ML20113E083
| ML20113E083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/16/1985 |
| From: | Hukill H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 5211-85-2001, NUDOCS 8501230306 | |
| Download: ML20113E083 (46) | |
Text
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Route 441 South Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
Januark162001 1985 5211-8 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
J. F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactor Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr Stolz:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Error Analysis - Subcooling Margin Indication By letter dated September 28, 1984, NRC requested additional information with respect to the Saturation Margin Monitor Loop Error Analysis for TMI-1. Subsequently, the licensee and NRC staff met on October 30, 1984 to clarify the NRC concerns. By Letter 5211-84-2291 dated November 30, 1984, GPU Nuclear Corporation responded to seven of the eleven NRC questions.
Responses to the remaining four NRC questions are enclosed (Attachment 1), as well as a revised Saturation Margin Monitor Loop Error Analysis (Attachment 2). As requested by Dr. F. P. Kadambi of your staff by telephone, a set of instrument loop diagrams also is enclosed (Attachment 3).
References to Abnormal Transient Procedures (ATPs) have been included with this response as a supplement to the discussions of October 30, 1984.
The operator maintains awareness of reactor coolant system status in terms of margin to saturation under all required conditions. The revised Saturation Margin Monitor Loop Error Analysis demonstrates a maximum loop error in the positive direction of 14.95*F, which results in less than 25 F combined instrumentation and system configuration error. The Saturation Margin Monitor is used only when the reactor coolant pumps are operating.
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GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation
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2-With the pumps off, the combined error associated with the alternate use of the incore thermocouples and RCS pressure indication, in conjunction with steam tables, to determine margin to saturation is also less than 25 F, as discussed in response to Question 5.
Sincerely, H. D.
ukill Director, TMI-1 HDH:SK:spb cc: J.-Van Vliet Enclosures 0
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ATTACHMENT 1 9
GPUN RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTIONS ON TMI-1 SATURATION MARGIN MONITOR LOOP ERROR ANALYSIS t-
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Question 2 Sheet 2 of the loop error analysis states that the more conservative temperature effects of a harsh environment were considered and the radiation effects were ignored in the calculations. This is shown in the calculations on Sheet 13. We request that the basis for ignoring the radiation induced errors be provided.
Response
SBLOCA Accident Error As discussed in our meeting of October 30, 1984, we judged that the temperature error could not be significant at the time the integrated dose
)
induces significant error. As requested at that meeting, we have performed l
a detailed analysis which includes both temperature and radiation effects.
This evaluation considers the error above and below RCS pressures of 200 psig and relaxes some conservatisms associated with the negative systematic error due to containment pressure. The revised loop error analysis considering both temperature and radiation is provided in Attachment 2 and shows that the subcooling margin error is acceptable over its full range of use.
The Rosemount pressure transmitter error due to containment pressure an-1 temperature plus radiation has been evaluated. SBLOCA evaluations performed in conjunction with equipment environmental qualification considered break sizes in the range from 0.01 ft2 to 0.5 ft. The most severe credible 2
small break is that of the largest Reacter Coolant System branch line with a cross-sectional area of less than 0.5 ft2 The s core flood line which has a break area of 0.44 ft{eeved 14 inch diameter is the largest such line. This break results in a reactor building peak pressure of slightly below 30 PSIG. The accumulated radiation dqse was calculated based on the present failed fuel predicted for a 0.44 ftZ break (i.e. no fuel failures beyond those assumed in the FSAR for worst case normal operation is predicted to occur by licensing basis SBLOCA analyses). A methodology similar to that of Appendix D to NUREG 0588 was then used to evaluate the equipment radiation exposure due to the small break fuel failures. The 40 year integrated dose was added to the 180 day post accident dose to obtain the total dose. The total dose calculated for equipment in the same area as the Rosemount transmitters is 4 x 104 Rads.
The Rosemount qualification report contains data for normal lifetime exposures from 1.2 x 104 to 3.75 x 104 Rads. The report also contains dcta for large break LOCA exposures of 2 x 106 to 5 x 107 Rads.
Although the SBLOCA radiation dose would be in the order of 4 x 104 Rads, we have evaluated the dose according to DOR Guidelines at 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
By this time the Decay Heat System would be in operation. The calculated maximum dose at 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is 4 x 106 Rads.
Toestablishaconservativeupperboundusingavailagletestdata,the transmitter error was evaluated.for a dose of 4 x 10 Rads. This is a hundred times greater than the dose calculated for the 0.44 Ft2 SBLOCA.
2-1
1 In the qualification testing of the Rosemount 1153D series transmitters, the transmitters were subjected to LOCA/HELB conditions. The test chamber was ramped from 120*F/0 PSIG to 350*F/85 PSIG in about one minute, and chemical spray was initiated at t=16 minutes. The qualification report contains data for the five test transmitters at 320 F, 240*F and 180 F.
GPUN has used this data in a linear regressional analysis (least squares fit) to develop an equation for error due to containment temporature. With five test transmitters, and two coefficients in the fitted equation, the degrees of freedom are (5-2) = 3.
At 95% confidence '.imits, the percentage point of the t-distribution with 3 degrees of freidom is 3.182. Therefore, the standard deviation of the fitted equation was multiplied by 3.182 to obtain the two-sigma (95% confidence) error.
1 This two-sigma temperature error equation was used with the containment conditions predicted by CONTEMPT to calculate the temperature error as a function of time. Since the transmitter measures gauge pressure, the " low side" is open to containment.
Thus, during the SBLOCA, the transmitter output will have a systematic negative error equal to containment pressure.
l This error was combined with the temperature induced error during the SBLOCA. The spectrum of SBLOCA's was evaluated using CONTEMPT-LT/28 to i
detennine the worst combination of temperature and radiation induced errors in the transmitter. The results of this evaluation were used to pick a limiting combination of pressure and temperature. The largest positive two-sigma error occurs when the pressure comes back down to O PSIG and the l
containment temperature is about 200*F.
Since radiation dose is increasing with time, the worst case combination temperature, pressure and radiation errors is bounded by con conditgonsof0PSIG,212*Fandanintegrateddoseof4x10gainment Rads. The 4 x 10 Rad data from the qualification report was used in a linear j
regression analysis to detennine the two-sigma error due to radiation, using the same methods by GPUN discussed above for temperature.
Thisworstcasecombinederrorduetocontainmengtemperatureandpressure plus radiation dose at 212*F, O PSIG, and 4 x 10 Rads was then added to l
the errors in the remainder of the loop to determine the two-sigma error during a SBLOCA.
Summing cf Errors The basic principles of combining errors were discussed in our earlier j
submittal (Letter 5211-84-2291 dated November 30, 1984, Response to Question 3). We have carefully evaluated each type of error involved in i
this analysis and concluded that the only systematic errors are the negative systematic error in the characterizer and the negative systematic transmitter error due to containment pressure. All other errors are
-independent random errors which can be combined by taking the square root of l
the sum of the squares.
i-2-2 l
Th2 accident induced errors dua to temperature and radiation are statistically random. The five test transmitters exhibited errors which differed in both magnitude and sign. Each of these sources of error is also independent of the other. The two-sigma accident error values are based on the premise that given a SBLOCA, this is the two-sigma error value. Thus, any dependence based on the probability of a SBLOCA does not exist since the probability has been taken as 100%.
The same logic applies to the temperature induced errors in the instruments outside containment. These are also independent random errors. They are based on the premise that given an elevated ambient temperature, this is the two-sigma error value. Thus, any dependence based on the probability of elevated temperature does not exist since the probability has been taken as 100%.
Similar logic applies to the combining of other errors such as calibration errors and drift. These are independent random errors, i.e., fixing the value of one would have no effect on the probability distribution of the other.
For example, the accuracy of a pressure gauge has no effect on the probability of human error in reading it, or upon the probability of drift.
2-3
Question 5 The loop error analysis has not included an error allowance associated with the RTD's process measurement accuracy (i.e. the difference between the temperature of the fluid at the 'ofnt of measurement as compared with the mixed mean fluid temperature).
For similar temperature measurement instrument loops, this error has been calculated to be 1.0 percent span at full loop flow conditions. This error would be nonconservative in the calculated saturation margin if the measured temperature is lower than the average temperature. We request that you provide the basis for neglecting this factor in the loop error methodology.
Response
As discussed during the GPUN/NRC meeting of October 30, 1984, the concern with a difference between the temperature of the fluid at the point of measurement as compared with the mixed mean fluid temperature arises in consideration of natural circulation conditions, i.e. when the reactor coolant pumps are off. During the meeting, NRC also requested information regarding actions to be taken to restore the reactor coolant system to single phase natural circulation.
During natural circulation flow, the operator does not use the saturation margin monitor to determine subcooling margin. Under those conditions, the incore thermocouples are used to provide temperature information for a manual calculation using the average of the five highest operable thermocouples. This results in a conservative measurement of mixed mean fluid temperature, and no additional error allowance is required.
The procedural means for the operator to assess margin to saturation following entry into Abnormal Transient Procedures and the required actions to restore natural circulation are provided for information in Appendix A.
Determination of Margin to Saturation without the Saturation Margin Monitor Margin to saturation may be determined by manual computation based upon RC temperature and pressure indications available in the control room, and steam tables.
1.
The computer provides an updated display of RC temperature based upon the average of the five highest incore thermocouple readings in F.
2.
Control room indicator PI 949A provides an updated display of RC wide range pressure in PSIG.
5-1
3.
Margin to saturation is manually calculated by converting the RC pressure to its saturation temperature by the steam table, and finding the difference between this value and the value of the RC temperature.
The error associated with the instrumentation required to perform the manual determination has been calculated to be less than 25F :
1.
Error under non-harsh containment environment conditions (e.g. for steam generator tube leak) is + 12.8 F at an RC pressure of 100 psig, and decreases for higher RC pressures.
2.
Error under harsh containment environmental conditions following the SBLOCA reaches its worst values when the containment pressure returns to atmospherie and the containment temperature stabilizes at 212 F assuming a containmen theD0RGuidelineof4x10gradiationlevelat10hoursequalto Rads.
In the RC pressure region of concern under harsh environmental conditions the errors are:
RC PRESSURE TWO-SIGMA ERROR IN MANUAL CALCULATION (PSIG)
F 140
+19.64
-6.76 200
+15.94
-5.50 240
+14.38
-4.94 300
+12.69
-4.31 400
+11.12
-3.80 The positive error only is of concern, since the negative error denotes that the indicated margin is less than the true value. As indicated in response to Question 11, HPI Throttling is not a concern below 175 psig. Thus, subcooling margin of 25 F is maintained in the pressure range of interest.*
- The system configuration error (+ 1.3 F) and an operator error in reading ASME steam tables of up to 0.5 F should be added to the values indicated in this table.
5-2
2 Apptndix A ATP PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE A.
PROCEDURAL MEANS TO ASSESS MARGIN TO SATURATION FOLLOWING ENTRY INTO ABNORMAL TRANSIENT PROCEDURES Entry into the Abnormal Transient Procedures (ATP's) occurs anytime either:
- 1) the control rod drive mechanisms have received an automatic or manual trip signal; or 2) the primary to secondary leak rate exceeds 1 gpm. From this point onward, the HPI throttling criteria of ATP 1210-10 apply.
1.
Margin to Saturation Determination / Limit Rule l
The_ minimum 1argin to saturation is 25 F* as determined by the saturation margin meter and/or the average of the five highest operable incore thermocouples and RCS narrow or wide pressure indication. The operator is required to use the most conservative operable indication of saturation margin, and the saturation margin monitor is not used unless the reactor coolant pumps are operabag.
The error associated with the use of the incore thermocouples and RCS pressure indication is addressed in response to Question 5.
The subcooling margin will be calculated by the operator by the use of these instruments in conjunction with steam tables.
'The following actions'related to subcooling margin (defined in ATP 1210-10) apply any time that the ATP entry point conditions have been met:
2.
High Pressure Injection (HPI) Initiation Criteria The operr. tor initiates two (2) HPI pumps, full flow in ES alignment,
.when:
a.
1600 psig ESAS has auto initiated, or b.
Subcooling margin is less than 25F*, or c.
Neither OTSG is available as a. heat sink.
3.
High Pressure Injection (HPI) Th$ottling Criteria The operator throttles HPI only if one or more of the following criteria are mei::
HPImustbethrbttledtopreventpumprunout(550gpm/ pump).
a.
(The operator does not throttle to less than 500.gpm unless one of the following criteria (b, c, or d) is met.)
_ b.. HPI must be throttled to prevent violation of the applicable brittle fracture / thermal shock curve limitations'.
c.
HPI.may be throttled if LPI flow is greater than 1000 gpm in each line and stable for 20 minutes.
d.
HPI may be throttled if the required 25F* subcooling margin-exists and pressurizer level is established at greater than 0
-inches.
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Appendix A B.
ACTIONS TO RESTORE NATURAL CIRCULATION The actions taken to restore and refill the loops are describsd in ATP 1210-4 " Loss of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer." During this. entire
-process the operator is required to follow the HPI and subcooling rules..
These rules are a higher priority action than the recovery of primary to' i
secondary heet transfer.
ATP 1210-4 treats the. loss of primary to secondary heat transfer including n
the loss of single phase natural circulation.
In summary, ATP 1210-4:
a.
Initiates feed and bleed cooling if the secondary side is not available a's a heat sink..(Once feed and bleed is established, the i
operator refers to procedure ATP 1210-9, "HPI Cooling--Recovery from Solid Operations.")
b.
If the secondary side is available as a heat sink,'the operator l
attempts to establish a primary to secondary temperature difference
-by reducing the OTSG pressure.
- c. -The operator also tries_to refill the system by " bumping" reactor i
coolant pumps to collapse steam voids.
If reactor coolant pumps are not available.for bumping, the procedure directs the operator to ATP 1210-9 "HPI Cooling - Recovery from Solid Operations." He would remain in that procedure until the subcooling margin is restored.
1.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Natural Circulation Verification The_ ATP's are specific about what constitutes indication of natural circulation flow. ATP 1210-10 provides procedural guidance regarding verification of natural circulation (indication of natural F
circulation may not stabilize for 15 to 30 minutes):
F a.
RCS delta T increases to approximately 30*F-to 50*F (dependent on decay heat) and stabilizes, and Th is less than 600*F.
l b.
Incore thermocouple' temperatures stabilize, and are tracking
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c.
Cold -leg temperatures approach saturation temperature for
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secondary' side pressure (normally within 5 minutes).
d.
Heat removal from OTSG's is ver,1fied, through steam flow indication and feed flow indication.
2.
Primary to Seconda'ry Heat Transfer Recognition Primary to secondary heat transfer is defined by the following:
a.
OTSG level and pressure are being controlled b.
RCS.Tc controlled by 0TSG pressure c.
Forced or verified natural RCS circulation.
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Ouestion 7 Note 5 on Sheet 7 of the loop error analysis states that the pressure transmitter error values are not applicable for calibration error calculations. As shown on Sheets 21, 22, and 23, the allowable calibration error is calculated by subtracting the error associated with pressure transmitter from.the total loop error for the non-accident condition.
It is the staff's concern that this may not be an appropriate method for considering calibration error.
Typically, calibration error is considered in addition to the error specified by the manufacturer for accuracy, stability and temperature effects. Calibration error may be from a number of sources including the inaccuracy of the calibration equipment and the ability of the technician to precisely read the calibration equipment or set an instrument, or procedural guidelines on how precisely to set an instrument. Where digital calibration equipment or precision type gauges are utilized, neglecting the human factor in reading calibration instruments may be appropriate.
Calibration errors act in combination with component drift (stability error) and tend to work together as a single error component in their effects on the input / output relationship of a transmitter. When summing these errors statistically they should be added into one unit, and total error may then be used in a statisticai summation.
If, for example, the square root of the sum of the squares method is used, the following would be an appropriate method to consider the variables associated with calibration and stability:
[(transmitter stability error + human factor calibration considerations +
calibration equipment inaccuracy + error band allowed by procedure )2 +
(transmitter accuracy)2 + (transmitter temperature effects)2 + (x)2 +
(y)2 + (z)2]1/2.
In this equation x, y, and z represent the independent error contributions to the total loop error associated with other components in the loop. Accordingly, we recomend that the instrument loop error be recalculated utilizing the methods described above or other appropriate methods to treat the errors associated with calibration accuracy.
Response
Error values of the test instrumentation required for calibration and surveillance testing of the Tsat instrument loop have been included in the revised Tsat instrument loop error calculation. As discussed in the response to Question 2, the sources of error were examined and found to be independent random errors. The test instrument accuracies are altiplied by the applicable loop gains and span changes and are summed statistically, for both non accident and SBLOCA accident conditfons.
The contribution of test instrument accuracy in the ranges of interest were a maximum of i 1.6*F for 200-400 psig, and a minimum of i 0.40*F for RC pressure between 1900-2500 psig.
The contribution of drift (stability) for the Rosemount pressure transmitter has been included in the error analysis.
For the Foxboro instruments, the accuracy term inc!udes contribution due to drift.
Except for one analog pressure gauge with negligible readability error, digital equipment is used; therefore, neglecting the human factors contribution is appropriate.
Treatment of the error band allowed by procedure is discussed in part 3 of the error analysis (Attachment 2).
7-1
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Question 11 The error in the subcooling margin monitor loop increases with decreasing reactor system pressure. Based on operating procedures and LOCA analyses, we request that you identify the lowest reactor system pressure that the high pressure injection flow would be throttled.
Response
With RCPs running, the subcooling margin monitor would not be required below 200 psig in the RCS.
Figure 1A of ATP 1210-10 illustrates that when RCPs are operated, the required subcooling margin will be greater than 25F*.
For example, at 200 psig, the emergency NPSH curve requires a subcooling margin of more than 185F.
Since the corresponding RCS temperature is 190'F, subcooling margin is assured. With RCPs off, HPI throttling might be required to 175 psig in the RCS.
In both cases, the instrument error is small enough to assure adequate subcooling margin. The instrument errors are presented in and Question 5, respectively.
If RCPs are not running, HPI might be throttled using the manually calculated subcooling margin when RCS pressure is below 200 psig. With RC pumps off, the operator could be controlling HPI at the minimum subcooling margin in one of the following reactor coolant conditions:
a.
The break is too small to relieve the liquid volume injected by HPI, i.e. the RCS is water solid. The operator would have to throttle HPI to reduce RCS pressure or hold pressure and reduce temperature so that the DHR system could be initiated.
Decay heat will be removed through the OTSG heat sink until DHR is initiated.
b.
The RCS reaches the LPI pressure, but refills and repressurizes above the shutoff head of the LPI pumps. Again, this requires the RCS to be filled water solid. HPI would be throttled to control RCS pressure, while the RCS temperature is decreased by 0TSG heat removal.
Plant emergency procedures (ATP 1210-6 and ATP 1210-9) address operation of the plant in conditions "a" and "b".
The decay heat system is operated with one loop in DHR alignment and one loop in LPI alignment. EFW must be maintained on until DHR flow is established at 1000 gpm per leg. Thus the plant is maintained in a state where decay heat is removed by either the DHR system or the OTSG's and inventory control is by the LPI and HPI systems. The procedure also allows the operator tc initiate DHR flow if system design conditions are met.
In addition, HPI flow woulc be throttled to control pressurizer level. The maximum pressure at which the DHR system can be established is 350 psig. The LPI system supplies 1,000 gpm at 175 psig and exceeds the HPI flow capability below 190 psig.
In breaks in this range the LPI system will be operating at or near its shutoff head of approximately 190 psig. Throttling HPI based on subcooling margin 1:; not critical to core cooling. The RCS is maintained water solid and RCS pressure is fixed by the volumetric flow of the LPI rystem. Any reduction of HPI flow results in an increase in the LPI flow. Thus, with LPI in operation, the RCS pressure is fixed at 180 to 190 psig, and throttling HPI flow can have no effect on RCS pressure or subcooling margin.
11-1
c.
The break is too small to remove decay heat at an RCS pressure below 200 psi. This would cause RCS pressure to hold up above the-pressure at which LPI flow is established (about 190 psi). HPI could not be throttled until the minimum subcooling margin is regained and pressurizer level returned on scale. Therefore, even if the calculated cubcooling margin is 25'F or greater, HPI flow would only be throttled to control pressurizer level.
Decay heat removal is provided by the steam generators and/or the decay heat removal system.
Thus, there are some plant conditions for which HPI throttling would be performed below 200 psig in the RCS. However, none of these conditions require throttling of HPI based on SCM for an RCS pressure less than 175 psig.
11-2
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if SkO)Q ({ 'e NUCIOSF DOCUMENT NO.
C-1101-665-5350-005 TITLE TMI-l SATURATION MARGIN MONITOR LOOP ERROR ANALYSIS REV
SUMMARY
OF CHANGE APPROVAL DATE 1
All sheets of the original issue were revised and additional sheets were added to this revision to include the g-(
g gain of the characterizer and the error I
j of the indicator and calibration b
/j instrument loops.
,mm 2
Added Part 4 calculations to include 44 [t4.
9.kW Steam Line Break errors.
Added Part 5 calculations tio include Systematic Loop errors.
,g 2::panded the Oojective, Assumptions and Discussions para. graphs to include
~g
( O SLB and Systematic errors.
- 3 Renumbered pages.
--_My 3
Changed Module 9 temperature effect error Tg from A T=10d *F to ATw50 *F & rev ised calculations to include new Tg value.
I" 2-N Delete Part 4 calculation and include SLB error as part of Part 1 calcula-tions.
4 References-Added reference 7 I
Discussion-included radiation for h
accident conditions (d T4 4< ' /1 4 t'l Conclusions-revised Table 1 values Sheets 5 through 8
- Deleted power variation errors
- Added Calibration Instrument errors
- Added RTD errors S'
N
- Changed Transmitter accident Temperature and radiation error values
- Added Transmitter stability as accident error Part 1 calculations revised Part 2 calculations revised A
Part 3 calculations revised f
I h-N'N Appendix-deleted
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A0000038 782
DOCUMENT NO.
Mf C-1101-665-5350-005 TITLE TMI-l Saturation Margin Monitor Loop Error Analysis REV
SUMMARY
OF CHANGE APPROVAL DATE l' //~I 5
Corrected Calculation Error-Summary of A*
Results Page 15 and 19.
Corrected Table 1 Values and added
- on Page 4.
Revised Description in Part 3 and Deleted Calculation Pages 21 & 22.
Deleted Pages 23 through 33.
Renumbered all sheets for new total of
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Rev.
5 Nt:12:i cAtc. no..C.1101.@.5.53.50-005 SHEET NO..1....... OF....$
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DATE...U.l. /8.4.
...I.U.... 5.AJ,URAT,I ON,MA.RGI,, MO,N I, O,R..
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7 SUBJECT....
COW BY/DATE.
N LOOP ERROR ANALYSIS
. M./.1/#/If cHK'D, BY/DATE 1
OBJECTIVE Determine the expected errors for the alarm, indicator, and calibration instrument loops during normal operations and also for small break LOCA, and steam line break conditions. This calculation is based on the instrument loop defined by the Reference 1 modification and includes the verification coments (Reference 2) to the original issue.
REFERENCES 1.
GPUN B/A 123072 - Modification of TSAT to replace non-lE temperature inputs with IE temp. inputs.
2.
GPUN verification of Calculation C-1101-665-5350-005 by J. P. Moore dated 7/10/84.
3.
USNRC Memo - Peter S. Kapotow 8/23/82 page A6 NUREG-0737 analytical solutions to two problems pertinent to Items II.F.1.4, 5, 6, a statistical treatment of deadband and hysteresis errors.
4.
Control valve handbook, Fisher Controls, Properties of Saturated Steam.
5.
GPUN memo EP&I/84/1525-047M, Rosemount 1153 accuracy.
6.
GPUN Calculation C-1101-665-5300-006, "TMI-l Saturation Margin Monitor Error Analysis - Rosemount Pressure Transmitter".
7.
GPUN Calculation C-1101-665-5300-008, "TMI Saturation Margin Monitor Error Analysis - Temperature and Radiation.d ASSUMPTIONS 1.
Unless othenvise stated, Vendor published accuracy data includes the combined effects of linearity, hystercsis, deadband and repeatability as stated in Standard ISA-551.1, 1959.
2.
Unless otherwise stated Vendor published accuracy data represents 3 Sigma (3a) values, and can be converted to 2o values by multiplying by 2/3 as stated in Ref.erence 3.
3.
Accident conditions are:
4 SBLOCA 30 PSIG (no RB spray), 100% RH, 4x10 R, 245 F.
Steam line break 38 psig, 390*F.
(245 F at pressure transmitter.)
4.
Signal conditioning electronics and display devices are located within controlled environments within the control building.
AOOO OO16 s a.s o 0918f
Rev.
5 N rleer CALC. NO..h.d.h.66.5.53.50-005
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SHEET NO....... OF...1$
SUBJECT.,....1M1...SAIURAIIDR. MARGIN.MONI.TO.R.,
DATE.....12/
COMP BY/DATE...
M.
............. l.00,P, ER,RO,R A,NA,LY S I S......
CHK*D. BY/DATE
./M'/ V 8
DISCUSSION The saturation margin monitor measures RC temperature and pressure. The pressure signal is used to electronically compute the fluid saturation temperature. This computed saturation temperature is compared to the actual measured temperature and a margin to saturation is determined and displayed. An alarm is provided. There are two channels. The RTD's and RC pressure transmitters are inside containment and exposed to the SBLOCA/SLB environment. The system is used under normal, SBLOCA/SLB, and 0TSG tube rupture conditions only.
The Rosemount RC pressure transmitter latest test results (1153 series B/0)isbasedonLOCAconditjRAD.ons with a maximum temperature of 420' and radiation exposure of 5 x 10 This is too conservative compared 4
with SBLOCA conditions of 245*F and 4 x 10 R.
Therefore, original test data was reviewed to calculate the standard deviation of temperature effect error and radiation effect error for the required accident environmental conditions (Reference 7).
R4 In addition to the loop uncertainty errors that are random in nature, there exists systematic errors that are fixed quantities under certain conditions.
The systematic errors consist of:
a)
Characterizer Curve Error.
b)
Containment Pressure Error
's Characterizer curve error is a function of reactor coolant pressure conversion to saturation temperature. For each of eight segments of RC pressure, the error varies from slightly positive at the segment end values to negative errors in between. For this application, this would be the maximum negative error (conversion to a saturation temperature value that is lower than the actual saturation valu'e). Therefore, the maximum negative error for each RC pressure segment is presented as a systematic error and the negative random error should be added to it where applicable.
Containment pressure error is a fune. tion of ambient pressure in the containment building where the low side of the RC pressure transmitter.
vents. During SBLOCA and steam line break accident conditions when the' 1
containment pressure is elevated the RC pressure transmitter will provide a pressure signal that will be decreased by an amount equal to the increase of containment pressure over atmospheric. The increase in containment pressure during SBLOCA is about 30 psig, and for steam line' break is a maximum of 38 psig. The RC pressure is converted to its equivalent saturation temperature and the erroneous decreased pressure transmitter signal would result in a lower value of saturation temperature than actually exists for the true RC pressure.
AOOO 0018 a.a o
Rev.
5 Nuclear CALC. NO. 0-U01.665.5350-005 SHEET NO... 3..... OF,.
.. O DATE..
. 2[,N k SUBJECT.
.~
COMP. BY/DATE..
.I.$'ON LOOP ERROR ANALYSIS cHK'D. BY/DATE Since the containment pressure error is systematic and the contain.nent temperature error random, the two errors are added algebraically.
It was calculated that the combined containment temperature and pressure errors reach a maximum value when the pressure excurision is completed (at T =
12000 seconds) and P returns to atmospheric and T at about 200 F.
Thus, the worst case combined error during a SBLOCA occurs under the following conditions:
Containment Temperature = 200*F M
Containment Pressure = 0 psig Containment Radiation = 4x104R TID RC Pressure = 400 psig To be conservative, the accident condition errors were calculated under the following conditions:
Containment Temp = 212*F Containment Pressure = 0 psig Containment Radiation = 4x100R TIO RC Pressure = 400 psig CONCLUSIONS The calculated errors are the difference between the indicated margin value and the true margin value. A negative error is conservative and denotes that the indicated value is less than the true value. When the error is algebraically subtracted from the indicated value it gives the true value. For example, if the indicated margin and error is 50'F
(-10+15'F), the true margin is between 60'F and 35'F.
1 AOOO Oo16 It ce
CALC. NO..'.
.h.'.h. I.
SHEET NO...b... OF..b....
SUBJECT.....
D ATE.......\\ ~.U.~ 3.h........
COMP. BY/DATE..
...Df.I.h
....... CHK'O. BY/D ATE............
Table 1 presents the total alarm loop error for the eight ranges of RC pressure. The negative error for each range is calculated by statistically combining the independent random errors and then algebraically adding the maximum negative characterizer error. The positive error is calculated in the same manner except that the maximum positive characterizer error is zero.
RC PRESSURE TOTAL ALARM LOOP UNCERTAINTY (psig)
Normal SBLOCA
( F)
(*F) i 0-100*
-46.61 + 22.21
-N/A 100-200*'
-12.73 + 10.03
-7.28 + 20.48 200-400
-11.12 + 7.32
-5.79 + 14.95 g
400-600
- 7.85 + 6.25
-4.42 + 12.74 600-900
- 7.32 + 5.82
-4.96 + 11.10 900-1300
- 6.65 + 5.56
-4.84 + 10.24 1300-1900
- 6.71 + 5.41
-4.80 + 9.72 1900-2500
- 6.17 + 5.37
-4.88 + 10.06 i
TABLE 1 TOTAL ALARM LOOP ERROR The Saturation Margin Monitor will not be used unless the RCP's are on.
85 This precludes use in these ranges of RC Pressure.
AOOO 001e e a.a o e
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itwoutir n
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- 457, 457/5oo
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SUBJECT.
DATE...l. M h.4.9.
comp. BY/DATE...
11-4-If k 'A'I'-Pb cHx.D. BY/DATE Pmt mo M.stcnM pcMtv \\ coq qt.nott
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J L-AOOO 0016 82-40
Nrclear Cate. no.6.g-g9Upg Reu-5 sscEr no...I.h.... OF.$.k...
SUBJECT.
DATE...l.49.Y.i.N..
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Nuclear
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~ H. 9. b W CALC.NO.
SHEET NO. )3.... OF..U...
SUBJECT...
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comp. BY/DATE.
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6/4uGRAT.oo ERoca(dg) Aco a comesoeb yp%p. %9. Testw9Aryur 4
noch,nr.' o. %c creaca-areuser t.coe vocoucs osc taf o
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AOOO 0016 e2 e0
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SHEET NO..l.h..
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DATE.
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+
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dous r ten u r.t.e.
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DATE..lM D.*.d SUBJECT..
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=
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- 1. S 'T 7.59 po-Aco 0.30 6 30
(,. 3 2.
400-too 0.10 5.71 5'l3 Goo-ho 0.lf 5.50 5.53 Mo-\\300
%JI 5.3 G 5,3%
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