ML20113D863
| ML20113D863 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1985 |
| From: | Hufham J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8504150647 | |
| Download: ML20113D863 (2) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA TENNESSEE 374ol 400 Chestnut Street Tower II February 23, 1985 BLRD-50-438/85-o 8 85 fEB28 P l; l g BLRD-50-439/85-08 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Canaission Region II Attn:
Mr. J. Nelson Grace, Regioral Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgta 30323
Dear Dr. Grace:
BELLEFWTE NUCLEAR PLANE WITS 1 AND 2 - SOE AUXILIARY BUILDING C0!NON i
ZWE AIR-CDNDITINING EQUIPENT NOT SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED -
BLRD-50-438/85-08 AND BLRD-50-439/85 FIRST INTERIM REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector Al Ignatonis on January 25, 1985 in accordance with 10 TR 50.55(e)
NCR BLN EEB 8420. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to subnit our next report on er about October 2, 1985.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
, censind an ' Manager W. Euf i
I Regulations Enclosure oc - (Enclosure):
U Mr. James Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 OmCIAL COPY g 41506y e\\8$
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c' ENCI.mURE BELLEFWTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SOE AUXILIARY BUILDING COPEON ZCNE AIR-CONDITIMING EQUIPENT IS NCTF SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED BLRD-50-438/85-08 AND BLRE-50-439/85-08 NCR BLN EB 8410 10 mR 50.55(e )
FIRST IN'IERIM REPORT Description of Deficiency Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) design criterla requim in part that the Auxiliary Building common area airsconditiontng (VF) system be designed and
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supported such that it will not fall upon e otherwise impair tne functional capabilities of safety-related equipnent as a result of the occurrence of a safety shutdown earthquake (SSE).
In designing VF system, the design criteria was interpreted to mean that if no safety-related (1E) equipnent was in the vicinity of the VF piping or components, the piping and components could be runseismic. As a result, many VF system components were purchased nonseisrtic and installai nonseismically.
Some of this piping or these nonseismic components ended up in proximity to safety-related electrical components (due to the 1E equipnent being added later) where a seismic event could result in the VF system eq2ipnent falling or moving and damaging the electrical equigtent.
o Where instrtsnetation and control (I&C) tubing and devices interfaced with piping or components designated on the 3AWO643-VF series as ncnseismic, the I&C tubing and devices were also designated as nonseismic. These I&C components designated as nonseismic are also potentially in proximity to class 1E electrical equipnenc where damage would occur due to movement or falling during a seismic event.
The following equipnent is 1E and is in proximity to nonseismically qualified ~
or installed heating, ventilating, and airsconditioning (HVAC) equipnent.
Local instetsnait panels 01X-ILPC-024-B, 023-A.
Additional equipnent will likely be addel to the list of affected components, as determined by a detailed analysis of safety-related areas containing nonseismic HV AC equipnent.
Interim Progress Piping systems in category 1 structures which potentially contain nonseismically qualified equipnet are currently being reviewed to identify any additional equipnent that may be lacking seismic qualification. The approach to be taken to msolve the probles will be finalized upon completion of the identification of all problem equiptent.
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