ML20115A869
| ML20115A869 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1996 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20115A866 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9607090058 | |
| Download: ML20115A869 (9) | |
Text
.
Docket No. 50-336 B15782 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Refueling Boron Concentration Marked-up Pages i
I 9607090058 960703 PDR ADOCK 05000336 PDR a p
i
\\
l b
Februar/ 2J,1982
~ ~ ~
i, 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 6
f 3/4.9.1 SORON CONCENTRATIONS.
~
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l
3.9.1 With the reactor v'essel' head unbolted or renov
. the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant Syst. nd the ' refueling canal shall be maintained enadess-nad sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of following reactivity conditions is met:
?
i Either a K,ff of 0.95 or less, or j
a.
b.
A boron concentration of gr, eater than or6 equal to 1720 ppm.
l f
i APPLICABILITY: MODE 6*.
l 4
ACTION:
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, within 15 minutes suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue beration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of boric acid solution at o'r. greater than the required refueling water storage tank' i
concentration (ppm) until K
'is reduced to less than or squal.to 0.g5 or the boron concentration is rest $Nd to greater than or equal to 1720. ppm whichever i
l 1s the more restrictive. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j
4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be i
determined prior to:
j a*.
Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and
[
)
b.
Withdrawal of any full length CEA in excess of 3 feet from its fully I
inserted position within the reactor pressure vessel.
i i
l 4.g.1.
The boron concentration of.". f:f ;:-t':n: of the reactor coolant synt nd the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least l'
once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
pg4l lbpf-shil'behbid4h; 4.9 l.3 "The b.rea concehdie= in
- g. Jw A
+e *, y,aem.r.g 4...o.ghe stew,,,,,,., 4.,a ea.3,,
n.
- The reactor'shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever the reactor vessel head is unbolted or renoved and fuel is in the reactor vessel. 'd II *eceMa h h l*
466 For 4ha C de YI ail A*epla c.c.
$$\\e.A adWWws s girlwg$s.e.4 a-A coaaec&
l*
be,..c asAr 4 es 44ae.v.baiei1. We e 6 4w be as I.w af Jadse p/m.
l MILLSTONE,- UNIT 2 3/4 9-1 I3o0 gs e
I 1
i
{
~
November 26, 1990 k
3 /4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS
(,
BASES 1
l 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION i
The limitations on reactietty conditions during REFUELING ensure that:
- 1) the reactor will remain suberitical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) + w. Ode.t daddenrtoron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel.
These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident la the accid *H analyses.
ft.qS RM.%e.VPB y L,.v.c mm0MENTAT10N The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactiv-ity condition of the core.
4 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subertticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioac-tive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
j The requirement that the s' pent. fuel pool bulk temperature be maintained below 140*F ensures that high water temperature will not degrade resin in the l(
spent fuel poo? demineralizers and that the temperature and humidity above the pool are compatible with personnel comfort and safety requirements. Addition-ally, the requirement ensures that the design temperature of the fuel pool cooling system, liner / building structures, and racks are not exceeded.
)
The requirement for the reactor to remain in MODE 5 or 6 until the most i
recent 1/3 core affload has decayed 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> ensures that alternate cooling is available during this time to cool the spent fuel pool should a failure occur in the spent fuel pool cooling system.
The shutdown cooling (SDC)
- system is a high capacity system; that is,.one train is sufficient to cool
{
both the core and the spent fuel pool should a failure occur in the spent fuel
(
pool cooling system within 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> from reactor shutdown.
j i
3 /4. 9. 4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS l
The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY i
ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment.
The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a 7
fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization poten-
)
tial while in the REFUELING MODE.
3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the L.
. facility status or core reactivity condition during fuel or CEA. movement j
within the reactor pressure vessel.
MILLSTONI - UNIT 2 8 3/4 g-1 Amendment No. 71. JJ/ n150
d
~
J Attachment *'A" For the Cycle 13 mid-cycle core ofEoad activities, the boron concentration of the water volumes in the steam generators and connecting piping may be as low as 1300 ppm.
During REFUELING and/or CORE ALTERATIONS, the water volumes in the steam
[l generators and connecting piping are stagnant and do not readily mix with the water in the reactor vessel. The water volumes in the pressurizer and connecting piping, shutdown 3
cooling system (including reactor vessel and connecting piping), and refueling pool shall
~
be maintained greater than 182tTppm.
I m
i er d*// ^/
T
/7gg,/ gu o 4v A boron diluti calculation has been performed which accounts for dilution of the l
shutdown cooling tem with the water volumes from' the steam generators and connecting pipin This analysis demonstrates that, in the unlikely event in which all of the waterin the ste generators and connecting piping mixes with the water in the shutdown 1
2 cooling system, the resulting shutdown cooling system boron concentration will remain greater than the required refueling boron concentration.
The surveillance requirement to verify that the boron concentration in the steam generators is greater than 1300 ppm prior to entering MODE 6 is consistent with the 4
i assumptions of the boron dilution calculation. The sample points are only located on the cold leg side of the steam generators. These sample points are representative of the water l
volumes in the steam generators (both hot and cold legs) and their connecting piping, j
based on the fact that uniform mixing of these water volumes at a boron concentration of
()[
i approximately 1320 ppm had occurred prior to shutting off the reactor coolant pumps. In
\\T l
March 1996, the reactor coolant system was drained and and subsequently refilled with yN water having a boron concentration greater than or equal to 1320 ppm. t b O....b -
i I
}
zg::': ?.=Te boron concentration ofthe water in the steam generators and connecting i
piping is,W ~ y agreater than 1300 ppm. #mw ky
,., w 4.r M.~~
'"yD y ^- l &
-lA.1.
V if n-l 4
4 f
i a
l Docket No. 50-336 B15782 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Refueling Boron Concentration 1
Marked-up Pages
)
4
I i
~
~
p/d,9 REFUELING OPERATIQMS 3/4,9,1 30RpN CONCENTRATIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j
\\
3.9.1 With the reactor vessel head unbolted or removed, the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System ** and the refueling canal shall be maintained sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of following i
reactivity conditions is met:
J a.
Either a K.,, of 0.95 or less, or b.
A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 1720 ppm.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 6*.
ACIl2H:
1 With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, within 15 i
minutes suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 40 gpm of boric acid solution at or greater than the required refueling water storage tank concentration (ppm) until K.cr is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is Icstored to greater than or equal to 1720 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to a.
Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and b.
Withdrawal of any full length CEA in excess of 3 feet from its fully inser ted position within the reactor pressure vessel.
4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the reactor coolant system ** and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 1
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
4.9.1.3 The boron concentration in the cold leg side of the steam generators shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1300 ppm prior to entering MODE 6.
'The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever the reactor vessel head is unbolted or removed and fuel is in the reactor vessel.
- For the Cycle 13 mid cycle core offload activities, it is acceptable for the boron concentration of the water volumes in the steam generators and connecting piping to be as low as 1300 ppm.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 1
Amendment No, ein
i.,
3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES i
l 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:
- 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and
- 2) sufficient boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accioent analyses.
I For the Cycle 13 mid-cycle core offload activities, the boron concentration j
of the water volumes in the steam generators and connecting piping may be as low as 1300 ppm.
During REFUELING and/or CORE ALTERATIONS, the water volumes in the steam generators and connecting piping are stagnant and do not readily j
mix with the water in the reactor vessel. The water volumes in the pressurizer and connecting piping, shutdown cooling system (including reactor vessel and connecting piping), and refueling pool shall be maintained greater than 1950 i
' ppm.
l A boron dilution analysis has been performed which accounts for dilution of the shutdown cooling system with the water volumes from the steam generators and 1
connecting piping. This analysis demonstrates that, in the unlikely event in which all of the water in the steam generators and connecting piping mixes with the water in the shutdown cooling system, the resulting shutdown cooling system boron concentration will remain greater than the required refueling boron concentration.
4 l
The surveillance requirement to verify that the boron concentration in the steam generators is greater than 1300 ppm prior to entering MODE 6 is consistent i
with the assumptions of the boron dilution calculation.
The sample points are only located on the cold leg side of the steam generators. These sample points are representative of the water volumes in the steam generators (both hot and cold legs) and their connecting piping, based on the fact that uniform mixing of these water volumes at a boron concentration of approximately 1320 ppm had 1
occurred prior to shutting off the reactor coolant pumps.
In March 1996, the reactor coolant system was drained and subsequently refilled with water having a boron concentration greater than or equal to 1320 ppm. The boron concentration of the water in the steam generators and connecting piping is greater than 1300 ppm.
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactiv-i i
ity condition of the core.
j 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The r.inimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioac-tive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
5 NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B3/49-1 Amendment No. 77, JM, J M,
0274.
j
-~
~..
BASES (continued)
The requirement that the spent fuel pool bulk temperature be maintained below 140*F ensures that high water temperature will not degrade resin in the spent fuel pool demineralizers and that the temperature and humidity above the pool are compatible with personnel comfort and safety requirements. Addition-ally, the requirement ensures that the design temperature of the fuel pool cooling system, liner / building structures, and racks are not exceeded.
The requirement for the reactor to remain in MODE 5 or 6 until the most recent 1/3 core offload has decayed 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> ensures that alternate cooling is available during this time to cool the spent fuel pool should a failure occur in the spent fuel pool cooling system. The shutdown cooling (SDC) system is a high ca)acity system; that is, one train is sufficient to cool both the core and tie s)ent fuel pool should a failure occur in the spent fuel pool cooling system wit 11n 504 hours0.00583 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.333333e-4 weeks <br />1.91772e-4 months <br /> from reactor shutdown.
3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element ru)ture based upon the lack of containment pressurization poten-tial while in tie REFUELING MODE.
3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during fuel or CEA movement within the reactor pressure vessel.
NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-la Amendment No. 77 JJJ J)p, 0274
Docket No. 50-336 B15782 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Refueling Boron Concentration Refueling Boron Concentration Calculation l