Text

Amends 202 & 183 to Licenses NPF-4 & NPF-7,respectively, Clarifying TS to Allow Switching of Charging & low-head Safety Injection Pumps During Unit Shutdown Conditions
	ML20116B231
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	07/24/1996
From:	Imbro E; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20116B233	List: ML20116B231; ML20116B236;
References
	NUDOCS 9607290156
	Download: ML20116B231 (28)
	v • d • e

i

- p nat:u l

'g UNITED STATES k

E NUCLEAR RE2ULATORY COMMISSION l

E f

WASHINGTON, D.C. 30806 4 001

s.,

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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY OLD DOMINION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE I

DOCKET NO. 50-338 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 202 License No. NPF-4 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company et al., (the licensee) dated July 26, 1995, as supplemented April 25, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

1 9607290156 960724 DR ADOCK 050003 8 i

i

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Speci-fications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.D.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-4 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) lechnical Specifications i

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 202, are hereby incorporated in the j

license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

l FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WWb l

Eugene V. Imbro, Director Project Directorate 11-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

July 24,1996 l

l B

l l

l ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0. 202 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-4 DOCKET NO. 50-338 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Paaes Insert Paaes V

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3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6a 3/4 5-6a i

B 3/4 1-3 8 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 i

B 3/4 5-3 B 3/4 5-3 1

l I

l l

l

~

l 1

l l

LIMITLNG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

SECTION PAGE 3/4.4.2 S AFETY VALVES - S HUTDOWN......................................................... 3/4 4-6 3/4.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES - OPERATING S afe ty Val ves............................................................................................. 3/4 4-7 Relic f Val ves........................................................................................... 3/4 4-7a 3/4.4.4 PRES S URIZER..................................................................................... 3/4 4-8 3/4.4.5 STEAM G ENERATORS.................................................................. 3/4 4-9 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems......................................................... 3/4 4-16 l

l Operational Leakage............................................................. 3 /4 4 - 1 7 i

Primary to Secondary Leakage................................................. 3/4 4-1 8 b Primary to Secondary Leakage Detection Systems.

................ 3/4 4-18d 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY................

. 3/4 4-19 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY...................................................... 3/4 4-22 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS Reactor Coolant System.............................................. 3/4 4-26 Pressurizer..

............................ 3/4 4 -3 0 Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection.................................. 3/4 4-31 l

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY l

ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components....................

... 3/4 4-33 3/4.4.11 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT....................................... 3/4 4-36 l

3//M EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 1 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS..

......................................................3/45-1 1

3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T GREATER TH AN OR EQUAL TO 350*F 3/4 5-3 avs 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -T LESS THAN 350*F......

............... 3/4 5-6 avs i

a NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 V

Amendment No. 16.32,58,61.

449,202

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l

CHARGING PUMP-SHUTDOWN l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3

' One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 l

l shall be OPERABLE.

i APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6 ACTION:

l With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE l

a.

ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one charging pump is restored to OPERABLE status.

1 b.

With no charging pump OPERABLE and the opposite unit in MODE 1,2,3 or 4, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one charging pump to

)

OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

i i

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 2410 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , verify that a maximum of one charging pump is OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS.*

Two charging pumps may be OPERABLE and capable ofinjecting into the RCS during pump switching opera' ions.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Amendment No. M-24, 202 l

T REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,2,3 and 4 *.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore a second charging pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 1.77% Ak/k at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore a second charging pump to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable for one hour following heatup 4

above 235 F or prior to cooldown below 235 F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4.1 The above required charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to l

2410 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.4.2 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , verify that a maximum of one charging pump is OPERABLE aad capable of injecting into the RCS whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 235 F."

1 1

A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of injecting into

)

the RCS whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 235*F.

- Two charging pumps may be OPERABLE and capable ofinjecting into the RCS during pump switching operations.

NORTH ANNA-UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 Amendment No. 3,15, !!7. 4%

.gg, 202 i

EMERGENCLCORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -Tavg GREATER THAN OR EOUAL TO 350'F l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem l

compnsed of:

1 a.

One OPERABLE charging pump, l

b.

One OPERABLE low head safety injection pump, c.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of transferring fluid to the Reactor Coolant System when taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal or from the containment sump when suction is transferred during the recirculation phase of operation or from the discharge of the outside recirculation spray pump.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to a.

OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the l

actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to 3.5.2.a and 3.5.2.b for i

one hour following heatup above 235'F or prior to cooldown below 235*F.

l l

l NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 3/453 Amendment No. k!6, l '7,153,

!'0,189. 202

)

i

EhiERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2.

Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection test signal:

a. Charging pump, and l

]

b. Low head safety injection pump.

f.

By verifying that each of the following pumps develop the indicated discharge pressure (after subtracting suction pressure) on recirculation flow when tested 4

i pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

1.

Charging pump greater than or equal to 2410 psig.

2.

Low head safety injection pump greater than or equal to 156 psig.

g.

By verifying that the following manual valves requiring adjustment to prevent 2

pump " runout" and subsequent component damage are locked and tagged in the proper position for injection:

1.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following completion of any repositioning or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

l 2.

At lent once per 18 months.

1. 1-SI-l 88 Loop A Cold Leg i

2.

1-SI-191 Loop B Cold Leg i

3. 1-S1-193 Loop C Cold Leg 4.

1 SI-203 Loop A Hot Leg

5. I-SI-204 Loop B Hot Leg

6. 1-SI-205 Loop C Hot Ixg h.

By performing a Cow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of 4

. modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

1.

For high head safety injection lines, with a single pump mnning:

a. The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to the minimum Cow rate required to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, and

b. The total pump Dow rate is less than or equal to the evaluated pump runout limit.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 3/45-5 Amendment No. 6,19, !~'! !?6.

gg, 202

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -Tavg iFSS THAN 350 F l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

One OPERABLE charging pump",

l a.

b.

One OPERABLE low head safety injection pump", and An OPERABLE flow path capable of automatically transferring fluid to the reactor c.

coolant system when taking suction from the refueling water storage tank or from the containment sump when the suction is transferred during the recirculation phase of operation or from the discharge of the outside recirculation spray pump.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 4.

ACTION:

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the a.

charging pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at l

least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 bour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

b.

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of the low head safety injection pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T less than 350 F by use of altemate ag heat removal methods.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant c.

System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

A maximum of one charging pump and one low head safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE and capable ofinjecting into the RCS whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 235 F except two charging pumps may be OPERABLE and capable ofinjecting into the RCS during pump switching operations.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. 3.15, L !l' 170.109,202

1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 At least cace per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , verify that a maximum of one charging pump and one low head safety injection pump is OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 235'F.*

i 1

)

l i

Two charging pumps may be OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS during pump switching operations.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 3/4 5-6a Amendment No.16. !!?,170.

49,202 l

R$ACT ITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% Ak/k after xenon' decay and cooldown to 200*F. This expected boration capability requiremeat occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 6,000 gallons of 12,950 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage 6

tanks or 54,200 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the l

Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 235*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

Having more than one charging pump OPERABLE during pump switching operations is allowed. This is acceptable based on pump switching being a momentary action under the direct administrative control of a licensed operator. Rendering a charging pump inoperable for this requirement may be accomplished by methods such as placing the control switch in the pull-to-lock position, tagging of the power supply breaker, or closing of the pump discharge valve. If the pump discharge valve is used to render a pump inoperable during solid water operation, the valve will be deenergized and tagged in the closed position.

With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATION and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boron capability required below 200 F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.77% Ak/k after zenon decay and cooldown from 200 F to 140 F.This condition requires either 1378 gallons of 12,950 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 3400 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics. The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING insures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

NORTH ANNA-UNIT I B 3/41-3 Amendment No. 5,15, SS,93,

!!?, !?0,189, 202

EMERGdNCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CCS)

BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 350'F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump and one low head safety injection pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify that a maximum of one charging pump and one low head safety injection pump is capable ofinjecting into the RCS below 235 F provides assurance that a ma>> addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

Having more than one charging pump OPERABLE during pump switching operations is allowed. This is acceptable based on pump switching being a momentary action under the direct administrative control of a licensed ope,3 tor. Rendering a charging pump inoperable for this requirement may be accomplished by methods such as placing the control switch in the pull-to-lock position, taggmg of the power supply breaker, or closing of the pump discharge valve. If the pump discharge valve is used to render a pump inoperable during solid water operation, the valve will be deenergized and tagged in the closed position.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPER/,BILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

In the event of modifications to an ECCS subsystem that could alter the subsystem flow characteristics, a Dow balance test shall be performed. The now balance test criteria are established based on the system performance assumed in the safety analysis (minimum flow limit) and on HHSI pump runout protection (maximum flow limit). In performing the now balance, the effects of Dow measurement instrument uncertainties accounting for system configuration and the variability between installed pumps must be properly considered.

Numerical acceptance criteria for the now balance test are specified in surveillance test procedure. These criteria are established based on the following considerations:

1) The total injected flow to the core (assuming spillage of the branch line with the highest flow) must meet or exceed that assumed in the safety analysis. The limiting safety analysis is the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis. This criterion may vary, panicularly since the inputs to the safety analysis controlled by LCO 6.9.1.7 may vary with reload cycle. The safety analysis flow requirements are thus established by the currently applicable LOCA analysis which has demonstrated compliance with the ECCS acceptance limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

2) The total pumped flow must be less than the HHSI pump runout limit. This flow varies with the specific HHSI pump assumed to operate during the accident. Since the HHSI pumps also function as normal charging pumps, their characteristics, including runout limits, will vary over service life.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 16,68,!!?,170, 48874 9, 202

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

3) The requirements for reactor coolant pump sealinjection must be met during normal operation, and the effects of seal injection during accidents must be considered in meeting constraints 1) and 2) above.

3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as pan of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counter:u.i any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvenent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The limits on injection tank minimum contained volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptions used in the steam line break analysis are met.

The OPERABILITY of the redundant heat tracing channels associated with the boron injection system ensure that the solubility of the boron solution will be maintained above the solubility limit of 111 F at 15,750 ppm boron.

3/4.5,5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the RWST as pan of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods insened except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained waten volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for quench spray and between 7.7 and 9.0 for the solution recirculated within the containment after a LOCA. This pH minimizes the evolution ofiodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

An RWST wide range level instmment loop uncenainty was included in the safety analysis and therefore need not be considered by the operator.

i NORTH ANNA - UNIT I B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 4,93, ! !0, ! SS, 202 r

sceuq p

1 UNITED STATES j

NUCLEAR RE2ULATGRY COMMISSISN 2

WASHINGTON, D.C. 2006H001 s*****/

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY OLD DOMINION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE DOCKET NO. 50-339 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 183 License No. NPF-7 i

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Virginia Electric and Power Company et al., (the licensee) dated July 26, 1995, as supplemented April 25, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; i

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

- The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

q

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Speci-fications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-7 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 183, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance l

with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall l

be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W&Y Eugene V. Imbro, Director I

l Project Directorate 11-1 l

Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

l Changes to the Technical Specif; cations i

Date of Issuance:

July 24,1996 l

4

]

1

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 183 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-7 DOCKET NO. 50-339 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with t

the enclosed pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove Paaes Insert Paaes V

V i

3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-3 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-4 i

3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-6 3/4 5-7 3/4 5-7 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3 B 3/4 5-3

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.4.2 S AFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN.......................................................... 3/4 4-6 3/4.4.3 SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES -OPERATING S afety Val ve s............................................................................................... 3/4 4-7 Re lie f Val ves............................................................................................. 3/4 4-7a I

3/4.4.4 PRES S URIZER........................................................................................... 3/4 4-8 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS........................................................................... 3/4 4-9 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE leakage Detection Systems....................................................................... 3/4 4-16 Ope ration al Leakage................................................................................ 3/4 4 - 1 7 Primary to Secondary leakage............................................................... 3/4 4-18b Primary to Secondary Leakage Detection Systems.................................... 3/4 4-18d 3/4.4.7 CH EM I STRY....................................................................................... 3/4 4-1 9 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY............................................................... 3/4 4-22 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS Reactor Coolant Syster.1.......................................................... 3/4 4-2 6 l

Pre s s u ri ze r...........................................................

............... 3/4 4-29 Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection............................... 3/4 4-30 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURALINTEGRITY ASME Code Class 1, 2 & 3 Components............................................... 3/4 4-32 i

i 3/4.4.11 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT....................................... 3/4 4-34 1

3L43 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 ACCUM ULATORS...................................................................

3 /4 5 - 1 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -Tavg GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350 F 3/4 5-3 l

3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg LESS THAN 350 F.........

................ 3/4 5 -6 l

3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM Boron Injection Tank....,..............

3/4 5-8 H e a t Traci n g.....................................

. 3/4 5 9 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TAN K.................................. 3/4 5-10 NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 V

Amendment No. 40. 9, !?O,183

r

\\

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP-SHUTDOWN 1

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 l

shall be OPERABLE.

l APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

a.

With no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one charging pump is restored to OPERABLE status.

b.

With no charging pump OPERABLE and the opposite unit in MODE 1,2,3 or 4, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one charging pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 2410 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , verify that a maximum of one charging pump is OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS.*

i Two charging pumps may be OPERABLE and capable ofinjecting into the RCS during pump switching operations.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/41-11 Amendment No. 5,183

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

\\

CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE.

1 8

l APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,2,3 and 4.

ACTION:

l With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore a second charging pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN l

equivalent to at least 1.77% delta k/k at 200 F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ; restore a second charging i

pump to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable for one hour following heatup above 270 F or prior to cooldown below 270 F.

SURVEILLANCC REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.4.1 The above required charging pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, l

that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 2410 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.4.2 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , verify that a maximum of one charging pump is OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 270*F."#

l l

A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 270 F.

Two charging pumps may be OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS during pump switching operations.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/4 1-12 Amendment No. 449;4-70.183 l

l

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -Tavg GREATER THAN OR EOUAL TO 350'F l

LIMITING CON' " ION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a.

One OPERABLE charging pump, l

b.

One OPERABLE low head safety injection pump, l

t c.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of transferring fluid to the Reactor Coolant l

System when taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal or from the containment sump when suction is transferred during I

the recirculation phase of operation.

I APPLICABIT ITY:

MODES 1,2 and 3.

ACTION:

l With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to I

a.

OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

c.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to 3.5.2.a and 3.5.2.b for one hour following heatup above 270 F or prior to cooldown below 270*F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:

3 i

l l

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/45-3 Amendment No. !19, !?0,183

I EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position

a. MOV-2890A

a. LHSI to hot leg

a. closed

b. MOV-2890B

b. LHSI to hot leg

b. closed

c. MOV-2836

c. Ch pump to cold leg

c. closed

d. MOV-2869A

d. Ch pump to hot leg

d. closed

e. MOV-2869B

e. Ch pump to hot leg

e. closed b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.)

c.

is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

1.

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENTINTEGRITY, and 2.

Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry whea CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

e.

1.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal.

2.

Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection test signal:

a) Charging pump, and l

b) Low head safety injection pump.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/45-4 Amendment No.183

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) f.

By verifying that each of t'se following pumps develop the indicated discharge pressure (after subtracting suction pressure) on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

1.

Charging pump greater than or equal to 2410 psig.

l 2.

Low head safety injection pump greater than or equal to 156 psig.

g.

By verifying that the following manual valves requiring adjustment to prevent pump " runout" and subsequent component damage are locked and tagged in the proper position for injection:

1.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following completion of any repositioning or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

l 2.

At least once per 18 months.

1. 2-SI-89 Loop A Cold I.cg

2. 2-SI-97 Loop B Cold Leg

3. 2-SI-103 Loop C Cold Leg

4. 2-SI-l16 Loop A Hot Leg j

5. 2-SI-l11 Loop B Hot Leg

6. 2-SI-123 Loop C Hot Leg h.

By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

1.

For high head safety injection lines, with a single pump running:

a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to the minimum flow rate required to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.46, and b) The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to the evt.iuated pump mnout limit.

i l

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 15! 15 159, 183

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -Tavg LESS THAN 350'F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

One OPERABLE charging pump",

l a.

b.

One OPERABLE low head safety injection pump *, and c.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of automatically transferring fluid to the reactor coolant system when taking suction from the refueling water storage tank or from the containment sump when the suction is transferred during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 4.

ACTION:

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the a.

charging pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at l

least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

b.

With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of the low head safety injection pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T,g less than 350*F by use of alternate heat removal methods.

c.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Repon shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of j

the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

I A maximum of one charging pump and one low head safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS whenever the temperature of one or i

more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 270 F except two charging pumps may be OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS during pump switching operations.

l NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/45-6 Amendment No. "'!, ! 19.!?0,183 l

i EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS j

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , verify that a maximum of one charging pump and one low head safety injection pump is OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS whenever the

)

temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 270'F.*

1 l

l l

l 1

l i

1 4

Two charging pumps may be OPERABLE and capable ofinjecting into the RCS during pump switching operations.

NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 3/45-7 Amendment No. M9. '70,183

~-

R5AC'I51TY CONTROL SYSTEMS s

BASES l

~

l 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS j

The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources,2) charging pumps,3) separate flow paths,4) boric acid transfer pumps,5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operation conditions of 1.77% delta k/k after xenon decay a

and cooldown to 200*F. The maximum er.pected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL i

from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 6000 gallons of 12,950 ppm borated l

water from the boric acid storage tanks or 54,200 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank, i

With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one injection system is acceptable without single

[

failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional l

restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the smgle injection system becomes inoperable.

l The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the l

Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 270*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

Having more than one charging pump OPERABLE during pump switching operations is allowed. This is acceptable based on pump switching being a momentary action under the direct administrative control of a licensed operator. Rendering a charging pump inoperable for this requirement may be accomplished by methods such as placing the control switch in the pull-to-lock position, tagging of the power supply breaker, or closing of the pump discharge valve. If the i

pump discharge valve is used to render a pump inoperable during solid water operation, the valve will be deenergized and tagged in the closed position.

The boron capability required below 200 F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.77% delta.k/k after zenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F.This condition requires either 1378 gallons of 12,950 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 3400 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

1 l

i NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. Si,78,119, !?0, H 3

E$ ERG 5NCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES

. ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and j

the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a rnaximum of one charging pump and one low head safety injection pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify that a maximum of one charging pump and one low head safety injection pump is capable of injecting into the RCS below i

270'F provides assurance that a mass aJJition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

4 Having more than one charging pump OPERABLE during pump switching operations is allowed. This is acceptable based on pump switching being a momentary action under the direct administrative control of a licensed operator. Rendering a charging pump inoperable for this l

requirement may be accomplished by methods such as placing the control switch in the pull-to-lock position, tagging of the power supply breaker, or closing of the pump discharge valve. If the 1

pump discharge valve is used to render a puinp inoperable during solid water operation, the valve t

will be deenergized and tagged in the closed position.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

In the event of modification to an ECCS subsystem that could alter the subsystem flow characteristics, a flow balance test shall be performed. The flow balance test criteria are l

I established based on the system performance assumed in the safety analysis (minimum flow limit) and on HHSI pump runout protection (maximum flow limit). In performing the flow balance, the effects of flow measurement instrument uncertainties accounting for system configuration and the variability between installed pumps must be properly considered.

l l

Numerical acceptance criteria for the flow balance test are specified in the surveillance test procedure. These criteria are established based on the following considerations:

1) The total injected flow to the core (assuming spillage of the branch line with the highest flow) must meet or exceed that assumed in the safety analysis. The limiting safety analysis is the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis. This criterion may vary, particularly since the inputs to the safety analysis controlled by LCO 6.9.1.7 may vary i

with reload cycle. The safety analysis flow requirements are thus established by the currently applicable LOCA analysis which has demonstrated compliance with the

' ECCS acceptance limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

l

2) The total pumped flow must be less than the HHSI pump runout limit. This flow varies with the specific HHSI pump assumed to operate during tne accident. Since the HHSI i

l pumps also function as normal charging pumps, their characteristics, including runout limits, will vary over service life.

i NORTH ANNA-UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. Si, 119,!50,183 MG,

l r

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS l

BASES i

l ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued) l

3) The requirements for reactor coolant pump seal injection must be met during normal operation, and the effects of seal injection during accidents must be considered in

(

meeting constraints 1) and 2) above.

3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that i

sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in l

reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent l

l depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

t The limits on injection tank minimum contained volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptions used in the steam line break analysis are met. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other j

l physical characteristics.

l l

The OPERABILITY of the redundant heat tracing channels associated with the boron injection system ensure that the solubility of the boron solution will be maintained above the j

solubility limit of 111 F at 15,750 ppm boron.

]

3/4,5.5 REFUFI TNG WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the RWST as pan of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of I

borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods insened except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line locztion or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for quench spray and betw'een 7.7 and 9.0 for the solution recirculated within the containment after a LOCA. This pH minimizes the evolution ofiodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

An RWST wide range level instrument loop uncertainty was included in the safety analysis and therefore need not be considered by the operator.

4 NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 78,96, !69,183 i

i

., - -

ML20116B231

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