ML20127E746

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re 831107 Response to Item 1.1 (post-trip Review) of Generic Ltr 83-28 Concerning Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events

ML20127E746
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	06/17/1985
From:	Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Harrington W BOSTON EDISON CO.
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8506240641
Download: ML20127E746 (5)

Text

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June 17,1985 Docket No. 50-293 DISTRIBUTION ABournia

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'DocketJ11e r NRC PDR DVassallo Local PDR EJordan

- Mr. William D. Harrington ORB #2 Reading BGrimes Senior Vice President, Nuclear HThompson JPartlow Boston Edisen Company SNorris OELD 800 Boylston Street ORB #2 Gray File ACRS(10)

Boston, Massachusetts 02199 RKarsch DShum Dear Mr. Harrington

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATIVE TO GL83-28, ITEM 1.1 (POST-TRIP REVIEW)

By letter dated. November 7, 1983, you responded to Generic Letter 83-28 with regard to required actions based on generic implications of the Salem ATHS events. We have reviewed your response with respect to Item 1.1 (post-trip review) and find that it does not fully meet our guidelines in the following areas:

C. .The methods and criteria for comparing the event with expected plant performance.

D. The criteria for the need of independent assessment of the event.

E. A systematic safety assessment program to assess unscheduled reactor trips.

The guidelines for the above areas and further details relative to our request for information are provided in the enclosure. Please respond within 60 days of receiving this letter.

The_ reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements of this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. ,96-511.

Sincerely, Original signed by/

Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactor Branch #2 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

See next page ORB # :DL ORB #2: 0 2:DL SNo c PLeech DVasgallo 06/n/85 06/17/85 06/fr/85 8506240641 850617 l PDR ADOCK 05000293  !

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Mr. William D. Harrington Boston Edison Company _

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

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Mr. Charles J. Mathis, Station Mgr. Thomas A. Murley Boston Edison Company Regional Administrator RFD #1, P.ocky Hill Road Region 1 Office Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360 U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Comission 631 Park Avenue Resident Inspector's Office King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 867 Mr. A. Victor Morisi Plyinnuth, Massachusetts 02360 Boston Edison Company '

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25 Braintree Hill Park m Mr. David F. Tarantino Rockdale Street 4 Chairinan, Board of Selectman Braintree, Massachusetts '02184

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11 Lincoln Street

, Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

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Office of the Commissioner

. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering One Winter Street

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Boston, Massachusetts 02108

, Office'of the Attorney General oa 1 Ashburton Place

, p_ 19th Floor

,_ Boston, Massachusetts 02108

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g, Mr. Rnbert M. Hallisey, Director Radiation Control Program o C

• Massachusetts Department of -

~. Public Health

• 150 Tremont Street Boston, Ma'ssachusetts 02111 l

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ENCLOSURE RE00EST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION --

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION ,

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SALEM ATWS ITEM 1.1 - POST-TRIP REVIEW -

I. Review Guidelines The following review guidelines were developed after initial evaluation of various utility responses to Item 1.1 of Generic Letter 83-28 and incorporate

'the best features of these submittals. As such, these review guidelines in eL--- -- . . ~ effect represent a " good practices" approach to post-t-ip review:-

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A. The Boston Edison Company (licensee) should have systematic safetr

, assessment procedures established that will ensure that the following

.' restart criteria are met before restart is authorized.

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The po:t-trip review team has determined the root cause

.. . u and sequence of events resulting in the plant trip.

• Near term corrective actions have been t'aken to remedy the cause of the trip.

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• The post-trip review team has performed an analysis and t,- determined that the major safety systems responoed to the

. event within specified limits of the primary system. parameters.

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• The post-trip review has not resulted in the discovery of a '

T. potential safety concern (e.g., the root cause of the event occurs with a frequency significantly larger than expectect),.

(7 If any of the above restart criteria are not met, then an~

independent assessment of the event is performed by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC), or another designated group with similar authority and experience.

B. The responsibilities and authorities of the personnel who will perform the review and analysis should be well defined.

The post-trip review team leader should be a niember of plant management at the shift supervisor level ~or above and should hold or should have held a Senior Operator license on the plant. The team leader should be charged with overall responsibility for directing the post-trip review, including data gathering and data assessment and he/she should have the necessary authority to obtain all personnel and data needed for the post-trip review.

( -

i A second person on the review tean should be a Shift Tec. hnical Adviser (STA) or should hold a relevant encineerirm' degree with special transient analysis traininp.

• A team leader and the STA (Engineer) should be responsible to concur on a decision / recommendation to restart the plant.

A nonconcurrence from either of these persons should be sufficient to prevent restart until the trip has been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) or equivalent organization.

C.

The licensee should indicate that the plant response to the trip s . -. _ . - --

event will be evaluated plant response and a determination was within acceptable limits. made as to whether the __

g include: The evaluation shou _id,

, A verification of the proper operation of plant systems

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and equipment by comparison of the pertinent data during the post-trip review to the applicable data

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provided in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

An analysis of the sequence. of events to verify the proper functioning of safety-related and other important equipment.

Where possible, comparisons with previous

- similar events should be made.

oa D.

IT- The licensee should have procedures to ensure that all physical evidence necessary for an independent assessment is preserved.

E.

Ts; Each licensee should provide in its submittal, copies of the plant procedures which contain the information required in Items A through D. As a minimum, these should include the

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following: .

The criteria for determining the acceptability of i

resta rt The qualifications, responsibilities and authorities of key personnel involved in the post-trip review process The methods and criteria for determining whether the; plant variables and system responses were within the-limits as described in the FSAR -

The criteria for determining the need for an independent review o

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II. Additional Information Requested We have reviewed the licensee's November 7, 1984 submitta1 [Rgainst the above guidelines and we found the information responsive to. areas I.A.

and I.B. However, the following information is needed for completion .

of our review in areas I.C., I.D., and I.E.: i C. The methods and criteria for comparing the event information with known or expected plant behavior should be addressed. We recommend that the pertinent data obtained during the post-trip review be compared to the applicable data in the FSAR. Where possible, comparisons with previous similar events should be made.

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D'. The licensee has established procedures to ensure that all .

phys-ical evidence necessary for an independent assessment is ___

g preserved. The licensee has also indicated that if the cause of ,

the trip is unknown, an independent assessment conducted by the operations Review Committee is required for the event. We find

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this insufficient and recommend that an independent assessment g should be performed if any of the restart criteria are not met.

E. The licensee should develop, and provide for cur review, a systematic safety assessment program to assess unscheduled reactor trips.

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