ML20115C256
| ML20115C256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1992 |
| From: | Hampton J DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210190245 | |
| Download: ML20115C256 (3) | |
Text
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- liskalburr Ct mpany J W lleurray (koner Nucirur Generatwn Department i1ce Prnident PO jfur1439 (M3)US 3499 (Ilhcr Senna SC:%?9 (iO4)373 5??!!n h..
DUKE POWER October 15, 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Oconee Nuclear Site Docket Nos, 50-269, -270, -287 Inspection Report 50-269, -270, -287/92-18 Reply to Notice of Violation Dear Sir By letter dated September 16, 1992 the NRC issued a Notice of Violation as described in Inspection Report No. 50-269/92-18, 50-270/92-18, and 50-287/92-18.
Pursuant to the provision of 10 CFR 2.201, I am submitting a written response to the violation identified in the above Inspection Report.
Very truly yours,
}.-
J. W. Hampton cc Mr. S.
D.
Ebneter, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. L. A. Wiens, Project Manager Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulattion U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 9H3 Washington, DC 20555 P. E. Harmon 190124 senior no$' dent Inspector l
Oconee Nuclear Site 1
9210190245 92101S PDR ADOCK 05000269 0
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ylpLATION 287/92-18-01, SEVERITY LEVEL IV Oconee Te:hnical Specification 6.4.1 requires that the station be operated - and maintained in accordance with approved procedures.
Step 2.3 of Enclosure 3.1 to OP/0/A/1103/11, Dropping the Loops, requires valve 3N-161 to be closed.
i Contrary to the above, on July 26, 1992, OP/0/A/1103/11 was not followed in that nitrogen supply valve 3N-161 was not closed.
This resulted in the inadvertent admission of nitrogen into the pressurizer and quench tank.
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RESPONSES 1.
The reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation:
' u event was the result of a miscommunication between two Nur.-Licensed Operators (NLOs) who were performing a sequence of valve manipulations in the reactor building.
Proper communication techniques, including
" repeat backs" on inctructions and proper feedback on tasks performed, were not used.
2.
The corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved:
The control room operators immediately noticed the increase in the quench tank pressure and directed the NL0s to close the nitrogen supply valve they had just opened. Following closure of the valve, the quench tank was vented to prevent rupture disc failure.
The operators reviewed the Oconee Flow Diagrams, checked the valves,-and determined that 3N-161 was mispositioned.
The valve was then positioned correctly.
Following the event, these subsequent corrective actions were implemented:
The Shift Supervisor had a discdssion with the operators involved in this event.
Emphasis was placed on identifying
" lessons learned" from the event and these were shared with tho remainder of the shift.
The Shift Supervisor and the two NLOs' involved in the event made presentations to the other Operations shifts describing the event in detail, what went_ wrong and the steps that could prevent recurrence.
These. presentations addressed the necessity of a proper pre-job briefing, proper control of
'rking copies of a procedure, _and proper communication
.achniques to be used by operators in the plant.
4 Violation Response 92-18-01 Page Two other mispositioned components were found during the same time frame which were attributed to personnel error.
Similar
" lessons learned" training presentations were made by the personnel involved in these events.
Since conducting this training, no additional instances of mispositioned components due to personnel error are known to-have occurred.
The Operations database on mispositioned components was consulted to determine if miscommunications had been identified as a " root" or " secondary" cause for any. previous mispositioned components. No mispositioning events attributed to miscommunications were identified over the last two years.
Following evaluation, it has been determined that no further corrective action is required.
3.
The correctise steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:
The corrective actions listed in Item 2 should prevent future violations.
4.
The date when full compliance will be achieved:
Full compliance was achieved on July 26, 1992 when the valve was positioned correctly.
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