ML20116A921
| ML20116A921 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1996 |
| From: | Decamp W, Gunter P, Katz D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK, NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#396-17800, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612 OLA, NUDOCS 9607290030 | |
| Download: ML20116A921 (8) | |
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'.i '( l 17300 July 18,1996 '
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
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- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOA 3 4 l Before Administrative Judges
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G. Paul Bollwerk, III, Chairman s m yg j D. Charles N. Kelber 4 )
Dr. Peter S. Lam : g jllt j 9 j996 ~
l DOCKETING &
In the Matter of sEnvlCE BPANCH N
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j General Public Utility Nuclear Corporation ) Docket 50-219 OLA O/ 6
) Tech. Spec. 5.3.1.B
) Movement of Heavy Loads Over ]'
Ovster Creek Nuclear Generatine Station ) Irradiated Fuel SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE, OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR WATCH, AND CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK l 1
1 I. INTRODUCTION ;
Pursuant to the ASLB order issued on July 3,1996, petitioners Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), Oyster Creele Nuclear Watch (OCNW) and Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) hereby submit the supplemental petition in accordance with 10 CFR 2.714(b)(2) regarding the requested hearing and petition to intervene on General Public Utility Nuclear (GPUN) license amendment application as noticed in 61 Federal Register 20848 (May 8,1996).
II. BACKGROUND On April 15, 1996, GPUN applied to modify the technical specification for OCNGS which currently restricts movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel to weights no greater than . j a single fuel assembly, approximately 500 lbs. The license amendment application is necessary for OCNGS to complete the loading of NUHOMS dry shielded cask (DSC). The task will require the movement of the shield plug and hoisting mechanism totaling 7 tons over the fuel pool storage pond and over a DSC which would be submerged in the storage pool and loaded with up to 52 irradiated fuel assemblies. The proposed license amendment application if granted would allow OCNGS to conduct the movement of a heavy load over irradiated fuel stored in the DSC 9607290030 960718 PDR ADOCK 05000219 C PDR
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approximately 28 times greater than currently allowed under by technical specifiestion in the Final Safety Analysis Report. j On June 6,1996, NIRS, OCNW, and CAN filed a Request for a Hearing and Petition To Intervene in the GPUN license amendment application process. j On June 21,1996 GPUN responded that the petitioners should not be granted standing for a hearing on the proposed amendment for OCNGS. GPUN argues that none of the petitioners l 1
have demonstrated that they will be injured by the proposed amendment. GPUN additionally 1 1
arges that the petitioners should be denied discretionary mtervention m this proceeding because l
, l the petitioners have not demonstrated that they will make a contribution to a hearing or otherwise satisfy the standards for discretionary intervention.
On June 26, 1996, the NRC staff responded that the petitioners should not be granted standing for a hearing on the proposed amendment. NRC similarly argues that none of the petitioners have demonstrated that they will be injured by the proposed activity.
On July 3,1996, ASLB issued its ORDER (Scheduling Filing Deadline for Supplemental Intervention Petitions and Response and for Prehearing Conference).
III. SUPPLEhENTAL PETITION The petitioners submit the following contention pertaining to GPUN's proposed license amendment application to modify Technical Specification 5.3.1.B by amendment.
CONTENTION A: The GPUN application fails to provide defense-in-depth against the risks of a heavy load drop onto irradiated fuel and fails to satisfy NRC regulatory guidance as provided in NUREG-0612 " Control ofHeavy Loads At Nuclear Power Plants" pertaining to defense-in-depth risk management to assure that a heavy load drop does not impact or encroach on irradiated fuel.
BASIS: GPUN is required by law under 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1) to establish and maintain safety limits governing activities potentially affecting fuel rod cladding and fuel pool steel liner integrity.
Technical Specification 5.3.1.B is designed to establish the specified safety limits which prohibits the movement of heavy loads greater than a single fuel assembly over or near irradiated fuel.
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The defense-in-depth risk management philosophy is a fundamental principle of NRC regulation ofnuclear power plant operation. Central to the defense-in-depth approach NRC directs in NUREG-0012 " Control of Heavy Loads At Nuclear Power Plants" that all plants are to !
establish " safe load travel paths and procedures to assure to the extent practical that heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment."' [ ATTACHED]
I In part, NUREG-0612 provides regulatory guidance to the nuclear power industry to employ defense-in-depth risk in order to protect the public health and safety from radiological 1 1
accidents evolving out of a heavy load drop involving irradiated fuel.2 NUREG-0612 recognizes that the major cause ofload handling accidents includes operator errors, rigging failures, lack of adequate inspections and inadequate procedures. NUREG-0612 specifically provides that the defense-in-depth approach for controlling the movement of heavy loads is to, include the prohibition of specified movement activity and the restriction ofload limits in order to prevent heavy load drops from resulting in unacceptable damage to irradiated fuel.. j NUREG-0612 further recognizes that "many operating plants require placement of the l
shipping cask in the spent fuel pool for loading with spent fuel such an operation makes fuel in the storage pool and storage pool integrity more susceptible to damage due to an accidental load drop."' This is the case at OCNGS which is the third oldest operating reactor in the United States and the oldest operating GE Mark I Boiling Water Reactor.
The petitioners assert that OCNGS does not employ a single failure proof crane for the movement of the shield plug. Consequently, OCNGS must rely on analyzed safe load paths for the movement of heavy loads and restricted load limits. As previously stated, NUREG-0612 implements the defense-in-depth principle by restricting, or prohibiting activities potentially l
resulting in an accident impacting irradiated fuel. GPUN's proposed activity to move the shield i
plug over as many as 52 irradiated in the Dry Shield Cask (DSC) is in direct violation of the NRC defense-in-depth guidance as provided in NUREG-0612 which is consistent with the current Technical Specification 5.3.1.B.
Generic Letter 85-11, June 28,1985, NUREG-0612 " Completion of Phase II of ' Control Of IIcavy Loads At Nuclear Power Plants' " Encloswe 1. Copy attached.
2 NUREG-0612. " Control Of IIeavy Loads At Nuclear Power Plants," Resolution of Generic Technical Actisity A-36, US NRC, January,1980.
3 NUREG-0612, p.6-1.
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As established in the petitioners' " Reply To NRC StatTand GPUN Answer Opposing Request For Hearing and Petition to Intervene" (July 18,1996), the shield plug movement could '
occur over potentially degraded fuel assemblies loaded into the DSC. The petitioners point out and have attached the Daily Event Report dated June 16,1995 (Reportable Event Number:
28954) describing the June 15,1995 event at Oyster Creek where fuel assembly UD003Y )
l structurally failed while being transferred from one cell location in the fuel pool to another cell.
This fuel assembly was discharged to the irradiated fuel pool on April 21,1980 end the fuel channel had been removed from the assembly on April 4,1984. The petitioners additionally point out and have attached OCNGS Licensee Event Report dated February 6,1987. The LER indicates that at least forty-seven (47) fuel bundles have cladding failure stating that the event "has safety significance in that a primary barrier against fission product releases has been breached."
The petitioners reiterate their concern that the material condition of an undetermined number of irradiated fuel assemblies in the storage pool at least ten years have undergone documented deterioration to the fuel rod cladding and fuel bundle assembly integrity. The petitioners funher
! assen that their submitted concerns regarding the documented deterioration in the material condition of both a known and unknown number of fuel assemblies and fuel rod cladding at OCNGS have not been addressed in the GPUN Safety Evaluation of a shield plug drop onto the loaded DSC. The license amendment application is therefore deficient because of the unanalyzed condition introduced by the potential undetected or deliberate movement and storage of deteriorating fuel assemblies and fuel rod cladding into the DSC.
The petitioners assert that the integrity of the fuel rod cladding and integrity of fuel assemblies stored in the DSC and stored in the irradiated fuel pool storage racks constitute the principle physical barrier that guards against the release of radioactivity. The petitioners have l documented the dubious integrity of an unknown number of fuel assemblies potentially moved and stored in the DSC. The petitioners funher assert that the structural integrity of the OCNGS l
fuel pool steel liner is also a principle physical barrier that guards against the release of radioactivity by way of providing containment for the fuel pool water cooling system.
I The petitioners further assen that the term " impact" as applied in NUREG-0612 constitutes a more inclusive definition than "to strike" irradiated fuel but also to mean
" impingement" and " encroachment" on irradiated fuel. Therefore, the petitioners interpret
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NUREG-0612 to encompass a minimization of activities tc, include heavy load drops onto the fuel pool steel liner in the vicinity of the dry cask loading area resulting in a fuel pool drain down as such an event would " impact" or encroach on irradiated fuel in storage racks by way ofloss of 1
coolant water. 1 GPUN claims in its Technical Specification Change Request No. 244 under its Safety Evaluation Justifying Change that, "GPU Nuclear has evaluated the process of transfening spent fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pool to the ISFSI. That evaluation considers the safe load paths, the design features of l the reactor building crane and the requirements of NUREG 0612."4 GPUN further states "that
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the movement of the shield plug would be in accordance with these same constraints."'
However, the petitioners contend that the limitation of activity subject to human error, mechanical and/or electrical failure by way of restricting weight limits to a single fuel assembly over irradiated fuel as currently incorporated into the current technical specification for Oyster Creek is emplaced as a defense-in-depth measure consistent with regulatory guidance directed in NUREG-0612. The proposed modification of Technical Specification 5.3.1.B to increase load limitt by 28 times is therefore in direct conflict with the intent and implementation of current j safety limits goveming the movemer.t of heavy loads over or near irradiated fuel, albeit irradiated fuel stored in the DSC in the fuel pool. Therefore, the proposed amendment by way of decreasing safety limits increases the risk and consequence of an accident involving ~ the Oyster Creek irradinted fuel poci resulting in unacceptable injury to the public health and safety.'
GPUN states that " Administrative controls over crane movements, which include, rail stops, serve to prevent travel of the crane outside the analyzed load path over the cask drop protection system. A safety factor greater than 10 with respect to ultimate strength, and redundant shield plug lift cables provide adequate margin for the shield plug lift. These features, combined with operator training and required inspections, contribute to the determination that dropping the shield plug onto a loaded shielded canister in the spent fuel pool is not a credible event."*
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. Docket No.50-219 Technical Specification Chantte Request No. "l44, Revise Specification 5.31.1 Concerning IIandling IIeavy Loads Over Irradiated Fuel. April 15,1996. General Public Utility Nuc! car FSAR, p. 8.
' Ibid. p.8.
Technical Specification Change Request No. 244 revised page 5.3-1.
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GPUN's claim that a shield plug drop is not a credible accident because of" operator !
training and required inspections" does not adequately address either the human error issue or mechanical and/or electrical failure issues in so much as the most effective way to remove human error and technical failure as a " credible event" is to restrict both human-directed activity and the prohibit the movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel as currently provided by technical specification in the OCNGS Final Safety Analysis Report.
The petitioners assert that NUREG- 0612 as the equivalent of a regulatory guide can be relied on to support their contentions alleging that the GPUN application is deficient. Regulatory guides have been recognized as evidence oflegitimate means for complying with 10 CFR l
1.714(b)(2). citing 34 NRC 332 (1991)
/7 Paul Gunter Nuclear Information and Resource Service 142416th Street NW Suite 404 Washington, DC 20036 (202)328-0002 (202)462-2183 FAX !
email- gunternirs@aol.com and pgunter@igc. ape.org WLaL%
William decamp, Jr. 7~
/ps 1 Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch
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PO Box 243 Island Heights, NJ 087732 (908)714-0334 (201)376-6639 email- 102115.3501@compuserve.com 2)elkulk&/Ps Deborah Katz V/
l Citizen Awareness Network l PO Box 83 j Shelburne Falls, MA 01370
- (413)339-4374 (413)339-8768 FAX i
Dated July 18,1996
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[0 ALL LICENSEES FOR CPERATING REACTORS I. >
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SUBJECT:
COMPLETION OF PHASE' !! 0F " CONTROL OF HEAVY LOA 05 AT!ItuttfAR- N. #
POWER PLANT 5" NUREG-0612. (GENERIC' LETTER 35- 11 )
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On December 22, 1980, NRC issued a generic letter (unnumberedj ~Witi$was.
supplemented February 3,1981 (Generic Letter 81-07) regarding MORC ! C',W !l
Control of Heavy Loacs at Nuclear Power Plants. This letter requested /$,') l that you implement certain interim actions and provide the NRC infomation related to heavy loads at your facilities. Your submittals wre requested in two parts; a six month response (Phase I) and a nine month response (Phase II).
cb All licensees have completed the requirement to perform a review and submit a Phase I and a Phase II report. Based on the improvements in heavy loads handling obtained from implementation of NUREG-0612 (Phase I), further action is not required to reduce the risks associated with the handling of heavy loads (See enclosed NUREG-0612 Phase II). Therefore, a detailed Phase II review of heavy loads is not necassary and Phase II is considered completed.
However, while not a requirement, we enc:urage the implementation of any actions you identified in Phase II regarding the hancling of heavy loads that you consider appropriate.
For each plant which has, a license condition recuirina commitments acceptable to the NRC egardinc Phase II. an aDDlication for license
. amendment may be submitted to the NRC to celete the 11 cense condition citing this letter as the oasis _. If y0'T have any questions, contact your Project Manager or Don Neighbors (301) 492-4837.
Sincerely, l
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. dugnj.. Thompson,j0r., factor y **
- c f 01difen of Licensingy
Enclosure:
b t tb W i As Stated 5'06;'70216 l
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Enclosure 1 i
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- NUREG-0612. "C0!mt0L OF HEWY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLMT5" l
l RESOL ~IOR OF NSE II 4
i seneric Technical Activity A-36 was establishec to systamatically examine the staff's licensing criteria, adequacy of measures in effect at operating plants l and recomend necessary changes to assure the safe handlimj of heavy loads.
l The task involved review of licensee informati:n, evaluation of' historical l data, performance of accident analyses and criticality criculations.
! development of guidelines for operating plants, and revier of ifcensing
! critaria. The review indicated that the major :auses of imod handling j accidents include operator errors, rigging fat'. ares, lact of adequate inspec-tion and inadequate proced: ares. The results of the review cuisinated in the j issuance of MUREG-0612. " Control of 3eavy Loacs at Eucinar Power Plants' in i July 1980. NUREG-0612 described a resciution e' Task A-36.
NUREG-0612 presents an overall philesophy that rovides a defense-in-depth
{ approach for controlling the handlia; of heavy !oans. The approach is directed
- to preventing load drops. The following sMZes this safense-le-depth
! approach:
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i 1. Assure that there is a well designed hand 1':g system.
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l 2. Provide sufficient operator traising, load undling fr.structions, and j equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the hand 11ag systam.
i j 3. Define safe load travel paths and y Mrss and ope:1 tor training to assure to the extant practical nat heavy 'caos are not carried over or i near irradiated fuel or safe shs::!own equ1: ment.
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) 4 Provide mechanical steps or 'electriez1 in arlocrs t: prevent sovement of i heavy loads o,ver irradiated fuel or in pr=fairf to envipment associated i
j with redundant shutdown paths. l j .
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