ML20116B131

Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Increased Flexibility for Acceptable Flow Balance Test Results for Charging Pumps

ML20116B131
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	04/10/1985
From:	BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20116B130	List: ML20116B127 ML20116B131
References
NUDOCS 8504250061
Download: ML20116B131 (12)

Text

. . . _

TABLE 1 .

Calvert Cliffs 2 Cycle 6

• Technical Spectrication Changes TOch. Spec. .

Explanation

! No, and Page Action Figure 3 2-4 The ECCS performance analysis for

] Modify Figure 3.2 4 as the small break spectrum presented page 3/4 2-11 indicated to restrict the i

allowable negative ASI to in Section 8.2 takes credit for this improvement in demonstrating accept .

l' .10 at full power able results for reduced HPSI flow.

a) Simply a clarifying statement, j 3/4.1.2.2 a) Add statement clarifying requirements for j page 3/4 1-9 operable flow paths from the boric acid storage tanks.

I b) Delete the requirements that testing b) This restriction is unnecessary since be performed during shutdown, this test can be performed at any time c) Add requirement for demonstrating that c) The boric acid pump can be part of a each boric acid pump starts on SIAS. flow-path which must be operable for the

) charging pump, in turn, to be operable i

j following SIAS. This addition is necessary j

to support the crediting of charging ptmp flow in the Small Break LOCA analysis.

Add requirement that charging ptaps start s This addition is necessary to support the i'

4.1.2.4 i page 3/4 1-11 on a SIAS test signal. crediting of charging ptanp flow in the Small Break LOCA analysis.

Add requirement that Tech. Spec. Surveillance Adds a cross-reference, l 4.1.2.6 j page 3/4 1-13 Requirement 4.1.2.2 he observed.

)

3 1.2.8 m) Change combinations of water sources, as These changes are being made to assure that a page 3/4 1-16 indicated. borated water source will be available to the b) Delete applicability to Mode 1 below 805 charging pianp following SIAS while the reactor power and to Modes 2. 3 and 4. is in Mode 1 above 805 power. Such changes i

c) Change action statement to recognize are necessary to support the crediting of i

different combinations of water sources charging pump flow in the Small Break LOCA and the sufficiency of reducing power analysis.

to 805.

8504250061 850410 PDR ADOCK 05000318 P PDR

Tcble 1 (c ntinued) . .

ech. Spec.

Action Explanation

o. and Page a) Change Tech. Spec. 3/4.1.2.8 to 3/4.1.2 9 The changes for Tech. Speo. 3 1.2.8 are not 3/4.1.2.9 necessary for operation in Mode 1 below 801 power n2e paga b) Change applicability to Mode 1 below 805 and in Modes 2, 3 and 4. Consequently, the old D/4 1-16s power.

Tech. Spec. 3/4.1.2.8 is simply being renum-bered to 3/4.1.2.9, its applicability to Mode 1 is being altered and its page number ,

is being changed to 3/4 1-16a.

I.S.2(h & 1) a) Clarify maintenance actions which a) Some maintenance actions will not effect flow .

p;go 3/4 5-5s - require verification or valve stem characteristics (such as motor resistance checks).

travel.

b) Change the method of vertrication of b) This change will provide improved flexibility in the sufficient HPSI flow fran certifying surveillance testing of HPSI flow without affecting a minimum flow for each injection leg the integrity of the safety analyses which credit to certifying that the sum of the flow HPSI flow.

from the three legs with the lowest flows meets a minimum value, c) Lower the total required HPSI flow. c) This change provides additional margin for verify-ing that sufficient flow existag it is supported by the safety analyses presened herein.

d) Add requirement that the sum of the d) This change formalizes a surveillance requirement flow from four legs will be less than whose observance is important to prevent the a maximum value, threatening of pump integrity.

e) Add Subsection "i" which adds a require- e) This addition formalizes a surveillance requirement ment that the HSPIs deliver a minimum for equipment whose proper function is necessary pressure head when tested. to preserve the assunptions used in the safety analyses.

2 3/4.1.2 Revise the BASES to reflect the crediting The Small Break LOCA analysis of Section 8.2 page B 3/4 of charging pump slow in the Small Break credits charging pump flow to improve the results 1-2 LOCA analysis. of the analysis and permit the lowering of the required HPSI flow [see change for Tech. Speo.

4.5.2 (b & i) b].

TABLE I (continued)

T;ch. Spec. .

No. cnd Page Action Explanation B 3/4.5.2 a) Move the discussio'ra concerning TSP a) Simply an editorial change separating all paga B 3/4 from the end of the second paragraph discussions of TSP in the BASES from discus-5-2 to the end of the first paragraph. sions concerning ECCS subsystem performance, b) Revise the Bases to refle + the b) See the change for Tech. Spec. B 3/4.1.2.

crediting of charging pump flow in the Small Break LOCA analysis.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS -

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'. FLOW PATHS - OPERATI'NG 3,l.2.7 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.2 At 1~ east two of the following three boron injection flow paths and one associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE: -

a. Two flow paths from the boric acid storage tanks ia either a boric acid pump or a gravity feed connection, and a charging

. pump to the Reactor Coolant System, and

b. The flow path from the refueling water tank via a charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one of tihe above required boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System to OPERABLE status within 72 1

hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3 ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at l 1 east two flow paths to OPERABLE status within/the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

~). I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

! 4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated l OPERABLE. i

)

l

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of' '

the heat traced portion of the flow path from the concentrated '

f boric acid tanks is above the temperature limi't line shown on Figure 3.1-1. -

I

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, l power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked,

, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct .j i position. Su15 7 ,

""*t by verifyingNhat  !

c. ) At least once per 18 months i-' - '

/ each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct '

position.sn : 5"! ;esi a ' v...i .

2) ,

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-9 Amendment No. 31 e

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l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l a '

CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING ' l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION- .

. 3.1.2.4 At least two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE. .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one charging pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3 % ok/k at l 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two charging pumps to OPERABLE status within the next~ 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the

.next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ONM'M !

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4.1.2.4 oadditionalSurveillanceRequirementsotherthanthoserequire[

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3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 31 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 a

t REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .

BORIC ACID PUMPS - OPERATING ,

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 ' At least the boric acid pump (s) in the boron injection flow path (s) required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a shall be if 0PERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus the flow path through the boric acid pump (s) in Specification 3.1.2.2a is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one boric acid pump required for the boron injection flow path (s) pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.2a inoperable, restore the boric acid pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least NOT STANDBY 2

within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2% ak/k at 200*F; restore the above required boric acid pump (s) l to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. f

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i SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specificatio 4.0.5 d X 4. /. 2. 2, .

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6 3/4 1-13 Amendment No. 31 ,

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 t .

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uGR.WrEU WAYEX TOURCES - OPERATING . ..

LIMITIi4G CCNCITICN FOR OPE:A7! Cit ca ) % r l m . F :~ % cy!

3.1~2.8 At leas: two of the following three berated wa:ar seur:as shall s

we C-r .v.e,o :. :

a. Twc beric. acid s:: rage tank (s) and one ass::ta:ed heat tracing cir:ut t cer tan.t w1:n the contents c. :n.e :anks in ac::r:anca et. wi n Fic.ure 3.1-1 and -he beren c:ncen:r. ation limited :: < E, 8.eJ<. daJ.M.*f L MAP- TPSf CA WS 3J.2.?. a. c~;t.

b. Ehe refueling water tank with:

1. A minime . c:n.aine s. bera:ad na:er veli.::.e Of a00,000 gallens,

2. A ber:n c:ncentraticn of be:4sn .23C0 and 2'C0 ;;:,

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3. A minimum sciution ta:peratu. e .cf 40'F, and 4 A maximum eclu M -a *=-a-e-a c'f'100'F in MCCE 1 .

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a. At least cnce eer 7 days by: ,

1. 'lerifying :he :cr:n c:ncan:rz:icn in eacn a:er 3eur:3, ,

2. '/eri fying :ta :: . :ained bers;ed ,.a:er velgme i,, gge,,,

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REACTIVITY IONTROL SYSTEMS

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BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION 9 .

l 3.1.2. At least two of the following three borated water sources shall j be OPE BLE:

a. Two boric acid storage tank (s) and one associated heat tracing

_ circuit per tank with the contents of the tanks in accordance with Figure 3.1-1 and the boron concentration limited to < St, and.

b. The refueling water tank with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 400,000 gallons,

2. A beron concentration of betwcen 2300 and 2700 ppm, l

3. A minimum solution temperature of 40*F, and r 4. A maximum solution temperature of 100*F in MODE 'l.

APPLICABILITY: MODES i, 2, 3 and 4 9 -,

ACTION:

With.cnly one borated water source OPERABLE, restore.at least two borated water sources to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />'.or be in at least HOT -

STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUT;0WN MARGIN equivalent to at least 3% ak/k at 200*F; restore at least two'torit'ed water sources to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUT 00WN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. .

SUEVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2. At Teast two borated water sources shall be demonstrated GPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

• 1. Verifying the baron concentration in each water source,

2. Verifying the contained borated water volume in each water source, and

3. Verifying the boric acid sto ge tank solution temoerature.

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWT temperature when the outside air temperature is < 40*F. . .J 4 A**"C"'"I * * .33 55 C? '." S. ' c'. I . E " I' ' 3/4 1-16a. Amendment No. 37, ja CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 N Ak & BOTo 'OTED THEAmne powy

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 4 ~

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) j

2. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> follow completion of ma'i'ntenanci dn' the valve or its operator by measurement of stem travel when

• the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERASLE.

HPSI SYSTEN- ,

Valve Number Valve Number MOV-617 i MOV-616 MOV-626 MOV-627 MOV-636 MOV-637 MOV-647, !j MOV-646 ,

h. By performing a flow balance test during shutdown following completion of HPSI system modifications that alter system flow characteristics and y rifying the following flow rateg b "'es. M .$.$. O I

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3/4 5-Sa Amendment No. JA, 56 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 4

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS L oc4

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aASES d , .

C4 M ~ edse y 3/4.1.1. 5 MININUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY -

l This specification ensures that the reactor will' not be made crigical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than

515 F. This limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature l

coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is -

capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RTNDT temperature.

3 / 4.1. 2 BORATION SYSTEMS 1

The boron injection system ensures that negativ eactivity control

(

is available durirts each mode of facility o eration. The components i required to perform this function include 1 borated water sources, 2)

charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated I heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE

diesel generators. -

l With the RCS average temperature above 200'F a minimum of two 4

'T separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure

_/ single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one I of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that

! minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures l  ;'

during the repair period.

l i

The boration capability of either system is sufficient-to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all gperating conditions of 3.0% t.k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 6500 gallons of 7.25% boric acid solution from the boric acid tanks or 55,627 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water tank. However, to be consistent with the ECCS requirements, the RWT is required to have a minimum contained volume of 400,000 gallons during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The maximum boron concentration of the refueling water tank shall be limited to 2700 ppm and the maximum boron concentra-tion of the boric acid storage tanks shall be limited to 8% to preclude the possibility of boron precipitation in the core during long term i

ECCS cooling.

0 With the RCS temperature below 200 F, one injection system is

acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restric-tions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the 4

i event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

!O CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 8 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 31

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS M -%, /j, 4 BASES 3 M M

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The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving l I

baskets located in the containment basesnent is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection I by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to I

~

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERASILITY is maintained.  !

Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be main-tained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the j ~

assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (2) provide an acceptabije ,

level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. /Tiie requirement to cisscive a repre-

' Tentative sample of idP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post OCA temperatures.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TA!W. (RWTl The OPERASILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron

. concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is availtble within contain-ment to' permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition fol?owing mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent

'* with the LOCA analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water s

not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

L CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.

L