ML20113E027

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-369/84-35 & 50-370/84-33.Corrective Actions:Station Memo Issued Requiring Whenever Valve SA-48 Fails Timing Test Standby Shutdown Sys Inoperability Must Be Logged
ML20113E027
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  
Issue date: 02/13/1985
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To: Grace J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20113D999 List:
References
NUDOCS 8504160151
Download: ML20113E027 (2)


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DUKE POWER GonnoT P.O. HOx 33180 CIIAHLOTTE, N.C. 28242 HALH. TUCKER TeLernoxe vic. remerneur (704) 373-4538

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85 Ft@tgarA 93; M5

.Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

Reference:

RII:WTO NRC/0IE Inspection Report 50-369/84-35 and 50-370/84-33

Dear Dr. Grace:

Please find attached a response to Deviation 50-370/84-33-01 which was identified in the above referenced inspection report. Duke Power Company does not consider any information contained in this report to be proprietary.

Very truly yours, f.8.

/8tV Hal B. Tucker PBN/mjf Attachment cc:

Mr. W. T. Orders Senior Resident Inspector - NRC McGuire Nuclear Station i

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8504160151 850307 PDR ADOCK 05000369-g PDR

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DUKE POWER COMPANY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION Response to NRC/01E Inspection Report 50-369/84-35 and 50-370/84-33 DEVIATION 50-370/84-33-01:

Duke Power Company in a letter to NRC Region II, dated September 10, 1984, stated that the McGuire station would implement interim technical specifications pertaining to the Standby Shutdown System (SSS). The interim technical specifications require the operations staff to notify Station Security when SSS equipment detailed in those requirements becomes degraded.

Contrary to the above on November 5, 1984, the operations staff did not notify Station Security when certain Unit 2 SSS equipment detailed in the interim technical specifications was determined to be degraded.

RESPONSE

.The steam supply valve (SA-48ABC) to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump failed its' valve stroke timing test. Although it was logged in the Technical Specification Log as inoperable (for auxiliary.feedwater purposes), it was not indicated that the Standby Shutdown System was inoperable due to a failure to recognize the SSS implications of the valve.

Af ter determination of the valves SSS applicability, it was logged out for the SSS technical specification and appropriate actions taken.

Technical Specification 3.7.14 for the SSS requires this valve to be periodically tested; however, it does not specify a stroke time requirement. Duke Power is investigating.the problem and will determine an appropriate stroke time for this valve (it has bee,n determined that,all valve stroke _ timing results to date for SA-48 were acceptable for SSS operation even if they exceeded IWV requirements).

A station memorandum has been issued requiring that until an appropriate stroke time is determined, whenever valve SA-48 fails its' timing test also log the SSS inoperable and notify Security.