ML20116D967

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Monitoring of Lng & Liquefied Petroleum Gas Shipping & Const Activities on Delaware River, bi-yearly rept,1983
ML20116D967
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 04/30/1985
From:
Public Service Enterprise Group
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NUDOCS 8504300139
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e HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION MONITORING OF LNG AND LPG SHIPPING AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES ON THE DELAWARE RIVER

4. BI-YEARLY REPORT - 1983 (BYR-3) t 8504300139 850419 PDR ADOCK 05000354 R PDR Docket Nos. 50-354 50-355 M P83 9/05 1-li April 1985

4.1 CALCULATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY 4.1.1 _ Accident Rate Per Ship Mile The number of accidents occuring per mile traveled by liquid fuel tankers is based on information collected from the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Casualty Computer Data and the U.S. Coast Guard accident files. The total number of accidents was divided by the total exposure (average yearly one way trips on the Dela-ware River) as determined from the publication

" Waterborne Commerce of the United States," to arrive at an accident rate per transit mile in the Delaware River. An analysis of each of these sources of data is presented in the following pages.

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Casuality Computer Data was used to identify all collision incidents on the Dela-

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ware River over the years 1981-1982 in the following seven categories:

1. a meeting situation
2. a crossing situation
3. an overtaking situation
4. an anchored or moored condition
5. fog
6. docking or undocking operation
7. not otherwise cla'ssified Liquefied gas carriers operate in U.S. Coastal Waters under very strict supervision of the U.S. Coast Guard. In the section of river adjacent to the Hope Creek Generating Facility, the tanker will be moving in the channel at all times under Coast Guard es-cort. In particular, in this section of the river, the liquid gas carrier:

. will not be moored

. will not be in area of industrial docks or piers

. will not encounter any area of rock river bottom M P83 9/05 2-11

. will not overtake or be overtaken by other ships

. will not meet other ships at bends

. will not meet oncoming ships of a relative speed of greater than 12 knots

. will not itself exceed a speed of 12 knots

. will only transit if visibility is two miles or greater

. will only transit with tug escort

. will be in continuous communications on two radio channels

. will be U.S. Coast Guard supervised Because of the strict operating procedures involving liquefied gas carriers, those accidents which occur in the seven categories listed above were examined, and any which could not occur under the operating conditions mentioned above for liquid gas carriers were excluded. Any incidents which were questionable were included so that the estimate will be conserva-tive, but any accident which did not involve at least one large vessel of over 18 ft. draft was discarded.

Next, the total number of one way trips in the Dela-ware River (either inbound or outbound) of large tankers, dry cargo, and passenger ships with a draft of more than 18 feet was obtained from the " Water-borne Commerce" publication. Each one-way trip con-stitutes a distance of approximately 100 miles, so that the average ship-miles / year is 100 times the total number of one-way trips.

The accident rate per ship mile was calculated by dividing the total number of accidents by the total ship miles. This calculation was carried out for the period under consideration and also for the cumulat-ive accidents since the first estimate was made. The value calulated for a single period is for comparicon purpcaes only; in the calculation of the overall probability, the cumulative value was used since it has more statistical validity because of the larger sample size. Tables 7 and 8 summarize these values.

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4.1.2 HISTORICAL COLLISION ANALYSIS FY81-FY82 The United States Coast Guard (USCG) Marine Casualty Computer Data tape was utilized to identify the oc-currence'of all collision incidents (the seven cate-gories listed above) on the Delaware River in the years FY1981 and FY1982. A total of 62 collision incidents were identified and-.the U.S. Coast Guard case number of each incident was recorded. This record of case number was then utilized to obtain de-tailed accident reports from the U.S. Coast Guard accident files available for 47 of the 62 incidents.

The details of the remaining 15 incidents were ob-tained from the decoded printout of the USCG Casualty Computer Data Tape. These 62 detailed incident reports were examined and analyzed further.

The 62 events were initially screened with the pur-pose of deleting those accidents only involving rela-tively small vessels that are not representative of large, self-propelled, liquefied gas carriers and could not puncture the LPG gas tanks if they were the striking vessel. There are 17 such incidents iden-tified in Table 4 by their assigned Coast Guard case numbers. An attached Appendix summarizes our rationale for their selection, together with our rationale for all other decisions outlined below.

A second screening of the remaining 45-incident re-ports was conducted to delete those incidents which were minor in nature, i.e., the incidents which are not large enough to cause credible accidents whereby spills of liquified gas of enough magnitude might be initiated. There are 12 such'. incidents identified in Table SA.

A third screening of the remaining 33 incident re-ports was carried through to delete those incidents resulting in grounding only. The bed of the Delaware River is soft, and also the modern liquified gas carrier tankers are designed with double sidewalls and double bottom walls. As a result, the grounding of these liquified gas carriers in the soft bed of the Delaware River will not cause credible ac-cidents. The recorded consequences of the grounding incidents in the Delaware River totally bear out the above conclusion as the damages were either minimal or nill. There are 25 such incidents identified in Table SB.

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l Three (3) of the remaining 8 incident reports, as shown in Table 6, involved collisions beween vessels while at least one was being intentio.nally moved.

The cases 0007 PHI, 0022 PHI and 0038 PHI-all in FY82, involved collisions while one of the vessels was in the process of docking or undocking, or one vessel was moored or anchored. Although a liquified gas carrier will not be moored, anchored, docked, or undocked in the 24 mile river section of interest, i.e., the catchment distance in which a cargo release might impact the nuclear power generating facility, all of the above cases were conservatively considered as potential collisions while underway and properly included in the accident data base. This practice is consistent with previously submitted testimony before the~NRC. In conclusion, therefore, we conservatively find 3 incidents that should be included in the accident data base: FY82-0007 PHI, 0022 PHI, and 038 PHI. Each is considered relevant and potentially applicable to the analysis of the LNG or LPG tanker spill probability in the 24 mile river segment of interest.

The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 7.

As a reference for the methodology employed above, the following can be consulted:

Supplemental Testimony of Dr. Ashok Kalelkar in response to matters raised by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board in ALAB-429, 11 October 1977 Docket Nos. 50-354-50-355 .

'Pages 5-21 M P83 9/05 5-11

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.i TABLE 4 INCIDENTS INVOLVING ONLY SMALL VESSELS BY USCG CASE NUMBER

  • Total number of cases: 17 FY81 FY82 0265 PHI 0004 PHI 0270 PHI 0006 PHI 0275 PHI 0008 PHI 1344 PHI 0014 PHI 2618 PHI 0021 PHI 3174 PHI 0030 PHI 0031 PHI 0052 PHI 0068 PHI 0085 PHI 0086 PHI

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  • These incidents only involved tugs, towboats, non-self propelled barges, or other relatively small vessels.

t M P83 9/05 6-li e

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TABLE SA MINOR INCIDENTS BY USCG CASE NUMBERS

  • Total number of cases: 12 FY81 FY82 0267 PHI 0037 PHI 0271 PHI 0084 PHI 0273 PHI 1112 PHI 1316 PHI 1979 JAC 2577 PHI 2925 PHI 3171 PHI 4267 PHI
  • Minor incidents involve the physical boundary of only one vessel and are not capable of causing credible accidents whereby spills of liquified gas of enough magnitude might be initiated.

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TABLE 5B GROUNDING INCIDENTS INVOLVING LARGE VESSELS BY USCG CASE NUMBERS Total-number of cases: 25 FY81 FY82 0263 PHI 0034 PHI 0271 PHI 0065 PHI 1174 PHI 1175 PHI 1182 PHI 1320 PHI 1342 PHI 1592 PHI 2113 PHI 2193 PHI 2353 PHI 2712 PHI 2901 PHI 2913 PHI 3173 PHI 4091 NYC 4123 PHI 4260 PHI 4262 PHI 4271 PHI 4712 PHI 5936 PHI 5937 PHI M'P83 9/05 8-11

TABLE 6 COLLISIONS INVOLVING LARGE VESSELS NO. CASE NO. DESCRIPTION

1. FY82:0007 PHI Freighter collided with moored freighter
2. FY82:0022 PHI Freighter collided with moored freighter
3. FY82:0038 PHI Towing vessel collided with freighter while assisting it to berth M P83 9/05 9-11

l TABLE 7 ACCIDENT RATE PER SHIP MILE Cumulative Cumulative T9tal Cumulative One-Way One-Way Accident Accident Year Accidents Accidents Trips Trips Rate Rate 1969-1975 10 10 66321 66321 1.5x10-6 1.5x10-6 1976-1978 7 17 28344 94665 2.5x10-6 1.8x10 1979-1980 8 25 14498 109163 5.5x10-b 2.3x10-6 1981-1982 3 28 12525 121688 2.4x10-6 2.3X10-6 1983-1984 1985-1986 1987-1988 1989-1990 1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 1999-2000 _

2001-2002

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.2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 2013-2014 2015-2016 2017-2018 2019-2020 2021-2022 2023-2024 2025-2026 2027-2028 _

-2029-2030 M P83 9/05 10.*-11

TABLE 8 DELAWARE RIVER ONE-WAY TRAFFIC IN TANKERS, DRY CARGO, AND PASSENGER SHIPS OF GREATER THAN 18 FT DRAFT (Source: " Waterborne Ccanerce")

Year: 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 One-Way Trips: 9744 10151 9258 9553 9858 9086 8671 9559 9300 9485 7789 6709 Year: 1981 1982 One-way Trips: 6452 6073 121688 Average One-Way Trips = 14 = 8692 Each one-way trip representing a distance of about 100 miles, the average ship-miles / year is 100 times the average number of one-way trips. Therefore, this figure is 8.692x105.

4.1.3 Collisions With Fixed Objects The calculation of collision rates with fixed objects (e.g. Tower 97, which is approximately 9 miles up-river - see Figure 6 and a partially submerged shipwreck about 4.5 miles upriver from the Hope Creek site), was handled in the same manner as the accident rate.From the Coast Guard accident casualty data for the previous years, the number of occurrences of rammings of fixed objects involving a ship of over 18 feet draft was determined. As in the previous analysis, any accidents which could not have happened to a ship following U.S. Coast Guard regulations for liquefied gas carriers were eliminated from the data base. The number of one-way transits per year of ships of over 18 feet draf t is the same as was used in the accident rate calculation.

The number of collisions with fixed objects is based on approximately 100 rammable objects

  • which large ships could have struck; Tower 97 and the shipwreck represent two of them. Thus, to calculate the prob-ability of a col) . ion with either Tower 97 or the shipwreck per transit, the total number of collisions in the river is divided by 50 (100/2) and then divided by the total number of one-way transits.
  • As counted from NOAA Navigational Charts for the Delaware River. None of the 100 objects, except Tower 97 and the shipwreck occur in the 24 miles of interest.

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Table 9 summarizes the-5 remaining incidents that involved large ship-collisions with fixed objects.

An examination of all 5 collisions involving vessels and fixed objects in the Delaware River (FY81-FY82) reveals that, all 5 of them are relevant and poten-tially applicable to the analysis of LNG and LPG tanker spill probability.

The'results of this analysis are summarized in Tabl9 10.

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TABLE 9 i

SHIP COLLISIONS WITH FIXED OBJECTS NO. CASE NUMBER - OBJECT CIRCUMSTANCES _

a 1 FY81-0262 PHI Bridge Operator error 2 FY81-1169 PHI Pier Docking pilot error 3 FY81-2463 PHI Pier Improper mooring / towing 4 FY81-2883 PHI Bridge Negligence on the part of the master 5 FY81-5023 PHI Pier Material failure M P83 9/05 13-11

, _ _ _ . . , . _ _ . _ . . . , . . ,,.m., _ . - . . - . . . ~ . , , ,. _ . _ . _ , . , . , _ ..

.- TABLE 10 COLLISIONS WI'IU 'IOWER 97 OR ' LEE SHIPWRECK PER TRANSIT Ctmulative Ctmulative Total Ctmulative One-Way One-Way Collision Collision Year Collision Collisions Trips Trips Rate Rate ,

i l 1969-1975 8 8 66321 66321 2.4x10-6 2.4x10-6 l 1976-1978 11 19 28344 94665 7.8 x10-6 4x10-6 l

1979-1980 8 27 14498 109163 1.1x10-5 5x10-6 1981-1982 5 32 12525 121688 8.0x10-6 5.3x10-6 2

1983-1984 4

1985-1986

, 1987-1988 1989-1990 1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 [

1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002 I 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2010 .

f 2011-2012 2013-2014 2015-2016

, 2017-2018 2019 -2020 l

2021-2022 2023-2024 2025-2026 2027-2028 2029-2030 M P83 9/05 14.*-11

l 4.1.4 Spills Per Accident The probability that a spill will occur given that there has been an accident was calculated based on a complex energy conservation model developed by V. U.

Minorsky.** The model estimated the depth of pene-tration of the hull of a ship based on the speeds of the colliding ships and the angle of collision.

Conservative estimates of the spill per accident rate are 0.1 for propane, butane, butadiene and liquefied natural gas carriers,* and 0.01 for vinyl chloride carriers. Vinyl chloride has a much smaller value because it is carried in self contained tanks near the center of the' ship, at a larger distance from the hull.

Table 13 presents the probability values for spills per accident associated with each type of liquefied gas.

The probability that a storage tank on a gas carrier would be ruptured given that an accident has occurred was calculated based on a method developed by Vladimir U. Minorsky.** In order to determine if there have been any new developments in this field, PSE&G has contacted Mr. Minorsky at George S. Sharp, Inc., N. Y. Since Mr. Minorsky had retired, we discussed this item with an associate of Mr.

Minorsky, Mr. Richard Rodi.

In response to our inquiry, Mr. Rodi indicated that there have been no new developments in the area of ship damage models which would lead to changes in the probability figures presented in Table 11.

  • These values were used in the ASLAB decision al-though the applicant's more rigorous estimate for LNG tankers indicates a much smaller conditional spill probability.
    • V. U. Minorsky " Analysis of Ship Collisions with Reference to Protection of Nuclear Power Plants,"

Journal of Ship Research October 19 53.

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TABLE 11 SPILIS PER ACCIDENT Vinyl Year Propane Butane Butadiene Chloride ING 1978 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.1 1980 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.1 1982 0.1 0.1 _0.1 0.01 0.1 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

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2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 5 20 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 M P83 9/05 16.*-11

4.1.5 Vapor Cloud Formation Per Spill Given that there has been a spill of a liquefied gas cargo, a vapor cloud will form only if the fuel is not ignited at the source of the spill. In a crash situation which is large enough to release the cargo, it is expected that there will be ample sources of ignition from severed wires, frictionally heated metal, and associated sparks. Although a vapor cloud could be expected in less than one percent of all spills, a conservative value of 10 percent has been used.

Table 12 presents the probability values associated with various liquefied gases.

In order to verify if any new developments in the area of vapor cloud formation and dispersion have occurred, PSE&G has contacted the following sources involved in this type of research:

a. Risk and Industrial Safety Consultants, Inc.

Mr. Sami Atallah - President

b. Dept. of Chemical Engineering, College of

. Engineering Northeastern University Dr. Elizabeth M. Drake- Chairperson In their response to our inquiry, both sources of information indicated that there were no new develop-ments in this field which would lead to changes in the probability values presented in Table 12.

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TABLE 12 VAPOR CIDUD FORMATION PER SPILL Vinyl Year Propane Butane Butadiene Chloride LNG 1978 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1980 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1982 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994

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1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

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2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 M P83 9/05 18.*-11 t

r 4.1.6. Meteorological Factor The meteorological factor is based on distance between the spill and facility, and the mean wind speed and direction. It represents the probability that a- vapor cloud formed at a particular location will reach the nuclear plant with a flammable mix-ture of fuel to air. It is not expected to change under ordinary circumstances over the lifetime of the facility and the values which were used are given in Table 13 for the entire 24 mile catchment distance and for Tower 97 and the shipwreck.

Table 13 - Meteorological Factors

  • Tower 97 24 Mile and Catchment Shipwreck **

Propane 0.31 0.002 Butane 0.32 0.002 Butadiene 0.25 0.002 Vinyl Chloride 0.24 0.002 LNG 0.354 0.002

  • For details on how the Meteorological Factor is derived, see answer to Question 3 of Exhibit 10 on Docket Nos. 50-354 and 50-355 dated January 13, 1975.
    • The value of 0.002 is very conservative since it assumes a 10,000 ton spill. Such spill sizes are not considered credible for propane, butane and butadiene since individual tank sizes for such cargoes are considerably smaller.

4.1.7 Conditional Probability Calculation The probability that a flammable vapor cloud will reach the nuclear facility was calculated for each fuel type under consideration (propane, butane, butadiene, vinyl chloride, and LNG). For each fuel type, two separate calculations were made, the first was based on the likelihood of a collision with another ship anywhere within the 24 mile catchment diJcance and the second was based on a ramming of either Tower 97 nine miles upstream or the shipwreck 4.5 miles upstream of the nuclear plant.

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The overall probability of a flammable vapor cloud

-reaching the nuclear plant is the sum of these eight terms.* .

The individual terms were calculated as the product of five other factors. These factors are:

1. Total number of ships per year
2. Accidents per mile; or accidents per passage
3. Spills per accident
4. Vapor cloud per spill
5. Meteorological factor The first of these five factors is determined an-nually for each fuel type as listed in Table 1. The remaining four factors have been conservatively estimated and are described in Sections 4.1.4, 4.1.5, and 4.1.6. These factors may vary somewhat as a re-sult of a biyearly review of shipping experience, and the method for their calculation is also described in Sections 4.1.4, 4.1.5 and 4.1.6.

The results of all these calculations are presented in Tables 14 and 15, for both ship to ship collisions and collisions with fixed objects.

4.2 Conclusions The results provided in Tables 14 and 15 show that the er conditional probability of a flammable vapo. iud reaching the Hope Creek plant is 9.5xl for 1982; and 2.1x10-7 for 1983. Both values are significantly less than the 10-6 value established as an upper limit by the NRC, based on conservative approximations.

All approximations in this study have been made in a conservative manner. The resultant probabilities of 9.5x10-8 and 2.1x10-7 are, therefore, conservative results.

  • Since LNG is not shipped on the Delaware, only four cargoes (propane, butane, butadiene, and vinyl chlor-ide) and two spill modes (ship-ship collision and collision with Tower 97 or the shipwreck) are relevant, leading to eight probability terms to be added for the total probability.

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The actual LNG and LPG traffic has decreased from 1981 to 1982 but there was some increase in LPG traffic in 1983; no additional rammable objects, mooring or docking sites, or any other facility that might cause a significant change in the probability of a flammable vapor cloud reaching the plant have been built or are planned for construction within the 24 mile catchment distance on-the Delaware River; and no proposals for construction of LNG terminals along the Delaware River have been received by FERC.

Based on the above information, we can conclude that the probability of a flammable vapor cloud reaching the nuclear facility is sufficiently small such that the associated hazards to the health and safety of the public are negligible.

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TABLE 14 PROBABILITY OF FIRMABLE VAPOR CIIXJD RFACHING NUCLEAR FACILITY (Based on 1982 Data)

No. of Ships Accidents Ramnings Spills Per Vapor Cloud Meteorological Per Year Per Mile Per Passage Accident Per Spill Factor Probability ING 0 2.3x104 0.1 0.1 0.354 0

LPG I

Propane 0 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.31 0 4

i Butane 8 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.32 5.89x10-8 q Butadiene 6 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.25 3.45x10-8 Vinyl Chloride 0 2.3x10-6 0.01 0.1 0.24 0 i

Tower 97 + Shipwreck DG 0 5.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.002 0 LPG 14 5.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.002 1.48x10-9 i Vinyl Chloride 0 5.3x10-6 0.01 0.1 0.002 0 i Tote.1 9.5x10-8 i

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C TABLE 15 PROBABILITY OF FIJM4ABLE VAPOR CILUD REACHING NUCLEAR FACILITY (Based on 1983 Data)

No. of Ships Accidents Ramnings Spills Per Vapor rioud Meteorological Per Year Per Mile Per Passage Accident Per Sp [ll Factor Probability IE O 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.354 0 LPG Propane 9 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.31 6.42x10-8 Butane 4 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.32 2.94x10-8 Butadiene 19 2.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.25 10.93x10-8 Vinyl Chloride 0 2.3x10-6 0.01 0.1 0.24 0 Tower 97 + Shipwreck IE O 5.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.002 0 LPG 32 5.3x10-6 0.1 0.1 0.002 3.39x10-9 Vinyl Chloride 0 5.3x10-6 0.01 0.1 0.002 0 Total 2.1x10-7 i

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u APPENDIX USCG CASE REVIEWS INTRODUCTION The following sections, denoted by U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) case numbers, discuss our interpretation of each of the sixty-two (62) reported incidents in the waterways of the Delaware River and the Delware Bay during the period FY81 -

FY82. An abstract of each of the incidents prepared from the detailed printout of the Marine Casualty Data tape and the USCG accident data files is provided in the beginning.

It is then followed by the rationale for our decision to include or not to include the incident in the accident data base.

CASE YEAR 1981 0262 PHI Freighter collided with Walt Whitman Bridge, Delaware River, Phildelphia, Pennsylvania, due to negligence on the part of' ship operators. Included in the accident data base.

0263 PHI Tank barge under tow ran aground at Reedy Point Anchorage, Delaware River, due to failure prior to anchoring on the part of the pilot. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only involving one non-self propelled barge.

0265 PHI Bulk ore carrier caused wake damage to a tank barge and a towing vessel at the Interstate Pipeling Company facility on the Delaware River at Burlington, New Jersey. Should not be l

counted since it involved only small vessels.

0267 PHI i

Tank ship developed small fire due to mechanical f ailure while being moored at the Sun Oil Company Dock 2A, Marcus l Hook, Pennsylvania. The fire was subsaquently brought under l control with some damage to one of the cargo pumps. Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident and also a liquified gas carrier will not be moored or anchored in the 24 mile river segment of concern.

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L _ _ _

u 0268 PHI Tanker developed material failure in the form of " crack in generating tube of starboard boiler, in the Delaware River" with minimal damage. Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

0270 PHI Fishing vessel sank 1/2 mile south of Egg Island Point, New Jersey, in Delaware Bay. Should not be counted, since it involved only one small vessel.

0271 PHI Cargo ship ran aground in the Delaware River at the junction of Marcus Hook Range and Bellevue Range, due to failure on the part of the pilot. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

0273 PHI Tanker lost main propulsion power 1/2 mile northwest of Miah Maull Light in Delaware Bay due to failure of the pump controller. Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

0275 PHI Passenger ship collided with submerged pipe.from_ dredge, Cape May Canal West Entrance, Lower Delaware Bay, due to error in judgement on the part of the master. Should not be counted, since it involved only one small vessel.

1112 PHI Docked cargo vessel developed minor flooding in engine room at Packer Avenune Marine Terminal, Delaware River, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, due to error on the part of the already working repair crew. Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

1169 PHI Ore-bulk oil carrier collided with Pier 122 on the Delaware River, Phildelphia, Pennsylvania, while being assisted to berth by tugs, due to an error in judgement on the part of the docking pilot. Although it happened while docking, conservatively included in the accident data base.

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1174 PHI Cargo vessel ran aground due to steering failure in the Delaware Bay near Buoy R42 without any physical or functional damage. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

1175 PHI Towing vessel ran aground in White's Basin, Delaware River, Bridgeport, New Jersey, due to an error in judgement on the part of the operator. Should not be counted, since it involved only a small vessel and also was a case of grounding only.

1182 PHI Bulk carrier grounded against river bank on three occassions while anchored at Mantua Creek Anchorage, Delaware River, due to an error in judgement on the part of the master.

Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only and also a liquified gas carrier will not be moored or anchored in the 24 mile river segment of concern.

1316 PHI Tanker caught fire in one of the center tanks at Gulf Oil Company, Hog Island, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on the Delaware River. Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

1320 PHI Freighter ran aground in fog in the Deepwater Point Range, Delaware River, due to failure on the part of the pilot.

Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only and also occurred in a fog situation.

  • 1342 PHI Oil tanker ran aground in the Delaware River. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

1344 PHI Two secured empty barges grounded near Buoy 91, Burlington, New Jersey, Delaware River, due to downward flow of ice mass. Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels and also was a case of grounding only.

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u 1592 PHI Container ship ran aground in the vicinity of Horseshoe Shoal, Delaware River, due to failure on the part of the pilot and the master. Should not be counted, since it was a

-case of grounding only.

  • 1979 JAC Oil tanker, while docked at Delaware Bay, developed mechanial failure, resulting in no damage. Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

2113 PHI Bulk carrier ran aground at Marcus Hook Anchorage, Delaware River, probably due to inattention to duty on the part of the master. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

2193 PHI Ore-bulk oil carrier ran aground at Berth 3A, Sun Oil Termina'1, Marcus Hook, Delaware River, due to f ailure of the terminal personnel to provide accurate information. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

2353 PHI Tanker ran aground in the Delaware River due to error on the part of the operating personnel. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

  • 2463 PHI Oil tanker collided with a pier on the Delaware River due to improper mooring / towing. Conservatively included in the accident data base.

2577 PHI Oil tanker developed mechanical f ailure in the reduction gear on the Delaware River, resulting in minimal damage.

Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

2618 PHI Tug while towing barge ran aground, subsequently colliding with the barge, Fort Miffin Range, Delaware River. Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels and also was a case of grounding only.

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o 2712 PHI Oil tanker ran aground at Mantua Creek Anchorage, Delaware River. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

2883 PHI Bulk carrier collided with the Delair Railroad Bridge, Delaware River, due to negligence on the part of the master. Conservatively included in the accident data base.

2901 PHI Oil tanker ran aground on the east bank of the Delaware River, near Buoy 44, due to loss of the rudder. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

  • 2913 PHI Ore-bulk oil freighter ran aground in the Delaware river, due to inadequate supervision of personnel. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

2925 PHI Gas tanker lost main propulsion on Marcus Hook Range, Delaware River, due to over heating of the tail shaft.

Should not be included, since it was a case of minor incident.

3171 PHI Bulk carrier lost propulsion in the Delaware River, south of Tacony-Palmyra Bridge, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, due to a governor failure of both main engines. Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

3173 PHI Oil tanker ran aground on Brown Shoal, Delaware Bay, due to f ailure on the part of the pilot. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

3174 PHI Towing vessel collided with tank barge, Upper Liston Range, Delaware Bay, due to a malfunction in the steering system.

Should not be included, since it involved a small non-self propelled barge.

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u 4091 NYC Tank barge while under tow ran aground on McCrie Shoal, Cape May, New Jersey, due to failure on the part of the operator. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

4123 PHI Tank barge while under tow ran aground in Bulkhead Shoal Channel, Delaware River, due to f ailure on the part of the operator. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

4260 PHI Oil tanker ran aground at the approach to the Delaware Bay, Cape Henlopen, Delaware, Atlantic Ocean, due to an error on the part of the master. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

4262 PHI Tug, while towing tank barge, ran aground, Eddystone Generating Station Range, Delaware River, due to silting of the channel. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

4267 PHI Tanker sustained a crack across the starboard side of the main deck, and part of the way down the starboard side, while in the process of discharging a cargo of crude oil at Delaware City, Delaware. Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

4271 PHI ,

Ore-bulk oil tanker ran aground at Marcus Hook Anchorage, Delaware River, due to f ailure on the part of the master.

Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

4712 PHI Tug, while towing barge, ran aground in the Delaware River, due to an error on the part of the operating personnel.

Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

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  • 5023 PHI Oil tanker collided with pier on the Delaware River, due to material failure of the main engine / motor. Included in the accident data base.

5936 PHI Cargo vessel ran aground while undocking from Beckett Street Terminal, Camden, New Jersey, Delaware River, due to an error in judgement on the part of the pilot. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

5937 PHI Bulk carrier ran aground in the New Castle Range, Delaware, due to unknown reason. Should not be counted since it was a case of grounding only.

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  • 0004 PHI A small fishing vessel was foundering in the Delaware Bay.

Should not be counted, since it involved only one small vessel.

0006 PHI Tug, while towing barge, ran aground south of Drydock Number Four, Sun Ship Inc., Chester, Pennsylvania, Delaware River, due to operator failure. Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels and also was a case of grounding only.

  • 0007 PHI Freighter (467 Ft. in length) collided with a moored freighter due to an error in judgement on the part of the operator. The computer printout does not contain any details of the size of the moored freighter which may very well be a small vessel. Conservately included in the accident data base.

0008 PHI Tanker lost main circulating pump. Should not be counted, since it involved only a small vessel and also was a case of minor incident.

  • 0014 PHI Two tugs collided with each other and ran aground, due to error in judgement on the part of the operating personnel.

Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels.

0021 PHI Barge in tow by tug collided with another barge at the entrance to the C&D Canal, Delaware River, due to failure on the part of the operator of the tug. Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels.

  • 0022 PHI Freighter (660 Ft. in length) collided with another moored freighter (750 ft. in length). Included in the accident data base.

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e 0030-PHI Tug, while towing barge, ran aground at Buoy 44, Delaware River, due to failure on the part of the operator. Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels and also was a case of grounding only.

0031 PHI Passenger vessel' collided with fixed object, eastern end of the Delaware River and Bay Authority, Cape May - Lewis ferry Jetty, Lewis, Delaware, Delaware Bay, due to failure on the part of the master. Should not be counted, since it involved only a small vessel.

  • 0034 PHI Ore-bulk oil carrier ran aground in the Delaware River, due to error in judgement on the part of the operating person-nel. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.
  • 0037 PHI Freighter developed propeller failure while on the Delaware River but proceeded to Jacksonville, Florida. Should not be

. counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

0038 PHI Towing vessel collided with freight vessel while assisting it to Berth, Pier 80 South (North side), Delaware River, probably due to "the momentary failure of the pneumatic clutch control on the main engine to operate properly."

Although it involved a small tug not large enough to cause any appreciable damage when colliding with a large modern liquified gas carrier, it was conservatively included in the accident data base. '

0052 PHI Tug, while towing barge, collided with another barge on the Delaware River, due to failure ~ to account for current / wind and adverse weather condition, by the operating personnel.

Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels.

0065 PHI Container vessel ran aground at night, one mile south of the Reedy Point Breakwater entrance to the C&D Canal, Delaware River, due to an error in judgement on the part of the pilot. Should not be counted, since it was a case of grounding only.

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0068 PHI Tanker collided with Mobil Oil Company Pier, Delaware River at Paulsboro, New Jersey, due to an error in judgement on the part of the mate on watch. Should not be counted, since it involved only one small vessel.

0084 PHI Freighter developed material failure in the cargo boom at Northern Shipping Company, Delaware River, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Should not be counted, since it was a case of minor incident.

0085 PHI Tug, while towing barge, collided with an unknown object in dense fog, on the Delaware River. Should not be counted, since it involved only small vessels and also occurred in a fog situation.

0086 PHI Tug developed material failure, resulting in steering casuality, at the Delaware Bay entrance. Should not be counted, since it involved only one small vessel and also was a case of minor incident.

  • Accident reports of these incidents were prepared from the detailed printout of the USCG Casualty Computer data tape.

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