ML20127E068

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Final Deficiency Rept (Rdc 127(85)) Re Starting Voltage Drops in Power Feeder Cables for Three Valves in RCIC Sys. Initially Reported on 850130.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)
ML20127E068
Person / Time
Site: Perry  
Issue date: 05/22/1985
From: Edelman M
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
(RDC-127(85)), PY-CEI-OIE-0046, PY-CEI-OIE-46, NUDOCS 8506240423
Download: ML20127E068 (2)


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1 THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMIN ATING COMPANY P O. BOX 5000 - CLEVELAND. OHIO 44101 - TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 - ILLUMINATING BLOG.

- 55 PUBLICSQUARE Serving The Best Location in the Nation MURRAY R. EDELMAN VICE PRESIDENT NucuAR May 22, 1985 PY-CEI/OIC-0046 LQ Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 RE:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Voltage Drop Affecting RCIC Valves [RDC 127 (85)]

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is the final report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) on the potential significant deficiency regarding starting voltage drops in power feeder cables for three valves in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System.

Mr. J. McCormick-Barger of your office was notified on January 30, 1985, by Mr. T. A. Boss of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company that this problem was being evaluated 'er our Deviation Analysis Report Number 222.

Interim reports ere submitted on February 28, and April 18, 1985.. We have d termined that this condition does not constitute a significant deliciency per the requirements of 10CPR50.55(e).

Description of Potential Deficiency Calculations had indicated that various DC powered valves within the RCIC system might be incapable of operating due to reduced voltage at the valve operators.

This condition results upon loss of a battery charger coupled with the voltage drop in the valves' motor circuit conductors.

  • Results of Evaluation Section 5.4.6.1 of our FSAR currently states that the RCIC. system can be utilized to mitigate the consequences of a Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA).

However, in the event that RCIC system 8506240423 850522 h

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'MAY 281985

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Mr. JImes G. Ksppler Mty 22, 1985 j

operation becomes impaired due to the loss of a battery charger, the High Pressure Core Spray system would be available to respond.

Additionally, the Automatic Depressurization System initiates upon Low Low Reactor Water level, enabling the Low Pressure Core Spray and Low Pressure Core Injection to provide core cooling and reactor _ inventory make-up.

Discussions with our Nuclear _ Steam Supply-System supplier, General Electric (GE), indicate that they are in agreement with f

our determination that RCIC is not required to function to

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mitigate the consequences of a CRDA.

Documentation from GE is forthcoming and we will notify you should our position change.

The documentation will be evaluated to determine if any changes to our FSAR are required.

In light of the-above, the identified condition would not have had a significant impact on the safe operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

Please call if there are any questions.

Sincerely, Murray R. Ede n

Vice President Nuclear Group MRE:sab cc:

Mr. J. A. Grobe USNRC, Site Office Mr. D. E. Keating USNRC, Site Office Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document' Management Branch Washington, D.C.

20555 Records Center, SEE-IN Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100~ Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339