ML20126J011
| ML20126J011 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1985 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Parris H TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126J015 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-85-049, EA-85-49, NUDOCS 8506180497 | |
| Download: ML20126J011 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES p_ 32 f c
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l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 gh JUN 141985 2N 3 29 yf5 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN:
Mr. H. G. Parris..
3i9 Manager of Power and Engineering 500A Chestnut Street Tower II 3qj Chattanooga, TN 37401-Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
SEQUOYAH UNITS 1 AND 2, BROWNS FERRY UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 (EA 85-49)
This refers to the special review conducted on March 27 - 29, 1985 by representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and Region II, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP) Units 1 and 2.
An April 18, 1985 NRC memorandum documenting the results of this review is enclosed. The review was conducted regarding the circumstances surrounding the preparation of nonconformance reports (NCR's) related to the SNP Units 1 and 2 containment pressure transmitters.
As a result of this review, a breakdown in your management controls for evaluating and reporting potentially significant safety conditions was identified.
As described more fully in the enclosed Order Modifying Licenses, on October 26, 1984, NCR WBNNEB 8415 was initiated at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant documenting that certain containment pressure transmitters at the Watts Bar facility were not environmentally qualified. Even though the Office of Engineering (OE) in Knoxville recognized the need to review similar instrumentation at SNP, no review was conducted until nearly two months later when NCR SQNNEB 8501 was initiated. The associated Failure Evaluation / Engineering Report (FE/ER) on NCR SQNNEB 8501 concluded that as a result of the failure mode, a reactor operator would have inaccurate information to mitigate a Loss of Coolant Accident or Main Steam Line Break event inside containment and that, as a result, certain safety functions or actions would be defeated or delayed. The engineering analysis of these events included as part of the FE/ER concluded that the consequences of such events could lead to exceeding the containment design pressure limits.
l The FE/ER was initiated on February 5, 1985 by a staff engineer who signed it on February 25, 1985. The FE/ER was reviewed and signed by another staff engineer on February 25 and subsequently reviewed and approved by a supervisor on February 27, 1985. The FE/ER was concurred in by the engineering staff at the Sequoyah site on March 4,1985 and signed by the Chief Nuclear Engineer (Nuclear Engineering Branch Chief) on March 5, 1985. Although the FE/ER documented a significant safety issue, at no point during the development and issuance of the document was the issue brought to the attention of senior plant operations management. The FE/ER was not formally issued by the CERTIFIED MAIL hm N !Mb9 llTTURTRCEIPT REQUESTED S
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V Tennessee Valley Authority Engineering Office in Knoxville until March 7,1985 and not received on-site until March 8, 1985. The significant issues raised by the FE/ER were not brought to the attention of senior operations management (the Plant Superintendent and Plant Manager) until March 11, 1985.
I am issuing the enclosed immediately effective Order Modifying Licenses to ensure (1) that potentially significant safety conditions are promptly evaluated and corrected, (2) that management and procedural controls are adequate to assure that responsible levels of management are promptly made aware of potentially significant safety conditions and (3~) that those individuals responsible for reporting significant safety conditions to the NRC are promptly apprised of potentially significant conditions which might require reporting under Part 21 or 10 CFR 50.72 and realize the importance of such reporting. We place the burden and the responsibility for assuring that the NRC is made aware of all significant safety conditions on the licensee.
It is fortuitous that it was later determined after evaluation that these transmitters were, in fact, able to perform their safety function.
We have recently received a copy of the TVA Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS)
Report on this event and are continuing to evaluate the event to determine whether any further enforcerent action is appropriate. Your response to this Order and the results of future inspections will be taken into account in making a determination.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Dublic Document Room.
The response directed by this letter and the accompanying Order is not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
Sincerely, L %-
mes M. Tay
, Director Office of In pection and Enforcement
Enclosures:
1.
April 18, 1985 NRC Memo on SQN Containment Pressure Transmitters 2.
Order Modifying Licenses