ML20125D909

Addresses Concern Expressed by ACRS Member on 840417 Re Lack of Experience Among Operators of Future Plants.Acrs Should Address Concern & Advise Commission on Steps to Remedy Situation

ML20125D909
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/19/1984
From:	Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	Ebersole J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
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ML20125D664	List: ML20125D660 ML20125D687 ML20125D703 ML20125D742 ML20125D756 ML20125D790 ML20125D811 ML20125D863 ML20125D881 ML20125D897 ML20125D909 ML20125D924 ML20125D943 ML20127B734 ML20127B742 ML20127B746
References
FOIA-84-740 NUDOCS 8506120509
Download: ML20125D909 (1)

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UNITED STATES e

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April 19, 1984 CHAIRMAN MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jesse Ebersole, Chairman Advisory Committse on Reactor Safeguards FROM:

Nunzio J. Palladino

SUBJECT:

REACTOR OPERATOR EXPERIGCE During a discussion on April 17, 1984 with a member of the ACRS, I was informed that several members of the ACRS have concerns about the lack of experience among operators of some of the nuclear power plants scheduled to come on line in the near future.

It was pointed out that while those who are concerned have no quick fix, they did feel that the situation should not persist far into the future.

If there exists such a concern on the part of the full ACRS, I believe it should be addressed by the Committee and the Committee's advice on steps to remedy this concern should be provided to,,

the Commission.

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Commissioner Gilinsky

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Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Ray Fraley OGC OPE EDO c-SfCY a

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COM!.itSSIONER April 9, 1984

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SEFYEDp~x f*2MORANDUM FOR SAMUEL J.

CHILK, SECRETARY Please, send the attached memorandum from the General Counsel on '"Li' censed ' Reactor Operator Examinations" to the parties to the Diablo. Canyon and Shoreham operating l'icense p,roceedings.

I would also like this memorandum to be sent to the parties'in the other pending operati~ng l'icense cases,

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as well as to the applicants in uncontested operating license cases.

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Vi.ctor Gilinsky

Attachment:

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4/6/84 OGC Memo

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Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal OGC s

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-MEMOEANDUM FOR:

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Assistan: General Counsel

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SUEJECT:

LICENSEC' REACTOR OPERATOR EXAMINATIONS During'the March 30, 1984 Co==ission briefing on a full-power operating license for WPPSS-2, you raised the I

cuestion of whether the staff's interpretation of 10 CFR S 55.25(b) is consistent with the terms of that regulation.1 4

Both during the~ briefing and in a~1etter dated April 3, i

1984, you sought the views of the General Counsel.

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staff's interpretation as stated in NUREG-0094, in our view, appears to contradict-the plain meaning of the regulation.

1 10 CFR S 55. 25 (b), entitled " Administration of operating test prior to initial criticality," reads:

i "he Commission may administer a simulated operating l

test to an applicant for a license to operate a reactor prior.to its initial criti'cality if a written request by an authorized representative of the facility licensee is sufficient for the Commission to find that:

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kb) The applicant has had extensive actual operating experience at a comparable reactor.

In 1976 the Operator L.icensing Branch, NRR, issued NUREG-0094, an NRC licensing guide entitled "A Guide for the Licensing of Facility ' Operators, Including Senior Opera-tors."

This guide was designed to revise and replace WASH 1094, the AEC licensing guide.

Section XI of NUREG-0094, entitled " Administration of Operating Test Prior to Initial 4

Criticality," defines whatHis meant in 5 55.25 (b) bp the term " extensive actual cperating experience at a comparable reactor."

A June 28,.1976 letter f(om Ben'C.rRusche, i

Director of NRR, to the Commissioners indicates that one of P

'Tr. 43-45.

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the revisiens made was te define " extensive actual cperating exgerience :: include "participa:icr in trai-ing programs tha utili:e nuclear pcwer plant simulators."-

Ccmmissioner Gilinsky pointed cut during the March 30, 19E4 Ocmmission briefing that this interpretation of 5 55.25 (b) seems te be inconsistent with the plain meaning cf the regulation, which calls for actual, no: simulator,- operating experience."

Mr. Thompson of NRR explained that the staff, had used the NUREG-0094 guidelines since their promulgation, and considered simulator experience adequate to ensure safe plant operation.'

A briet review of the legislative history of 5 55.25 (b) vields nothine that would contradict the plain meaning of the regulation.

The Statement of Consideration for the 6:omulgation of 5 55.25 states that S 55.25 was added to Part 55 to provide for the administration of an operating test "provided the conditions stated'in the section are met."

26 Fed. Reg. 9654 (Oct. 12, 1961).

The condition i

stated in 5 55. 25 (b) is " actual operating experience" (emphasis added).

No provision is made for simulator experience, equivalent _ experience, or comparable experience.

.. =rovision similar to S 55. 25 (b) is contained in

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1 5 55.24 (a).

Under that section, the " extensive actual operating experience," within two years of application, can i

contribute to the basis for waiver of any or all of the written examinations and operating test.

It is interesting to note that when read in light of Section X of NUREG-0094

'and S 55.24 (b) this phraseology contemplates hands-on t

operating experience rather than some substitute.

cc:

Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthali SICY 0?E EDO ELD 2

SECY-76-341, June 28, 1976, Enclosure 1.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA a

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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COMMISSIONERS:

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Victor Gilinsky

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Thomas M. Roberts SRANCH James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal SERVED APR131984 In the Matter of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Docket Nos. 50-275 OL 50-323 OL (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2)

' MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

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(CLI-84-5) i This decision completes the Nuclear Regulatory Comission s ("NRC" or -

" Commission") reinstatement of Pacific Gas and Electric Company's ("PG&E" or " licensee") Facility Operating license No. DPR-76 (" low ~-power license")

toconductlow-powertests(atupto5%ofratedpower)attheDiablo T.c ' a

. Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 ("Diablo Canyon"). The events leading up to the Comission's suspension of this license and subsequent steps to reinstate the license in part have been described in several prior orders of the Comission.1 Accordingly, th'is order focuses on events which have r

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The low-power license was issued on September 22, 1981.- See CLI-81-22,14NRC598(1981).

It was suspended on November 19, 1981.

See,CLI-81-30,14NRC950(1981).

Following substantial review and reanalysis of the design and construction of Diablo Canyon, and public meetings at which all interested parties participated, the Comission

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reinstated the low-power license in part to authorize PG&E to load fuel and conduct pre-criticality tests (operational modes 6 and 5).

[FootnoteContinued]

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occurred since the Comission's last order and refers back to previous events only as necessary.

Safety Review A Commission condition for reinstatement of Diablo Canyon's low-power license was the successful completion of an Independent Design erification Program (IDVP).

CLI-81-30, 14 NRC 950 (1981).2 The IDVP was conducted by organizations and individuals not associated with PG&E and was managed by Teledyne Engineering Services (TES).

PG&E conducted a separate design verification effort called the internal technical program (ITP) which was perfomed by PG&E's Diablo Canyon Project ("DCP"), a joint organization of PG&E and Bechtel. Then, the NRC staff, with the help of its consultant, Brookhaven National Laboratory, conducted its own analysis.

[FootnoteContinued]

CLI-83-27, 18 NRC (1983).

Subsequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District oTTolumbia Circuit denied a motion to stay the Commission's authorization to PG&E.

On January 16, 1984, the Comission denied Joint Intervenors' motion for a stay of fuel loading and pre-criticality testing at Diablo Canyon finding that these activities did not present significant health and safety risks and would not prejudice subsequent Commission decisions or foreclose modifications, if necessary, of the plant. CLI-84-1, 19 NRC (1984).

On January 25, 1984, the Comission reinstated another part of PG&E's' low-power license by authorizing precritical hot system testing (operational modes 4 and 3).

As a separate matter, the Comiss' ion declined to review the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board's decision in ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777 (1983) which affirmed a decision by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.on all issues other than quality assurance related to PG&E's

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application for a license to load fuel and conduct low-power testing.

2The Comission's Order required an IDVP of seismic, service 'related contract activities prior to 1978.

In addition, the NRC staff required an IDVP of non-seismic, service-related contract activities, PG&E internal design activities and post-1978 seismic service-related contract activities.

In addition to design verification, the IDVP also reviewed some construction activities.

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The scope of the IDVP and ITP, and the relation between them, is explained in detail in ALAB-763.

19 NRC (1984).

Essentially all of Diablo Canyon's safety-related seismic design was reviewed:

the ITP l

reanalyzed all of the seismic design fo safety-related structures, systems and components, while the IDVP oversaw and verified selected portions of the work in accordance with the program approved by the Connission. The review of non-seismic safety-related design was not as comprehensive. The IDVP reviewed three safety-related systems and two areas of safety-related analysis applicable to many other systems.

Items of concern identified by the IDVP as potentially generic were addressed by the ITP for all systems designed by PG&E.

In turn, the ITP verification work was sampled by the IDVP and the results reported in an Interim Technical Report (ITR). The

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ITP independently reviewed.other non-seismic systems.. As n' result of this interai:tionbetweentheITPandIDVP,theIDVPobtainedabroadandcompre-hensive understanding of the non-seismic d,esign of Diablo; Canyon.

The.IDVP was completed.in October 1983; PG&E's ITP is still ongoing.

The NRC staff's review of the IDVP Final Report is contained in Supplements 18,19and20totheSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)forDiabloCanyon, Unit

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1.

Supplements 18 and ig, PGAE's ITP, and physical modifications to the plant were the basis of the staff's recossendation of the partial rein-statement of PG&E's low-power license to load fuel and pe,rf.om pre-criticality testing at Diablo Canyon.. CLI-83-27,18 NRC (1983). At that time there were still:several open items and follow up items which the staff believed required resolution prior to reinstatement of the rest of' the low-power license.

The staff has updated its progress on open items in 5'upplement'20 to theSafetyEvaluationReport.($$ER20). The staff considered infonnation

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in the seis=ic =enthly re;crts free the It'!? are FG&E, tne ICYF Final Repcrt, the FG&E final re;crts, and the Interi: Technical Reports.

SSEE 20 presents the staff's safety evaluatien of cpen items anc follow u: itses l

that in the staff's view, must be satisfactorily resolved prior to the Commission's reinstatement of Pis&E's authcrity to achieve criticality and perform low-power testing, i.e. reinstatemnt of the low-pewer license for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1.

SSER 20 reports that many of the coen items and follow up items previously identified in SSERs 18 and 19 have been re-solved. On March 27, 1964, the NRC's Director of Licensing reported that in his view, all open and follow up items identified in $$ER 20 had been resolved satisfactorily fer reinstatement of the low-power license for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1. He also stated that: (1) he knew of no new inforse-tion since the completion of 55ER 20 which would affect the staff's con-clusions ce judpents in 55ER 20;-and-(2) that any other issues not addressed in $$ER's 18,19. and 20 had bete satisfactorily addressed for the purposes of low power operation.

The Comerission also heard from Mr. Isa Yin, an NRC inspector at Diablo Canyon. Mr. Yin reported that he had found inadequate compliance with the quality assurance program for designing supports for small bore and large bore piping. He also stated that reinspection fo11'owing modification of the pipe suspensions would be rendered nere difficult by,the enviromental conditions in the plant after operation at low-power. Acccedingly, he requested that the Commission defer granting a low power license until pG&E 1

h Interim Technical Reports (ITR) are called interie because they were issued before completion of the IDVp.

The ITRs document the completion of technical issues.

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5 had remedied the deficiencies in pipe supporting systems and those changes

.had been reinspected by the NRC.

The Cosmission voted to defer reinstatement of the low power license for Diablo Canyon until the disparity between Mr. Yin's views and those of the rest of the technical staff had been considered by the Advisory Connit-tee on Reactor Safeguards ("ACR$") - a statutorily created advisory coamit-tee comprised of experts in various disciplines including nuclear engineer-ing, nuclear physics, and radiation health physics.

The ACR$ met in public session on April 6.1984 and heard from Mr. tin,other members of the NRC staff, and Mr. Stokes, a previous employee at Diablo Canyon who had made allegations regarding the adequacy of the quality assurance program for the design of supports for small bore pipes.

I Mr. Yin had found' that some of Mr. Stokes' allegations were correct.

The NRC staff infonned the ACR$ that, on March 19, 1984 the NRC had convened a peer revjew panel of technical, experts to review Mr.' Yin's concerns. The panel met with Mr. Yin, and later with representatives of p6&E and some of the contractors involved in the 10Vp. The' peer review panel also visited Diablo Canyon to examine in detail some of the specific items identified as deficient by Mr. Yin. After the visit, the peer review panel met with Mr. Stokes, and somewhat later. net again with Mr. Yin to discuss the panel's proposed findings.

The panel conc 1,ude( that Mr. Yin's

, concerns did not warrant delaying low-power operation of Diablo Canyon, but did require resolution prier to going' to' full-power.

4 Mr. Yin also addressed the ACR5. He stated that "while several reverification and corrective action programs should be completed by PG&E prior to NRC issuance of a full power operation license, there will'be no apparent risk to the public health and safety to allow the reactor testing O

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i up to five percent power at the present." On questioning by members of the ACRS. Mr. Yin reiterated his position in spite of his acknowledgement of i

i some residual differences with the rest of the NRC staff.

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On April g 1984 the ACRS reported on its consideration of Mr. Yin's concerns. Based on the presentations by Mr. Yin and other members of the NRC staff and supporting documentary materi&1, the ACRS found:

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We agree that it is acceptable to permit low power cperation at r

this time. We believe that such operation will not compromise corrective actions that may be required.

i In view of the statements by the ACR$ and Mr. Yin, the Commission concludes that the concerns previously. expressed by Mr. Yin have been l

resolved satisfactorily and do not warrant deferring the reinstatement of I

j the low-power operating license for Diablo Canyon.

t Quality Assurance

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The Joint Intervenors and the Governor of California. raised issues j

related to design quality assurance and to construction quality assurance at Diablo Canyon. Their motion to reopen the record on the design quality assurance (DQA) program at Diablo Canyon was granted, and resulted in an

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adjudicatory proceeding before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board l

at which the adequacy of the IDVp was a central issue. On March 20, 1ge4, i

i the Appeal Board issued a 122-page decisi.on in which it found:

[T]he scope arid execution of the applicant's verification program i

have been sufficient to~ establish that Diablo Canyon Unit 1

-design adequately meets 1.ts licensing criteria. The applicant's i

verification efforts provide adequate confidence that tie Unit 1 i

safety-related structures, systems and components are designed to -

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perform satisfactorily in service and that any significant design deficiencies in that facility resulting from defects in the applicant's design quality assurance program have been remedied.

Accordingly, we conclude that there is reasonable assurance that i

the facility can be' operated without endangering the health and f

.j safety of the public.

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7 ALAB-763, slip op. at 101.

Additional motions filed by the Joint Intervenors and Governor of California to reopen the record on DQA are still pending before the Appeal Board.

The Joint Intervenors and the Governor of California also sought reopening of the record on construction quaTity assurance (CQA). That motion was denied by the Appeal Board in ALAB-756,19 NRC (Dec.19, 1983).

Petitions for review of that decision are now pending before the i

Comission, and petitions to reopen the. record are also pending before the Appeal Board.

In view of the pendency of the petitions for review of ALAB-756 (on construction,QA),andofthefactthatthetimeforfilingpetitionsfor reviewofALAB-763,(ondesignQA)hasnotelapsed,weexpressnoopinionas to the" correctness of'th'e.two Appeal Board decisions.. Nevertheless, we consider it worthy of note that there is nothing in the Appeal Board's decisions on construction quality assurance or design quality assurance to suggest that PGAE's low-power license should not be reinstated.

Allegations Since 1982, the NRC staff has received numerous allegations and concerns about the design, construction, and operation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant (Diablo Canyon) and the management of' these activitie.

by Pacific' Gas and Electric Company (PG&E).4 As the ID'P neared completion Y

4 1n early 1982, the staff received allegations re arding the design I

and operation of the component cooling water system (C WS) for Diablo (FootnoteContinued]

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and the target date for a Commission decision en reinstatement of the license' approached, the flow of allegations became a deluge and the NRC staff, with Commission concurrence, established a special Diablo Canyon.

l Allegation Management Program ("DCAMP") to pursue the allegations and concerns to resolution.

The DCAMP is described in Supplement 21 to the Safety Evaluation Report for Diablo Canyon (SSER 21). The procedures for handling allegations under DCAMP included confinnation of the allegation by contacting the $11eger whenever possible, site inspections of construction or documentation, independent measurements and evaluations where appropri-ate, technical reviews, interviews with site personnel, public meetings on significant technical issues, discussions between the alleger and staff on staff's findings and reports to the Comission.

So far, allegation manage-1 ment h[s involved more' than 40 members of the NRC technical staff and con-tracter personnel.and required.18,000 person hours. The~ staff's review of an' allegation was not limited to the allegation itself, but included all necessary related issues.

[FootnoteContinued]

Canyon, Unit 1.

The staff's evaluation of the allegati6ns is described in Supplement No.16 to the Safety Evaluation Report.(SSER 16). On the basis of that evaluation, the staff concluded that the CCWS satisfied most design requirements, that the only deviation.was acceptable on the basis of PG&E's satisfactory demonstration of design capability in this area, and that the allegations.regarding the CCWS-had no generic implications.

In ALAB-763, the Appeal Board instructed the Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to ensure that-PG&E's proposed technical specification on CCWS is incorporated'into the plant technical specifications before pennitting operation. The order of reinstatement of PG&E's low-power license is contingent on the Director's completion

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of that action.

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I:2 3, 55EF. 21. Eowever, a::iti::ai alieg ic s ::::i:ced :: te e:eited and e.e O.A*P has a tenc:r :: 1ee: c; win ther. 52## :=ri:et as c:daad w-itten reviev

1. the allegri: I cc Fei-.a y E,1954 (SECT-51-EI) and m;c.ed :: ~_en : :he Cds:issi:c i: x:li: :eeti ss teit 1

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xzoer cf allega: ices was a;: :xirately 1*C.

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I iss::sf E 22, stich add essed 219 ef de alle;ati:cs, irci:cirs 24 :mes t

i addressed ~ericesi.v. Su#f re;c-ted :t.1: it had me' ret 135 alleg:i:es r

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= cean aM c.eurs. rec ::aar. ene zueg:i:es c. _: =c: war a : centsee-review beca se 24y raisec ss:es stru.ar :: :::se aarea:y :es,.::e e: r were.:: resa:ed := s1=. :,.::as: sa,.e:v iss es.

l E rid Sa-:1, te' C:surissi:= gare ;;tii: eti:e ita: it reped :: :e able :: mie a ce:isien~= reirstaw! Of tie licacse f:-dri:ait:y aM icw ;ower Operatice==. war = Zii,1964 I: ::e weeks te#:re.%. di, 1

s::res Of new allegati:cs were filed. Cee ; :c:, te kve.

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atiit:y Prefe::, filed alleg ices eat we e received by ne C:ssrissi:e i

cely hecrs bef:re the s:ted: led :nectis;. Accrexistely ECC allegatices L

have :cw been filed. Neediess = say, :his fi:od Of its:- rie:e allegee new i:#:rmati:c, years after ::e affMi:2:: y pr:ceedi:ss 5;ar, has straired t e Coeurissi:c's res

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l teen reviewed is tuil r-cer DJeF. Y,c lite se, :ctever a I:w ;cwe-liceese, 02: he iss:ed withect ade= ate '; :te: i:e :: ce';ctii: bealth aM 51,.e*y.

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4 10 operation are limited to a very small fraction of those possible at full pcwer.

Low-power operation would generate between one-hundredth-and-one tenth of the radioactive fission products which would be generated by full power operation. Thus, any consequences of accident would be significantly less than those detennined by the safety evaluation for Diablo Canyon.

Accident consequences would be further reduced by the lower quantity and rate of production of decay heat produced at low-power as compared to that produced at full power. However, the energy required to damage a reactor, the capacity of the heat removal systems, and safety features are not reduced by low power operation. Therefore, accidents involving failures of these systems at low-power operation would evolve over longer periods than at full power operation and could be contained by equipment operating at only a few percent of capacity.

With the above in mind, all of the allegations have been reviewed under one basic safety criterion:

is there significant new information which suggests that some safety-related structure, system or component necessary for safe low power operation will not perform its. safety func-tion, or that there are such weaknesses in licensee's management or quality assurance that plant safety is called into serious question.

For the first two hundred allegations, the results.of the review 1re documented in SSER 21 and the transcripts of the public Comission meetings in January, February, and March'.

For the approximately 300 more recent allegations, the Comission was faced with a choice ~of decision delay, while the review could be carefully documented, or reliance on a preliminary review and

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staff expert judgment without the more detailed documentation. The Comis--

sion has deliberately chosen the latter course. There is every reason to' 4

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11 believe that more allegations will be filed and delay to provide written documentation will lead to paralysis in Comission decisionmaking.

All of the allegations received on or before April 13, 1984, have been reviewed under the criterion specified above and those necessary to be resolved prior to license reinstatement have been resolved. As a result, none of these allegations warrant a delay iri the reinstatement of the low-power. license. Work under DCAMP will continue, both to document the reviews completed to date and to' address those matters that need to be resolved prior to licensing at higher power levels.

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Operator Experience The Comission has also considered the circumstance that the. regular operating staff for Diablo Canyon has a limited amount of. experience with operating similar faciTities. The Comission was briefed on the issue by PG&E as part of its coments at the public, meeting of February 10, 1984.

PG&E has 43 holders of senior operator licenses and 16 holders of reactor

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operator licenses at Diablo canyon. A typical licensee has successfully completed: (1) a 30-month program on power plant fundamentals, equipment, systems, radiation protection and administrative controls including time on-shift at the facility; and (2) an approximately-year-long licensing program. Several license holders ~ have participated in, pre-operational

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testing programs, hot functional testing programs, on-going testing, maintenance', surveillance-and: modification programs.- bcensed; operators t

have also each had from 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> to 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> of hands-on-simulator training.

However, because the operators have not.had actual plant operational experience, additional experienced personnel will be on hand to assist with startup operations. This extensive training of PG&E's

12 operators and PG&E's comitment to provide additional trained personnel during start-up have led the Comission to find that PG&E has an adequate operating staff for Diablo Canyon.5 Seismic License Condition The Comission has also considered recent developments regarding the characterization of the Hosgri Fault.

At the public meeting of March 26, 1984, t'he staff reported that it had received a preprint of an article by certain petroleum geologists who have used previously unavailable informa-tion developed during petroleum exploration to determine that Hosgri Fault is a thrust fault and not a strike / slip fault as previously believed.

In view of this development, the staff proposed that PG&E should conduct further seismic and geologic studies of the Hosgri Fault..Mr. Devine, a geologist with the United States Geologica~l Survey also discussed. the new i

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5The Comission notes that a literal reading of 10 CFR 55.25(b), which was adopted in 1963, would have required candidates for operatorlicense examinations, at facilities that have yet to go critical, to have had

" extensive actual operational Experience" before taking the operator license examination. Since 1967, the NRC has taken the position, in l

publicly available documents, that completion of NRC-approved training that j

utilizes simulators can, togetehr with other nuclear reactor activities, constitute adequate experience. Operators at Diablo Canyon and fo'ur other -

plants were. licensed on this basis. Because this long-standing interpretation of the rule' does not match the Literal language of the' rule, although it satisfies the rule's purpose and does not diminish safety, the Comission will shortly initiate a rulemaking proceeding to confonn the language.of the rule to this long-standing practice.

In the interim, the Commission sees no reason to revoke or suspend existing operator licenses, including those held by the operators at Diablo Canyon. The sophistication of current simulator training provides a suitable basis for operator licensing, and similar training in lieu of operational experience.

consittutes no diminution of safety. Under these circumstances, the Commission finds no reason to grant Joint Intervenors' April 10, 1984 I

motion for a stay based on the operator license issue.

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13 findings with the Commission.

In Mr. Devine's view, this new infomation was not startling but more in the nature of a refinement in the understand-ing of the overall faulting pattern in the region around Diablo Canyon.

Mr. Devine supported the NRC. staff's proposals for further study. He also stated that, in his view, the new report did not warrant any change in the magnitude of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake f6r Diablo Canyon.

The Comission has detemined that this new information does not affect its low-power decision. There is no indication that the new infor-mation undercuts.the seismic design basis for Diablo Canyon.

However, the Comission has asked the ACRS to review the new information prior to any full power decision and to coment on a draft license condition which would requirePG&Etoreassess.by1988the.seismicdesignbasisforDiablo Canyon.

f Additional Matters The staff has denied Joint Intervenors' petition for enforcement action under 10 C.F.R. 2.206. DD 84-8,19 NRC (March 26, 1984). Joint Intervenors contended that PG&E's failure to provide to the Comission a 1977 audit perfonned by Nuclear Serv' ices Corporation on the quality assurance program by Pullman Power Products, a PG&E contractor, required F

The Director, Inspection continued suspension of the. low-power lic.ense.

and Enforce. ment found that PG&E made a material false statement by.failing in 1978 to provide the. audit to the Licensing Board considering quality assurance. However, the Director also found that under the circumstances, the material false statement was a violation of the lowest severity level and, as such, warranted only a Notice of Violaticn. That Director's decision -is still pending before the Commission for its detemination of l

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14 I

whether to review it.

10 CFR 2.206(c)(1).

Under these circumstances, the Comission expresses no opinion on the correctness of thc Director's decision. However, the Comission finds noteworthy that rathing in the

' decision suggests that PG&E's low-power license should not be reinstated.

t On April 12, 1984, the Government Acco'untability Project (GAP) petitioned the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 to direct the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) to initiate an investigation into alleged false statements by PG&E and the NRC staff regarding the resolution of allegations of deficienc~ies in design and construction quality assurance at Diablo Canyon.

GAP also requested an opportunity to address the Coccission on April 13, 1984 on the alleged false statements and suggested that the Commission defer any decision on reinstituting PG&E's low-power license for i

Diablo' Canyon until tiiis matter is resolved.

In addition,. GAP requested the Comission to direct the~ Office-of Investigations (01) to release transcripts of interviews with allegers to the Board considering design and construction quality assurance.

GAP's request was suppor+ad by affidavits from Mr. Steven Lockert and Mr. Charles Stokes. Both have provided allegations to the Comission on several previous occasions; most recently, Mr. Stok'es addressed the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards.(ACRS). Mr. Lockert's affidavit refers to some welds, made in 1974 and corrected in 1977 for which, in some instances, documentation'was not provided' until 1982. Deficiencies in

~

welds and the quality assurance prograin for documenting repairs _to welds' have been the subject of many other allegations investigated by the staff.

Similarly, Mr. Stokes' a,ffidavit contains allegations of the type already' extensively considered by the staff. Mr. Stokes' affidavi: also draws

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legal cenclusiens based en his c;iniens cf varicus ac-icns a'r.en at Diatic Canycn.

Fcr the ces part, GAP's allegations of false staterents by the NRC staff and PG&E are based en its cw interpretation cf the i=plicaticns of various allegations regarding conditiens at Diabic Canycn. Others cf GA?'s allegations are based en GAF's differences cf opinien with varicus statecents by ce=bers of the NRC staff.

To the extent that GA. relies on statecents by Mr. Yin, GAP's conclusions-are-not supported by Mr. Yin's statements to the AURS and a Mecber-of Congress. As for staff's i=plementation of its policy of reinterviewing allegers, ttc Cixx:issica l

notes that staff's policy was announced before GAP i=pesed additional precedural burdens et access ~to allegirs. ~ Finally, regarding statements addressing compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 5, that issue is pending before the C a issien in the context of its review of ALAS-755 and ALAS-763.__Because these reviews are still.pending, the Commissicn expresses no cpinion en this issue. Ecwever, the Concissien notes that the Appeal Board found that FG&E had complied with A;:pendix B.

Under these circumstances, the Cerr:ission finds that nothing in GAP's recent subcittal requires the Cornission to delay censideration cf reinstatenant of PG&E's low-power license. Ecwever, the Ccanissien has asked its Office of Investigations to consider GA?'s recues.t fer the protected release of transcripts of interviews to the Scard and has requested its Office of Inspecter and Auditor to review the petiticn and to take whatever actions it deecs necessary.

4 w

e 16 Motion For Stay Joint Intervenors have requested the Comission tc stay the effec-tiveness of any reinstatement of PG&E's authority to operate Diablo Canyon Unit 1 at low-power until the completion of all pending administrative matters and the conclusion of any judicial review of the Commission's decisions underlying such reinstatement of duthority.

In the alternative, Joint Intervenors have requested the Comission to stay for several days any reinstatement of. PG&E's low-power license to pennit them to apply to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for an emergency stay pending appeal.

Joint Intervenors base their request on three factors: '(1) the issues raised in their stay request of October 31, 1983; (2) pending allegations of design and constructiin deficiencies at

~~

Diablo Canyon and motions based on those allegations; and (3) an affidavit by Dr.'Michio Kaku. The Comission believes there is no warrant to stay i

the effectiveness of the reinstatement of PG&E's low-power license until all administrative and legal appeals are exhausted.

However, the Commis-

'~

sion will delay the effectiveness of this decision until noon, April 19, 1984 (Eastern Time) to give Jo' int Intervenors an opportunity to read the decision and det' ermine whether to pursue judicial review.

Nothing has happened since October 31, 1983, which would cause the Commission to change its mind about Joint Intervenor's previous motion for a stay. As for recent developments based on allegations, the progress on resolving these allegations indicates'that they do not support a motion for j

stay.

Finally, the generic nature of Dr.- Kaku's affidavit reveals a lack -

of specific knowledge of the Diablo Canyon plant and, in particular, the j

activities to be undertaken during start-up and low-power testing. The

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l affidavit does not describe any specific aspect of low-power operation of.

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J 17 i

Diablo Canyon which would create an_ undue risk to public health and safety or to the plant personnel. Rather, the affidavit is based on general and well-known considerations, some of which are irrelevant to Diablo Canyon, and hypothetical accident scenarios without any indication of their likeli-hood of occurrence during low-power operation at Diablo Canyon.

It is well-established that speculation about a n0 clear accident does not, as a matter of law, constitute the imminent, irreparable injury required for t

staying a licensing decision. State of New York v. NRC '550'F.2d 745, 756-57 (2d Cir.1977); Virginia Sunshine Alliance v. Hendrie, 477 F. Supp.

68,70(D.D.C.1979). Under these circumstances, the Commission sees nothing in Dr. Kaku's affidavit which contradicts the extensive ' technical reviews of Diablo Canyon.

For these reasons, the Comission den'ies Joint Intervenor request for a stay.

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18 Conclusion The Comission has detemined that the concerns which led it to suspend PG&E's low-power license have been resolved to the point where that license can now be reinstated in its entirety.0 Comissioner Gilinsky dissents from this order. The separate views of Chaiman Palladino and Comissioners Gilinsky and Bernthal are attached.

11! is so ORDERED.

s or the Comission F

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SAMUEL J. UMLE D

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Dated at Washington, DC,

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, 1984.

this 6Still pending before the Commission is PG&E's Teiuest for an

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l extension of the expiration date of the original low-power license. As the Comission has previous'ly stated, PG&E's extension request is subsumed within the proceeding on P,G&E's application for a full-power operating license. The staff safety evaluations, testimony and views of the parties, and adjudicatory proceedings that have been held in this proceeding are all applicable, to the' extent relevant, to PG&E's extension request. The Commission finds that the previous adjudicatory

-hearings that have been held satisfy the hearing requests that have been filed with regard to PG&E's extension request and that, because PG&E's extension request does not raise any health, safety or environmental l-issues that have not been resolved previously, that extension request i

should be granted.

Chairman palladino's Separate Views I believe that it is important to put in context Commissioner Gilinsky's statements about reactor operator experience.

The Commission did not " disregard a vital safeguard"; it has simply applied the same standards to Di.ablo Canyon that have been applied to other commercial power plants over the last 17 years.

I see no reason to impose different standards on this plant than on the others which have preceded it.

~

Each applicant for.a reactor license is required to develop and implement an NRC-approved training program for its reactor operator candidates.

It has been NRC practice to accept satis-factory-completion of.an NRC-approved training program as ful-filling-the prerequisite for an operator candidate to take an NRC reacto'r'~ operator examination.

As pointed out by the staff in SECY 84-152:

"There are three phases of an NRC approved cold license training program.

Phase I includes basic fundamentals and operation of a research reactor during which.the trainee performs at least 10 reactor startups.

The time normally required to cover Phase I is 12 weeks.

Phase II includes participatory observation of the day-to-day operation of a 1

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nuclear power plant.

This observation includes normal operation, surveillance testing and radiation procedures.

Also included in this phase is the operation of a nuclear power plant simulator similar in design to the facility for which the trainee will be seeking a license.

The duration of Phase II training varies from f'our to six months.

Phase III is the plant specific design lecture series which covers the features of trainee's facility and normally take six weeks to complete."

Reactor simulators have become sophisticated devices which provide the opportunity.to expose a reactor operator candidate to a variety.of plant operating' conditions which is'no't generally.

possible on an actual' plant.

It is also important to note that actual operating experience has a number of components in which reactor operators are involved.

These include such activities as learning about systems during construction -- a particularly good time to learn about the plant.

I also want to comment on. Commissioner.Gilinsky's. statement that_

" advisors 'with questionable qualifications may be positively dangerous."

I categorically reject the implication that advisors at Diablo Canyon, or at any plant for that matter, are " positively dangerous."

Each advisor has previously had an operator license e

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at another commerical nuclear power plant and has undergone training and examination on specifics of the plant at which they are to advise. The debate that took place relative to Diablo Canyon was not about questionable qualifications. Rather, it was about whether the NRC itself administers the examinations for these advisors or whether the NRC audits the sxaminations

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administered by the utility.

The Commission ~ has' decide'd on the latter, course 'of action, b~ut ~ndither ~ course of~~ a'ction~~results in advisors who are positively dangerous.

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4/13/84 ADDITIONAL SEPARATE VIEW OF COMMISSIONER GILINSKY ON REINSTATEMENT OF LOW-POWER OPERATING LICENSE AT DIABLO CANYON I

Attached are the separate views which I distributed two weeks ago when the Commission last discussed the reinstatement of the Diablo Canyon low power license.

At that time I withheld approval because of the' lack of actual operating experierice on -the ~ plant's operating crews and the absence of adequate compensating measures.

The situation has not changed since then.

None of the licensed operators at the plant has actual operating experience at a comparable 4

'N commercial reactor.

j The Commission ~h'as decided to require that the operators be backed up by experienced. advisors.

The critical difference i-between myself and the other Commissioners is over how to certify the advisors' inowledge of the plant.

Advisors with i

questionable qualifications may be posit 1vely dangerous.

I want the NRC to administer the' examinations they will be f

given.

The Commission :is satisfied with colupahy -

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administered ' examinations.-

The-view has been expressed that l

it makes no difference who'does the examining.

I regard l

this as naive.

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Since.the C:mmission's last meeting on this subject a legal bar to low power operations at Diablo Canyon has surfaced.

I-have disecvered that the NRC's regulations require operators whose license examination is conducted on a simulator, rather than on an operating plant, to have had

" extensive actual operating experience at a comparable reactor".

None of the Diablo Canyon operators meet this standard.

Their licenses are therefore invalid until such time as they either meet this test or the Commission decides to exempt them from this requirement on the, basis of the factors enumerated in-the regulations.

i After receiving a memorandum from the General Counsel stating that.the course followed in this xa4 is

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incon_ sis, tent with, the, plain _ meaning of the,regulati,ons, the 1

l Commission decided this. morning to ignore.its regulations f

and simply assert that the. licenses are valid.

The effe'et is to disregard a vital safeguard which ensures that some degree of experience is available en a plant's staff.

Had the regulations been followed, Diablo Cany.on would not now find itself without any experienced operators.

The -

operators are the most important safgty feature in the plant since they have.the discretio,n_to_. undo al;l.the other. safety features in the plant.

It is hard to think of a more f

important safety. issue than the competence and experience of l

l the operators.

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3/27/84 SEPARATE VIEW OF COmi!SSIONER GILINSKY REINSTATDiENT OF LOW-POWER OPERATING LICENSE AT DIABLO CANYON I am withholding my approval of the reinstatement of the Di'ablo Canyon low-power license because I am not satisfied with the readiness of the plant for operation.

I am especially concerned by the absence of commercial. experience on the operating crews and the failure;to. compensate adequately for this..

t There are two other aspects-of this case

. seismic design i

and construction -quality assurance - which, while not disabling _from the:po. int of yi<ew of. low-poweriopetration,,do not cast the NRC's own review irr a particularly favorable -

light.

i operating Staff Experi5nce I regard the operator experience question as.the most-important one in this case.

Se'ismic, issues have received a great deal.of attention, as -they -should,- but it..is well to -

remember that seismic protection,is designed against-unlikely contingencies.

We rely.on the operators.for ensuring safety 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, every day.

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Diablo Canyon does not have a single operator who has had actual operating experience on a commercial nuclear power plant of comparable size.

Four operators previously operated the Company's Humbolt Bay plant, a very small 4

boiling water reactor -- one-twentieth the size of_each Diablo Canyon unit --

which has been shut down for 8 years, ha'rdly relevant experience.

Much has been made of the fact of. simulator training.

This is valuable, but it does not compensate for the complete lack of relevant: commercial-experience.

It is worth noting also that Diablo Canyon does not have a site-specific simulator.

j This problem should have been resolved a long time ago.

At this point,- there seems to be no alternative to supplementing the shift crews with experienced advisors for the initial period-of-operation?.The: difficulty-with the

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way this has been done.is that.there is no-assurance that -

they have,the site-specific training and knowledge needed for safe operation.

I would approve plant operation at low power if the. advisor:on each shift previously held a senior i-operator license on a large commercial plant, and if he has passed'the site specific portio'nc-of the 'senipt operator license examination ~.for-Diablo Canyon; Th0 Commission-has instead chosen to allow the Company itself to~ decide whether the advisors are qualified.and to require such advisors only above five percent power.-

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Seismic Design Standard-J I continue to be concerned by the issue of seismic design standards.

The root of the difficulty is that although PG&E and the NRC staff accepted a standard based on a Richter scale magnitude 7.5 earthquake for the purposes of the licensing hearing, after the Hosgri fault was discovered, they did not accept that standard in practice.

Apparently in order to avoid'having to make significant modifications 4

to the design, PGEE and the~NRC staff decided-on a number of 1

changes in the way the-post-Hosgri standard was applied.

j These had the effect of shaving safety-margins to the maximum extent.

In at least one respect, which involved a j[

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substantial reductio, n in safety-margin, they resorted to a j

highly dubious technique.' This reduction, referred to as-the tau effect, was' accepted by'two licensing Boards-which thought that they, and the expert witnesses, understood the technical basis.

As it turns out, there is hardly any l

technical, basis for thi reductions.

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I asked the Commission ~to'take review of this question long' i

ago.-

There was plenty of time to do a-review 7before -the plant-was ready for operation ~but'at-each point the concern that plant operations-might be~ held up persuaded the

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i commission to ignore the problem.. What I find particularly disturbing is that it was clear to me ' that the-Commission declined to take Teview not because it understood the i

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that a thorough review of the entire seismic design be undertaken, to be completed about 1988.

At yesterday's meeting, the Commission learned that a paper which is to be delivered at the Scripps Institute in April raises new questions about the interpretation of the nature of the faults near Diablo Canyon.

This new information reinforces the need for a thorough review of the entire seismic design, as proposed by the ACRS.

The Commission has now agreed in principle to such a study.

I wish this had been done earlier but.I am prepared to accept-this approach t

as a way of dealing with the seismic issue. - -

Construction Quality Assurance

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The ERC-has. received hundreds,of allegations:concerning the Diablo Canyon plant.

Because~one of the allegations was

.l sent to me directly, I felt that I should look into how they were resolved.

I chose the audit of the Pullman Power Products, the prime piping. contractor from 1971 to 1977, I

done by the Nuclear Services Corporation (now -Quadrex)..

An important conclusion of that audit report was that the Pullman quality assurance system had been inadequate --

I among other. things-, that "there is no confidence that welding done. prior to early.1974 was performed in accordance with welding specification requirements."

Most of the piping had been installed by 1974.

The NRC staff initially l

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seismic design and thought it to be acceptable, but because it looked like a can of worms, and the Commission feared the consequences of reopening the issue.

The ACRS recently told the Commission that "we do not believe that scientific or engineering analyses exist today that could be used to calculate the specific quantitative reductions in free-field seismic spectra (the tau effect]

that he [Dr. Newmark] recommended for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant."

Had the Committee stated this view years ago when it originally reviewed the seismic design standard, I doubt that the Boards would have accepted the standard.

l The most favorable statement that the ACRS could ultimately l

make-about the seismic standard was that the Committee continued to feel that overall "the use of the staff approach leads to an acceptable level of~ safety in this instance."

This does hot address the tau reductions or whether the safety regulations have been satisfied.

What I take the Committee to mean is that the earthquake chosen to.

determine the seismic standard is top large -and that the plant's design is adequate for a smaller earthquake.

No doubt the Committee al'so took into consideratien the fact that Diablo Canyon is a relatively isolated site.

The ACRS did remind the Commission that it had earlier recommended 4

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peried between 1971 and 1977.

The NF.C staff schsequently decided to leck into the allegation =cre closely, appare:_1y because cf the Regicnal P 3 istrater's feeling that =cre needed te be dene.

n Deca ~er 1953, the staff issued a supple =entary Safety v

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4 When.I asked te see the inspectics reper dree zends later, the inspecter initially tefr_ sed c scpply it to ::ae.

As it t=: s cut, c 1y notes existed at the time dat Se staff v cte the SSER.

Se far as I can tell, t5.e inspectie repcrt c ly began te be written at abcut the time I asked te see it.

An explanation and ccrrectic ef the reference :=

the inswden report was subsee 2entiv sulatitted hv de staff *c the C

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have been dcne earlier.

I would have._cre confidence in this review if the NRO had first centacted the pecple who worked en NSO's audit, had then ec=pleted the inspecticn report, subsecuently written the SSER, and had only then inferred the Ecard and the C3 ssicn of its conclusions.

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• 4 VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL ON REINSTATEMENT OF LOW-POWER OPERATING LICENSE AT DIABLO CANYON i

Having gone through 21 years and literally hundreds of allegations, thousands of hours of inspections, reinspections, analysis, and

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investigation, we can often lose sight of the 98% that is done, since it i

is frequently the job of the Comission and especially the NRC staff to focus on the 2% that remains undone.

I would therefore like to state for the record the effort that has gone into the long, painstaking, and sometimes just plain painful period of reevaluation and modification of the Diablo Canyon power plant.

During l

this period the licensee, through its primary contractor, has spent some 2,000,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of professional effort to address the problems raised in j

the fall of 1981 and thereafter; other firms have carried out i

independent evaluations to the tune of.250,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />; the staff of the j

NRC has devoted 70,000. hours to the technical issues, and another.18,000 I

hours to evaluating allegations. Diablo Canyon is almost.certainly the most inspected plant ever built. -

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All this is not to imply, of course, that legitimate questions cannot~or

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should not still be asked.

I.would like.to. focus on one or.two such broad, and I belfeve legitimate, considerations that remain with respect to the Diablo Canyon powerplant beginning operations.

But first let me note what is not reasonable or legitimate to expect in any such massive endeavor. What is not reasonable to-expect is perfection.

It is not h

reasonable to expect all things to be perfect at any multibillion dollar constrtrction project, a project involving' thousands of workers and millions of independent-steps leading to. completion,.over a period of some 15 years. And, as might'have been expected, Diablo' Canyon was.not perfect.. What was not expected,'was that-it wasn't even just good enough, 21 years'ago, when this second construction, as it were, began.

l In my judgment, two important and legitimate issues deserve special i

mention here today.

One question, and perhaps the most fundamentally l

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.. N i important because it is unique to Diablo Canyon, is that of the seismic design adequacy of the Diablo Canyon facility.

It should be understood that the science of geology, and especially the study and forecasting of seismic events is an inexact science, as is the engineering of structures to withstand seismic events of a given magnitude.

But the b'est experts available in the field today have offered reasonable and sufficient assurance that the design basis and construction of this l

plant is adequate to withstand the maximum probable earthquake in the geologic region of the Diablo Canyon plant.

I have supported, and the ACRS has recomended, a continuing review and evaluation of the state of the seismic art and science as it develops and relates to Diablo Canyon over the next several years.

In particular, I would note that the recent scientific paper, discussed in some detail at the last meeting of the Connission, apparently indicates that, although the Hosgri fault may be somewhat closer than previously thought to the Diablo Canyon site, the probability is that a large, 7.5 Richter-magnitude quake would, under this latest hypothesis, be less-frequent than previously thought'.

I therefore find no reason, based on this latest of what I am sure will be many more papers on California geology and seismology, to change my position on the seismic adequacy of the Diablo Canyon plant.

I have reached that conclusion on the basis of my personal inspection of the plant, the recomendation of the ACRS, and the consensus of expert opinion.

Another important issue is that Comissioner Gilinsky raises in respect to operator qualifications. No one questions the legitimacy of that.

issue, and indeed, the Comission is' currently considering the question of how best to achieve not just adequacy, but excellence at-all levels in nuclear powerplant operating staff qualifications.

But the question here is not how PGAE and other, utilities will achieve unifom excellence in the months and years ahead, but whether PG&E in its Diablo Canyon operations today has achieved a standard that is, beyond a ' reasonable doubt, adequate to protect the public health and safety.

I believe it has achieved that standard. Mhat they have achieved is good, if not perfect.

I would add thdt, consistent with the strong expressed desires e

W1 of Comissioner Gilinsky, I believe the Comission does owe this licensee, as it does all our licensees, a clear statement, and soon, of j

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those further steps to be taken along the road to excellence in the I

operator corps as this licensee prepares for full power operation.

l i

It must be emphasized in this context that the Commission meeting this morning was not intended to address, nor is there any specific or implied need to address for low-power operations at Diablo Canyon, the question of the Commission's longstanding regulation,10 CFR 655.25, and i

the definition and practical application of that regulation in 1

satisfying the literal requirement for " extensive actual operating experience at a comparable reactor."

I The fict is, the-Comission has either implicitly or explicitly

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l concurred in the evolving application of 155.25 since its promulgation

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more than 20 years ago. The fact is, 555.25 was promulgated at.a time l

when reactor simulators were not generally available.

The fact is, in a l

1967 memorandum, the General Counsel's office explicitly concurred in the criteria which the' staff were then applying in determining whether

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655.25 was satisfied or not. The fact is, the Comission participated in the development of the ANSI standard which provided that simulator j

i training was an acceptable means of acquiring necessary experience. The l

regulatory guides which endorsed that ANSI standard as a method of I

complying with the requirements of $55.25 were published in their final form only after solicitation and consideration of public coments.

l Further, the Commission was explicitly informed by the staff of the planned issuance of MUREG-0094 in June,1976.

l t

l It is both understandable and eminently reasonable that the-prerequisites for operator licensing should change as the state of the art in operator training techniques changes.

Indeed, there are good reasons to rely heavily on simulator training as a prerequisite for operator licensing, not the least of which reasons is that in many respects the use of a simulator is superior to experience gained actually sitting at the controls of a power plant. Given the background of operator licensing criteria applied by this agency for the past 20

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, -o 1 years and the implicit, if not explicit, concurrence of the Comission in the application of those criteria, the suggestion that any near terr.

operating license applicant should have a license denied or delayed l

because the Connission has suddenly changed its mind about what constitutes adequate operator qualification would be irresponsible, and w'ould violate fundamental principles of fairness. The Comission has known exactly what it has been doing for 20 years, what it is doing

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today, and what it intends to do with regard,to operator training. The i

operators at Diablo Canyon meet Comission standards today, and will be required to meet what may well be upgraded standards yet to be adopted by the Comission in future regulations or regulatory guidance.

Finally, I would address the concerns raised by Mr. Yin at the last l

meeting of the Comission, and seemingly resolved during the intervening two weeks.

I do not interpret Mr. Yin's carefully considered position to reflect total agreement with his colleagues on all technical issues.

I would be surprised, and frankly a little concerned, if there were ever total agreement within our staff on such issues.

But I do understand 3

)

that there is now essential agreement on'an action plan and timetable for resolution of the remaining questions, and more importantly, j

agreement.that those remaining questions and differences should not i

preclude criticality and 5% operation.

I would caution that we are never entirely out of the woods in such matters, but I believe we have made significant progress, sufficient to act affimatively to reinstate the suspended license of Diabic' Canyon.

4 There has been a worthwhile and necessary process undemay during the two weeks spent resolving Mr. Yin's questions, with the help of the i

expert third party oversight of the ACRS.

I dog,bt, incidentally, that Mr. Yin considers himself, as some have characterized him, a "whistleblower". Rather, he is,a professional member of the NRC's own technical staff who has openly expressed several times over the last four months, his professional disagreement with other staff on a number of technical issues. That is as it should be. But although the issues had been on the table for months, and had been discussed extensively.

l they apparently had not been discussed sufficiently prior to the 4

,.Ob C: ;-is sion's March 27 meeting.

So if I may proffer one plea, to put it kindiy', to ou? staff and especially to the senior staff, it would be that 'n future, when such professionai cisagreerents exist among staff, if'the' Ccm.ission-is expected to rescive them in a meeting, then the Cermiission nust have the benefit of an active debate.

Such a debate cannot occur when intrastaff communications have been poor, and when there is not even agreement en what the disagreements are.

4/13/84 F

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UNITED STATES h w, o.,i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e

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.A f C WASWNGTON, D. C. 20555 f-

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s June 13, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine

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Co si er Bernthal FROM:

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, OPE SUBJECT ~:

DIABLO CANYON STATUS At the request of the Chairman, this memorandum is being provided to assist the Comission by identifying information germane to the Diablo Canyon licensing action.

It is based upon infomation provided by the NRC staff in a briefing for the Chainnan and'the Comissioner's assistants on June 12, 1984. We have specifically called attention to instances where Comission action may be required prior to the Comission's reaching a final decision to authorize full-power for the Diablo Canyon plant.

In addition, the information in this memorandum may be useful as background material for the Comission's testimony to Congressman Udall at 2 p.m. on Thursday. This memorandum also includes two items which we have received from Comissioner's offices (items # 8 and. 9 below). We have~ attached a memorandum to the files on Diablo Canyon covering the status of adjudicatory and other items prepared by Sheldon Trubatch, OGC. The major issues discussed below which are still under NRC, staff review are: piping and supgorts, resolution of certain allegations, and the Seismic' Design Basis Revalidation Program Plan.

1.

Plant Status.

In its letter of June 8,1984 PG1E reported that it had completed the low power testing program and the few remaining construction activities and that it would be ready for operation above 5 percent power on or about June 19, N

1984. NRC Region V staff concurred in PG&E's estima_te of operational readiness.

2.

Status of Adjudicatory Items s

'The Comission has a number of adjudicatory items pending. Some may require Comission action before reaching a full-power decision on Diablo Canyog Contacts:

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Gene Gallagher, OPE 8

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a.

The Comission must conclude an immediate effectiveness review of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) preliminary initial

& W' decision (LBP-82-70; of Auoust 1982 for full power. The Board's f pg g g decision primarily focused on emergency planning and equipment and PORY safety issues. The emeroency plannino issue which will i

recuire special attention is the licensino condition that Drior to e.((

full Dower oDeration. there must be a formal FEMA review and Q.

Q approval of the California state emeroency olan as annlicable to 1 (

Diablo CanVon.

PG&E and the NRC staff have appealed the imposition of this licensing condition, b.

The Comission has pending before it petitions for Comission review of ALAB-763 (Design Quality Assurancet OGC will shortly provide its recommendation on the cetitions-for review. The Comission need not. complete action on ALAB-763 befors' authorizing full power for Diablo Canyon, but could rely upon a preliminary detemination as part of an immediate effectiveness decision on LBP-82-70 that there is nothing in the ALAB-763 requiring deferral of a decision on full power, h[p.

c Two petitions on ALAB-756 (Construction Quality Assurance) are

<'g currently before the Cnmmission for review. These. petitions are to y

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reopen the record on alleged deficiencies in construction QA. The t

V Comission has not decided whether to defer a full-power decision

, ' (/ c, ' N until these petitions have been resolved. As a part of its immediate effectiveness review of the ASLB decision on full power.

bs the Comission could also decide based upon a preliminary

,a" determination that the ' full-oower license need ndt be delayed pendino final action on ALAB-756.

d.

There are pending motions before the Comission for the Appeal Board.to reopen on allegations in the areas of design quality y

assurance and construction quality assurance. Comission action on A g.7 these motions is not essential prior to a decision on full-power.

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However, by analogy of the Commission's treatment of allegations,

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_dtcision on full power operation.

e.'

The effect of earthquakes on emergency plannin'g'is'an issue pending

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before the Comission. The Comission is considering whether to p#

- reopen the Diablo Canyon record on this issua.; The Comission has

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left open the question of whether the litigation of-this~ issue must lA precede the grant of a full power license.

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3.

Status of Pending Investigations Mr. Hayes reported that there are currently 20 ongoing investigations of which 16 were inquiries.

Mr. Hayes indicated that he relies on Region V for identification of investigations having safety significance which could affect a Comission decision to permit Diablo Canyon to go to full power. At the cresent time. there are no investications which have been identified by the staff that would bar a Commission decision to authorize full oower.

However, prior to authorizing full power for the Diablo Canyon plant, the Comission will need to make a preliminary review and come to a judgment that there are no significant safety issues which must be resolved prior to the Comission's decision. We would expect that prior to a Comission decision on full power that the Comission would be briefed by the Office of Investigations in order to obtain the most current status of OI's investigations. Thus could include additional written materials on the status of investigations beyond that now contained in SSER 22.

The areas of investigation are:

a.

Intimidation and harrassment b.

Quality Assurance / Quality Control breakdown c.

False documents - Background of security guards d.

Vendor material false records Yuality Assurance / Quality Control welding concerns e.

f.

Falsification of PG&E documents 4.

Allegation Status.

Mr. Bishop of Region V reported on the current status of allegations. At the present time, there are approximately 700-800 allegations whose safety significance is being screened according to criteria. contained in SSER 22.

Mr. Bishop expects staff work on resolution of allegations pertinent to a Comission decision authorizing. full power for Diablo Canyon to be completed within the next week. Mr. Bishop indicated that the NRC.s.titff continues to receive new allegations.

However, it appears that many of these allegations repeat earlier ones.

Prior to a Comission decision to authorize full power operation for Diablo Canyon, the Comission will need to make a judgment based upon the most recent infomation that there are not significant outstanding safety issues associated with the allegations. We would expect that the Comission's judgment would be based upon the most current information presented as additional written material on the status of allegations beyond that contained in SSER 22 and/or an NRC staff briefing highlighting the most recent information on allegations.

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4 5.

Seismic License Condition.

According to the Cornission's decision authorizing 5 percent power, FG&E cust put in place a seismic review program which will reevaluate seismic factors at Diabic Canyon ever a several year period.

In accordance with that cendition, PG&E will sub=it its proposed seismic progan by January,1985.

Further, in response to the Cocnission's request, the staff is preparing a more detailed plan of implementation on the seis=ic review program that, although not recuired, the Concission would consider at the time of full power licensing.

6.

Licensine Issues.

Mr. Eisenhut and Mr. Vollmer reported on various licensing issues currently under review by the NRC staff. They are:

I.

IDVP issues: Mr. Vollmer estimates that there are'four issues to be co=pleted. These issues were previously identified-in SSER 20 as requiring resolution prior to full power operation. These issues are 1) turbine building roof truss modeling, 2) two additional piping aulyses,3).-jet impinsec'ent loads inside contair. ment, and 4) seismic _ analysis of the containment annulus b..

There are several te:hnical specification changes and modifications for which staff work is not cocpleted yet.

c.

The.NRC staff is continuing to ev.aluate the'Diablo Canycn tperator and shift supervisor qualifications and training. ]

d.

Mr. Eisenhut reported that there are roughly four $2.206 petitions on Diablo Canyon which the staff is currently reviewing.

e.

Mr. Eisenhut stressed that there are a number of areas where PG&E -

still owes the NRC staff additicnal information in order for the NRC staff to complete their reviews.

(e.g., containment painting, small bore piping, and systees interactions modifications.)

With respect to cocpletion of NRC staff reviews, Mr. Eisenhut stressed that acditional time would be required to complete NRC staff review, and that this would tie unlikely to be'completeibefore the end-of June ~ah(more likely I

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sometime during July.

i Mr. Yin is providing separate testimony for the Udall-Ccenittee.

In his

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testicony he expresses a nunter of concerns with respect to the sufficiency f(

of PG5E and NRC followup work-and he indicates his belief that adequate resolutien of his concerns cannot be ccepleted until. July or August.

6

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The NRC staff plans to provide an SSER 23 which will document the staff's i

review, conclusions, and recommendations on these remaininc issues. The exact scope of this SSER has yet to be defined.

For instance, it could focus f

on the licensing issues discussed above or it could include the current status of allegations and investigations. The Comission will need to review this SSER prior to reachina a decision to authorize full-Dower operation at Diablo Canyon..

7.

DIA Investigation.

Mr. Messenger reported on the work by OIA on the Governmental Accountability Project' 52.206 petition alleging material false statements made by the NRC staff during Comission meetings of March 19, 26, and 27,1984 and in SSER 21 and 22. He indicated that DIA is currently reviewing the GAP submissions to determine what specific information the petitions contain in support of the allegations.

Prior to authorizing full-power operation of Diablo Canyon,' the Comission will need to make a preliminary judgment that there are no significant safety issues steming from the 01A investigation.

8.-

Comissioner Gilinsky believes that there should be at least one person 7

on each shift with one year " hot" licensed operating experience and that person should have passed a plant specific examination identical to the two day NRC SRO examination.

9.

Comissioner Asselstine believes that prior-to authorizing full power operation the-Comission should direct the NRC staff to complete the two actions recomended in the " additional connents" by several members of the ACRS in its letter to Chairman Palladino of April 9,1984. This letter presents the ACRS report on design control measures at the Diablo Canyon plant. ACRS members Axtmann, Ebersole, and Okrent believe that prior to ascent above five percent power, the NRC staff should prepare a document discussing in considerable detail how the various relevant issues raised by its inspectors and others have been handled. They also recomend that the 1

staff perform a. careful examination of a selected sample of actual j

construction details to help assure that the appropriate quality has been 1

achieved.

In addition, they believe that the.ACRS s_hould be given an opportunity to review these results prior to full power operation.

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3 UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION yt i.s. 7 l

WASHINGTON. D. C. 20355 a

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June 13, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:

i Files FROM:

Sheldon L. Trubatch REMAINING ACTIONS FOR FULL-POWER

SUBJECT:

i This pyesents, an. overview of remaining Commission actions relateB to a full-power operating license for Diablo Canyon and relates those. actions to the division of institutional

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r.esponsibilities within the NRC.

A review of some important' earlier licensing milestones in'this proceeding provides the necessary context'for understanding the current licensing situation.

1.

Full-Power Licensing Board Decision PG&E applied for an operating. license in 1973.

A Licensing Board held hearings on that application between 1976 and 1979.

In 1978, the Licensing Board issued the first of four decisions deciding in PG&E's favor various-allegations.

regarding the;. safety: and environmental impacts of' plant

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operation.

The Appeal Board subsequently affirmed three of

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those decisions.

The fourth, LBP-82-70, on emergency planning and two safety. issues, is currently' pending before the Appeal Board.

The issues in that decision did.not have to be resolved finally before the issuance of a low-power licensee.

But under Commission practice, before a full-power license can be issued to PG&E, the Commission itself must conclude affirmatively an immediate effectiveness review of this fourth Licensing Board decision..

q-2.

Low-Power Adiudication

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In July of 1980, before the full-power licensing proceeding was ' concluded,*7 GEE applied for a low-power license.

The Licensing Board held separa e hearings on.that request, and t

granted it in 1981.

Thereafter, the Commission made the low-power. license.immediately,ef'ective..However, because f

cf subsequent events,,the Commission's involvement with the tLlPff 4 An97, gju ww- - w

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2 low-power license was unusually extensive.

No further Commission action is pending on the low-power license.

3.

IDVP The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued the license on September 22, 1981.

The subsequent discovery of a significant breakdown in quality assurance at Diablo Canyon led the Commission to suspend the license by immedi-ately effective order of November 19, 1981.. The suspension was to be -ef fective pending the satisf actory completion of an~ Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP).

Because the reinstatement of the low-power license has been treated as an enforcement matter, review of the IDVP has been conducted by the staff and the Commission in a non-adjudi-catory manner.

Although the IDVP was instituted for the purpose of rein-stating the low-power license, the IDVP has uncovered matters which are important to only full-power operation.

Thus, the Commission reinstated the low-power license with these matters still open, but will not authorize full-power operation until those matters have been addressed.

Essen-tially, the Commission is treating IDVP issues related to full-power as it would treat any uncontested issues related to full-power.

The staff expects to prepare safety eval.

uati.on reports (SER) on the resolutions of these issues.

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For low-power reinstatement, the Commission's decision relied in part on such SERs.

4.

Allegations As the IDVP drew to a close and the Commission moved towards a decision on reinstating PG&E's low-power license, several hundred allegations of_ design and construction deficiencies were made to the NRC staff.

Not all of_these allegations l

have been resolved, and the staff has yet to determine

~

whether any of-these allegations require resolution' prior to full-power operation.

Also, the Commission. hts not adopted criteria for determining that all~arlegations have been addressed adequately before authorizing. full-power opera-tion.

5.

Adiudicatory Items The IDVP and allegations of violations of NRC regulations have provided the bases for several adjudicatory issues

3 which were raised after the record closed for the full-power

hearing, a.

ALAB-756 i

This is an Appeal Board decision denying intervenors' motion.

to reopen the record on alleged deficiencies in construction !

quality issuance (CQA).

Petition.s for review of this i

decision are still pending before the Commission.

The

}

Commission has not decided whether to defer a full-power i

decision until these petitions have been resolved.

The Commission.could use its immediate effectiveness review of the Licensing Board's full-power decision to include a determination on whether a full'-power license should be delayed pending final action on ALAB-756.

b.

Motion to Reopen on COA.

After ALAB-756 was issued, intervenors again moved the Appeal Board to open the record on QA and on management competence and character.

These motions rely on many of the issues raised in the allegations pending before the staff.

The Acceal Board has not yet acted on those motions.

Here again, the Commission could use its immediate effectiveness '

review for a full-power license to include a decision on how the pendency of these motions should be factored into a 4

full-power decision.

4 c.

ALAB-763 1

This is an Appeal Board decision finding no. merit to intervenors' challenges to the adequacy of design quality assurance (DQA) at Diablo Canyon.

Petitions for review of this Appeal Board decision are still pending before the.

Commission.

As with ALAB-756, the Commission could use its i= mediate effectiveness review of the Licensing Board's full-power decision to include a determination on whether a full-power license should be delayed pending final action on I ALAB-763.

d.

Motion to Reopen on DQA r

After ALAB-763 was issued, intervenors 'again moved the Appeal Board to reopen the record on DQA issues.

This motion relies on many of the issues raised in the f

i allegations before the staff.- The Acceal Board has not yet acted on these pendine motions.

As with the pending motions 9

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4 to reopen on COA, the-Commission could use its immediate effectiveness review of a full-power license to include a decision on how the pendency of these motions should be factored into a. full-power decision.

e.

Effects of Earthcuakes on Emergency Planning The Commission asked the parties to brief issues on whether to reconsider this issue.

Becaus'e this issue mainly affects offsite emergency planning, the Commission determined that the issue did not have to be considered when it determined to issue a low-power license for Diablo Canyon.

The I

proceeding on this issue may not be concluded soon, g)

Accordingly, the Commission could use its immediate effectiveness review of a full-power license to include a J

decision on how the pendency of this issue should be factored into a full-power decision.

6.

2.206 Petitions There are four 2.206 petitions pending before the staff.

These involve many of the same issues raised by the.alle-gations.

After the staff responds to those petitions, the Commission will.have to review any denials.

The Commission could use its immediate effectiveness review of a full-power license to include a determination of how the pendency of the 2.206 petitions should affect a full-power decision.

7.

OIA Investigation This investigation is an off-shoot of the 2.206 petitions.

Those petitions contained allegations that the NRC staff 3

made deceptive or material. false statements to the Commis-

)

sion during various meetings and in various documents.

Because these allegations go to the Commission's confidence in the staff's assessment of Diablo Canyon's readiness for full-power licensing, the Commission may want to make at least a preliminary decision on the substantiality of these claims.

The Commissioh could use its immediate

~

effectiveness review of a full-power license'to include a determination on how the pendency of this investigation should affect a full-power decision.

8.

OI Investigations These= investigations are off-shoots of the allegations presented to the staff.

Currently,-the staff believes that i

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5 none of these allegations present safety issues recuiring resolution prior to the issuance of a full-power license.

.The-Commission may want to review that assessment prior to deciding on whether to authorize full-power operation.

The

. Commission could use its immediate effectiveness review of a full-power license to include a determination on how the pendency of these investigations should affect a full-power decision.

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