ML20112H352
| ML20112H352 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 01/10/1985 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20112H337 | List: |
| References | |
| JPN-85-01, JPN-85-1, NUDOCS 8501170093 | |
| Download: ML20112H352 (5) | |
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.e Attachment I Proposed Technical Specification Changes Related to Refuel Interlocks and Control Rod Blocks Safety Evaluation New York Power Authority i
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Pla.it Docket No. 50-333 dated January 10, 1985, JPN 85-01 i
I G501170093 850110 PDR ADOCK 05000333 PDR
o I.
Description of the Proposed Chances The proposed changes to the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications relate to reactor protection system operability, refuel interlocks and control rod blocks.
The refuel interlocks are listed in Table I of this letter.
Specifically, the following changes are being proposed:
On pages 41, 41a, 41b and 42 in the column heading under
" Refuel", add "(16)".
On page 43a add the following note:
"16.
When all rods are full-in and electrically l
disarmed, the reactor protection system need not be l
operable."
f On page 227, amend the end of Section 3.10.A.1 to read "3 lO.A.2. 3.lO.A.8, 3.10.D. and 3.10.E."
On page 230 add Section 3.10.A.8:
" Refuel interlocks and rod blocks associated with one rod permissive need not be operable if all rods are fully inserted and electrically disarmed."
Section 3.10.B.1 is moved from page 230 to a new page 230a.
II.
Purpose of the Proposed Chances The proposed changes are necessary to allow refueling while the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is inoperable during installation of Analog Trip Transmitter System components.
Present Technical Specifications would prevent refueling while RPS is inoperable.
Approval of these changes will avoid a potential delay of 20 days in completion of the 1985 refuel outage.
III.
Impact of the Proposed Chances The Reactor Protection System limits the uncontroll2d release of radioactive material from the fuel and the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary by terminating excessive temperature and pressure increases through the initiation of an automatic scram.
The purpose of the control rod blocks and refueling interlocks, aa described in Reference 1, Sections 7.6 and 7.7, is to prevent inadvertent criticality by restricting the movement of control rods.
In addition, refueling is prevented when rods are not all inserted.
The proposed changes would electrically disarm the control rods when they are fully inserted, thus interlocks would not be required.
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V An " electrically disarmed control rod" is defined in the Technical Specifications on page 6.
"To disarm a rod drive electrically, the four amphenol type plug connectors are removed from the drive insert and withdrawal solenoids rendering the rod incapable of withdrawal.
This procedure is equivalent to valving out the drive and is preferred.
Electrical disarming does not eliminate position indication."
The proposed amendments would not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Since the reactor would be in cold shutdown, the only design basis accidents that could possibly occur, and, therefore, need to be considered are: a rod drop accident, a fuel assembly drop accident in the spent fuel pool, and a refueling accident in which a fuel assembly drops on the core during refueling.
The proposed amendments would not increase the probability of fuel assembly drops.
In the unlikely event that one occurs, neither the reactor protection system not the control rod blocks and refueling interlocks could, or are designed to, prevent or mitigate the consequences.
A rod drop accident, which is described in Section 14.6.1.2 of Reference 2, is not considered credible since it cannot occur in the absence of rod withdrawal.
Rod motion is physically prevented by electrically disarming all rods as described above.
In addition, procedures and administrative controls which meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B will be used to assure that the rods are electrically disarmed.
(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since a rod drop is the only event that could be associated with these changes. 'As stated above, the control rod drop accident is not considered credible.
(3)-Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety since the proposed changes apply only when all rods are full-in and electrically disarmed.
In addition, the nuclear characteristics of the core assure that the reactor would remain subcritical even if the highest worth control rod were fully withdrawn.
IV.
_InDiementation of the Changes Implementation of the changes, as proposed, will not impact the' fire protection program at FitzPatrick, nor will the changes impact the environment.
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V.
Conclusion The incorporation of these changes: a) will not change the probability nor the consequences of an accident or salfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report; b) will not increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report; c) will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specifications; d) does not constitute an unreviewed safety question: and e) involves no significant hazard considerations, as defined in 10 CFR ei 50.92.
VI.
References 1.
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
2.
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Rev.
- 1. July 1983 Sections 7.6, 7.7, and 14.6.
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r TABLE I Refuelino Interlocks Conditions Interlock Mode switch in startup and service platform hoist loaded Rod Block Mode switch in startup and refuel platform over core Rod Block Mode switch in refuel and second rod selected Rod Block Mode switch in refuel and grapple not full up with refuel platform near core Rod Block Mode switch in refuel with refuel platform Rod Block near or over core Mode switch in refuel with service platform hoist loaded Rod Block Not all rods in and grapple not full up Platform Not all rods in and refuel platform hoist loaded cannot Mode switch in refuel and more than 1 rod out move Mode switch in startup toward or over Core Not all rods in and service platform hoist loaded Block service platform hoist power Not all rods in with refuel platform over core Block grapple pcuer Not all rods in with refuel platform over core and Block frame hoist loaded frame hoist power Not all rods in with refuel platform over core and Block trolley hoist loaded trolley hoist power 1
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