ML20127E283
| ML20127E283 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1985 |
| From: | Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Brons J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8506240505 | |
| Download: ML20127E283 (6) | |
Text
June 17,1985 Docket No. 50-333 DISTRIBUTION HAbelson
- Docket. File -
DVassallo
'NRC PDR EJordan Local PDR BGrimes ORB #2 Reading JPartlow Mr. John C. Brons HThompson OELD Senior Vice President SNorris ACRS (10)
Nuclear Generation ORBf2 Gray File Power Authority of the State of new York 123 Main Street White Plains, New York 10601 Dear Mr. Brons
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - FITZPATRICK SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS)
Your letters dated November 30,1984 transmitted the FitzPatrick SPDS Parameter Safety Analysis and the SPDS Implementation Plan. We have reviewed both of these submittals and find that the additional information delineated in the enclosure is needed for us to complete our review.
We request that you respond to the items contained in the enclosure by November 1, 1985.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements of this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely, Original signed by/
l l
Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactor Branch #2 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated L
cc w/ enclosure:
i See next page ORB #2:DL OR 0
- DL SNo m s:rc HA n
DVassallo 06/17/85 06/ 7/85 06/f}/85 0506240505 850617 PDR ALOCK 05000333 F
Mr. John C. Brons James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Authority of the State of New York Power Plant cc:
g Mr. Charles M. Pratt Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Assistant General Counsel Division of Policy Analysis Power Authority of the State and Planning of New York New York State Energy Office 10 Columbus Circle Agency Building 2 New York, New York 10019 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Resident Inspector's Office Thomas A. Murley U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator Post Office Box 136 Region 1 Office
""' - Lycoming, New York 13093 U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommfIsion 4
631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Mr. A. Klausman Mr. Harold Glovier Vice President - Quality Assurance Resident Manager Power Authority of the State James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear of New York Power Plant 10 Columbus Circle Post Office Box 41 New York, New York 10019 Lycoming, New York 13093
~.
Mr. J. A. Gray, ~Jr.
Mr. George Wilverding, Chairman.
Ci Director - Nuclear Licensing - BWR Safety Review Committee
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P.pwer Authority of the State Power Authority of the State r
of New York of New York 123 Main Street 123 Main Street he White Plains, New York 10601 White Plains, New York 10601 5
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Mr. Robert P. Jones, Supervisor Town of Scriba R. D. #4 Oswego, New York 13126 Mr. Leroy W. Sinclair Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Mr. M. C. Cosgrove Quality Assurance Superintendent Jares A. FitzPatrick Nuclear i
Power Plant Post Office Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 9
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RE0 VEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM System (SPDS)g reactor shall be provided with a Safety Parameter Display Each operatin The Commission approved requirements for an SPDS are defined in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.
In the Regional Workshops on Generic Letter 82-33 held during March 1983, the NRC discussed these requirements and the staff's review of the SPDS.
Prompt implementation of the SPDS in operating reactors is a design goal of prime importance. The staff's review of SPDS documentation for operating reactors called for in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 is designed to avoid delays result ~ing from the time required for NRC staff review. The NRC staff will riot review operating reactor SPDS designs for compliance with the
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m requirements of Supplement 1 of NUREG-0737 prior to implementation unless a.
pre-implementation review has been specifically requested by licensees. The licensee's Safety Analysis and SPDS Implementation Plan will be reviewed by the NRC staff only to determine if a serious safety question is posed or if
- the analysis is seriously (a) adequate.
in The NRC staff review to accomplish this will be directed at confirming the adequacy of the paraneters E
selected to be displayed to detect critical safety functions, (b) confirming
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that means are provided to assure that the data displayed are valid,
'(c) confirming that the licensee has comitted to a human factors program to ensure that the displayed information can be readily perceived and comprehended so as not to mislead the operator, and (d) confirming that the SPDS will be suitably isolated from electrical and electronic interference with equipment and sensors that are used in safety systems.
If, based on p__
this review, the staff identifies a serious safety question or seriously inadequate analysis, the Director of IE or the Director of NRR may require or
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direct the licensee to cease implementation.
h The staff reviewed the SPDS safety analysis and implementation lan provided
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by The Power Authority of the State of New York (References 182. The staff.*
was unable to complete its evaluation because of insufficient information.
~~
The following additional information is required to continue and complete the SPDS evaluation:
ISOLATION DEVICES a.
For each type of device used to accomplish electrical isolation, describe the specific testing performed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application (s). This description should include elementary diagrams where necessary to ifidicate the test configuration and how the maximum credible faults vere applied to the devices.
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b.
Data to verify that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were the maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and define how the maximum voltage / current was determined.
1 c.
Datatoverifythatthemaximumcrediblefaultwasapkliedtothe output of the device in the transverse mode (between gtgnal and return) and other faults were considered (i.e., open and short circuits),
d.
Define the pass / fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.
e.
Provide a commitment that the isolation devices comply with the environmental qualifications (10 CFR 50.49) and with the seismic qualifications which were the basis for plant licensing.
f.
Provide a description of the measures taken to protect the safety systems from electrical interference (i.e., Electrostatic Coupling, e
EMI Common Mode and Crosstalk) that may be generated by the SPDS.
t 4
HUMAN FACTORS PROGRAM A Provide a description of the display system, its human factor design, and the methods used and results from a human factors program to ensure 2
that the displayed information can be readily perceived and comprehended 4
so as not to mislead the operator.
Include a discussion of any tests of operator comprehension / man-in-the-loop simulation that may be planned as part of the design or validation phases.
The staff notes that the licensee has committed to meeting the L__
requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 (Reference 2, Section 3.0).
I.
However, a commitment to providing continuous display was omitted. The staff position is that the SPDS parameters must be continuously displayed (e.g. dedicated display) or an alerting mechanism provided so b
that the operator is aware of changes in critical safety function status
, ic_
and can easily access the parameter (s) that are affecting the status of.
the critical safety function (e.g. continuously displayed status lights
- combined with function key access to detailed data).
DATA VALIDATION Describe the method used to validate data displayed in the SPDS. Also describe how invalid data is defined to the operator.
PARAMETER SELECTION The staff's review of the variables selected for display onithe Fitzpatrick SPDS identified the following omissions:
- 1) Primary containment radiation i
- 2) Primary containment isolation status
e' l.
- 3) Combustible gas concentration in the primary containmeAt t
- 4) Source range monitors 52 The lice' should provide justification for why these variables are not neer
. display on the SPDS. Discussion should address the Containmer...rategrity, Reactivity Control and Radioactivity Control functions in particular; e.g., containment isolation is an important parameter for use in making a rapid assessment of Containment Integrity.
A determination that known process pathways through containment have been secured provides significant additional assurance of Containment Integrity.
Combustible gas (hydrogen, oxygen) parameters will be identified in' g,_ _ _.
future revisions of the EPGs and provisions should be made to include.
4 these parameters. These parameters are related to the Containment Integrity Critical Safety Function.
UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS
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Provide conclusions regarding unreviewed safety questions and changes to technical specifications.
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REFERENCES 1.
Letter from C.A. McNeill (PASNY) to D.B. Vassallo (NRC) dated 11/30/84, with attachment "SPDS Parameter Safety Analysis."
1 2.
Letter from C.A. McNeill (PASNY) to D.B. Vassallo (NRC) daf,ad 11/30/84, with attachment "SPDS Implementation Plan."
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