.after scrams from low decay heat condition and prescribing
.a planned course of~ action for dealing.with these situations.
Additionally, a new simulator scenario was established to train
~
the operators in scrams from low decay heat conditions.
Previous Similar Occurrences
- None.
L
_ _ _ _ . . _ ..__.__m___m.__._.__m_m-_.____m __m____ -_ _m.- m _.m_ .
,4. i. :
Dr.-Thorac _E. Murlcy' -
May:1, 1985 Page 5
-If'you require anE further information, please do not
-hesitate to contact-us.
F_
Very truly yours, ff W.-T. Ullrich Superintendent Nuclear Generation Division cca J. T. Wiggins, Senior. Site Inspector See Service List L
4
i cc: Judge Helen F. Hoyt Judge Jerry Harbour Judge Richard F. Cole Troy B. Conner , Jr. , Esq.
Ann P. Hodgdon, Esq.
Mr. Frank R. Romano Mr. Robert L. Anthony Ms.'Phyllis Zitner Charles W. Elliott, Esq.
7.ori G. Ferkin, Esq.
Mr. Thomas Gerusky Director, Penna. Emergency Management Agency Angus Love, Esq.
David hersan, Esq.
Robe r t J . Sugarman, Esq.
Martha W. Bush, Esq.
' Spence U. Perry, Esq.
Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel Docket & Service Section (3 Copies)
James Wiggins Timothy.R. S. Campbell d
l January 16, 1985 l
.