ML20126H582
| ML20126H582 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1992 |
| From: | Ray H SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126H577 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9301050261 | |
| Download: ML20126H582 (12) | |
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A UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON' COMPANY, JC[ AL. for a Class 103 Docket No. 50-361 License to Acquire, Possess, and Use a Utilization Facility as Part of Amendment Application Unit No. 2 of the San Onofre Nuclear No. 123 Generating Station SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, El AL. pursuant-to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby submit Amendment Application No. 123.
This amendment application consists of Proposed Technical Specification P
Change No. NPF-10-418 to Facility Operating License NPF-10.
Proposed Technical-Specification Change No. NPF-10-418 is a request to include a new Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1, " Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System", and its associated Bases 3.4.7.3.1, in the Sar Onofre Unit 2 Technical Specifications, a
The proposed change will include operability and surveillance requirements for the Component Cooling Water Safety Related Hakeup System.
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Subscribed on this day of Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY By:
HaroW B. Ray Senior Vice Presiden State of California County o Oran e I c7 nil 006 hCIlkersonally On l}.40' before me, appeared' Nft r'ald h, K RA, personally known to me =(cr praea w mr-Athe_has44-4f-sat 44 factory evidence) to be the persor$1Q whose namE((
l isfort subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that hehhe/.they executed the same in his7 hee /eur authorized capacity (tesl, and that by his/b w 4tha14. signature % on the instrument the person K, or the entity upon behalf of which the personM acted, executed the instrunient.
hand and official seal.
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James A. Beoletto Attorney for Southern California Edison Company N
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application of SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDIS0N COMPANY,-[T AL for a Class 107 Docket No. 50-362 License to' Acquire, Possess, and Use a Utilization Facility as Part of Amendment Application Unit No. 3 of the San Onofre Nuclear
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. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, EI'AL. pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, hereby submit Amendment Application No. 107.
This amendment application consists of Proposed Technical Specification Change No. NPF-10-418 to Facility Operating License NPF-15.
Proposed Technical Specification Change No NPF-10-418 is a request to include a new Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1, " Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System" and its associated Bases 3.4.7.3.1, in the San Onofre Unit 3 Technical Specifications.
The proposed change will include operability and surveillance requirements for the Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System.
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Subscribed on this day of Respect' fully submitted, SOUTHERN CAL!f0RNIA EDISON COMPANY By:
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an is/e q subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/he#4hatr authorized capacityThQ, and that by his/her/thalt signatureKon the instrument the personK, or the entityuponbehalfofwhichthepersonb(acted,executedtheinstrument.
WITNEs$ my hand and official seal.
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James A. Beoletto Attorney for Southern Qalifornia Edison Company r
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i DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPP-10/15-418 This is a request to include a now Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7,3.1 " Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System,"
and its associated Basos in the San Onofro Unit 2 and Unit 3 Tochnical Specifications.
Pronosed SnecificatiODHi Unit 2:
Soo Attachment "A" Unit 38 Soo Attachment "B" 1
SUMMARY
OF ClibHGES SCE plans to install a dedicated sourco of safety related seismically qualified makeup water for the CCW System during the Units 2 and 3 Cyclo 7 outages.
The proposed change will incorporato into the San Onofro Nuclear Gonorating Station (SONGS) Unit 2 and Unit 3 Technical Specifications now Technical specification 3/4.7.3.1 concerning the now Component Cooling i
Water Safoty Related Makeup System.
The proposed TS 3/4.7.3.1 will' ensure sufficient component cooling water capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal conditions and Design l
Basis Events.
Background
The current SONGS Unit 2 and Unit 3 accident analysis credits being able to provido Seismic Category I makeup wator_from the seismic fire tankers _via hose connections to the CCW surge tanks.
i Although the primary function of those tankers is to provido-water for=firo' protection following a design basis carthquako
- (DBE), the supply can be replenished with water _from the Unit i reservoir.
Between May 2 and June 10, 1988, a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) was performed at-San onofro Units 2 and 3 by the NRC.
The SSFI assessed the operational readiness of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System and Salt Water Cooling (SWC)
System under normal and analyzed accident conditions.
NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 9.2.2, specifies that a Soismic category I source provido makeup water for at least seven days-of potential CCW leakage.
As a result of the SSFI, SCE in-allotter to the NRC, dated July 30, 1990, committed to provide a Seismic Category I source of' makeup. water for the CCW System.
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L -The Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System for each unit will consist of one chared primary Plant Makeup Storago Tank (PPMU Tank) and two redundant flow paths, each supplying a CCW critic 31 loop an illustrated in Sketch A.
Each Unit has its own PPMU Tank and rodundant flow paths.
Each flow path incorporates one 100% capacity pump.
PPMU Tank T-056 is lined up for service to Unit 2 and T-055 for service to Unit 3.
Each PPMU Tank is fabricated from stainless stool and has a capacity of approximately 303,500 gallons.
The tanko rocoivo domineralized makeup water from the liuclear Servico Water System.
The CCW Safety Rolated Makeup System is designed to provido each critical loop of CCW with adequate makeup for savon days under Design Basis Events.
The purpose of the requestod additional technical opocification is to onouro that nufficient inventory is maintained in the PPMU Tanks during plant operation.
The required lovel will be based on CCW System leak rate, unrecoverable volume in the tanks and Total Loop Uncertainty (TLU) in the tank level instrumentation.
DE E RIPTIO11 OF Cl]A11GES 1.
The proposed Technical Specification will be numbered 3/4.7.3.1, with a title of " Component cooling Water Safety Related Hakeup System."
Dincussion A now proposed Technical Specification will be numborod 3/4.7.3.1 in accordance with the existing practice of numbering the Technical Specifications.
The now system is a support system for the CCW System; thoroforo, the proposed now Technical Specification will bo located immediately after the CCW Technical Specification.
2.
The LIMITIllG CO!1DITIOl4 FOR OPERATION for the proposed now Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1 will road:
"Two Trains of component Cooling Water (CCW) Safety Related Hakeup System shall be OPERABLE with a contained volume in the Primary Plant Hakeup Storage Tank at or above the lovel-specified in Figure 3.7-2."
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SKETCH A
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Primary Plant Makeup Storage V
Tank, T 056 N
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To CCW *.
Suction to Train 'A' Non-Safoty v
Related loads A
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To CCW TraWB' COMPONENT COOLING WATER SAFETY RELATED MAKEUP SYSTEM FOR UNI tecw sArtti artAtto stvr systts rea uxit 3 is tot 8ticAL to unti a systml J
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4-Discussion The water source for the component Cooling Water Safety Rolated Hakeup System is the PPMU Tank.
The total capacity of each PPMU Tank is approximately 303,500 gallons.
The curve for PPMU Tank volumo represents a savon day supply of makeup water at a specific allowable leakage rato from the CCW system.
The requiremont for savon days is consistent with Standard Review Plan, Section 9.2.2.III.c.
3.
The APPLICAD1LITY statomont for the proposed Technical HODES 1,2,3, and 4."
Specification 3/4.7.3.1 will read:
D1RGIDalQ.D The component cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System is a support system to the CCW System.
This means whenovar the CCW System is required to be OPERABLE its support system should be OPERABLE also.
In MODES 1,2,3, and 4, Technical.
Specification 3/4.7.3 " Component cooling Water" requires "At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE."
Thorofore, in MODES 1,2,3, and 4, the PPMU Tank and both trains of the makeup flow of the Component Cooling Water Safety Related Makeup System shall be OPERADLE.
4.
The proposed ACTIOli a for Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1 is "With one CCW Safety Related Hakeup flow path inoperable, restore the flow path to OPERABLE statun within 7 days."
lliEGLJALOR With one CCW Safety Related Makeup Systom's flow path inoporable, action must be taken to rostoro OPERABLE status within 7 days.
The allowable completion time of 7 days is considered reasonable based on the low probability'of a DDE occurring during the 7 days and the redundant capability of the OPERABLE CCW Safety Related Makeup flow-path.
A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed to assess the increased risk of core damage from a 7 day allowed outage timo for one train of the CCW Safety Related Makeup System.
The PRA indicated that the increased risk of core damage from a 7 day allowed outage time is less than 1x10-'
por year.
This increase in coro damage risk is considorod acceptably small.
5.
The proposed Action b for Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1 is: "With the Primary Plant Hakeup Storage Tank level less than that required by Figure 3.7-2 and/or both CCW Safety Related Hakeup flow paths inoperable, restore the Primary
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-S-Plant Hakeup Storage Tank level and one CCW Safety Related Hakeup flow path to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />."
D.innunni9n This operating condition in more restrictivo than the Action a condition.
If the level in the PPMU Tank drops below that required to support two CCW critical loops operation for sovon dayu, the condition is similar to loss of both CCW Safety Related Makeup System flow paths.
Actions should be taken to restore the PPMU Tank level within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
If both CCW Safoty related Makeup flow paths are inoperablo, one CCW Safety Related Makeup flow path should be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
The allowed completion time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is based on operating experience and a Probabilistic Risk Assousment (PRA).
Operating experience shows that the likelihood of Primary Plant Makeup Storage Tank level dropping below 66% (which corresponds to an allowablo CCW leakage of 18 gpm based on Figure 3.7-2) is extremely low.
Also, a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed to assess the increased risk of coro damago from an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> allowed outage time f or two trains of the CCW Safety Related Makeup System.
The PRA indicated that the increased risk of coro damage from an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> allowed outage time is less than lx10-' por year.
This increase in coro damage risk is considered acceptably small.
6.
The proposed Action c for Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1 in: "With Actions a or b, above, not completed in the specified action times, he in llOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and be in COLD SilUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."
ninnunnisn In MODES 1,2,3, and 4, two CCW System critical loops provido cooling to a number of safety related systems, such as llPSI, LPSI, shutdown cooling, omorgency chillors, etc.
The CCW Safety Related Makeup System is a support system for the CCW System.
Two CCW Safety Related Makeup flow paths are required to provide makeup to the two CCW critical loops.
If one CCW Safety Related Makeup flow path can not be restored to OPERABLE status in sovon days, the Unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION does not apply.
To achieve this status, the Unit must be placed in a' least
!!OT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in COLD Sl!UTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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P I Similarly, action should be taken if the PPMU Tank lovel is below that required for two CCW critical loops operation and/or both CCW Safety Related Makeup flow paths are inoperable.
If both the PPMU Tank lovel and at least one flow path are not OPERABLE within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, the Unit must then bo placed in a MODE in which the LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION does not apply.
To achieve this status, the Unit must be placed in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The allowed completion time is consistent with other Technical Specification completion time requirements to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner.
7.
The proposed Action d for Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1 is: "The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable."
Discussion Specification 3.0.4 requires that entry not be made into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition unless the conditions of the Limiting condition for Operation are mot without reliance on provisions contained in the Action requirements.
The exemption from this requirement gives Operations more flexibility to chango-MODES while still performing required Actions.
Exemption from Specification 3.0.4 will not rostrain Operations from changing KODES.
The CCW Safety Related Makeup System is only required to support the CCW system in the ovent of a Design Basis Earthquako.
It should be noted that the CCW system itself does not have a 3.0.4 exemption.
Thorofore, the CCW system is always OPERABLE during up MODE changes.
The PRA has demonstrated that the allowed outage times speciflod would result in an acceptably small risk of coro damago.- Therefore, a 3.0.4 oxemption for the CCW Safety Related Makeup System is considered acceptable.
8.
The proposed SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.7.3.1.1 for Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1 is: "The Primary Plant Makeup Storage Tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least onco per 7 days by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits."
Discussion This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT verifies that the PPMU Tank contains the required volume of makeup water. _Tho 7 days frequency is based on similar SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS frequencies.
Tho 7 days frequency is considered adequato-in
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i view of other indications in the control room, including alarms, to alert tho operator to abnormal PPMU Tank levol deviations.
9.
The proposed SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.7.3.1.2 for Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1 is: "Each CCW safety Related Hakeup flow path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE hh least cace per 92 days by testing the CCW makeup pumps pursuant to specification 4.0.5."
Discussion This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT verifies that the CCW makeup pumps develop sufficient dischargo pressure to deliver the required flow to tho-CCW system from the Primary Makeup Water Storago Tank.
Performance of inservice testing, discussed in the ASME Codo,Section XI at throo month inte rvals, satisfies this requirement.
10.
The proposed SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.7.3.1.3 for Technical Specification 3/4.7.3.1 is: "Hensure CCW leakage at least once per refueling interval."
Discu n ten This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT measures CCW leakage to ensure the PPMU Tank lovel is adequato in accordance with Figuro L.7-2.
The specified frequency is considered adoquato in view of the spocial alignment required to perform this test.
This measurement can be performed only when ono CCW critical loop can be removed from service..Thorofore, this measuromont needs to be performed during refueling outages.
11.
Proposed Danos D3/4.7.3.1, " Component Cooling Water Safety.
Related Makeup System," is added.
Discussion Dacos B3/4.7.3.1 describes the CCW Safety Related Makeup System, its major olomonts and their functions in sufficient detail to understand the OPERABILITY of this system.
Safety Analysis The proposed chango described abovo-shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if-there is a positivo finding in any one of the following aroast 1.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this
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proposed change involve a significant increano in tho probability or conocquences of any accident previously evaluated?
Responso: No The CCW Safety Related Makeup System providos an assured water supply to the CCW in case of a Design Basis Event.
As such, the proposed Technical Specifications describe a now system which will ensure that the CCW remains OPERABLE following a Design Basis Event.
Thorofore, this proposed change will not involvo a significant increase in the probability or consoquences of any accident previously evaluated.
2.
Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed chango creato the possibility of a now or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?
i Responso: No The changes proposed horoin improve the reliability of the CCW system by providing it with a safety related makeup.
Thorofore, this proposed change will not creato.the possibility of a now or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
3.
Will oporation of the facility in accordanco with this proposed chango involve a significant reduction in a.
- margin of safety?
Responso: No Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change will not be altered as a result of.the proposed change.
The purpose of this change is to ensure the CCW will continuo to perform its functions
- in caso of a DDE without reliance on the non-Soismic I Nuclear Sorvice Water System.
Thoroforo,-the proposed chango will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Safety a_nd Sionificant Hazards Dolgrmination Based on the above Safety Analysis, it is concluded that: (1).the proposed chango does not constituto a significant-hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92: and (2) there is
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