ML20116L314
| ML20116L314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 08/12/1996 |
| From: | Jeffrey Mitchell NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20116L316 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9608160224 | |
| Download: ML20116L314 (6) | |
Text
.
f %g 0
4 UNITED STATES j
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2006H001 Y+9
,o BOSTON EDISON COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-293 PILGRIM NOCLEAR POWER STATION giENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 166 License No. DPR-35 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by the Boston Edison Company (the licensee) dated May 1, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),
and the Comission's rules and regulations; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety' of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifica-tions as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.
9608160224 960812 PDR ADOCK 05000293 P
k r
i
' 3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION MGO Jocelyn A. Mitchell, Acting Director 1
Project Directorate I-I Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical 1
Specifications Date of Issuance: August 12, 1996 1
1 1
)
4 4
J b
i 4
4 i
l
i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.166 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-35 DOCKET NO. 50-293 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Remove Insert 1-4 1-4 3/4.7-16 3/4.7-16 3/4.7-17 83/4.7-13 B3/4.7-13
-o I,'O
. DEFINITIONS (Cent) s Q.
Core Alteration - Core Alteration shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed, and fuel in the vessel. The
- following exceptions are not considered to be Core Alterations:
- a. Movement of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special movable detectors (including undervessel replacement); and
- b. Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.
Suspension of Core Alterations shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
R.
Reactor Vessel Pressure - Unless otherwise mdicated, reactor vessel pressures listed in the Technical Specifications are those measured by the reactor vessel steam space detectors.
S.
Thermal Parameters
- 1. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) - the value of critical power ratio associated with the most limiting assembly in the reactor core. Critical Power Ratio (CPR) is the ratio of that power in a fuel assembly, which is calculated to cause some point in the assembly to experience boiling transition, to the actual assembly operating power.
- 2. Transition Boilina - Transition boiling means the boiling regime between nucleate and film boiling. Transition boiling is the regime in which both nucleate and film boiling occur intermittently with neither type being completely stable.
- 3. Total Peakina Factor - The ratio of the fuel rod surface heat flux to the heat flux of an average rod in an identical geometry fuel assembly operating at the core average bundle power.
T.
Instrumentation I
- 1. Instrument Calibration - An instrument calibration means the adjustment of an instrument signal output so that it corresponds, within acceptable range, and accuracy, to a known value(s) of the parameter which the instrument monitors. Calibration shall encompass the entire instrument including actuation, alarm or trip.
- 2. Instrument Channel - An instrument channel means an arrangement of a sensor and auxiliary equipment required to generate and transmit to a trip system a single trip signal related to the plant parameter monitored by that instrument charmel.
- 3. Instrument Functional Test - An instrument functional test means the injection of a simulated signal into the instrument primary sensor to verify the proper instrument channel response, alarm and/or initiating action.
- 4. Instrument Check - An instrument check is a qualitative determination of acceptable operability by observation ofinstrument behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the instrument with other independent instruments measuring
)
the same variable.
1 Amendment No. 15,119,-444,166' 14
l e
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont) 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
Shutdown Transformer is required to be C.
Secondary Containment operable and capable of supplying power to the emergency bus.
1.
Each refueling outage prior to
-Fuel movement will not occur until the reactor refueling, secondary containment vessel is flood up to elevation i14'.
capability shall be demonstrated to
-The train of CRHEAF without its safety related maintain 1/4 inch of water bus or without its emergency diesel generator vacuum under calm wind (5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow will have power supplied from a normal offsite rate of not more than 4000 cfm.
source via a non safety related bus. The normal offsite source consists of either the Startup Transformer or Unit Auxiliary Transformer (Backfeed Mode)
- 1. Secondary containment shall be OPERABLE when in the Run, Startup and Hot Shutdown MODES, during movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and during movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, and during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).
- 2. a. With Secondary Containment inoperable when in the Run, Startup and Hot Shutdown MODES, restore Secondary Containment to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
- b. Required Action and Completion Time of 2.a not met, be in Hot Shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND Cold Shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
- c. With Secondary Containment inoperable during movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and during movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, and during CORE ALTERATIONS, and during OPDRVs, immediately
- 1. Suspend movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.
AND
- 2. Suspend movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool.
AND
- 3. Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.
AND
- 4. Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.
Amendment No. W,166 3/4.7-16
J e
' BASES:
+
3/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
C.
Secondary Containment The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during reactor operation, when the drywell is sealed and in service; the reactor building provides primary containment when the reactor is shutdown and the dr>well is open, as during refueling. Because the secondary containment is an integral part of the complete containment system, secondary containment is required at all times that primary containment is required as well,
as during refueling.
There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for secondary containment operability.
These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a fuel handling accident inside [ secondary]
containment. The secondary containment performs no active function in response to each of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.
An operable secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered operable, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.
If secondary containment is inoperable (when required to be operable), it must be restored to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> completion time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during Run, Startup, and Hot Shutdown modes. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment operability) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.
If secondary containment cannot be restored to operable status within the required completion time, the plant must be brought to a mode in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least Hot Shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to Cold Shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
Movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool, core alterations, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the emironment. Core alterations, movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies, and movement of new fuel over the spent fuel pool must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.
Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release.
Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.
Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water negative pressure within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the operation of the reactor building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reactor building and performance of the standby gas treatment system. Functionally testing the initiating sensors and associated trip channels demonstrates the capability for automatic actuation.
Performing these tests prior to refueling will demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to the time the primary containment is opened for iefueling. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability.
Amendment No. M-u2,166 B3/4.7-13