ML20113G583

Requests Response to Encl Correspondence from Eb Graham. W/O Encl

ML20113G583
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	02/28/1984
From:	Long R SENATE
To:	Kammerer C NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)
Shared Package
ML20113F513	List: ML20113F566 ML20113G363 ML20113G397 ML20113G422 ML20113G461 ML20113G510 ML20113G568 ML20113G583 ML20113G599
References
FOIA-84-341 NUDOCS 8501240420
Download: ML20113G583 (1)

Text

I f-RUSSELL G. LoNG KU;$;ANA

?JCnifeb Stafes Senefe WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510 February 28, 1984 Mr. Carlton Kammerer Director, Office of Congressional Affairs Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 "H"

Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20505

Dear Mr. Kammerer:

I am enclosing a copy of the correspondence which I have received from Ms. Evelyn B. Graham.

I would appreciate it if you would provide me with a report on this matter.

With best wishes, I am

incerely, M

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MIMORANDUM FOR:

Parties to the TMI-l Resta d Proceedine

/b Chilk,Secretar[tQ FROM:

Samuel J.

SU3 JECT:

T E N T A T I'v ~., COMMISSION VIINS A'ND PLAN FOR RESOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT'INiEGRITY ISSUES PRIOR TO RESTART On October 7, 1983, the Commission issued a Notice to the Parties setting for h "the Commission's current estimate for completing reviews of the various. issues that migh possibly affect the decision whether to restart TMI Unit 1."

The Comrd.s-sien stated in the Notice that, given the estimated time neces-sary to resolve those issues, it was " prepared to consider alternative approaches for dealing with the management competence and integrity issues."

The Co=ission subsequently had an open meeting on November 28, 1983 to hear from GPU on such an alternative approach, i.e.,

GPU's June 10, 1983 management organization proposal, as modified.

The Commission heard from the other parties on December 5, 1983 on GPU's proposal.

The Commission has also provided the parties an opportunity to comment on staff's response to the GPU proposal, and as a separate matter, an opportunity to commhnt on a list of integrity j.ssues in the TMI-l restart proceeding.

The Commission has decided to inform the parties to the restart proceeding of its current views on certain critical management integrity issues and the Commission's plans for reaching a final restart decision.

These views and plan are those of a Co==ission majority.

The additional views of Chairman Palladino and Commissioner Bern, thal and the separate views of Commissioners Gilinsky and Asselstipe are attached.

The' Commission emphasizes that this mamorandum is provided only to keep the parties informed.

It is not a restart. decision and does not authorize restart.

As explained'further belowl these current views and plans are subject to change, based on i

consideration of parties' comments on the list of integrity issues and other matters, and on any other important new information.

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Curren views The Ocmmiss!.cn ~ has tentatively ccaciudef that, in principle, temporary separation frc nuclear cpera icn cf scme G?t empicyees and c her acticns, including these preposed by the licensee, can serve as an inte

=* tion to the management integrity issues raised by the. "open items," pending resolu:Lon cf these items.

In this regard, the Cc-i ssion presently believes that the only engeing investiga:icn which may require 1

4 further res6lutien before a decision en the management issues is the Unit i leak rate investigation.

The Commission intends ::

obtain additional information regarding that matter before

'" 3iaking a restart decision.

i With regard to specific individuals, the Commission's view, based en currently available information, is that neither Chairman of the Board William Kuhns ncr President of GPU Eerman Dieckamp will have to be temporarily or per:anently separated i

from nuclear operations prior to restart.

The Commission nay, however, require restrictions beyond these proposed by the licensee.

This may include requiring tna: certain acct :ena2 individuals be separated from nuclear operations.pending completion of the ongoing ~ NRC investigations cf integrity ' issues or of the TMI-2 leak rate cr4minal trial.

Plan fo'r Restart Decision After reviewing further information concerning the TMI-l leak l

rate matter and the parties' comments both on the list of

• integrity issues and on staff's response to the GPU proposal, i

the Commission will issue a tentative draft decision on the j

management issues for comment by.the parties.

After reviewing the' parties' comments on the draft decision, the Commission will

.then issue a final decision on management issues.

The Com'ission believes that'this process provides the possibility i

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for reaching a decision on whether to lift the inmediate effectiveness of the original shutdown orders.

l The Commission's process for making a decision on the management issues will not affect the ongoing 1.ppeal Board merits. review of I.

those issues, or affect the other ongoing investigations.

Those

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investigations will continue and any individuals involved in i'

wrongdoing will be subject to possible enforcement proceedings, as accroariate.

The Commission's decision will prescribe the cond'itie'ns that will apply for any-individuals who are to be -

separated from nuclear operations.

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VCTED FDR TODAY'S ACTION EECAUSE i EELIEVE IT OFFERS A

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REASONAELE AFPROACM TO MAKING THAT LONG-DELAYED DECIS10N ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW RESTART.

WHEN THE COMMISSION MAKES THAT DECISION, WHICH I HO?E WILL EE EY JUNE 1984, IT WiLL EE CALLED UPON TO JUDGE THE

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COMPETENCE AND INTEGRITY OF THE MANAGEMENT OF IMI, UNIT 1 -

A QUESTION WE ADDRESSED IN TODAY'S ACTION IS W: ETHER OR NOT j

iT IS NECESSARY TO AWAIT THE COMPLETION OF THE CRIMINAL TRI AL AGAINST METROPOLITAN EDISON EEPORE WE ATTEMPT TO REACH A JUDGMENT ON COMPETENCY AND INTEGRITY.

.I EELIEVE THAT A JUDGMENT CAN BE REACHED BEFORE COMPLETION OF THE TRIAL IF CERTAIN GPU EMPLOYEES ARE TEMPORARILY SEPARATED FROM NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AT IMl-1 DURIN5THE TRIAL.

WE WilL DESIGNATE THOSE PEOPLE, AS WELL AS THE CONDITIONS FOR T, HEIR SEPARATION, IF WE MAKE' A DECISION TO ALLOW RESTART, WE ALSO ADDRESSED TODAY WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEPARATE THE MOST SENIOR MANAGEMENT OF GPU, 'THE CHAIRMAN AND.THE PRESIDENT OF GPO, IN ORDER TO MAKE A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW RESTART.

MY VIEW IS THAT THE PENDENCY OF THE OPEN ITEMS INCLUDING THE CRIMINAL TRI AL DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE JUSTlF) CATION TO REQUI s

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COM51SS10';ERSERNTHASADDITIONALVIEWS

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It is evident from the Commission's memorandum to the parties, and J am sure from public representations of several Members of the Co=is-sion, that the central question addressed in this memorandum is the fitness for further duty, so to speak, of certain high-level management individuals, who have been in their positions of responsibility through-out the troubled history of the Three Mile Island facility.

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. add.that, beyond t'hese two. individuals, no clear difference'be' ween my t

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defined.

While one may question the judgment of the governing board of licensee in permitting such an issue to distract for so long from the real questions of licensee preparedness and competence to resume opera-tion of the undamaged TMI-1 reactor, the responsibility of the NRC must go beyond opinions and perceptions.

The NRC must not lose sight of its

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fundamental responsibilities and obligations'.

It must provide first and i

foremost for the public health and safety by evaluating competence and, to the extent that it touches on public health and safety, integrity of licensee management.

Second, it must consider the rights of the licensee and the public that licensee serves.

In the matter of Messrs.

Kuhns and Dieckamp, there is current'ly no evidence bearing adversely on -

their integrity or competence, which would dictate their removal from their present positions. Should any such new evidence come to light as a result of further investigations and proceedings, however, the i

Comission always has remedies at its disposal.

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2 At least half cf my dissenting colleagues have clearly stated many times for the pubite record their judgment on Mr. Kuhns and Dieckamp, even before the indictment now lying against licensee (not against Mr.

Kuhns and Dieckamp), had ever been handed down by the Department o Therefore, the question of the outstanding indictment 2 gainst Justice.

licensee was and is apparently not the underlying issue.

Rather, the issue has frequently been represented as responsibility I do not believe of the commander for the acticns of his subordinates.

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that it is the' province of.the NRC to make such judgments.in the ab e u.

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x...of'.reasanable evidence,. and based only on such.f aci e.me ap or -

representations, as though the analogy and language of martial discipline were appropriate to this matter.

The responsibility of the Commission in this case is simple and Can the It is to ask and answer the single question:

straightforward.

current personnel of the reorganized General Public Utilities nuclear division be expected to operate TMI-1 consistent with the NRC's standards and regulations providing for the public health and safety.

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Indeed, it would be highly inconsistent.gnd incongruous if the Commission now, in considering this single question, were to require removal of Mr. Kuhns and Dieckamp on the grounds of the NRC's p health and safety responsibilities, while it has, to my lowledge, never even seriously considered such action with respect to the continu operation of the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant, a plant tha permitted to generate electricity today, under the same senior management personnel in question here today, and under th is responsible here today for meeting the requirements of law and I, for judgments in protection of public health and safety for TMI-1.

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e one, would be hard pressec :: arcue

.a: high-level GPU management should be removed or quarantined fro: the TMI-I operations, but not from those at Oyster Creek.

Indeed, I believe that the entire Comission has, by their very inaction over the last several years in respect to the operation at Oyster Creek, alreacy agreed with the premise of my decision today.

Integrity is the most importar.: anc valuable personal trait any of us possesses.

It is.. in my judgment, unwise and unjust for anyone, especially those who are in posi,tions of pub'lic trust, to impugn the

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-integrityJ 'faany' -individua-1 without substantial < evidence that h.is.or.her... -

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o integrity has been compromised.

Nor is there any e~vidence that these two individuals are incompetent or otherwise unfit to perform their responsibilities as executives of General Public Utilities, or that their continuing to do so would somehow render the operation of either Oyster Creek or Three Mile Island Unit-1 unsafe.

In sumary, the Comission has a duty to the public served by

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licensee, and to licensee to determine whether the hardware and person-nel of GPU and specifically of TMI-1 are qualified, competent, and prepared to, allow the plant to resume operations, consistent with the Comission's responsibility to protect public health and safety.

With respect to the top-level management of GPU, it is high time that the Comission spoke to that issue..This action today does so.

It does not address in detail, nor have I yet reached a conclusion 'on any of the other outstanding personnel, hardware, and procedural issues related to TMI-1 restart.

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F7 1/2"l24 SIP._:t.TI VIEWS OF CCW Tec CNIF.GILIKSKY

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. It goes without saying that I do net agree with the three Cc- #ssioners who have echraced GPU's proposal der dealing with the =anagament integrity issue--the critical issue in this case in view of the numerous instances of wrongdoing by the Company.

The Co--ission majority has, in effect, brushed aside this central question.

The majorit"'s a

approach would leave in place the Chairman of the Board of,

1 Directors and the President of the Company, the two chief

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executive officers who have been in. direct control of the i

operations of GPU and its subordinate cc=panies since before the accident.

The three Coc=issioners have argued that these individuals were and are removed from day-to-day operations and that they have not been shown to be involved personally and directly in the wrongdoing co=mitted by GPU.

i Nor would the majority hold them accountable for GPU's grudgi'ng - response to instances of cheating and lying by its i

staff.

This is sharply at odds with NRC's tenet that the actions and exa=ple of the top utility managers are kdy to

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safe plant operation.

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t There is an altogether unseemly contrast between the t

Commission's solicitude for the persons at the top of the e

corporate pyramid and its microscopio examination of., and

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handwringing over, 'the lapses cf miner ac:crs in the 0.v.:

accident.

(I: is impossible :: adequately ecnvey this upside do n view withcc: queting from the transcripts of closed Cc=missien meetings.

I can enly hope they will be released before icnc.)

In reality, persons c: the working level by and large do what is expected of them.

The climate

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for rightdcing er wrongdeing is se by those at the :cp.

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.3 The Cc= mission majority has also brushed aside the criminal indictment cf the Company that operated the T.C plant a.nd which is still headed by the same chief executive officer.

The majority argues that that Company, Metropoli. tan Edison, has been replaced as licensee by GPU Nucicar, but this is little more than a paper change.

The majority also argues that since no criminal indictments have been brought against individuals, there is nothing for the Commission to take

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into account in its restart decision.

While the possibil.ity has been raised that several GPU employees may be

" quarantined" pending the outcome of the criminal trial, it is clear that the Commission majority has decided that no

_outeeme of the trial can affect,their decision since no individual verdicts will be rendered.

This ignores the fact thit the criminal indictment of the entire Company is a far mere serious matter than would be individual indictments of operators or supervisors, and that such an indictment weighs more heavily against the Company's management.

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is that timid regulation is to no one's advantage; in the 1eng run, not even that of the uti*tities.

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agree witn the majority's de:ision c croceet with a pian that wouic allow the restar _ cf TMI Unit i prior to the completion ci five NRC investiga-tiens reia ing 'to the-integrity of the licensee's management.

Stripped tc, its essen itis, the majority's decision amounts to an acceptance with few, if any,

' modifications 1of the GPU proposti for restarting TMI-1 before compie: ion of -he a

_ min.agement integrity investigations.

As the NRC staff has recognized, this approach will permit the restart of TMI-1 before the Commission has the infor-i mation needed to reach a final conclusion on whether the present management of

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the GPU Nuclear Corporation has the proper character to operate.the. plant safely.

Although there are conditions under which I could approve restart of TMI in advance of the completion of the management integrity-investigations, those conditions are not met by the majority's plan.

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Last year, the NRC renewed or began five investigations bearing directly on 'the integrity of GPU management.

These investigations covered:

(1) the Har.tman i -

allegations that leak rate tests for TMI Unit 2 were falsified; (2)-

l inform.ation on possible leak rate test falsif,ication for TMI Unit 1; (3)the Parks, Gischel, King allegations that GPU management or'others attempted to

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intimidate or harass individuals who questioned whether procedural requirements relating to the clean-up of TMI-2.were being followed; (4)GPUinvolvementin

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a material false. statement. violation for failure to provide copies of internal l-GPU reports, including the RHR and BETA reports, to the NRC; and (5) GPU management involvement in modifications to the draft Keaten report.

The first -

of these items--the falsification of leak rate tests at TMI dnit 2--is also the-t L:

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. su je:7 cf the firs criminal indictmen et a u-iiity for vicia-ing NRC safe y recuiremen'.s in ne history of the :cmmer:iti nu:iear power program.

n the case of the TMI.-2 leak ra e f alsifica:icn issue, the agency alreacy

~pessesses sufficien; information to lead senier members ci the NRC staff to con:iude that such tes falsifications likely did occur, but we do not have access c the information deveicoed by the Department of Justice investiga icn that served as the basis for the criminal indictment of the utility.

As the Department of Justice has recognized, the information supporting the indictment may well be of value to the NRC in evaluating.the significance of the leak rate test falsification issue for present TMI-1 ranagement.

Given the Justice Department's reouest that we not interview some 43 individuals who were involved with the operation of TMI-2 at the time of the suspect leak rate tests, it is clear that our investigation of the TMI-2 leak rate falsification issue cannot be completed until after the conclusion of the criminal. trial.

It also appears likely that this Department of Justice recuest will, limit our ability to complete the TMI-1 leak rate investigation, the Parks, Gischel, King-investigation.and the investigation of the Keaten re_ port as well.

In the case of the TMI-1 leak rate investigation, in particular, the NRC Office of

~ Investigations staff responsible for conducting the investigation have concluded that the TMI-1 leak rate falsification issue cannot be resolved without interviewing a number of individuals on the Justice Departmen't list.

This means that investigations of the TMI-1 operators will likely continue

. beyond the June 1984 date targeted by the najority 'for restart of TMI-1.

Quite apart from the management integrity issu1, the NRC staff has expressed safety concerns about the operation of TMI-1 with operators who are un, der the stress of a continuing NRC investigation.

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e, 3 '.' *:lin em: t:e: by n's majori y a-em::s :: deti e.- - e Or::ier :# -he

't.::m:le e inves-i;tbons by:

(1) :reven-in; -hose v:h:

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reg.iar du y E! TM:-2 li:ensed Operators a: -he time c' :ne a::ider. f rc se vin; en TMI-i licensed ope.-ators'; -(2) providing some a::itional in ernai Gp'.' oversight cf TKI-I operations; and (3) re:viring the esignation cf R:bert Arncid as Presiden and a Direc.or of the GD'.' Nu iear Oc :: a: ion.

iiowever,

'ever, the NRC s:Eff acknowledges tha: the GPU pian leaves ir :'.a:P a: ieas-

.segen or eight individuals in the GPU-TMI-1 organization w : are potentially involved in the areas under investigation, including persor.s in responsible high-levei management positions in the Company.

As the s:sff notes in its cc=nents 'on the GPU plan:

If restart is approved prior to completion of the variots inves-tigations, the possibility exists that subsequen: investigations or court proceedings will produce negative information bearing direct-ly on persons in responsible management positions.

Tr.is might require further reorganization (of the licensee's organization) or shutdown (oftheplant)...

The majority's endorsement of the GPU plan amounts to an assumption either that the investigations when eventually completed will find no v ongdoing by the TMI-1 organization other than.the former TMI-2 operators, er that a'ny wrong-doing will reflect only on a few individuals ' nd will not call into question a

the overall management integrity of the TMI-I organization.

At the present

ime, the information available to the Commission simp 19 d:es not support such an optimistic assumption.

Indeed, as the NRC, staff notes, there is every possibility that the investigations will lead to the oppos'. e result.

Given this state of affairs, 'I cannot support the majority's restart plan or the wishful thinking that underlies it.

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. As I mp.-ione: a: the ou se, there are ::nt'-icr.s un:er wnich ! c:vid se: pert restar :! T.": ' :rior the ::::ie-icr Of the criminal receedings and the NF.: inves-iga-ions.

One a::e;.a:ie op-ion w:uic he :: brir.; in an cutside Organization, with an established record of :cepe ence and integrity in the operation of comercial nu:iear power piar.:s, :: manage the operation of TMI-1.

A second option woulc be the removai, untii the completion ef the N?.C inves-tigations and any subsequent hearings that may be required, of the remaining individuals in the GPU TMI-1 organizat. ion who are potentially involved in' the matters under investigation.

Like Comission.er Gilinsky, I would pay particular attention to those individuais_ in responsible management positions.

In the years since the Three Mile Island accident, the Commission has repeatedly stressed the critical role of management in the safe opera. tion of nuclear power plants.

It is most unfortunate that, when put to the test, the Commission has failed to sustain this prin.ciple with its actions.

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