Text

Rev 1 to North Anna Power Station Svc Water Sys Probabilistic Safety Assessment
	ML20112J587
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	03/31/1985
From:	Kimball K; ABB IMPELL CORP. (FORMERLY IMPELL CORP.)
To:	;
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ML20112J585	List: ML20112J581; ML20112J587; ML20112J592;
References
	03-1250-1097, 03-1250-1097-R01, 3-1250-1097, 3-1250-1097-R1, NUDOCS 8504050231
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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT Prepared for:

Virginia Power Prepared by:

Impe11 Corporation 333 Research Court / Technology Park Norcross, GA 30092 ,

Report No. 03-1250-1097

Revision 1 March,1985 i

8504050231 850329 PDR ADOCK 05000338 P PDR

bb APPROVAL COVERSHEET Document Title. North Anna Power Station Service Water System Probabilistic Safety Assessmen.:

Control Number: 03-1250-1097 .

Client Virginia Power Job No; 1250-023-1572 Project Service Water Reliability study Revision Record Rev. No. Date Prepared hed Approved kbL11() 7,-

0 2/26/85 K. D. Kimball '

F 1 3/21/85 b. 4j k 1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND OVERVIEW 1 -1 ,

2.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 2-1 2.1 Objectives and Workscope 2-1 3.0 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION- 3-1 3.1 Service Water System Function 3-1 3.2 Service Water System Description 3-4 3.3 Descriptions of Systems Supported 3-16 by Service Water 3.4 System Success Criteria 3-23 4.0 ANALYSIS METHOD 4-1 4.1 Methodology 4-1 4.2 Qualitative Analysis 4-2 4.3 Quantitative Analysis 4-5 5.0 RESULTS 5-1 5.1 Qualitative Analysis 5-1 5.2 Service Water System Failure Frequency 5-7

5. 3 - Significant Contributors to System Failure 5-11 5.4 Sensitivity Studies 5-18

6.0 CONCLUSION

S AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6-1 6.1 Conclusions 6-1 6.2 Recomnendation 6-2

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7.0 REFERENCES

7-1 APPENDIX A PLANT SPECIFIC DATA RESULTS APPENDIX B SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAULT TREES APPENDIX C FAILURE RATES AND PROBABILITIES APPENDIX D HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITIES APPENDIX E FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS APPENDIX F COMPUTER ANALYSIS OUTPUT Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1

LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1 -1 Success Criteria for Service Water System and Associated Systems 1-6 1 -2 Service Water System Failure Probability 1 -9 3-1 Service Water System Electric Power Interfaces 3-10 3-2 Power Supplies for Service Water M0V's 3-11 3-3 Service Water System Control Room Annunciators (Unit 1) 3-14 3-4 Service Water System Remote Indicators (Unit 1) 3-15 3-5 Success Criteria for Service Water System and Associated Systems 3-24 4-1 Plant System Designator 4-8 4-2 Component Code 4-8 4-3 Failure Mode Code 4-9 4-4 Service Water System Human Error Probabilities 4-16 5-1 Potential Common Cause Events 5-6 5-2 Service Water System Failure Probability 5-8 5-3 Significant Contributors to Service Water 5-12 System Failure-Normal Operation

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5-4 Significant Contributors to Service. Water 5-13 System Failure-LC0 Operation 5-5 Significant Contributors to Service Water System Failure During Loss of Station Power, Normal Operation 5-15 5-6 Significant Contributors System Failure of Flow to Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers, LC0 Operation 5-16 5-7 Signficant Contributors to System Failure of Flow to CCW Heat Exchangers, LC0 Operation 5-17 5-8 Results of Reduced Maintenance Cases 5-20 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 -

LIST OF FIGURES

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Figure Page 2-1 North Anna Power Station Technical Specification 2-2 on Plant Service Water 3-1 Service Water System Interaction Diagram 3-3 3-2 Simp 1lfied Flow Diagram North Anna Service Water System 3-5 3-3 Compcsent Cooling Water Heat Exchangers - Simplified Flow Diagram 3-18 3-4 Simplified Flow Diagram Charging Pump Lube-oil and Seal Coolers 3-20

. 3-5 Simplified Flow Diagram Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers 3- 21 4-1 Sample FMEA Format 4-4 4-2 Probability Distribution for Motor Operated Valves 4-13 l

l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 l .

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U RECORD OF REVISION 1 PAGES REVISED, DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE -

Title Page; Revision number Table of Contents; Titles and page numbers 1-1, 1-3, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 1-12; Editorial and typographical corrections 1-7; Addition of last paragraph 3-2, 3-6, 3-8; Editorial corrections ,

3-3, 3-5; Figure correction 3-11, 3-12; Title change 3-14; Addition of footnote 3-25; Addition of last paragraph 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-5 ; Editorial corrections and title changes .

4-11; Correction of equation 4-12, 4-14, 4-15, 4-17; Editorial corrections and title changes 4-11; Correction of equation 4-12, 4-14, 4-15, 4-17; Editorial and typographical corrections 5-2; Editorial change 5-3; Correction to second paragraph 5-4; Correction to last paragraph 5-5; Repaging 5-8; Correction to reference 5-9; Correction to second paragraph 5-11; Addition of equation 1

Record of Revision 1 Page Two 5-14; Editorial correction 5-16; Typographical correction 5-18, 5-19, 5-20; Editorial and typographical correction 6-1, 6-2; Editorial and typographical correction 7-1; Addition of references 7 and 8 B-10 , B-14, B-25, B-26; Typographical correction D-3, D-5, D-6, D-9, D-10, D-11; Typographical correction E-5; Terminology change under ' Detection Mechanism' F-32, F-33; Addition of Table

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SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW _

INTRODUCTION This report presents the results of a safety study performed on the service water system at the North Anna Power Station which is owned and operated by Virginia Power. The North Anna Power Station consists of two pressurized water reactor units. The service water system is a connon system to both units and is capable of supplying treated water from the service water reservoir or untreated water from the North Anna Reservoir.

The purpose of this study is to perform an evaluation of the service water system reliability under current Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and under extended LCO conditions. The current Technical Specifications allow for one of two service water headers to be out of service for a maximum period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months before both North Anna units must initiate hot standby operations followed shcrtly by shutdown operations. The extended LCO conditions evaluated will allow for the operation of the service water system for a period of seven (7) days with one header itioperable.

This section provides an overview of the analysis including the results and

- conclusions. The detailed analysis is contained in the following sections and appendicies.

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Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 1-1 l

Objectives The overall objective of this project is to perform a probabilistic safety assessment of the service water system with particular emphasis on the change in reliability of the service water system as a result of extending the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) to a time period of seven (7) days. The analysis includes:

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. A reliability study of the North Anna Power Station service water system in normal operation (i.e. two main headers operable);

. A reliability study of the service water system in an LCO condition with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months as the mission time;

. A reliability study of the service water system in an extended LCO condition with 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months (7 days) as the mission time; and

. Several sensitivity studies to investigate the reliability of systems supported by service water and potential changes in ' system operation to enhance service water reliability.

Scope This analysis is based upon a qualitative and quantitative probabilistic evaluation of the reliability of the service water system under the conditions described above. Specifically, the evaluation centers on the ability of the service water system to provide adequate flow to the main headers and to the primary systems that are supported by service water. Electrical power interfaces are considered in the analysis. It is important to note that the l

study does not consider failures of systems supported by service water that are caused by faults independent of the service water system. For example, l

service water flow to the recirculation spray heat exchangers is evaluated; l however, failure of the recirculation spray subsystem because of recirculation pump failure is not evaluated.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Rev'ision 0 Page 1-2

In addition to the evaluation of the service water system, service water flow to the following heat loads were evaluated:

. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers

. Charging Pump Lube-oil Coolers and Seal Coolers

. Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers There are two other primary heat loads to the service water system: the compressed air system and the control and relay room air conditioning condenser water system. Flow to these systems was not evaluated explicitly for the following reasons: -

. Although important to plant operation, loss of service water to the compressed air systems and subsequent loss of compressed air to the plant will not affect the safe shutdown capability of the plant. All safety related, air operated valves that may be operated during accident conditions have air available from storage bottles or fail in the safe position. ,

. The air conditioning arrangement is such that no action, either automatic or manual, is required during an emergency. The service water connection to the air conditioning condensers is through nonnally open manual block valves, thus the limiting condition for service water supply is the failure of the service water system itsel f.

The service water system also provides backup supply to the following systems:

. Steam Generator Feed System

. Fuel Pit Cooling and Purification System Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 -

Page 1-3

. Containment Air Recirculation System

. Hot Pipe Penetration Cooling Coils .

The backup supply function of the service water system was not modeled.

Analysis Methodology The analysis was performed in two parts, a qualitative analysis and a quantitative analysis.

The qualitative system evaluation included the performance of a failure modes and effects analysis which identified potential failure mechanisms and j evaluated their consequences in terms of system performance. In addition, a review of the industry Licensee Event Reports (LER's) on service water systems was conducted and evaluated with respect to North Anna Power Station.

The quantitative system evaluation was a fault tree analysis of the service water system and applicable support systems. It includes a consideration of key human factors in causing and correcting service water system failures and a listing of main contributors to system unavailability. The list of main -

contributors was then reviewed to identify potential measures to enhance system performance, particularly during an extended LCO.

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The fault tree was analyzed by assigning probabilities to the basic events contained in the tree. These were derived from system and component failure data and human error data and models. Industry data sources and North Anna Power Station plant-specific operating experience were reviewed to develop a recommended data base for this analysis.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 1-4

There are numerous sources of nuclear industry component reliability. These sources have been reviewed to derive failure rate estimates for electrical and I mechanical equipment generic to the nuclear industry. These have been assembled into a data summary contained in Appendix C. The summary lists -

recommended values for each component failure mode and provides an estimate of the uncertainty range. This data summary provides the generic data base for this project.

Plant-specific data were generally used to supplement the more extensive generic data base whenever there were significant differences between the plant-specific operating experience and industry experience. This was particularly useful in evaluating the potential impact of certain operational problems in terms of overall system performance. .

Success Criteria The success criteria are presented in Table 1-1 for the service water system and associated supported systems. These success criteria are based upon the design basis accident condition stated in the North Anna Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, specifically, a simultaneous loss of coolant ,

accident for one unit and loss of station power for both units. The NAPS UFSAR provides the system success criteria in tems of flow rate and/or heat transfer.

e Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 1-5

TABLE 1-1 SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS l SUCCESS CRITERIA Service Water System Flow Full flow from two pumps Heat Transfer Full flow through two spray arrays or j operation from lake to 1 lake. ]

Component Cooling Water Heat Transfer F?ow to two component cooling heat exchangers.

Charging Pump Lube-oil Coolers and Seal coolers Heat Transfer Flow to one charging .

pump lube oil cooler and seal coolers (per unit).

Recirculation Spray Subsystem Heat Transfer Flow to two recirculation spray heat exchangers.

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'l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 1-6

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The analysis is also based upon the following key assumptions:

. Two service water pumps are assumed to be normally operating at the start of the mission time. This is consistent with normal operating practices.

. The maximum number of service water pumps allowed in maintenance at the same time is two. Only one auxiliary service water pump is allowed in maintenance at a time. This is based upon Technical Specification limits and normal operating practices.

. During the LCO evaluation, it is conservatively assumed that a supply and return header is inoperable. Usually, only one of the two is inoperable, thereby still providing redundancy in the other headers.

. During the LCO evaluation, the intact header is considered operable per Technical Specification criteria.

. Credit for operating the service water system in the Lake to Lake suction-discharge mode was not given in this analysis. This is a conservative assumption because this mode is a backup to the normal supply / discharge path of the service water reservoir. It is ,

important to note that this assumption does not preclude service water system operation in the Lake to Lake operating mode.

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Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 1-7

Results The results of the quantitative analysis of the service water system are summarized in Table 1-2. The following cases were analyzed under normal two header operation, operation under an LCO condition of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , and operation under an LCO condition of 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months s:

. Case 1 - Service water system (pumps and major headers);

. Case 2 - Service water. system with loss of station power;

. Case 3 - Service water flow to the recirculation spray heat exchangers;

. Case 4 - Service water flow to the component cooling water heat exchangers; and .

. Case 5 - Service water flow to the charging pump lube oil coolers and seal coolers.

For the Case 1 series of analyses, the results showed that the probability of system failure to provide adequate service water flow during any arbitrary 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months period is 8.5 x 10-6 This translates into a failure frequency for the service water system of 0.001 events per year.

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It should be noted that the value 8.5 x 10-6:is not the system unavailability, since system repair times have not been considered. This analysis assumes that no individual component is repaired during the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time span of interest. Given the maintenance history of the system and the nominal lead times to repair, this is a reasonable assumption; however, should a service water system component failure cause an LCO condition, it is i expected that the system would be repaired on a high priority basis, lending additional conservatism to the analysis.

d Report No. 03-1250-1097 Re' vision 1 Page 1-8

1 TABLE 1-2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY Case Description System Failure Probability l l A B l C

'l 12 hdr, 72 hr.1 hdr, 72 hr LC011 hdr,168 hr LCO I l l 1 1 I 1 l Service Water System l 8.5E-6 l 3.2E-5 l 4.0E-5 I I I I

2 l Service Water System with LOSP l' 1.4E-2 l 1.9E-2 l 1.9E-2 with frequency of LOSP 3.1E-6 4.2E-6 I 9.8E-6 applied I l; I I l 3 i SW Flow to Recirc Spray Hx l 8.2E-6 l 2.3E-4 l 2.4E-4 I I I I 4 l SW Flow to CCW Hx I 8.5E-6 I 9.0E-5 I 1.7E-4 I I I 5 l SW Flow to Charging Pump l 8.5E-6 1 3.2E-5 1 4.0E-5 I Coolers l I l l l l 1

Frequency of LOSP is assumed to be 0.027 events / year (Reference 5) for all events. The probability reported is the failure probability during any arbitrary 72 or 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months period.

I Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 1-9 '

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The results show that the system failure probability during an LCO condition of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is 3.2 X 10-5 and is 4.0 X 10-5 for 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months . The difference between these results are well within the bounds of uncertainty due to data variability and modeling approximations of the approach used in this and other industry studies, and can be considered negligible.

An additional series of cases was run assuming that a. loss of station power

initiator occurred. The results showed a three order of magnitude increase in failure probability, with again little sensitivity to extending the LCO condition. The majority of contributors to system failure were electrical components, and since plant specific data was not utilized for these components and a simplified fault tree was used for electrical distribution, there exists a large uncertainty in the failure probability. Conservative

' data was also used in that a loss of station power for a period of six hours is assumed for the mission time of the diesel generators. For shorter durations the failure probability would be significantly reduced.

The failure probability for flow to the recirculation spray heat exchangers for an LCO condition of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is 2.3 X 10-4 and for an LCO condition of

168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months is 2.4 X 10-4 .

The failure probability for getting service water to the corponent cooling water heat exchangers is the same for the service water system, 8.5 X 10-6 ,

For the LCO conditions, the probabilities are 9.0 X 10-5 and 1.7 X 10A for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months respectively. The failure probability for service l

water flow to the charging pumps is the same as that for the service water system under all operating conditions.

l A sensitivity study was also performed to evaluate the impact of reducing the maintenance activity on the service water pumps during the extended outage.

This pre-condition would limit maintenance activities such that 3 out of 4 l

l Report No. 03-1250-1097 l Revision 1 i Page 1-10 l

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main service water pumps and 1 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps are available for the extended LCO condition. The result of this action reduces the failure probability for the extended LCO case from 4.0 x 10-bto 2.0 x 10-5 ,

Conclusions Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 - Service Water System - Limiting Condition for Operation, requires that with only one service water loop operable, both loops must be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or the nuclear units must be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in cold shutdown within the following thirty hours. This analysis has evaluated the impact upon the reliability of the service water system of extending the LCO time period from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days (168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months ).

Based upon the results of a probabilistic safety study, it is concluded that the extension of the LCO time period will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident. The probability of a service water system failure increases from 3.2 x 10-5 to 4.0 x 10-5 when the time period for the LCO is extended from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months . This small increase in failure probability of the service water system due to ,

extension of the LCO condition would result in a negligible increase in overall plant risk.

In addition, certain actions if incorporated will further reduce the risk associated with the extended LCO. One action in particular is recomended to be implemented. This is the implementation of an administrative control to limit major maintenance on the service water pumps to one pump at a time (i.e.

1 of 4 service water pumps and 1 of 2 auxiliary service water pumps in maintenance at any one time). This action will reduce the failure probability from 4.0 x 10-5 to 2.0 x 10-5, thereby increasing the reliability of the l Service Water System for the 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months extended LCO condition over the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months l LC0 condition.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 1-11

The operation of the nuclear units under the extended LCO does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The plant is currently licensed to . operate with only one header operable under current LCO restrictions, and this does not change as a result of extending the time period.

l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 1-12 I . _ - - _

1 SECTION 2 i

SCOPE AND O&JECTIVES ,

2.1 OBJECTIVES AND WORKSCOPE The overall objective of this project is to perform a probabilistic safety assessment of the service water system with particular emphasis on the change in reliability of the service water system as a result of extending 1 the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) (See Figure 2-1). The time period of seven (7) days was selected for this i evaluation. The analysis includes:

. A reliability study of the North Anna Power Station service water system in normal operation (i.e. two main headers operable);

. A reliability stu of the service water system in an LCO condition with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months as the mission time;

. A reliability study of the stryice water system in an extended LCO condition with 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months (7 days) as the mission time; and

. Several sensitivity studies to investigate availability of systems

supported by service water and potential changes in system operation i to enhance service water reliability.

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In the course of the performance of this analysis, several other objectives were accomplished. These were:

. Quantification of the failure frequency of the service water system;

. Identification of the most significant contributors to system i unavailability; 4

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 2-1

FIGURE 2-1 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION '

ON PLANT SERVICE WATER PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.1 At least two service loops (shared with Unit 2) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.1 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position. ,

b. At least once per 6 months by measurement of the movement of the pumphouse and wing walls.

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety i

related equipment actuates to its correct position on a

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safety injection signal.

2. Verifying that each containment isolation valve actuates to its correct position on a containment high-high signal .

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Rep, ort No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 2-2

. Qualitative assessment of the susceptibility of the service water systiem to cosmon mode failures; and

. Development of component, support system and human reliability data estimates for the service water system.

The overall scope of work consisted of the following tasks:

. Task 1 - System Review .

. Task 2 - Data Analysis

. Task 3 - Qualitative System Evaluation

. Task 4 - Quantitative System Evaluation 9

I The system review task included a walkdown of the North Anna Power Station service water system, and reviews of system drawings, de'scriptions, operating procedures, maintenance instructions, and emergency procedures. Interviews with plant maintenance and operations personnel were also performed. .

The data analysis task consisted of assembling a generic data base, and to the extent possible, a plant-specific data base. Component failure statistics were reviewed and compiled from a number of industry sources. Operating and maintenance records were also reviewed to develop a plant-specific data base and to compile a performance history of the service water system. These generic and plant specific data were then used to obtain point estimates of ,

i i the unavailability of key system components as part of the quantitative

! analysis. l

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The qualitative system evaluation included the perfomance of a failure modes I and effects analysis which identified potential failure mechanisms and evaluated their consequences in terms of system performance. In addition, a -

review of the industry Licensee Event Reports (LER's) on service water systems 1

was conducted and evaluated with respect to North Anna Power Station.

The quantitative system evaluation was a fault tree analysis of the service water system and applicable support systems. It includes a consideration of key human factors in causing and correcting service water system failures and

, a listing of main contributors to system unavailability. The list of main contributors was then reviewed to identify potential measures to enhance system performance, particularly during an extended LCO.

The results of these tasks are presented in the following sections.

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SECTION 3 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 3.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FUNCTION i

The North Anna Power Station service water system is a common system l designed to remove heat resulting from the simultaneous operation of various systems and components of two nuclear units. There are two j independent sources of water that provide the ultimate heat sink for North Anna Power Station. These are the North Anna Reservoir and the service i water reservoir. The water from the North Anna Reservoir is untreated and the water from the service water reservoir is treated.

The main function of the service water system is to act as the heat sink for the following plant systems:

. Component Cooling System

. Chemical and Volume Control System ,

i . Containment Depressurization System

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- . Control and Relay Rooms Air Conditioning Condenser Water System i . . Compressed Air System i

Additionally, the service water system serves as a backup supply to following systems:

. Steam-Generator Feed System Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-1 l

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. Fuel Pit Cooling and Refueling Purification System -

. Containment Air Recirculation System

. Hot Pipe Penetration Cooling Coils These functions are presented in the Systems Interaction Diagram of Figure 3-1. The Systems Interaction Diagram is a logic diagram illustrating the interrelationship's among these systems. As drawn, this diagram shows:

. The service water subsystem and the auxiliary service water subsystem;

. Direct support systems for each service water subsystem;

. Electric power source by bus designator; and

. Each. plant system which contains components supported by service water.

Drawn in this fashion, it is relatively straight forward to determine the impact of an interface system fault. For example, failure of emergency bus 1H would directly fail Train A of auxiliary service water and one

- service water pump in Train A of the service water subsystem.

The Systems Interaction Diagram is also useful in identifying safety significance and intersystem dependenci'ai f

l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 3-2

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I FIGURE 3-1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM INTERACTION DIAGRAM JNIT 1 CTL. UNIT 1 UNIT 1 UNIT 1 B RELAY RM CONT. AIR FEEDWATER

'ONO WATER llONT,AIDSEN1 DE RESS. -CIRC SYS SYSTEM il i l il Jl COMPONENT CHEMICAL JNIT 2 CTL. UNIT 2 FUEL PIT UNIT 2 UNIT 2 XIMPRESSED COOLING a VOLUME B RELAY RM l:ONTAZP#EEN1 CONT. AIR FEEDWATER AIR

- ten gTy 5,WgER oE reg. COOLING.

- TE -CIRC - Sv8TE= - tex Il i t i l i l il IL il jl il l i AUXZLIARY SERVICE SERVICE WATER SUBSYSTEM WATER SUBSYSTEM i

HEADER A MAM S DEADER A M AMR S

,0W

_ m. ECTR R .?'J!- !"1.?'J!- "*"""

1-X L-ZZZ 2-2 n-ZZZ 1H AJ SH l SJ l

VVVV ,

V"VV Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 3-3

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3.2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION Service Water Piping and Pumping Systems A simplified flow diagram of the main service water headers and pumps is shown on Figure 3-2. The service water system is shared between Unit 1 and Unit 2 and consists of redundant supply and return headers which are supplied by four main service water pumps and two a0xiliary service water pumps. The entire service water system, including the service water reservoir, service water pump house, and service water traveling water screens is designed in accordance with Seismic Class I criteria.

The service water pumps are Johnston pumps with each having a rated capacity of 11,500 gpm at a head of 127 feet. They are designed to operate at a service water temperature of 110*F. One service water pump is normally operating for each unit. Each pump takes suction from its own screenwell in the service water pump house and discharges back to the service water reservoir via the reservoir spray system. The pumps are cross connected so that each pump can service either of the two headers.

There are four traveling water screens that remove trash and foreign matter i from water upstream of the service water pumps. The screens have single ' speed non-reversing drives, and operation of the drive motor without rotation of the screen will activate an alarm in the control room. -Cleaning of the screens is accomplished by spraying water into the backface of the screen while slowly rotating the screen past the spray nozzles. Accumulation of debris from the screen is knocked into an adjacent trash sluice trench. The backwash spray is provided by either of two screen wash pumps.

l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-4

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The backwash system periodically (every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ) starts by automatic timers to ensure the screens are adequately washed. In addition, if the

~

j screenwell differential level is greater than 3.5 inches, the system is l automatically started. The differential level control instrumentation is supplied by a dedicated compressed air system (service water air system).

The backwash system can also be started manually at either the service water pump house or the control room.

The auxiliary service water pumps are identical to the service water pumps and provide an alternate supply of service water to the service water supply headers. They are installed in the main intake structure at the North Anna reservoir and take suction from the main intake screenwells and can discharge to the N3rth Anna reservoir via the discharge tunnel. The auxiliary pumps can be used as a normal source of supply to the service water system, if desired, in lieu of the service water pumps.

The auxiliary service water pumps and the screen wash pumps are within an enclosed area, and are protected from adverse environmental effects such I

as freezing or icing that might cause failures or malfunctions in systems essential for safe shutdown. The piping to and from these pumps and the' pump bodies are redundantly heat traced and the motors are equipped with heaters.

4 The service water pump house provides tornado protection for the pumps and related equipment. The main intake structure provides tornado protection for the auxiliary service water pumps. The service water headers are buried for seismic and tornado protection and essential service water lines off the headers are missile protected.

The service water piping to the spray arrays is submerged in the service water reservoir for protection; only the individual risers and spray nozzles project above the surface.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 3-6

Service water is returned to the service water reservoir through the reservoir spray system. The reservoir spray system consists of four equal-capacity grid networks. Each grid consists of headers, risers, and 53-gpm spray nozzles and is capable of handling 50% of the service water '

system pumping capacity required for normal operation and during accident I recovery.

Carbon steel pipe is used throughout the system with the exception of the spray piping, which is primarily fiberglass, and portions of the charging pump cooler piping, which are primarily stainless steel. The joints in steel piping are welded except where flanges are used at connections to equipment, butterfly valves, check valves, and expansion joints. All valves are of steel material. Expansion joints are provided as required.

Fiberglass-reinforced plastic pipe is used for the spray system in the, service water reservoir.. The transition from steel to fiberglass is effected outside the service water pump house. No valves are installed in the fiberglass pipe. Fittings are attached using epoxy resin.

All steel service water pipe that is underground is coated and wrapped in-accordance with the " Recommended Practice Control t f External Corrosion on Underground or Submerged Metallic Piping Systems," Standard RP-10-69. In addition, insulating flanges and cathodic protection systems are used throughout the system where necessary. The interior of the 36-in. pipe has a corrosion-preventive coating. The entire service water system has a corrosion allowance in excess of that required by code specifications.

The fiberglass reinforced plastic pipe that is used in the service water reservoir spray system is not subject to corrosion under conditions existing in the service water system.

l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-7

Service Water Sources -

There are two sources of water for the service water system. The primary source is the service water reservoir and the secondary source is the North Anna reservoir.

The service water reservoir is designed to provide service water for the operation of a potential four nuclear units with a total maximum calculated rating of 11,345 MWt. The storage capacity of the reservoir is approximately 22.5 million gallons at elevation 313 ft and has a surface area of about 9.0 acres. It is constructed by a combination of earth dike and cut. The bottom and side slopes are provided with 2-f t-thick compacted impervious earth liner. Dikes are of the zoned-rock-fill type having a compacted impervious core ssparated from the rock fill by graded filters and sand and gravel.

The dikes are designed as Seismic Class I structures and a minimum freeboard of 3 ft is maintained between the top of the compacted impervious core and the maximum water level in the reservoir. -

Makeup for the service water reservoir is supplied by two 500-gpm pumps from the North Anna reservoir or by the auxiliary service water pumps.

- The makeup pumps are located in the circulating water intake structure.

The service water reservoir capacity is sufficient to provide enough water for 30 days of operation for four nuclear units without makeup. .

There is insufficient head available to cause overfilling of the service water reservoir while the auxiliary service water pumps are in operation, discharging to the discharge tunnel, and while the motor-operated valves in the discharge header to the spray arrays are open.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 3-8

, The North Anna reservoir is impounded by an earth dam and provides water to the auxiliary service water pumps. The water from the North Anna ,

reservoir is also strained by traveling water screens upstream of the l auxiliary service water pumps.

l Electric Power Sources Service water system equipment is powered by essential AC power supplies.

Essential AC power is from four essential buses which are shared between North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. If normal power sources to the buses fail, each one has a dedicated diesel generator to supply emergency power automatically. The essential buses receive control power from essential DC power supplies. DC power supplies are from batteries or battery chargers powered from essential AC buses.

i Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show the electric power supplies to service water system equipment. These electric power interfaces are modeled explicitly in the service water system fault trees described in Section 4 and contained in Appendix B.

Of particular note, the auxiliary service water pump 1-SW-P-4 is interlocked with pump 1-SW-P-1 A to prevent running both a service water 4 pump and an auxiliary service water pump on the same bus at one time.

Pumps 2-SW-P-4 and 2-SW-P-1 A are similarly interlocked on Unit 2.

1 i

, Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-9

TABLE 3-1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ELECTRIC POWER INTERFACES AC Electric Power .

I Component Power Source Service Water Pop 1-SW-P-1A Bus 1H Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-1B Bus 1J Service Water Pump 2-SW-P-1A Bus 2H Service Water Pump 2-SW-P-1B Bus 2J Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-4 (auxiliary) Bus 1H

- Service Water Pump 2-SW-P-4 (auxiliary) Bus 2H Service Water Air Compressor 1-SW-C-1 A MCC-1H1-3 Service Water Air Compressor 1-SW-C-1B MCC-1 J1 -3 Traveling Water Screen 1-SW-S-1 A MCC-1H1-3' Traveling Water Screen 1-SW-S-1B MCC-1J1 -3 i

Traveling Water Screen 2-SW-S-1A MCC-2H1-3 -

Traveling Water Screen 2-SW-S-1B MCC-2J1-3 Screen Wash Pumps 1-SW-P-2 MCC-1H1-3

~

Screen Wash Pumps 2-SW-P-2 MCC-2H1-3 DC Electric Power l

Bus 1H Battery 1-I Bus 1J Battery 1-III Bus 2H Battery 2-1 Bus 2J Battery 2-III I

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-10 l

l -. -

TABLE 3-2 POWER SUPPLIES FOR SERVICE WATER MOV's ,

Unit I Unit II Valve Mark Powered from Valve Mark Powered from Number MCC Number MCC MOV-SW100A 1H1-3 MOV-SW200A 2H1-3 MOV-SW100B lH1-3 MOV-SW2008 2H1-3 MOV-SW101A lH1-2N MOV-SW201A 2 H1-2N MOV-SW101B 1J1-2N MOV-SW201B 2J1-2N MOV-SW10lC lH1-2N M0Y-SW201C 2H1-2N MOV-SW101D lJ1-2N MOV-SW201D 2J1-2N MOV-SW102A 1Hl-25 MOV-SW202A 2H1-2S MOV-SW102B lJ1-2S MOV-SW202B 2J1-2S MOV-SW103A lH1-2N MOV-SW203A 2H1-2N MOV-SW1038 lJ1-2N MOV-SW203B 2J1-2N MOV-SW103C 1J1-2N MOV-SW203C 2 H1-2N MOV-SW1030 lH1-2N MOV-SW203D 2H1-2N MOV-SW104A 1H1-2N MOV-SW204A 2H1-2N MOV-SW1048 lJ1-2N MOV-SW204B 2J1-2N MOV-SW104C IJ1-2N MOV-SW204C 2J1-2N MOV-SW104D lH1-2N MOV-SW204D 2H1-2N MOV-SW105A lH1-2N MOV-SW205A 2 Hl-2N MOV-SW105B IJ1-2N MOV-SW205B 2J1 -2N MOV-SW105C lHl-2N M0Y-SW205C 2Hl-2N MOV-SW105D 1J1-2N MOV-SW205D 2J1-2N l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 _

Page 3-11

TABLE 3-2 (CONTINUED)

POWER SUPPLIES FOR SERVICE WATER MOV'S _

Unit I Unit II Valve Mark . Powered from Valve Mark Powered from Number MCC Number MCC MOV-SW106A l H1-2S M0Y-SW206A 2H1-2S MOV-SW106B lJ1-2S MOV-SW206B 2J1-2S MOV-SW108A 1H1-2S MOV-SW208A 2H1-2S MOV-SW1088 lJ1-2S MOV-SW208B 2J1-2S M0Y-SW110A lH1-2N MOV-SW210A 2H1-2N MOV-SW110B 1J1-2S MOV-SW210B 2J1-2S MOV-SW113A 1H1-2N MOV-SW213A 2H1-2N MOV-SW113B 1H1-2N - MOV-SW2138 2H1-2N MOV-SWil4A lH1-2N MOV-SW214A 2H1-2N MOV-SWil4B IJ1-2S MOV-SW214B 2J1-2S MOV-SWil5A l H1 -1 MOV-SW215A 2H1 -1 MOV-SW115B 1H1-1 MOV-SW215B 2H1 -1 M0Y-SWil7 1 H1 -1 MOV-SW217 2Hi-1 MOV-SWil8 1H1 -1 MOV-SW119 lH1 -1 MOV-SW219 2H1-1 l

MOV-SW120A l H1 -1 -

MOV-SW220A 2H1 -1 MOV-SW120B lHl-1 MOV-SW2208 2H1-1 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 3-12 l

i i

J Service Water Instrumentation and Control Under normal operating conditions, the service water pumps are manually started. Automatic initiation of the service water pumps can occur, however, with either of the following:

. Loss of station power; or

. Safety injection actuation signal from affected train on either unit.

Service water pumps 1-SW-P-1 A and 2-SW-P-1 A will not start, however, if the respective auxiliary service water pump is already operating.

Numerous instrumentation is available to the operator for the service water system. Tables 3-3 and 3-4 list the annunciators and remote indicators respectively. In addition, there are numerous local indicators available. The availability of good instrumentation is important in assessing the operator's ability to diagnose a problem with the system.

The flow instrumentation on the various pump discharges and service water headers are accurate for major changes such as those caused by a loss of a pump or erroneous valve lineup. The associated alarms are to detect a complete or major loss of service water flow. There are no automatic I

devices to mitigate a rupture or leakage of the service water system.

Operator action to switch headers or pump source would be required.

Leakage in any of the buildings in which a service water pipe is located will cause sump-level alarms, i

l l

i Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-13 l

TABLE 3-3 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS (UNIT 1)* .

PANEL 1J Aux SW Pump Discharge Hi Pressure Aux SW Pump 2-P4 Lo Flow Aux SW Pump 1-P4, 2-P4 Auto Trip SW System Loss of Control Power SW Reservoir Hi-Lo Level CHI-II Unit 1 SW Mode Valves Change Position SW Return Header Low Flow SW PP 1-P-1 A, '2-P-1 A Auto Trip Aux SW PP 1-P4 Lo Flow .

SW PP 1-P-1B, 2-F-1B Auto Trip SW Screens 1 A-1B No rotation SW Sc.reens Hi Differential Pressure Unit 2 SW Mode Valves Change Position SW Screens in Local Control Panel 1K

- Service Water Pump House Sump Hi Level SW System Logic Cabinets Units 1 and 2 Door Open SW Pump House Air Compressor Trouble Panel 1C .

l Charging Pump 1A-B-C Lube Oil Hi Temp l l

l

Typical for Unit 2 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 3-14 I

f TABLE 3-4 -

~

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM REMOTE INDICATORS (UNIT 1)*

Type Indicator Number Function Ameter 1 SW pump 1-SW-P-1B Ameter 1 SW pump 1-SW-P-1A & aux SW pump 1-SW-P-4 Pressure 2 SW pump 1A,1B discharge pressure Pressure 1 Aux SW pump 1-SW-P-4 discharge pressure Pressure 4 Service water return headers Temperature 4 Recirc. spray heat exh. outlet temperature Temperature 2 SW return to SW reservoir Temperature 2 SW pump discharge header Temperature 2 SW return to North Anna reservoir Temperature 1 SW supply from aux. pump 1-SW-P Temperature 2 Pipe penetration cooling coils Flow 4 Recirc. spray heat ex.

~

Flow 3 Charging pump lube oil coolers Flow 2 To SW reservoir Flow 1 From aux. SW pump 1-SW-P-4 Level 2 SW reservoir level

Typical for Unit 2 l

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-15

i The discharge valves to the North Anna reservoir have alarms to indicate i that the valves are open. These valves also have indicating lights on the main control board to indicate open and closed positions. High and low '

l 1evel alarms and level indication are provided on the main control board for the service water reservoir. Flow instrumentation is provided on both the discharge to the service water reservoir and the discharge from the auxiliary service water pumps. i Local and remote instrumentation is also provided for other equipment on a general basis. All instruments with the same system power supply are grouped by a color-coded system, therefore increasing the control room operator's awareness of system operations (e.g. pump-heat exchanger relationship).

3.3 DESCRIPTION

S OF SYSTEMS SUPPORTED BY SERVICE WATER Component Cooling System The component cooling system consists of the component cooling water, chilled water, and neutron shield tank cooling water subsystems. These subsystems are used individually or in combination with each other to '

provide cooling water for the removal of heat from components in the i

station. The maximum heat load occurs during the initial stages of residual heat removal during a reactor unit cooldown. The component l _

cooling water subsystem is designed to reduce the temperature of the reactor coolant from 350*F to 140*F within 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months based on a service water temperature of 95'F.

During normal full-power operation, one component cooling pump and one component cooling heat exchanger accommodate the heat removal loads for each reactor unit. Operation of two pumps and two heat exchangers for the unit being cooled down is the standard procedure during the removal of residual heat during unit cooldown. One pump and one heat exchanger per unit may be safely used under these conditions although cooldown will extend longer than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months .

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-16

Each of the four component cooling heat exchangers is designed to remove the entire heat load from one unit plus half of the heat load common to both units during normal operation. Each heat exchanger is also capable of removing half of the heat load occurring 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after a shutdown of l one unit under conditions representing the maximum allowable cooldown rate.

1 The component cooling water system has sufficient volume such that loss of ,

one service water supply header will result in a 3*F/ min rise in component cooling water temperature for the plant. Since the valves are readily accessible, this will allow more than enough time to change the component cooling heat exchanger supply and return to the other service water header.

. Figure 3-3 is a simplified flow diagram of the service water piping to the component cooling heat exchangers. This flow path is modeled in the ,

j service water fault trees.

i Chemical and Volume Control System 4

i The charging and letdown functions of the chemical and volume control

(

i system maintain a programmed water level in the RCS pressurizer, thus -

maintaining proper reactor coolant inventory during all phases of plant operation. The charging pumps normally take suction from the volume 1 control tank and return reactor coolant to the reactor coolant system 1 -

through the charging line. Normal charging flow is handled by one of the

, three charging pumps.

A portion of the charging flow is directed to the reactor coolant pumps through a seal-water injection filter. The purpose of this flow is to cool the reactor coolant pump bearings and seals.

I l In addition, the charging pumps also serve as the high head safety injection pumps in the emergency core cooling system.

l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-17 -

FIGURE 3-3 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM -

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGERS SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM A A 4 4 i

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I3 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 l l Page 3-18

l l

l The service water system is the heat sink for the charging pump-lubricating oil and seal coolers. Figure 3-4 is a simplified flow diagram of the service water piping to these coolers. The service water supply to the charging pump lube-oil coolers is normally lined up from both supply headers. Therefore, the failure of a single supply will not result in a loss of cooling to the lube-oil coolers. The size of the inlet and outlet lines to the lube-oil coolers precludes a major loss of fluid from one header through the cooler to the other return header in the event of a

header rupture. Check valves on the inlet lines prevent a loss of water 1

from one header to the other supply header. The charging pump seal coolers are supplied in a manner similar to the lube-oil coolers.

The charging pump lube-oil coolers and seal coolers are explicitly modeled in the fault trees.

Containment Depressurization System The containment depressurization system is used to return the containment a'tmosphere to subatmospheric pressure after a LOCA by removing heat from the containment structure. The containment depressurization system consists of two subsystems: (1) the quench spray subsystem and (2) the recirculation spray subsystem. There are four 50% capacity recirculation

) ,

spray heat exchangers. Service water is supplied to the recirculation i spray heat exchangers; two of the heat exchangers are supplied from one

header, the remaining two from the other header. There is a cross-tie

! valve between the headers immediately upstream of the heat exchangers so

that service water flow from either header can supply all four heat l exchangers. Figure 3-5 is a simplified flow diagram of the service water piping to the recirculation spray heat exchangers.

l The recirculation spray heat exchangers are explicitly modeled in the fault trees.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-19 l

l 1

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Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-20

l l

FIGURE 3-5 SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM RECIRCULATION SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGERS MOV g ,...

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.. =rvaM Me oen . Mov-..i..a Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-21

7 Control and Relay Room Air Conditioning Condenser Water System Two independent 100% capacity cooling systems, one for each reactor unit,

)

each with independent power supplies, supply the common control and relay '

room. An additional water chiller for each reactor unit is provided to prevent a compressor failure from shutting down a cooling system for any appreciable time. The air conditioning arrangement is such that no' action, either automatic or manual, is required during an emergency as the normal mode will continue.

Condensing water for the chillers is provided by the service water 1 system. A review of the service water piping to the water chillers revealed that the limiting condition for service water supply was the

failure of the service water system itself. This is because the service

. water connection to the air conditioning condensers is through normally open block valves. Therefore, the support to the, control and relay room condenser water system was not explicitly modeled in the fault trees.

Compressed Air System The service water system provides cooling to the four (two per unit) 100%-

capacity air compressors of the service and instrument air subsystems.

This system provides compressed air of suitable quality and pressures required for station operation, however, the compressed air system is not required to safely shutdown the nuclear units. All safety-related, air operated valves that may be operated during accident conditions have air available from air storage bottles or will fail in the safe position.

Since loss of serv' ice water to the compressed air system, and subsequent loss of compressed air to the plant will not result in a condition affecting safe shutdown, the service water support to the compressors and coolers was not explicitly modeled by fault trees. Other cases (such as failure of service water to the charging pumps) are a more Ifmiting and serious transient, therefore loss of service water to the air compressors is not considered any further.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-22

. _ _ . - - _ ~ _ _ _ _ . - . . -_. . . - _ . _ - _

Other Systems Service water may also be used as an emergency backup to the following systems:

. Steam-generator feed system

. Fuel pit cooling

. Containment air recirculation system

. Hot pipe penetration cooling cofis With the exception of the steam generator feed system, the other systems

! are all primarily cooled by component cooling water, which has been explicitly modeled in fault trees. The only function service water supplies to the steam generator feed system is providing emergency make-up water.

None of these systems are explicitly modeled by fault trees because service water is only provided as an emergency backup. Failure of the service water system itself will not fail these systems directly (there may be indirect failure such as through component cooling water, which has been modeled). -

3.4 SYSTEM SUCCESS CRITERIA

' ~

The success criteria are presented in Table 3'-5 for the service water system and associated supported systems. These success criteria are based upon the design basis accident condition stated in the North Anna Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, specifically, a simultaneous loss of cool 6at accident for one unit and loss of station power for both units. The NAPS UFSAR provides the system success criteria in terms of flow rate and/or heat transfer.

l l

\

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 3-23 -

l

TABLE 3-5 SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS SUCCESS CRITERIA Service Water System Flow Full flow from two pumps Heat Transfer Full flow through two spray arrays or operation from lake to lake.

Component Cooling Water Heat Transfer Flow to two component cooling heat exchangers.

Charging Pump Lube-oil Coolers and Seal coolers Heat Transfer Flow to one charging pump lube oil cooler and seal coolers (per unit).

Recirculation Spray Subsystem Heat Transfer Flow to two recirculation spray heaf exchangers.

4 I

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

( Page 3-24

1 The analysis is also based upon the following key assumptions:

. Two service water pumps are assumed to be normally operating at the l start of the mission time. This is consistent with normal operating practices.

, . The maximum number of service water pumps allowed in maintenance at the same time is two. Only one auxiliary service water pump is allowed in maintenance at a time. This is based upon Technical Specification limits and normal operating practices.

. During the LCO evaluation, it is conservatively assumed that a supply and return header is inoperable. Usually, only one of the two is inoperable, thereby still providing redundancy in the other headers.

. During the LCO evaluation, the intact header is considered operable

! per Technical Specification criteria.

i

. Credit for operating the service water system in the Lake to Lake

suction-discharge mode was not given in this analysis. This is a conservative assumption because this mode is a backup to the normal' supply / discharge path of the service water reservoir. It is important to note that this assumption does not preclude service

- water system operation in the Lake to Lake operating mode.

l l

l l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 3-25

SECTION 4 !

l ANALYSIS METHOD 4.1 METHODOLOGY 1 The analysis methods used to assess the reliability of the North Anna Power Station service water system included both formal qualitative evaluation techniques and quantitative analysis. The objectives of ,the qualitative analysis were:

. To review individual component reliability characteristics and determine the impact of component failure on overall system

, performance; -

. To identify mechanisms for fault detection;

. To assess the potential for common mode failures involving multiple system components; and

. To identify the interfaces between the service water system and other plant systems.

Specific products of the qualitative analysis were the failure modes and

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effects analysis contained in Appendix E, the System Interaction Diagram in Section 3, a limited qualitative evaluation of the potential for fire and flooding as external common causes, and a review of industry experience with service water.

The quantitative analysis was based on a fault tree of the service water system. The objectives of this analysis were:

. To estimate individual component failure rates based on industry experience, as well as reviews of plant operational data; Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 4-1

! . To identify combinations of component failures which will cause the service water system to fail;

. To determine the frequency with which the service water system may fail based on individual component failure data; and Y

. To identify the individual component failures and failure mechanisms that contribute most significantly to overall system failure;

.Unlike the qualitative evaluation process, fault tree analysis identifies I the combinations of multiple failures which cause the overall system to fail. It also quantifies the relative reliability enhancement which can be gained by modifying the system through design or procedural changes.

', The result of this analysis are recommendations for measures to enhance j -

system performance during the LCO.

4.2 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS l

1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative induction -

technique for identifying hazardous conditions and determining their importance. As used in this reliability study, the FMEA identified failure modes for the components within the service water system and

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systems supported by service water. Emphasis was placed on identifying the problems which result from hardware failure. Four basic hardware failure modes were evaluated in the FMEA:

l

! . Premature operation of a component; l . Failure of a component to operate at a prescribed time; f . Failure of a component to cease operation at a prescribed time; and i

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 4-2

. Failure of a component during operation. .

Within each of these four categories, multiple failure modes were -

postulated.

For each component, the following were identified and qualitatively evaluated:

. Feasible component failure modes;

. Methods to detect the failure (and possibly mitigate its effects);

! . The effects of each failure on other components in the service water system; and 1

. The effects of each failure on the overall service water system function.

No attempt was made to quantify the likelihood of any component failure as part of the FMEA, nor were multiple component failures considered. ,

Because the effects of component failures may be quite different depending on the availabtlity of various subsystems, the FMEA was performed for two scenarios:

. All equipment available (i.e. two header operation); and j . One service water header in maintenance (i.e. one header operation).

Figure 4-1 illustrates the format used to document the FMEA. Appendix E contains the FMEA for the North Anna Power Station service water system.

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I 4.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS Fault Tree Development l

The quantitative reliability analysis of the North Anna Power Station l I

service water system is based upon the development of a system fault tree. A fault tree is a logical model illustrating the relationship between the undesired event (e.g., system failure) and the basic component faults which may contribute to that event. The fault tree is a systematic means t,o identify all combinations of component faults which may cause

system failure. It airo provides a mechanism for calculating the overall system failure probability based on individual component failure statistics.

Appendix B contains the fault trees for the service water system and systems supported by service water.

In preparation for the fault tree developraent, the service water system function and failure criteria were first defined. These were discussed in Section 3.0 of this report. Note that in a fault tree analysis an absolute determination must be made for conditions where a reduction in, capacity leads to failure.

A detailed fault tree of the service water system was then developed using the methodology and symbology of WASH-1400 and IEEE-352. The construction of the fault tree was done in a rigorous and systematic manner, considering every component and event which could contribute to the failure of the system. Quantitative judgments about the likelihood of failure of a component were not made during the detailed fault tree construction.

. Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 4-5

The following categories of faults were considered:

. Interruption of a flow path -

. Diversion from a flow patn

. Interruption of sources

. Interruption of power supplies

. Interruption of support services

. Loss of control function Within each of these categories, each component and component failure mode were evaluated.

In developing detailed system fault trees, the intent was to include all failure combinations which could result in system failure. However, the minimum requirement applied in this fault tree development effort was that all single passive failures and double active failures be considered within a single flow path (e.g., within a single train of a multiple train system). A single failure is the failure of one element within the flow path which causes the failure of the required flow path function. A double failure is the combined failure of two elements within a flow path which causes a failur.ec of the required flow path function. A passive failure is breach of a fluid pressure boundary or blockage of a flow path in fluid systems. An active failure is a malfunction, excluding passive failure, of a component which relies on movement to complete its intended function. Examples of active failures include the failure of a motor-operated valve to move to its correct position, or the failure of a pump or diesel generator to start. Human errors (acts of commission or Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 4-6 l

omission) are considered active failures. Higher crder failures (e.g.,

triple active failures in a single flow path) were included if potential common mode failures, or possible pre-existing faults, may cause such high order faults to become significant.

In constructing the fault tree, consideration was given to recovery from failure whenever such recovery was judged to be feasible. Such judgments were based upon the method of detection of the faulted condition, the likely operator response to the fault detection (particularly important were written procedures to assist the operator in responding to the fault), and the ability of the operator to correct the fault. In general, credit for correcting a fault did not include repair of the fault, but only alternative actions available to the operator, e.g., a flow control valve fails to open automatically, but a manual bypass valve could be opened. Also, only pre-existing faults which wou.1d not be detected in normal operation were included, e.g., pre-existing faults in active components (other than maintenance outages) were not considered, since such faults would be detected and corrected routinely.

In constructing system fault trees, the following rules applied:

. Components and basic events were coded using a standard 8 character, format as follows:

S PU 2SW4 F l i I I System Code i i l l Failure Mode Code (Table 4-1) l l (Table 4-3) l l Component Code l l Descriptive (Table 4-2) Nomenclature Report No. 03-1750-1097 Revision 0 Page 4-7

i l

TABLE 4-1 PLANT SYSTEM DESIGNATOR A Instrument Air Subsystem C Circulating Water E Electric Power System S Service Water

- TABLE 4-2 COMPONENT CODE Battery BY Battery Charger BC Bus BS Compressor CM DC Power Supply DC Diesel Generator PG Filter FL Generator GE Heat Exchanger HE Nozzle NZ Pipe PP Pump PU Reservoir RS Traveling Water Screen TV Valve, check CV Valve, Manual XV Valve, Motor Operated MV Valve Pneumatic Operated AV Report No. 03-1250 1097 Revision 0 Page 4-8 a

i i

l TABLE 4-3 i

l FAILURE MODE CODE i

Closed C -

Does Not Close K Does Not Open

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D Does Not Start A Exceeds Limit Y Leakage L Loss of Function F Maintenance Fault M ,

No Input N Open Circuit B Operator Error E

> Operational Fault X Overload H Plugged P Rupture R Short Circuit Q

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1 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 4-9

. All transfers into or out of the fault tree were denoted with the triangle symbol. Intersystem transfers were labeled by the code "XNNN" where X was the system designator for the system from which the transfer was made, and NNN was a sequential number. 'Intrasystem transfers were labeled with only a sequential number.

. The fault tree was developed to the level where acceptable failure data existed.

. The component alignments, as shown in Figures 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5 were assumed for the base case fault tree. However, the possibility of misalignment was considered when such misalignment would contribute to system failure, and when such misalignment might not be detected in normal plant operations.

. Spurious human acts of commission and acts of sabotage were not considered.

Data Analysis The fault tree was analyzed by assigning probabilities to the basic events contained in the tree. These were derived from system and component ,

failure data and human error data and models. Industry data sources and North Anna Power Station plant-specific operating experience were reviewed to develop a recommended data base for this analysis.

There are numerous sources of nuclear industry component reliability.

These sources have been reviewed to derive failure rate estimates for electrical ar.d mechanical equipment generic to the nuclear industry.

These have been assembled into a component reliability data base report contained in Appendix C. The report lists recommended values for each component failure mode and provides an estimate of the uncertainty range.

This data report provides the generic data base for this project.

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Plant-specific data were generally used to supplement the more extensive generic data base whenever there were significant differences between the plant-specific operating experience and industry experience. This was particularly useful in evaluating the potential impact of certain operational problems in terms of overall system performance.

Sources of plant-specific data included Licensee Event Reports (LER's),

NPRDS reports, operating records, and maintenance records. These sources were reviewed to identify: i

. Failures associated with SWS components.

. Failures associated with SWS support system components.

. Failures associated with plant components similar to SWS components.

. Equipment outages for test or maintenance.

All failures found were categorized by component type and failure modes.

The results of this review are tabulated in Appendix A. -

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A Bayesian analysis was then performed to integrate the generic and plant specific analysis. The following equations were applied (Reference 7):

P(A/N) P(N/A4 ).P (A9 )

m where [ P(A )P(N/A g g) i =1 P()/N) = is the probability that the failure rate is A given that there have been N failures in time span T (Posterior Distribution)

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P(N/A) = is the probability that there have been N failures in time span T given a failure rate 1 -

P(X) = is an estimated probability distribution function for A prior to examining the N failures (Prior Distribution)

The prior probability distribution function P(A) is estimated from the generic data base and is assumed to be log-normal.

The probability P(N/A) for operational failures is given by the expression P(N/A) = ( T)N exp (-At) '

where A = industry generic failure rate F = total failures experienced at North Anna Powe,r Station T = total standby or operating hours (as apprcpriate) or in the case of demand failure rates: -

D P(N/A) = [ (D)! AN(j_y)D-N N=F N; (D-N);

where X = industry generic failure probability F = total failures on demand D = total number of demands Figure 4-2 presents an example of the prior distribution (P(A)) and the posterior distribution (P(X/N)) for motor operated valves. From the plant specific data, there have been 13 reported failures in 638 demands.

Therefore, the average motor operated valve failure rate is:

1 Report No. 63-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 4-12 _

l Figure 4-2 -

PROBABILITY DISTRIBl1 TION FOR MOTOR OPERATED VALVES Prior Posterior Distribution Distribution Mean Failure Rate =

1.0 x 10-2 C

D E -

5 a

m

1 1

i l l l ,

10-3 10-2 10-1 FAILURE RATE (DEMAND-I)

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A = 13 failures = 2.0 x 10-2 demand -l 638 demands _

l I

The prior probability distribution function, P(A), is based upon the -

-3 generic failure rate of 4.0 x 10 / demand. The resultant probability distribution from the Baysian analysis is the posterior distribution P(A/13) with a mean failure rate of A = 1.0 x 10-2 demand-l Fault Tree Analysis The service water system fault tree was analyzed to determine:

. Minimal cut sets (e.g., those component failure conditions that are necessary and sufficient to cause system failure); and

. Point estimate of the top event (probability of service water system failing).

The EDSCUT computer code was used in the fault tree analysis. This is a Boolean manipulation computer code which determines the probability of. ,

occurrence of the top event (and any specified intermediate events) in the fault tree. It also identifies the minimal cut sets of the fault tree.

- eSince the service water system fault tree developed in this study was very detailed, many thousands of minimal cut sets existed. In order to limit computer running time, the code has an input minimum probability cutoff.

Any cut set whose probability is less than the cutoff value is discarded from the calculations. So as not to eliminate any potentially significant cut sets, this minimum probability cutoff was selected to be three orders of magnitude (1000 times) less than the probability of the top event of the tree.

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l - _ _

Mean values for basic event failure probabilities were input to the EDSCUT code. Where failures were characterized by failure rates (units of inverse time) the failure rate was multiplied by a component " mission time" of either 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months depending upon the evaluation.

For operation of the diesel generators following a loss of off-site power event, a six-hour mission time was conservatively assumed. This was based on electric power restoration experience, which indicates that most power losses are restored in less than six hours. Once off-site power is restored, the diesel generators would no longer be required as an electric power source. ,

Human Factors Analysis ,

The human factors modeling used in the basic fault tree construction included only single basic events for human failure, e.g., " valve misaligned". In initially estimating the probabilities for these acts, values of 0.1 were assumed to identify key operator errors.

The human factors that showed up as potentially important contributors to the service water system failure were evaluated in more detail. Table 4'-4 lists the key operator actions identified and the resultant values used.

Appendix D contains the detailed evaluations.

Common Cause Analysis l

Common cause failures are those events which can simultanecusly cause a combination of component failures. These events normally include seismic events, fires, flooding, aircraft impact, sabotage, severe weather conditions, and severe environmental conditions. Typically at the system-level, common cause failures are not significant contributors to Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 4-15

TABLE 4-4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HUMAN ERPOR PROBABILITIES Human Error Probability Operator drains the service water reservoir. negligible Operator misaligned service water pump discharge negligible valve (to the normal header) closed.

Operator fails to start a standby pump on 0.002 loss of the running pump.

Operator fails to realign service water pump 0.004 manual discharge valve to alternate header in response to losing a service water pump Operator fails to start a standby pump when 1.0x10-5 one pump taken out for maintenance These values are non-recovered probabilities, i.e. the probability that the action will occur and will not be recovered from.

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system unavailability. Since common cause events may impact several plant systems at one time, however, they often are contributors to overall plant risk assessments. _

Quantitative analysis of common cause failures includes evaluations of initiating event frequency, initiating event severity, and the impact of the common cause on component failure rates. There are typically large uncertainties in all of these factors, so that cbmmon cause quantitative analyses are often very conservative in their assumptions and results.

As part of this project, common cause factors were evaluated qualitatively. The common causes considered were fire and flood in the pump houses. The qualitative evaluation concentrated on the susceptibility of the service water system to common causes. This evaluation formed a basis for making engineering judgments about the integral design of the ser/ ice water system. However, common causes were considered quantitatively in the fault tree evaluation for completeness.

The beta-factor method was used in this analysis. Beta is defined as the fraction of the total failure rate attributable to dependent failures.

Values used for the beta-factors are conservative and are as follows:

l -

Common Cause Beta-Factor Three of four service water pumps fail 0.0055 Two of two auxiliary service water 0.055 pumps fafi Three of four diesel generators fail 0.080 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 4-17 l

l SECTION 5 RESULTS i

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5.1 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS The qualitative analysis of the service water system identified general reliability characteristics about the system. The results obtained are detailed in the following sections.

FMEA and Plant Data Review

. The detailed failure modes and effects analysis revealed that the NAPS service water system is a highly reliable system with redundant supply of service water available to all systems supported by service water. During normal operation there are no single failures that will disable the service water system.

. There is adequate instrumentation available to the operators to diagnose failures or degradations in service water system -

performance. In addition, the abnormal procedures for loss of ,

service water, loss of station power, loss of coolant accident, and loss of cooling to various systems adequately irstruct the operator to verify service water flow. These items grestTy enhance the probability that an operator will correctly diagnose a problem with the service water system. In addition, much of the instrumentation ,

i is redundant between the two units control rooms, such that the majority of the faults would be detected by both operating shifts.

. Alignment and system restoration procedures are well written from a reliability standpoint in that they require independent verification Report No. 03-1250-1097 ~

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l of system lineup with a detailed valve checkoff list. This greatly reduces the possibility of an operator misaligning the system.

. During one header operation, the only event that will disable the -

service water system is a non-isolatable rupture of the supply header. The probability of this event is judged to be small ;

(10-4/yr) because the service water lines are all Class I seismic ,

design and the lines are low energy piping.

. A review of the past two years of maintenance work requests revealed no failures of the service water pumps or auxiliary service water pumps.

. There have been no common cause failures of the service water system at North Anna. There has been some industry experience on potential common cause failures and these are addressed later in this section.

. A review of the maintenance history over the past two years revealed several failures of motor-operated valves. The majority of these failures occurred in 1983 and involved the inlet and discharge valves to the recirculation spray heat exchangers for Unit 1. The ,

mechanical portion of these valves have since been replaced, and there has been only one reported failure in 1984. These failures -

were remote operating failures, and did not prevent the valves from being operated manually.

. Several pinhole piping leaks have occurred in the service water piping at North Anna. The majority of the leaks have occurred in the service water lines leading to the charging pump lube oil coolers and seal coolers and were a result of corrosion to the carbon steel piping. The piping to the charging pumps has been replaced with stainless steel piping. In addition, extensive efforts are ongoing to internally clean all of the service water piping and coat the piping with a corrosion inhibitor.

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i . The review of maintenance data revealed that the preventative maintenance action of overhauling the service water pumps was taking on the average 41/2 months. The time involved in performing this .

maintenance tends to reduce the availability of the system.

Common Cause Failures There are two areas that were evaluated (in a limited scope) qualitatively for potential connon cause failures. These are fire and ,

flood in the service water and auxiliary service water pump houses. The following paragraphs present the results of this evaluation.

The service water pump house and the main circulating water intake structure that houses the auxiliary service water pumps were evaluated j

for the potential of a fire occurring that could disab10 either both j auxiliary service water pumps or three of four main service water pumps.

Since the auxiliary service water pumps and the main service water pumps are completely separated, there is no credible fire or flood in either pump house that will affect all pumps.

In the auxiliary service water pump house, the combustible loading is '

negligible because of the lack of combustible material in the area.

Accordingly, the potential for a fire affecting both auxiliary service

, water pumps is judged to be very low.

In the service water pump house, the only significant combustible is the diesel fuel tank for the diesel driven fire pump. If completely filled, the tank would hold approximately 350 gallons of diesel fuel. This 2

I corresponds to an approximate combustible loading of 17000 BTU /ft or approximately a 15 minute fire. The tank is surrounded by a 12" high concrete curb that can easily contain the volume of the tank should it rupture. In addition, there is a drain in the oil collection area to Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision.1

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- s_- .-.--, -- -

,r,,,--,,yy- - - . . , . ,_ _ _ ,_ _. , --,_-_ , _ , , __*--

drain the diesel fuel out. No diesel fuel lines run near or over the service water pumps. There is smoke detection in the pump house but no automatic suppression. The closest service water pump is approximately 20 feet from the tank with no intervening combustibles. The next closest pump is about 28 feet away. While the potential exists for a rupture of the fuel tank and subsequent ignition of the fuel, there is very low probability that the fire would affect three of the four pumps because the fuel would be contained away from the pumps and there are no intervening combustibles to propagate the fire.

1 There have been two incidents reported in the industry that involved service water pumps and fire. These were a fire in the service water pump motors at Quad Cities Unit 1 and Three Mile Island Unit 2. Both fires were contained to the individual pumps.

The potential for flooding of the service water pumps is also judged to be very low. The service water pumps are approximately 13 feet above the highest allowable reservoir level (per alarms and Technical Specifications). In order to raise the reservoir level this high, the operators would have to inadvertently fill the reservoir from Lake Anna, ignoring several alarms in the process. Both control room shifts would ,

have to miss the situation. In addition, overfilling the reservoir would first result in the water spilling over the sides. It is unlikely, if

. not impossible for the water level to reach the pumps.

c.

Flooding from major water lines is also not a problem because the major water lines in the service water pump house are located below the pump elevation.

There have been two flooding events involving service water pumps reported in the industry service water LER data base. The first occurred in 1982 at Dresden Unit 2, where the flooding was caused by rising of the river level due to several days of heavy rainfall. Since the service Report No. 03-1250-1097 i

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water reservoir is not fed by any rivers or streams, this is not applicable. The second event occurred in 1983 at Salem Unit 2 where excessive leakage in a service water header caused internal flooding.

The piping in the service water pump house at North Anna is located below the elevation of the pumps and the water level would have to rise approximately 15 feet in the building sump. In addition, there are sump puraps in the building to remove this water.

The industry LER's on the service water system were reviewed for other potential comon cause events. These events are tabulated in Table 5-1.

One such event occurred at North Anna and was the result of a design error on the spray arrays. Too many nozzles were specified which resulted in the pressure and flow rates to be below design 4 specifications. This has been corrected and a subsequent study was performed by Virginia Power to determine the maximum number of nozzles that could be lost on each array before service water temperature limits would be exceeded. The result of this study was that during peak sumer conditions each spray array could lose four nozzles before reaching the

, water temperature limit of 110*F. Specific plant data was not complete enough to accurately estimate the number of nozzles failing per year; i however, even if one were to conservatively assume that the plant has '

been failing 25 nozzles per year, the probability of losing four nozzles on all four arays is on the order of 10-6 Even in this situation, it t would take a period of time before the reservoir heated to 110*F.

! - Therefore, the probability of this comon mode failure is judged extremely small.

During non-sumer months, the spray array study showed that the service water system could discharge directly into the reservoir without reaching the 110*F design limit.

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TABLE 5-1 POTENTIAL COMMON CAUSE EVENTS Event Date Plant Name Common Cause Event 5/7/83 Connecticut Yankee Large amount of rainfall and high river conditions caused the "B" filter to plug with river silt at a very fast rate.

3/3/79 Cook Unit 2 Service water pump clearances were set too small in accordance with Johnston pump manual. Pump failed due to small clearance.

11/12/80 Farley Unit 1 A design error potentially eliminated the redundancy of the two service water trains by providing cooling to the 'A' pumps from the 'B' header and vice versa.

1/9/76 Hatch Unit 1 Two of four service water isolation flow switches froze causing a false isolation of division II service water valves.

6/13/78 North Anna Unit 1 Design error led to the specifying of too many spray nozzles on the return -

spray headers. The result was that flow rate and pressure were below design specification on three out of four spray arrays.

i 10/1/73 Peach Bottom Unit 2 Service water pump casing clearances ,

I were set too large on all four pumps.

Two of the pumps did not meet TS limits.

5/22/74 Pilgrim Unit 1 Four service water pumps became inoperable because of a radial support problem in the Gould pumps.

l 1/26/79 Three Mile Island Traveling water screens were found Unit 2 inoperable due to a significant buildup of debris. Procedures did not require one of the screens to be continuously operable.

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. - - , . - . ew .. .- - . - - - . . . - - _ e -

5.2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAILURE FREQUENCY The results of the quantitative analysis of the service water iystem are suianarized 'n Table 5-2. The following cases were analyzed for normal operation, operation under an LCO condition of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , and operation under an LCO condition of 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months s:

i

. Case 1 - Service water system (pumps and major headers);

. Case 2 - Service water system with loss of station power;

. Case 3 - Service water flow to the recirculation spray heat exchangers;

. Case 4 - Service water flow to the component cooling water heat exchangers; and

. Case 5 - Service water flow to the charging pump lube oil coolers and seal coolers.

For the Case 1 series of analyses, the service water system and main ,

headers was modeled. The failure criteria was failure to obtain flow ,

from two pumps through one of the two headers. To evaluate the LCO conditions, a basic event of assigned probability equal to 1.0 was used to model one main aeader out of commission. The results of the analyses showed that the probability of system failure to provide adequate st vice water flow during any arbitrary 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months period is 8.5 x 10 . This translates into a failure frequency for the service water system of 0.001 events per year.

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l -- , - - - . . - - , . -. . . . . _ _ - .

TABLE 5-2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAILURE PROBABILITY _

Casel Description l System Failure Probability i I l A l B l C 1 2 bdr, 72 hr'1 hdr-72 hr LCO 1 hdr,168 hr LCO l i l l I 11 Service Water System l 8.5E-6 1 3.2E-5 4.0E-5 l i I

2l Service Water System with LOSP l 1.4E-2 1 1.9E-2 l 1.9E-2 with frequency of LOSP l 3.1E-6 1 4.2E-6 I 9.8E-6 l applied l l l l l l l 3 l SW Flow to Recirc Spray Hx 1 8.2E-6 l 2.3E-4 l 2.4E-4 I I I 41; SW Flow to CCW Hx I 8.5E-6 l 9.0E-5 l 1.7E-4 I I I I 5 l SW Flow to Charging Pump l 8.5E-6 1 3.2E-5 1 4.0E-5

! I Coolers i I I I I I I

Frequency of LOSP is assumed to be 0.027 events / year (Ref. 5) for all events.

The probability reported is the failure probability during any arbitrary 72 or 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months period.

5 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 5-8

It should be noted that the value 8.5 x 10-6 is not the system unavailability, since system repair times have not been considered. This analysis conservatively assumes that no individual component-is repaired during the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time span of interest. Given the maintenance history of the system and the nominal lead times to repair, this is a reasonable assumption up to the point at which a component failure would cause an LCO condition. At this point, it is expected that the system would be repaired on a high priority basis.

The service water system was also analyzed for operation during an LCO condition. The analysis did not assume any specific cause for the LCO, only that one of the main service water headers was inoperable. It was also assumed that the LCO condition was not a planned evolution. The results show that the system failure probability during an LCO condition of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is 3.2 X 10-5 and is 4.0 X 10-5 for 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months . The difference between these results are well within the bounds of uncertainty due to data varir.0111ty and modeling approximations of the approach used in this and other industry studies, and can be considered negligible.

A detailed review.of the minimal cut sets of the fault tree analysis shows that the major contributors to system failure (see Section 5.3) are not time dependent failures, therefore, there is relatively little sensitivity to the increased LCO period.

An additional series of cases was run assuming that a loss of station power initiator occurred. The results showed a three order of magnitude increase in failure probability, with again little sensitivity to extending the LCO condition. The majority of contributors to system failure were electrical components, and since plant specific data was not utilized for these components and since a simplified fault tree was used for electrical distribution, there exists a large uncertainty in the failure probability. As stated earlier, conservative data was also used Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 5-9

l in that a loss of station power for a period of six hours is assumed for the mission time of the diesel generators. For shorter durations the failure probability would be reduced.

For the case of maintaining flow to the recirculation spray heat exchangers, the failure probability is 8.2 X 10-6 This is slightly better than the overall failure probability for the service water system, because the conditions under which building spray would be initiated would also automatically start the service water pumps. This effectively removed the operator error of failing to start a standby pump following a pump failure.

4 The LCO cases analyzed for this model resulted in a failure probability for an LCO condition of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is 2.3 X 10-4 and for an LCO condition of 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months is 2.4 X 10~4 It should be noted that this system is only required during LOCA events. Assuming a frequency of 10~3 for LOCA events, these failure probabilities become 2.0 x 10~9 and 5.0 x 10-9 for any arbitrary 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or 168 hour0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months period.

i The failure probability for getting service water to the component cooling water heat exchangers is the same for the service water system, -

8.5 X 10-6 For the LCO conditions, the probabilities are 9.0 X 10-5 and 1.7 X 10 for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months respectively. The increase in failure probability from the normal operat,fon to the LCO condition is

largely due to the potential single failure of either of two isolation valves (see Section 5.3 for further discussion).

Report No. 03-1250-1097

, Revision 0 Page 5-10

l The system design for getting flow to the charging pump lube oil and seal coolers has good redundancy. The failure probability for service water flow to the charging pumps is the same as that for the service water system. Within a " charging pump subsystem," there is one air operated valve that can isolate flow to its respective pump should it fail to operate. Loss of instrument air, however, is not a major factor since the valves fail in the open position. l Appendix B contains the fault tree models and Appendix C contains a listing of the basic events along with theit description and failure probabilities.

5.3 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORS TO SYSTEM FAILURE One of the objectives of this study is to identify the significant contributors to service water system failure. The method used to

! identify these contributors was the Fussell-Vesely measure of importance

! (Reference 8). This , measure is defined as the probability of the union of all minimal cutsets containing one basic event given the condition has failed. Expressed in equation form:

[ Probability of cutsets with event (f )

I = Event (i)

[ Probability of all cutsets Although there are several other measures of importance, this method was chosen becaJse it defines the sensitivity of the top event to small changes in the unavailabilities of individual basic events.

Tables 5-3 and 5-4 list the fault tree basic events which are most significant in contributing to failure of the service water system.

Table 5-3 is for the case of normal operation and Table 5-4 is for operation under an LCO with header A assumed unavailable. The basic events are grouped into the general categories: mechanical failures, human factors, maintenance faults, and interface system faults.

Numerical values indicate the relative improvement in system reliability Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 5-11

TABLE 5-3 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORS TO SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAILURE - NORMAL OPERATION Basic Event Importance Mechanical Faults Service Water Pump Connon Mode Failure 0.39 SW Pump 2-SW-P-1 A Fails to Run 0.05 SW Pump 1-SW-P-1 A Fails to Run 0.05 MOV-SW-117 Fails to Open 0.03 MOV-SW-217 Fails to Open 0.03 SW Pump 1-SW-P-1B Fails to Start 0.02 SW Pump 2-SW-P-1B Fails to Start 0.02 Human Factors Operator Fails to Start Standby Pump Prior to Maintenance 0.23 Operator Fails to Start Standby Pump Following Pump Failure 0.10 ~

Maintenance Faults SW Pump 1-SW-P-1A in Maintenance 0.21 SW Pump 2-SW-P-1A in Maintenance 0. 21 SW Pump 2-SW-P-4 in Maintenance 0.20 SW Pump 1-SW-P-4 in Maintenance 0.20 ,

SW Pump 2-SW-P-1B in Maintenance 0.18 SW Pump 1-SW-P-1B in Maintenance 0.18 Interface System Faults Vital Bus 1 H Fails .-0.11 Vital Bus 2 H Fails 0.11 l

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 5-12 l

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TABLE 5-4 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORS TO SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAILURE - LCO OPERATION (HEADER A UNAVAILABLE)

Basic Event Importance Mechanical Faults Service Water Pump Common Mode Failure 0.11 ;

MOV-SW215A Fails to Open 0.07 MOV-SWil5B Fails to Open 0.07 Isolatable Rupture in Good Header 0.05 Non-Isolatable Rupture in Good Header 0.05 SW Pump 1-SW-P-1A Fails to Run 0.03 SW Pump 2-SW-P-1 A Fails to Run 0.03 MOV-SWil7 Fails to Open 0.03 MOV-SW118 Fails to Open 0.03 MOV-SW217 Fatis to Open 0.03 Human Factors Operator Fails to Open Valve 1-SW-4 0.34 Operator Fails to Start Standby Pump Following Pump Failure 0.26 Operator Fails to Open Valve 2-SW-11 0.20 Operator Fails to Start Standby Pump Prior to Phintenance 0.05 Operator Fails to Isolate Rupture 0.05 Maintenance Faults .

SW Pump 1-SW-P-1B in Maintenance 0.38 SW Pump 2-SW-P-1 A in Maintenance 0.22 SW Pump 2-SW-P-1B in Maintenance 0.21 SW Pump 1-SW-P-1 A in Maintenance 0.19 SW Pump 1-SW-P-4 in Maintenance 0.16 SW Pump 2-SW-P-4 in Maintenance 0.10 Interface System Faults Vital Bus 1 H Fails 0.06 Vital Bus 2 H Fails 0.06 i

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which .fould result from total elimination of that event'as a service water system failure mechanism.

Table 5-5 lists the significant contributors to system failure during a loss of station ' power initiator. Tables 5-6 and 5-7 list the contributors to failure to get service water flow to the recirculation r

spray heat exchangers and component cooling water heat exchangers respectively. Note that these are additional contributors to Table 5-4.

For the case of service water flow to the charging pump lube oil and seal coolers, the significant contributors are the same as listed in Tables 5-3 and 5-4.

For the normal operation and LCO operation of the service water system, the major contributors to system failure are maintenance faults. This is

~

l attributable to two items. The first is the average time a service water pump is in maintenance. The maintenance unavailability for the pumps is i

relatively high because of a preventative maintenance item requiring j overhaul of the pump. The average time to perform this item has been 4 1/2 months per pump (see Appendix A). The pump is ~ physically removed 4

from the site (normally when one unit is in an outage) and sent to the manufacturer for maintenance. ,

The second item regards the amount of pumps that can be in maintenance at I

one time. Although the review of maintenance records did not reveal

- instances of more than one service water pump in maintenance at the same time, there is no written policy at the plant preventing this.

Accordingly, it was assumed in this analysis that the limit of the number of pumps in maintenance is governed by the Technical Specifications.

Specifically, there will always be at least one operable pump per header. This allows for two service water pumps to be in maintenance at one time, i

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l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 5-14 l

l .. - -_- - .- .- . - - - - - . - _ - - . -.- , .. .. .

TABLE 5-5 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORS TO SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAILURE DURING LOSS OF STATION POWER, NORMAL OPERATION Basic Event Importance Maintenance Faults SW Pump 1-SW-P-1B in Maintenance 0.40 SW Pump 2-SW-P-1B in Maintenance 0.40 SW Pump 1-SW-P-1 A in Maintenance 0.23 SW Pump 2-SW-P-1 A in Maintenance 0.23 Interface System Faults Diesel Generator 1 H Fails to Run -

0.32 Diesel Generator 2 H Fails to Run 0.32 Diesel Generator 1 H Fafis to Start 0.22 Diesel Generator 2 H Fails to Start 0.22 Diesel Generator 1 J Fails to Run 0.17 Diesel Generator 2 J Fails to Run 0.17 Diesel Generator 1 J Fails to Start 0.12 Diesel Generator 1 J Fails to Start 0.12 Diesel Generator Common Mode Failure 0.02 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 5-15

l TABLE 5-6 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORS TO SYSTEM FAILURE OF FLOW TO RECIRCULATION SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGERS -

LC0 OPERATION (HEADER A UNAVAILABLE) 1 l

Basic Event Importance Mechanical Faults MOV-SW101C Fails on Demand 0.44 MOV- SW101D Fails on Demand 0.44 Inlet Check Valve 1-SW-116 Fails to Open 0.43 Note: These significant contributors are in addition to those listed on Table 5-4. .

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Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 5-16

TABLE 5-7 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORS TO SYSTEM FAILURE OF FLOW TO CCW HEAT EXCHANGERS -

LCO OPERATION (HEADER A UNAVAILABLE) -

Basic Event Importance Mechanical Faults MOV-SW203A Transfers Closed 0.32 MOV-SW203B Transfers Closed 0.32 Note: These ' system contributors are, in addition to those listed on Table 5-4.

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Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page 5-17 l

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l For the case involving loss of station power, maintenance continues to be a significant contributor. However, the remaining contributors are electric distribution system components, of which there is' uncertainty in 4

the applicability in the data since this data is all generic and not plant specific.

J l

During normal operation, the major contributors to failing to get flow to the CCW heat exchangers ano the recirculation spray heat exchangers are 1 the same as those listed in Table 5-3. For LCO operation, the CCW heat l 1

. exchangers add the contributor of a single MOV transferring closed (e.g. ,

spurious closure of the valve or valve plugging due to disk failure).

This failure isolates the emaining service water header to the CCW heat exchangers and fails al' four heat exchangers.

5.4 SENSITIVITY STUDIES .

The overall main objective of this study is to evaluate the change in reliability of the service water system as a result of extending the LCO period from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months . The previous sections showed that this impact on the failure probability is negligible. Certain actions may be performed to further enhance the reliability during the extended LCO condition.

Typically, there are three areas where changes can be made to enhance

- reliability. These are design changes, procedural changes for operator i

Report No. 03-1250-1097 i Revision 1 i

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i actions, and procedural changes for maintenance unavailability. Design changes are typically identified for portions of the system where inadequate redundancy exists or where a modification would enhance the reliability significantly. Based upon the importance values and upon the totally redundant design of the system, no design changes are recommended. This is because any design changes that could be implemented would be costly and provide little, if any, improvement.

Although some operator actions were significant, these actions have been reviewed in detail and there is little room for improvement in the human error probabilities because existing operator procedures are well written from a reliability standpoint.

There is, however, one action regarding maintenance that could be .

implemented at low cost and would have a positive impact upon the reliability of the system. This action would be to administrative 1y restrict the preventative maintenance action for pumps to one service water pump and one auxiliary service water pump at a time. This case was analyzed for the LCO condition and is presented in Table 5-8. The results show that an increase in reliability could be obtained by implementing the above action. The probability of failure for an extended LCO reduces from 4.0 X 10-5 to 2.0 X 10-5 This is a factor '

of two better than the current LCO conditions.

There is relatively little change in the CCW heat exchanger and recirculation spray heat exchanger cases because the failure probabilities are not dominated by maintenance events.

4 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 5-19 -

TABLE 5-8 RESULTS OF REDUCED MAINTENANCE CASES LCO CONDITION 72 hr 168 hr 168 hr CASE DESCRIPTION BASE CASE BASE CASE REDUCED MAINT.

1 Service Water System 3.2E-5 4.0E-5 2.0E-5 3 Flow to Recirc Spray Hx 2.3E-4 2.4E-4 2.1E-4 4 Flow to CCW Hx 9.0E-5 1.7E-4 1.5E-4 5 Flow to Charging Pumps 3.2E-5 4.0E-5 1.5E-5 f

I Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 5-20 l 1

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SECTION 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 CONCLUSION

S Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 - Service Water System - Limiting Condition for Operation, requires that with only one service water loop operable, both loops must be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or the nuclear units must be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in cold shutdown within the following thirty hours. This analysis has evaluated the impact upon the reliability of the service water system of extending the LCO time period from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 7 days (168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months ).

Based upon the results of a probabilistic safety study, it is concluded that the extension of the LCO time period will not involve a significant increase in the probability of occurance or consequences of an accident.

The probability of a service water system failure increases from 3.2 x 10-5 to 4.0 x 10-5 when the time period for the LCO is extended from ,

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to 168 hours0.00194 days 0.0467 hours 2.777778e-4 weeks 6.3924e-5 months . This represents a negligible increase in risk to the public.

The operation of the nuclear units under the extended LCO do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The plant is currently licensed to operate with only one header operable under LCO restrictions, and this does not change as a result of extending the time period.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 6-1

6.2 RECOM4ENDATION Certain actions if incorporated will further reduce the risk astociated with the extended LCO. One action in particular is recommended to be implemented. This is the implementation of an administrative control to limit any major preventative maintenance on the service water pumps to one pump at a time. This action will reduce the failure probability from 4.0 x 10-5 to 2.0 x 10-5 ,

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Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page 6-2

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SECTION 7 REFERENCES

1. North Anna Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report :

l

2. North Anna System Description 17-1, Service Water Pumps and Systems, May 25,1982.

3. North Anna Systems Description 17-?; Service Water ' System Valves, April 26, 1976.

4. Licensee Event Reports - Service Water System, Industry Data Base, January,1985.

5. Losses of Offsite Power at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants, All Years Through 1983; May,1984, prepared by Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, EPRI.

6. Impell Corporation Component Reliability Data Book, Report No.

03-0000-1027, Revision 1. (Contained in Appendix C for- reference).

7. NUREG/CR-2300, Vol.1, PRA Procedures Guide, January 1983.

8. The Importance Computer Code, H. E. Lambert, F. M. Gilman, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, USNRC Research Contract 60-76-021.

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APPENDIX A PLANT SPECIFIC DATA RESULTS _.

The data results contained in this section present the failures and maintenance events over from the period January,1983 to December,1984.

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-SERVICE WATER COMPONENT FAILURE TABLES l

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Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-2

FAILURE TABLE (TAKEN FROM MAINT. REPORTS)

Component Type: Miscellaneous Pumps -

Total Operating Hours: Insufficient Data to Calculate Total Number of Demands: Insufficient Data to Calculate Total Number of Failures: 6 Maint. Reported Report No. Date Component Failure Cause N1 1/18/83 1-SW-P-3 Fail to run correctly Faulty level switch 01180700 N1 11/2/83 1-SW-P-9A Fail to run Rotor bearing bad 11021407 N1 7/4/83 1-SW-P-9B Fail to run Mechanical binding 07041331 N1 7/4/83 1-SW-P-9A Fail to run Mechanical binding 07041330 N1 9/7/83 1-SW-P-3A Fail to run Faulty selector 09070207 switch and level control mechanism N1 9/7/83 1 -SW-P-38 Fail to run Faulty selector 09070200 switch and level control mechanism

)

i Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-3 l

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FAILURE TABLE (TAKEN FROM MAINT. REPORTS)

Component Type: Manual Valves _

Total Operating Hours: 11.74x106 hours Total Number of Demands: Insufficient Data Total Number of Failures: Leakage - 7, Fail to Operate - 1 Maint. Reported Report No. Date Component Failure Cause JN 3/21/84 2-SW-620 Leakage 5900003160 4

JN 3/21 / 84 2-SW-613 Leakage 5900003161 JN 3/21 /84 2-SW-619 Leakage 5900003159 JN 3/21 /84 2-SW-614 Leakage 5900003158 JN 3/24/84 1-SW-254 Leakage 5900001534 N1 12/17/83 1-SW-276 Fall to operate Handwheel broken 12171845 N1 8 /31 / 8 3 1-SW-634 Leakage Faulty valve bonnet 08312343 and ball ,

2-SW-584 Leakage Faulty valve bonnet N1 8/29/83 and ball 08291423

- No entry on work order to indicate cause of leakage.

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i Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 -

Page A-4

FAILURE TABLE (TAKEN FROM MAINT. REPORTS)

Component Type: Service Water g0Vs Total Operating Hours: 1.26x10 hours Total Number of Demands: 638 Demands Total Number of Failures: Fail to Operate - 13, Leakage - 6 Maint. Reported Report No. Date Component Failure Cause N1 1/25/83 1-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Mechanical binding 01250233 103C & limit sw. req'd adjustment N1 1/25/83 1-SWMOV- Fail to operate Mechanical binding 01250234 104C N1 1/25/83 1-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Limit sw. req'd 01250235 104D adjustment N1 2/17/83 1-SW-MOV- Fail to. operate Faulty torque sw. '

02171111 1038 N1 2/23/83 1-SW-MOV- Leakage Mechanical portion of 02231502 1048 yalye req'd replacement N1 2/23/83 1 -SW-MOV- Leakage Mechanical portion of 02231500 103C valve req'd replacement -

N1 2/21/83 1-SW-MOV- Leakage Mechanical portion of 02212201 104A valve req'd replacement

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N1 2/21/83 1-SW-MOV- Leakage Mechanical portion of 02212200 103A valve req'd replacement N1 2/21/83 1 -SW-MOV- Leakage Mechanical portion of

< 02210202 103D valve req'd replacement N1 2/21/83 1 -SW-MOV- Leakage Limit sw. req'd 02210015 104C adjustment N1 1/25/83 1-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Mechanical binding 01250232 1038 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-5 l

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FAILURE TABLE (TAKEN FROM MAINT REPORTS)

Component Type: Service Water MOVs (Continued) -

Maint. Reported Report No. Date Component Failure Cause JN 3/1/84 2-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Dirty contacts 5900005642 220B JN 4/19/84 2-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Defective motor a 5902007294 208A torque sw.

JN 6/15/84 1-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Dirty torque sw.

5901009915 1108 contacts JN 6/15/84 1-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Limit sw. req'd.

5901009914 110A adjustment

! JN 8/15/84 1-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Limit sw. req'd.

5901013190 104D adjustment N1 10/10/83 1-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Short circuit due to 10101218 108A water in motor 8 limit sw.

JN 2/29/84 1 -SW-MOV- Fail to operate Limit sw. req'd.

5900005650 108A adjustment JN 3/17/84 1-SW-MOV- Fail to operate Motor grounded-5900006106 113B due to water I

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-G l

FAILURE TABLE (TAKEN FROM MAINT. REPORTS)

Component Type: Service Water Air Compressors -

Total Operating Hours: 17,520 hrs Total Number of Demands: Insufficient Data to Calculate Total Number of Failures: Fail to Run -3, Fail to Start - 1 Maint. Reported Report No. Date Component Failure Cause N1 6/29/83 1-SW-C-1A Fail to run Check v1v stuck shut 06292338 JN 2/17/84 1-SW-C-1B Fail to run Pressure sensing 5900004494 line leakage JN 2/17/84 1-SW-C-1A Fail to run Pressure sensing 5900004495 line leakage JN 6/10/84 1-SW-C-1 B Fail to start Pressure switch 5901009622 out of cal.

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FAILURE TABLE (TAKEN FROM MAINT. REPORTS) ;

Component Type: Miscellaneous Heat Exchangers -

Total Operating Hours: Insufficient Data to Calculate Total Number of Demands: Not Applicable Total Number of Failures: 3 Maint. Reported Report No. Date Component Failure Cause JN 2/3/84 2-EHC-E-1B Leakage Tube leak req'd plug 5900004665 JN 2/3/84 2-EHC-E-1A Leakage Tube leak req'd plug 5900004666 JN 1/10/84 1-CH-7-4 Leakage Defective studs &

5900004074 gaskets 9

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l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-8

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FAILURE TABLE (TAKEN FROM MAINT.'REFORTS)

Component Type: Instrumentation ..

i Total Operating Hours: 4.59x106 hours /2 years Total Number of Demands: Not Applicable -

Total Number of Failures: Component Hardware Failures - 7 Erratic or Incorrect Indication - 22 Maint. Reported Report No. Date Component Failure Cause N2 5/23/83 2-SW-FS- Fitting leak at gauge Loose bolts on gauge 05230340 202A 1

. N2 5/24/83 2-SW-FI- Out of cal. Recalibration req'd.

05242258 2038 N1 6/8/83 2-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Recalibration req'd.

j 06081731 1038 r

i N2 9/30/83 2-SW-FI- Erratic ind. Recalibration req'd.

09300329 203A l N2 3/14/83 2-SW-LDS- Incorrect ind. Recalibration req'd.

03141337 2006 N2 2/3/83 2-SW-TI- Erratic ind. Recalibration req'd.

i 02031850 2038 N1 7/20/83 1-SW-LT- Ruptured diaphragm No cause shown on l maint, report 07201435 101 A Linkage from float N1 7/1/83 1-EI-CB- Hi-lev annun.

07011915 21K locked in switch rusted

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N1 7/8/83 1-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Transmitter req'd.

07081853 1038 venting

N1 3/11/83 1-SW-FI Incorrect ind. Transmitter req'd.

03110719 103A venting l

i j N1 3/11/83 1-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Transmitter req'd.

4 03110721 1038 venting N1 4/10/83 Gauge Level glass broken No cause given in

maint. report 04100258 N1 1/16/83 1-SW-PI- Incorrect ind. Recalibration req'd.

01161408 106A N1 1/16/83 1-SW-PI- Incorrect ind. Recalibration req'd.

01161409 106B

' Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-9

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l FAILURE TABLE (TAKEN FROM MAINT. REPORTS)

Component Type: Instrumentation (Continued) _

Maint. Reported

Report No. Date Component Failure Cause 2-SW-PI- Incorrect ind. Test hookup attached JN 6/6/84 to inst line 5902009456 201A JN 2/14/84 1-SW-LI- Both channels failed Recalibration req'd.

. 5900004227 101 A JN 2/9/84 1-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Transmitter req'd.

~

103A filling a venting 5900004407 JN 1/3/84 1-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Transmitter req'd.

5900003727 1038 venting JN 1/3/84 1-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Transmitter req'd.

5900003728 103A venting JN 3/9/84 1-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Transmitter req'd. .

5900005882 1038 venting JN 3/16/84 2-SW-FI- Ca1. req'd. Transmitter req'd.

2038 filling, venting, 5900005947

recalibration JN 3/12/84 1-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Transmitter req'd.

5900005946 1038 filling, ventihg,

> recalibration ,

JN 3/12/84 1-SW-LS- Level alarm Float being held

) 5900005955 601 locked in up by plastic object

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JN 2/24/84 2-SW-LDS- Switch not turning Defective switch 5900005301 2006 pump off

. JN 2/13/84 2-SW-LI- Incorrect ind. Req'd calibration 5900004898 201A 3

JN 2/24/84 1-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Cause not reported 5900005532 103A i-

! JN 3/1/84 1-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Bao card-req'd.

j 5900005660 1038 replacement and recalibration JN 3/5/84 1-SW-FT- Incorrect ind. Recalibration req'd.

5900005719 103A l

JN 3/9/84 2-SW-FI- Incorrect ind. Venting req'd.

! 5900005881 203A Report No. 03-1250-1097 l

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FAILURE TABLE (TAKEN FROM MAINT. REPORTS)

Component Type: Traveling Water Screens -

Total Operating Hours: 1460 hrs Total Number of Demands: 8760 demands Total Number of Failures: 1 failure Maint. Reported Report No. Date Component Failure Cause JN 3/14/84 1-CW-S-1A Fail to start Defective shear pin 5901002582 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-11 l

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l SERVICE WATER COMPONENTS MAINTENANCE TABLES l

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-12

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Instrumentation -

Total No. of Maintenance Events: 35 Events Total Maintenance Hours: 7868 Hrs.

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action N2 5/23/83 2-SW-FS- 483 Hrs. 730 Hrs. Replaced 2 bolts on body 05230340 202A of switch N2 5/24/83 2-SW-FI- ---

705 Hrs. Recalibrated 05242258 2038 N1 6/8/83 1-SW-FI- 24 Hrs. 350 Hrs. Recalibrated 06081731 1038

N2 9/30/83 2-SW-FI- 8 Hrs. 156 Hrs. Recalibrated j 09300329 203A N1 9/23/83 1-EI-CB- 82 Hrs. 177 Hrs. Tightened cabinet door 09230918 21K N2 3/14/83 2-SW-LDS- 52 Hrs. 865 Hrs. Recalibrated 03141337 2008 -

i N2 2/3/83 2-SW-TI- 3 Hrs. 352 Hrs. Calibrated power supply 02031850 2038 card l "

,_ N1 7/20/83 2-SW-LT- 115 Hrs. 139 Hrs. Replaced ruptured 07201435 101 A diaphragm

. N1 7/1/83 1-EI-CB- 3 Hrs. 235 Hrs. ' Cleaned rusted level 07011915 21K switch linkage N1 6/8/83 1-SW-PI- 28 Hrs. 354 Hrs. Recalibrated l 06081728 101A l

N1 7/8/83 1-SW-FI- 23 Hrs. 37 Hrs. Vented transmitter 07081853 1038 N1 3/11/83 1-SW-FI- 52 Hrs. 1111 Hrs. Vented transmitter 03110719 103A

(

l N1 3/11/83 1-SW-FI- 4 Hrs. 1111 Hrs. Vented transmitter 03110721 1038 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-13

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Instrumentation (Continued) _

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action N1 4/10/83 Gauge 3 Hrs. 3 Hrs. Replaced glass 04100258 N1 3/20/83 1-EI-CB- 42 hrs. 101 Hrs. Tightened cabinet door 03201325 21K N1 1/16/83 1-SW-PI- 2 Hrs. 121 Hrs. Recalibrated 01161408 . 106A N1 1/16/83 1-SW-PI- 2 Hrs. 121 Hrs. Recalibrated 01161409 106B N1 1/12/83 1-SW-FI- 383 Hrs. O Changed ID on Gauges 01121140 1000 N1 1/12/83 1-SW-FI- 383 Hrs. O Changed ID on Gauges 01121139 100C N1 1/12/83 1-SW-TI- 383 Hrs. O Changed ID on Gauges 01121138 1000 N1 1/12/83 1-SW-TI- 383 Hrs. O Changed ID on Gauges 01121137 100C

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JN 6/6/84 2-SW-PI- 96 Hrs. 120 Hrs. Removed test rig 5902009456 201A attached to line JN 2/14/84 2-SW-PI- 24 Hrs. 48 Hrs. Recalibrated 5900004227 101 A JN 2/9/84 1-SW-LI- 12 Hrs. 24 Hrs. Filled a vented 5900004407 103A transmitter JN 1/3/84 1-SW-FI- 48 Hrs. 72 Hrs. Filled & vented 5900003727 103B transmitter JN 1/3/84 1-SW-FI- 48 Hrs. 72 Hrs. Filled & vented 5900003728 103A transmitter Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-14

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Instrumentation (Continued) _.

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action JN 3/9/84 1-SW-FI- 12 Hrs. 24 Hrs. Filled a vented 5900005882 1038 transmitter JN 3/12/84 1-SW-FI- 48 Hrs. 264 Hrs. Filled a vented 5900005946 103B transmitter JN 3/16/84 2-SW-FI- 48 Hrs. 168 Hrs. Filled a vented 5900005947 2038 transmitter -

JN 3/12/84 1-SW-LS- 12 Hrs. 24 Hrs. Obstruction removed from 5900005955 601 level switch JN 2/24/84 2-SW-LDS- 12 Hrs. 120 Hrs. Malfunctioning switch 5900005301 200B replaced JN 2/13/84 2-SW-LI- 24 Hrs. 72 Hrs. Recalibrated 5900004898 201A JN 2/24/84 1-SW-FI- .

5900005532 103A JN 3/1/84 1-SW-FI- 48 Hrs. 168 Hrs. Recalibrated 5900005660 1033

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JN 3/9/84 2-SW-FI- 12 Hrs. 24 Hrs. Vented Transmitter 5900005881 203A

No entry on work order for work done or maintenance duration.

I l

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-15

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Service Water Air Compressors -

Total No. of Maintenance Events: 9 Events ,

Total Maintenance Hours: 39 Hrs. ,

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action 1

JN 6/10/84 1-SW-C-1B 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs. Calibrated pressure i 5901009622 switch j JN 7/10/84 1-SW-AC 0 0 Hooked up air comp.

5901011404 (Temp. Air electrically Compressor)

JN 2/17/84 1-SW-C-1A 1 Hr. O Tightened fitting on 5900004495 pressure sensing line JN 2/17/84 1-SW-C-1B 3 Hr. O Replaced tubing and 5900004494 fittings on pressure sensing line JN 1/4/84 1-SW-C-1A 1 Hr. 1 Hr. Oil dipstick replaced in

5900003--- holder JN 2/27/84 1 -SW-C-18 1 Hr. O Tightered fittings 5900005405 1

JN 2/27/84 1-SW-C-1A 1 Hr. O Tighte id fittings 5900005106 N1 7/19/83 1-SW-C-1B 4 Hrs. 24 Hrs. Replaced missing spacer 07191145 to correct excessive end-play in motor N1 6/29/83 1 -SW-C-1 A 2 Hrs. 12 Hrs. Cleaned stuck check 06292338 valve

Unable to verify last three digits of job number due to elimination during reproduction process.

I

i l Report No. 03-1250-1097 l Revision 0 -

! Page A-16

_________.________.._l.________, - - . _ - - - _ _ _ - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ , _ . . _ _

1 MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Manual Valves -

Total No. of Maintenance Events: 31 Events Total Maintenance Hours: 3552 Hrs.

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action

/

N2 12/7/83 2-SW-208 --- 30 Hrs. Removed valve a replaced 12071100 with new one N2 6/30/83 2-SW-222 --- 23 Hrs. Removed bonnet to drain 06301455 system - replaced N2 8/29/83 2-SW-584 13 Hrs. 13 Hrs. Cleaned & replaced valve 08291423 ball & cover assembly N2 9/8/83 2-SW-217 --- 29 Hrs. Removed valve to check 09081555 for line blockage -

replaced valve N1 8/31/83 1-SW-634 18 Hrs. 20 Hrs. Replaced valve bonnet &

08312343 ball assembly N1 9/16/83 1-SW-639 3 Hrs. 3 Hrs. Replaced diaphragm a "0" 09161516 rings N2 3/7/83 2-SW-204D 98 Hrs. 180 Hrs. Disassembled valve.

03071954 cleaned all components,

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replaced worn components and reassembled valve N2 3/7/83 2-SW-2048 98 Hrs. 180 Hrs. Disassembled valve, t 03071953 cleaned all components, replaced worn components and reassembled valve N2 3/7/83 2-SW-2038 98 Hrs. 180 Hrs. Disassembled valve.

03071951 cleaned all components, replaced worn components and reassembled valve N2 3/7/83 2-SW-204A 98 Hrs. 180 Hrs. Disassembled valve.

03071952 cleaned all components, replaced worn components and reassembled valve Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-17

1 l

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT. )

Component Type: Manual Valves (Continued) -

Total Out I Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action N2 3/7/83 2-SW-203C 98 Hrs. 180 Hrs. Disassembled valve, 03071949 cleaned all components, replaced worn components, reassembled valve -

N2 3/7/83 2-SW-203D 98 Hrs. 180 Hrs. Disassembled valve, 03071948 cleaned all components, replaced worn components, reassembled valve N2 3/7/83 2-SW-204C 98 Hrs. 180 Hrs. Disassembled valve, 03071947 cleaned all components, replaced worn components, reassembled valve N2 10/7/83 2-SW-222 . --- 44 Hrs. Replaced Valve 12071058 N2 12/7/83 2-SW-196 --- 28 Hrs. Replaced Valve .

.' 12071104

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N2 12/7/83 2-SW-210 --- 18 Hrs. Replaced Valve 12071054

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N2 12/7/83 2-SW-201 --- 30 Hrs. Replaced Valve 12071102 N2 12/7/83 2-SW-215 --- 44 Hrs. Replaced Valve 12071056 N1 12/17/83 1-SW-276 --- 3 Hrs. Replace bonnet assembly 12171845

! Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-18 nr, - ,. - - - - - - - - - , , , , . , , , , . , , .. , - - - - - - . - - - , , , , , , . - , . .

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Manual Valves (Continued) -

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action N1 1/24/83 1-SW-664 345 Hrs. 501 Hrs. Cleaned valve a replaced 01240955 . gasket N1 1/24/83 1-SW-665 345 Hrs. 501 Hrs. Cleaned valve & replaced 01240959 gasket N1 1/24/83 1-SW-686 345 Hrs. 501 Hrs. Cleaned valve & replaced 01241001 gasket N1 1/24/83 1-SW-689 345 Hrs. 501 Hrs. Cleaned valve & replaced 01241002 gasket ,

N1 1/15/83 1-SW-251 1 Hr. 1 Hr. Adjusted packing - cycled 01151521 valve N1 2/1/83 1-SW-257 1 Hr. 1 Hr. Adjusted packing - cycled 02012329 valve JN 3/21/84 2-SW-614 --- --- Valve replaced per 5900003158 DC-82-08 JN 3/21/84 2-SW-619 --- --- Valve replaced per 5900003159 DC-82-08

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JN 3/21/84 2-SW-613 --- --- Valve replaced per 5900003161 DC-82-08 JN 3/21/84 2-SW-620 --- --- Valve replaced per 5900003160 DC-82-08 JN 1/31/84 2-SW-603 1 Hr. O Valve handle shortened 5900004664 JN 2/29/84 Isolation 1 Hr. 1 Hr. Tightened packing, 5900005317 valve to replaced plugs on drain 2-SW-PI-206A piping l

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-19

-~. . - _ . . - - -- --. _ _ . - ., -

m

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: MOV's -

Total No. of Maintenance Events: 54 Events Total Maintenance Hours: 10,030 Hrs.

l Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action N1 2/21/83 1 -SW-MOV- 91 Hrs. 96 Hrs. Repaired mechanical 02212200 103A portion of valve N1 2/21/83 1 -SW-MOV- 91 Hrs. 96 Hrs. Repaired mechanical 02210202 103D portion of valve N1 2/21/83 1 -SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. O Adjusted limits 02210015 104C N1 1/25/83 1-SW-MOV- 238 Hrs. 590 Hrs. Repaired mechanical 01250232 1038 portion of valve N1 2/25/83 1-5W-MOV- 2 Hrs. O Adjusted limits

02252120 1048 N1 2/26/83 1-SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. O Tested valve operation 02260110 103A ,

N1 2/26/83 1-SW-MOV 2 Hrs. O Tested valve operation 02260115 104A N1 1/25/83 1-SW-MOV- 238 Hrs. 590 Hrs. Adjusted limits

_ 1 01250233 103C N1 1/25/83 1-SW-MOV- 238 Hrs. 590 Hrs. Repaired mechanical 01250234 104C portion of valve N1 1/25/83 1-SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. O Adjusted close limit 01250235 1040 N1 2/17/83 1-SW-MOV- 78 Hrs, 78 Hrs. Replaced torque sw.

02171111 103B adjusted limits N1 2/23/83 1-SW-MOV- 57 Hrs. 122 hrs. Repaired mechanical 02231502 104B portion of valve N1 2/23/83 1-SW-MOV- 63 hrs. 128 Hrs. Repaired mechanical 02231500 103C portion of valve t

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-20

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT. )

l Component Type: MOV's (Continued) -

l l

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action N1 2/21/83 1-SW-MOV- 91 Hrs. 96 Hrs. Repaired mechanical 02212201 104A portion of valve N1 10/10/83 1-SW-MOV- 7 Days 7 Days Dried out rotor & limit 10101218 108A sw. housing a meggered N2 5/12/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. O Adjusted Open Limit 05121652 203B N2 3/31 /83 2-SW-MOV- 35 Days 35 Days Determinate a reterminate 03310722 203C after maintenance N2 3/31 /83 2-SW-MOV- 35 Days 35 Days Determinate & reterminate 03310723 203D after maintenance N2 3/31 /83 2-SW-MOV- 35 Days 35 Days Determinate & reterminate 03310721 203B after maintenance N2 3/31 /83 2-SW-MOV- 35 Days 35 Days Determinate a reterminate 03310720 203A after maintenance N2 3 /31 /83 2-SW-MOV- 35 Days 35 Days Determinate & reterminate 03310724 204A after maintenance N2 3/31 /83 2-SW-MOV- 35 Days 35 Days Determinate & reterminate 03310725 204C after maintenance N2 3/31 /83 2-SW-MOV- 35 Days 35 Days Determinate & reterminate 03310726 204B after maintenance N2 3/31 /83 2-SW-MOV- 35 Days 35 Days Determinate & reterminate 03310727 204D after maintenance N2 5/14/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 0 Cleaned contacts on 05141030 214B torque sw N2 5/12/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 0 Adjusted open limit 05121654 203D Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-21

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.) ,

Component Type: MOV's (Continued) -

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action H2 5/12/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours O Adjusted open limit 05121653 203C N2 5/12/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 0 Adjusted open limit 05121651 - 203A N2 5/12/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 0 Adjusted mechanical 05121650 203D stop N2 5/23/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 0 Adjusted close limit 05230825 201D N2 5/23/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours O Adjusted close Ifmit 05230824 201C N2 5/23/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 0 Adjusted close limit 05230823 2018 N2 5/23/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 0 Adjusted close limit 05230822 201A N2 5/11/83 Service 6 Hours 8 . Hours Performed EWR-83-186 05110634 Water MOV's N2 5/12/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 2 Hours Adjusted mechanical 05121648 2038 stop N2 5/12/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 2 Hours Adjusted mechanical 05121649 203C stop N2 5/12/83 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hours 2 Hours Adjusted mechanical 05121647 203A stop N1-83 10/6/83 1-SW-MOV- 1 Hr. O Added fuse in motor box 10062222 119 heater JN 4/19/84 2-SW-MOV- 8 Hrs. 8 Hrs. Replaced motor & torque 5902007294 208A sw Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 ~

Page A-22

/

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.) i Component Type: MOV's (Continued)

Total Out l

Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action l JN 8/15/84 1-MOV-SW- 2 Hrs. O Adjusted limits 5901013190 104D JN 6/15/84 1-SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs. Cleaned torque sw 5901009915 110B contacts JN 5/26/84 1-SW-MOV- 4 Days 4 Days Disconnected, cleaned, 5901009229 102A meggare'd motor, reconnected JN 6/15/84 1 -SW-MOV- 4 Days 2 Hrs. Adjusted limits 5901009914 110A JN 7 /21 / 8 4 1-SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs. Verified torque sw 5901011667 103B settings JN 7/21 /84 1-SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs. Verified torque sw 5901011666 103A settings JN 8/24/84 1-SW-MOV- 238 Hrs. 590 Hrs. Reset torque sw 5901013479 119 JN 2/29/84 1-SW-MOV- 4 Hrs. 4 Hrs. Adjust close limit 5900005650 108A Replaced torque sw JN (These two MR's were worked together) 5900005645 JN 2/7/84 1-SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. O Repaired flex conduit 5900004733 103A JN 3/1/84 2-SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs. Cleaned limit sw 5900005642 220B contacts JN 2/7/84 1-SW-MOV- 1 Hr. O Put water-tight seal on 5900004734 104B J-Box and put on new cover Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 i Page A-23

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: MOV's (Continued) -

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action JN 2/7/84 1 -SW-MOV- 1 Hr. O Replaced missing J-Box 5900004732 1040 screws JN 3/17/84 1 -SW-MOV- 8 Hrs. 8 Hrs. Dried motor & limit sw, 5900006106 1138 meggared JN 8/24/84 1 -SW-MOV- 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs. Reset torque sw 5901013474 110B t

JN 9/3/84 1-SW-MOV- 24 Hrs. 24 Hrs. Performed EMP-C-MOV-3 5901013832 1108 (Test SAT)

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Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-24

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Service Water Pumps & Auxiliary Service Water Pumps Total No. of Maintenance Events: 5 Events Total Maintenance Hours: 6024 Hrs.

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action

N1 9/19/83 1-SW-P-1A 143 Days 143 Days Pump removed, sent to 09191306 factory for overhaul, reinstalled

N1 (These were both part of the same Motor removed, moved to 09191307 maintenance procedure) Unit 2 turbine b1dg. for cleaning a bearing repairs, reinstalled

JN (These were both part of the work outlined -----

5900002015 on N1-83-09191306,1307)

JN 5900002016

N2 3/30/83 2-SW-P-1B 108 Days 108 Days Motor disconnected, 03300830 . motor overhaul, bearings replaced, motor reconnected

N2 (These were both part of same Remove pump, perform 05250823 maintenance procedure) maintenance, reinstall pump N1 3/14/83 1-SW-P-1A 1 Hr. O Adjusted packing 03141313 JN 5/7/84 2-SW-P-1B 2 Hrs. O Adjusted packing 5902008124 JN 4/10/84 1-SW-P-1B 2 Hrs. O Adjusted packing 5901006672

These events were preventative m intenance events l

l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-25

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.) l Component Type: Misc. Pumps -

Total No. of Maintenance Events: 6 Events .

Total Maintenance Hours: 4468 Hrs.

Total Out l Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action N1 9/7/83 1-SW-P-38 5 Hrs. 59 Hrs. RWK selector sw cleaned 09070209 & lubed level float arm N1 9/7/83 1-SW-P-3A 5 Hrs. 59 Hrs. RWK selector sw cleaned 09070207 & lubed level float arm N1 7/4/83 1-SW-P-9A 86 Days 138 Days Cleaned a rebuilt pump 07041330 N1 7/4/83 1-SW-P-98 39 Days' 41 Days Cleaned & rebuilt pump 07041331 N1 11/2/83 1-SW-P-9A 12 Hrs. 54 Hrs. Changed motor bearings 11021407 N1 1/18/83 1-SW-P-3 120 Hrs. O Cleaned corrosion off of 01180700 float sw lubed sw-float arm Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-2,6

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MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Misc. Heat Exchangers -

Total No. of Maintenance Events: 3 Events Total Mainienance Hours: 264 Hrs.

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action JN 1/10/84 1-CH-E-4 96 Hrs. 120 Hrs. Replaced studs and 5900004704 gaskets JN 2/3/84 2-EHC-E-1A 48 Hrs. 72 Hrs. Plugged tube leaks 5900004666 JN 2/3/84 2-EHC-E-1B 48 Hrs. 72 Hrs. Plugged tube leaks 5900004665

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' Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-27 L _ _. . _ _

MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Traveling Water Screens Total No. of Maintenance Events: 2 Events Total Maintenance Hours: 476 Hrs.

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action JN 3/14/84 1-CW-S-1A 163 Hrs. 212 Hrs. Installed new shear 5901002582 pin N1 11/10/83 Stop Logs 264 Hrs. 264 Hrs. Straightened runners 11101300 on stop logs

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Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 -

Page A-28

l MAINTENANCE TABLE (EXCLUSIVE OF PREVENTIVE MAINT.)

Component Type: Spray Array Total No. of Maintenance Events: 1 Event Total Maintenance Hours: 1913 Hrs.

Total Out Maintenance Maintenance of Service Report No. Date Component Duration Duration Action N1 3/16/83 Spray Riser 1740 Hrs. 1913 Hrs. Install complete riser 03160235 U-4 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-29 i

l

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE Est. ,

Maint. Time Component Mode Periodicity PM# (Hours) ,

All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-200A All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-2008 All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-201 A Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2

. 2-SW-MOV-201 B Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 I 2-SW-MOV-201C Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-201D Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-202A Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-2028 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-203A Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-2038 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-203C Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-203D Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-204A Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-204B Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-204C Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-204D Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-30

l l

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE Est.

Maint. Time Component Mode Periodicity PMf (Hours) 2-SW-MOV-205A Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-205B Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-M0Y/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-205C Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-205D Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-206A Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-206B Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-208A Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-208B Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2

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2-SW-MOV-210A Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/;<-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-210B Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-213A All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-213B All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-214A Mode 5 Outage only M-20-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-214B Mode 5 Outage only E-24-MOV/R-1 2 l Mode 5 Outage only M-20-M0V/R-5 2 l

2-SW-MOV-215A All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 l 2-SW-MOV-215B All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 .

1 Report No. 03-1250-1097 I Revision 0 ,

Page A-31 l

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE

- Est.

Maint. Time Component Mode Periodicity PM# (Hours) 2-SW-MOV-217 All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-219 All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-MOV-220A All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 2-SW-MOV-220B All 18 Mos. E-24-MOV/R-1 2 All 18 Mos. M-20-MOV/R-5 2 2-SW-P-1A All Semi-Ann M-20-P/SA-21 0 All 3 Years M-20-P/R-11 336-672 All 18 Mos. E-25-M/C-2 1 All Semi-Ann E-20-LO/SA-4 .17 2-SW-P-1B All 18 Mos. E-25-M/C-2 1 All Semi-Ann E-20-LO/SA-4 .17 All Semi-Ann M-20-P/SA-21 0 All 3 Years M-20-P/R-11 336-672 2-SW-P-12 All 5 Years M-20-P/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-1 2 _

2-SW-P-13 All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-1 2 All 5 Years M-20-P/R-5 2

_ 2-SW-P-2 All Annual M-20-P/A-19 2 All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-3 2 All Semi-Ann E-20-LO/SA-5 .17 2-SW-P-4 All Semi-Ann E-20-LO/SA-5 .17 All Semi-Ann E-20-LO/SA-4 .17 All 18 Mos. E-25-M/C-2 2 All Annual M-20-P/A-19 0 All 5 Year M-20-P/R-11 335-672

! 2-SW-P-5 All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-1 2 All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-1 2 2-SW-P-6 2-SW-P-7 All ,

18 Mos. E-24-M/C-1 2 All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-1 2 2-SW-P-8 l

Report No. 03-1250-1097 I Revision 0 Page A-32 .

l

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE

- Est.

Maint. Time Component Mode Periodicity PM# (Hours)

All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-3 2 2-SW-S-1A All Annual M-20-TS/A-1 1 All Semi-Ann M-20-TS/SA-1 4 (Not tagged)

All 5 Year M-20-TS/R-2 24 All 5 Year M-20-TS/R-2 24 2-SW-S-1B All Annual M-20-TS/A-1 1 All Semi-Ann M-20-TS/SA-1 4 (Not tagged)

All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-3 2 All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-1 2 2-SW-S-3 All 5 Year M-20-SR/R-1 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-4 2 1-SW-C-1 A All Annual M-10-C/A-11 4 All Semi-Ann M-10-C/SA-17 2 1 -SW-C-1 B All Annual M-10-C/A-11 4 All Semi-Ann M-10-C/SA-17 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-4 2 1-SW-MOV-100A All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 -

All 18 Mos. E-14-MOV/R-1 2

~

All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-100B All 18 Mos. E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-MOV-101 A Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 l Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 l 1-SW-MOV-101 B Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1 -SW-MOV-101 C Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-101 D Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-102A Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-MOV-102B Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-33 i

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE e

Est.

2 Maint. Time Component Mode Periodicity PM# (Hours) 1-SW-MOV-103A Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-103B Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-103C Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-MOV-103D Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-MOV-104A Mode 5 Outage only M-10-M0V/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2

1. SW-MOV-104B Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2

. Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-104C Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1 -SW-MOV-104D Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-105A Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1 -SW-MOV-105B Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-14-M0V/R-1 2 1 -SW-MOV-105C Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1 -SW-MOV-105D Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-M0Y-106A Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1 -SW-MOV-106B Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 ,

1-SW-MOV-108A Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1 -SW-MOV-108B Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 ,

I Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 -

Page A-34

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE

- Est.

Maint. Time Component Mode Periodicity PM# (Hours) -

1-SW-MOV-110A Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-1108 Mode 5 Outage only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 Outage only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-MOV-113A All 18 Mos. E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 18 Mos. M-10-M0V/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-1138 All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-MOV-114A Mode 5 Outage Only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 Mode 5 Outage Only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-114B Mode 5 Outage Only M-10-MOV/R-5 2 Mode 5 -

Outage Only E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-MOV-115A All 18 Mos. E-14-MOV/R-1 2 All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-MOV-115B All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-MOV-117 All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-M0V/R-1 2 1 -SW-MOV-118 All 18 Mos. E-14-MOV/R-1 2 All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1-SW-M0V-119 All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1-SW-MOV-120A All 18 Mos. E-14-M0V/R-1 2 All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 1 -SW-MOV-1203 All 18 Mos. M-10-MOV/R-5 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-MOV/R-1 2 1 -SW-P-1 A All Semi-Ann M-10-P/SA-24 0 All Semi-Ann M-10-P/R-12 336-672 All 3 Year E-10-LO/SA-4 .17 Mode 5 Outage Only E-15-M/C-2 1 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-35

1 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE .

Est.

_Maint. Time Mode Periodicity PM# (Hours)

Component All Semi-Ann E-10-LO/SA-4 . 17 1-SW-P-1B Mode 5 Outage Only E-15-M/C-2 1 M-10-P/SA-24 0 All Semi-Ann 336-672 All 3 Years M-10-P/R-12 E-14-M/C-1 2 1 -SW-P-10 All 18 Mos.

E-14-M/C-1 2 1 -SW-P-11 All 18 Mos.

M-10-P/A-8 2 1 -SW-P-12 All Annual 2

All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 E-14-M/C-1 2 1 -SW-P-13 All 18 Mos.

M-10-P/A-8 2 All Annual 1 -SW-P-14 All 5 year M-10-P/R-2 ---

All Annual M-10-P/A-23 2 1-SW-P-2 l All Semi-Ann E-10-LO/SA-5 .17 E-14-M/C-3 2 i All 18 Mos.

All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 2

, 1-SW-P-3A ---

All Semi-Ann M-10-P/SA-13 1-SW-P-38 All Semi-Ann M-10-P/SA-14 ---

All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 2 1-SW-P-4 All Semi-Ann E-10-LO/SA-5 .17 All 18 Mos. E-15-M/C-2 2 All .~.- 5 Year M-10-P/R-12 0 All Annual M-10-P/A-23 336-672 1-SW-P-5 All -

18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 2 1-SW-P-6 All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 2 1-SW-P-7 All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 2 1-SW-P-8 1-SW-P-9A All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 2 1-SW-P-9B I

Report No. 03-1250-1097 !

Revision 0 Page A-36 l

PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE Est.

'Maint. Time Componen't Mode Periodicity PM# (Hours) 1-SW-S-1A All 18 Mos. E-24-M/C-3 2 All Semi-Ann M-10-TS/SA-1 4 (Not tagged)

All 5 Year M-10-TS/R-1 24 All Annual M-10-TS/A-1 1 1-SW-S-1B All Annual M-10-TS/A-1 1 All Semi-Ann M-10-TS/SA-1 4 (Not tagged)

All 5 Year M-10-TS/R-1 24 All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-3 2 All 18 Mos. E-14-M/C-1 2 1-SW-S-3 All 5 year M-10-SR/R-3 2 i

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page A-37

APPENDIX B I SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAULT TREES l

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page B-1

I" SYMBOLS USED IN THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAULT TREES -

EVENTS Circle - Basic event

)

Diamond - A fault event that is not resolved any further. Though this is not a basic event, it is considered as if it were one in the analysis since it is not resolved any further, either due to lack of failure data at further resolution, or no further

. resolution is required for the particular analysis.

Circle within a Diamond - A fault event that.

is treated like a basic event. The reliability / availability

{h } characteristics of this event are calculated separately by a separate fault tree analysis, and inserted in the main fault tree as if it were a basic event.

Double Diamond - An important undeveloped basic event that requires further development.

House - An event that is normally expected to occur (probability of occurrence = 1), or never to occur (probability of occurrence =

0). It can be used as a " switch" to turn "0N" or "0FF" parts of the tree.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page B-2

l 1

l l

SYMBOLS USED IN FAULT TREES (Continued)

Rectangle -

1. An intermediate event that is resolved further, or

11. The top event.

GATES A

"AND" gate "0R" gate m

A Combination gate V

"NOT" - The small circle indicates "l40T".

The bigger dotted circle represents the l basic event A, which is "NOTed". Together they represent the complement of A. -

OR gate with N inputs (listed), used in

~ "' streamlined format of the simplified fault trees.

I Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page B-3

l SYMBOLS USED IN FAULT TREES (Continued) -

Transfer in - The subtree below triangle is drawn elsewhere. (This A is a convenience used in drawing large fault trees.

Transfer out - The subtree drawn below the triangle belongs el sewhere. This complements the A " transfer in" triangle, and an index number within the triangle indicates the correct match.

~

I l

' f, ,

I ,

, l l

l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 l Page B-4 l

1

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAULT TREE l

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 -

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LOSS Cr hl0NTO l TYPICAL FOR PUMPS l-SW-P fB, 1-SW-P.IA J-SW-P IA. AND 2-SW-P-IB)

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TRAVELING l-SW-S-IA f$ l3,, p + SCREEN l-SW-S IA SACKWASH g OD 5 FAILS

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i APPENDIX C FAILURE RATES AND PROBABILITIES Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page C-1

l 1 i

-                              BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTIONS AND FAILURE PROBABILITIES 1

FOR THE FAULT TREES CONTAINED IN APPENDIX 8 i 1 1 1 I 4 i 1 i 4 I 4 E7. l i 1 i i i Report No. 03-1250-1097 - Revision 0 Page C-2

PAGE NO. 00001 02/23/85 FAILURE DATA FOR SW FAULT TREE EASIC EVENTS BASIC DESCRIPTION FAILURE FAILURE EVENT FROB. PROD. 72 HR 168 HR AINSTASF INSTRUMENT AIR FAILURE 1.70E-02 3.70E-02 CCVXXX1D BACKWASH PUMP OUTLET CHECK VALVE FAILS 9.OOE-04 2.10E-03 CCVXXX2D BACKWASH PUMP OUTLET CHECK VALVE FAILS 9.COE-04 2.10E-03 CCVXXX3D BACKWASH F' UMP OUTLET CHECK VALVE FAILS 9.OOE-04 2.10E-03 ' CCVXXX4D BACKWASH PUMP OUTLET CHECK VALVE FAILS 9.OOE-04 2.10E-03 CPU 1W2AA BACKWASH PUMP 1-CW-P-2A FAILS TO START 1.80E-02 4.20E-02 CPU 1W2AF BACKWASH PUMP .-CW-P-2A FAILS TO RUN 4.50E-05 6.50E-05 CPU 1W2EA BACvWASH PUMP 1-CW-P-2B FAILS TO START 1.80E-02 4.20E-02 CPU 1W2BF BACKWASH PUMP 1-CW-P-2B FAILS TO RUN 4.50E-05 6.50E-05 CPU 2W2AA BACKWASH PUMP 2-CW-P-2A FAILS TO START 1. DOE-02 4.OCE-02 CPU 2W2AF BACKWASH PUMP 2-CW-P-2A FAILS TO RUN 4.50E-05 6.5<:E-OG CPU 2W2BA BACNWASH PUMP 2-CW-P-2B FAILS TO START 1.80E-02 4.20E-02 CPU 2W2EF BACVWASH PUMP 2-CW-2B FAILS TO.RUN 4.30E-05 c.50E-05 CTV1SW4A TRAVELING SCREEN 1-CW-S-1D FAILS TO STRT 9. 90E--04 2.30E-O3 CTV1SW4F TRAVELING SCREEN 1-CW-S-1D FAILS TO RUN 5.40E-04 7.90E-04 CTV25W4A TRAVELING SCREEN 2-CW-S-2A FAILS TO STRT '? . 90E-04 2.30E-03 CTV2SW4F TRAVELING SCREEN 2--CW-5-2A FAILS TO RUN 5.40E-04 7. DOE-04 CXVXXX1D 1-CW-P-2A MAN. ISOL. VALVE FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-04 1.00E-OJ CXVXXXIX OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN MAN. ISOL. VALVE 1.OOE-01 1.oOE-01 CXVXXX2D 2-CW-P-2B MAN. IFOL. VALVE F' AILS TO OoEN 1.OOE-04 1.OOE-34 CXVXXX2X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN MAN. ISCL. VALVE 1.OOE-01 1. DOE-01 E41601GF 41eOV BUS 1G FAULTS 3.60E-OS G.4vE-05 E41602GF 4160V BUS 23 FAULTS 3.60E-05 8 6 40E-05 EBSEM1HF 4160 BUS 1H FAULTU 3.60E-05 8.40E-05 EBSEM1JF 4160V BUS 1J FAULTS 3.60E-OG S.40E-05 ESSEM2HF 4160V 3US 2H FAULTS 3.60E-05 E.40E-35 EBGEM2JF 4160V BUS 2J FAULTS 3.60E-05 8.40E-05 EDGEM1HA DIESEL GEN. 1H FAILS TO START 2.50E-02 2.50C-02 EDGEM1HF DIESEL GEN. 1H FAILS TO RUN 3. 6 0E--0 2 0.G:E-02 EDGEM1HM DIESEL GEN. 1H IN MAINTENANCE 1.10E-OZ 1.19E- 02 EDGEM1JA DIESEL GEN. 1J FAILE TO START 2.50E-02 2.SvE-02 EDGCM1JF DIE 5EL GEN. 1J FAILS TO PUN 3.LOE-02 3. i E- 0:. EDGEM1JM DIESEL GEN. 1J IN MAINTENANCE 1.10E-02 1.10Em/2 EDGEM2HT DIESEL GEN. 2H FAILS TO STAR ~ 2.50E-02 2. 5CC- 02 EDCEM2HF DIEGEL GEN. CH FAILS TO RUN 3.60E-02 3.bOE-02 EDSEM2HM DIESEL GEN. CH IN MAINTENANCE 1.10E-OO 1.1M-N EDGEM2JA DIESEL GEN. 2J FAILS TO START 2.30E "32 2.5CE-07 EOGEM2JF DICUEL CEN. 2J FAILO TO SUN .. KE - 6? 7. M 2-02 EDGEM2JM D I E U.L GEN. 23 IN NAINTENANCE 1. lot 02 1,. E N COGEMcMr DIEGEL GCN. COMMUN MODE FAILilRC 2.OGE-03 2. {- :! EL O'" TF WF LOSS CF OFFGITE FOWER 2. 2r,E-r 4 0,~SC-01 SAV102AF T CV-SW -102A FAILS 10 OPERATE 7.OOE-04 ~n{v' 3AV100Br TCV-SW-102D FAILE TO Or% ATE 7.00E-01 '. X E 4 SAV102CF TLV-2W-lOOC FAILO TO OFERATE 7.OOE-01 7 ' E - : <1 3CNAIR3F COMFREC3ED AIR SYG1EM FnILURE 1. 70E- 0 ' 3. ? :!C - 0 : CCVIEW36. 1-3W-P-1A DISCH CHECF VLV rn'LC 7U CLOC ..OtE-r4 ; . . E-i 4 3CV1W10D 1-5W-P-1b DISCH CHE2F VL./ FOILE TC OFEN 1.0/E-04 1. JE ' n SCV1W22D 1-0W-F -4 DISCH CHECh VLV FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.OCE-: 4 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page C-3

i PAGE NO. 00002 02/23/S5 FAILURE DATA FOR SW FAULT TREE BASIC EVENTS BASIC DESCRIPTION FAILURE FAILURE EVENT PROB. PRCE. 72 HR 16S HR SCV1W63D 1-SW-P-2 DISCH CHECK VLV FAILS TO OPEN 9.00E-04 2.10E-- 03 SCV25W3K 2-SW-P-1A DISCH CHECK VLV FAILS TO CLOSE 1.00E-04 1.00E-C4 SCV2W10D 2-SW-P-1B DISCH CHECK VLV FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.OOE-04 SCV2W24D 2-SW-P-4 DISCH CHECK VLV FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 SCV2W2SD 2-SW-P-2 DISCH CHECK VLV FAILS TO CPEN 9.00E-04 2.10E-03 SCVW114D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-114 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 SCVW116D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-116 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 SCVW120D CHECK VALVE 1-SW -120 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1. 00E- 34 SCVW130D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-130 FAILS TO OPEN 1.0CE-04 1.00E-04 SCVW140D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-140 FAILS TO CFEN 1.00E-04 1.03E-04 SCVW150D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-150 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.UOE-01 SCVW630D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-630 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.00E-OC SCVW631D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-631 FAILS TO OPEN 1.r.0E-04 '.'?E-04 SCVW641D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-641 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 SCVW644D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-644 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 SCVW647D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-647 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.OOE-U4 SCVW648D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-648 FAILS TO OFEN 1. 00E- 04 1.00E-04 SCVW65SD CHECK VALVE 1-SW-655 FAILS TO OPEN 1. 00E- 04 1.002-04 SCVW661D CHECK VALVE 1-SW-661 FA[LS TO OPEN 1.00E-0^ 1.002-04 SISOVLAF VALVES FAIL TO OPERATE TO ICOL RUPTURE A 4.00E-03 4.00E-03 SIGOVLPF VALVES FAIL TO OPERATE TO ISOL RUPTURE B 4.00E-03 4.COE-0! SLCOBRCA BRANCH LINE HEADER A INOPERAELE O.00E-00 0.OOE-00 GLCODRCD BRANCH LINE HEADER B INOPERABLE O.00E-00 0,0:E-0) SLCOMDRA LCO HEADER A 0.00E-00 '. . :"0 E - 0 0 SLCOHDRB LCO HEADER B 0.00E-00 0.005-00 SMV100AP RETURN A MOV-SW100A FLUGGED 2.70E-05 o.7?E-05 SMV100BP RETURN B MOV-SW100D PLUGGED 2.90E-CD e.70E-35 SMV101AD MOV-SW101A FAILS TO OPERATE 1.00E-02 1. 0 ? E -0 ~; - SMV101AP MJV-SW101A PLUGGED 2.40E-05 6.70E-05 SMV101DD MOV-SW-101B FAILS TO OPERATE 1.00E-02 . C C :. - : 2 SMV101BP MOV-SW101B PLUGGED 2.90E-OS 6.'/E-O'5 SMV101CD MOV-SW101C FAILS TO OFERATE !.00E-02 . . O': E- C 2 SMV101CP MOV-SW101C PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.v2-05 SMV101DD MOV-SW--101D FAILS TO OPERATE 1.00E-02 . i. O E - 0._ SMV101DP MOV-SW-101D PLLIGGED ~ "PCAS . 7:'E - f S MV 102f- P MOV-SW-102A PLUGEED 2. 90E .35 ' ;. O -02 9MV102bP MOV-SW102D FLUGGED 2.90E-C 6. OE " f.1V1O?AP MOV-SW10~A PLUGaED 2. 90E- 05 _ . ~ ; ~. CC SMV103BP MOV-GW100b PLUGGED 2 . 4

E -"r o . ~O_ { C SMV103Cr MOV- W103C PLUGUEI 2.90E-05 A.w-7 SPV103DP MOV-SWt00D PLUDCEO 2. 90E-O'" 6. ' 0"" 9 S*1V ! O 4 AP MOV-SW104A PLUGGED 2.90E-OL 4 ~F ".;

SMV104DP MOV-SW104D F LUGGCD 2.90E-US s . 'E-Oi OMV104CP MOV-SW1uqC PLUGCED 2.90E-oi. L . N 4.i CMV104DP MOV-SW104D PLUGGCD 2. 90E- 00 t.~W M bM .'.t V5 AD MOV-SW1CDA FAILE TU OPERATE 1.00E-02 1. L _ SNV105AP MOJ cW105A PLUGGCD 2.00E- 3 e.%.5 SMV105DD MOV-GW10nD FAILS TO OPERATE 1. 00E- 02 1.."+ .>._ Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page C-4

i a PAGE NO. 00003 02/23/85 FAILURE DATA FOR SW FAULT TREE BASIC EVENTS BASIC DESCRIPTION FAILURE FAILURE. i EVENT PROB. PROB. ! 72 HR 16S HR SMV105BP MOV-SW105B PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-05 SMV105CD MOV-SW105C FAILS TO OPERATE 1.00E-02 1.COE-02 SMV105CP MOV-SW105C PLUGGED 2.90E-05 -6.70E-05 SMV105DD MOV-SW105D FAILS TO OPERATE 1.OOE-02 1.03E-02 SMV105DP MOV-SW105D PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-05 SMV106AP MOV-SW106A PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-05 SMV106BP MOV-SW106B PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-OG SMV108AP MOV-SW108A PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-OD SMV108BP MOV-SW108B PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-05 SMV115AD -MOV-SW115A FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-02 1.OCE-02 i SMV115AP MOV-SW115A PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-05

,                   SMV115BD .MOV-SW115B FAILS TO OPEN                                               1.OOE-02 1.COC-22                 1 1                    SMV115BP      MOV-SW115B PLUGGED                                                2.90E-05 6.70E-05 l                   SMV2OOAP      MOV-SW-2OOA PLUGGED                                               2.90E-05 6.70E-05 l

SMV2OOBP MOV-SW-2OOB PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-05 j SMV200AP MOV-SW2084 PLUGGED 2.90E-OG 6.70E-05 SMV208BP MOV-SW208B PLUGOED 2.90E-05 6.70E-05 SMV215AD MOV-SW215A FAILS TO OPEN 1.OGE-02 1. OOC-02 j SMV215AP MOV-SW215A PLUGGED 2.90E-05 d . 70E--05 SMV215BD MOV-SW215B FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-02 1.COE-02 , SMV215BP MOV-SW215B PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-05 SMVAUTOF AUTOMATIC INITIATION FAILS 0.OOE-OO O.OOE-OO i SMVW117D MOV-SW117 FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-02 1 OOE-02 > SMVW117P MOV-SW117 PLUGGED 2.90E-05 6.70E-OS SMVW118D MOV-SW118 FAILS TO OPEN 1.COE-02 1.OOE-02 SMVW118P MOV-SW118 PLUGGED 2.90E-05 e.70E-05 SMVW217D MOV-SW217 FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-02 1.OOE-02 SMVW217P MOV-SW217 PLUGGED 2.90E-OD 6.70E-05

      ~                                                                                                                                l SPPISOAR      ISOLATABLE RUPTURE HEADER A                                        1.40E-03 C . 40E--O!

. SPPISOAX OPERATOR FAILS TO ISOL. RUPlURE-HDR. A 1.OOE-01 1. 00E- 01 SPPISOBR ISOLATABLE RUPTURE HEADER B 1.40E-03 C.40E-O!

l SPPISCBX OPERATOR FAILS TO ISOL, RUPTURE-HDR. B 1.OOE-01 1.OOE-v1

!                   SPFNISAR      NON-ISOLATABLE RUPTURE' HEADER A                                   1.40E-04 3.40E-04 SPPNISDR      NON-ISOLATADLE RUPTURE HEADER D                                    1.40E-04 '.40E-04 GFU1GW2A      1-CW-P-2    FAILS TO START                                         1.80E-02 4.20E-02

, SPU1SW2F 1-SW-P-2 FAILS TO RUN 4.50E-05 6.50E-05 SPU1SW4A 1-SW-P-4 FAILS TO START 1.10E-03 1.10E-03 SPUISW4F 1-SW-P-4 FAILS TO RUN 1.70E-04 C. OOE-C 4

GPU1SW4M 1 --SW-P-4 IN MAINTENANCE 7.20E-02 L2CE-02 SPUISW4P 1-SW-P-4 SUCTION DLOCKED 7.20E-05 1.70E-04

! SPU1W1AF 1-SW-P-1A FAILS TO RUN 1.70E-04 4.OOE-04 EPU1W1AM 1--CW- P- 1 A IN MAINTENANCE 8.30E-02 c.70E-C2 SPU1W1AP 1-SW-P-1A SUCTION BLOCKED 7.20E-OS 1.70E-OA SPL11W1BA 1-SW-Pu1B FAILS TO START 1.10E-03 : . I C E '. ! SPU1W1BF 1-SW-P- 1B FAILS TO RUN 1.70E-04 4.OeE- X

SPU1W1BM- 1-SW-P-1D IN MAINTENANCE P.30E-02 E,. Ci. E - 0 2 SPU1W1BF 1-SW-P-1B SUCTION ELOChED 7.COE-05 1.70E-04 SPU25W2A 2-SW-P-2 FAILS TO START 1.00E-02 4. 20E-a.C Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

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7 i PAGE NO. 00004 i 02/03/85 l

        ,                 FAILURE DATA FOR SW FAULT TREE DASIC EVENTS BASIC                      DESCRIPTION                                  FAILURE         FAILURE            ,

EVENT PROB. FROB.

72 HR 16S HR SPU2SW2P 2-SW-P-2 FAILS TO RUN 4.50E-05 6.50E-C5 SPU2SW4A 2-SW-P-4 FAILS TO START 1.10E-03 1.10E-03 i SPU25W4F 2-SW-P=4 FAILS TO RUN 1.70E-04 4.OOE-04 SPU2SW4M 2-SW-P-4 IN MAINTENANCE 7.20E-02 7.20E-02 SPU25W4P 2-SW-P-4 SUCTION BLOCKED 7.20E-05 1.70E-04 SPU2W1AF 2-SW-P-1A FAILS TO RUN 1.70E-04 4 . OC E- 04 l SPU2W1AM 2-SW-P-1A IN MAINTENANCE 8.30E-02 S.00E-02 SPU2W1AP 2-SW-P-1A SUCTION BLOCKED 7.20E-05 1.70E-04 SPU2W1BA 2-SW-P-1B FAILS TO START 1.10E-03 1.10E-O!

SPU2W1BF 2-SW-P-1B FAILS TO RUN 1.70E-04 4.00E-04 L SPU2W1BM 2-SW-P-1B IN MAINTENANCE 8.30E-02 E.COE-02 SPU2W1BP 2-SW-P-1B SUCTION ELOCKED 7.20E-05 1.70E-04 SPUAXCMF AUX. PUMPS COMMON MODE FAILURE 6.10E--05 6.10E-(c i SPUMAINX OPERATOR FAILS TO START PUMP-MAINTENANCE 1.. O O E - 0 5

                                                                                                  .BOE-03 i       SPUSTRTX  OPERATOR FAILS TO START PUMP-FAILURE                          2.OOE-O!        2.COE-03
}       SPUSWCMF  SERVICE WATER PUMPS COMMON MCDE FAILURE                       2.40E-03        2.40E-OS           L SRESEVRX  OPERATOR DRAINS RESERVOIR                                     O.OOE-OO        O.OCE-OO SRSLVLLO  RESERVOIR LEVEL LOW                                           O.OOE-OO        O.OOE-OO SRSMKUPX  OPERATOR FAILS TO PROV. MAKEUP TO RESERV                      1.OOE-01        1.OOE-01           '

STV181AA TRAV. SCREEN 1-SW-S-1A FAILS TO START 9.90E-C4 2. 20E--03 STV1SIAF TRAV. SCREEN 1-SW-S-1A FAILS TO RUN 5.40E-04 7,90E-OC STV151BA TRAV. SCREEN 1-SW-S-1B FAILS TO START 9. TOE-04 2.3C2-02 STV191BF TRAV. SCREEN 1-SW-S-1B FAILS TO RUN .5.40E-04 7.CO2-04 STV2S1AA TRAV. SCREEN 2-SW-S-1A FAILS TO START 9.90E-04 2 .'3 C E - 0 3 STV251AF TRAV. SCREEN 2-SW-S-1A FAILS TO~RUN 5.40E-04 7.80E-Oc STV2SIBA TRAV. SCRCEN 2-SW-S-1B FAILS TO START 9.oOE-04 2.202-C2 STV2S1DF TRAV. SCREEN 2-SW-S-1B FAILS TO RUN 5.40E-04 7.80E-Of SXV1SW4D MAN. VALVE 1-SW-4 FAILS TO OPEN 1.COE-04 1.OOE-04 SXV1SW4X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN MAN. VALVE 1-SW-4 4.OOE-03 4.OOE-O! SXVISW6E OPERATOR MISALIGNED MAN. VALVE 1-SW-6 0.OOE-00 C.00E-OO SXV1W11E OPERATCR MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-11 O.OOE-OO O.OVE-00 SXV1W13D MAN. VALVE 1-SW-13 FAILS TO OPEN .1.COE-04 1. C ?E-04 SXV1W13X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN MAN. VLV. 1-SW-13 4.OCE-03 <.OOE-03 i SXV2SWAE OPERATOR MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 2-SW-4 0.OCE-OO C . 00900 I 'SXV25W6D MAN. VALVE 2-SW-6 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1. ?E-94 SXV2EW6X CFERATOR FAILS TC OPEN MAN. YLV. 2-SW-6 4.OOE-03 .O'E-03 l SXV2W11D MAN. VALVE 2-SW-11 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-02 1. OOE-' m SXV2W11X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN MTN. VLV. 2-SN-11 4.COE-03 A . OOi. ' l SXV2W13E_ OPERATOR MISALIGNED MAN. VLV. 2-SA-1! C.00E-CO 0.*T-A SXVW176.E OPERATOR MISALIGNS VLV. 1-SW-176 1.20E-04 1. 20E- o i SXVW177D MAN. VALVE 1-SW-177 FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-04 1.00E-C-j SXYW177X ' OPERATOR CAILS TO CPEN VLV. 1-EW-177 1.20E-04 . 2?C-04 l .SXVW184L MAN. VALVE 1-SW-184 FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-Oo 1.OvE-04 j SXVW184X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN VLV. 1-BW-184 1. 20E- CA 1.20E-01 SXVW185D MAN. VALVE 1-SW-1SS FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-OS 1.OOE-04 SXVW185X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN VLV. 1- SW- I E5 1. 20E-N : . . v .~ ~ SXVW18cD MAN. VALVEci-SW-lee FAILS TO OFEN 1. ME- X 1.?CE u a SXVW106X -OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN VLV. 1-SW-186 1.20E-04 1.20E-04 Report No. 03-1250-1097 i

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i 1 PAGE-NO.-00005 4 02/23/05 FAILURE DfiTA FOR SW FAULT TREE BASIC EVENTS BASIC DESCRIPTION FAILURE FAILURE , EVENT PROD. FROE. 72 HR 16S HR SXVW195D MAN. VALVE 1-SW-195 FAILS TO OPEb' 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 SXVW195X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN VLV. 1-SW-195 1.20E-04 1.20E-04 SXVW222D -MAN. VALVE 1-SW-222 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.COE-04 SXVW222X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN VALVE 1-SW-222 1.20E-04 1.2CE-04 ,

       .SXVW231D MAN. VALVE 1-SW-231 FAILS TO OPEN                      1.00E-04    1. 00E -04          '

EXVW231X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN VALVE 1-SW-231 1.20E-04 1.20E-C4 SXVW232D MAN. VALVE 1-SW-232 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1. 00E- 04 j SXVW232X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN VLV. 1-SW-232 1.20E-04 1.20E-04 SXVW233E OPERATOR MISALIGNED MAN. VLV. 1-SW-233 1. 20E--04 1.20E-04 - SXVW240D MAN. VALVE 1-SW-240 FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-04 1.30E-04 SXVW240X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN VLV. 1-SW-240 1.20E-04 1.20E-04 SXVW241D MAN. VALVE 1-SW-241 FAILS TO OPEN 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 SXVW241X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN VLV. 1-SW-241 1.20E-04 1.20E-04 I SXVW30SD MAN. VALVE FAILS TO OPEN 1.OOE-04 1.00E-04 SXVW308X OPERATOR FAILS TO OF'EN MAN. VALVE 1.00E-C1 1.00E-01

SXVW634E OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-634 1.' 20E- 04 1.20E-04 i SXVW635E OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-635 1.20E-04 1.20E-04 a SXVW636E OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-636 1,20E-04 1.20E-04

;       SXVW637E OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-637                 1'.20E-04    1.20E-04 SXVW639E OFER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-639                 1.20E-04    1.20E-04 SXVW642E OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-642                 1.20Er04     1.20E-01 SXVW643E  OFER. MISALIGNED ~ MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-643              1.20E-04    1.20E-04 SXVW645E OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-645                1.20E-04     16 20E-04 SXVW646E  OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-646                1.20E-04    1. 20E- 04 l       SXVW651E  OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-651                1.20E-04     1.2CE-04
     . SXVW652E  OPER. MISALICNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-652                1.20E-04    1.20E-C4 SXVW652E  OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-653                1.20E-04     1.20E          SXVW654E  OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-654                1.20E-04    1.202- 04 SXVW656E   OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-656               1.20E-04    1.20E-04 j       SXVW659E  OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL' VALVE 1-SW-659               1.20E-04    1. 2 0E- 0-3 SXuW660E   OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW--660              l'20E-04
                                                                         .           1.20E-04

. SXVW669E OFER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE-1-SW-669 1.20E-C4 1. ME-01 SXVW670E OPER. MISALIGNED MANUAL VALVE 1-SW-670 1.20E-04 1.20E-04 i i j- Report No.- 03-1250-1097 l Revision 0 i Page C-7

APPENDIX D HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITY EVALUATIONS This appendix contains the detailed evaluations of key operator actions that were identified during the course of the analysis. These actions were identified by first applying a conservative value of 0.1 to the human error probability (HEP) and then analyzing the fault tree. The significant cutsets were then reviewed for important operator actions from which a detailed evaluation was performed. These human error probabilities developed in this appendix are non-recovered probabilities, that is, they are the probability that the event occurs and is not recovered from in time, resulting in a failure. Human error probabilities less than 10-7 are considered negligible in this analysis. Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 l Page D-1 -

l Operator Action: Operator drains the service water reservoir I Basic Event (s): SRESEVRX Human Error Probability: Negligible Justification:

Background

The service water reservoir can be potentially drained by opening two valves in series either discharge header (MOV's SW-120A '1d 220A, or SW-120B and 220B. This operation directs the service water ' . turn flow to Lake Anna via the discharge canal. Subject,ive Assessment The initiation of this event is unlikely, requiring two errors of commission; , i.e., the inadvertent operation of two motor operated valves from the two control rooms. To open each valve, two separate actions must be taken:

1) placing a keylock " normal-defeat" switch in the defeat position, and

 ,2) depressing the "open" pushbutton Since closing the valves (by the "close" pushbutton) does not require operation of the key-lock switch, it is unlikely that the two operations could be confused.    -

The possibility of this event, if initiated, going undetected is extremely remote. At full flow through the service water system, the reservoir would empty in about 16 hours. For conservatism,10 hours is assumed to be the time until pump suction is lost. Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page D-2

Several factors would alert the operators to the event in progress:

1) Both units are supplied from the same reservoir, thus two incependent operating crews would have to fail to realize the situation.

2) The discharge valve positions are alarmed in both control rooms when their positions are changed.

3) Reservoir level is alarmed and indicated in both control rooms.

4) Reservoir level readings are logged by the operators in both control rooms every 4 hours.

 ~5) At least one shift change per unit would occur during the event.

Personnel entering and leaving the site via the station access road could be reasonably expected to notice the decreased reservoir level and the absence of reservoir spray. Quantitative Assessment No detailed human error probability evaluation is required for this postulated event due to the weight of subjective evidence against the possibility of its occurrence, i This type of recovery error most closely corresponds to the " Operator Inhibits" category of the Oconee PRA (Ref.1). All such errors were ultimately disregarded in that study. For this analysis, the basic event will be left on the tree for accountability, but will be assigned the E notation on the data sheets (negligible probability). A value of 0.0 will be assigned for this basic event in the computer analyses. l l l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page D-3

Operator Action: Operator misaligned service water pump discharge valve (to the normal header) closed. . Basic Event (s): SXV1W11E SXY2W13E SXV1SW6E SXV2SW4E Human Error Probability: Negligible Justification: :

Background

In the normal service water system alignment,' each of the 4 service water pumps is connected to a predetermined header. The manual discharge valve to that header is normally open, and the manual discharge valve to the alternate header is normally closed. When the required pump is started, flow is l l achieved to the proper header without further manual valve operation. The valves are located in the service water pump house. - Qualitative Assessment Valve mispositioning events are credible. Both the Oconee PRA (Ref.1) and the " Handbook" (Ref. 4) addresses this type of event. A quantitative assessment is per~ formed to estimate the probability of occurrence. Quantitative Assessment ! The unrecovered misalignment of the valve (resulting in failure of a pumping train) consists of two elements: i 1) The probability of the valve being misaligned at the time of the demand, and Report No. 03-1250-1097

 ~                                                                            Revision 0 Page D-4

2) The probability that the operators would fail to open the valve, following the attempt to place the pump in service. -

PTotal = Pj XP 2 Pj = (Pomission + selection error) X (Pnon-recovery I Pj is the probability that the operator will omit a step in a written . restoration procedure plus (OR situation) the probability that the operator will " restore" the wrong valve, assuming that he does not omit the procedural step, multiplied by the probability (AND situation) that an independent verification by a second person fails to correct the misalignment. Pj will be calculated as the unavailability (U)(probability of failure per demand) of the valve. P = (Pomission + Pselection error)(Pnon-recovery) Pomission = .001 (Ref. 4, Table 15.3) ^ Pselection = .01 (Ref. 4, Table 14.1)*

 -                        *Value of .01 is used because all discharge valves are j                          similar and in the same location.

P non-recovery = . 0 01 + . Ol * *

                          ** Since North Anna maintenance procedures require totally independent verification, P non-recovery is computed the same way as Pomission + Pselection*

P = (.001 + .01)(.001 + .01) = 1.2E-4/maint event For maintenance data, there have been about 3.2 maintenance events per year. The resultant failure rate is 3.2 X 1.2E-4 = 3.8E-4 i Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page D-5

The mean time between demands on the pump from data is 0.04 years / demand. Using one half the mean time between demands, the resultant failure probability is: P) = 7.6E-6 Element 2 is the probability that the operators would fail to correct the situation (by opening the closed valve) upon attempting to establish fl ow. Since the probability of element 1 is very small, element 2 will be estimated simply as if it were a failure to open the valves following a loss of service water pump event (bringing an alternate pump on line that is normally connected to the heater). This value is estimated as P2 = 0.004. ) The total probability of this event is then (7.6E-6)(4.0E-3) = 3.0E-8 I l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page D-6

Operator Action: Operator fails to start a standby pump on loss of the running pump - Basic Event (s): SPUSTRTX < Human Error Probability: 0.002 . Justification:

Background

One standby service water pump is normally running on each header, with one pump aligned to the header in standby. Pumps that are normally aligned to the alternate header can also be used, following a manual (local) valve realignment. In addition, either of 2 aux service water pumps may be started with valve alignments accomplished from the control room. Qualitative Assessment This event is credible. The Oconee PR'A considers a similar event in its analysis of the reliability of the service water system. 'l Quantitative Assessment Loss of a running service water pump would be evident to the operators of both units. The following alarms and indications would result:

1) Low S.W. return header flow annunciators

2) S.W. pump auto trip annunciators

3) High component cooling temp and surge tank level indications

4) High charging pump lube oil temperature annunciators The annunciator response procedures specify starting an additional pump on verification of low flow or pump trip. The loss of service water abnormal procedure also specifies as an immediate action to verify / start one pump on Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 -

Page D-7

             , _ _ -    - , - , , - , - - . , - , , , - ,         - - _- - - , , ,           ,,- -  -    - , , , , _ _ , ,         .y, - , , ,

each header. The Oconee PRA quantifies a similar action at 0.002. The major difference to be considered between North Anna and Oconee is that multiple redundant service water pumps are available as backups for North Anna, while Oconee has only one standby pump. I For this evaluation, it is assumed that the diagnosis of the situation dominates the operators' response; therefore a high degree of coupling exists for failing to start any of the backup pumps. Rather than quantifying the operators' response for each pump, only one action will be quantified. The independence of the two control rooms is not taken credit for in this evaluation lending additional conservatism in the use of the Oconee PRA human error probability of 0.002 for the North Anna station. The probability is calculated as follows: P = P) X P2+P3+P4 Where Pj= ' probability of failure to decide to take action based on event diagnosis ' P2" probability of failure to take action based on rules - P = probability of failure to take action based on surveillance 3 , P4= probability of uncorrected failure to manipulate controls correctly The HEP of 0.002 in the Oconee PRA is assumed to be the product of P) and P. P is assumed to be not applicable, since the operator is responding 2 3 to an event (loss of a pump) characterized by positive indication of the event l (alarms, etc. ). P4 is assumed to be negligible due to the simplicity of the action and the positive feedback resulting from the action (flow and pressure). l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 Page D-8

Operator Action: Operator fails to align service water pump discharge manual valve to alternate header following loss of operating pump. Basic Event (s): SXV1W13X SXV2WilX SXY1SW4X , SXV2SW6X Human Error Probability: 0.004 Justification: ! Background In order to line up a service water pump to supply the alternate header, the valves at the pump discharge must be repositioned manually. These valves are located in the service water intake structure in the vicinity of the pumps. Quantitative Assessment . This HEP is quantified using the following model: P=Pj XP2+P3+P4 Where Probability of failure to decide to take action based on P) = event diagnosis l P2= Probability of failure to take action based on rules Probability of failure to take action based on surevillance P3= Probability of uncorrected failure to manipulate controls P4= correctly. This action is similar to the " failure to start a standby pump" action l quantified earlier since the same event diagnosis applies. l l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page D-9 L ____ - _ _ _ _ _ - __ . . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

As in that calculation, the product of P jand P 2is assumed to be the only contributor to-tothl probability. - Using a base probability of 0.002 for the failure to diagnose (from the Oconee PRA " failure to start a standby pump" estimate), the estimate for failing to open a discharge valve is 0.004. This factor of 2 over the base probability is used due to less specific guidance in the alarm response procedures and abnormal procedures for the case where the pump will start, but flow cannot be verified (Ref. 2 and 3). " Verify Valve Lineup" is the general guidance ' provided in the procedures. l

     >                                                           Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page D-10

Operator Action: Operator fails to start a standby pump when one pump is i taken out for maintenance. _ f l Basic Event (s): SPUMAINX Human Error Probability: 1.0 X 10-5 Justification:

Background

Prior to taking a service water pump out of service for maintenance, the operator should first start a standby pump in order to maintain sufficient 4 flow to all components. If available, the standby pump or auxiliary service water pump that is aligned to the same header would normally be used. Qualitative Assessment ; This event is credible," but of very low probability. The event is somewhat similar to event SPUSTRX " failure to start a standby pump on loss of the running pump." Some significant differences exist in the two scenarios. In - this case, " loss" of the running pump is a planned evolution, with specific procedures for establishing flow from the standby pump prior to maintenance. 1 l Quantitative Assessment An unrecovered failure to start a standby pump would be a combination of two elements:

1) Omission of a procedural step, followed by

2) Failing to diagnose a loss of service water condition (and not starting the standby pump) ,

1 Item 1 is assigned a base HEP of .001 in Table 15-3 of Ref. 4, and a value of

            .005 under abnormal operating conditions. The value .005 will be used in this calculation for conservatism.

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1 Page D-11 l l

l The HEP for " omission" must be "ANDed" with the calculated value of the

    " operator fails to" model of Reference 1 to estimate the overall pr_obability of the omission error and recovery error.

P = (Pomission) X (Pnon-recovery The value of the recovery error probability is estimated to be 0.002, using the previously mentioned Oconee PRA HEP estimate of failure to start a standby pump as a basis. In this case, no auto trip audible alarm cue will be evident, but the operator's immediately preceding acting stopping the running pump would be expected to link the resultant low flow alarm to the causal factor. Therefore, the estimate of 0.002 is assumed to be valid for this case. P = (0.005)(0.002) = 1.0 X 10-5 Z< i Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision G Page D-12 i

l l I I I REFERENCES

1) Oconee PRA-NSAC 60

2) VEPCO Procedure 1-AP-12, Rev. 3, " Loss of Service Water System"

3) VEPC0 Procedure 1-AP-9, Rev. 9, " Panel IJ - Main Control Board"

4) NUREG/CR-1278 J

l I , l l Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 - Page D-13

APPENDIX E FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 l l l

t FAILURE ISOE$ AND EFFECTS ANALY$15 trett u as: I FAILURE MTECTION xxvau unnta 5T5. TWO HEADER OptR. xxvnt unttu 5T5. 00E HEADER OpfR. I taituent

                                                                                                                                                                        $YSTEN                CtBOENTS i                                  MODE             MECHANISM I

Fatis to start 1. $W pump Auto Trip None. Other $W p e p will lNone. During one None. Assumes one 1. Assumes one pump operating on each header for tuo l l Annunciator : continue to provide header operation two l pump Currently running header operetten and tue pumps operating on one header l l ladequate $W flow and Iservice water pumps los each header, for one header operation. s l l 1 pressure. Iwill be operattng ' I I i i I 'on the active header. 2. Two SW pumps are nome 11y aligned to each supply l l l l 1 I header. l I ' I

11. $W pump Auto Trip I Temporary less of SW flow l SW flew and pressere i Less of pressere to I Fatis to continue running l Annunciator and pressure in header Iwill be reduced in the Isupported systems

12. $W pump Discharge I supp1ted by this pump. I good header. Start up lentil additional SW l l pressure (Control Manuel start of alternate of another $W pump or ' pump started. l l Room Indication) i $W pump or austitary SW aestilary SW pump will I l l l 3. $W Discharge Header Ipap will result in SW ' restore $W flow and l l Flow to Reservoir I flow being maintained. I pressure. I I I (Control Room l l l l l Indication) I l l l l 4. $W Return HDR Low I i 1 Flow Annunctator ! l l l

l (may not provide 1 l l l alare under certain i l { I i situations) l i I 1 l l l l I I I I I I ' I

                                                                                                                                               '                                         s                                                                             I i                                I                         I                                                                             I

' l l I 3 I l l i I I I I 1 t 1 I l l

I l l l l 1 I I I l

i lLu.r = uis Service Water Pumps 1-55-F-1 A,1 55-Fig, Z-55-F-1 A, Z-35-F-15 L. R Anne Feuer 5tation - 5ervfqe Water 5ystes

      !                                                                                                                                                                                              J08 NO.1250-023-1572 pese 1    of 14 l

i Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

I FAILURE IlODES AND EFFECTS AllALY$15 l I tretcT5 UN: FAILURE DETECTlost anviu unstu 5T5. xurict Wartu 5Y5. I taitwent ONE HEADER OptR. SYSTEM CtDRENTS I MODE MECHANISM TWO HEADER OPER. . l II. The Aust11ery $U pumps provide make-up to the SW l Fell to Start II. Aus. $W pump Auto lilone. Meke-up can be lIlone, lione. Iprcvided by other Amu. l l l system and provide back up to the pernal SW pumps. l i Trty Annunciator I l lSW pump. l l 2. One Aust11ery $U pump is normally altened to each 1 I l header; homever, both pesups are capable of supplying l l l ) J I l l l etther header. l 1 I I I I I

11. Aus. $W pump Aute litone, lloreal SW supply llone. Other aus. $W lNone, IFatis to Continue I launning i Trty Annunciator lis provided by mein $W Ipump can be cross ! I l l 2. Ama. SW pump to Ipumps. Iconnected to continue I I Flow Annunctatar l lprovidtag make up if I 3. Aua. $W pump I I needed. I Olscharge Flow l I

i Control Room i I Indicator 1 i l 4. Ana. SW pump I l 1 Discharge pressure i l l, Control Room Indicator . I I I I i . I I I i l. 1 1 i 1 1 i i 1 1 I i 1 i l i 1 I l 1 1 1 I I i 1 I I I I 1 11 1 1 ' i i 1 i i l l i l i . l 1 mI: Ausilf ary 5ervice Water pisups 1-5W-p-4, Z-5W-p-4 North Anne pauer 5tatten - 5ervice Water System l%

JOB NO. 1250-023-1572 e page 2 of 14 o

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

l1i l I111llI lll Il1I _ se e t h s y t S y r l p t e p a u W 7 s 9 n e c 0 a i 1 c v - r t a e 0 h 5 5 t - 2 s 1 _ p n - _ o e. e s i t2 3 pn a7 0 e t5 he 51 0 sr 4 e c ws r31 e2 o u0 Nn nr of o ee et P0o 5 ti ra cw a2 n1 rs s oi g An .3 pv on wi .O ee tl UNBg e RR S eve Oa T N ra ar LJP EO e t ll1 B rr t C eu ho Tf I iI IiI I11 $ 1i I t n4 aE 5 uT 1 tSY 5 T uS t L A N . . A e e no n S o T N N II1l C 1 I I I 1 E F F E . 3 . D TR N A :5EP u uO - S E c t iR D s aE u wDA O M E R t e r uE i H , U t vE L uN I tO . . A s e e F n o n e o N N ) l l l IIll1II IIl11Il , l e bg

f . n 5 eni YR. tal 5E P

a n cev uO rpa Z t sR e t ut mr - nE l p P a e - uDA hh W est 5 nE a H ha Twr os. Z vO , uW nf n Z tT .e e eede s nrer en P ocsc N o W NsusI1 Il'r 1 11 l. l l I l l I 5 1 t o a s n i p o c . o i n P t1 u aMl n - h c an e s NM i sfA v a OS dnt o W _ II nene eer b TN r ru a _ I CA n EN l c es s e TC aSf s a e r EE c f e c DM owl r e 5 LSOP m a

                        ..              S                                                                                         r
                                          -                                                                                       e I

12.11Il11 11 1ll1 111 l 8I1 lIi11 Iil1li t a W e ic v r t e r s a n E t S u ; R R i UE o w LO ID t t o AM F s s n _ l l i l l a a w . F F L 1 l I111li I I1lII1ll1l1l1

f FAILURE IIDOES AhD EFFECTS AllALYS15 l tertt:5 ON: 11 l 1 I l i FAILURE DETECTIOli i xxisot vasta 5T5. xxvin WATER 5T5. ExitummL CIBGENTS I IIn0E MECHANISII 1 TWO IIEADER OPER. 01E HEADER OPER. SYSTEM i i Plugged - Falls to 11. $W Screens - Ilo ITemporary re&ction of SW ISW fisw and pressure ; Loss of pressure to 1. The traveling water screens are automatically cleaned Allow Flow I Rotation, high iflow and pressure to Iwill be reduced in the tsupported systems every efght hours and ulten the differentf al pressure l l Offferential lheader suppiled by the Igood header. Start-up luntti additional SW across the screen gets too high. l l Pressure Annunciaterlpump affected. Manuel Iof another $W pump or I pop started. I 1 ll2. SW Pump Discharge Istart of alternate SW pump lsuntilary SW pump will l l Pressure (Control I or aux 111ery $W pump will I restore SW flow and l l 1 Room Indication) Iresult in $W flow bef ag pressgre.

I l l 1eatntsined. I I l . I I 1 I l l l 1 I i 1

l I I 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 I 1 i i i l I a i l i 1 i 1 i I I I , I I I I I I i 1 1 I 1 1 I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I

                                                 \                                \                            l                 .

I 1 I . I I i 1 1 I I I ICtBIPJIIENT: Traveling Water 5creens 1-5W-5-1 A 1-5W-5-15, 2-5W-5-1 A. 2-5W-5-1B, North Anna Pc=- 5tation - 5ervicq Water 5ystes JOS 110.1250-025M572 Page 4 of 1* Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

f FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS AllALYSIS l trr:6n cu: l FAILURE DETECTION xWyICE MATER 5T5. 5ERVICE WATER 5T5. l taitzumL l H0(4 HECHANISBS TWO HEADER OPER. DIE HEADER OPER. SYSTEN CtBGENTS

 .kupture                1. SW Return Header Lo Loss of SW flow and         Total loss of service       All systems supported I. Ruptured header must be isolated.

Flow Annunctator l pressure in effected water flow. lby service water can

2. SW Retarn Header header. l lLe realfgnee to the l Flow Control Room l unaffected header.

Indicator l l l l l I l l ll ll l \l l l l l 1 D IUTHP0hEhT: 5ervice Water Supply Header North Anna Power 5tation - 5ervice Water System 1 JOS No.1250-023-1572 8 i Page 5 of 14 A o Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 1

f FAIListE IqODES AND EFFECTS AaI4 LYSIS I i terics> us: i l FAILURE I BETECTIcel xxviu unstu 575. auric [ WATER 575. i taitanat i Mo0E I MECHANISM TWO NEADER OPER. ONE HEADER OPER. SYSTEM CIBeelTS JJ l l Rapture 11. 5d Return Header Le ILess of SW pressure in :Less of $W discharge lnene. $W supply to Ruptured header must be f eelated. The possibility of I Flow Annunciator l affected discharge header Ipressure. $W flow to I the systems supported I draining the service meter reservefr eststs if the 1

2. SW Discharge Header l Ithe spray header would iby $W would still be header is not Iselated. I l Flou (Control Room I lhe reduced. leve11able.

I Indicatarl I l l 3. Service Water te 1 I l Spray Header I pressure (Control Room Indicator) i I I I I i l i i I I i 1 I I i 1 i i i i l i i i 1 l l l t 1 1 1 1 1 1 I l l l 1 1 I I i l l l 1 ' I . I I i l l 1 l l l 1 l l 1 l l l 1 1 , I i I g ' l i I l 1 I . lCIBFJIENT: Service Water Dfscharge Meader l North Anna Pouer 5tation - 5ervfpe Water 5ystee l l l JOB 110.1250-023-1572 l l l page 6 of 14 l 9 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

F , f FAILURE IE00ES AW EFFECTS AllALYSIS l l' l I tretc15 05: ii I l FAILURE I DETECTION l xxvau unutu 5Y5. MuriCE WATER 5T5. Lmunna. 1 CSOENTS I I NODE i NECMANISM I Tuo HEADER OPER. ONE HEADER OPER. I $YSTEM

1 1 IThe function of the SW Air Compressor is to estatain Falls to Iteintain 11. $W Pump House Air lNone. The alternete air leone. lNone. I l'Af r Pressure Compressor Trouble l compressor can be started.1 I 1 air pressure for the traveling water screen differential l l l Annunciator i 1 I level control system and the reservoir level Indicating l l l l and alem system. Failure of both compressors will I l l lcause the above systees to be inoperable; however, 1

I neither of these systems is vital to the tsumediate l I operation of the service water systee. I l i I I I I I l t i I , l 1 1 I l I l 1 1 1 1 , I I I l l I l 1 I I I l l l 1 1 1 1 1 I . I I i 1 I I i 1 1 1 1 I i I I I l

     ,                                                                                         I                                        ,            I i

i I 1 1 I l 1 i

                                                                                 ,          I                                                                          I                                                            I I                                                                          1                                                            1
    'C590NENT: Service Water Air Compressors 1-5W-0-1 A 1-5W-C-15                                                                                                                 North Anna Power 5tation - 5ervice Water Systee i
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    '               l JOS NO.1250-023-1572 I

Page 7 of 14 _l

               '                                                                                                                                                                   Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

I FAILURE IIDDES AND EFTECTS AERLTSIS I tretcr> Uu: I OETECTiell l xxvast unitu m . xxvict Unitu 5Y5. ausnum FAILURE ONE HEADER Opts. SYSTEM CtBUENTS MODE MECMANISM TWO MEADER OPER. l luone. Affected pump Ilone. lIlone. l Fall to Open 11. Local Indication l lcannot be aligned to the i l I l i l l respectivepumps header; however i 1 latternate can still 1 i lbe aligned and tne effected l l 1 l l pump can be If ned up to i , supply the other header. 1 l-Sans as above. Ilone. Ilene. Fall to Close I. Local Indication I i I i l t l I I i 1 1 1 l l I I I 1 I 1 I I I I I I i 1 I i 1 i l i i I I l i 1 l l 1 1 1 l 1 I I I i 1 l I l 1 l l l I l l , l l l l 1 I i i I I I I l

                                                                                        !                               I                             I Z-5W-4, Z-5W-5,                               Parth Anna Pouer 5tation - 5ervice Water System l-lCiDFOIENT: Service Water Pump Discharge Valves        1-5W-4.1-5W-5,1 54-11,1-5W-13                                                                                        '                 l JOS 110.1250-023-1572
                                     '                                                      2-SW-11, 2-5W-13                                                                      pa.e a     of is l

o Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

f FAILURE MODES A m Ef7ECT5 ANALYS15 I i u trett u as: 1 i l FAILURE l DETECTION senviu unitu 575. sturgCE WATER 575. I tu ntuant 1 I N00E NECHANI$N ' TWO MEADER OPER. ONE MEADER OPER. SYSTEN CSOENTS I i (FCils to Open

1. Valve Posttfon I l l l Indicator at i . Control Board

12. Aus. SW Pump Le l Flow Annunctstor

13. Aus. SW Pump Same as Ausfilary Service Water Pumps l Ofscharge Nt l l l Pressure Annuncleter Folls to Start" and " Falls to Continue Running-l 4. Aus. SW Pums, I l Discharge Flou (Control Room i l Indicator) I 1 1 5. Aua. SW Pump i '

i I Discharge Pressure l l 1 l (Control Room ' l l l l Indicator) I I i i l l I I I I I I I

l l l l l 1 l i I I i 1 1 1 1 1 1 I i l i I i 1 1 I t ! I I e i I ,

I l l l I l' l l l COWONENT: Austliery Service Water Pump Discharge Isoletfon Valves MV-5W117. IWV-5WZi7 I horth Anna Pouer 5tation - 5ervice Water System i J05 NO.1250423-1572 l Paee e of 14 Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 ,

                                                                                                                               -l1           i
                                                                                                                        ;l l

l1 I I Ii1Ii I m e t s y S r e t a W e c 7 i v8 9 r 0 e 1 5 0 n 5 i o 2 t2 1 a7 - t5 51 3

4 31 2

0 0

                                                                                                                                               - f             0 735 o                 o a2                  Nn n1 n 0                     o A           1       ti hN O              rs t             e      oi S

rSg pv T oOa ee N NJP RR E 9 l W C II gII llll l 1II L aM nE S uT I tS rY S aS Y t L A N . A e n e S T M 1i C lll E F F E . 5 . t D N A : Yt 5f p r no e u uO dtr S u trR ape E eed D aE Hca O n WD xe , A M c A ow eh 58 tE , 15 E u cH Tnee otl 11 r R1 1 t i vE si a b* W2 5W L xN atn a S . I arl - A F xO erel met a 7 0 a pl v soaa IlI I[I lIl1liii II W. M s . eA v5 p. o eb re l1 a2 skd YW $

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e d - ped i vO . bot ta aV eO xW udrt n. xT ie o evdnped koan aten s re aal s s r MM e g n ph c pA o r I iIlIIllil II l 1II I l 1II1l a r h o c t e s a r i r i u D eo c n s p n o d Lta itrpt p1 n yl e u wom prosem m u t aamcmMnnFo P ou n u Aa mPo NM t p)u Ri - _ Os srBPuPen Pe ge rPe r r . I l oo gl o gl o e _ TN CA PtlWnWr rWrotWrot aoSASau5a r a5a ra t a _ e cr cs . htcn i .htc EH W TC EE vit . ldnxossexsods sod w.hs c c ni e OM anoul ut rufCn uiCn c VICAFAOPAO(IAD(I i v

                          .           . .                  .            .                                                                   r 4             5                                                                     e ll -

1 2I3Il1lll l I

                                                                                           ,111ii          IlIi1I                          5 y

r e 51 1 s u n A e p E R O Ut T Lo o N Io t E An N F s O l F l a B I F C l1IlI Illllll1ll II1 lil l ,l' l i

f FAILURE IqODES AIIB EFFECTS ANALYSIS 3 treets> Ds: 1 FAILURE I OCTECTION anvu.t unstu 5Y5. navin unstu 575. i ta r tuuni. i 1 Moot 1 MECHANISM TWO MEADER OPER. ONE HEADER OPER. SYSTEM CtBOENTS F;fis to Open . 11. Velve Positten .IIene. Ilone, lione. Fefiere of this valve to open wf11 remove the cross Indicetor et Iconnect capability of the Austifery SW pumps. IIormal Control Board !

                                                                                                                                                                                 'operetten of the service water system uf11 be l   2. Aux. SW Pump Le                                 1                                                    I unaffected.

l Flow Aneunciator l l l3. Aus. SW Pump l Discharge Mi Pressure Annunc1eter 1 4. Aus. $W Pimp l l Discharge Flow I I I I l l Control Room I l l l Indicator)

15. Aus. $W Pump I l Discherge Pressure i l l i IControl Econ j l Indicator) i i l i I

I l 1 I i 1 1 I I I I I i , i 1 1 I 1 l I

I i 1 1 I I l , 1 - 1 I I I I l l l l

                                                                                       '         l l                                                      l                                                                                                                 l I w - mi: Aus111ery 5ervice seter rump Discharge Reeser Crossover Isolation velve urf-svilu                                                             morta anne romer station - service water system 1                                                                                                                                                      JOB NG.1250-023-1572             e l                                                                                                                                                       Pese 11 of 14 o

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0 3

I FAILIMit MODES AND EFFECTS AMLYSIS I i arreo n au: FAILME I DETECTION xxvatt unstu 5T5. xxvitt unstu 5T5. i tait m N0DE NECHANI5M i TWO HEADER OPER. ONE HEADER OPER. SYSTEN CtBOENTS Rupture 1. SW to $ pray Meader None. Each spray grfd ,$ pray header capacity None. In the event the spray header capacity f s reeced to i pressure Icontrol : Is capable of handif ag luould be reduced to 505 (e.g., only one header is operable), the SW systen l Roce Indicator) 150L of the total $W .50E capacity !could be operated with suctlen and discharge to Late l 1 2. SW Discharge Needer i pumping requirements. l l11,500 gpm) I lAnna as an alternative. ' l 1 Flow to Reservoir lRedundant spray headers l l l ' l l (Control Room Icould be used. l l l I Indicator) , I l l 1 l l I 1 1 I l 1 [ l l l l s 1 I l l l

l l 1 l l l I I l,

i l 1 I I i 1 I i l i l I i i l . I g g I I I I I l I I 1 1 , i l 1 I I i 1 1 1 I l . I l I lCIBFONENT: Service Water Heservoir Spray Needer North Anna Power 5tatten - 5ervfpe Water 5ystem 1 J00 NO.1250-023-1572 l Page 12 of 14 l r Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

t FAILURE IIDDES Als EFFECTS AIIRLTSIS I tretti> us: FAILURE I DETECTION xxvitt unitu sn. xxviu maitu 5Y5. taitnant n00E l NECHAlll$10 1 TWO HE.s0ER OpfR. ONE HEADER OPER. SYSTEM CSOENTS I Falls to Open/ plugged 11. SW to Spray 14eeder alone. Each spray grid Spray header cepecity llone. In the event the sprer heeder cepecity is reduced to i l pressure IControl I is capable of handitag luould be reeced to ' 505 le.g., only one header is operable), the SW system ll l Room Indicator) 1505 of the total SW l505 cepecity !could be Ope sted with suctlen and discharge to Lake

12. SW Otscherse needer Ipimptog restrements. I 111.500 gem) 1 Anne as an alternettve.

I Flow to Reservoir l Redundant spray headers l l l l l l Control Roon lcould be used. l i II Indicator) l i i I I l i I I I I I i 1 1 1 1 1 I i 1 l 1 1 1 1 I I I I I I i i I i 1 1 I I i 1 \ J l 1 l 1 l 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I . I ' I l I

                                                                                                       .A..

l i . i i I I . I I I I l s i i i i l north Anne rauer 5tetten - 5ervice Meter 5ystee lowwumal: Dutlet Talve to 5ervice Water Reservoir 141T-5W1DDn. IEUT-5W100s 14DT->ncuun l n0V-5W2000 JOB NO.1250-023-1572 l page 13 of 14 9 6 nort No 03-1250-1097 Vision 0

I FAILURE 1400E5 AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS i trettis pu: I FAILURE I PETECTION xxvan unita 5Y5. xxviu unrtu 5Y5. tutunni. I n00E MCHAN194 ' TWO HEADER OPER. ONE HEADER OPER. SYSTEM CiggENTS Fall to Open .l. Velve Position .None. Alternate header Fallure of valve to None. 1 Indicator at Contro11can be aligned to lopen with alternate i 1 l Soard ldtscharge tunnel. : header disabled will I i 1

12. Unit SW mode valves I result in loss of I l 1 Change Position I ' capability to operate 1 1 l Annunciator i I the SW Systee in the 1 1

3. SW Return Her 1 (Lake to Lake flow path. l ,

Teep to Tunnel i I Normal SW operation 1 I (Control Room I will be unaffected. l l Indication) l l l Fall to Close l -Same as above- Mone. Second valve in l None. None. I series can isolate flow. l l l 1 I I I I I I i 1 1 l l l l 1 I i

I I I I I I !

i I l l 1 I l l 1 1 I I I I I i 1 1 I I I I i 1 - l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I i l i I I i 1 I I i 1 l l l 1 1 L w um mi: Discharge Valves to Circ. Water Discharge Tunnel MDV-5N1204. RDV-5M2204, North Anna Pouer 5tation - 5ervice Water 5ystae l MOV-5W1200, M0V-5W2208 JOB NO.1250-023-1572 1

                                                                                ._                                                                                                Page 14 of 14                                                                             I I

Report No. 03-1250-1097 Revision 0

APPENDIX F COPFUTER ANALYSIS OUTPUT - i This Appendix contains a printing of the top set of cutsets for the cases analyzed. In some cases, cutsets were not appifcable because of modeling inefficiencies and were deleted from the results. These cutsets do not appear in the following pages.

Report No. 03-7250-1097 Revision 0 _ Page F-1

CA5E la - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM, 2 HEADER CFERATION, 72 HOUR MISSION !!"E TCP FIFTY CUTSETS -

1. 1.44E-06 -EPU1EW4M SF025W4't SPUEEMF

2. 1.44E-06 SPU!!s4M -SPU25W45 SPUSEMF

3. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU2W1AM

4. 1.00E-06 EPUMAINI SPU1W12

5. 3.40E-07 SPUSTRTI SPKW AF

6. 3.40E-07 SPUSTRTI SPU1W1AF

7. 2.92E-07 EBSE*:HF -SPC1W1AM SPUlW1EM -S:U2W1AM SPU2W1EM

9. 2.92E-07 EBSEM1HF -SPU1W1AM SPU1W1ER -SPU241AM SPU2WBM

9. 2.9:E-07 EESEP.!HF -SPU1W1M -SPUiW:EM SPU2WIM SFJ:W1EM

10. 2.9:E-07 EESEM2HF SFU1W1M -SPU1W1SM -SPrW1M SFGk!!M

11. 2.92E-07 EESEM1HF -SPU1W!R SPU1W1EM SPU2W12 -5PU2W15M

12. 2.92E-07 E!3EM2HF SPU1W1A". SPu!W1B". -SPCW1M -SPCW!EM

13. 2.40E-07 SMVW217D SFUSEMF

14. 2.40E-07 SMVW!!70 SPUSEMF

15. 6.2EE-CB -SFCIEW4M -SFU:W!M SPU!W1BF -SPU1W!EM SPU25W4?. SFCW M SPCW1EP.

16. 6.25E-CE -5:U!SW4M -SPU1W1AM SFU1W1EM SPU25W4M SFU2W12 S: D if:

                  -SPU2W1BP

17. E.25E-08 SPUISW4M SPU1MIM SPL1W !F -SPU1W1EM -SFXSW4". -EF U2414".

SPU2W1BM

18. 2.25E-06 SPUISW4M SPU1W1M SPU1W15M -SPU:SW4P. -EPU2W M SPCW:EF

                  -SPU2W1EM

19. E.25E-03 -SPUISW4M -S?U1W1M SFU1W:!". SPU25W4M SFIWIAF -E:CW:M SPU2W:BP.

20. E.2iE-CS SPUISW4M EFU1W1AF -SFU;W M SFU1W1EM -5P"25W4M -!?CW1*M SPU2WIBM

21. 7.20E-05 EBSE" HF EPUSTRTI

22. 7.20E-0E EBSEM1HF SFUSTRTI

23. 4.60E-02 SPUSTFil S:U5W MF

4. 2.64E-02 S:25W4A SPUSEMF

25. 2.64E-06 SPUISW4A SFUSW MF

26. !.7 E-0S EISE"1J: -EPU15W4M -!PU1W1M -SFU:WISM SPCS'.4" i:G1M SP;2W1EM

27. 1.75E-09 E!5E"2JF -5:U 5W4" -5PU1W14". SPU W1EM EFf5k4M EFCW!M

                   -SPCW1BM

22. 1.75E-0S EBEEM:JF SFU SW4M SPU:W1R -5PU1W121 -!FISWir -E:CW R EPCW1EM

29. 1.7:E-08 EEEEM2JF SPU15W4M SFU WIM EFU1W:B" -5:CSW4?. -SP'.:d:M

                   -SFU:W1BM

30. :.!SE-02 SMVE170 -5~U1W1M 5PU:WISM SilG1R E?CWiii -5:U:Wi!".

31. '.!!E-0S EK d 17: 5:U Wie SFU:Wi!M -SPCCM SPDiSF -S"C'W ;it

32. 1.!EE-0 5"VE17D -5F'J 111M STU:Wi!" SFrW1AF -SPU:WM 5%!!9

. 1.!!E-(3 S",~.'217: -EPUltM SFU1W1EF -EPU:W'EM S~CWIM SF.':W'!"

34 1.!EE-08 SM'iW117D SFU W!AF -SPUWIA" SFU1W!!" -E:IWla SPU:W:E"

. .!5E-02 SNC;7D SPU;Wie SPU1W11F -EPitn!M -5FU:W1M SPU:W;**

!6. 4.0SE-09 S:25W4F                            5:U5WC":
!7. 4.:EE-C9 SPUI!W4~                           SF;SE"F

2. !.21E-09 E?$EM:HF EPU1Wi!4 -5:U1W15" -SP'. :M A" 5F21EP.

39. 3.:1E-09 EESEM:FF -5 U1W1R SFU1W1BA -E~U1W!!" 3:;2W:S ".

40. 3.2;E-09 E!!EP:H: -ECU'WiM SFU!d!EA -5'rW M SPU:W15"

41. 3.21E-C9 EEEEMIP; SPJ1EBA -SPU1W155 -E:U:41M SF D :!M

                                                                                                                                     ;EPCRT No. 02-12:0-1097 REVIS!:N0        FAEE :-2

42. 3.21E-09 EESE91Hf -SPU1W1AM SPU!W1BA -S?U1W1BM SFU2W15M 4!. 3.21E-09 EfSE91RF -SPU!WIAM SFU1W15A -S?U2W1AM SPU2W1EM 44 3.21E-09 EBSEM2FF SPU1W1EM -SPU2W1AM SPU2W15A -SFU2W1BM

45. 3.21E-09 EBSEM2HF -57J1W1AM SFU1W1BM SPU2W1BA -SPU2W1BM

46. 3.21E-09 EESEF2HF -SF;1W1AM SPU1WIBM -SFU2W!AM SPU2W1BA 47, 3.21E-09 EISEM1HF SPU1WifM -SPU2W1AM S:02W1EA -SFU2W1BM

49. 3.21E-09 ESSEM1HF -SPU1W1AM SPU1W15M SPU2W15A -SPU2W1BM

49. 3.21E EBSEM1kF -SFU1W1AM SFU!WIBM -SPU2W1AM SFU2W!BA

50. 3.21E-09 EBSEM1HF -SPU1W1BM SPU2W1AM EFU2W1EA -SFU2W1BP' REPCRT Ns. 03-12!0-1097 REVISIT" 0 FASE F-3

CASE 19 - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM, CNE HEADER LCD COND! TICK, 72 H UR MISSICh TIME TCP FORTY CUTSETS

1. 1.94E-06 SLC0CRA -SFUISW43 -SPUlW1AM SPu!W12". SPU25W4M SPU W:A"

                   -SFU:W1EM             SIV2W111

2. 1.94E-06 SLC0 ERA SFU1SW4M -SPU1W!AM SPU1WB" -SPU25W4M -SPU N AM SPU:WBM SIVISW41

3. 1.94E-06 SLC0H:RA SPUISW4M SPU1W AM SFU!W!B* -SFU25W4M -SPU:W AM

                   -SPU2W!EM              SIV2W !I

4. 1.44E-06 -SPUISW4M SFU25W4M SFUSWCMF

5. 1.44E-06 SPUISW4M -SCU25W4M SPUSWOMF

6. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU W1AM

7. 1.00E-06 SPUMA!NI SPUlWIAM B. B.20E-07 SLC0HRA SPFNIS5R

9. 9.20E-07 SLOCHD:.A SFPISOER SPFISCSI

10. 3.40E-07 SP"STRTI SPU2W1AF

11. 3.40E-07 SPUSTRTI SPU1W1AF

12. 3.24E-07 SLC0HIRA SMV215AD SFU1W1AM -SP'J Wi!M SFU2W1AM -SP'J2W1EM SIV2W111

13. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV115BD SPU1W!AM -SPU1W19M SPU:W AM -SPU:W1EM SIV2W111

14. 3.24E-07 SL:0HERA SMV21!At -SPU1W1AM SPU1WiB" SPU:WIAM -EP'.:W1E" SIV:W11I

15. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA 59V:15BD -SPU:WIAM SPU1W11" SPL2WIAM -SFU2W12".

SIV2W11I

16. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDFA SMVW217C -SFU1W!AM SPU1W1BM SOUWiAM -SPU:Wi!".

SIV:W111 17, 3.24E-07 SLCCERA SM'/215AD -SFU1W1AM SPU1WISM -SPU:W1A" SPU N E" SIVISW4I .

15. 3. 4E-07 SLC0CRA SMVII5BD -SPU1WlAM SPU1W;S". -SPU W14" SPU"W:E ". -

SIY1SW41

19. 3.24E-07 SLCCHDRA SMVW:!SD -SPU1W!AM SPU1W1BM -SFU2WIA" SPU"il!M SIV!SW41

20. 3.24E-07 SLCDSRA SEVW1172 -SFU1W:AM SPU1W1EM -SPU:W1AM EF"*W;iM SIVISW4I

11. 3.24E-07 SL:0 HORA SEV215AD SPU1W1AM SPU1W15" -SPJ:W1A* -SD'J 41S*.

SIV2W1:1

22. 3.24E-07 SLCOnsA SMV1:5ED SFUlW AM SPU1W1SM -SFU2WIA*. -E?.3;i' SIl m t!

2. .24E-07 SLCDCRA S"'!W1193 SPU1W!A". SFU1WEM -SPU:W1AX -SFUN!"

SIV;Will

24. !. 4E-07 S 00HD;A SMVW:17: SPU1NIAM SFU!W1SM -!FU: Wit" -SFJ:41EM SIV Wi!I

25. I.24E-(7 S'C0H:FA

                       .                   S".'!!At       -S:UIW1AM         -SPUWii*             SP.'N A*.       S:U:Wi!M
                    ' SI'v 1S'.'4I li.     :.24E-N SLC 4RA                   5"V115ED       -SFC W:AM         -SFU1W15"            S?U N AM        SFU N ET SIV1EW41 II. 3.:"E-07     SLC0HLRA             SMV2:5AD       -S U1W:AM           SPU1W:EM           SCU W1AM      -S?L' N !"

SI"!SW41 2E. I.24E-07 S'00HI A

                       .                   SMV:1!B3       -EFU:W1 A".         SFU1W1B9           SPU:W:AM      -SPU N 5" SIVISW41

9. 2.9:E-07 ELSE"*HF -SPU1W1AM SFU1W1EM -SFU:W1AM SPU:Wi!"

00. 1.9:E-07 E25E"1H- -S?U:W1AM SPU1WISM -SFU N A" SFC d!!M

31. 2.9:E-07 EE!SM1HF -S U1W1AM -SPU W1E" SF'J:W:AM SFU:Wi!M FECORI No. 03-1250-!097 RE/IE1CN 0 FAGE F-4

32. 2.92E-07 EBSEM2HF- SPU1NIAM -SPU1W1EM -SPU:W!A9~ SPU2W15M 4

33.- 2.92E-07 EESEM1HF' -SPU1W1AM SPU1W1?M SFt:WiAM -5FU:h15M

34. -2.92E-07 EBSEM2LF SFU1WIAM SPUIW1EM -5FU2k!AM -SPU:WISM

    !!.           2.40E-07 S'CCHDRA
                              .        EM7215AD   SFU5W:MF                                                        '

26. 2.40E-07 SLC0HDEA SMV11:!D SPUSW:P.F l 37, 2.40E-07 SPVW2170 S?tSW MF

38. 2.40E-07 SLCOE*RA SMYW115D SPUSWCMF

39. 2.40E-07 SRVW1170 SPUSW:MF

40. 2.00E-07 SLC0H:'RA SPUETF.TI SIVIEW4:

I-t i REF;R7 .":. 0!-!!50-1077 RE*/!3:2N 0 :45E F-5 3 -.

CASE 1C - SERV!2E WATER SYSTEM, ONE HEA2E2. CPERAT10': - LCD,163 P33 f.ISSION T!".E TCP FIFTY CUTSETS

1. S.00E-06 SLC0HDCA SFUSTRTI SIV!SW41

2. 1.94E-06 SLC0HDRA -SFU15h4M -SF'1W!AM J SPU1W1EM SFU25W4M SPL2W!AM

                  -SPU2d12"          -SIV2411I

3. 1.94E-06 SLC04RA SFU1SWi" -SPU:W1AM SPU1W!BM -SPU25W4M -SPU241A9 SPCW!!M SI/1SW4I 4 1.94E-06 SLCCHORA SFU1SW4M SPL1WiA". SFU1WlBM -S?UISW43 -SFCW:AM

                  -SFU2W1BM            SIV2W111

5. 1.90E-06 SLC0HDRA SPFN!SER

6. 1.90E-06 SLCCH:DA S?P!SIPR SPFISC3I

7. 1.44E-06 -SFu!SW4M SPU25W4M SFUSWCMF

5. 1.44E-06 SPUISW45 -5:025W4M SPJSWCMF

9. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SFU2W1AM

10. 1.00E-06 SFUMAIKI SPU1W AM

11. B.00E-07 SPUSTRTI SFU241AF

12. S.00E-07 SPUSTRTI SPU1W AF 13, 6.BCE-07 E!SEM2HF -S?U1W1 A.". S?U1W:SP. -SFU2W AM SPCW1EM

14. 6.80E-07 E2SEM1HF -SCU1W1AM SFU1W1E" -SFCW1AM SCU2X;BM

15. 6.83E-07 ESSEM1HF -SDU1W1AM -SFCIW1EM SFU2W1A". !?U2W1EM

16. 6.50E-07 ESSEM2HF SFU1W1AM -SFU:W!EM -SPU2W1AM SFU:412". .

17. 6.80E-07 EBSEP.!HF -SFU1W1AM S*U:WlBM SFU2W1AM -2N2W1EM

15. 6.80E-07 ESSEM2hF SPU:h1A" SPU1W1EM -SPU2WIAM -SPCW12M 19, 3.24E-07 SLCCHDRA SM7215AD SPU1WlAP. ,-SFU1WEM SP'J2W1A" -S?CWi!P.

SIWW111

20. !.24E-07 SLCOP:RA SMV1151 SFU1W1AM -SPU W1BM SPCWIAM -SPCW15" SIV2W1:1 2!. 3.24E-07 SLC0H::A SMV215A' -SPU!W AM SFU1W1EM SFU2W1A*. -SFrW:SM SIV2W!!!

22. 3.24E-07 SLC:FDRA SMV11550 -3PU1W1A" SPU1WEP SPEW 1A9 -SFGW155 SICW111

23. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMVW2173 -SFU1W:AM SDU1W1BP. SPU2W1A?. -SFL2W199 SIJ2W!!!

 - 24, 3.24E-07 SLCCH2KA               SMK15:D        -S:UIW AM           58U1W1BM       -SFU2n!AM           SFCW'59 SIV!SW41

25. 3.24E-07 SLCOMD8A $9V11550 -Set!!WI A". SFUW!!" -EPU2W!AM SFCW15P SIV!SW47

26. 3.28E-07 S'20HDFA

                     .                 S"VW!!!D       -S~C1WIAM           SPU:W15"       -SPCW1A"            SFCX;i" SIV1SW41

27. 2.24E-07 SLICH:RA 5"VW1170 -SFU1W1AM S:U1Wi!M -S:EW:P 5:04:5" SIVIEW41 2E. 3.24E-37 SLCH:Rt. 5"V2150 SPU:W:AM SFU1W1?" -5:rW:M -S:Zh i!"

SIEW111 27, 3.24E-07 SLCHOU 5% 11 i' SPL!s:A" SFU1W11" -SFCWie -S?ZWii" SI'.2W:11 30, 3.24E-07 SLCH:RA S"VW11SD SFUlW1AM S:01W11M -S*CW1AM -SFU2dli" SIWW:11

   ;1. 3.2*E-17     SLC0H:RA            SP!W117D        SFUlk:AM          SF11W15*        -E'rW1AM          -S?U2W;i" SIV2WI!!

2". !.24E-(7 SLCCHDAA SMC1:C -SFU1W1AP -S*UiWi!" SFCCAM SFCWilt SIV!SW41 l 3.24E-07 SLC0k5;

33. 5".Vi!!!D -S?U:W!A1 -SPU141S", S:Ch!P SFL~W'.1" SIVISW41 8.EFORT Nc. 03-1253-1997 CEVISI2N 0 SA3E F-6 l

l l

34. 3.:4E-07 SLC34tRA SMV215AD -SFU W1 M SPU;W:i" SFU:W1AM -S U~hl!"

i SIVISnal

35. 3.24E-07 SLC3H:RA SMV1:532 -EDUW:AM SPL1W!EN SFU:W1AM ~ -S?U:W15' SIV!Sh41

36. 2.40E-07 SLCCH:?A SMV21543 S'USW:MF

   !7. 2.40E-07 Sit 2WKA         SMV11 ED     $?USW:MF

39. 2.40E-07 SP/W217D 5:USW:MF

39. 2.80E-07 SLCJHDFA SMkW11SD SPSWCMF

40. 2.40E-07 SMVb1170 SPUSW MF

4. 2.00E-07 S'.C0FDRA SPUSTRTI SIVISk4D

42. 1.94E-07 -SPUISW4M -SPU1W1AM SPUIW1SM SFU25W4M SFU2'41AF -S'U2W1Ai SPU2W1BM

4. 1.94E-07 -SFU1SW4M -SPU1W1AM SPU:WI!F -SPU1W125 SFU25W4M S:U:W1A1 SPU:W1EM 44, 1.94E-07 -SFC1SW4" -SPU1W:AM SFU1:12M SPU25k45 SFU2W1A9 S. W1SF

                   -SPU W1SM

45. 1.94E-07 SPuiSWAM SFU1W1AF -SPU1W1AM S?U1W1BM -SPU25WiM -SFU2W AM S*U2W1BM 46, 1.94E-07 SPU!SW4M SPU1W1AM SFC X1EF -SFU1W!EM -SPU2Sd4M -SPU:W1AP SPL' W:IM

47. 1.94E-07 SFJiSW4M SFC1W1AM SPJ1W:EM -SFU SW4M -SFU:WIAM SPL2W:EF

                   -500:W195

49. 1.6BE-07 EESE9:HF SPUSTRTI

49. 1.6EE-07 EESEMIFF SPUSTRIX

50. 7.76E-06 SLCCHL;A SPUISW4M SPU1W1BM -SPJ25W45 -SPJ:WiA1 -SPL2W119 SIVIEW41 SIV2W111 f

 -                                                                                                              ; E' s

? KEFCRI No. 0?-150-1097 FE'!!!!0N 9 PASE F-7 t

l l I CASE 2A - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM, TWO HEADEF. OPE UTICN, 72 HOUR MISSI]N T!ME, LDS5 TOP FIFTY CUTSETS

1. 2.00E-03 E03E":MF ELOSTFW:

2. 2.92E-04 EDGEM HF ELC5TFW: -EFU1W1AM -SFU:W1EM 5:U2W1AP. SPU3:5"

3. 2.92E-04 ED3E"2HF ELCST?WF SPJ1W1AM -Segg g g gw, .gp g;gggs, Spg3tp.

4. 2.92E-04 EDGEM:HF ELCSTFW: -SPUIW1AM SPU:W1EM SFU2W1AM -SF1:3;E"

5. 2.92E-04 ED3EM2HF ELOSTPWF SPUlk!A* SFU1W1EM -SFU2W:#M -SDU31EM

6. 2.92E-04 EDBEM2HF ELOSTPW: -5PU1W1AM SPU:W12M -EFU2k!A" SPU31E".

7. 2.92E-04 EDSEM1HF ELOSTFWF -SPU1W!A9 SPU1W:5M -SPL3:AM SPU311M

8. 2.02E-04 EDSEM2HA ELOSTPhF -SPU1W!AM SPU1W155 -SPU:bleM E E2CE" S"U1W13" -SPU3:AM 5:U2;159

9. 2.02E-04 EIGEM1HA ELOSTFW: -SFU1W14M

10. 2.02E-04 EDGEM1HA ELOSTFWF -SFU!W!AM -S?U1W1E't SFU31A1 SFU2Wi!P

11. 2.02E-04 EDGE"2HA ELOSTFW: SPL'1W1AM -S?]!W1EM -SPU2W1AP 5:J:WMM

12. 2.02E-04 ELSE11HA ELD 5TFW: -SPU:W1AM S?U:W11M SFU2W1A" -5:U2W:E"

!I. 2.0:E-04 EDGE"2HA ELOSTFW: SFU1W1AM SPU W1BP. -SFU2W1AM -5:J31s* 14 1.0!E-04 EDSEM1H EDGE 12HF ELOSTFWF -SFU1W:BM -EFC31 M S:U3 !"

15. 1.0:E-C4 EDEEM HF EDGEPlHF ELC5TFWF -SFulh1A" -5 U;W1EM SFU'W i"

16. 1.05E-04 EMEM:hF ED3ECHF ELD 57PW~ -SFU1W141 -SFU3 A" SFC3 i"

17. 1.0:E-04 EDGEM1HF EDGEM2JF ELOSTFWF -SPC:WiiM SPU"W AM -5:U"k:E"

!!. 1.0!E-04 EDGEM:HF EDSECJF ELCSTFWF -5FU1W1AM -5"U;W1E". 5: 31 AM

19. 1.05E-04 EDGEM1HF EDGE *2JF ELOSTFWF -S?L3;AM SPU3;AM -SFUN EM

20. 1.0 E-04 ED3EM2HF EDEEPOJF ELOSTFW: S U1W1AM -SPU1W:S" -SP"2Wi!"

21. 1.0:E-04 EDSE92dF EDGE"2JF ELDETFWF SFU W:AM -SFU:W1BM -SPU3 A"

22. 1.0 E-04 E03EP2,F EDGEM2JF ELOSTFW: S?u1W AM -EPU2W1AM -3FU315"

23. 1.' E-04 E SEMMF EDGECHF ELOSTFWF S:U1W:B" -5:U2 CAM -5:J3:!"

24 1.05E-04 EDGEM*HF ED2E"2H: EL STFWF -S*U W1AM SPC:W13M -EFU3:!M 2!. 1.0!E-04 E;3EM HF EDGECHF EL3STFWF -5:31W:AM SPU1EEM -S U31P.

26. 1.0 E-04 EDGE"1HF EDGEM1JF ELCSTFW: -SFU1 WISP SFU3!M -5:J2ktiM

27. 1.05E-04 EDSEMhF EDEEM1JF ELOSTFWF -5:U14AM -5:U1W1E" S:020e -

28. 1.0:E-04 EDGEM1HF ECBEM1JF ELGS*:WF -S~U1W1AM SFU31P -SFJ311"

29. 1.0!E-04 EDGEM1JF EIGECFF ELCSTFWF SFU1h!AM -SFU!CE" -SFL:eli"

30. 1.0 E-04 EOSE11J: EDEEM2HF ELOSTFWF SF'J1WiA1 -SFU:WiiM -SF L3

P 3:. 1.0:E-04 EDGEGJF EDGECHF ELOSTFWF SPU1WlAM -5PL3;P -5:U3 i"

2. 1.0$E-04 EDEEM3F EC6EM2J: ELOSTFWF EPU1W1EM -!FU313 -E?U*Mi"

33. 1.0 E-04 ED3EM2HF EDSECJF ELDETFWF -5FJ:W1AM S?U14!E" -SFU2EE" 34 1.05E-04 E 6EM2HF EDEECJF ELCSTF# -5:Ulkt;M SPUICS9 -SFU2Ce

!5. 1.0!E-04 EXEM1HF ECEEM2JF ELOSTFhF SFU1W:!M -EFU:W1M -SFt315"

35. 1.0:E-04 EDSEM:HF E!BEM2 F ELCSTFF -E:U1W1AP SFU!EB" -S:"31EM T. :.0!E-04 E23E"!HF E"SE.".2JF ELD 5TFWF -EPU'.W!A" SFU1W:EM -5:"3;P

!!. 1.05E-04 ED3EM:JF ELSE"NF ELOSTFW: -5FU311M -5FU2EAM S:U3;E"

39. 1.05E-04 E33E"1JF EDGE":F: ELCSTFWF -S:U:W1A" -SFU1WIS" SO3 E" 4;. 1.0 E-04 EDGEN!JF E:BECHF ELOSTFWF -SFU31A" -S?U3;P 3:L3;i"

41. 1.0!E-04 Et3E"'HF ED3E"1;F EL:5TFWF -SF;'.Ri" -EPU:WIP 5 23;i"

12. . 0 E-04 E SEM:bF EDSEM:JF ELCET kF -E:U31M -SFUlti" 5: 2 5"

(!. 1.0 !-04 Et3E"iHF E:3EM1J: ELOSTFW: -S 01M A" -5FU31AM SU 3.i* 44 7.29E-05 EEGEP1HA EC3E*2FF ELOSTFWF -S:31WE P. -5F';3 A9 SFU:CI*

5. 7.29E-05 EC3EMiMA ED3EM~M: ELCETF'# -SFt!W::M -E'U1W1:* SFL'3:!"

46. 7.29E-:5 EXEMIFA EDEECHF ELOETFWF -S:U C " -5:U31M SFU3:!"

47, 7.:9E-05 ED3EM1H EDGECH: ELCSTFF 5:L CIP -SPL'3!e -SPUS.!' 4!. 7.29E-05 ED3EM1HA EDGE"aHF ELCS!F4 -5:31W1R 5F'.;ESM -!FJ:.;E" 48 7.:9E-05 E:3E":H4 EC3ECHF ELC5'F'# -5:03:'M S:t:Cis -S:Ubit "

50. 7.29E-05 EDGE"!JA EDIECHF ELD 5TFF -5FU1MEP -5"Jh!M SFJ31EP

E:3T u. 0?-1250-! 97 REVIS:3 0 :A3E :-2

CASE 2B - SEF.VICE WATE:. SYSTEM, CNE HEADEF 0FEMil01, 72 HOUR CEE!CN TIME, LCEF TCP F0F.!Y F1VE CCTSETS

1. 2.00E-03 ED3E"CMF ELC:iFWF

2. 2.92E-04 ED3EM:HF ELDSTFWF -SFU!WIAM -SPU!WIS" SPU2W1AM SFJ:h;D

3. 2.92E-04 EDGEM2-F ELOSTFhF SPU1W14M -SF31W12M -FU2W1AM SP':h J !M

4. 2.52E-04 E!3EM!HF ELDSTFWF 3FU131AM S CIWiB1 SFU2W!AM -PL:W:E9

5. 2.9:E-04 EDSECHF ELOSTFWF SFU1W12 SPU:W15M -SFU2W1A". -SFJ23!PM

    !. 2.9"E-04    EDGEM2H:         ELOSTFW:         -SFUIW:A9            SFU1W1EM      -S?UIW!M          SFU:Wi!!

7. 2.9:E EIIEM1HF ELOSTFWF :Fu!W AM S?U1W151 -SFU2W1AM PU2W:BM S. 2.02E-04 ED3EM2HA ELOSTFWF -5 'J!W! AM S?u!WIB" -SFU2W:AM FU Wi!M

9. 2.02E-04 EDSEM HA ELOSTFWF -E: :E:AM !?U:W15". -SFU2WIM SFLW15M

10. 2.02E-04 EDGEMHA ELOSTFWF -5F a:A5 -SFU1W15M SPU2W!AM FU:W:st

11. 2.02E-04 EDSECHA ELDETFWF 5:L';M M -EFU1W155. -5 J241A". SPJ2WIB

12. 2.02E-04 EDSEM1HA ELOSTFhF -5F31n:AM SFU:W1BM SFC:WlAM -SFJ24:!M

13. 2.0:E-04 EOSEM2HA ELCSTFhF SP'J:k12 SPU1h1BM -SFU2W!A". -SFU:h1EM 11 1.05E-04 E 3EM1HF EDSEM2HF ELCSi?"F -SFUW!iM -SPU2W:AM S:U:W:!"

15. 1.0 E-04 EDSEM:HF ELSECHF ELCSTF'WF -SD"1W1M -SF"!WSM. 5:U:WiiM

16. 1.05E-04 ED3EM HF EDSECHF ELOSTFWF -EPU1W1M -SFU:WIM EFU"W i"

17. 1.0 E-04 EDSEM1HF EDGEC F ELDSTPWF -5:U:W1B SFU2W1M -FU:W '.5 "

15. 1.0:E-04 EDGEtHF EDED2JF ELC5!?WF -5:U:W M -5FU:W1EM. SFJ"W A" 19 1.0 E-04 EDEEM1HF EDSE92JF ELDSi?hF -SFUW1M SFU2W AM -5 U:W11" 20, 1.05E-04 EDSEM2HF ECSEM:JF ELCS!?h' SFU1WIAM -SFU1W1EM -SFL:Wi!M

21. 1.0 E-34 EDSECHF EDGE"2J: ELCETFWF SPJ:W1AM -SFU1W:SM -S U: G ?

22. 1.0!E-04 EDSECHF EDSa:JF ELCETFh: SFU1WIM -SP32W:A" -FL2W:5"

20. 1.0 E-04 EDSEM1H7 EDEEM2H: ELCST:WF SFJ1W;EM -S:U:W1AM -EFU~W it 28 1.05E-02 E2SEM1HF EDEECHF ELCSTFF -SFU1W1AM SFU1NIS" -EFU:W:E"

15. 1.05E-04 Et3EM1HF EDGECHF EL:STFWF -FUth:A" SCU1W12M -S?U: G "

23. 1.0 E-04 EOSBIHF EISEM:JF ELCET8b~ -SFU1k!!9 S:U:W:AM -EF.26:!"

27. 1.0 E-C4 E CE"!HF EEEEM1J: ELOSTFF -S?uldte -SFU:W1B 5:'J:LIAM 25, 1.05E-04 Et3EM1HF EDEEM1JF ELCSieh: -SPL1htA" SFC:W:M -EFL2h!M

9. 1.t:E-04 EDSE"13F EDSECH: ELOSTFW: EFU181'.M -SFU W1E3 -EFJ:W:3"

30. 1.05E-04 EDGE"1JF E SEC HF ELOSi?hF S~U WiAf -5:J!b BM. -5:J2WM

31. 1.0!E-34 EDSE"!JF E SEM2H: ELCSTFWF FU:W1M -EFU2h13 -SPJ:W 5 ".

 - 32. 1.0 E-04 EOSECHF             EJEEM2JF          EL ST F            S;U1W!EM      -EPJ:W 14".     -SF;.2W

i".

   ;;. 1.05E-04 EDSE"2F             EIEECJF           ELOSTFF           -SFU:WM          SFU1W:SM       -EFU:W1EM 38    1.05E-04 EDSECHF             ED5ECF            ELOSTPF          -SFU:W:;"         S?L1WIS*       -EFL:W1**
   !!. 1.C5E-04 ED3EM:9             EDSEM2F            EL:STFF            SPU b1E",     -5:CWiM.        -EFJ:i:P.

i. 1.05E-04 E!3EM HF EDSECJ ELOSTFF -5:J:W:M EFL!EE" -!FU:W:1?

   !7.   :.0!E-04 EDEEM .'F           EDSECJF            ELCET:W:         -SF. W:M         SFU Wi!".      -! L h R
   ;6.   :.0 E-04 E;SEM!JF            E 3ECW             EL ETFWF        -EPL!WiiM        -5:U2h1M          F":W;i?
   !9. 1.0!E-04 E:SEM1JF             EDIE"~'.:
                                             -           E.CETFW-         -5:L;Wie        -E:U1WiEM         SP":W ;i".

40. 1.):E-04 ED3E" Je EDSEC' F ELCETFW: -5:U!LIA" -SFCWIM E::':W !"

41.

0 E-04 E 3E"!H~

           .                           E 3EtJF           EL:SI:7          -5 U1Wiin       -EFU:WP           EE:WiP 12    1.0$E-04 Et E":er             g;gg ;p           g;;Sici;         .syg;gt;=         3: gig:gy       p; g;;y 4;. 1.;!E-04 E:3EM:3              EEGEtJF           ELCS~FF          -SFU:h!M        -5:U2W12          SE:W:!*

44

UE-05 EISE9thA

           .                           E:EE" .F          ELOSTPF          -SFJ;W1EM       -5FC:W1M          SFC/ P 45,   7 ;iE-0! E SEN;HA             EDGECyr           g;csipg          .gp;ute,        .EFU'41SM         SF"~WIP FEFC:I N:. 03-1~5M0?7 FEVISION O FA2E F-?

CASE 20- SERVICE WATER SYSTEM, 04E HEA2ER OFERA!CN, 169 HOUF M SSION TIME, LO!P TCP FORTY FIVE CUTSETS

1. 2.00E-03 EDSEC".: ELCSTFF

2. 2.92E-04 EOSE"1HF ELOSTFh: -SPU1W1AM -5PU1W15M SFJ2W1AM SPU2W;i9

    ;. 2.9"E-04    ECSO2HF          ELOSTPF          SFU:W1M          -SFUlW!iM      -SPU2W!M             SFCE:59 8  2.92E-04 EDGEM:HF            ELOSTFWF       -EFU1W1AM            SFU1W:EM       SFU:W1AM          -SFs2W:5"

5. 2.92E-04 E:5EM2HF ELOSTFWF SPU1WlAM SFMW159 -SP]2W:A" -5F"2W:!1

6. 2.92E-04 EDSECHF ELDSTFF -SP'J1W:AM SFU1W1BM -3PU2W:A" S C W1EM

7. 2.92E-04 EDGEM1HF ELOSTFWF -SPL1W1AM SPU1WlEM -SPU:WIM SFJ2iCEM B. 2.02E-04 EISECHA ELOSTPWF -SFJiW1A" SPU1W1EM -EPU2W!AM SF'::W!BM

9. 2.0*E-04 EISEM1HA ELCSTFWF -SPuiWie SFU1W13M -SPU2WIM EFTW1Et

10. 2.02E-04 ELSEM1HA ELCSTPF -E 31W:AM -S;U1W15" S:U:W1M SFCW:E ".

11. 2.0:E-04 EDSEM2FA ELOSTFW SPU!WIM -EPJ1W;iM -EPCWIM S* CW:!".

12. 2.02E-04 ED5EM1HA ELOSTFF -EPU1W:AM SPJ1W1EM SPCW!AM -52Ch;P".

13. 2.0:E-04 EDGE."2FA ELOSTFF SP"1WIAM S?U1W1BM -SFU2WiM -SPCW13M

14. 1.05E-04 EDSEM1HF EISECH: E'.DSTFWF -SFU1W!!M -E?' :J W1A" !FCE:!".

15, 1.05E-04 ED3EM1HF EDGECHF ELOS*F F -SFU WIM -SFU1W:S" S?Ch;!?

16. .0!!-04 EDEEMEF ECEE"EF ELOSTFWF -SFL'1W1M -SPCW1 A". S*J2CE"

17. 1.05E-04 E:3E"!HF ED3ECJF ELOSTFWF -5PU1W15". SPCWiAM -SFU:W:!"

19, 1.05E-04 EDSEM1HF EDSECJF ELOSTFWF -SFU!W1AM -5:L W12" SFJ2k:A"

19. 1.0 E-04 EDGEM1HF EDGEM2JF ELC57FWF -SFU:W1AM SFCW1AM -SFCW:IM

20. 1.0 E-04 E GE"2HF EDGECJF ELC5f?WF SPU1W1M -SPJ!htiM -S?CW:E"

21. 1.0!E-04 EDGECFI ECBECJF EL 5iPbF SPL'!W1M -SPU!W1SM -SPCW! A"

22. : 05E-04 EDGECHF EESECJF ELOSTFk: SPU!W1M -E:U:21AM -SFCW11F 2;. 1.0!E-04 ED3EM1HF EDSE12H: ELC5TFWF SPU WiiM -SFU2W AM -SFrWiiM 24 1.05E-04 EDSEMIF EDEECHF ELO!7FWF -5:L1W!AM SPJ1W159 .cpgggg-

25. .05E-04 EDGE"1HF EDGE"2H- ELCSTFh: -SPU1W!A" S:UIW1BM -S*CW:M

26. 1.05E-04 EDGE"!HF EDGEN!JF ELCETFW: -E8U1hl!M SPCWIAM -SFU2Wi!"

27. 1.0!E-04 E: GEM 1FF ED3E"!Jr ELOSTFWF -SFJ1W!A" -3FU1h15" SFCWIM

29. 1.05E-04 E:3EM!HF ECSEM11F ELOSTPWF -SPU1WIM SPU2W1M -SPU2W1E9

29. 1.0!E-04 EDS:M!!F EC3E"2hF ELCSTPF SPUIW1AM -SPL'!W1SM -SPCW'3"

30. 1.0!E-04 E: GEM!JF EDBECHF ELOSTPWF SPU:WIM -5:U:W15M -EFCW'A"

31. 1.0 E-04 ED3E"!JF EDGECHF ELCSTFF SPU1W1M -S?CWIM -5:Ci!!"

 - 32. 1.05E-04 EOSE92HF            E SE CJ'         ELCETPF            SPU1W1EM     -S:U2n:M            -SFCW11"

3. 1.05E-04 EISiCHF ED3ECJF ELOSTFWF -Sr"W:M SPU1W:SM -SFCW:E"

24. 1.0!E-04 EDGE."2HF EDSECJF ELOSTFW~ -SP]1W1R SFUW12M -5:CW:D

   !!. 1.05E-04 E03EMHF             EC3ECJF          ELCSTFF             SPU1W1E"    -5FCW1M             -E*CW:E ".
   !$. 1.0!E-04 ED3EM:HF            EDGE":JF         ELOSTFWF         -5FU1W M         SFU1W1E9          -5:CW!!"

37. 1.0 E-04 E 5EM1HF E:3E"2.?F ELCETFF -SFJ1W1V S:U1W15.". -5FCW1M

35. 1.0 E-04 EI3EM:JF ED3EM2HF ELC5tFF -!FJW1EM -5FCW13 SFCW1EM

   !i. 1.ME44 ED3E"!JF              E03ECH:          ELCSTFF           -SFUICM        -5FU:W1EM            iPCW:2?

40. 1.05E-04 ED3E" JF ED5E"2FF ELCSIW: -3PU:WIM -EFCW P !?L:'Ci9 4:. 1.ME44 EDEE M : EDGE";J: ELOSTFh~ -5FU:W:E -SF'Ck1M i:CCE!

   **. 1.0!E-04 E*3E"SF             EDGE"!Jr         ELGi'F F         -!FL!WiM       -EF21W:2"             i:Cs12"

43. .0!E-C4 Et3E*19: EC3EM:JF ELOSTFh: -!PU:X1M -SF CW A" S:CL E" 44 7.29E-)5 ED3EM:HA EDSECHF ELC5~:# -5:3:CEM -5FCs:AM SPU:CIM

45. 7.:?E-05 ECE*1'A EDEE"2H ELOS*:Wr .gm, g:e .spty:53 Sprjig.

REF*RT N:. 0~-1250-1C?7 REV!!!0fs 0 FA3E F-:0 1 - l

CASE 34 - FLOW 70 RECIRC SFRAY HI, TWC HEADER OFEFtAT:0N, 72 HOUR M:SS! . TIME TlP FIFif UTSE!S

1. 1.**E-06 -FUISW4M SPUCSW43 SFUSWCMF 1

2. 1.44E-06 S UISW4M -SPU25W4M SPUSWCNF !

3. 1.00E-06 S?CMAINI SFU:WiM l

4. 1.00E-06 S?U"AINI 5U W1AM .

5. 2.92E-07 EESE.1:HF -5 U1WIA" SFu!W1EM -SFU~W1AM SFU:W1E"

6. 2.9:E-07 EESE.91HF -SPU1W1AM SFU1W!EM -SPU:WIA" SFU2WSM l

7. 2.92E-07 ESSEN1HF -SPU1W1 A". -S?U1W1EM SFU2W1M S?U:Wl!9

6. 2.9:E-07 EESEM2HF S?U1W1AM -SPU WIDM -SPU WIAM SPU2WE5 4 2.92E-07 EESEM HF -SPJ1WIAM SFU:W!EM S:U:WM -SFU2W1SR.

10. 2.9'E-07 ESSEM24F SFU1W1AM SPU!W:SM -SFU:W:AM -SPU2WISM

 !!. 2.40E-07 SMVW:17D                SFUSW P:

12. 2.40E-07 SMVWil7E SPUSWCMF

13. B.25E-08 -SPUISW4M --SPU1WIAM SFU1W11F -S 2:W1EM SFU25W8M S:U:W:M S U:WISM 14 B.25E-08 -5 U1SW4M ,

                                      -SPU1W1A1         SPU1W!!M          SFU25WM            SPU2WlAM         SFU2WISF
                   -SPU2W1EM

15. 8.25E-05 SFd1SW41 SFU1W1AM SPU1W1SF -SPU1W1EM -SFU25W4M -SPU2W:AP SPU2W1EM

16. B.05E-05 SPU!SWM SPU1WIM SPU1W!BM -SPU:SW4M -SFU:W1M SF;;2W!!

                   -SFU2W1BM

17. B.25E-08 -SFU1SW4M -SPU1W1AM SPu1WISM SFU25W4M SFUIW A - S?U:b1;"

SPU:W1BM

19. 8.25E-09 SPU!SW4M SFU1WlAF -SPU1W1M S?U1W1E1 -SFU*SWM -5:U:W : .'.".

SPU2W!EM

19. 3.74E-05 SFUSTRTI SPU W1AF

20. !.74E-06 SPUSTFil S U1W1AF ,

21. 2.64E-05 SFU:SW4A SFUSW "J

22. 2.64E-05 SPUISW44 SPSk:MF 2;. 1.75E-0E EISEM1J: -SFU1SW4M -SFU1W:A" -S?U1W:BM SPU25W4" SFU~ alm SPU:WISM

24. 1.75E-05 ESSEM2JF -SPUISW4M -!?U1WIAM 5:U1W1EM SFU25W4M. SFU:W:AM

PU2W9M

25. :.75E-06 EESEM1JF SFU1SW4M SFulalM -SFU1W1EM -SFUISW4M -5:U:WM SFU:W1SM

26. 1.75E-09 EESE"2JF SPU1SW4" SFU1W1M !?U1WISM -SFU25WM -

SFU:W: A".

                   -SFC:W!E"

27. 1. EE-08 59VW2170 -SFU1WIM SPU1W:29 SP":W:M SFU:Wif: -SFU:t:EN

25. 1.!SE-CE SMVW117D SPU:WIM SPU:WISM -S:U:W:AM SFU:W:5F -SF'.':W 15"

29. 1.!SE-0S SMVW217D -SFU1WIM SPJ1W:SM S*L:W1A~ -5 ":WM SF"2W:i"

20. 1.;SE-05 SNW:17: -SFU1W:M SFU1W:!F -SFC W 59 S U:W:AF SFC:W:!"

 !!.    : SE-0S SUW:17D                  SFU1W1AF     -SFUWIM             SFU!W1ER         -SF;:i:A"          5:UN!!"

2. :.!SE-0E SM.W1:7: SFut.l:M SFJ1W15F -5:U1W iM -5:U:h!M SF.::L:iR

. !.00E-CS S:VW118: 5:VW:li:-

 !.       .00E-05 S:W::i                 SNIO! A: -     5"V;0:!t
 !!. 1.00E-05 S:',W:180               SMV101:D       5"/10!I:

. :.0:E-CS 5.W10!A: SN:0533 SRV105:D SMVIO!:t

< 7. :.00E-05 SMVit:A: 5"i10!!: 5"V10:CD SM110 DC

75. 7.5:E-09 EESE G : SFUSTRTI

 !?. 7.9:E-09     EISE"I'~            S:UST"il                                                                   ,.

40. 5.ISE47 S:USTRTI SFUSk:MJ

41. 4.0SE-09 S:U2SW4F SFUSW "F FEP R' N:. 0!-!:50-1(97 EEV;S:0N O F'.3E F-11

                                       ~                         -                                     ,-v4

42, 4.0BE-09 SPUISW4F SPUSWCRF i - 43. 3.60E-09 SRV105A3 SMV10:2D EBSEM1JF

44. 3.6(E-09 SMV10520 SMV105]D EBEE.91HF

45. 3.60E-09. SMViOIAD SMV101CD EBSEM!JF

      - 46. 3.60E-Oi SRV101BD          SMV101DD      EBEEM1FF

47. 3.21E-09' EBSEM2HF SFU1W1BA -SFU1WIBM -SF32W!AM SFU2W1BM

45. 3.21E-09 EBSEM2HF -SFU1W1AM SPU1W1BA -SPU:W1EM SFU2W1BM .

49. 3.21E-09 ESSEM2HF -SPU1W14M S?UlW15; -SFU2s!A.! SPU2W!BM

50. 3.21E-09 EPSEMIMF SPU1W1EA -SFU1W1BE -EPJ2W1AM SPU2W1EM i

4 J i 1 h

i l 1 f i i l

                                                                  ;EF]F' N:. 0!-125:-1097 EE'i!!!0N 0 FAEE -1; i

f

  , a     w    -            --    ~     - - , ,  -        n  -

r -. - , , e , - -- , ,-

CASE 3B - FLCW T3 RE IRC SFRAY HI, CSE HIR CFER, 72 HOUR 9135!0E TIME

T2: FORTY CUT 3ETS

1. 1.00E-04 SCVs116D SLCCEDRA

2. 1.00E-04 EMV10:CC - E9V1010: SLC0~-?RA

3. 1.94E-06 SLC0HERA -SPU1EW4M -SFU1h!A" SFU1W1EM SPJ25W4M SPL~>!A"

                        -SPU2W151          SIV2Wi!!

2 1.94E-06 SLC: HORA SFU1SW4M -SFU:WIAM SPU1W115 -EPU:SW4M -SFU2k:A" SPU:W:2M SIVISW8I

5. 1.94E-06 SLC0HDRA SPUISW4M SPU b!AM SFU1WIS" -EPUISW4M -SF'~W14" J

                        -SPU"W199           SIV2Wi!!

6. 1.44E-06 -SFU: SWAM SFU2EW4M SPUSWC"F

7. 1.44E-06 SFUIEW4M -S?u25W4" SFLEW:MF

8. 1.00E-06 SFU"AINI SPU2W1AM

9. 1.00E-06 SFUPAINI SFU1WIA*

10. 9.E:E-07 SLC0HDRA SPUSTRTI SIVIEW41

11. 2.20E-07 SLC0H"RA SPFN:SER ~

12. B.20E-07 SLCCHIRA SFFISCER SFP!SJEI

13. 3.6:E-07 SMV10!CD EESEM1JF SLCOHDRA 18 3.60E-07 EMV!0!DD EBSEM1HF SLCCH:RA

15. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV215AD SPU1W AM -EPU1Wi!M SFU:W:AM -S~J2k!!M SIV2W111

16. 3.24E-07 SLCCHORA SMV115E3 SPU1W1A1 -SPU1W!EM SFU2W:AM -SCUW!!M SIV2W111 17, 3."4E-07 SLCCH3RA SMV215A3 -SFU1W:AM SFU:Wi!M S*U:Wia" -SFU:Wi!".

SIV:W111 IS. 3.24E-07 SLCCHDRA SMV115ED -EFUiW1A" EFU1W:IM SFU2WIM -EPU2W:IM SIV2W111

19. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMVW:17D -SFU h!A" S?U:W12M SFU:W:AM -EFL*W:?"

SIV2W11I

20. 3.24E-07 SLCCHORA SMV215A: -SPU1WIAM SPU1W1E" -SCU'W:A9 SFU2W iM SIV!!W41

21. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDR4 SMV115BD -SFU1W1A" S)U Wi!M -SFU:W!AM E U' stim SIVISW4I

22. 3.24E-07 SLCCH RA S"VW11Et -SPU1W1AM SPU1Wi!M -SPU:W:A" S0"2'.

SIV!SW41

. 2.24E47 SLC0HDRA SMVh!!7D -SPU1W1AM SFU1W1E1 -SiU:W1AM E ;':W15" SIV!SW41 24 3.24E-07 SLCH:RA SMV:15AD EPUW!A9 !:UWlBM -EP D IAM -I'U:W:IM SIV:all!

25. 3.24E-07 SLC M RA SMV1153 SPU:W1AM SFU1W1BM -EFU:WIAM -S?U:i:E" SIV2W:11

26. !.24E-07 ELC3HDRA SMVW1150 EPU1W1AM EFU!WIPM -S:U:W1'1 -!"; i1E" i SIV:W!!!

;     :7. 3.24E-07 S.00':RA                 SMW!!75           SPU:W:M            EFU W:i"         -Ect:W:M      -5:U:.;119 SIV:W:11   -

25. 3.24E-07 ELCCHDRA $9V215;D -5:Ulk!AM -5:31WIBM 3:U:W1AM SF'J:a:!9 SIVISW4I

29. 3.24E-07 SLC0 HORA SMV1155: -SFJ!WIM -5:316155 EFU:WlAM $P'J"W 11'.

SIV SW'I

      !0. 3.24E-07 SLCCH:;A              SMV2:!AO        -SPUla!AM            !PUlk:Er'          SPU:WIAM     -SFU:w;i" SIVISW41
      !!. 3.24E-07     5'. CH:"A         5"Vl!!E'        -SFU!W1A"            SFL1Wii"           SOU:W:A"    -SF .'". E d.

SIV:SW 1 REF0Fi N:. 0!-1*:0-1077 FEVIS!DN 0 CASE :-!* i e l

32. 2.92E-07 EBSEM2HF -SFU1W1AM SPU!W1BM -SFU2W1AM SPU2W1EM

33. 2.92E-07 EBSEM1HF -SFU1W1AM SF'J1W!!M -SPCW1A9 SFU2W11M

24. 2.92E EBSEM1HF -S'U1W1AM -SPU1W1BM Scu2W1A". SFU2W!!M

35. 2.92E-07 EBSEM2HF EPU1W1AM -SFCIWi!M -SPg:41A" SF'J2W1BM

                !6. 2.92E-07 EESE*1HF    -SPU1W1AM           SPU1W1EM        EFU2k1AM            -SFU2WIBM

37. 2.92E-C7 ESSEM2HF SPJ1W1AM SFU1W1BM -SP' J2W! AM -SPU2W!BM

                !!. 2.90E-07 SMV101CF      S"V1010D          ELCCERA

39. 2.90E-07 SMVIC1CD -SMV101:F SLCCFDRA 40, 2.40E-07 SLCCC9A SMV215AD SPUSW2MF i

em e e. i e i i l KEF0Fi hc. 02-12'C-1097 REVIS 0s 0 FA3E F-11 l ,

CHE 3C - FLCW TO RECIEC HI, ONE HEA:ER OFEFATICN, 162 HR MISS*0N T*ME

TOP FIFTY CUTSETS

1. 1.00E-04 SCVWil6: SLCCH28iA

2. 1.00E-04 EMV101CD SMV10!DD SLCH!FA

      !. 2.00E-06 SLC2'?RA               SPSSTRTI         SIVISW4!

4. 1.94E-06 SLC0HD9 -SSU1EW4M -EPU!W1AP SPU1W!EM SFU25W4M EP13! AM

                     -SFU2W:IM            SIV Will

5. 1.94E-06 SLCCH:RA SPU1EW4M -SPJ:WIAM SPU1W1EM -SPUISW4M -EFU"W:A" SPli2WEM SIVISW41

                                                                                             -SFU;SW4M         -EFU:W1AP

6. 1.9:E-06 SLC0HDRA SPU1EW4M EPU1W!AM SPU1W15M

                     -EPU:WISM             SIV2W111

7. 1.90E-06 SLCCHDRA 'S FNISER

S. 1.9]E-06 SLCCHD!iA SFP!S0!R SFFISCSI

9. 1.44E-06 -SDU!SW4M SPU:SW4M SFUSWCMF

10. 1.44E-06 SPUISW4M -SPU2Sh4M SPUSWC"F

11. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU:W1AM

12. 1.00E-06 SP"MAINI SPL1W1AM

13. 6.40E-07 SMV10100 EBSEM1:F SLC.1 HORA

14. B.40E-07 SPV101DD EESEM1HF SLC0 HORA

15. 6.80E-07 EBSEM2HF -SPU1W1AH SPU1WISM -SPU:W1AM EPU:W1EM

16. 6.9:E-07 EBSEM1HF -SPU1W!AM SFU1WSM -S?t:W AM SPU2W1EM

17. 6.E0E-07 EBSEM1HF -SPd1W!AM -SPU1W1BM S?U2W!AM SPU:b!BM

18. 6.00E-07 ESSEM:HF SPU1W1AM -SPU1W1EM -SPU:WIAM spi':W12M

19. 6.20E-07 ESSEM:HF -SPU1W1AM SPU: WISP. SFU:W AM -S:":W1SM

20. 6.SCE"07 ESSEM:HF SPU1WIAM SPUlW155 -SPU:WIAM -SPU:W1EP.

21. 6.70!-07 SMV101CD SMV101 P ELC3FDRA

22. 6.70E-07 5"V101CP SMV;0:L3 ELC0H;RA 23, 3.24E-07 SLC0HEU EMVI!!A: S?U;WIAM -SFL'W1EM SFUW1AM -S:U:W11M SIV Will

24. !.24E-07 SLCOH;RA SMV1151D SFu!WiAM. -SFU Wi!P SPU241A" -SPJ:Wi!M SIV:W111

25. !.24E-07 SLCDHORA SMV2:!AL -EFU1W!AM SPU1W113 SPU:WIAM -SFL"a:EM SIV:W1;I

26. 3.24E-07 S.00HDRA SMVi!!!D -SFCW!AM SPU1W1BM SFU:W1AM -5:U"d12"

                       $1VW111 27,   3.24E-07 SLCCH:RA                SM/W:17D       -SPJ111AM          S:U1W1B"          SFU:W:AM        -SFU:W15" SIV:Wi!!

25. !.:4E-07 SLC0FERA SMV21540 -E:U!WIAM EFU W:EM -EFL:h!AM S:U:W:EF SIV!S=41

29. 3.24E-07 SLCCHLKf SMV11 !D -SPU1W1AM SFU1W1E". -SPL:W:AM SFu*v:15 SIVISW41

30. 3.24E-07 SLC0 FORA SMiWi!S3 -SPU1h1A" 5:UW11" -SFU:W: AP. SP'U:111"

                       $1V!SW4I

31. 3.:4!-C7 ELCOLDU SMVW !70 -SFC:W:AM SPU13133 -SFJ:W'.A* S:U:Lii" SIV;5W4I

     !2. 3.24E-07 S'CDFDRA
                        .                  SM/215A3         SPU;WIA"         S UtW!!M         -5:U:W1AM         -SFC:WiiR
                       $1'i2W 11

3. !.:4E-)7 SLCCP:RA !"k11582 SFU;W:A'l SFUW13M -SFU2W1AM -SP;:W;!-

SIVIW1:1 34 !.24E-07 S'.CC'DF A STiW11ED SFL:WlaM SFU1W1PM -SFU2d:A" -S:U:W !? SIV:W::I

. 3. 4E-07 ELCDCM SMVW117D SFU1h:AM SFU Wiin -SFU:W!AM -S U:aliM SI'i:W!!!

REFC!!! 2. 03-1250-!C97 KEVI!!C% 0 FME F-15

   !6. 3.24E-07 SLCCHDRA     SMV215A2       -SFU1WIAM      -SPU1W1BM        SFU2WIAM        SPU2W1E' SIVISW41

37. 3.24E-07 SLC0HNA SN!!!BD -SFU1W1AM -SPU1W1EM SPU2h1AM - SPU2WBr.

SIV!SW4I '

   !S. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA     SN21*AD        -SPC1W1AM        SFU1W1EM       SFL'2WIAM     -SPt2k!!M SIVISW41

39. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDFA SN!!!!D -SPU1W1AM SFU1W1BM SFU2W!AM -SFU2W1EM SIVISW41

40. 2.40E-07 SLCCHIRA SN215AD . SPUSWCMF

41. 2.40E-07 SLC0 HORA SMV115BD SPUSWCMF

42. 2.40E-07 SMVW217D SFUSW2MF

43. 2.40E-07 SLCONDRA SMVW11BD SPUSEMF 44, 2.(0E-07 SMVW117D SPUSMCMF

45. 2.00E-07 SPUSTR71 SDU2W1AF

46. 2.00E-07 SPUSTRTI SPU1W1AF

47. 1.94E-07 -SFCISW4M -SFU1W1AM SPU1NIEM SPU25W4M SFU2h1Ar -5?U2W1M 4 SPU2W1SM

42. 1.94E-07 -SPUISW4M -SFU1W AM SPU1W1EF -S?U1W1EM SCU25W49 SFJ241M SPU2W1EM Stu1W!BM SFU2WIAM SPU2h;!F

49. 1.9AE-07 -SFu!SW41 -SFU1W1AM SPU25W4M

                   -SPU2WISM

50. 1.94E-07 SPU! SWAM SFU1W1AF -SFU1W1AM SPU!W11M -EPU25W4M -S?; W:'M-SPU2W!EM i

I

 -                                                      49.

d RE*CC* Nc. O!-!~50-1077 REVIS*3 0 FME :-16

9 CASE 3D - RECIR HI, ChE HEA:EF,165 HR MISSION TIME,1 PLMF IN MAINT At A ?!ME TO: FIFIY CJTSETS

1. 1.00E-04 SCVW116D ELCCGRA

2. 1.00E-04 kV101C EFV!0:00 SLC0CRA

. 1.90E-06 SLC00RA S:Fh SSR 2 1.90E-06 SLCCCRA SF?!EDER SFFISCBI

. 1.44E-06 -SFL!SW M EFCIW4M SPUSCMF

6. 1.44E-06 SPL!SW4P -SFU:SW4M SPUSWCMF

7. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU2W1AP.

S. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SFU1W!AM

9. S.40E-07 SMV!01CD EPSEM1JF SLCCHDRA

10. S.40E-07 SMV101DD EESEM1HF SLCOMRA

1. 6.70E-07 SMV101CD S"V101tP SLCO@RA

12. 6.70E-07 SMV10!CD SW101D3 SLC002A

13. 2.40E-07 SLC00RA SMV215A3 SPUShCMF 14 2.40E-07 SLC00RA SMY11550 SPUSMCPF

15. 2.40E-07 SMVC17D SPUEWCPI

16. 2.40E-07 SLCCEF3 SMVW11ED S?USW:P5

17. 2.4;E-07 SMVW117D SPUSWCMS

19. 7.60E-0S SISOVLSF - SLC0%RA SF?!SOBR 19, 6.99E-OS SLC:HDRA SCU!SW4M -SPU1W1AM SPU1W12M -SFU25W4M -S?U:WiA"

                     -SPU2W1BM           SIVISW41         SIV2W111

20. 5.00E-05 SLCCCRA EPUSTRTI SIVISW43

21. 2.64E-0E SFU25W4A SFUSWCFF

, 22. 2.64E-05 SP 15W4A SPLSEMF

23. 2.45E-0S EBSE12HF SLCCORA -5FU;W1AM SFU1W1EM -SFU:WIAM -E:U:Wi!M SIV:Will

24. 2.45E-CS EBSEM!HF SLCCHIEA -ESU!W1AM foL'!W:SM -3FU:EAM. -52CW!!".

                       !!V2W111 25, 2.45E-0S EEEET:HF              ELCCCKA        -S*U1W!AM               -SPU1W1EM   -SPCW1AM          !?"2011 SIVISW41

26. 2.4!E-05 EPSE.92HF SLCChCRA -SFU!W:AP. SFU1Wi!M -SFU2WIAM -SF D IEM SIV!SW41

  -   27, 2.4:E-09 E35EM1HF              SLC0 HORA      -SPC1W1AM               -SP'J1W:IM     SFU:W1AM     -5F;~415" SICWill
                                                                                                            -S: ;42"     '

25. :.4:E-05 ESEE9:H- SLCONTA E*'.'!W: A9 ' -S:UW15" -SF"2W!AM SIV2W:11

29. !.9:I-05 SLC;H:RA -SPL1SW45 -SFJ1W14" SFU!k EA -EPC!W:SM S U:!.11 5:UIW1AM -EFU:Wi!M !!CW111

30. 1.92E-0S SLCOM*A SFCISW45 SFt!W' AM. 5:U:W1SA -5FU!b;!" -S:CEP

                      -EPCW1AM          -SF.:W:!M         SIV2W111
    . 31. 1.i:E-05 SLCCH:RA               E:CSW4M        -SFU:W:AM                SFJ n 14   -E?JW:E?       -!:' u  !P
                      -S*J"k:A ".         5 CCEM          SIVISW4I
      *:.   .::E-05 SL:"H*3A              SSUl?W4"       -SFCW14"                 !?UIMi9    -5F;25W4"       -!*'J:LA" SPL2W:iA         -!?U2W15?          SIVISW41

~ l ::. I.2)E-09 !!;3TR71 ESL'5E1F 34 :.17E-0S SLCCP:!A E"i:!A: -5FC:W1AP S*J1MSX -S:CW:AM -S?Ci!!" SIVIEW4 SICW:11

. 1.17E-02 S.CCK9 !"V115!: -E?U: CAM S:U1W1!1 -5:U:W1A9 -SPC. !?

SIVISW41 SIV"U!!

      !6. 1.17E-05 ELC39RA                Srik:12:       -5~0!WiAM                EFD1W!!M   -S' D !!#       -5?CWi!"
                  +

SIV1EW41 SICW1.1

37. 1.17E-0S SLCCH:RA INW:173 -SFU1WIAM SPJ1W155 -SFC: CAM -SFL:C!9 EEPCET he. 02-!:50-1007 REC!!3 0 FAGE :-17

4 SIVIEW4I SIV:Wi!!

22. 1.17E-05 SLC0 HORA SM.V215A -SFt1W!A* -SFU1h15M. SFC:W1AM -5:' :J W1*:M SIV!!W4I SIVIW!!!

SMV115E: -SPd1W:AM -SFU1W1EM SPL2W!AM -SPU:W;S

39. 1.17E-00 SLCCHDRA -

SIV!EW41 SIV2W111

40. 1.CCE-08 SCVW1140 SCVW!!63

41. 1.00E-0S SCVW!!62 SRV101A0 SMV1015 42, 1.00E-0E SCVd!!4D SMi101CD SMV101tD i 4!. 1.00E-CS SMV105AD SMV105BC SMV105CD SMV105:D

44. 1.00E-08 SMV101AD SMV101BD SRV10!CO SMV101DD

45. 9.60E-07 SFU25W4F SFUSMC'F

46. 9.60E-09 .SFU!SW4F SPUSW".9F

47. S.40E-09 SMV105AD SRV105C: EBSEM1JF

48. E.4CE-09 SPV105ED SMV105tD Ei!E11HF

49. B.40E-09 SMV101AD SMV101CD E!!EM1JF j 50. E.40E-09 SMV101BD SMV10100- E5SEM1HF i ,

l i i i l 4 i 7 i 1 l I REFCRT No. 07-12!0-1077 FEVIS!CN 0 8 AGE -li

                                                          -v     -*

CASE 44 - FUOW TO C W HI., TWU HEA:ER OFERATION, 72 HCUF MISSICN TIME TOP THIRTY NINE CUTSETS

1. 1.44E-06 -SFU15W4M SFU2SW4M SPUSW:rF

2. 1.44E-06 SPUISW1M -5PU25W41 SPU3W:MF

3. 1.00E-06 SFUMAINI SPU2W1M 4 1.^0E-06 SFUMAINI SPU1W1AM

    . 3.40E-07 SPUSTRTI                SPU:k1AF

6. !.40E-07 SFUSTRTI SPU1W1AF

7. 2.92E-07 EBSEM2HF -SFU1W1AM SPU1W12M -SPU2WIA" S?U2W1EP.

S. 2.92E-07 EISEM1HF -SPU1W1AM SPU1W1PM -S?U2W!AM SPU2n!!" 9, 2.9 E-07 EPSEM1HF -SFU1W1AM -SPU1W1BM S?U:WIAM SFJ2h:25

10. 2.9:E-07 EBSEM2HF SPU1W:AM -SP"!W1BM -SFU2W1M SPU2W!PM

 !!. 2.92E-07 EISEN!HF            -58U1W1AP           SFU1W!B*         SPU2WIAM        -SFU:k:B"

12. 2.9:E-07 EBSEM2kr SPC1W1AM SFU:W!!M -SFU:W1A" -SPU:W!in

13. 2.40E-07 SMVW:170 SPUSW:"F

14. 2.40E-07 SMVW 17D SPUSW"MF

 !!. 8.91E-03 SMVW217C            -SPU1W1AM           SPC1W13M         SFU2WIAM          SPU:W!!A      -5:U:W:!"        .

16. 8.91E-08 SMVW117D SPU:W1M SFU1W12M -SPU:WIAM SPC2W!BA -!"U:Wii"

17. E.91E-02 SMVW217D -S U1W1M SPU1W1EA -SFU1WIPM SPU:W1AM SFC2h!!".

15. 9.91E-0E SMVW117D SPU1W!AP. SPU!WIPA -SFUWEM -SPJ2W1M SFC:h:5"

19. B.25E-08 -SPU1Sb4M -SFU1h1M SPU1W1BF -SFU1W155 SPU:SW4M SFCIW A" SFU2W125 20, 9.2:E-02 -SPU!Sh4" -SPU1WiM SFU1WISM SFU:!W8M SPU2W!M SF '. W:EF

                    -SPU:W!!M 2!. B. :E-05 SFU!SW4M              SPuiWla           SFU1W15~       -SFU1W:EM         -S:U: SWR       -SFU261M SPU:W1E?.

22. B.25E-03 SFU!SW4M S:U1W1M S:U:W:S". -SPU25W4M -SFU2W1A? S*U:W1EF

                    -SFU W1EM 2!. 9.25E-06 -S*U!SW4M           -SPU1h1AM           SFU1W12M         SPU2SW49          S?u:W!AF      -!?C:WIM SFU2W1EM 24     9.25E-06 S UISW8M              SFU1W1AF        -5FU1W!A".         3PUW11M         -SPU:SW49       -583:W14 SFU2h:29

25. 7.20E-08 EISEM .F SPU3TRTI

26. 7.20E48 E!!EMiHF SDU5TRi!

27. 4.30E-03 SFu!iEi! SPUSW MF

22. 2.64E-03 SPU:!W4A SFU2W:MF 25 2.64E-03 SFU15W4A S*USW:MF D. 1.7 E-08 EE!!N!JF -3PUISW4M -3FU:W1M -!FU:W:EM 3FJ25WM SF U~,:M 5:U2Wi!M

31. 1.75E-0E E!SE"2JF -!FU1EWM -SPU!WIAM SPC1W1E" 5:U:Sh4P SFU:CM

                    -SFU2W!S"

. 1.75E-05 E!!!": F EPU1!W4M SPU!W!M -5:'".a15 M -SOU:!h4M -5:U: Win SFU:E1E"

 !;.      .75E-05 EESE C :             SF1SW49
                                          .              SFU:W:M          S:01Wif"        -3C"!ie         -SC:Wie
                    -EC:W!!"

34 1.!SE-03 S"VW:170 -!PUin:M SFU1h!!" SFU:WM S;;2WIBF -SFU.'W:!"

. 1. EE-C3 5"W!:7D EFU;W1AP SFi.'In1EP -SF.':ble SFU:WlBF -S~U:i;i" 31, 1.!8E-05 CMVW2170 -5:UW!A" Sct.h!EM SFJ:bA- -S*U*WlAM SFU:4!'

 !7.      . 2E-02    5".W":7D         -SFJ1W1R           3FC1W:!F        -SPU1.!!M           3FU2W1M        SF J:Wi!'.
 !2. 1.03E48 S"VW1:7                 !"U:hAr        -SFJ1F!P            EFU1Wii"        -!cy:W A"        3F::Wiir
 !:. 1.!EE45 S?.'.E:17L             5:Uti1M          SPU1W1EF        -S*)W iM          -SN:WiM          !K~h !"

EEF Fi Nc. 03-! 50-1097 REV!310N 0 FAIE 8-14 a ,

CASE 48- FLCW TC CCW HEai EI., CNE HEMER OFERATICN, 72 HOUR MISSICN TIME TCP FIFTY CUTSETS i

1. 2.90E-05 SMV2C!2F SLCCH2RA

2. 2.90E-05 SMV205AP SLC0H:RA

3. B.00E-C6 SLCCH RA SFUSTRTI SIV!SW4I

4. 1.94E-06 SLC0HIRA -SPUISW4M -SSU1h!AM .SFU1W1EM SFJ2Sh4M SPl.2W R

                    -SPU2W:BM            SIV2W11I
     !. 1.94E-06 SLC0HDRA               SPUISW4M       -SPU1W:AM            SPU1W1BM     -SF"25W49        -SFU2W:AM SPli2WISM          SIVISW4I

6. 1.98E-06 SLC0HDRA SPUISW4M SPU1WIAM SPC1W1BM -SPU2SW4M -SFJ:W:AM

                    -SSU:W12M            SIV2Wil!

7. 1.44E-06 -SFU!SW4M SFU25WAM SFUS'CMF B. 1.44E-06 SPU SW4M -SPUISW45 SFUSW:MF

9. 1.00E-06 SFUMAINI SPUIWIAM

!   10. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI                SPU1W:4M

11. B.20E-07 SLC0HDRA SFFNIS!*.

12. 6.20E-07 SLCCWtiA SFPISCBR SFP:SCBI

10. 3.40E-07 SPUSTRTI S9UIW1AF

14. 3.40E-07 SPUSTRi! SPU1h!AF 15, 3.24E-07 SLCCHDRA SMV2150 SPU;W!AM -!PU1W1H SFU:W!A9 -520Wi!P SIV2W111

16. 374C-07 SLCCHDRA SMV!'5BO SPUlWIAM -SPU1W12M SPU2W1AM -SSU: Wilt SIV2W111 17, 3.24E-07 SLCOHERA SMV215At -SPl.1WIA9 S 1 WilM SFU:W!A9 -SFi':Wi!M .

                    'SIV* Wit!

12. 3.24E-07 SLCDEDRA 59V ::!: -SFU:W:R SFU1W1EM S:U2W:AM -S:'J:W119 SIV2W111

19. :.24E-07 SLC0H:RA SMvh:170 -SFU!W!AM SFU;W!!M SFU*d!A9 -SFU~n!!?.

SIV2W111

20. !.24E-07 SLC3HDRA SN2:5AD -SPL1W:AM SFU:Wi!M -SFU2W A' 55'.':Wi!9 SIV!SW41

21. 3.24E-07 SL:0HERA SMV11:B -SPU W1AM SFU1W11M -SFU2W14M SFU:W i * ".

SIVISW4I

  - 22. !.24E-07 SLCCH:FA                SM'"W1:ED      -SFU:WIAM           SPU!Wi!M      -SFU'W1AM          SFJ:W:59 SIVISW41

23. 3.24E-07 SLC0Ht;A SMtW!!7C -SFU:W149 SFi!!W:SM -SFU2W1A9 SDU2W!EM SIV:SW41

24. .24E-07 SLC0FERA S'.1:15 0 SPU1W:AM SFU1W11M -SFu:W1Ar. -SFU:W:19 SIV:Wi!I 25, 3.24E-07 SLCCHDRA S%;1:!: SPU:W1AM SPL:W:BM -S;U2n!AM -SFU3:!'

SIV:W111 2t. 3.28E-07 SLC0H*RA SMVWil!3 SFulk!A9 SF'J:W1EM -S*U:W:Ai 58.:. !* SIV2W111 27, 3.24E-07 SLC3s;RA SUW:170 STU:X:A9 S:Ulk!!M -!:U:' 14M

                                                                                                   .       -SFU:Wi!9 SIV2W1:I

29. !.24E-07 SLCCH;FA S".V2:!M -SFU;W149 -SPU'W1EM SFU2W1AM SC U20.!*'

SI11564I 9 !.2:E-M SLCCH;FA SMst:50 -SFU;W:AM S*U1W:IM SFU:h! AM " SPUI.!!9 SIV!!W41

30. 3.24E-07 SLCOHC;A SMV215A -!cU:' .AM SFU1W:EM SDL2W!AM -5:U2W;S?

. SIVISW41 31, 3.24E-07 SLC0432A SMVit !D -SPU:WlaM SPL1W1*M !?'.':W! AM -SFL:W:!' SIV:SW4I REPOR! No. 0;-1:00-1077 AEVISI'i) FASE:-:)

32. 2.92E-07 EPSEM2HF -EPU1W1AM SPU1W1BM -SPU2W1A9 .SPU2W'!M 37, 2.9:E-07 EBSEM!HF -SFU1N!AM SPU1W12M -SPU2W1AM S:U: WISP

34, 2.f:E-07 EBSEM1HF -SPU1NIAM -EPu!W1BM SFU2W!AM SFU:WIBM

  ;5. 2.92E-07 EBSEM2HF         SFU1W1AM -SPU1W1BM      -SPU2WIAM              SPU:W1BM                  .

36. 2.9:E-07 EBSEM1HF -SPU1W1AM SPUlW1BM SFU:W!AM -SPU2W1BM

37. 2.92E-07 EBSEM2HF SPU1W1AM SFU'W!BM -SPU2W1AM -SPJ2W1BM

  !E. 2.40E-07 SLC0 ERA      SMV215A    SFUSW:MF

39. 2.4CE-07 SLC0 ERA SMV115fD SPUSWCMF

40. 2.40E-07 SMVW217D SPUSWCMF

41. 2.40E-07 SLCDERA SMVW119D SFUSW:MF

42. 2.40E-07 SMVW117D SPUSWCMF 4;. 2.00E-07 SLCCEF.A SPUSTRTI SIVISW40 44 B.25E-0E -SPUISW4M -SPU1W1AM SPUlW1EF -SPU1W125 SFU2SW4M !?D:PR SPU2W199

45. 9.2bE-05 -SSUISW45 -SPU1WIAM SPU1W1EM SPU25W4M SPU2W!AM S:U2W15F

                    -SPU:W12M

46. 6.25E-03 SFU1SW49 SPU1W1AM SPU1W1BF -S?U1W1?M -SFUISW4M -SPUElli S'U2h12M

47. B.25E-09 SPU1SW4M SPU1W1AM SFU!W12M -SP" SW4M -SPU:W!A9 S*U:W11F I -SPUIW;BM

42. B. 5E-0S -SFU1SW49 -SPU1W1AM SFU1Wi!M SPU25W45 SFU2W:AF -S:J:WIAM SPU:W1SM

49. E.05E-08 SPU1SW4M SFU1W1Ae -SPU1W!AM SFU1W1BM -SPUISW4M -SFU:W1AM SFU2W151

50. 7.7dE-05 SUCCE?.A SPUISW4M SPU1E!BM -SFU:SW4M -SFU2WlAM -SP;l2 stem SIVISW4I SIV2W111

> ~ l 1 REF:RTNo. 03-!:50-1(97 CEV!'. ION 0 FAGE F-:1

CASE 4C - FLOW TO CCW HI, DNE HEADER OFERAT10N, 168 HOUR MISSION TIME TCP FIFiY CUTSETS

1. 6.70E-C5 SMV20EEP SLOCMRA

2. 6.70E-05 SMV20EAP SLC0HDRA

3. 6.0(E-06 SLCOMRA SFUSTRi! SIV!SW4I

4. 1.94E-06 SLCORRA -SPUISW4M -SPU W1M SPU1WISM SFU25W4M SPU:Wie

                      -SPU:W1EM            SIV Will

5. 1.94E-06 SLC0HD9A SPU1934M -SPU!N!M SPU1WBM -SFU2 Skin -SP'.' s:M SPU2W1BM SIV!SW4I

6. 1.94E-06 SLCOMRA SFU1SW4M SPU1W1AM SPU1W1SM -S?U25W4M -S~CIWIM

                      -SPUIW1EM            SIV:Wi!!

7. 1.90E-06 SLCOGRA SPFN:SER

8. 1.90E-06 SLC00RA SFF15 BR SFPliOBI 9, 1.44E-06 -SFU:SW4M SPU25W4M SPUSWCMF

10. 1.44E-06 SPU!SW4M -SFU2SW4M SPUSWCMF

11. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SP"2W!AM

12. 1.C0E-06 SFUMAINI SFU1W1AM 13, 6.00E-07 S?USTRi! SPU2W!AF

14. 8.00E-07 SPUSTRTI SFU1W!AF

15. 6.60E-07 EESEM2HF -SPU1W1AM SPU1W121 -S'U2WIM SPU:W1SM

16. 6.60E-07 ESSER 1HF -SPU1W1AM SPU1W!!M -E?U2W1R SPUIW12M

17. 6.80E-07 EBSEM1HF -SPU1W1AM -SPU1W!EM SPU2W1AM SFJ2W1SM

18. 6.80E-07 EBSEM2HF SPU!W1AM -SPU:W1BM -SPU2W1AM SPU2W13M

19. 6.BCE-07 EBSEN!HF -SPU1W1AM SPU1W12M SFU:W1AM -SFU:W15"

20. 6.E0E-07 EBSEM hF SPUlW1AM SPC11129 -SPU2W1M -SFU2W12M

21. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV21!AD SPU1W1M -SPU W1EM S: 5 12 -SFJ'i!!9 i SIV2 Wit!

22. !.24E-07 SLC0KRA SMV11 PD SFU1W1H -SFU1W11M SPU:W1AM -S?L:W !M SIV hill 23, 3.~4E-07 SLC0HERA S*VI:5AD -SFU:W1AM SFU1W1BM. SFU:WIM -SFC:W1E*

SIV W111

24. 3.24E-07 SLCOHCRA SMV11!iD -SPU1W1AM SPU1W161 SFU:W AM -SPC2Wi!*

SIV:W111

 -   25. 3.24E-07 SLC0HERA               SMVW1172        -SPU1W1AM           SPJ1W125         SFU:W1A"     -SFU"Wii9 SIV"Will 26,   3.24E-07 S'.COMRA               SMV215AD        -SFu!WIM            EPU1W15M       -SFC:W:P         ScU:Wi!M SIV!SW4I

27. 3.24E-07 SLC0CRA SMV:1:i -SFU1W:M SFU1W1EM -SPU:W1AM SF L 11M SIV!SW4I

25. 3.:4E-07 SLC0 ERA SM/W11SD -SFU1W1AM SPU1WifM -SFU:WIM !?L:W;i" SIV!SW4I

29. 3.:4E-07 SLCCN9A SMiW:173 -SPU1W1M SFU1h1EM -SFU2W14 S? L 15'

                        $1VISW4I
     !C. 3.24E-07 SLCD G A               SMi2:54D          SFL b1AM           SPUIWi!M       -SFU:W::M      -ifllWilM SIV:Wi!!

31. 3.24E-07 SLC0H:RA 59/11513 SFU:W1M SF'.'in tim -SDU:W1M -SPl::W:f"

                        $1V:W1:1

. !. 4E-07 SLOCMRA SMVW :S: SFU:stAM SFJWi!M -SPU:W12 -SFU:W:i" SIV2W111

. !.24E-07 SL:09:RA SMVW1173 SFU1Wla SFU1W15" -SFU2W1M -SFC:W1EP Sr.:W111

     ;4. 3.24E-07 S.C:H:RA               SMV21$a:         -SSU:WIM          -SFUW1E"          SFD M          geg gig.

SIV1SW41 FIFCRT N:. (3-1:50-10:7 EEVIS!0N 0 ASE F-::

35. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SM/115ED -SFU1W:AM -SPU1W19M SPU2W!AM SFU2W1EM SIVISW41

36. 3.24E-07 SLC0H:RA SMV215AD -!FU:W:AM SFU1W1BM SF"2W:AM ~ -SFU2Wi!M SIVISW41 ,

37, 3.24E-07 SLC0HCRA SMV11520 -SPU1W!AM SFUfW1BM SFU2W1AM -SFU2n!!N I SIVISW4I

39. 2.40E-07 SLCONDRA SMV215AD SFUSW2MF

39. 2.40E-07 SLCONDRA SMV115BD SPUSWCMF

40. 2.40E-07 SM'iW217D SPUSWC9F 41, 2.4CE-07 SLC0H2RA SMVH11BD SFUSW2".F 42, 2.4CE-07 SMVW117D SPUSMCRF

43. 2.00E-07 SLCCHDRA SPUSTRTI SIVISW;D 44 1.94E-07 -SPUISW4M -SFU1WIAM SFU1WISM SPU25W4M SFU2WIAF -SFt2W;AM SPU2W15",

45. 1.94E-07 -SFJ1EW49 -SPU1W1AM SFU1W1BF -SPU1W11M SP'J25W45 SPU2WIM SFU2b1BM

46. 1.94E-07 -?FUISW49 -SPU W1AM SPU1W1BM SFU25W45 SFU2WIAM SFU2W;f~

)
                                                                     -SP'J2W199

47. 1.94E-07 SFU1SW4M SFU1W1AF -SFU1W1A". SPU W1EM -SFU25W45 -SFU2W:A9 i SFU2W:9M

46. 1.94E-07 SPUISW4M S?U1W1AM SFU1WISF -SPU1W!!M -SFUISW41 -S*U2h;AM SPU2W1BM

49. 1.94E-07 SPUISW4M SPU1W1AM SPU:W:BM -S?U2SW4M -SPU2WiAM SFU2W:PF

                                                                     -SPU2W1BM

. 50. 1.6SE-07 EBSEM2HF SFUSTRTI

1 j FEF2R7 M. 03-12:0-1047RSV!$:0N C F'BE F-23

CASE 4D - CCW HI, CNE HEADER OPERATION, 168 HOUR TIME, 1 PLMP MAINT Ai A TIME TOP FORTY CUTSETS

1. 6.70E-05 SPCOSEP SLCCHDRA

2. 6.70E-05 SMV20BAP SLC3HOFA

3. E.00E-06 SLCHERA SPUSTRTI SIVISW4I 4 1.90E-06 SLC0 ERA SFFKISSR

5. 1.90E-06 SL:CH:RA SFFISCER SFFISCSI

6. 1.44E-06 -SPU1SW4M SPCSW45 SPLSW MF

7. 1.44E-06 SFUISW4M -SFU25W4M SPUSW:MF

8. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SFU2W1AM

9. 1.00E-06 SPUMA!NI SPU1W!AM

10. 8.00E-07 SPUSTRTI S*U:W1AF

 !!. 8.00E-07 SFUSTRTI              S?U1WIAF

12. 2.4CZ-07 SLC0HERA SMV215A SPUSWCMF 13, 2.40E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV115BD SPUSW:MF

14. 2.40E-07 SMVW217D SFUSW:PJ

15. 2.40E-07 SLC0HDu SMVW1193 SPUSCMF

16. 2.40E-07 SMVW1170 SPUSWCMF

17. 2.00E-07 SLC3RRA SPUSTRTI SIVISb4D

16. 1.6EE-07 EPSEM2HF SFUSTRTI

19. 1.69E-07 E2SEM:HF SPUSTRTI ,

20. 7.60E-C8 SISDVLBF SLC3HDRA SFP150ER

21. 6.99E-03 SLC0H:RA SPUISW4M -SFU1W1AM SFU1Wi!M -SPU25W4M -5::2W AM

                 -SFU2WISM           SIVISW4I        SICW!!!

22. 4.50E-09 S?uSTRTI SPUSWCMI

23. 2.64E-00 SPU25W4A SPUSW MF 24 2.64E-CB SFUISW4A SPUSi:PJ

25. 2.45E-02 EBSEN:HF SLC0H RA -SPU:W AM SFU1W1BM -S~U2W P -3:L:k'!!

SIEWi!I

26. 2.45E-09 ESSEM1HC SLC0HLEA -3PU:W14M SFU1W1BM -5:U:4:AM -SFCW129 SICW11I

27. 2.45E-08 ESSEM2HF SLC0HDRA -SFulh!AM -S:U1WISM -SFU2W!AM SFU:W:IM.

S!V SW41

29. 2.45E-03 E!SEM2HF SLC0HDRA -SFU1W1AM S?U1W1E1 -SPU:W 1 A". -SFu:W:19 S1715441

29. 2.45E-08 EBSE.11HF SLCOCRA -SPU1W:AM -S?U1Wi!" SPU:h;A" -SF:.':Wi!*

SICW111

30. 2.45E-08 ESSE *:HF SLCCH:RA S~U:WiAP -S?Uth EM -SPU:W:N -S~U2il51 SIWW:!!

1. 1.9:E-09 ELCCCoA -SFL'1SWa*. -SPQW!AM S?Lli1SA -SFU1W:!M SFCSh'P S*U:W1M -S U~n1E.9 SIch:11

32. 1.92E-09 SLCD-EEA SFU1SWM SFU1W12" SFL!W:1A -SFU:k:2.* -S*CSW;*

                  -S;Cs1P.          -SFC W 15.*      SIV:k111
 '. 1.9 E-CS SLC0H::A              S*UISW M      -5:L1W1A*           SFL W15A        -S:U;W:!M      -S*":SW'"
                  -S*CW:M            SPJ:W51         SIVISk;I 34   1.9:E-02 SLC00Ra               SFU1Sh49      -S?C1ht;9           SFU!W1B*        -SFCSW4*       -SF:W:

SFU:k:2A -SFU:s!E" SIV Sk41

35. 1.33E-02 S:MAIRSr SptSTRt! SFL:W:A-

6. 1.!!E-OS S;MIESF SFjSTEil SF":d!A:

37. 1.17E-0E SLCH~ 2.4 S*C1540 -SFJ1W:M Sst!W;iM ~ -S ~ .':W:AM -SF":d:E?

SIVISh41 SICWi!!

 !8. 1.17E-DE SLCHDRA               SMv!!*fC       -SFU:nt;M          SFUW159,        -SFCd:P'       -SFU:4:!"

SIVISd(I SIVW1:I REFORT t. 0!-! 50-1097 REVIS Ci 0 FASE C-24

 !?. 1.17E-08 S'.CC90RA   SMVWilS  -SFU!W14M        $P'J1W1EM        -SFU:W1A?.          -SFJ:W11M SIVIEW4! SIV:Wil!

40. 1.17E-CB SLC0CF.A SEVW117D -S?l!;h 1 AM SPL1W1SM -S?J:W1AM - -SPJ:E:!M SIVISW41 SIV:Will RSFOR' N . O!-1250-10?7 ;SV! SIC'i 0 FAGS F-25

CASE 5A - FLOW TO CHS PUMPS, TWO HEADER OPERAT1:N, 72 HOUR MISSICN TIME TCP FORTY CUTSETm

1. 1.44E-06 -SFU!SW4M SPU25W4M SPUSWCMF

2. 1.44E-06 SPUISb4M -SPU25W4M SPUSWCMF

3. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU2W1AM

4. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINX 5:01W1AM

5. 5.34E-07 -SFU1SW4M -SFU1WIAM SPU1W1EA -SP:.i!W1EM SPU2Sh2M SFU2W1AM SPU2WISM

6. 5.34E-07 -SPUISW45 -SPulh!AM SPU1h1SM SPU25W4M SPU2h1AM SPU2W1EA

                         -SPU2W1EM

7. 5.;4E-07 SFUISW4M SFU1W1AM SPUIW1EA -SPU1W1EM -SPU25W4M -S?C:W14' SPU2W1BM

6. 5.34E-07 SPU!SW4M SPU141AM SPU1W'3M -SFU25W4M -S?U:WIA" S?U:Wii4

                         -SPU2W12M B. 3.40E-07 SFUSTRTI                      SFU2W1AF

9. 3.40E-07 SPUSTRTI SPU131AF

10. 2.92E-07 EBSEP2HF -SPU1W1AM SFU141BM -SPU2W1AM S U2W1EM

11. 2.92E-07 EBSEM1HF -SPU1W1AM - SFU1W1EM -SPU2W1AM SPU2WiSM 12, 2.92E-07 EBSEM1hF -SPU!W1AM -SFU1W1EM SPU2W1AM SPU2W1EM

13. 2.92E-07 E!SEM2HF SPU1W1AM -SPU1W19M -SPU2W1AM SPU31E" 14, 2.92E-07 ESSEM1HF -S?U1WIAM SFU1W1BM SFU2W1AM -S U2W1BM

15. 2.52E-07 EBSEM2HF SPU1W1AM SPU1W1BM -SPU2W!AM -SPU2W19M

16. 2.40E-07 SEVW217D S USW:".F

17. 2.40E-07 SMVW1170 SPU!h "F

19. B.25E-09 -SPU1SW4". -SPL1W1AM' SFL1W!EF -SPU:415M SPU25W4M SFU:W1AM SPU2W1BM 19, 8.25E-05 -SPUISW45 -SFU1W1AM SFU1W:3M SPU25W4M SFU2W1AM SFU31EF

                          -SFU2W:SM                                                                                               '

20. E.25E-06 SPUISh4M SPU1W1AM SFJ1W15F -SFU1W:EM -SPU:SW4M -SFU:W!A' SPU2W1SM

21. B.25E-03 SFU1SW4M SFU1W1AM SPU1W1SM -SPU25W4M -SPU2W:AM S?U2W'EF

                          -SFU2W;SM

22. 9.25E-08 -SPUISW2M -SPU1W!AM SPU!Wi!M SPU25W4M Stu:W1A~ -SFC:d!P.

SFU:41SM

23. B.25E-05 SPUISW4M SPU1W1AF -55J1W1Ai SPU1W125 -SFU25k1M -EFl.':b! A" SPU:h:2P 24 7.20E-08 EESEM2HF SCUSTRTX

25. 7.20E-0S EESEM1HF SPUSTRTI

26. 4.80E-09 SPUSTKT1 SPUSW:MF

27. 2.64E-05 SPUSW4A SPUS C F

22. 2.64E-03 SFU1SW2A SPUSW "I

?. 1.75E-08 ESSE 91JF -SFU!SW4M -SP21W1A9 -SFU;W:EM S:U:SW4" SF'.h1 A' SPU:h!EM

0. 1.75E-0S EPSEM2JF -SFt1SW49 -S~U1WIAM SFJ1W1E" SFJ2Sn4M S:U:41.M

                          -SFU2W1EM i   31,    1.75E-03 ESSEM1JF                      SFCISW4M          SPU!alAM         -SPU1W123         -S U:SW4M     -S U:k1M SFC:W1EM l

u. 1.75E-08 ESSEM:JF 5:UISW4M SPU1W:AM SPU!W1EP -SPC25W4M -$ FUN:4'.

                           -SFU:W1EM 3:. 1.!SE-08 SMvw2170                       -SFU1W1AM           SPU1W1EM            SFU:W1AM         S U:W!!F    -SP.':Wi!".

34 1.3SE-02 SMVW1170 SPU!W1AM SPU1W1BM -SFU:W1AM SPU2W.EF -SFrali"

   !5. 1.!SE B SMW: 7C                      -SFu!W1AM           SFC141EM            SFU:W!t.~      -5:LU;AM        S P'.3 ;i".
   ;6. 1.33E-08 SMW2170                      -SFU1W1AM          SPU1W1EF          -SFJ1X1SM          SFU2h:AM       SP2:WiiM REF0FT No. 0;-!:50-1C77 REVISION O PASE :-26

l

37. 1.!EE-08 S m it?0 Spttnige _epggggg,"

e,

                                                    "'  ' ",         ~6 U2WISM to  , 3a 08
                                      1W
                                      -           -SFU1W1EM          -SOU:alAM          S*h"'W:'"m 5;hw'h

h. Shh Ch ,

                     ;,5 -e31 !!n -SFU!W!EM         SPU2Sd4A          ce"'WIA" Sc"
                                                                                           -.W. 1 t.*

40. 9.90E-09 Spyggg44 goggggg. e,g!m

                                   --    a4Ba.    -580W1BM           -SFU2h!AM          S?U;g;p=

h EF:FT No. '0.-I:!',-1??? FE'[5:cs'

                                                                           ,      o F gg p. 7

l i CASE 59 - FLCW TO CHS. PUMP CCOLERS, CNE HEADER OFERATICN, 72 HOUR MISSICN TIME TCP FCRTY CUTSETS i

1. 5.00E-06 SLCONDRA SFUSTRTI SIV!!W41

2. 1.04E-06 SLC0HDRA -SPUISW4M -EPU1WIAM SPU1W1BM SDU25W4M SPU2414M

                      -SPU:WISM               SIV2W111

3. 1.94E-06 SLC0HDRA SFU15W4M -SPU1WIAM SPU1W1EM -SPU25W4M ,

                                                                                                                -SFU241A" SPU:W1EM               SIV1SW4I

4. 1.94E-36 SLC0HDRA SPUISW4M SPU!W1AM SPU1W1BM -SPU25WAM -SFU2WAM

                      -SD32W1Br               SIV2W11I
     !. 1.44E-06 -SPUISW4P                   SPU25W4M       SPUSMCMF

6. 1.44E-06 SPUISW4M -SPU25W45 SPUSW:MP

7. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU2W1AM S. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU1W1AM

9. S.20E-07 SLC3 HORA SPPNISBR

10. 5.20E-07 SLC0HDRA SPPISOBR SFP!SCSI

11. 3.40E-07 SPUSTRTI SPU2W1AP

12. 3.40E-07 SPUSTRTI SPU1W1AF 13.~ 3. 4E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV215AD SPU1W:AM -SFU1W15M SPU2W1AM -SFU2h125 SIV2W111

14. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV1155D SPU1W1AM -SPU1WIBM SFU2W1AM -SFU~W15M SIV2W111

15. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV215AD -SPU!W1AM SPU1W1EM SPU2W1A" -SPU2W1ER SIV2W111

16. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV11553 -SFU1W1AM SPU1W!BM SPl'2W1AM -SPU2Wi!*

SIV2W111 17, 3.24E-07 SLCCHORA SMiW2170 -SPU1WIA9 SCU1WiEM SPL:W14M -S? O '!M SIV:Wil! j 13. 3.24E-07 SLC0h:RA SMV:15AD -5:U:h AM SFU1W15M -SFU2WIA* SFU:W:E" i SIV!SW41

19. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV115BD -SPU1W!AM SFU1W1E9 -SDU2W1A'1 SP O 1EM SIV1SW41

20. 1.24E-07 SLCCHDRA SMVW1153 -SFulh!AM SFU1W1EM -EPU:WA? S?U:W15?

SIVISW4I

  - 2!. 3.24E-07 SLCCHDRA                    SMVW:17D     -SPU1W:AM             SPU1W1EM       -SFU2W1AM         SFU:s;i?

SIV1SW4I

22. 3.24E-07 5.CCHDRA SPV215AD SPU:W:AM SPU14:!M -SP O AM -50 0 13" SIV2W:11

23. 3.24E-07 S.CCHDRA SM'!!!!B2 SFUlW1AM. SPU1W11M -SFU2W145 -5:U"W15' SIV:W111 24 !.24E-07 SL :EftA 53VW11E: SFU!W1AM SPU1hliE -SFU:W:AM -!:L:k;i" SIV W111

5. 3.2*E-07 SLCOHDFA SMVW1173 SFU!Wie. SCU1Wi!M -!PU2W:A" -!:.:W:59 SIV:W!!!

1 26. 3.24E-07 SL:0 EPA spi::!AD -SFU:W1A1 -EPU1W:E" 5:U:W:AM S~J2dli* l SIV!SW4I i 27. 3.24E-07 SLC0HERA SMV115ED -SPU1W:AM -S U:Wi!M S 32W1AM SPU:61EP SIVISW41

23. 3.*4E-07 SLC0H:RA SM4215A3 -SFU1W1 A", SFUW1E9 SFU2W1AM -SP O ;!N -

SIV!SW4I 2'. .24E-07 SLCCFDRA SMV11553 -SFU1W1AP SFU1W!iM SP O !AM -SPJ:Wif9 SIVIS44I

20. 2.92E-07 EfSEP~W -SN!W1 AM S:U!W1EM -SP O ;AP 5:U:h!SM

31. 2.92E-:7 EEEEMihF -SPU1W1AM SPUW:SM -SF D IAM SP O !EM REFCRT No. 03-1:50-!097 REV1SICN 0 FA3E F-25

4 32, -SPU1W1AM -SPU1W1BM SPU2W1AM SPU:WISM 2.92E-07 ESSEM1HF

                                      -SPU1W1EM       -SPU2WIAM               SPU:WISM
    !3. 2.92E-07 EBSEM2HF   SPU1W1AM

' -SPU1W1AM SPU1W1BM SPU2h1AM -SFU2k!BM l

34. 2.92E-07 EBSEM1HF SPu1W1BM -S:U2h1AM -SPU2W1BM

35. 2.92E-07 EBSEM2HF SPU1W1AM -

36. 2.40E-07 SLC0H:KA SMV21 A SPUSECMF SFUSWCMF l'

37. 2.40E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV115BC

    !S. 2.40E-07 SMVW217D   SPUSd:MF

39. 2.40E-07 SLC0HERA SMVW11ED SPUSMCMF

40. 2.40E-07 SMVd117D SPUSBCNF 1

i 1 i ) l l i FEDORT No. 0;-1:50-1077REV:510N 0 FA2E :-:~

f CASE F5C - FLOW TO CHS PUMP C0CLERS, ONE HEADER OPERATION, 168 HOUR M:SS:GN TIME TOP FIFTY CuiSETS

1. 8.00E-06 SLCCHDRA S?USTRTI SIVISW8I

2. 1.94E-06 SLCCHLRA -SPU!Sb4M -SFU1WIAM SFU1W!EM SPUISW4M SPU2W1A*

                  -SFU2Wi!M            SIV Will

3. 1.94E-06 SLC0H:RA SPUISW4M -SPU1WIAM SPU1W1SM -SFU25W4* 3

                                                                                                         -SPU2W1A*

SFU2 WISP SIVISW4I 4 1.94E-06 SLC0HDRA SFU!SW4M SFU1W1AM S?U1W1B1 -SFU25W4M -SFU2W1A"

                  -SFU2W!!M            SIV:W111

5. 1.90E-06 SLC0HDFA SPFNIS!R

6. 1.90E-01 SLC0HERA SPFISCSF. SPFISOEI

7. 1.44E-06 -SPUISW4M SPU25W4M SPUSW:MF E. 1.44E-06 SPU!EW4M -SFU25W4M SPUSWCMF

9. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU2W1AM

10. 1.00E-06 SPUPA!hl SPU!W1AM

11. E.00E-07 ,S:USTRTI SPU2W1AF

12. 8.00E-07 SFUSTRTI SPU1W1AF

13. 6.80E-07 EBSEM2HF -SPU1W1AM SPU1Wi!M -SFU:W1AM SPU2WIS"

14. 6.80E-07 EBSEM1HF -SPU1W:AM SPU1W1EM -SFU2W1AM SFU2W15M

15. 6.50E-07 EISEM1HF -SPU1W!AM -5PU!W1EM SPU:WIAM S?u2W1SM

16. 6.80E-07 EBSEM2HF SPU1W1AM -SPU1W1BM -SP;'2W:AM SFU2W:BM

17. 6.50E-07 EBSEM1HF -SPU1W1AM SPU1W1EM SFU:k1AM -SP'J2h15M

19. 6.80E-07 ESSEM2Hr SPU1W1AM SPU:W:BM -SFU2W AM -SFU2n1BM

19. 3.24E-07 SLC0HERA SMV2!!AD SPUlW1AM -S:U1W!EM SFU:W!AM -EPU:W1EM SIV2W11I

20. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDFA SN!!!BD SF'jlW1AM -SPU W1EM SFU2W14M -S~U:Wi!".

SIV:kil! 21, 3.24E-07 SLCHDRA !*V215AD -SFC:W!AM SFUWISM SPU:W:A" -SPU:W !' ' SIV2W:11

22. 3.24E-07 SLC0H:RA S;1V115B: -SPU W1AM S?U1WISM SPJ2W1A'. -SFU:Wi!M ~

SIV2Wi!!

23. 3.24E-07 S.C0h:RA SMVW217D -SPU WIA9 SFU1W1BM SF.l2W:AM -EPU:W1EM SIV2W;1I

 - 24, 3.24E-07 SLC0 HORA              SN215AD       -5:U W1AM           SPU1W1BM      -SFU:h:AM          $~ '.':W 15 ".

SIVISW41

25. 3.24E-07 SLC0H;RA SMV!15ED -SFU!WIAM SFU1W125 -SPU:h1AM SPL:W !M SIVISW4I

26. 3.24E-07 SLC0H RA SMW11SD -S?uW1AM SPU1W1EM -SF'.':W:AM S U241P SIVISW4I

27. 3.24E-07 SLC0H RA 5"W1170 -SPU:W1AM SFUiW1EM -SFU:W:AM SFC:h1EM SIVISW4I

22. 3.24E-07 SL: HERA SW.2150 SFU:WIAM SPU1W1EM -S:U:W14M -EPL':W1E" i SI72Will

29. 3.24E 07 SLCCHt:A S*111:50 SFU1414M SFJ1W1E* -SP2:W:A" -S:L:W:!P SIV: Wilt

30. 3.24E-07 SLCCHD~A SMVW:183 SPU1d!AM SPU1W1EM -SFU2W1AM -SPU:W:P SIV:W1:I

   !!. 3.24E-07 SL:0WDFA               SMW117D         SFU1W:AM          SFU1W1EM      -SFU2W1AM         -S~U:k:E" SIV:W:11

30. !.24E-07 SLC0 HORA SMV215AD -SFUWIAM -SFU1WIP, SFU:W!AM SFUWi!M SIV!SWAI

33. 3.24E-07 SLC3 HORA SMV11:53 -SFU1W1AM -SPUlWIP, SFU2W:AM S:L:W:P.

SIV!SW41 REFORT Nc. 03-1253-1077 REVISION 0 'ASEF-!(

34. 3.24E-07 SLC0HDRA SMV215AD -SPU1W1AM SPU1W1!M SPU:W1A9 -SDU2W1EM SIV!SW41

35. 3.24E-07 SLC0HERA SMV115!D -SPU!W1AM SFU1W1EM SFU2W1AM -- -SFU:s1EM SIVISW41

36. 2.40E-07 SLCCHDRA SMV21:AD SFUSWCMF

37. 2.40E-07 SLC0H:RA. SMV11:5D SPUSW:MF

   ;8. 2.40E-07 SMVW217D                   SPUSWCMF

39. 2.40E-07 SLC0HDRA SMVW11BD SPUSWCMF

40. 2.40E-07 SMVW1170 SPUSWCMF 41, 2.00E-07 SLC0HDRA SPUSTRTI SIVISW40

42. 1.94E-07 -SPUISW4M -SPU1WIAM SPU1W1BM SPU:SX4M SFU2W1AF -ScV2WIAM SPU2W1EM

43. 1.94E-07 -SPUISW4M -SPU1WIAM SPU1W1SF -SPU1W13M SPU:!W1.M SPU:WIAM SPU2W1EM .

44, 1.94E-07 -SFCISW4M -SPU1WIAM SPu!W12M SPU:SW4M SPU2W1AM SFU:W15F

                     -SPU2W1BM

45. 1.94E-07 SFU!SW4M SPU!W1AF -SPU1W1AM SPU1W!BM -SFU25W4M -SPU2b!A9 SPU2W1BM

46. 1.94E-07 SPUISW4M SPU1W1AM SPU1W1BF -SFU1W1BM -SFU:SW4M -EPU:E!AM SPUW1BM

47. 1.94E-07 SPUISW4M SPU1W1AM SFU1W!BM -SPU2SW4M -SPU:W1AM SFU2W1EF

                                                      ~
                     -SFU2W12M

43. 1.65E-07 EBSEM2HF SPUSTRTI

49. 1.6EE-07 EBSEM1HF SPUSTRTI

50. B.91E-08 SLCCFDRA SMV215,AD SFU!W1AM -SPu1W1EM SPU2W1AM SFU2W1EA

                     -SFU:W1EM I

i FEF:RT No. 0!-1250-10:7 REVISIC% 0 FAGE F-!!

       ,.       ,          . - - - - , - -  -                      , - - - - - , - - , - , - , ,              -         -          -m           e,-     --

CASE B - SW SYSTEM, CNE HEACER OFERATION, 168 HR, 1 PUMP MAINT AT A TIME TGP FIFTY CUTSETS

1. 8.00E-06 SLCCCRA SFUSTRTI StilSW4I

2. 1.90E-06 SLC0HDRA SFPNISPR

3. 1.90E-06 SLC0HDRA SPFISCBR SFP!S0!!

4. 1.4*E-06 -SF' J1SW4M SC' :J SW4M SPUSWCMF

5. 1.44E-06 SPUISW4M -SPU25W4M SFUSWCMF

6. 1.'00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU2W!AM

7. 1.00E-06 SPUMAINI SPU1W1AM

9. 8.00E-07 SPUSTRTI SFU2W:AF

9. 8.00E-07 SPUSTRTI SPU1W1AF j 10. 2.40E-07 SLC3 ERA SMV215AD SFUSW:MF

11. 2.40E-07 SLCCMRA SMV115BD SPUSEMF

12. 2.40E-07 SMVW217D SPUSWCMF

13. 2.40E-07 SLC0HERA SMiW118D SPUSWCMF

14. 2.40E-07 SMVW117D SPUSWCMF

    !$.      2.00E-07 SLCCHDRA                 SPUSTRTI        SIVISW4D 16,      1.6SE-07 EBSEM2HF                 SPUSTR'I

17. 1.6BE-07 EBSEM1HF SPUSTRTI

15. 7.60E-08 S!S3VLEF SLC0HDRA SFFISCER

19. 6.99E-08 SLC0HDRA SPU1SW4M -SPU W1AM SPU1W12M -SPU25W8M -SFU2W1M

                         -SFU2W1EM             SIVIEW41         SIV2W111

20. 4.60E-08 SFUSTRTI SPUSEMF

21. 2.64E-08 SPU25W4A SPUSCM:

22. 2.64E-08 SPU!SW4A SPUSWCMF

23. 2.45E-08 EBSEM2hF SLCCERA -SFU1W:AM S;U1W:BM -SFU:W1AM -SFU:k1EM SIV2W11I

24. 2.45E-08 ESSEM1HF SLCCHERA -SFU1W!AM SDU1W1EM -SFU:W1 AM. -SFU:WSM SIV h111

25. 2.45E-05 EBSEM HF SLC0KRA -SCU!W1AM -SFU1W1PM -SFL2W1AM 580:WSM SIVISW41

26. 2.45E-02 ESSEM:HF SLCCHERA -SPU1W1AM SPUlkiEM -SPU2"!AM -SFU:W1EM SIVISW41

27. ".45E-02 EBSEM1HF SLC0H:RA -SFU1W1M -SFu!W15M SPUN:M -!FU:Wi!" w SIV:W111

9. 2.45E-08 ESSEM2HF S.CCORA 58U1W1M -S?U1W12M s -S UIW1AM -ScU:Wi!M SIV2W111 ,

                                              -SCU;$W4M       -SPU1W!M             SPL1W194                 -!PU1W1E"       Seg;gg;w

29. 1.92E-0S SLC0htRA SFU2W1AM -3:U:W125 SIV:Will

10. 1.92E-;S SLC3HDRA SFU1SW4M. SFU1W:AM SFU;W!!A -SFU:h:2M -5:CS4D

                          -SF;':W1AM          -SPU2W1EM          SIV2W111
       !!-    1.92I-08 SLC0htRA                 SFU1SW4M      -SPU1W1AM            SOU;W12A                 -SFU:h!!M     -5:U:5.P
                          -SFU:W1AM              CoJ:W15M        SIVISW41

72. 1.9"E-09 S.C0HtoA SPUISW8R -SFJW1M Sr.' W:IM -SeU Es19 -55fW M S:U:W:fA -SFC:W:E" SIVISW41

       !3. 1.!!E-08 SCM41RSF                  SPUSTRi!        SPU2W!AF

4. 1.3:E-05 SCMAIRSF SPUS!RTI SFJiWiA:

35. 1.17E-06 SLC EFA SMV2:5AD -SFU1W1AP !?U1W:!M -SFrW14M -SF L ; P SIJ1SW41 51V2W11I

36. 1.17E-0S ELCOMRA SMV!!!BD -SFU1W:M SF'.1W1BM -SDU:W1AM -SF'4h;P SIV!Sh41 SIV2 111

37. 1.17E-03 SL:0H!# SSWi1S -SPU1W!AM !*U1WIP -S:L:n:A" -!:Zh:P SIV;SW41 Sh'2W1:1

- REF N u. 03-1:50-1097 RIVISIC) 1 FA!! F-:: , B

 - - - ,      ,               n--                 -
                                                                      -,_a -e  ,           m , , - - - -

i

35. 1.17E-09 SLC0F. RA SMVWil7D -SPU1W1AM SPU1W1BM -SFU:W1AM -SFUIW1PM SIV!SW4I SIVIW111

39. 1.17E-08 SL 0HERA SMV215AD -SPU1W1AM -SPL1W15.1 SFU2W1AM ~~ -SFL2W15M SIV!SW4I CIV2W11I i

40. 1.17E-08 SLC0HDRA SMi'11550 -SPU1W!AM -SPU:W1BM SPU2W1AM -SPU:W!!M

;                                                SIV!SW41   SIV2W!!!

l

41. 9.60E-09 SOU:SW4F SPUSW:MF

42. 9.60E-09 SPUISW4F SPUSWCMF

43. 6.97E-09 SLC]HDRA -SPUISW4M -SFU1W1AM SPU1W15M SPU25W49 SP":W1;"

                                                -SPU:W1AM -5:UIW1EM                                        SIV2W111 44    6.99E-09 SLCCHDRA                      -SFU!SW49                                      -S?U1W1AM       SPU1W1BF             -SFL!W1BM        SFU25Wa" SPU2W1AM -SPUW1EM                                         SIV2W111

45. 6.99E-09 SL 0FIRA SPUISW4M -SPU1h!AM SFU1W1EF -SPU1W!!M -SFU2?W4?.

                                                -SPU:W1AM   SPU2W1EM                                       SIVISW41

44. _6.99E-09 SLC0HERA SPU!SW4P. -SPU1W1AM SPU1W1BM -SFU25W4M -SFU:d!AM SPU2W1BF -SFU2W1BM SIV!SW4I

47. 6.99E-09 SLC0HDRA SPUISW4M SPu!W!AF -SFU1W1AM SFU1W1EP -SP' J:SW4M

                                                -5 U2W1AM -SPU"Wi!M                                        SIV2W11I

45. 6.99E-09 SL"0HERA SPUISW4M SPU1W1AM SPU1W1EF -S?U1W1EM -SFL':SW4M.

                                                -SPU2W1AM -SFU2W1BM                                        SIV:Will

49. 6.74E-09 EBSEM2HF -SPU1W1AM SPU1W1BA -SPU!W1BM -$PU24!AM SP'IW1EM i 50. 6.74E-09 ESSEM2HF -SPU1WIAM SPU1W1!M -SFU:W1AM SFU:W15A -SPU:W1EM l

d i I I l i REF0;T N:. 0!-!!!0-10"7 #EVI!!:N1 FAGEF-:: I _ . _ _ __ __ _ _ , _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ . . _ , , . ~ _ .

Enclosure 3 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE NORTH ANNA UNIT 1 c.

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 S" LICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.1 At least two service water loops (shared with Unit 2) shall be OPERABLE. APPLICAEILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 ACTION:

a. With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STAN0BY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours,

b. The allowable time that one of the two service water loops can be inoperable as specified in Action Statement a. may be extended beyond 72 hours up to 168 hours provided 3 out of 4 service water pumps and 1 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps have been operable since initial entry into the action statement and remain operable during the extended action statement.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.7.4.1 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position,

b. At least once per 6 months by measurement of the movement of the pumphouse and wing walls,

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on a safety injection signal.

2. Verifying that each containment isolation valve actuates to its correct position on a containment high-high signal.

3/4 7-18 NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1

9 Enclosure 4 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE . NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 l

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.1 At least two service water loops (shared with Unit 1) shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION:

a. With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. The allowable time that one of the two service water loops can be inoperable as specified in Action Statement a. may be extended beyond 72 hours up to 168 hours provided 3 out of 4 service water pumps and 1 out of 2 auxiliary service water pumps have been operable since initial entry into the action statement and remain operable during the extended action statement.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.1 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position,

b. At least once per 6 months by measurement of the movement of the pumphouse and wing walls.

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

i l

1. Verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on l a safety injection signal.

2. Verifying that each containment isolation valve l actuates to its correct position on a containment high-high signal.

1 3/4 7-15 NORTH ANNA - UNIT 2 __ , _ - . -. - -. _. _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ - _ _ _ - -}}

ML20112J587

Text

1.0 INTRODUCTION

6.0 CONCLUSION

7.0 REFERENCES

3.3 DESCRIPTION

6.1 CONCLUSION

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