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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211H7921999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-54 ML20198G8271997-08-22022 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 125 to License DPR-54 ML20059G9621990-09-10010 September 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 115 to License DPR-54 ML20247B3611989-07-17017 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 112 to License DPR-54 ML20245E1161989-06-20020 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 111 to License DPR-54 ML20245A1991989-06-0909 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 110 to License DPR-54 ML20248B6321989-06-0505 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 108 to License DPR-54 ML20248B9361989-06-0505 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 107 to License DPR-54 ML20248B9621989-06-0505 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 109 to License DPR-54 ML20247P1761989-05-30030 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re on-line Testing of Reactor Trip Sys ML20247M9231989-05-23023 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 106 to License DPR-54 ML20247K7261989-05-23023 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-54 ML20247K6871989-05-16016 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-54 ML20246F4671989-05-0404 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program & Requests for Relief Re ASME Class 1,2 & 3 Pumps & Valves.Program Acceptable ML20245F9041989-04-18018 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-54 ML20248E9371989-03-29029 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 102 to License DPR-54 ML20155D3131988-09-28028 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 100 to License DPR-54 ML20151L5511988-07-14014 July 1988 Redistributed Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 99 to License DPR-54 ML20151A2771988-07-13013 July 1988 SER Supporting Util Actions to Prevent Failure of Ammonia Tanks Which May Result in Incapacitation of Control Room & Technical Support Ctr Personnel ML20195C5571988-06-0808 June 1988 SER Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1) Re Equipment Classification (Reactor Trip Sys Components) ML20195C9311988-06-0808 June 1988 SER Accepting Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) Re Vendor Interface Programs (Reactor Trip Sys) ML20150F2851988-03-28028 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Resolution of Tdi Diesel Engine Vibration Problems at Facility ML20148J8611988-03-17017 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 98 to License DPR-54 ML20153B2911988-03-15015 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License DPR-54 ML20055E3041988-02-12012 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 871223 & 880111 Proposed Changes to Tech Specs,Including Reducing Lower Limits of Detection for Liquid Radioactive Effluents ML20149L6961988-02-12012 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 95 to License DPR-54 ML20149L2761988-02-0909 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 94 to License DPR-54 ML20148C7321988-01-0505 January 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 93 to License DPR-54 ML20237B4141987-12-0707 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 92 to License DPR-54 ML20236X1771987-12-0303 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 91 to License DPR-54 ML20236X1111987-11-13013 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 90 to License DPR-54 ML20236Q2461987-11-10010 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util & Related Submittals Re Design Mods to Emergency Electrical Distribution Sys (Ref Tdi Diesel Generators) ML20236J2671987-11-0303 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 89 to License DPR-54 ML20245C7051987-10-27027 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 87 to License DPR-54 ML20245C7831987-10-27027 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 88 to License DPR-54 ML20236G8791987-10-23023 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 86 to License DPR-54 ML20236D1361987-10-23023 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 870826 Request to Use Repair & Replacement Program Contained in ASME Section XI 1983 Edition Including Addenda Through Summer 1983 ML20238D4151987-09-0303 September 1987 Evaluation of Engineering Rept ERPT-E0220 Re Reactor Regulation of Util Approach to Compliance W/Reg Guide 1.75 for New Diesel Generator Installation at Plant.Licensee Approach to Demonstrating Compliance Acceptable ML20238B1771987-08-27027 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 85 to License DPR-54 ML20236E3731987-07-24024 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Existing & Proposed Mods to Meteorological Program & W/Planned Improvements,Facility Will Satisfy Min Meteorological Emergency Preparedness Requirements of 10CFR50.47 & 10CFR50,Apps E & F ML20205T3021987-03-31031 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 84 to License DPR-54 ML20205R7871987-03-26026 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Concluding Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability On-Line Testing Permits on-line Functional Testing of Sys,Including Diverse Trip Features of Reactor Trip Breakers ML20205C3951987-03-13013 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events (10CFR50.61).Util 860123 Submittal Re Matl Properties & Fast Neutron Fluence of Reactor Vessel Acceptable ML20206B6561987-03-13013 March 1987 Corrected SER Re Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events (10CFR50.61).Util 860123 Submittal Re Matl Properties & Fast Neutron Fluence of Reactor Vessel Acceptable ML20205J0971987-03-11011 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Sys Selected for Facility Sys Review & Test Program.Sys Constitutes Adequate Scope for Sys Review & Test Program ML20211P2601987-02-19019 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 860116 Request for Amend to License DPR-54,redefining Fire Area Boundaries Required to Be Operable to Separate safety-related Fire Areas & Reassessing Adequacy of Components in Fire Area Assemblies ML20210D1011987-02-0303 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Issuance of Amend 83 to License DPR-54 ML20215N6881986-11-0404 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.4 Re Improvements in Maint & Test Procedures for B&W Plants ML20212N4351986-08-13013 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 82 to License DPR-54 ML20206F9071986-05-19019 May 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Request for Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Subsection Iii.L Re Capability to Achieve Cold Shutdown in 72 H 1999-08-13
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20211H7921999-08-13013 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-54 ML20195D1901999-05-0606 May 1999 Annual Rept ML20195H8571998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Smud. with ML20155D4801998-10-27027 October 1998 Amend 3 to Rancho Seco DSAR, Representing Updated Licensing Basis for Operation of Permanently Shutdown & Defueled Rancho Seco Nuclear Facility During Permanently Defueled Mode ML20248C4301998-05-0606 May 1998 Annual Rept, Covering Period 970507-980506 ML20249A7831997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Smud Annual Rept ML20198G8271997-08-22022 August 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 125 to License DPR-54 ML20217D3271997-07-30030 July 1997 Update of 1995 Decommissioning Evaluation for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML20140A6371997-05-0606 May 1997 Annual Rept, Covering Period 960507-970506 ML20140G4481997-05-0101 May 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby Diesel Generator Sys.Recommends That Springs Be Inspected on Periodic Basis,Such as During Refueling Outages ML20137W8151997-03-20020 March 1997 Amend 1 to Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20141J2711996-12-31031 December 1996 Smud 1996 Annual Rept ML20138L1231996-11-13013 November 1996 Smud Rancho Seco Incremental Decommissioning Action Plan, Rev 0,961113 ML20129E7151996-10-14014 October 1996 Defueled SAR for Rancho Seco ML20059H6821994-01-17017 January 1994 Revised Rancho Seco Quality Manual ML20058K3841993-12-0909 December 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby DG Sys,Regarding Potential Problem W/ Subcover Assembled Atop Power Head ML20056E5171993-08-31031 August 1993 Technical Review Rept, Tardy Licensee Actions ML20059K1981993-05-0606 May 1993 Annual Rept, Covering Period from 920501- 930506,consisting of Shutdown Statistics,Narrative Summary of Shutdown Experience & Tabulations of Facility Changes, Tests & Experiments,Per 10CFR50.59(b) ML20128C9641993-02-0202 February 1993 Informs Commission of Status of Open Issues & Progress of Specified Facilities Toward Decommissioning ML20127H2301993-01-15015 January 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defeat in Component of Dsrv & Dsr Enterprise Standby DG Sys.Starting Air Distributor Housing Assemblies Installed as Replacement Parts at Listed Sites ML20126B0421992-12-17017 December 1992 Final Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Steel Cylinder Heads.Initially Reported on 921125.Caused by Inadequate Cast Wall Thickness at 3/4-inch-10 Bolt Hole.Stud at Location Indicated on Encl Sketch Should Be Removed ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20126E6771992-08-0303 August 1992 Rev 7 to Rancho Seco Quality Manual NL-90-451, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1990-10-31031 October 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML17348B5061990-10-0909 October 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Zener Diode VR2 on Power Supply Board 9 1682 00 106 Possibly Being Installed Backwards ML20059G9621990-09-10010 September 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 115 to License DPR-54 NL-90-443, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1990 for Rancho Seco1990-08-31031 August 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1990 for Rancho Seco ML20217A5711990-08-28028 August 1990 Final Engineering Rept,Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Liner Leakage NL-90-439, Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1990-07-31031 July 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML20055F8591990-07-16016 July 1990 Special Rept 90-11:on 900613,06,25,18,21 & 28,fire Barriers Breached More than 7 Days & Not Made Operable in 14 Days. Corrective Actions:Operability of Fire Detectors Verified on One Side of Breached Barriers NL-90-423, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1990-06-30030 June 1990 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1990 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML20055C6291990-05-21021 May 1990 Special Rept 90-08:on 900419,fire Pump Batteries Inoperable When Surveillance Procedure SP.206 Not Performed by Due Date.Caused by Test Frequency Incorrectly Changed from Weekly to Monthly.Surveillance Schedule Revised ML20055C6301990-05-21021 May 1990 Special Rept 90-09:on 900424,25,30,31 & 0502,fire Barriers Inoperable for More than 7 Days,Per Tech Spec 3.14.6.2 Requirement.Hourly Fire Watches Established & Penetrations & Doors Returned to Operable Status ML20058B6521990-05-0404 May 1990 Rev 0 to ERPT-M0216, Property Loss Study for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station in Long Term Defueled Mode ML20248E0121989-09-13013 September 1989 Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Six Specific Engine Control Devices in Air Start,Lube Oil, Jacket Water & Crankcase Sys.Initially Reported on 890429. California Controls Co Will Redesign Valve Seating NL-89-634, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1989-08-31031 August 1989 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station NL-89-598, Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1989-07-31031 July 1989 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML20247B3611989-07-17017 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 112 to License DPR-54 NL-89-556, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Station1989-06-30030 June 1989 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Station ML20245E1161989-06-20020 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 111 to License DPR-54 ML20245B6651989-06-15015 June 1989 Part 21 Rept 150 Re Potential Defect in Component of Dsr Standby Diesel Generator.Cause of Failure Determined to Be Combination of Insufficient Lubrication to Bushings.Listed Course of Action Recommended at Next Scheduled Engine Maint ML20245A1991989-06-0909 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 110 to License DPR-54 ML20248B9361989-06-0505 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 107 to License DPR-54 ML20248B6321989-06-0505 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 108 to License DPR-54 ML20248B9621989-06-0505 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 109 to License DPR-54 NL-89-517, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station1989-05-31031 May 1989 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station ML20247P1761989-05-30030 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re on-line Testing of Reactor Trip Sys ML20247N7491989-05-30030 May 1989 Special Rept 89-13:on 890328-29,specific Activity of Primary Sys Exceeded Limits in Administrative Procedure & Chemistry Control Commitment.Possibly Caused by Power Reduction.Isotopic Analysis Continued ML20247K7261989-05-23023 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-54 1999-08-13
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g UNITED STATES NUC' LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- r. 8 WASMNGTON, D. C. 20555
' \*****J: SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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i SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.70 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.'DPR-54
! SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT i
RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
, DOCKET NO. 50-312
! INTRODUCTION
, By letter dated February 14, 1985, as revised May 6, 1985, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (the licensee) submitted an application to amend Facility Operating License No. DPR-54 for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. The amendment would revise the Technical Specifications to-incorporate design changes to the Control Room / Technical Support Center (TSC)
Emergency Filtering System and the Air Supply System which are subsystems of the new Control Room /TSC Emergency Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System.
BACKGROUND To satisfy the habitability requirements of NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4, the Control Room Emergency HVAC System was modified from a single train system into a two-loop redundant full-flow system. In addition, the Control Room i Emergency HVAC System was expanded to include the Emergency HVAC requirements for the TSC. The new Control Room /TSC Emergency HVAC System is designed to satisfy the habitability requirements of both the Control Room and the TSC.
As a separate licensing action, we reviewed the licensee's proposed modifications and found them acceptable.
EVALUATION The licensee's application dated February 14, 1985, would revise the Technical Specifications to (1) change the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for i
the Control Room /TSC Emergency Filtering System to reflect the new design, (2) revise the surveillance testing of the Air Supply System to reflect new design flow rates and Control Room /TSC positive pressure requirements, and (3) revise surveillance testing of the filtering system to reflect proposed 4
reduced removal efficiencies for testing of the charcoal and HEPA filters and 1 to reflect new design flow rates.
The current LCO for the Emergency Control Room Filtering System requires that if the single train filtering system is inoperable, that the system be restored to operable status within 3.5 days or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- The proposed new Technical Specifications require the same action for the i
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i modified Emergency Control Room /TSC Filtering System if both trains are
, inoperable, i.e., no emergency filtration available. Therefore, for the i case where there is no emergency filtration available, the proposed Technical Specifications are the same as the current Technical Specifications. For the i case where a single train is inoperable, the proposed Technical Specifications i require that with one Control Room /TSC Emergency Filtering System train
- inoperable, the system must be restored to operable status within 7 days or be i in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or in cold shutdown within the i following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. This is the same as the Standard Technical Specification i requirement for a single train inoperable. Therefore, we find the proposed LCO 1
Technical Specifications for the Control Room /TSC Emergency Filtering System '
j acceptable (Item 1).
! As noted above, as another licensing action, we reviewed the proposed j modifications to the Control Room /TSC HVAC System. From our review, we have t
concluded that for the proposed design modifications there will be no j significant radiological impact as compared to the present design, and it f will not affect the exposure limit of General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 and j Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.4. In addition, we have also concluded that the i positions of Regulatory Guide 1.75 and 1.95 and SRP Section 6.4, as they
! relate to toxic gas protection of the operators, will still be met. Since j the Control Room /TSC Emergency Filtering System and the Air Supply System are 1
subsystems of the Control Room /HVAC System, we conclude that with the j proposed Control Room /TSC Emergency HVAC System modifications and appropriate l Technical Specifications for surveillance testing of the Control Room /TSC j Emergency Filtering System and the Air Supply System (Items 2 and 3 above),
i occupancy in the Control Room can be maintained under design basis accident
, conditions without exceeding GDC-19 for the duration of the accident. We have
{ also found the surveillance testing for these systems proposed by the licensee 1 acceptable, except for the specified removal efficiencies for testing charcoal
{ and HEPA filters. The licensee proposed removal efficiencies that are less i than those in the current Technical Specifications. Subsequently, by letter i
dated May 6, 1985, the licensee revised the February 14, 1985, application to i delete the proposed change of the reduced charcoal and HEPA filter testing (i.e., so that the current Technical Specifications remain unchanged).
! We independently evaluated the modified Control Room /TSC HVAC System to .
i determine if GDC-19 is met for the radioactive iodine removal efficiency for !
! filtration of 99% proposed by the licensee. This efficiency would require
! surveillance testing of the charcoal filters consistent with the requirements l of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2. These requirements are more stringent ,
- than are presently required by the existing Rancho Seco Technical Specifications for charcoal filters. Because ongoing source term research work indicates iodine releases from a core melt accident are not expected to
.; be instantaneous and may be primarily in a particulate form, cessium iodide issues relating to iodine removal are subject to future reevaluation. With j this consideration, it is judged that the more stringent' filter testing I
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requirement that otherwise would be applicable to this new filtration system should not be required. Instead, the existing charcoal and HEPA filter testing requirements specified in the current Technical Specifications will be sufficient for the interim pending an NRC staff decision on source terms and their overall effect on safety systems. Therefore, we conclude that the Technical Specification changes proposed in the February 14, 1985, application, as revised by the May 6,1985, letter are acceptable.
EMERGENCY CIRCtfMSTANCES The following reasons describe the emergency circumstances as to why regular notification procedures are not required for this amendment:
- 1. NRC regulation 10 CFR 50.91 describes the procedures that will be followed on applications received after May 6, 1983, requesting license amendment. These procedures require that, in addition to other requirements, a 30-day coment period will be provided to allow for public coment on the Comission's proposed no significant hazards consideration detemination. The latest revision to the proposed amendment required to resolve a technical problem was received by the Comission on May 10, 1985.
Therefere an expedited notice of such detemination related to this amendment was published in the Federal Register on May 16, 1985, and the 30-day coment period expires on June 17, 1985.
- 2. The licenset, in its May 29, 1985, letter stated that the Rancho Seco plant was shutdown for a scheduled 90-day outage. The licensee further stated that due to exceptional perfomance of plant personnel, a very effective scheduling program, and the ability to resolve problems quickly, the outage schedule progressed ahead of the planned outage.
The licensee now expects to heatup the plant on June 5 with criticality on June 7. This is about one week ahead of the schedule planned prior to the shutdown on March 15, 1985.
In addition, the licensee also stated that because of the impending sumer heat load and the high cost of oil generated capacity, Rancho Seco should l be put on-line as soon as possible.
The Commission has detemined that emergency circumstances exist in that swift action is necessary to avoid a delay in startup not related to safety and finds that for the reasons stated above, these circumstances caused the outage to be completed earlier than scheduled.
In connection with requests indicating an emergency, the Comission expects its licensees to apply for license amendments in a timely fashion. However, with this consideration in mind, it has been determined that a circumstance has arisen where the licensee and the Comission must act quickly, and the licensee has made a good effort to make a timely application.
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i FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The Connission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92 state that the Connission may make a final determination that a license amendment involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the ,
amendment would not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The information in this Safety Evaluation provides the basis for evaluating this license amendment against these criteria. The request for amendment to the Technical Specifications incorporates design changes made to the Control Room HVAC System to satisfy the habitability requirements of NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4 The revised Technical Specifications are based on the modified design of the HVAC System and fall within the acceptance criteria. Since the requested change does not affect the plant's design basis or plant operating i
conditions, we conclude that:
d' (1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
.i (2) Operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not
'l create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
(3) Operation of the facility in accordance with the amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Accordingly, we conclude that the amendment to Facility Operating License DPR-54 to support operation of Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating station at full rated power during the upcoming Cycle 7 involves no significant hazards considerations.
STATE CONSULTATION 1
In accordance with the Comission's regulations, consultation was held with the State of California by telephone. The State expressed no concern either from the standpoint of safety or of our no significant hazards consideration determination, l
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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION ;
This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of'a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes a surveillance requirement. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has made a final no significant hazards consideration finding with respect to this amendment. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, andsuch (2) public activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the bralth and safety of the public.
Dated: June 7, 1985 Principal Contributors: F. Akstulewicz, R. Fell, and S. Miner l
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