ML20115A821

Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Rod Block Monitor Requirements from TS by Reducing Number of Rod Movements During Power Maneuvers

ML20115A821
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	02/29/1996
From:	PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17158B664	List: ML17158B663 ML20115A821
References
NUDOCS 9607090019
Download: ML20115A821 (22)

Text

_ _ -

.... ~ -. _ _.

INDEX ummNq cONDmONS FOR OPERADDN AND SURVElu.ANCE REQUEEMENTS i

HCIlos tard 3/4.0 APPUCAEUTY

............................................3/401 i

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN...................................... 3/4 1 1 i;

i 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMAUES................................... 3/4 1 -2 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS

\\

Control Rod Operabilety..................................... 3/4 1 3 Control Rod Mammum Scram insertion Tines...................... 3/416 i

l Control Rod Average Scram insertion Times....................... 3/41-7 1

Four Control Rod Group Scram insertion Times.................... 3/4 1-8 l

Control Rod Scram Accumulators

............................ 3/4 1 9 1

Control Rod Drks Couping.................................. 3 /4 1 1 1 Control Rod Position Indication................................ 3/4 1-13 1

l Control Rod Drive Housing Support............................. 3/4 1 15 i

a l

3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS l

Rod Worth Minimizer

.......................... L'4 1 1 6 i,

Rod Sequence Control System

......................... 3 /4 1 1 7 6 _g g r y m..........._

....................... n 1n P-3/4.1.5 STAND 8Y UQUID CONTROL SYSTEM

......................... 3 /4 1 1 9 i

i 3/4.2 POWER DISTRistJTION LIMITS 1

3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR UNEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE.........,..... 3/4 21 i

3/4.2.2 APRM SETPOINTS..........

........................ 3/4 2 2 1

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

........................ 3/4 2 4 3/4.2.4 UNEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE

....................... 3/4 2 5 1

/

y

/

/.

i Amendment No. 99,126

~

SUSOUEHANNA - UNIT 1 ar 1

4 9607090019 960618 PDR ADOCK 05000387 P

PDR

i

]

4 i

REACTIVI*Y CONTROL SYSTEMS 1

MOSLOCKMON! TOR

)

LIMI CONDITION FOR OPERATION l

3.1.4.3 Se red block monitor (R$N) channels shall be OPERA 8LE.

1 I

APPLICAll!LITY:

PERATIONAL CON 0! TION 1, when THERMAL POWER is ter than i

I or equa' to 305 o TED THERMAL POWER.

l M'

i a.

With one RM 1 inoperable, resto inoperatie ASM channel to GPERA8LE status ithin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> verify that the reacter is i

met operating on a ITING CONT 200 PATTERN; otherwise, place i

the inoperahle rod b1 monito channel in the tripped condition q

within the next hour.

i D.

With both RAM channels er le, place at least one inoperable rod block monitor in the tr ed condition within one hour.

t SURVEILLANCE REQUI 5

~

}

4.1.4.3 Each the above required ROM channels shall demonstrated OPERABLE rformance of a:

1 CHAlstEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL-CALIBRATION at frequencies i

and for the OPERATIONAL CON 0!TIONS specified in Table. 3. 6-1.

b.

CHANNEL FINICTIONAL TEST prior ta control red withdrowal when the 3

j reacter is operating en a LIMITING CONTROL 200 PATTERN.

l DELCE3 i

i a

l 1

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 1/4 1-18

~,

t s

P-I. ~,

TAKE 3.3.61 C

I rn CONTROL ROD KOCK INSTRURRENTATION o

s cm MINIMUM OPERABLE APPLICA8tE fj TRIP FUNCTION CHANNELS PER TfMP OPERATIONAL ACTlON FUNCTION CONDITIONS Tg g C ""._MCC-1.

Y

i 2.

Aretas e.

Flow Blesed Neutron Flux - Upecele 4

1 61 M

4 1.2.5 61 i

b. Inepetetive 4

i 6I l

c.

Downecolo d.

Neutron Flux - Upecele. Stortup 4

2,5" 61 l

W 3.

soustCE RAsseE AIONITORS 1

=

iu 3

2 61 1

w e Detector not fun in 2

5 61 j

M 3

2 61 b.

Upecele 2

5 61 i

3 2

61 M

c.

Ineperative 2

5 61 3

2 61 i

d.

Dowmocale" 2***

,5 61 l

4.

WSTEgmEEDIATS RAffGE RA000ITORS 6

2.5 61 l

e.

Detector not fue in 6

2.5 6I

b. Upecate 6

2,5 61

c. Ineperative 6

2,5 61 '

d. Downecele" D

s. sClanas cISCHAfteE WOIAfRAE.

2 1,2,5 *

• 62 i

e, water Level-High f

s. flEACTOR COOUWST SYsTERS ftECNICIAATION FLOW 2

1 62

' e.

Upecele 2

1 62 1

b. Inoperative 2

1 62 i

c.

Comparator p

O

\\

-.... ~... -

so S

O TAKE 3.3.5-1 lCentinesedl mI>

CONTROL ROD KOCK INSTRUMENTATION AcTeost.

C f- 'C_^# enddekg(th/ACT)DN reqbre(iry y: Ap* 1 f,1pp z4 ACTION SO - (fs6tgie die "

f cm.

I ACTION 61 - With the remnber of OPERARE Channels:

One less then required by the Mmimurn OPERARE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperetde a.

channel to OPERAKE etetue within 7 days or piece the inoperstdo channelin the tripped condwien within the next hour.

b. Two or more less then required by the Minwnum OPERAKE Chennels per Trip Function requirement, piece et least one inoperstdo channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

u

~b u

ACTION 62 - With the number of OPERAKE channels less then required by the Mmwnum OPERARE Channels per Teip Function l

3 C

requeroment, piece the inoperetde channelin tlw tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

atOTES (Wah YttEftlytAL PjDWERg 39% pf R$TF,0 T)tEML Mh AWED With enere then one control rod withdrawn. Not appucebts to control rede removed per Specification 3.9.10.I or 3.9.10.2.

Not,e,ui,ed e,1,or, e g t er fewe, fusi eseemmes is.iecent t. tf e SRMei - in the e-F_no Y' ewe fW cQ~indic

[

88h'*8

• d 8-This function ohell be automaticeSy bypassed if detector count rete is 2100 cpe et the IRM channets as on range 3 or higher b.

This function is automaticeSy 4; - :I when the eseociated IRM channels are on range S or higher.

c.

g This function le automaticeNy bypeseed when the IRM channels are en range 3 or higher.

3 d.

This function le automaticepy bypeseed when the NIM channels are on range 1.

• 3 e.

This function is required to be OPERARE only prior to and during Shutdown Mergiri demonstrations as performed per 2

f.

?

Specification 3.10.3.

1

(

sa

.4 j

en

___ _ _.. _...__ m _, _.. _..

. _ _ _ _. _. ~. _ _. _... _ -

s y

TAKE 3.3,8-2 CC4rrvDi. ROD KOCK WGSTRUNIENTATION SETF0 WITS E

I e,1En

. AtleufAsta VALUE 1Y.

L t.

M SETPOWIT 3

+

' 8-s g.

W, a

j i

~&

el stede

1. M

-=

aft

_ r_

scess

^

Meer Moned fessmen fher 14eeste##

s.

13 neue gesed i

24 9tWe Roer Osmped 10.50 W + $0%

h.

heparesse s 100% etitATED TimeAAL POWWI se.Se w + S3%

esa s 111% of MTED Yt8BBAAL FOWER s.

d.

Stoween ftet-15 esses Seerhe 2 5% of MTED YtWRAAL POWER stA s 12% of RATED YtWhAAL POWER k 3% of RATED TlWEAAL POWER i

3, 514% et RATED TemmeAL POWER g

r Y

a.

Deesceer nos M be I

h.

15ecele 88A c.

Insporedse 5 2 a l# cys I

90A

< -~

DGA 14a1# ape 34 4

,?

o i'

a i,

. +

i

. I a +

\\

e.

Deseceer nos M be h.

asp-a=

. v+

IIA

[

c.

bispere#se 1 ;0GilN emisions of M acaso

d. W 38 4 111ef1N eudaisne of M seats

(

84 4 i

2 5f128 eudslene of M seele k af1N eststene et M esses S.

i j

e.

t Weser Lesef -l4 git 6

S44 gnBene 144 gnBens g,

=

....a _ _ m a._ _ se name 6

s.

tapeeste h.

heepersees 5114#125 entstone of M seele g

e comparecer BGA 511TF128 delstone of fue acese l

944 s 10% see, es.eseen 3

s 11% neer do eeeen seiebiesbied he esassdanse est$n SpeeMasten 3.1.2.Tlie Aserees Posser Renee assedser sed tese

[

i.'.2

.4

^

e unseen anstbe

_ _. s eye se =In esepeint one 2.5 M;ser stoevette tekee.

rveseems op esse se a 2. E ^

t sa see & 3.4.1.1.2.s ser sende toep operosen es,4emenes.

I

• e

l en E

TASLE 4.3.6-1 i

o Cg CONTROL ROD OLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SUR'.;ALASICE REOUNIERIENTS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL ifer FLSICTION CHANNEL CHECK TEST CALIBRATM CONelTIONS FOR i

l WHICH SURVEILLANCE h

MEQUIRED TQmuu@

fm

/

. c. - C-e-

~

2.

Argue

e. Flow Blaced Neutron Flum -

' W*

S O

SA 1

b. Insperative NA O

NA

1. 2.5 * *

• w5

c. Downeceio S

O SA i

u d.

Neutron Flum - Upecolo.

S O

SA 2.5 "

• Startup 3 sounca Rase 0E seOseTORS SM ".W NA 2.5 Detector not full en NA e

NA SM

.W O

2.5 b.

Upscale SN".W

.NA 2.6 NA c.

Inoperative NA SM

.W O

2.5 d.

Downecafe 4.

BETEIWAESIATE flAf00E R$00sTORS N

e.

Detector not fullin NA SM

.W NA 2.5 S

SM

.W G

2.5 b.

Upecole NA SN

.W NA 2.5 3

c. Insperative S

SM

.W G

2.5 E

d.

Downecate h

S. SC8 tass - VOLueEE

?

a. Water Level-HIOh NA O

R 1.2.5 '

E

4. REACTOft COOLAsff SYSTEAR IECIRCULAftces ELOW G

e.

Upecole NA O

O 1

b.

Inoperative NA O

NA 1

NA O

O 1

i c.

Cornparator r

---

A

i l.

TAqtt 4_2.s-1 (Cominued) cc--Gt non as ncr anTauuswTavion munvser i em psninnsusNTs l*

TABLE NOTATIONS i

fe) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CAUORATION.

j (b) Wmen 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to startup, W not performed within the previous 7 days.

l

-@Fe(1*psw.rbyspe4f grorTween sace wwi more n on..om,w,od -=*e.n.

u. w bi. io coni,,ods re,no.ed per SpecNication 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

• • This function is rogured to be OPERABLE only prior to and during Shutdown Margin demonstrations as performed per Specificanon 3.10.3.

i l

i i

1 1

i 4

i i

4 i

1 6

i i

/

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 3/4356 Amendment No 29,140 4

e

er-6_..

_,w_.

A a

_s_m

-.-._a_.

m.

As a

A m

a a

.w4--h.

um--am.emm--

a m-o, w--_A ItEACTOft COOLANT SYSTEM l

l NECNtCULATMMI LOOPS - SINGLE LOOP OPERATION i

uMmNG CONDmON FOR OPERATION

{

3.4.1.1.2 One reactor cooient recuculation loop shen be in operation with the pump speed s 50% of the rated pump speed and the reactor et a THERMAL POWER / core flow condition outside of Regions I and il of Figure 3.4.1.1.1 1, and f

l

e. the fogowing revised specification limite sheE be followed:

4 4

1 1.

Spoolfleetion 2.1.2: the MCPR Safety Limit sheE be incrossed to 1.07.

)

2.

Table 2.2.11: the APRM Plow.aleaed Scram Trip Setpointe shall be se fogows:

?

{

T^C;;e@;;.T$ asW s # m.

N ewette Vehse 5 0.58W + 54%

5 0.SSW + 57%

4 i

4 l

3.

Specificadon 3.2.2: the APRM Setpointe sheA be se fotowe:

5 49:3 riep Seep h t

~ : I^

ASouseMe Vales 4

i m

3 s 10.58W + 54%) T S s 10.SSW + 57%) T Sgg 510.58W + 45%)T Sgg s 40.58W + 48%) T I

4.

Spoolfleetion 3.2.3: The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO IMCPRI shen be greater then or equal to the applicable Single Loop Operadon MCPR limit i

es specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

5.

Specification 3.2.4: The UNEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGfU ehall be less then or aquel to the opphcable Single Loop Operation LHOR limit se epocified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

8.

Tobis 3.3.6 2: t6 Control Rod Block Setpoente ehen be se i

fotows:

1 T4 Seepalet ASouseMe Vehse ggg l

@ gearsde

/ i e.88wf13.*

sp.eswmiy Tety Saipalet AAswette Vales 1

b. APRM - Row s 0.58W + 45%

5 0.58W + 48%

i Slesed o

1 APPLICAM.ffY:

OPERATIONAL CONDfTIONS 1* and 2'

, emospt dunng two loop operation.#

1 i

i e

Amendment No. III, N N3 i

i SUSOUEHANNA UNIT 1 3/4 4 te i

~

!= - -

1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS c

I BASES i

j 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTRO@ (Continued) i i

280 cal /gm design limit to demonstrate compliance for each operating cycle. If cycle specific l

values of the above parameters are outside the range assumed in the parametric analyses, an l

extension of the analysis or a cycle-specific analysis may be regured. Conservatism present i

in the analysis, results of the parametric studies, and a detailed description of the methodology for performing the Control Rod Drop Accident analysis are referenced in Specification 6.g.3.

j RBM is designed to tomatically event f I dams in event of err ous rod j

ithdraw fr locations o high war naity d ing high rati Tw tw\\els er provide Tri 'ng one o the c is ill bloc errone srod aw h

to vent fu damage. This s stem eks the wr en sec by the operator forj j

wit awal of ontroQods.

(

3/4.1.

STANDBY LIQUlf) CONTROL SYSTEM j

The standby liquid con'rol system provides a backup capability for bringing the reactor from full power to a cold, Xenwfree shutdown, assuming that none of the withdrawn control rods i

can be inserted. To moot this objective it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron which produces a concentration of 660 ppm in the res:: tor core in apprommately 90 to 120 minutes.

i-A minimum quantity of 4587 gallons of sodium pentaborate solution containing a minimum of 5500 lbs. of sodium pentaborate is required to meet this shutdown requirement. There is l

an additional allowance of 165 ppm in the reactor core to account for imperfect mixing. The i

time requirement was selected to override the reactivity insertion rate due to cooldown following the Xenon poison peak and the required pumping rate is 41.2 gpm. The minimum storage volume of the solution is established to allow for the portion below the pump swtion that cannot be inserted and the filling of other piping systems connected to the reactor vessel.

The temperature requirement for the sodium pentaborate solution is necessary to ensure t9at j

the sodium pentaborate remains in solution.

l With redundant pumps and explosive injection valves and with a highly reliable control rod i

scram system, operation of the reactor is permitted to continue for short periods of time with the system inoperable or for longer periods of time with one of the redundant components l

inoperable.

l l

Surveillance requirements are established on a frequency that assures a high reliability of the j

system. Once the solution is established, boron concentration will not very unless more boron or water is added, thus a check on the temperature and volume once each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> assures i

that the solution is available for use.

Replacement of the explosive charges in the valves at regular intervals will assure that thess valves will not fail because of deterioration of the charges.

I i

i i

SUSOUEHANNA UNIT 1 8 3/4 1 4 Anandurot No. !!S,126 I

1 I

i i

j l

INSTRIA4ENTATION i

8ASES

]

3/a.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION j

The reactor core isolation cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to assure adequate core cooling in the event of j

reacter isalation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to j

the reactor vessel without providing actuation of any of the emergency core coeling equipment.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its THp setpoint but j

within its specified Alloweble Value is acceptable on the basis that the i

difference between each THp 5etpoint and the Allouable value is equal to or 1ess than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

3/4,3,6 CONTROL RW) ILOCK IM57ttssENTATION j

l The costrel red block functions are provided consistant with the requirements of the specifications in Section 3/4.1.4, Centrol Rod Program

)

Controls and section 3/4.2 Power Distribution Limits. The trip logic is arranged so that a trip in any one of the inputs will result in a control rod 1

{

block.

1 i

Operation with a tH p set less conservative than its TH p 5etuoint but within ita specified Alloweble Value is acceptable en the hasis that the '

difference between each THp 5etpoint and the Alloweble Value is equal to or less than the drift all assumed for each pi analyses.

Red Eleck Monitas;(RAM) portion of the contre red bl~

instrumentatio

~)

ntains multial ing ci try which interfaqas with reacta manua control 1

tam.

ROM a

systas which includes two channel of in mation whtgh must are red ion is po sitted Each of it nels has 4 self-tasfuf which licitly tas ng rfo e of

(@survglames pursuant to this sp@ecificatten'as we as the control r ged l

nt 3/4.3.7 NONITORING INSTRLSIENTATION j

3/4.3.7.1 RADIATION NONITORING INSTRUNENTATION.

T1e OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; l

(1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the l

individual channels; (2) the alam or automatic action is initiated when the radiation. level trfp setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient infomation is i

available en selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistant with the recensendations of lElRN-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November,1980.

3.4.3.7.2 SEISMIC NONITORING INSTRtpqENTATION The OPERASILITY ef the seismic monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient capab(11ty is available to promptly detamine the magnitude of a seismic event and evalusta the ressense of those features important to safety.

This capability is required to postt camparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the untt. This instrumentation is consis-i tant with the recommendations of Regulatary Guide 1.12 " Instrumentation for 1

Earthquakes", April 1974.

T

$USQUEMAMMA - UNIT 1 8 1/a 3-a Ameneent No.2 9 l

. ~.-.

I i'

i 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

i-j BASES 4

l 3/4.4.1 REClflCULATION SYSTEM i

i Operation with one reactor recirculation loop inoperable has been evaluated and found j

acceptable, provided that the unit is operated in accordance with Specification 3.4.1.1.2.

]

LOCA analyses for two loop operating conditions, which result in Peak Cladding Temperatures l

(PCTs) below 22OO'F, bound single loop operating conditions. Single loop operation LOCA analyses using two-loop MAPLHGR limits result in lower PCTs. Therefore, the use of two loop 1

j MAPLHGR limits during single loop operation assures that the PCT during a LOCA event remains below 2200'F.

1 The MINIMUM ORITICAL POWER Rt TIO (MCPR) limits for single loop operation assure that l

the Safety Limit MCPR is not excesoed for any Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO).

j in addition, the MCPR limits for single loop operation protect against the effects of the l

Recirculation Pump Seizure Accident. That is, for operation in single :oop with an operating j

MCPR limit at 1.30, the radiological consequences of a pump seizure accident from single-loop g

l operating conditions are but a small fractior} of 10 CFR 100 guidelines.

i C'

i For single loop operation, the M APRM setpoints are adjusted by a 8.5% decrease in recirculation drive flow to accN: "the active loop drive flow that bypasses the core an 5

goes up through the inactive loop jet pumps.

Surveillance on the pump speed of the operating recirculation loop is imposed to exclude the l

possibility of excessive reactor vessel internals vibration.

Surveillance on differential temperatures below the threshold limits on THERMAL POWER or recirculation loop flow

+

)

mitigates undus thermal stress on vessel nozzles, recirculation pumps and the vessel bottom head during extended operation in the single loop mode. The threshold limits are those values I

l which will sweep up the cold water from the vessel bottom head.

L l

Specifications have been provided to prevent, detect, and mitigate core thermal hydraulic j

instability events. These specifications are prescribed in accordance with NRC Bulletin 88-07, j

Supplement 1, " Power Oscillations in Boiling Water Reactors (8WRs)," dated December 30, l

l 1988.

i LPRM upscale alarms are required to detect reactor cere thermal hydraulic instability events.

The criteria for determining which LPRM upscale alarms are required is based on assignment 1

of these alarms to designated core zones. Yhese core zones consist of the level A,8 and C alarms in 4 or 5 ediscent LPRM strings. The number and location of LPRM strings in each j

zone assure that with 50% or more et the associated LPRM upscale alarms OPERA 8LE i

sufficient monitoring capability is available to detect core wide and regional oscillations.

l Operating plant instability data is used to determine the specific LPRM strings assigned to i

each zone. The core zones and required LPRM upscale alarms in each zone are specified in J

appropriate procedures.

i Amendment No. III.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 8 3/4 6 1 126

INDEX LIMITING CONDfTIONS FOR OPERaIlDN AND 1.U.RVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION f&fai 1

314.0 APPLICABILITY

............................ 3/4 0-1 3/4 1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SH UTDOWN MARGIN...................................... 3/4 1 1 1

1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES................................... 3/4 1 2 1

2 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS Control Rod Operability..................................... 3/4 1 3 Control Rod Maximum Scram insertion Tines...................... 3/41-6 Control Rod Average Scram Insertion Times....................... 3/41 7 Four Control Rod Group Scram insemon Times.................... 3/4 1 8

~

J Control Rod Scram Accumulators...

......................... 3/4 1 9 I

Control Rod Drive Coupling

........................... 3 /4 1 1 1 l

Control Rod Position Indication................................. ' 3/4 1 13 i

1 Control Rod Drive Housing Support

..................... 3 /4 1 1 5 I

3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROO PROGRAM CONTROi.S 4

l Rod Worth Minimizer

.............. 3 /4 1 16 Rod Sequence Control Systern

................ 3 /4 1 17 f

& B4i/u u,w........ ~

~

................... <wo hW.D 3/4.1.5 STANO8Y LIQUlO CONTROL SYSTEM

..................... 3 /4 1 19 3/4 2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS t

l 3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATlON RATE............... 3/4 21 d

3/4.2.2 APRM SETPOINTS.........

.................. 3/4 2 2 l

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

..................... 3/4 2 4 3/4.2.4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE

..................... 3/4 2 5

/

e Amendment No. M,95 SUSOUEHANNA - UNIT 2

.a.

a

.Ah--

as

.m.

--,.-w

.s4-4J...gm,

_4 E

4:

._me:

-Ji.me4J hem

-3.da m

..A4

. - -ARA---

--u-'

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 1

R00 SLOCK NONITOR LIMITI)E CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION y

l 3.1.4.3 Bote rod block monitor (R8M) channels shall 0PERA8LE.

APPLICAll!LITY DPERATIONAL CON 0! TION 1, POWER is greater than j

or equa' to 305 ' RATED THERMAL POWER.

l M*

a.

With one R8M $annel inoperabl, restore the inoperable RSM clannel to OPERABLE status within 24 urs and verify that the reactor is j

not operating on 1.LIMITI TROL A00 PATTERN; otherwise, place the inoperable rod block nitor channel in the tripped condition within the next hour.x b.

With both RSM chann s inoperable, place at least one inoperable red j

block monitor c 1 in the tripped condition within one hour.

q j

$URVEILLANCE REQUIR 4.1.4.3 Each of above required RBM channets shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by perf of a:

i a.

L FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies i

i for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS speciff in Table 4.3.6-1.

i b.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST prior to control rod wi drawal when the l

reactor is operating on a LIMITING CONTROL R00 PATTERN..

4 l

k i

(

)

d f

i

-SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3/4 1-18

. -.--. =

-;I g

I s x,

1.. ;.

r.a i.

l' TAKE 3.3.81 fL c

.h :

CONTROL ROD KOCK BfSTRUMENTATION I'l -

Tl.I I c

m y

MINIMUM OPERARE APPLICARE z

Tir FUNCTION CHANNELS PER TRIP OPERATIONAL AC iI FUNCTION CONDITIONS

[f5'}7 MLO---

C i

4

(

2.

Argue

• • d Ii!.

a.

Flow Bleeed Neutron Flum - Upecele 4

1 S'

. l

b. Inoperative 4

1.2.5" k [

1 c.

Downecele 4

1

'Il fl i

d.

Neut'ron Flum - Upecate, Startup 4

2.5" b 15 W

3.

SounCE fUWGE 3000WTORS kNI b

Deiectee not fun in 3

M j'

e.

5 U

tes 3

2 IE b.

Upech i

)jpf 2

5

, S' l

i, ge 3

2 4

Inop***tive :

c.

2 5

0' b

d.

Downscele"

~ 'f 3

2 2***

5

?

4.

IIstantsEceATE N ascestfons r%

f, s.

Detector not fur in S

2.5 i j

b. Upecele 6

2,5 l ' '

d

{

c. Inoperettwo 8

2,5 M

b

d. Downocale 8

2,5 8.

SCmass seeCHARet vol.tsIEE

$8 gr3r e.

Water Level-High 2

1,2.5 '

i't l,

s. REACTOR C00UUST SYSTERA flEC5tCULATIO90 FLOW g,

L g!;.M i

e.

U,ec.

2 b.

Inoperative 2

t C

c.. Competetor 2

(.

n O

01

).

.i 4('

i j.1 ;

IJ,

wg y

0 C,g TABLE 3.3.8-1 iCemeinnee 1

E contact Ron ELoca mestaisessurAveom g

acmas

,,f]

E 4

ACTION 80 -(_MIW

- f ;"" Aake,she J)CT)ON reguso4C A' gg

.g i

~

.g i

=

on_em n ACTION 81 - Wish the number of OPERABLE Channets:

};i

s. One lose Wasm required by the Mmimurn OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, ressere the inopereMe channel to OPERABLE status w, shin 7 days or piece the inoperehte channelin the tnyped ceruimen i

whhin the nest hour.

h. Two or more less then required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requwement, piece et.

w least one inoperehte channel in the tripped condmen wishin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

v...

e, s

u ACitON 82 - Weeh the number of OPERABLE channels less then required by the Mwwnuen OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function

[,

1 requeement. piece the inoperable channel in the tripped condmen withm 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

I d.

T :-

mo1Es

.y

. Y)

• (h_ ldElu$ALPOWyERJt $%+f flATED T$H)AAjlPjNfE{

g 4'

Wish enero then one sentrol red withdrawn. Not opf4cette to control rods removed per Maa8-i 3.9.10.1 er 3.9.10.2.

l

p

(

• *

• Not required when eight er fewer fuel assembhos legocent to the Sfudal are in the core.

}

p o_<__nT)

[ M Mis M Mthe % @

~

-- w 7dre6;TWRn4 ALM.r m,____

E. I hl thi Tids funcdon eheE he r_^

^'ibypassed it detector count rees is 2100 cps er the IRM channels are en range 3 or higher.

!{

,e, y,,,,,e,,sde,, w suger,,sdcapy by,essed when sie - mM channess we en ran e e er highw.

le This funcdon is outemedcocy trypassed when the ift4 channels are en range 3 er higher.

_ fj '

j ist This funcdon is automaticacy bypassed when the IRM channets are en range 1.

t ift This funcelen is required to be OPEME ady W to and during m W hh as p.h5 Specacesion 3.10.3.

S

g.....

9 i

g

,a i

'..~

E I.

lrl-ll l

i li.!

y i

l 3

=

l

,8 e

I

n a s 5

i g

N'

=: b n 's

{

51 i gws

!E d f!f :a

(! s, ae a

g~

wwfaw win w

g l

ji

.lll 1i l

l

^1!

11 1,

1 1

s y:

.lg i3 i

slgg j

.l jj ':

j l

g l

s!

3j

{

i r 5:

s

!,, i 'n 8 I 3

}-

9 i

i5 g.z_

ga

,3 1

l

• h 0%4 Yi E

I 1I fal) wiw

~

I j) i a

'I 1s 5I l

8 a

Y laji l

l 3[

l l

I mt

!!j'

,}I i-INI

}

j}l 1

-s l' ji hp

]

2 I

1 j

i th el!!l ll l}

I I$I I II t

n.. 1. a

/'

i i

SU500EMANNA. UNIT 2 34 3 S4 Amendment No.

• 103 4

..m

'Il

. \\.

l,j k C

h.

TABLE 4.3.4-1 4

r, E

CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRbt4ENTATION SUftVER. LANCE REQUSusassasTS O

C CHA80 EEL CHA8edEL OPERAllONAL CONDITIONS

!.li i E

TRIP FWGCTIDet CHANNEL CHECK FUNCTIONAL TEST CAUERATION'"

FOR WHICH SURvftLLANCE

-9 {

ntoustEO i

2 i <

z 1.

m-7 7 Aq y!

N

/

/

?

a u

2.

AFIWA 3a ;

e. Flow stened Neussen Nu -

4' Upecate S

O SA 1

j; 1

m. Inoperative NA O

NA 1.2.5* "

c. Downeceis S

O SA 1

d. Neuteen Nu - Upecelo, 5

O SA 2.5 "

• i ge., tup f7 u

3.

SOURCE RA800E teONITOAS I

Detector nos fullin NA Sm ",w NA 2.5 a.

M SA 2.5 Y,

b.

Upecole NA gg,w NA 2.5 c.

Deepasse6ve NA IMM*

SA 2.5

. Ii d.

Downeceio NA m

SN

,W jj 4.

effemmasmays massag asossionS a.

Detector not fus in NA sal",W M

2,5

. i.k 1

M SA 2.5

b. Upecate S

gg,w

c. Insperceive NA me DIA 2.5 l' >.

U

• W SA 2.5 SM",W T^ I l f

d. Downeceio S

2 l

S.

SCRAas 800CNMISE WOLRfBEE s

a. Weser Level-High NA O

M 1.2,5 "

i II,

8. REACTOR C00LASIT...a-J I

merameam a19000 Flout i,

e.

Upecele NA O

O 1

f,

'];'

U b.

Inoperative NA O

$4A 1

a.

Camparator NA O

O 1

I c-) :

y t -

s

.?

l

.s

,.......,4,n K;---

m-._. -

r -m.

wg

=r. *-

--..g.' a., ~2 * ".R I'-

' ? ; ~~ - W ABLE NOTATIONS--i 2 -. d'a-ih~y_ t-r ---

W'

~

T a.

.u, ~,.

w-1.

---9%.

r (a)

Neutwa detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CAUSMATION.

(b) Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to startup, if not performed W h % 7 %..

I 6

• t>* m ac w a4 m g Tro n om w. m c a i

• With more than one control rod withdrawn. Not appilcable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

i

• M h is requwsd to be OPERABLE orW prior to1andesring Shutdown Margin demonstracons as performed per Specification 3.10.3 4

1 i

s i

1 1

s 1

e i

I 4

i i

1 i

i 4

.n. -

i i

j l

.I

,. /

i

/

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 3M 3 58 Amendrnent No.110 l

I o

• r m COOLANT SYSTER$

n mammma ATIDAl LOOPE - M LOOP OpERAT1tMd

.,I.

- -- i suse run w ATiGid 3.4.1.1.2 One reester eselant recircule6en loop sham he in operation with the pump speed I

s s 80% of the rated pump speed and the reacter et a THERMAL POWER / ears flew 1

eendition outende of Regione I and il of Figure 3.4.1.1.1-1, and j

e. the following revised speesfleetion limite ches he fecewed:

l a

j 1.

Specificellen 2.1.2: the MCPR Safety Umit ehes he ineressed to 1.07.

2.

Tehle 2.2.1-1: the APRM Plow-Glaced Serem Trip Soapointe shed be se i

fomews:

l

~

T4 Seesha

,~

M1 Anne s 0.58W + 54%

s 0.00W + 57%

)

4 3.

Speciftsetion 3.2.2: the APRM Soapointe ehes he se fogows:

l t

1

% ampshe

, M_Vess II t

S s 40.88W + S4W T S s W.SSW + 57W T j

Sms IO.S5W +.48%) T Sam s 5.00W & 48W T s

K j

4.

Spoolflooden 3.2.3: The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWW. RATIO IMCPRI shes bei yester thee or equal to the emellesbia Single Leap Operation MCPR Emit so sposfied in the CORE OPERATING UMITS fWORT.

5.

Speelficaden 3.2.4: The UNEAR MEAT GENMATION RATE (LNGft shed be l

ines then er eeuel as the oppscehle Sinste Laep Opereden U40R Emit so i

specified in the CORE TING UMITS REPORT.

8.

Tehta 3.3.5 2: the Centrol fbed Week Seepeinte shes he se l

l

}

fosawe-d i

l DcL2A Q T4 estenho Atenable Wahme a&rdJIdeene/ / n a nsw s seu

_ l/WQ.ssyntypsD l

r%

Ass. ease Vs.

l l

h. APfad Mew s 0.saw + 45%

s 0.SSW + 44%

siemed j

APP m OPERATIONAL CONOtTIONS l' and 2* +, essept during two leep operesien.#

AEDQN:

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1:

s.

i

1. With i

el ne resseer coolent eyesem recrcusseen lesse in opereden. er i

l bl Hopen i of Figure 3.4.1.1.1 1 entered. er

/

cl Region W of Figure 3.4.1.1.1 1 erased and more thermal hydrouse instabehty l

l esaurrhe as endenced by:

l

/

i i

Amenenent No. N

• N.

[

f SUSOUD4 ANNA - UNff 2 3s4 41e 103 1

i

i.

1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS I.

BASES i

CONTROL RODMOGRAM CONTROLS (Continued) i i

The RSCS and RWM logic automatically initiates at the low power setpoent (20% of RATED i

THERMAL POWER) to provide automatic supervision to assure that out of-sequence rods will not be withdrawn or inserted.

l j

Parametric Control Rod Drop Accident analyses have shown that for a wide range of key j

reactor parameters (which envelope the operating ranges of these variables), the fuel enthalpy rise during a postulated control rod drop accident remains conaederably. lower than the 280 i

cal /gm limit. For each operating cycle, cycle specific parameters such as maximum control tod worth, Doppler coefficient, effective delayed neutron fraction, and maximum four bundle local peaking factor are comparsd with the inputs to the parametric analyses to determine the i

i peak fuel rod enthalpy rise. This value is then compared against the 280 callem design limit l

to demonstrate compliance for each operating cycle. If cycle-specific values of the above parameters are outside the range assumed in the parametric analyses, an extension of the analysis or a cycle specific analysis may be required. Conservatism present in the analysis, results of the parametric studies, and a detailed description of the methodology for performing the Control Rod Drop Accident analysis are reference

.3.

)

gh power } vent fuel damage in stically pr vent of er cus' r

. The M is deseg d to out nsity durin high power ration. Tw che s

wit rawal from I stions of are ovided. Tr' ping one the chan s will block troneous rod ithdrawal e

h 4

t prevent fuel amage. T s system eks up the ritten segue by opor tor for

'thdrawal control r

p f

4 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM i

The standby liquid control system provides a backup capability for bringing the reactor from i

full power to a cold, Xenon free shutdown. assuming that none of the withdrawn control rods j

can be inserted. To meet this objective it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron which produces a concentration of 660 ppm in the reactor core in approximately 90 to 120 minutes.

j A mirumum quantity'of 4587 gallons of sodium pentaborate solution containing a minimum l

of 5500 lbs. of sodium pentanorate is required to meet this shutdown requirement. There is an additional allowance of 165 ppm in the reactor core to account for imperfect mixing. The l

time requirement was selected to ovemde the reactivity insertion rate due to cooldown f

following the Xenon poison peak and the required pumping rate is 41.2 gpm. The minimum storage volume of the solution is established to allow f or the portion below the pump suction that cannot be inserted and the filling of other piping systems connected to the reactor vessel.

l The temperature requirement for the sodium pentaborate solution is necessary to ensure that j

the sodium pentaborate remains in solution.

1 With redundant pumps and explosive injection valves and with a highly reliable control rod scram system, operation of the reactor is permitted to continue for short periods of time with the system inoperable or for longer periods of time with one of the redundant components l

inoperable.

4 l

SUSOUEHANNA - UNIT 2 8 3,4 g.4 Amanhent No. 91, 95 2

a l

j t

a I.

INSTRt#tENTATION SASES j

3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEN ACTUATION INSTRLSENTATION l

The reactor core isolation cooling system actuation instrumentation is

]

provided to initiate actions to assure adequate core cooling in the event of j

reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without providing actuation of any of the emergency core j

cooling equipment.

J i

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip 5etpoint but 5

within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the j

difference between each Trip 5etpoint and the Alloweble Value is equal to or l

1ess than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

l l

3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROO BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION l

The control rod block functions are provided consistent with the requirements of the specifications in Section 3/4.1.4, Control Rod Program l

Controls and Section 3/4.2 Power Distribution Limits. The trip logic is arranged so that a trip in any one of the inputs will result in a control rod block.

Operation with a trip set less conservat.1ve than its Trip 5etpoint bit e

i l

within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the j

difference between each Trip 5etpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allmwence-assumed h nr& "; ;;&+y =Myn=.

7

[cntainsmult The Rod Block Nonitor RON) portion o the control rod block i trumentatio lexing circu ry which inter es with reacter I cont 41 j

sy tea.

The is a redunda t system which neludes two hannels of formatkon whi h must agree fore rod no on is permit Each of se redunda chan-l l

nels s a self-te feature whi is implicitly ted duri perfo ce of su 11ance purs t to this s ification as well as the control rod l

operabili specificati

(

1.3.1) A h

3/4.3.7 WITORING INSTRLSENTATION M

J 3/4.3.7.1 RADIATION NDNITORING INSTRLpqENTATION P

The OPERASILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; l

(1) the radiatten levels are continually esasured in the areas served by the individual channels; (2) the alars or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is saceeded; and (3) sufficient information is I

available en selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables l

following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations l

of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," Nevenber,1980.

4 l

3.4.3.7.2 SEISMIC W ITORING INSTRUMENTAT!0N l

The OPERABILITY of the seismic monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a l

seismic event and evaluate the response of these features important to safety.

This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to l

that used in the design basis for the untt.

This instrumentation is consis-l tent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12 " Instrumentation for Earthquakes". April 1974.

SUSQUEHAfstA - UNIT 2 8 3/4 3-4 L

S

. _ _, _ _ ~

j

..s j*

2/4.4 nEacTOR COOLANT SYSTMed i!.

• • • me s/4.4.1 naculCULATION SYSTEM a

j us J

operation whh one reactor recircuistion loop inoperable has been evetussed and found,., O accepteide, provksed that the unit is operated in accordance with Spootnoeden 3.4.1.1.2. I j

M LOCA analyses for two loop operet%g conditions, which susult h Peak Ctedens js Temperatures IPCTal below 2200% 'oound single loop operedng ownscions. Single toes _ $.

l operation LOCA anstyees using in '::; MAPLHGR Emits result in lower PCTs. Therefore, 4

the use of two.4eos MAPLHGR Emits during eingle loop operation aneures that the PCT d.

du,in, a LOCA event remmns below 2200*P.

~

The MINIMUM CfWTICAL POWER RATIO (MCPRI Emite for eingis leep opereden amours that i

the Safety Umit MCPR is not escoeded for any Anticipated Operational Docurrence (A00).

in adesion, the MCPR Emite for singloloop operation protest agelnet the effects ait the j

Recirculation Pump Seisure Accident. That is. for operation in single loop with an operating i

MCPR Emit a 1.30, the radiological consequences of a pump seleurs socident from

1. 7: '::; operating conditions are but a smes fraction of 10CPR100 guideAnos.

-cauE l

For eingle loop operadon, the setpoints are atqueted by e 8.5% decreens 1

in recirculation drtve flow to account for the active loop drive flow that trypasses the core l

and goes up through the inactive loop jet pumps.

y 3

Surveisance on the pump speed of the operating recirculation loop is imposed to exclude the l

l possiWBey of excessive reactor vessel intomais whation. SurveBenos en agtforential temperatures below the thresheid limas of THERMAL POWER er roeirculation loop flow malgates undue thermal stress on vessel nomales, recirautoden pumps and the vesesi bottom l

head during entended operation in the single loop mode. The threshold Emits are those i

values which wig sweep up the cold water from the vessel bottom head.

i i

Specifications have been provided to prevent, detect, and mitigste core them.e4 hydreuilc instatssey events. These specificeoons are prescribed in acconsance with NRC Ouestin 88 07, Supplement 1, ' Power Oscelations in Somng Woest Reacters (SWRei,' dated i

December 30,1988.

(

P LPRM upscale alarms are required to detect reactor core thermal hydreuEs instabety events.

{

The criterie for determining which LPRM upscale alarms are required is bened on assignment of these alarm to designeted core zones. These cors nones consist of the level A, B and C l

storms in 4 er 5 algesent LPRM strings. The number and location of LPRM strings in each j

none soeurs that with 50% or more of the associated LPRM upscais eierms OPERAeLE sufflaient monitoring capabety is eyeliable to detect core wide and regionsi osometions.

opersdne meant instabety date is used to determee the specific LPRM setnes assigned to seen sono. The oore sones and requirw LPRM upscale alarms in eese sene are speedied in i

appropriate procedures.

An inoperable jet pump is not, in itself, a sufficient reason es declare a reeircuistion loop l

inoperelde, but it does in cose of a design beeis accident, increase the blowdown ares and reduce the capabety of refloodn0 the core: thus, the requirement for shutdown of the facety with a jet pump inoperstda. Jet pump f ature can be detected by menteering let pump l

performance on a prescribed schedule for ogmficant degradeelen.

I i

SUSQUEHANNA UNIT 2 8 3/4 4 1 Amendment No. 31, j

OCT I s 892

-w-

-