ML20126H575
| ML20126H575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126H571 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104160062 | |
| Download: ML20126H575 (4) | |
Text
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4 UNITED STATES y y.g gg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20$55
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. SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTIllG AMEUDt1ENT NO. 66 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-336 INTRODUCTION By letter dated September 16, 1980, Northoast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO or the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (T$)
appended to Facility Operating License No. O?R-65 fer the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2.
The changes involve the incorporation of certain of the TMi ? Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements.
The licensee's request is an direct response to the NRC staff's letter dated July 2, 1930.
b CKGROUND INFORMATION L
By cur letter cated September 13, 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the TMl-2 accident.
Certain of these requirements, designated lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to January 1, 1980.
Due evaluation of the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter to UNELO dated February 25, 1980.
In order to provide reasonaDie assurance that operating reactor facilities are maintained within the limits determined acceptable following the ir lementation of the THI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" items, we requested th :.t licensees amend their 15 to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements, as approriate.
This request was transmitted to all licensees on July 2, 1980.
Included therein were model specifications that we had determined to be acceptable.
Lach of the issues identified by the NRC staff anc the licensee's response is discussed in the evaluation below.
EVALUATION 2.1.1 Emercency rower Suoply Requirements The pressurizer water level incicators, pressurizer relief and block valves, and pressurizer heaters are important in a post-accident situation. Adecutte emerU ncy power supplies add assurance of post-accident functioning of these components, lhe f acility's original design has the requisite emergency power supplies. We find the existing TS already provide appropriate surveillance and actions i the event of con.ponent inoperability and are thus t:ceptable.
010416 Q Q 1
. 1.1.3.a Direct Indication of PORV and SV Flow
'1E;0 has provided an acoustic monitoring system downstream of the pressurizer
- irect indication of flow through any of these valves in the control room.
~,ese indications are a diagnostic aid for the operatorc and provide no EJt ratic action.
UNECU has agreed to the TS requirements issued on January
'), 1981 for St. Lucie, Unit No. 1 by Amendment No. 37 to Facility Operatino License No. DPR-67.
These TS would provide. 31-day channel check and
'3-month channel calibration requirements.
Thus, the TS are acceptable as
- ,ey meet our July 2, 1980 model TS criteria.
2.1.3.b Instrumentation for Inadequate' Core Cooling
~1e licensee nas installed an instrument system to detect the effects of
'1ade:uate core cooling.
This instrument system,'a succooling meter, receives alc processes data from existing plant instrumentation. We previously rsvie.:ed tbis system in our Safety Evaluation cated February 25, 1980.
The
'icensee has agreed to TS with a 31-day channel check and an 18-month channel
- ltibration requirement and appropriate actions to be taken in the event c' component inoperability.
We conclude the TS bre acceptable as they
- c/i:e acequate surveillance and meet our July 2, 1980 model TS criteria.
2.1.4 Diverse Containment Isolation
'c,E:0's respcnse indicates that the T3 regaroing containment isolation
'11 ces are adequate in their current form. ' The' existing system has diverse
- ir:Teters, including high containment pressure and low pressurizer pressure,
- :e sensed and ensure automatic isolation of nonessential systems under
- stulated accicent conditions. TS Ta51es 3.3.3 (ESF Instrumentation),
3.3-4 (ESF Actuation Trip Valves), 3.3-5 (ESF Response Times) and 4.3-2
- iSF Surveillance Requirements) provide for'the appropriate actions and s r.eillance requirements.
Therefore, we find the current TS acceptable.
2.l.a Integrity of System Outside Containrent
'.c < quest indicated tnat licensees should propose a license condition t:Jire a periodic System Integrity Measurements Program to prevent the
'ilita ;f significant amounts of radioactivity to the environment via
'53 3;s from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems which are located
- .::.;E eacter containment.
The licensee's present program includes
- :.1sicas for a preventative maintenance program and periodic visual
~n sc i:ns.
The program also includes system leab test measurements at
- 1: m cies not to exceed refueling cycle in.erva',s.
'it: 1 a license condition, NNECO has agreed to place such a requirement
~S ie: tion o.
Bassa on our review we find that inclusion of this require-
-:.: 'n the Administrative Controls Section of the TS satisfies our re-E :n: and is acceptable.
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3-2.1.7.a Auto Initiation of Auxillary Feedwater Systems This requirement was completed by our issuance of Amendment No. 63, dated January 14, 1981.
The related safety evaluation found the TS Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) acceptable.
Two open items remain to be completed to meet our October 22, 1979 letter giving the Bulletins and Orders Task Force requirements. Our review of the safety grade system that NNEC0 has installed to automatically initiate AFWS flow will be completed at a later date.
2.1.7.b Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indications Our February 26, 1980 evaluation of this item found the control room instrumentation installed at Millstone, Unit No. 2 meets the intent of Item 2.1.7.b.
2.1.8.c lodine Monitoring Our request indicated that the licensees should implement a program which will ensure the capability to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas requiring personnel access under accident conditions. The licensee's present program includes training of personnel, procedures for monitoring and provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.-
Again, NNECO has agreed to place such a requirement in TS Section 6.
Based on our review we find that inclusion of this requirement in the Adminis-trative Controls Section of the TS satisfies our requirement and is acceptable.
2.2.1.b Shitt Technical Advisor Our request indicated that the TS related to mininum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of Shif t Technical Advisor. The licensee's application would add one Shift Tecnnical Advisor to eacn shift to perform the function of accident assessment during reactor operation.
The individual performing this function will have at least a bachelor's decree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with special training in plant design, and response and analysis of tne plant for transients and accidents.
Part of the 5hift Technical Advisor duties are related to cperatin; experience review function.
Based on our review, we find the licensee's submittal satisfies our requirement and is, therefore, acceptable.
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4 Ervironmental Consideration
-e have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in ef'luent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and
.:01 not result in any significant environnental inpact. Having made
-J's determination, we have further concluded that the amendment
'rco'ves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of en/iror, mental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that en environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-e.tel inpact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of tilis amendment.
- c'.ci u si o n de have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that
'1} be:ause the amendment does not involve a significant increase
'n t.e probability or consequences of accidents previously considered irM foes not involve a significant decrease in a safety nargin, the arsndment 'does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2)
-here is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public ciil not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) su:h act,ivities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's e;u'ati' ns and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical o
c t"e common defense and security or to the health and safety of t e :ublic.
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- a:e: April 7, 1981 A,
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