ML20112G322
| ML20112G322 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1984 |
| From: | Felton J NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| To: | Garde B GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20112G325 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-84-23 NUDOCS 8501160300 | |
| Download: ML20112G322 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES b
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
WASHINGTON,0. C. 20555
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Docket Nos. 50-329/330 M 0 4 94 Ms. Billie Pirner Garde Government Accountability Project Institute for Policy Studies 1901 Que Street, NW IN RESPONSE REFER Washington, DC 20009 TO F01A-84-23
Dear Ms. Garde:
This is in further response to your letter dated January 9,1984, in which you requested, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, documents related to Enforcement Notice 83-69 regarding the Midland Nuclear Power Plant.
The documents listed on Appendix A are being placed in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC.
You may obtain access to these documents by presenting a copy of this letter or by requesting folder F0IA-84-23 in your name.
The review of additional documents subject to your request is ongoing.
As soon as our review is completed, we will be in touch with you.
Sincerely,
. M.
elton, Director i
Division of Rules and Records Office of Administration
Enclosure:
Appendix A l
l l
l 8501160300 840504 PDR FOIA GARDE 84-23
- PDR,
R2:
APPENDIX A 1.
10/6/83 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT - Richard C. DeYoung, Director, DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 - Accession No. PDR/AD0CK/50-329A - 8310200386 (23 pages) 4 2.
6/13/83 Letter to The Honorable Chairman N. Palladino et. al. from B. P. Garde re: PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY (24 pages) 3.
11/26/83. Letter to R. C. DeYoung from B. P. Garde re: CONCERNS REGARDING OCTOBER 25, 1983, MEETING (2 pages) 4.
8/11/83 MEETING WITH INTERVEN0RS AND GAP by J. J. Harrison (11 pages) e 4
i e
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- GOVERi54ENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT Instiiute for Policy Studies 1901 Que Street. N.W., Woshington D.C. 20009 (202)234 9382 November 26, 1983 Mr. Richard C. DeYoung Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. James G. Keppler Administrator, Region III Inspection and Enforcement 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Gentlemen:
Some weeks ago I received a copy of a Memorandunn for Region III files regarding a closed meeting held October 25, 1983, in Bethesda, with Mr. J. Selby, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Mr.
S'. Howell, Executive Vice-President of Consumer
-Power Company (CPC).
The brief memo raises a number of significant questions which I have listed below.
^
Some of these questions I have already expressed to members of the Region III Office of Spacial Cases, Midland Team.
I would appreciate a response from you as soon as possible to these concerns.
Ctncerns Regarding October 25, 1983, Meeting 1.
The independent management audit discussed at the meeting has, presumably, been left in the hands of CPC.
GAP is concerned that, like the Stone and Webster nomination for the Q.A. soils work, the CPC nomination and the scope of the audit will be a fait accompli.
The independence criteria (SECY 82-1003) adopted by the NRC at Diablo Canyon for situations such as this.. requires public comment be included after the nomination of several companies.
Further, since the sug-gestion was generated by the GAP petition filed June 14, 1983, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206, it seems minimally reasonable that public comment be permitted abdut the scope of the ' management audit.
It is appropriate to note that the NRC position on the case of Midland's problems remains one of bewilderment; see Wall Street Journal article of October 28, 1983, regarding Midland.
This has been Region III's response to the cause of Midland's problems since May, 1982.
In light of the NRC's lack of insight and the obvious criticality of pin-pointing the cause of a decade of quality assurance breakdowns and unprecedented construc-tion foul-ups, we renew the request for the NRC approval-phase of CPC's management audit to be conducted with regard for the requirements of SECY 82-1003.
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4 Mr. Richard C. DeYoung November 26, 1983
[
Mr. James G. Keppler 2.
The memorandum also makes reference to a " plan of action" which was being pre-pared for submittal to the NRC.
Please explain what this " plan of action" is, and the purpose which it is to serve.
l l
I le k forward to your earliest possible response.
Sincerely, h*w k
Billie Pirner Garde Citizens Clinic Director BPG:me cc:
Distribution List
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ow MEETING WITH INTERVENORS AND GAP BY J. J. HARRISON AUGUST 11, 1983 b
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CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION PROGRAM -CCP BASIS:
HISTORY OF QA PROBLEMS LACK OF EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING INSPECTION LICENSEE ALSO FINDS PROBLEMS SIMILAR TO DGB IN OTHER PARTS OF PLANT ACTION REQUIRED BY NRC:
BACKWARD LOOK; AS-BUILT VERSUS DESIGN FORWARD LOOK; PUT IN PLACE MEASURES TO PROPERLY COMPLETE PLANT
's LICENSEE RESPONSE PROPOSED CCP 4
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HISTORICAL PROBLEMS I
1973 CADWELDS 1976 REBAR 1977 TENDON INSTALLATION BULGE IN CONTAINMENT LINER 1978 S0ILS SETTLEMENT 1979 HVAC REACTOR ANCHOR STUDS PIPE SUPPORTS AND' HANGERS 1981 ELECTRIC CABLE ROUTING 1982 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING INSPECTION t
.QC INSPECTIONS (QC SUPERVISORS INSTRUCTING QC INSPECTORS TO SUSPEND INSPECTIONS OF EXCESSIVE DEFICIENCIES WERE FOUND)
BREAKDOWN IN QA DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DRAWINGS AND AS-BUILT CONDITIONS OF PLANT DESIGN DOCUMENT CONTROL PROBLEMS DESIGN CONTROL PROBLEMS CONTROL PANEL TERMINATION PROBLEMS ELECTRICAL CABLE SEPARATION PROBLEMS CONTROL OF WELDING PREHEAT TEMP CONTROL OF NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS l #
i 9
CCP PREREQUISITIES:
P 1..
100% REINSPECTION OF THE PLANT
.ESTABLIS' MENT OF NRC HOLD POINTS 2.
H 3.
QA/QC RE0RGANIZATION 4.
TRAINING AND RECERTIFICATION OF QC INSPECTORS 5.
GENERAL TRAINING OF FIELD ENGINEERS / CRAFT 6.
REVISE PQCI's 7.
CCP TEAM TRAINING 8.
CCP APPROVAL 9.
THIRD PARTY APPROVAL b
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CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION PROGRAM SCHEMATIC
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PHASE 1 i
PHASE 2 SECTION PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION i PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION l
Preparation l
2 of th's plant l
l QA/QC l
3 reorganization l
l Phase 2 Phase 1 t
4 Planning Planning i
Management' NRC Verification Hold.
of completed i
s Revyew -
Point inspections Evaluation NRC Systems l
5 and Hold' compL l
f8VI8W Point work Management NRC Installation Hold and a
n Review Point inspect, ion i
status k
4 l
6 Quality Program Review t
7 Third party reviews - Hold points / Audits throughout program l
i
.8 System Lgy Up 9
Continuing work activities 10 Program Revision - NRC approval reqbired i
CCP SCOPE:
ALL SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS INCLUDED EXCEPT:
NSSS INSTALLATION WORK BY B&W HVAC INSTALLATION WORK BY ZACK POST SYSTEM TURNOVER WORK PIPE HANGER AND CABLE REINSPECTIONS REMEDIAL S0ILS WORK DESIGN ENGINEERING SYSTEM LAY-UP s
4 4
O e
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NRC' HOLD POINTS:
TRAINING /RECERTIFICATION OF QC INSPECTORS
- CCP TEAM TRAINING PRIOR TO INITIATION OF PHASE I ACTIVITY PRIOR TO INITIATION OF PHASE II ACTIVITY OTHER-APPROVAL OF THIRD PARTY APPROVAL 0F CCP APPROVAL OF HVAC ZACK WELDING PROCEDURE
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THIRD PARTY OVERVIEW:
STONE AND WEBSTER PROPOSED INDEPENDENCE AND COMPETENCY CONSTRUCTION IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW (CIO)
PROGRAM PROCEDURES CHECKLIST SCOPE:
CCP ACTIVITIES PRE-PHASE I TRAINING MANAGEMENT REVIEWS PHASE I VERIFICATION 1
STATUS PHASE II NEW WORK REWORK ADDITIONAL SCOPE (0UTSIDE CCP):
NSSS - B&W ACTIVITIES HVAC - ZACK ACTIVITIES SPATIAL SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS PROGRAM REMEDIAL S0ILS/ UNDERPINNING - SEPARATE S&W PROJECT 4
MONTHLY MEETING FOR THIRD PARTY UPDATE - OPEN TO PUBLIC FOR OBSERVATION CCP OVERVIEW REMEDIAL S0ILS OVERVIEW a
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GAP 2.206 REQUEST (1)
MODIFY CONSTRUCTION PERMIT INCLUDE MANDATORY HOLD POINTS (2)
REQUIRE A MANAGEMENT AUDIT (3)
REJECT THE CCP REJECT STONE a WEBSTER AS THE THIRD PARTY (4)
REMOVE QA/QC FUNCTION FROM.MPQAD (CPCo)
INDEPENDENT TEAM REPORTING TO NRC/CPCo MANAGEMENT SIMULTANE0USLY (5)
INCREASE NRC STAFFING FOR MIDLAND t
j (6)
REQUIRE DETAILED REVIEW OF S0ll SETTLEMENT RESOLUTION; DGB i
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CONCLUSIONS MIDLAND HAS EXPERIENCED REPEATED QA PROBLEMS LICENSEE HAS TAKEN ACTIONS TO RESOLVE THESE QA PROBLEMS AS THEY OCCURRED, ACTIONS OVERALL WERE INEFFECTIVE AFTER SOME NECESS RY CHANGES, Tile CCP WITH THIRD PARTY OVERVIEW AND NRC INSPECTION SHOULD IDENTIFY QUALITY PROBLEMS IN EXISTING CONSTRUCTION AND PROVIDE QUALITY IN NEW CONSTRUCTION AND ANY NECESSARY REWORK 0
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OTHER THIRD PARTY TERA CORPORATION IDCVP FOR THREE SYSTEMS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER D.G. STANDBY ELECTRIC POWER CONTROL ROOM HVAC QA STUDY - FORD AMENDMENT - PROPOSED 1
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.',0%RNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 1
IdsU:uof 5PolicyStudi s
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-j 903 Ou? 532 t..NN/.. Woshington. D.C. 20009 (202)234-9362 c?
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'WrM'4 I
w.p June 13,'1933' Honorable Chairman Nunzio Palladino Honorable Victor Gilinsky Honorable John Ahearne Honorable James Asseltine i
Honorable Thomas Roberts I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission' Was hington, D. C.
20555
Dear Commissioners:
On behalf cf the Lone Tree Council, concerned citizens of centra,1 Michigan, and numerous nuclear workers on the Midland Nuclear Power Plant site,the Government Ace'ountability Project (GAP) through its' Citi: ens Clinic requests that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) take immediate action to protect the future public health and
-r safety of central Michigan residents through the following actient.:
l (1)
Mo[ify the Construction Permit (Midland Nuclear Power Flar.t, Units 1 ar.d 2) to include mandatory "hcid poin s" on the balance-of-plant (507) york and incorporate the current Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ( ASLB or Board) ordered " hold points" on the soils remedial work into the Midland construction permit.
(2)
Reguire a management audit of Consumers-Power Company (CPCo) by an independent, competent management auditing firm that I
will determine the causes of the management failures that have resulted in the soils settlement disaster and the recently dis-
-covered Quality Assurance breakdown.
il ---
(3)
Reject t he Con struction Compl etion Pl an--(CC?). as cu erantly..
proposed, including a rejection of Stone and Webster to conduct l
^_conpetent, and credible thrid party auditor should be selected with
~the third party audit of the plant.
Instead a truly independent, i
l public participation in the process.
(4)
Remove the Quality As su rance/Quattty. Cottro.1 lanction fr;n the.
l Midland Project C:uality As su ranc e Department (MPQAD) and replace them with an i nd e pe nd e mt t e+m -ef QA/qc.p ers~onrel that. he port s simultaneously te the NRC and CPCo management.
(5 )
Increase the assignment of NRC personnel to include additional technical and inspection, personnel as requested by the Midland Section of the Office of Special Cases (CSC); and, (6)
Require a detailed review of the soils settiament resolution a s outline d -ir*t he Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, incorpcrating a technical analysis of the implemer.taion of the underpinnin9 projact at the cur. rent stage of completion.
~6/14..To EDO for Dtreet Reply... :Sttspense: June 28.....Cpys to : Chm, Cmrs PE,GC,RF Docket...(2.205 petition)... 83-1945 o-i
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- tC'Cc=missioners June 13,1983-
. I.
EACKGROUND The Government Acccuntability Project'is a project of..thm.Instttute
'for Policy Studi es. Was hington.. D.C.
The purpose of GAP's Citizens 4.
and Legal clinics are to bro,aden the understanding of the vital role of the public employee, corporate employee, and private citizen in preventing waste, corruption or health and safety concerns.
GAP also offers legal and strategic counsel to whi:tleblowers, provides a unique legal education for law student interns and public policy students, brings meaningful and significant reform to the government workplace, and exposes government actions that are repressive, wasteful or il.1.. gal, or that pose a threat to the e
1 health and safety, of the American public.
Pr.esently, GAP provides a program of multi-level assistance for government employees, corporate emp1.oyees, ind private citizens who report illegal, wasteful or improper actions.
G AP also regularly
=eniters governmental reforms, offers expertise to Executive Branch I
offices and agencies, and state and local governmental bodies, and.
,7responds to requests by Congress and state legislatures for analysis of legislation' to make government more accountable to the public.
In Mar'ch 1982 GAP's Citizen Clinic becact actively involved with the Midland Nuclsar Power Plant.
The Lone Tree Council had requested GAP to pursue allegations from workers of major problems at the Midland plant.
After cur preliminary investigation, we i
compiled six af fidavits which we filed with the NRC on June 29, 1982.
Since that time.we have filed five additional af fidavits.
We are alse prepa' ring an expanded affidavit of one of our original witnesses, Mr. E. Earl Kent, concerning welding construction problems at the Midland site and four additional affidavits from current and former workers.
Other alarming ' allegations continue to come to our attention from a large number of current workers who believe that reprisals and harassment will follow any rcrelation; of construction problems to either their own management or the NRC.
As a result of the intense " chilling effect" on the Midland site GAP is re evaluating 1
tur normal investigation process in an attempt to determine a possible solution to the problem.
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t Since the fall of 1982 GAP has also been active in-the evaluation of Consumer Power Compa y's proposals for a. number of audits requested or requGe7 b t hMRC' f ri a'n attempt -to drturmine and establish the quality of t.he work, the implementation ~of the Quality Assurance / Quality Control plan for the soils remedial work, and an independent design and construction verification ( IDCV')
of three plant systems.
GAP has submitted several analysis lotters which revealed substanial weaknesses in the programs, inade-quate information to judge program adequacy, and basic lack of
._... independence,_qigthe proposed nain independent review contractors.
In late November the NRC Region III OSC's Hidland Section completed an extensive inspection of the hardware and materials in the nuclear plants' dies'el gen'erato'r building.
This inspection subsequently 1ed to a $120,,000.00 f,ine agains,t,CPCo for a quality assurance
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,NRC,Comm'issioners June 13, '1983 a
,br'eakdown.
T5e inspection of the DGB building revealed an extensive
. backlog of quality assurance / quality control documentation, inability to provide materials traceability, unqualified and/or uncerti.fied
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weldens, and en In-Process Inspection Notification (IPIN)'sy' stem that turned non-conforming items back to contruction instead of documenting quality failures on the appropriate Non-Confor'mance Reports (NCR).
In spite of the major revelations of inadequa,te construction practices the NRC Staff permitted the critical soils remedial work to begin in mid-December.
It is GAP's position, well known to the Staff, that this premature approval violates the June 1982 request of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards ( ACRS) to Chairman Palla:dino.
GAP also believes that the NRC approval to commence the irreversible soils underpinning work makes a mockery out of the' At6mic Safety and Licensing Board ( ASLB) hearings current 1y' in progress to dete~rm'ine whether or not the soils work should be allowed to continue.
Since February 1983 GAP has continued its attempt to determine the qseriousness of the situation and the adequacy of the proposed solutions f o r t h e M i dl a n d pl a.n t.
Our efforts at working with the administration of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement have been frustrating.
For ex ampl e, although NRC letters and public presentations were informative, they failed to provide the key methodology necessary to assess the adequacy of the proposed third-party program.
When GAP investigators attempted to pursue the questions at the public meeting, they were told to " allow the NRC time to ask for those documents."
(NRC Public Meeting, Bethesda, Maryland, November 5,1981.)
Subsequently, GAP repeated the request in its November 11, 1982 letter.
Over two-and-one-half months after the original request, G AP finally received the NRC's response:
"You may wish to request access to the documents f rom Consumers Power." ( D e c em b e r.1_4, 1932 let.ter from James G.
Keppler to Billie P. Garde.)
Ou r 'r e qu e s t t o C P Co 'wa's, o f course, turned down.
Ou r Febru ary 8, 1983 analysis of the proposed Construction Completion
'. Program (CCP) requested a number of considerations by the NRC, i n c l u d i n g t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e co n s t ruc t i o n _p e rn i t _ t o m.a.1,n t a i n susupension of all safety-related work until the entfre third-party
r o v i e w p r o g r am-- i n c l u d i n g t he t h i r d - p a rt y. ; A1. e c tj o.n, _tcap e, a n d methodolo gy -- was a pproved and incorporated into the construction pe rm i t.
Ou r Ma rc h 7v 1963 Letter to4 he JLE rais ed further. questions about the CCP general *y, and particularly about the " closed-door",
meetings that continued between CPCo and NRC RegionIIIadministration.
In both a March 7,1983 meeting with Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff and IE staff and a March 10, 1983 letter to Mr. James Keppler we asked for an immediate response to allegations that we had received about negotiations over the details and acceptability of the CCP.
--Mr.
Keppler's-essponse confirmed the fears of our internal sources.
He stated that the NRC did not plan to hold a public meeting to hear comments on the independent third-party proposed by CPCo for the CCP overview, nor did,they plan to review the methodology or the scope of the third-party review unle'ss it was necessary.
(March 28, 1983 and April 5 1983 letters from Mrc James G.
Xeppler to Billie Garde.)
NRC. C'oc=i s s i on ers June 13,1983 q
,Since that time the NRC Staff and Mr. Kepp'ler himself have testified before the ASLB in Midland, Michigan.
His staff has gone on record.
with a' deep distrust of CPCo as. well as a la.ek, of. con.fidence.:in their ability to adbquately build a. nuclear power plant.
Construction problems continue to surface, even with the safety-related/mmrk remaining halted.
As recently as May 24, 1983 Mr. Thomas Novack, Assistant Director for Licensing notified the ASLB of a VIOLATION OF HOLD TAG DURING REMEDIAL UNDERPINNING CONSTRUCTION. (Exnibit 1)
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The allege d solution to problems stemming fr'om a " poor management attitude" (testimony of Dr. Ross Landsman on April 28,1983. ASLB) to the unknown extent of hardwar.e problems is the CCP.
Yet as late as June 3,1983 CPCo was still submitting eleventh hour edition's of this plan that continue to ignore basic programmatic flaws.
Further, it is clear that the NRC Staff pla.ns to evade or ignore-public requ'ests for the minimum necessary information to complete a res ponsible review of the proposed audit and completion plans.
Our experiences at the William H. Zimmer nuclear power plant in Ohio 4 and at the LaSalle plant in Illinois have led us to be extremely skeptical of the NRC Staff's conclusion about the safety of nuclear
- -er plants under construction.
In those cases the Staff either igncred er missed major QA/QC violations ~at plants 97% and 100%
complete, respectively.- To illustrate, after the Staff virtually ignored GAP anarysis and granted approYal for full power operations at LaSalle, the plant was able to operate for less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before being s hut down due to a hardware breakdown.
At Zim mer, the Staf f-approved Quality Confirmation Plan was so ineffective that on November 12, 1982 the Commission suspended all safety-related construction.
As a result there i; no basis for confidence in an NRC-approved
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'CCP on f aith.
The basis for this extraordinary remedy ~must be fully -
disclosed, as well as the methodology for an inde sendent review.
The modification of the construction' perdit' will ie" t hefi rs t "s t e p 1 h'-
l the right, direction.
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j II.
LEGAL BASIS i
A.
Le;al Recuirements
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The law gives the Commission broad dTsc~re' tron to revote. suspend, or i
modify the construction permit of an NRC licensee.
42 U.S.C.. l2236 states that:
license or contsruction permit may be revoked, suspended or modified in whole or in part, for any material false statement in the application for license or in the supple-cental.or.gther statement of fact required by the applicant; l
or because of conditions revealed by the application for J'
license of statement of fact or any report, record, inspection, or other means whi,ch would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application; or for e
june 13,1983 I t KC 'Co,mmis sioners f ailure to construct or operate a facility in accordance
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with the terms of the construction permit of license tor-...
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the technical specifications in the applicationi'oFfor ~
the violation of or.f ailure to observe any of the_ler.ms; and provisions of this chapter or of any regulation of the Commission.
Part 50. 100 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations states the same criteria for the revocation, sus penrion or modification of a construction permit.
4 The NRC has a mandatory duty to excercise this authority when necessary.
According to the -decision in Natural Resources Defense Council vs. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 528 F.
2a 166(2nd C i r.19 78 ).,
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the NRC is required to dttermine that there will be adequate protection of the health and safety of the issue ' f safety must be resolved before the Commission pu bl i c.
The o
issues a construction permit.
(Porter City Ch. of Izaak Walton League q vs. Atomic Energy Commission, 515 F.
2d 513, 524 (7tn Cir. 1975).)
- 5. Crite ri a to Excercise Discretion Accordin g to 10.C. F.R..g2.202, the NRC "may institute a proceeding to mo di fy, suspend or revoke a license or for such other action as may be proper by serving of the i f censee an~ order to show cause which will: (1) allege the violations with which the licensee is charged, or the potentially haza rdous conditions or other facts deemed to be sufficient ground for the proposed action."
As interpreted by the Proposed Genera 1' Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Action, pu blis he d ig t he Fe de ral. Re gist e r,,4_4 FedReg. 6 675 4,. 0.ct. 7, 198 0 (10 C.F.R. g2.202,2.204), suspending orders can be used to remove a threat to the public health and safety, the. rommon. defease and. security or the enviroment.
More specifically, suspension orders can be
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issded to stop facility construction when further work would preclude zu significantly hinder the identification and correction of an i=prope rly const ructed sa fe'ty-rel ate d system o c. campanent;. ar. i f the licensee's quality assurance program implementation is not adequate
an d e f f e ct i ve t o prov i de co n fi de n ce t hat. coas t rusti on act i v i t i e s.are being prope rly carried out.
Moreover, orders can be issued when the licensee has not re svn de d e4e quetely-to +the r en fo rcMe nt. acti on o r when the licensee interferes with the conduct of an inspection or',
investigation or for any reason not mentioned above for which the license revocation is legally authorized.
In order to help determine the significance of violations within this list, the Commission estabe lished " severity categories" ranging from the most serious structural flaws (Severity I), to minor technicalities (Severity VI),
44 Fed Reg, at 66758-59.
4 C.
Specific Bases for Suspension
' The Commissian cle'arly has both the duty and the discretion to O
4 S
NRC Commissioners June 13,1983
.,modify the Midland Construction P,ermit..
.In Novembe r 1982' 'Mr. Thoma~s Nova'c k~, t he As si st a~nt 'Di re~ctn r fo"r ' '
Licensing issued to Dr. Paul shewmon, the Chairman of the
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Advisory Committee of Rea'ctor Safeguards the "Re port 'onliifTEnd Desien and Construct' ion Problems, Their ' Dis position, and Overall Effectiveness of the Ef fort to Assure Appro priate Quality."
This report covereo Midland's problems from the start of construction through June 30,,1982.
It is* attached as Ex hi bi t 2.
A review of this report indicates that the " Summary and-Conclusions of Overall Effectiveness" is charitable in its observations.
The report contains the following statement:
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Consumers Power has on repeated occasions not reviewed resolu-problems to the depth required for full and timely (2) tendon tien.
Examples are: (1) rebar ommissions (1976);
s heat'h location errors (1977); (3) Diesel Generator Building 7
Settlement (1978); and (4) Zack Company HV AC deficiencies (1930).
In each of these cases the NRC, in its investigation dat armined that the problem was of greater significance than the.first reported or that the problem was more gqneric than i denti fi ed by Cons u'mers Po wer Com pany.
The Region III inspection staff believes problems have kept (1) Over-recurring at Midland for the following) reasons:
t reliance on the architect-engineer. (2 failure to recognize and correct root causes, (3) f ailure to recognize the signi
- ficance of isolated events (4) failure to review isolated events for their generic application, and (5) lack of an
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aggressive quality assurance attitude
ea ch o f th e ex am pl es g i v en a'b'ov[ d emon s t'U Ec's Eo'n:1uslyely
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In f a ct,
that CPCo.has long since lost control of the Midland Project.
Im illustrate, although the Diesel Generator Building settlement is quietly tucked into a list of ex.amples of common construction
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problems at nuclear s i t e s a c ro s s the co u nliy i t' i s f a~r fr om t' hat..
T h e C S E s e t t l e me n t issue starts with a. Matetlal f alse Statement
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(see ACRS Interic Report, at 16-17 ) submitted to the NRC in the' FSAR.
!t c o n t i n u e-s.+s e n e o4. tAa -m o s.t m a t t i v e c o n s1r_u.ct i g n.e x pe r i e. :
cents in the history of construction, '4hether or not it is possible to tunnel undern::th : nuc-lear power plant and build a foundation after-the-fact remain a subject of heated debate.
Another example is contained in an in-depth look at the problems of the Zack Company on the Midland site.
Not only did the
$38,000.00 fine levied in 1980 for CPCo's failure to control a
~ ~ subcontractor-#Dt catch the attention of CPCo it seems to have forced them to extraordinary bumbling.
In April of 1982 the Quality Assurance Su pervisor of the Zack Company came to Consumers Power Company management with solid evidence of a serious QA/QC breakdown on-going in the Iack headquarters.
Not only did CPCo O
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f.
lissioners
-7, June 13, 1983 e serious warnings of the QA/QC superv.isor, Mr. Albbrt hey did not warn two other utilities receiving suspect they did not notify the NRC accord-ing 'to th'e requife5ents
/
. c.F.R. Fart 21, and they revealed the c'onfidentiality of
- rir. Howard who' was subsequently dismissed --with his stiff =from I
the Zack Company.
Since July 1982 'when the Zack employees came to GAP for assistance CPCo has had to lay off unqualified Zack welders, (Exhibit 3), reins pect 100% of the HYAC equipment on the site, and reorganize the Zack QA/QC function.acain as recently as June 9, 1983 (Exhibit 4).
Unfortunately, the reorganization reveals that CPCo has still not caught on to the seriousness of the probl ems. they have allowed 'th.e. same su pervisor res ponsible for the Zack ;reblems for the past two year to be promoted to the General Superintendent of Plant Assurance Divis~ ion of the Midland Project Quality Assur ance De partment.-
Fur t he r, since the issuance of the November report the DGB in-s pection confirms that CPCo continues its tradition of construction mis ha ps. Af ter.14 years and an estimate of $4.43 billion dollars
-ithe Commission has ample bases to take immediate action to ensure that the pubife health and safety will be adequately pro t e ct e d.
i III.
SPECIFIC CRITICISk5 0F THE CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION PROGRAM In the February 8, 1983 analysis of the CCP submitted to the pu bl i c,
the NRC, and CPCo GAP requested that the multiple ~ audits / third-party reviews be combined into one comprehensive inde pendent review.
p Specifically, the GAP staff took exception to the CCP as being inadequate because it:
(1 )
relied heavily on and incorporated an INPO-type audit by the Management Analysis Corporation.(MAC). wh.1ch.had been.
rejected by the NRC staff as not in d e pe n d ent ;-
~
(2) failed to provide any significant details of the methodology.
by whi c h e i t he r t hi r d pa r t i e s o r C P Co wo u l.d iliert.t i fy _pr.cil ems t
in the as-built condition of the plant; l
(3) was permeated by an inherent conflict-o f-inte. rest; i
a..-.,
1 (4) institutionalizes a lack of organzational freedom for the
]
quality assurance / quality control function; u
(5) was not com prehensive; and, l
(6) failed to s pecify evaluation criteria and construction 1
orocedures that would guarantee quality of construction j.......
{
M The CCP documents incorporated in our analysis include (1) Letters h
from Mr. J.W.
Cook to Mr. J.G. Ke ppl e r, NRC, da ted Jan.10,1983,
]
A pril 6, 1983, April 22,- 1983,.and June 3,1983i (2) Letters from h
Mr. J.G.
Ke 1er to Mr. J.W. Cook, CPCo, dated Dec 30, 1982, Mar ch 28, j-1983; and (
public meetings-with-the NRC and CPCo on CCP.
i
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I s si o.n ers June 13,1983 the submittal of the original CCP (January 10, 1983) bruary 8,1983 public meeting in Midland the NRC requested eci.fic information' in.their' March 18..1983.1.e t t er. r gestions~from' the Regional Staff seek s pecific details about the scope of the p o pos ed CCP And the methodology of its-implemen-tation.
CPCo 's res ponses, April 6, 22, and June 3,1983, provide more details --in some instances ex plicit details--yet continue to evade or avoid the key questions about the adequacy of the CCP to restore the NRC and the pu bl i c's confidente in the safe'ty of the Midland pl a n t.
Our analysis of the submittals,in,dicates that CPCo has provided a plan that will meet only the minimum s pecified requirements cf the NRC.
The plan remains structurally flawed at the outset.
- First, it pro poses a third party for the audit function that fails a prima facie test for indepen&nce. Nhose competence is questionable '
/
given the most charitable review of 'the past experiences with quality assurance breakdowns, and whose third-party methodology is too su perficial to even evaluate.
Finally, the proposed auditor.
-ithe Stone and Webster construr. tion firm, is suggesting a staf f of only nine auditors to provide assurance about the work done by a ccestruc-ion force of over 5,000 (Midland site tour, June 5,1983).
The NRC administrative staff continues to ignore both the pleadings of the public and the advice of their own technical and ins pection staf f about the a ppro priate regulatory action at the Midland plant.
The Regional Administrator has blatantly refused to include the s/',
I public in any serious consideration of the solution to the problems at the Midland site.
The continued refusal of the region to asuage the concerns of the public cou pled with the interse Lscrutiny that the Midland plant i s receiving from Congress, the press, and
'- l o c a l and state government offic.ials is inexcusable.
The ASt B hearings, on going at this time in response to-t. requast-from CPCo for a hearing, continue through the laborious process of a judicial hearing.
Although the hearing, in theory, will t esolve the issue of safety for the central Micigan residentst-i n' f a c t, i t Vill be the Sta f f that controls the critical dry-te-day -ovenview of the plant.
For this reason GAP is turning directly to the C:=-ission.
We ha v e ex ha u s te d ou r e f forts -to wo rk -wi t-h--4 he Re gi on al Admini str ation.to insure that the CCP is ade.quate.
At.the Site i
Tour Mr. War n i c k a'n d~Mr. D a y'Ts ~,~ 1t e gi or I t!7 cofrfi rmed-t h a t t h e C CP would be a pprovec witn "10. days to two weeks."
With the a ppr oval.
l of the CCP safety-related construction activities can commence immediate1.y.
It is critical that the Commission review the decision of the Staff and r'ecognize the serious step backwards that this action represehts for the third prty auditor concept.
~
l ~ ~ A.
Modify the=4cnstruction Permit to include mandatory " hold points" l
on the bal ance-o f-pl a n t (BOP) work and incor porate the current Boara o rd ered " hold points" on the soils remedial work into the co nstruction p"irm i t for the Mid, land P.lant, Units el anc #2.
, eune e
4 9
998 S
O
[.
'NRC' Commissioners 9'
June 13, 1983
'On April 8, 1981 Region III mana gement over ruled its investigative staff's recommendations to sus pend con ~struction.at the Willi.am..H..
P6wer Station near Cincinnati, Ohio.
Instead,' the Zicc er Nucl ear,Immediate Action Letter which', inter alt a, NRC issued an required o
the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company to develop a Quility Con-firmation Program (QCP).
On November 12,.1982 the utter failure of the QCP for'ced the Commissioners to sus pend all safety-related construction at Zimmer.
Unfortunately CPCo's Construction Completion Plan (CCP) pro p~osed for Midla nd bears a stri,k4 ng resemblance to the key flaws that doomed the QCP.
In some cases, the CCP exacerbates the mainful mista kes of Zimmer.
Mo re s pecifically, the Construction Completion Plan is doomed to
' ~
to the r esumption of construction on the site'.ypot resolved prior failure if the following s pecific problems are 1.
Inherent Conflict of Interest
.The foundation of the CCP is to complete " integration of Bechtel
' QC fu netions i nto the Midla nd Project Quality As sura nce De partment (MPQ A3) u nder Consumers Power Compa ny mana gement..." (CCP Executive Summary, 1-10-83, a t 3. )
That has been completed according to the E-3-83 CPCo l etter -to the NRC, at 17.
If the CCP adequately recognized that it is the MPQAD management that has failed to supervise and control the Engineer / Contractor throughout the. life of the Midland Project perhaps the CCP would have a chance to resolve i
the quality problems.
But the "QA/QC Organization Changes" outlined in part 3.0 of the S 3-83 submittal simply legitimizes the very structure that has failed to implement the past QA/QC reorganization plans.
l As stated on Page 11 of Part 3.0 of the 6-3-83 CCP it is the MPQAD Executive Manager who holds the key contatt -position with Bechtei QA/QC personnel.
This individual, Mr. Roy Wells, confirmed that the burden of change for the Midland Plant was on his shoulders at the
'_Je brua ry. 8,19 83 public meeti.ng.
He maintained tnat it was his personal decision to not replace the top Sechtel QC-personnel-underneath his I
s u pe rvis ion, even in the face of direct NRC requests and public -
L
=skepticis=.
If t here wa s any dou bt t hat-MPQAD-intended-to brin g-in new perscnnel to change the Midland Project.around it is disp'elled u n d e r t he " O bj e c + +"W ' rrf ttre t?A'/ QC -Re org aTri z a t-ion.
l 3.
Use quali fied pe rsonnel from existing QA and QC departments and contractors to staff key positions l
throughout the integrated organization. (6-3-83, at 11) l l
ses
-1/
Ali safety-relAtad work was halted by CPCo' on December 3,1982 following the results of the NRC OSC ins pection of the DGB.
That "s to p wor k" remains in.es tf ect. for J a f ety. rela ted constructio n exc e pt the soils wor k, HVAC, MSSS a nd electrical ca bles'. (CCP letters)
~
.. ~.
NNCCo'mmissioners
- 10 June 13,.1983 In s pe ct i o~n' 'P ro e'e'd' ~re s' 'a n d Eva l u a t i on C rit e ri'a 'Dd) 2.
Failure to Specify u
'The original p~roposal ( 1 83,'.a t 8 - 9, 12 ) p r o m'i s e d t o _d ty'eJa p' a n d Ig 4
revise the procedures that will' be' used to ' onduct' the reinspections.
c Neither the procedures nor' the 'eyaluation' criteria for' the inspect' ions were s peci fied beyond vague vrefefenc'e' to profes'sional codes'.
According to the 6-3-83 propr sal the QA/QC Reorganizat' ion'still failes to include or explatn the critical Quality Control inspection plans, (6-3-83, at 12).
The technical content and requirements of such plans are promis.ed at some undisclosed futu re time,. alt hou'gh QC will be 'res ponsible for implementing these unknown,. unexplained methodolpgies which hold the key to future quality 'at the Midland' plant. (6-3-83, at 12')
MPQAD even plans to continue to use Bechtel's Quality Control Notices Manual (QCNM) and Quality Assurance Manual (BQAM) "ts approved for use on the Midland Plant." (6-3'83, at 12)
The solution 4 cay be convenient, ' cess Inspection Notification but it fails to explain how a QA/QC system that produced the In-Pre (IPIN) and Ce ficiency Report (DR) system could be adequate for a new Midland commitment to quality. _-
As recently as Way 27, 1983 the first monthly report of the TERA Co rpo ra t i on. t ha t is conducting the Independent Design and Construction Verification (IDCV) program discovered yet another Quality Control process that has failed.
Confirmed Item report
~
( Attached as Exhibit 5 reports the signifcance Number C-031 four hangers TTe)ld measured by TERA were of their finding that out of installation tolerence limits. T.he r.eport states.. simply:
l i __
The construction deviation contro.1 lu otess is.not functional.
Other TERA confirmed items include hangers installed three feet from its design locatign (C-032 and C-033), spring hangers located Yhe wrong side _ of a 90 elbow, const ruction deviaitio_n in fotg.ation not forwarded for approval and processing-by engineering as requi. red
_by procedures (C-034), h a g e rs a t e l e v a t i q n t.w hi c h d.o_ ant m a t c h design elevations (C-035), offset dimensions, and drawings that
_ha ve be e n s i g n e d hu t n ot c he.c_ke d.. (.C-Q3.6 ),Ja'ni oja. FK AR 'e rrors that "could lead to the utilization of improper input to the design process." (C-037), improper power supply to the AFW pump which could result in
"(f)ailure to provide minimum flow " and could damage to the AFW turbine driven pump during the statig7 cause blackout
( C- 03 8 ).
In all TERA reported 46 confirmed items. -
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TERA's monthly summaries contain Open, Confirmed and Resolved (OCR)
Item re ports, Finding Reports and finding Res' lution' Reports.
Co n fi rmed o
items will be furthe r rey ~iewed and' ei.ther' dis pos'itione d or re ported closed ' r' tracked.
o l
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,' NR6 Co= mis sioners June 13,1983 The TERA IDCV plan is not a part of the CCP activities.
- However, the examples stated above. clearly indicate that there is a strong ~
need for a comprehensive inspection of the plant 'according t&E'"
specified and defined procedures.
o In Section 4.0 " Program Planning,"
the Procedure for Control 4
and Eelease of New Work exemplifies the lack of information given to the NRC and the public to judge the adequacy of the CCP.
Alt hou gh Section 4.5.3 (named above) allegedly provides the basis for ensuring that the requirements ~of the CCP are met prior to initiation of new wo.rk, in reality these procedures are in something called the Construction Work Plans (CWPs)'.
Th'e CWPs will not be developed until after 2 list is prepared of the Phase I activities are carried out.
In other words.the CCP will make u p the answers as' it goes along--b,ecaus e no one, par.ticularly CPCo and Bechtel, know the questions.yet.
Similar to the CWPs are the Quality Work Plans (QWPs) which will be written to match the CWPs.
The CWP/QWP packages obviously
-kill. provide the critical guidance to construction and quality control personnel.
'Any variation on the CCP simply must contain
.;EC in s:e cti on " hold points" to review the CWP/0WP packages orior ]p3)
[O to tne ir.itiation of any Phase Two work on the site.
~
The " hold point" r'equested above between completion of Phase I and Phase II activities is consistent with the commitments made by Mr. Keppler to the Midland public at the February 8,1983 3
public meeting during which he commited to taking a "hard look at the Midland Project."
(Public Meeting, February 8,1983, Midland, Michigan ~)
3.--
Program Implementation Weaknesses m
Historically it has been the implementation of any QA/QC program that has been CPCo's Achilles heel at the Midland Plant.
Similarily it
---4 s the i m pl e me nt at i o n o f t he' cu r r e n t e d i t i o n o f_.t h t_ CC P t h at _.c o n ce rns GA? staff working on the Midland project.
In Section 5.0 Procram Implementation the key sclution apparently ~
~
i s t h e m a n a g e m e n t t nyo l vem e nt--a-ta v e ry. s t ge_. o f irel a m a ni a.t i o.n activities.
As we hav2 previously stated we believe that this management influence will render the CCP ineffective, regardless of the commitment of construction personnel.
Saction 5.0 calls for a management review prior to the initiaticn of team activities for Phase 1 work.
This review will, of necessity, y
review training and recertification of QA/QC employees.
They will i
~~ ~al s o "c o v e r the*) r o c e s s for both (1) the verification of completed
~"
inspection activity'and (2) the installation and inspection statas activity.
GAP believes that these heviews' are critical to the credibility of
w
-e-e
E.
I. NRC Commissioners June 13,1983
'the safety of the construction on the Midlahd tite.
We request that a tjRC " hold point" and a third party " hold point" be incorporated at the Manage, ment
- Review stage prior to the beginni.ng.of. any :
Phase 1 work.-
,m Installation of a " hold point'" at this juncture would require that the Manacement Release _ discussed on page 27 as Section 5.3 would be a res pensibility transferred to the third-party team, with NRC review and approval.
Under Phase 2 Imolementation the following statement raises serious concern about the CPCo,co,mmitment to followi g its n
own professed work plan:
Correcti'on of identified problems will be given priority l
over initiation of new work, as appropriate, and the comp 1etion' teams will schedule their work based on these priorities, l
(emphasis added).
1 nhere is no discussion of who will decide what is and what is not i
appropriate to' correct before new work is started, nor how that deter..ir.ation will be made.
Those critical decisiens simply must be cade by someone other,than CPCo and their Bechtel Engineer /
Contractor.
Finally, GAP takes exception to the " catch all" provided for in the CCP.
Section 10.0, CHANGES TO THE CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION PROGRAM.provides a procedure which could undermine the entire CCP.
If CPCo fol' lows its historical path of disguising all unauthorized work as a " misunderstanding" or " lack of clear communication," than this Section provides a legitimate channel
'or " obtaining approval' to initiate activities that.do not
~~
___ me et t he re qui rem e nt s o f t he C CP.. "
4.
Lack of Organizational Freedom for the Quality Assurance Department The organizational premise' of the CCP is a " team" concept that integrates construction, engineering and quality assur'ance persohne'1.
7he " team
~
-mer' e rs will be located together to the extent practicable..." (1-10-83,-
at 5)
The NRC recognized the lack of orgadIFati5n'aT'f71edom in 19 8 3<- 14 t t e r - f r_am Re g i.o n._,II I,t o; C P,C o. ( 3 - 2 8 -83, a t 1),
-the March 28, and asked CPCo to provide a description.the measures the dtility intends to institute to ' accura that QC reinspection will be sufficiently" inde pendent of team controls."
CPCo's res ponse as documented in their April 22, 1983 letter on Page 7 indicates that QC personnel assigned to the teams will be It states that actual under the Administrative controls of MPQAD.
-~QC in'spectiomrdwill be conducted in accordance with the PCQIs and irs approved by MPQAD.
Further explanation is provided in the 6-3-83 CCP, Section 4.0, PROGRAM PLANNING and 4.2 TEAM ORGANIZATION.
These sections detail both team organization and training /recertification
r NNC: Commissioners
.13 -
June 13, 1983 Many of the detiils concerning retraining and recertification appear to be not only adequate, but surpass the commitments cade by other, utilities Qith similar problem.
In. p a rt i cul a r:: '- '
GAP believes that i f imp'lemented as planned, and reviewed at a Phase I retraining " hold point" the training process.J_ M.
l 0
~
will produce construction and quality control personnel with sufficient skills to perform their jobs.
However,.even the best trained work force must still have su pervisors who ~are commited to quality work'instead of cost and schedule pressures.
To date MPQAD has demonstrated neither the a bility, to impleme,nt, any quality plan, nor the 5
i com:itment to do so.
~
(
GAP reserves judgement on the o peration on -the " team concept' l
as an appropriate construction concept for nuclear power plan,ts until such time'as a utility can demonstrate that there can be
.c rg ani z a ti onal freedom for QA functions.
4 l
5.
Lack of Comprehensiveness CCP reinspections will cover only " accessible" completed construction, (1-10-83, at 10; 4-22-83, at 1; and 6-3-83, at 21).
The Regional staff has indicated that this is acceptable to them.
(3-28-33 letter, at 1)
Although there is no indication in any of the su h-ittals of the percentage of work that is not accessible 3
Section 4.3 Quality Verification (6-3-83, at 21-22)
=ajority of the work performed prior to December 1982.
Further the CCP continues to define out from CCP coverage the
^
i soils work, the HVAC work, the electrical ca ble rei ns pectio n,'
__ the NSSS work, a n d o t he r pr o bl em a re a s, t h_at._ha v e.te qu,i r e_d i n d i v i d u al,.,
programs to res olve de ficiencies.
-Thi s pi e c'eme al a pproach effectively surrenders any pretentions i
Fnat the CCP will provide a definitive answer to the Midland QA problets, e ve n i f t he p ro g r am we re 'o t he rw'i s'e l e g i tim a't e.
TliF
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_ne:essit'recor. reins pection results from the inaccuracyPa pe rwo r'k re fi ew's'~are sim v for of current
~
quality ds in the first pl a ce.
- n ot. de pe n d a bl e a t_ tha M i.di a rui. Pro j e ct.
It is critical that either a third party or NRC " hold point" be g})
('
J contained in. the reinspection Phase I activities to determine the adequacy of the "accesible systems" approach.
Clearly if reir.spections find items of non-conformance the inspection scope needs to be increased to include both Non-Destructive Examination techniques as well as other means available to the utility to
-- -- d e t e rmi n e t he-aer b u i l t condition of the plant.
The STATISTICAL SAMPLING PLAN, Appendix C, Rev.1 of the 6-3-83 CCP is being revie.wed.by a industrial statistician at this time.
The initial review of the sampling plan indicates that it is consistent with appropriata samplieg techniques.
We also request
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.n-
NE,C Commissioners June 13, 1983 that Mr. Rubenstein of the Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulations
~~ (NRR) r'eview ghis plan for acceptability prior.to.NRC.a pproval. -
~---
6.
The CCP f ails to require. the minimu~m of a credible reinsmection of tne as-built condition of tne pl a nt.
At the February 8,1983 public meeting Mr. Keppler said that the NRC " told them that comprehensive programs needed to be developed and put into place in order to: (1) Provide assurance that comp-leted construction work was sound, and (2) Provide assurance that future work would be ef fective-ly controlled." (0pening Remarks, Mr. Keppler, attached as Exhibit 6 )
Evi dently Region III's assurance will come from' CPCo's own audit of the plant.
Since February GAP staff members have tried every reasonable approach to convince Region III that their philosophical view of industry self-examination has f ailed at Midland.
,, Althou gh Mr. Ke ppler boldly maintains that his " reasonable assurance"
'of the Midland plan,t can only now be maintained with adequate third. -party reviews, in fact, the third party review amounts to nine professionals overviewing the wotk of over 5,000 construction employees.
~
The' meat of the reinspection program is the Quality Verification Program.
This Program is explained in detail in Appendix I of the 6-3-83 CCP su bmittal.
Our analysis is on going, however, there are a number of obvious flaws.
These include, but are not limited to:
--Exclusion of 31,890 questionable closed Inspection Records (irs) for HV AC and soils. work,
'Ca bfe^ routi ng and' i d'enti-f i c a t i o n a n d A S M E h a n g e r pr o g r a.m s ( A p_p I, at _7,),,,..
m
--Incomplete review by the NRC of the PQCI's to be used for reinspection,( App I at8),
L
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--Non-compliance with the 100i reins'pe'ction requ'est (3:38-83
~
letter from RIII to CPCo. at 1), substituting a 100%
j reins pection ef fort based on a " systems /a'rfa 'o7Tehtatiop,"
l-a n d s u p pl eme n.t.e d by-a "r.an dom. pl a n,t_-wi d e _i n s pe ct_i on " _to provide a valid quality baseline.on an expeditious basis.,
(In other wo rds manipulate the requirement to get beyond the 100% hardware inspection as quickly as possible.),
--Exemptions fo r re bar, components, and other materials that are inaccessible but indeterminate because of materials traceability problems. ( App I, at 13)
--Excess 4em responsiblity for the Executive Manager of MPQAD I
to have overall responsibility for the QVP, ( App I,' at 16),
)
--Critical PQCIs.to be verified by Review of documentation only Ap pendix B.
,j-
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F_.
1 NRC.Com6issioners 15 -
June 13,1983 Clearly the CCP is not adequate to assure public health and
__ sa fety 'i n ce nt ral Mi chi g an.
Insta'lation of mandatory.
Z:~-
~
" hold points" to review the training and recertification of
?'
~
i personnel, the adequacy of the PQCIs, and the appropriatenes's-to proceed'from Phase I to Phase II in this massive project is called for..
GAP urSes.the Commissioners to review the materials which comprise the CCP 'and critically consider the extraordinary requirements that will bring the Midland project into conformance with 10 CFR. 3.
Recuire a management audit of Consumers Pcwer Company (CPC.o) by an i n ce pe nde nt, competent management auditing firm that will cetermine the causes of the management failures that have resulted in tne sciis settlement disaster and the recent Quality Assurance breakdown.
Even if the method'ol'ogy of the reinspection program and the instal-lati:n,cf mandatory " hold points" in the balance of plant work and soils work were adequate it is impossible to have any faith in the current Midland managemest team.
These are the same people responsible for the problems in the first pl a ce '
The evidence on the public record is clear -- the c.orporate management of the Midland project simply cannot build a nuclear power plant according to the. laws of the Atomic Energy Act as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 10 Our conclusion is based on the
__ testimony of NRC staff inspector.s, sinvestiga. tors, technisal experts internal sources as well as the attitude and actions of CPCo
__ man a gement o f fi ci al s.
For 14 yea r CP C.o. has. bum bl e d.from,one extraordinary breakdown to another, and they have continsed a pattern of blaming their woes on the NRC, the intervenors, the State Attorney General, and hard times.
CPCo has lacked the initiative to ca ke adequate modi fications to their cops,truction..boondoggl.e.,
to recognize the most obvious problems, and to resist regulatory._
'ncentives to improve.
J t e s t i =e ny be f o re, t he At omi-c Sa fe t-y..a n d Li cen s,ing E ntr d ( AS LB o r Ecard) NRC inspectors tastified that they still do not know the cause of the problems at the Midland site. ( Exhibit 1
)
- Recently, however, one inspector testified that he believed the plant would "run a lot easier without them {CPCo officials) th'ere."
( Ex hi bit 8
)
Similarily memos written to. Regional Administrator Keppler during the summer of 1582 give significant insight into the reasons for the pro blecs-at t he-f.4 di a nd si te.
(Co ntai ned a s Ex hi bit-9
).
These memos include iniight -into the technical i nadequacies. com=unication
~
breakdewns, and tta ff recommendations about solution to the problecs on the hite.
Several examples of these types of comments are listed below) 4
--On April $7,1983 Dr. Ross Landsman, OSC-RIII, testified before 9
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~~
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'NR'C Commissioners dune 13, 1983
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the ASLB that he did not trust CPCo because there were too many examples of them putting " cost and. scheduling
~
ahead of huality."
('Exhi. bit 10
),
' ~ ~
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--On May 6,1983 Mr. Wayne Sha f fer, 'OSC-RIII, forme r"hehh'o f the the OSC-Midland Section said that he didn't have any faith in CPCo a bility.
(Exhibit 11
)
--On June 1, 1983 Dr. Landsman testified that MPQAD Executive Manager, Mr. Roy Wells; Superintendent of MPQAD soils work, Jim Meisenheimer; and the Section Head for the Soils QA work.
Dick' Oliver should be replaced because they are unqualified or.have attitude problems. (Exhibit 8
)
--In a June 21, 1982 memo from Mr. Charles 'Norellius and Mr.
Spessard stated the following a-bout Mr. James W. Cook, the CPCo Vice-President in charge of the Midland Project:
(He) may actually be contributing to mme of the confusion 4
which seems to exist.
The staff views that he is too much involved in details of plant operations and there are times when the working levelstaff appear to agree and be ready to-take action where Mr. Cook may argue details _as to t'he necessity for such action or may argue as to the specific meaning of detailed work pro-cedures...."
--The Norellius/Spessard memo further suggests that the 'NRC "should question whether or not it is possible to adequately manage a construction program which is as complex and di ve rse a s t hat whi ch curre ntly exis t s., at Mi dl a nd._",
~ --Finally the same memo questio ns.whether_the KRC. shquid consi. der..,
that CPCo "have a separate management group all the u y to a pos.sible new Vice-President level, one of which would manage the construction of the reactor to get it operational and the second to look solely after the remedial soils and underpinning activities.
m e m o ra n d um f rom li.~JT Co o k"t'o 'R. F. W a rn i ck
~
-- An NRC July 23,33 states that CP Co h as -a ki sto ry. of, n o t te s p,ond i n a t o_ h3C _ c o n ce rn s,
giving misleading statements to the NRC, not having control cf their contractor, continuous deficiencies in material storage conditions, a practice of inspecting -rather than bui.1 ding-quality into the plant, slipshod workmanship, an attitude which precludes quality workmanship, and an unwillingness of the constructor to share information with the NRC.
(Exhibit 9
).
--The Coo k-meco fu rt he r st ate s that CPCo uses " tunnel vision,"
in the identification of problems, has a gag order on their employees to prevent them from talking to the NRC, and remains
" argumentative" toward the NRC when they must discuss regulatory concerns.
.~
a-.
e--+
dune 13, 1983 NRC Commissioners 17 -
i m
.The Cook memo concludes with.the following insight:
When considering th'e above listing of questiona'ble11censhe performance attributes', the most damning concept is,t_he,c _
~"
fact that the NRC inspection effort at Midland has been purely reactive in nature for approximately the last year, and that the indicators are what have been observed in a pproximately the last six months.
If these are the types of items that have become an NRC nuisance under a reactive inspection program, one can only wonder at what would be disclo sed under a rigorous routine inspection i
and audit program.
Clearly the problems on the site warranted aggressive management
~
attention..Yet evidence obtained by GAP uhder the Freedom of Information Act demonstrates tha the solutions to Mi dl a nds '
problems have consistently had to be initiated, developed and structured by the NRC in a series of painful regulatory negotiations.
.gJust as CPCo cannot " ins pect quality into the Midla nd plant""
the NRC cannot regu. late integrity into CPCo management.
Both quality construction and competent, trustworthy management depend on a basic respect for voluntary disclosure of quality control or assurance problems. T It is perhaps. easier to u nderstand the. lack of candor on the part of the CPCo Midland management team after reviewing the statements of CPCo President John Selby in recent news articles.
In particular 1
GAP brings to the attention of the Commissioners a recent Detroit News article (April 833 ) in which Mr. Selby admits that they l --
"have bet the compary,on the Midland plant."
His statement; coupled with the actions of his top-level management, l ___ i s o n e e x pl a n a t i on o f t he p a n i c m an a g e'm e n"t ~tt at p eime a t st t he Mi dl a nd '-
project.
It is Mr. Kep pler's view, as expressed during his ASLB testimony, that if CPCo can't build Midland he would have to pull their operating license for. Big Rock and Palisades.
We disagree with
-his conclusion--Palisades and Big R'ock art plarts that are-a1 ready in the rate base, Midland is not.
Its' $4.43 billion dollar price tag, and questionable completion date have atmost-destrvyid the
____ company.
Common sense can exp1,a_jn the lack.of confidence that has developed as a result o f t he c o n fi f e tTn g 'p rEs s uYe s 6T t o s t-/ s c h e d ul i ng.
and safety at the Midland site Yet Mr. Kepp1'er maintains that neither he nor his staff have yet discovered the reason for Midland's managemant problems.
Since May 1982 the Regional Director has been looking for an answer.
At this point GAP believes that the answer is clearly evident
._..i n t he.te s t im_cgag o f hi s own i n s pecto rs.
The root causes for the management breakdown can be best discovered at this point by an l
i ndependent management audit that has' the authority to recommend solutions to, poor judgement and colossal cost overruns as well as l
l construction flaws unlike any other nuclear construction project.
l i
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.--, _,,,my
iiRC Cdami ss io ne,r s _.
June 13, 1983 C.
Re j.e c t t he C C.P a s c urr e n' l y hro po's ed, including a rejection of-Stone a nd Webster to conduct t he thi ro..pa r ty auci t o f t he pl a nt.
~
'I ns t ead a truly compet ent, credible, a no.i nd e pe nd ent t n i r d. pa r ty auditor s no u l d be c ho s en wi tn pu bl ic par tici pa tio n i n rWe Tr cc es s.
To date the NRC has announced that there will be no res ponse to pu blic concerns about CPto's selection' of S&W as the third party auditor.
Nor will there be an opportunity to review the eethodology by which S&W is to pr e f orm i ts fu ncti o n'.
Instead, according to an April 5,1983 ' letter from Mr. Keppler to Billie Garde, tne S&W work will be looked at only af ter a probl em is found:
problems which they have missed. zya>
13
. e 'bave not reviewed S&W methodologies and do 'not plan to W
unless we find significant (Exhibit J2, at 3.)
The letter confirms that there will be no public meeting to consider 4public comments about either'S&W or to review the adequacy of their pl a n.
This continues the long history of regulation by default at Midland. Unfortu nately for the public this theor etical a pproach to sever nmental regulation is both dangerour'and ex pensive. At this stage Region III is as ~g'uilty as CPCo in a serious conceptual breakdown that prohibits implementaion of any realistic solution to Midland's problems.
These problems are at least as serious as Diablo Canyon and Zimmer.
q
~
They touch on every area of design and construction.
For almost 14 years there has been a total lack of commitment to a QA program which has left the plant 85% complete in an indeur.minate state.
l ~~ The long trail of continuing revelations, potential safety problems, hardware problems, design flaws, major construction defects, astro-l nomical pri c e inc reas es, a nd troken p omiser have to tally eroded the p2blic '...
t f
co nfidence in CPCo and in the NRC to ensure the qua tity of the
~
.pla nt's co nstructio n.
~
- O nly a truly i-nd e pe nd e nt, com pr eh ens i v e au di t ud 1 L-a ssua g e_.the. pu bli c 's well-fou nded fears that Midland is not sa'fely constructed.
1.
Evaluatio n of the Sto ne a nd Webster Pro posal_
~
.~.. -., - -.
The concerns about S&W's independence would be somewhat academic Jf S&W had pres ented a minimally adequate audit pro posal to address the scope of the QA breakdown.
But it didn't.
Although the plan is too sketchy to evaluate - 'a bri ef 3 page outline --the number of pers o nn el plann ed for the audit r emoves any doubt about credibility or d e penda bility.
S&W proposes nine auditors for the Midland project!
~ ~ "'At a h i n imum','"fR e N RC s ho ul d r e co g ni z e t ha t a ny C CP mu s t b e ba s ed o n the r esults of compl eted third-party findings, as well as com=itment for the duration of the pr o j e c t.
The third yarty pro g ram must proyide a comprehensive view of the as built condition,of the pl a nt by an independent auditor, as well as an independent assessment of all future to nstructib n' 'r the-CP,Co CCP and S&W' pl an do not do either.
I t '.. 'lUtC Commissioners
- June 13,1983 1
The only truly substantive part of the Stone and Webster audit is the Construction Implementation Overview (CIO), described in the 6-3-831subinittal at-30.
Like the soil-s audit -the --
C'~
S&W program co'mmits to stay only until CPCo and the NRC have confidence in the adequacy of the implementation of the QA J--
Program for the Midland plant.
This is not a third party audit by any stretch of the imagination.
t I
i 2.
Lack of Independence Midland needs, and the Region has commited to a verification program by a truly independent" company with no stake in the outcome of its audit.
This independent third party is not serving a client's requirements, but rather the public inte' rest in ensuring the-quality of construction, at the -plant..
Stone and Webster fails under both a literal and realistic reading i
of the Co: mission's primary financial ' criteria, that the third Qarty not have' any direct previous ~ involvement with the Company, py $'
S&W directly fails this test.
In September 1982 S&W was hired
)&
by CPCo to be the overviewer on the soils QA implementation.
If t.
the C = missions independence criteria are to be taken seriously they must be applied.
l Ironically, it is the independence criteria that NRR uses as a basis to reject the other CPCo nomination, the TERA Corporation
[
(see March 28, 1953 letter from NRC to CPCo, at 3).
-)
I l
3.
Lack of Publi.c Participation in the Selection Process Even if the independence criter'ia' could b~ ~ met for S&W the lack
- p >h / /
t e
l of public participation in the selection process destroys its. -
3,ygt$,,g,,
February 8,1983 meeting attracted several hundr.ed
-Although the
,l Midland residents there was no discussion or input from the public a bout t he thi rd party audito'r, o r th'e m eT hoto'lt gy by ~whi c h -
the audit would be conducted.
Instead Mr. Keppler and Mr. Eisenhut p
fir:1y informed the pu bl i c t h a t a'n i n d e pin dint ~ a 0 di~t' FEul d d e t e rmi ne the adequacy of the Eidland_g]aat... Within days the NRC and CPCo we re in "cl o s e d doo r" s e s si o n s o ve r t h'e ' ac cipt a'bT1 fty o f t he~ CCP', "
the auditor, and the various scopes and methodologies.
Unless Mr. Keppler and the Commission have rewritten the policies of the agency the Diablo Canyon model set the basis for increased public participation in resolving the issues of how the Commission chooses independent auditors.
At Midland, by contrast, Region III has chosed to ignore the serious-
.y ness of the situation by eliminating many of the most useful means of public particip.ation, employed at Diablo Canyon.
When GAP protested the series of " closed door" meetings pertaining to the independent audit we were told t. hat there wo.uld be no public meetings about 2 --
.i S&W, but that all written comments would be considered (Exhibit 12,
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NRC Cqmmissioners June 13,1983 at 3). Instead of the NRC acting to allay the fears of the public Mr. Keppler* s position of." resisting shared d_ecision making"
..~
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-(Ex hi bi t 13 ) has o n l y s e r v e d t o r e i n f o rce t he f'e a r's o'f' a n 'al r e a dy j~
skeptical public in central Michigan.
7 Stone and Webster may be capable of addressing the problems at Midland,but neither S&W nor CPCo have bothered to acknowledge l
that importance of public credibility for the third party auditor.
S&W's selection would completely undermine t.he NRC's reform action for Midland.
D.
Remove the Qua'lity Assuran e/ Quality Control Function from the
\\[
Midland Project Quality Assurance Department (MPQAD) and replace
~
them witn an independent team of QA/QC personnel that report
'9U simultaneously to the NRC and CPCo.
L
,A licensee's quality assurance program is its internal structure
~'of checks and. balances to ensure safe operations.
Every applicant for a construction permit is required by the provisions of 10 C.F.R. 55 0.34 to include in its preliminary safe,ty analysis report a description of the quality assurance program to be applied to 3
the design, fabrication, construction and testing of the structures, systems and components of the facility. Quality assurance comprises all those planned and systemati:c actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system or
~~
component will perform satisfactorily in service. Each structure, system or component must be documented, inspected and periodically audited to verify compliance with all aspects of the quality assurance program. The cause of the safety defects described above is an i'na'dequate qu'aTity assurawce -
program, which has been in shambles for a decade. In fact, i n 1973 the ori gi nci Midland li censi r g' apjeal boa'r'd "memS'e'rs
~
~
c.
felt so strongly about QA violations that the Director of J
Regulations pointed out that even though the Appeals Board could not take_ action on the IE fi n d i.ngs--
( H ) a d t he con s t ru cti on pe rmi t p rocee.di n g -st&LL._
- i been before our Board at the time that the re-sui ts o f thE' N c7 embTr-fr: 8 -i tts p e ct-i en wer e -a*--
~
nouncad, it is a virtual certainty that we would have ordered forthwith a cessation of i
all construction activities....
(November 26, 1973 Letter from L. Manning Muntzing, Director of Regulations, re: Quality Assurance Deficiencies Encountered
.....atMi_dlandFacigity,p.2.)
1 The 1973 warning should have served as notice to both Bechtel and l
. ~.
i, -
i
.' NRC' Commissioners
- 21 June 13,1983
' and Censumers Power Company to resolve their QA problems.
Quite the contrary, however, they ignored the notice..So did the NRC,
The prgb1'ms at the Midland plant have continued unab'atid.
staff.
e
+
Scth the 1979 and 1980 Systemic Assessment of Licensee 7erf~oYuance (S ALP) reports give notice of futher and expanded problems at Mid-itnd. The problems identified then (lack of qualifications of QC inspectors, continuation of work prior to corrective action) are similar to those cited as causes in the recent stop-work order.
~
The reports also include acknowledgements of excessive QA backlogs and lack of timeliness. (SALP Report 1980.) Consumers' failure to learn from its mistakes passed the stage of accidental oversight long ago.
The lack of quality assurance at Midland has. been a continuous concern to R~egion III. In the spring of 1982 at the release of the 1981 S ALP rating, Mr. Keppler publicly reported that it was neces-sary to change previous testimony before the ASLB which had provi-i ded a" reasonable assurance" that the plant would be constructed in
-iccordance wit,h nuclear construction regulations. The revised test-imony was not modified substantially, it is clear that QA problems n-Midland were resolved.
Accordi g to testimony 5y the NRC staff as early as September 1982 the Midland 'special section was so concerned about the prob-1 ems of QA implementation that at least one of them recommended stopping work at the Midland facility. Subsequently the Diesel Gen-erator Building inspection confirmed that in fact, there had been a 5
quality assurance breakdown on the site. The solution to resolving the QA breakdown,is the CCP, l ~~ dnfortunately the Region III management'seems satisfied with~the
~
, ut C.onsume_r.s_i,n charge of_
__ basis upon which the CCP is developed,:
p the program.
The public already has had an opportunity to preview the results of Consumers' internal policy with the Zack debacle over the past three years. It's performance has been disappoinTingi' Et ~most.-~
~~
Although the NRC fined CPCo $38,000 for ZacTTs'nd'n2cbmpTTance.with
- e de r a l r e g ul a t i o n s. a.n d fo rcAd.A__m a j o t. qA,r e o r g a n_i z a t i o n_,,further actions by the utility, revealed a determination to hide ' probTems.
Currently.an Office of Investigations probe is being conducted intb the most recent Zack problems.
The findings of the probe are already documented in the NRC inspections of the Zack QA breakdown at the LaSalle Plant.
A December 22, 1982 NRC IE report about the revelations acknowledges the critical role that CPCo played in response to the 1979 citation:
services of a Seni.or Quality On September 2,1981, the Assurance Engineer from Project Assistance Corporation (consultants). were retained by CPCo fo'r assignment at
~
Zack for the purposes of establishing a formal document
~
- [ NKC C'ommissioners
- June 13, 1~983
~
control system and performing an indepth review of the conditions described by Zack in their Septembe'r letter -(Zack notified CPCo of' a 7 0 CF-R-I ' '
50.55(e) on August 28, 1981).
CPCo MPQAD employees and management knew about the new QA breakdown on the Midland site, yet they failed to notify the NRC or take any other action.
LIkewise, the infamous soils settlement problems, began with pre-notification to the Midland management team through the settlement of the Administrati'o'n' building in 1977.-
That settle.-
ment ocurred a year prior to the beginning of construction of the Diesel Generator Building.
That building, is now cracked
- ~
and sinking.
The technical debate over the-building itself and and its ultimate safety remains little more than a judgement call between experts.
-t Fi nally, the a recently released NRC Investigation (83-13) into the possible ". false statement" of CPCo mana gement*
cf ficial Mr. Boos concerning the status of work completed on the. site during a 1982 NRC meeting shatters any doubts: that CPCo is a utility that seeks to be candid and open with the. regulators. -
Recent testimony into the 83-13 Investigation report led to an "in camera" session after an NRC IE Inspector acknowledged that at least one CPCo official at the March 82 meeting knew that the NRC had been seriously misled. (Exhibic 13) l
-These examples of the utility's resposne.to _the discovery o.f.any cajor problems completely undermine the assumption' upon which l
the CCP is based -- voluntary disclosure-of-QA violatians.
Clearly a completion and reinspection program that places faith
-in a management team that has lost the confidence and trust of
- NRC inspectors, and a QA Department that..has nn.totiously and...
blatantly disregarded 10 CFR Appendix B, 'is inappropriate.
Only a new QA/QC team, with no stake in the outcome of their work, can e ve r re sttrre qual-i-ty -wort -to the-Midla-nd fMi_11.ty
~
GAP recognizes this is an extraordinary request for relief, but it is clearly warranted at the Midland Proje.ct.
After 14 years L
of bumbling and $4.43 billion dollars of construction cost
~
l l
there cust. be a time when the Commissioners intervene to protect the public affected by this out-of-control project.
The Region t
and the utility have stopped short of realistic regulation, and appropriate controls for the remainder of the' construction i
' ~ ~~~ h a s e. '
HopeTuity, the Commissioners will intervene.
~
p Increase the assignment of NRC personnel to include additional E.
l technical and inspectiom personnel.
Region III is currently tnteTstaffed and critically overworked
~'
e s,
net C'ommissioners June 13,1983 The new Office of Special Cases is handling two aof the most troubled nuclear ' plants under constructio'n in the" country.
The intense in.spertion effort has provided the only atceptable
~
solution' to both the Zimmer and Midland crisis.
The teams.
o f H R C In s p e ct o'rs a s s i g n e d t o t h e O f fi c'e o f S pe ci al C a s e s h'a~r-
~
of h.gh quality and extremely i
been, for the most part, ce n s:ienti o u s.
They have requested. through memorandum and testimony the assignment of additional personnel to assist on the Midland project.
We strongly support.the assignment of additional technical and inspection personnel to the Region to augment the OSC teams.
F.
Require a detailed review of the soils settlement resolution, as outlined.in the Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, incor porating a technical analysis of the implementation of the underpinning at the current stage of completion.
-iAs a further structural check on the independence and performance
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of the third-p' arty program at Diablo Canyon, in 1982 the NRC staff c:..issioned Brookhaven National Laboratory ("BNL") to study par-ticular aspects of the seismic design of the plant..BNL raised que-stions about many of the -mathematical models used by PG&E to deter-mine the seismic-design response spectra for the plant. The BNL study revealed. that the Teledyne audit was not complete and compre-he h:nsive "enough" and that broad access to the audit process by outside consultants can significantly enhance the value and cred-x ibility of the third-party review process.
In light of the c'oncerns by a number of the technical disagreements of several NRC staff members; GAP believes s it appropri-ate.for the
~~
NRC commissioners to request another study of the design deficiencies l
cf the Midland nuclear power plant. In partitular ve request anot-her review of the Diesel Generator Building by a non-nuclear construction consultant.
l
-If these basic questions cannot -be answered-then nt-matter-what. the l
nucerous third party auditors do to restore confidence in the
~
ta l a n ce o f t he pl a nt t he re s i de nt-s o f c e n te rb Mi s hi ge n-w411 ne ve r.-
- know whose technical _ judgement was correct.
IV.
CONCLUSIONS In the fall of 1982 an NRR ' staff person recorded (in a log recently obtained by GAP through FOI A requests)the following summary of the ACRS request-formalized through their June 8,1982 le,tter to
._..; Chair,ma,nPalladgno;andNRRmanagementresponse.~
The ACRS asked for a report of design quality and construction adequacy.
They are looking for assurance.that with all the QA problems. rt Midtand in. specific areas that we have not over-lo'ked problems in other areas that have not yet reared their o
head.
I's CPCo ad-dressing thrs only through the AFW review?
-~
l t
L
w,.
f:: ' '!K Commi s s i o'n e rs June 13, 1983 t
N But the INPO effort addresses " work in progress" only!
BUT WHEN INTEGRATED WITH TERA EFFORT, YOU G'ET
-- -(Q nE Ei p he ra bl e )
Only for the AFW system'
" '-~ ~
SERVES AS A " SAMPLE" (AUDIT)
But it doesn't ' answer Oakrent's problem.with hidden problems.
INPO goes;from today and does only addr'ess forward fit.
They do not investigate what happened previously.
TERA LOOKS BACKWARD T00.
Eut only for the AFW sys m' (We've come full circle). Exhibit 14,at5 Dr. Oakrent's problem with hidden problems is the' same as GAP's concern about hidden problems.
In the past year both CPCo and
-the NRC have managed to avoid the key question about the Midland l
Plant -- What is really out there ?
Until that question is answered l
cc ;1etely, ccmpetently, and credibly there can be no assurance j
about the safety of the. Midland plant.
j l
We urge the Commilisioners torequest a management audit of CPCo; to replace MPQAD with an independent firm; to install " hold points" in the i
. construction permit, and to require all the necessa.ry changes to the propo' sed CohstrQction Completion Plan which will enable the public to know the facts about the cost and safety of the Midland plant.
Like Zi=mer, the traditional approach of licensee control at Midland can be
~
accomplished o nl y a t t h e -e x p e n s e o f,' u n d u e r i s k's' t o p u bl i c h~e al t h' a n d safety. We trust that the ASLB will reach a fair and just decision about the
~
Mid1:nd Plant when it reviews the long -ecord'that'haTheen estiblisTad by
~~
~
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Citizen Intervenors, the Staff, and the utility.
But, the approval of the CCP without substantial modification will have the effect of allowing CPCo to continue itr long out-of-control nuclear plant virtually independent of the third-party i
i audit that the central Michigan public expects to Be 'esta511sMd.~
~
~ - " ~
J2'look forward to youi prompt response.
~ ~ ' ' '"'-
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b '4 O
BILLIE PIRNER GARDE Citizens Clinic Director
' -' cer Service Lista
.f-EPG/dk
i @nTT:
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- (. ' (/,
DD 16
\\..'
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.-1~"
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT J-Richard C. DeYoung, Director In the Matter of
)
l Docket Nos. 50-329 50-330 CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY
)
(Midland Nuclear Power Plant,
')
Units 1 and 2)
)
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DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 Introduction By letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) dated June 13, 1983, Billie Pirner Garde of the Government Accountability Project, on behalf 1
of the Lone Tree Council and others (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners), requested that, among other relief, the NRC take imediate s
action with regard to the Midland project. The letter was referred to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement for treatment as a request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Comission's regulations.
On July 22, 1983, Edward L. Jordan, Acting Director of the Office of Inspec-tion and Enforcement, acknowledged receipt of the petition and infonned'the petitioners tnat their request for imediate action was ' denied. Mr. Jordan noted that safety-related work at the Midland site had been stopped, with the exception of certain specified activities, and that the NRC staff was closely
.+
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+
ne
?
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/
. ~
1 s-following the current activities at the Midland site. Mr. Jordan further noted that Consumers Power Company had agreed not to proceed with implement-4 ation of a construction completion program until such a program had been reviewed by the NRC. The staff expected to be able to complete its evaluation of the request before final action was taken on that program. Consequently, Mr. Jordan concluded that "contir}uation of currently authorized activities at Midland should not affect the staff's ability to grant the requested relief."
Letter from Edward L. Jordan, Acting Director, Office of Inspection and*
Enforcement to Billie Pirner Garde (July 22,1983). The staff has now corgletid its evaluation of the petition, and for the reasons stated herein, therequestisgran'tedinpartanddeniedinpart.
Issues Raised Petitioners requested that the following six actions be taken by the Comission:
t Modify the Construction Permit (Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) to include mandatory " hold points"' on thu balanM-of-plant-(BOP) work and incorporate the current Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB or Board) ordered " hold points" on the soils remedial work into the Midland Construction permit (sic).
I l
Require a management audit of Consumers Power Company (CPCo) by an
(
independent, competent management audi-t4ng firm.that-w4-ll determine the causes of the management failures th,at have resulted in the soils settlement-disaster-and-the recently41-scovered-Qua44ty Assurance breakdown.
I Reject the Construction Completion Plan (CCP) as currently proposed, l
including a rejection of Stone and Webster to conduct the third party l
audit of the plant.
Instead a truly independent, competent, and credible third party auditor should be selected with public participation in the process.
"8--
p
- 4 eg.
es 2
~
? T-
, - * * [,
[i Remove, the Quality Assurance / Quality Control. function from t.he,..
Midland Project Quality Assurance Department (MPQAD) and reprlace them with an independent team of QA/QC personnel that reports
+
simultaneously to the NRC and CPCo management.
~ " -
Increase the assignment of NRC. personnel to include additional technical and inspection personnel as requested by the Midland Section of the Office of Special Cases.
Require a detailed review of the soils settlement resolution as outlined in the Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, incorporating' a technical analysis of the implementation of the underpinning project at the current stage of completion.
Petition at 1.
The fifth issue relates to a matter of internal Connission
]
organization and staffing, namely the allocation of staff to inspection of f
facilities. The staff is expecting to augment inspection personnel available to work on Midland. However, the creation of positions within the' Office of l
j Special Cases is a matter that wiil be determined by the Commission budget i
process. For these reasons, the staff is not considering this aspect of the request in this decision.
l
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Background
. ~..
The Consumers Power Company (CPCo or licensee) holds Construction Permits t.
g No. CPPR-81 (tJnit 1) and No. CPPR-82 (Unit 2), issued-by the -Atomic-Energy I;
p Commission in 1972, which authorized construction of thetiidland-Plant.
i i J
The Midland nucleir15Tanris'lTcaYea in Midland 7titchigan, and consists.
1 of two pressurized water reactors of Babcock and Wilcox. design and related facilities for use in the commercial generation of electric power.
?
Stnce the star % of construction, Midland has experienced significant construction problems attributable to deficiencies in implementation of 3
n
..i its quality assurance (QA) program. 3/ Following the identification of
\\g. '
these problems, the licensee took action to identify the cause and correct each problem. Steps were also taken to upgrade the Midland QA program.
Nevertheless, the licensee continued to experience problems in the implementation of its quality assurance program.
In 1980, the licensee reorganized its QA department so as to increase the involvement of high level CPCo management in onsite'QA activities. Among
~
its other tasks, the reorganized QA department, called the Midland Project Quality Assurance Department (MPQAD), was given the resp'onsibility for quality centrol (QC)'of hea' ting, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) work in
~
place of the HVAC contractor, Zack Company.
In fiay 1981, the NRC conducted a special, in-depth team inspection of the Midland site to examine the status of implementation and effectiveness of the QA program.
Based on this inspection, Region III concluded that the newly 1/
Significant construction problems identified to date include:
1973 - cadweld splicing deficiencies 1976 - rebar omissions 1977 - bulge in the Unit 2 Containment Liner Plate 1977
-tendon sheath location errors._-.
1978 - discovery of soil settlement problem 1980 - Zack-Company-heat 4cg,-ventilation, and-ab =ditioning deficiencies 1980 - reactor pressure vessel anchor stud failures 1981 - piping suspension system installation deficiencies 1982 - electrical cable misinstallations Several of these deficiencies resulted in the Commission taking escalated enforcement action.
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organized QA pro, gram was acceptable.
See Inspection Reports 50-329/81,1.2; 50-330/81-12. The special team did, however, identify deficiencies in pre-4 vious QC inspections of piping supports and restraints, and electrical cable installations.2_/ QC functions were further reorganized by the licensee's integration of the QC organization of its architect-engineer, Bechtel Power Corporation, into MPQAD in September 1982. This reorganization reflected the recommendations of the NRC staff. As part of this change, the licensee also undertook to retrain and recertify all previou'ly certified Bechtel QC' s
inspectors.
Nevertheless, const'ruction difficulties continued to be identified at the Midland site. An inspection conducted during the period of October 1982 through January 1983 found significant problems with equipment in the diesel generator building. The subsequent identification of similar findings by CPCo in other portions of the plant prompted the licensee to halt the majority of the safety related work activities in December 1{82.
In view of the history of QA problems at the Midland plant and the lack of effectiveness of corrective actions to implement an adequate quality assurance program, the NRC indicated to the licensee that it was necessary to develop a comprehensive program to verify the adequacy of previous construction activities and to assure the adequacy of future construction.
In view of the licensee's perfonnance history, such an a..---
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As a result of staff discussions about the seriousness of such findings and of similar indications of deficiencies as identified in the System-atic Assessment of Licensee Performance Report issued in April 1982, a special Midland Section in Region III was formed in July 1982. The Midland Section devoted increased attention to inspection of the Midland
. facilityWncluding upgrading the QC program of the project's constructor, the Bechtel Power Corporation.
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effort was neces,sary to restore staff's confidence in CPCo's ability to.. properly construct the Midland plants.
Consequently, CPCo discussed with the NR'C the concept of a construction completion program which would address the concerns raised by the staff.
These discussions were followed by a formal submittal of the Midland Con-struction Completion Program (CCP).
Th,e CCP is the licensee's program for the planning and management of the con-struction and quality activities necessary for its completion of the construc-tion of the Midland facility. An important aspect of the CCP is the third party overview, which is designed to provide additional assurance as to the effectiveness of the CCP.
In response to coments from the NRC and members of the public, the CCP underwent several revisions. As revised and submitted
(
by the licensee on August 26,1983,S/ the CCP includes:
(1) NRC hold points; (2) the requirement for 100% reinspection of accessible installations; (3) the integration of Bechtel's QC program with M,PQAD; (4) th,e retraining and recertification of QC inspectors; (5) the general training of licensee and contractor personnel in quality requirements for nuclear work, requirements of the CCP, safety orientation and inspection, and work procedures; (6) the revi-sion, as necessary, of Project Quality Control Instructions (PQCI'.s); (7) CCP l
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team training; and (8) an independent third party overview of CCP activities.
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The Petition was apparently based upon the June 3,1983 version of the
-- CCP. -Subinequent versiim. of the CCP, is described in this decision, add ess a number of 1%:s raised by petitioners.
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The.CCP is divided into two phases.
Phase 1 consists of a systematic.r,eyiaw of the safety-related systems and areas of the plant. This review will be 4
conducted on an area-by-area basis and will be done by teams with responsi-bility for particular systems.
Phase 1 is intended to provide a clear identification of remaining installation work, including any necessary rework and an up-to-date inspection,to verify the quality of existing work.
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Phase 2 will take the results of the Phase 1 review and complete any neces-sary work or rework, thereby bringing the project to completion.
The teams organized for Phase 1 activities will continue as the responsible organiza-tional units to com'plete the work in Phase 2.
It should be noted that the CCP does not include the remedial soils. program, nuclear steam supply system installation, HVAC installation, and the reinspection of pipe hangers and electrical cable. The remedial soils
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activities are being closely inspected under the ccnditions of the construc-tion permits which implement the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's April 30,1982, order and under a work authorization procedure. Therefore, the staff does not consider it necessary to require the remedial soils activities to be included in the CCP.
Centrols over the soils work have been implemented undy a separate program. Similarly, reinspection of the pipe hangers and electrical cable were not included in Phase I of the CCP because that reinspection is being done under a separate comitment to the NRC. See letters from James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, NRC Region III to James W. Cook, Consumers Power Company (August 30, September 2,1982).
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Huclear Steam Supply System installation and HVAC installation were not Y
drawn into. question by the diesel generator building inspection.
7
H8Y The staff has no,t developed facts to indicate that inst.allation of thes.e.,,,
~
systems should be included in the CCP. However, these activities wi11 be
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% kk included in the construction implementation overview to be conducted by the third party overviewer.
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The CCP is designed to address the generic applicability of the problems iden-tified by the NRC's inspection of the diesel generator building. The objective of the CCP is to look at the plant hardware and equipment, identify ex!' sting' prpblems, correct these problems and complete construction of the plant.
i Consideration of Issues Raised 1.
Modification of Midland Construction Pemits s
Petitioners request that the Comission modify tie Midland construction pennits in two respects:
- 1) require " hold points l',at various stages of the cc istruction completion process; and, 2) incorpor, ate those hold goints concerning remedial soils work previously authorized by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board panel with jurisdiction over the Midland proceeding.
The hold points are fundamental elements of the Midland CCP. As used by both the staff and petitioners, hold point's refer'to predetermined stages beyond which activities cannot proceed until authorized. Only when such prior work is found to be satisfactory will new work be authorized under the CCP.
In this regard, the petitioners requested that three specific hold points be incor-porated into the CCP to require NRC or third party review prior to continuation of work.
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Based on their review of an early version of the CCP, petitioners asserted that the Midland project had been detrimentally affected by the lack of 4
organizational freedom for its QA staff.
See Petition at 13.
Accordingly, 3
the petitioners requested that a hold po~ int be incorporated into the CCP whereby the success of the proposed program for the retraining and recertifi-cation of QA/QC personnel would be evaluated before any actual work was t
authorized under Phase 1 of the CCP.
Id. at 13,15. Subsequent to its initial discussions with the staff concerning development of a comprehensive' construction completion program,5._/ the licensee began preliminary work, such as team training and recertification of QC inspectors in preparation for its anticipated Phase 1' activities, quality verification program and status assess-ments. The NRC was infonned when training and recertification of QA/QC person-nel and CCP team training would begin, and conducted a review of the licensee's I
actions.
The staff suggested that the licensee undertake additional work before g
proceeding with some of its training effort. Consequently, the retraining hold point requested by petitioners has already been satisfied by the staff.
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5f On December 2,1982, when CPCo first discussed a construction completion plan with the NRC staff, CPCo was informed by Region III staff that it would be necessary to incorporate NRC hold points. The staff identified four points at which it would require NRC inspectors-to-review-completed work before the next activity could be undertaken. These hold points were identified as:
1.
Review-and-approval-of training-and recertifircat4en-of-QC- -
inspectors before beginning Phase 1; 2.
Review and approval of CCP team training before beginning Phase 1;-
t 3.
Review and approval of the Quality Verification Program (QVP) and status assessments before beginning Phase 1; 4.
Rever and approval of the progran for rework or systems completion j
work before beginning Phase 2.
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The petitioners,also viewed the proposed CCP as lacking in comprehensiveness.
To remedy this deficiency, petitioners proposed that "either a third. party or
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NPC ' hold point' be contained in the reinspection Phase I activities [of the CCP] to determine the adequacy of the ' accessible systems' approach."6_/
Petition at 13.
As described in section three, infr_a_, a third party will be conducting an
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extensive overview of the CCP and other construction completion activities.
Th,e fact that the third party overviewer will also have hold point controls over the licensee should provide additional assurance that construction is proceeding if1 accordance with all applicable requirements.
See Consumers Power Company, Construction Completion Program (August 26,1983) at 34.
The NRC and the third party will monitor the reinspection activities. The staff believes that these monitoring activities will provide the control sought by the petitioners in their request to establish a hold point during Phase 1 reinspection to detennine the adequacy of the accessible systems approach.
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u The third hold point requested by petitioners derives from another criticism 1
l of the proposed CCP - the failure of that plan to specify inspection procedures l
l and evaluation criteria. See Petition at 10-11. Accordingly, petitioners l
request a systematic and thorough review of the construction and quality work packages which will be completed as a prerequisite to initiation of new con-struction wo.k under Phase 2 of the CCP.
Id. at 11.
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The accessible systems approach refers to the extent of reinspection under the CCP.
Inaccessible areas of the plant will be reinspected s!
by utilizinga records review and destructive and non-destructive j
testing as required. See Consumers Power Company, Construction
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Completior Program (August 26,1983) at 22-23.
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The.CCP requires, that representative construction and quality work packages,be
/
reviewed to assure that any completed work is consistent with statements made
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by the licensee in both its Final Safety Analysis Report and quality Assurance Topical Report.
In addition, the third party overviewer will be using sampling techniques and reviewing selected work and quality packages prior to and during Phase II. Should the results of this sampling approach identify inadequate work packages, the sampling size will be increased as necessary to provide the needed assurente that work packages are adequately reviewed. Moreover,' the 'NRC staff, in performing its inspection activities, will overview this entire process, including reviewing selected quality and work packages.
In sumary, the staff believes that those hold points it has incorporated into the CCP, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially satisfy the hold points requested by petitioners. The licensee is required to adhere to these hold j
points as part o' the CCP in conformance with the Confirmatory Order for Modification of Construction Pemits (Effective I, mediately). _
With respect to the second aspect of the requested relief, incorporation of NRC hold points authorized by the Licensing Board's April 30, 1982, Memorandum and Order, the petitioners' request has been satisfied by previous action of the Cumission.
By amendment dated May 26,1982,.the hold points ordered by the Board were incorporated into the construction permits.
See 47 Fed.
Reg. 23999 (June 2, 1982). Accordingly, the construction permitt already prohibit CPCo frcm performing the following activities without " explicit prior approval" from the staff:
(a) any placing, compacting, excavating, or drilling soil materials around safety-related structures and systems; 11
[..
(b) physical implementation of. remedial action for correction
'o'f soil-related problems under and around safety-related " '
structures and systems, including but not limited to:,
4 (i) dewatering systems (ii) underpinning of service water building
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(iii) removal and replacement of fill beneath the feedwater isolation valve pit areas, auxiliary building electrical penetration areas and control tower, and beneath the turbine buildirip '
(iv) placing of underpinning supports beneath'any of the structureslistedin(iii)above (v) compaction and loading activities; (c) construction work in soil materials under or around safety-related structures and systems such as field installation, or rebedding, of conduits and piping.
Construction Pennits No. CPPR-81 and CPPR-82,' Amendment No. 3 (May 26,1982).
2.
Management audit of CPCo 1
The petitioners' request that the NRC require a management audit of CPCo's
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performance on the Midland project. The staff does not believe that a ~
management audit is necessary at this tirrfe'as 1 cohdition"fdr'goTrig forwrrd-l with the CCP. The staff expects that the CCP, with its built-in hold points and third party overview, should provide an effective-process-to-satis-l factorily complete construction at Midland, without. the-previews-qualit) assurance problemn -The third 7 arty overview together-witHheIplanrd staff inspection activities should provide information to detennire the adequacy of the licensee's k.plementation of the CCP.
Nevertheless, the staff will continue to review information concerning the licensee's performance-4mether areas to determine whether an audit is required.
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3.
Rejection of Construction Completion Program and Third Party Overview Organization In requesting that the Commission reject the Midland construction completion plan, petitioners based their position on the unacceptability of the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (S&W) to conduct the third party overview of the CCP. Petitioners raised three objections to the selection of S&W: the failure of S&W to meet the Commission's criteria for the independence required
~
of a third party, see Petition at 19; the failure of S&W to submit a mihimally adequate audit proposal, id. at 18-19; and the lack of public participation in the selection of S&W as the third party review organization for the Midland project. k.at19-20.
In support of its argument that S&W is not sufficiently independent.to monitor implementation of the CCP, the petitioners asserted that "under both a literal 1
and realistic reading of the Commission's primary financial criteria,...the third party not have any direct previous involvegent with the Company.",
Petition at 19.
In order to evaluate whether an. audit or.g'anizat.io.n is suffi-ciently independent to conduct a third party review, the Commission generally utilizes the guidance originally set forth in a letter from Chairman Palladino to Representatives Ottinger and Dingell.
The Commission's standard does not require that a proposed third party reviewer have.had no previous involvement with the utility whose program it will be reviewing. Rather, the criteria require that the audit organization, including those employees who will be participating in the third party review, will not be reviewing specific
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ep 13
See, Letter from Chair-d cctivities in wh,ich they were pr:viously involve.d Dingell (Feb.1 man Palladino to Representatives Ottinger an f remedial Petitioners stated that S&W's role as the ove from serving in the same ment 1, at 1.
soils work at Midland prohibits that org'anizationSince the rem The staff disagrees.
capacity for the CCP.
lled upon to review ill not be ca ties are outside the scope of the CCP, S&W w rview Consequently, the staff does not agree that S&
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its own work.
d activities will conflict with the established in epen fied from consideration The petitioners questioned why TERA w t disqualified on the TERA's disqualification 7/
See Petition at 19.
ground of independence.
TERA had previously made was based on the potentiaT Tor conflict t a overview under the CCP of determinations that Verification Program i
under the Independent Design and Construct on iliary Feedwater (IDCVP) of the adequacy of the construction of the Aux the HVAC system for System, the onsite emergency AC power supplies and Since TERA has been approved by the NRC See letter the control room.the IDCVP, the staff determined that TER f the CCP.
independence criteria for the third party ove III to James W. Cook, i
28, 1983) at 3; ConsumersPowerCompany(March 5
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The written program documents being utilized to directly control and.,,.
implement the Construction Implementation Overview (CIO) programb an[
the applicable S&W corporate master program documents 9/ have been reviewed by the staff. These documents are representative of the scope and depth
~
of the S&W overview. The NRC staff also met with S&W on August 25, 1983, in l
l; Midland, Michigan in order to gai,n additional insight into the total S&W I
program. Based upon its document review and discussions with S&W at the c.j August 25, 1983, meeting, the staff has found the-S&W proposal to constitute an L
acceptable third party overview program. To provide additional assurance that the third party audit is being properly implemented, the CIO program will also l
be audited independ'ently by the S&W corporate quality assurance staff. NRC inspectors will also monitor the adequacy of the CIO program.
O 8/
The documents written expressly for the CIO include:
1.
CIO Program Document dated April 1,1983.
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2.
CIO Quality Assurance Plan.
3.
Third Party CIO Plan.
o 4.
CIO Assessment Procedure, 10.01.
5.
Nonconfomance Identification and Reporting Procedure,15.01.
6.
A detailed attribute checklist for each CPCs Pre: Ject Quality---
Control Instruction (PQCI).
7.
A detailed checklist to review generic 4ypes cf.reqdrements ll (for non-PQCI activities); e.g., QA Audits and Surveillances.
8.
Additional-Quality Cwtrerl Instruction-as needed-4e-provide -
adequate overview control.
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The following S&W corporate master program documents will also be utilized for the CIO, as required:
q l
1.
QA Topical Report SWSQAP 1-74A, S&W Standard Nuclear Quality Assurance Program.
2.
S&W4:ality Standards; e.g., for quality sampling.
3.
S&W Quality Assurance Directives.
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Of particular co,ncern to the petitioners was the number. of personnel wb.i.ch.
S&W had assigned to the Midland overview.
See Petition at 18. The. number of
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qualified people will vary with the demand of the work activities to be over-viewed. S&W's CIO staffing plan currently has nine people assigned at the Midland site an'd there are planned increases to 32 people as work activities progress. These numbers, howevet, are only estimates and S&W has represented that it will commit whatever personnel are necessary to conduct the CIO.
l Furthermore, the number of personnel utilized by S&W is not subject to limita-ti.on by CPCo.
S&W has already begun to review preliminary activities of the licensee in preparation for initiation of the CCP.E This effort has identified various concerns and one nonconfonnance that required CPCo action to resolve. The NRC staff has reviewed the CIO activities performed to date and has found this
/
overview, including actions taken by CPCo, to be of the quality expected of a i
third party overview.
l 10] The activities being overviewed have included the following CCP and non-CCP activities.
L H
Program and7focedure%vTiss'.- "'
Review of PQCI's.
Review of MPQAD QA/QC personnel training and certification.
Review of general training of CPCo and Bechtel personnel, j
including construction craftspersons.
i Review of CCP Management Reviews.
g Review of System Interaction Walkdowns.
Review of Design Documents.
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The, purpose of t,he independent third party overview is to provide addi,t,i.onal 8
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assurance that the CCP is adequate and will be properly implemented., This
/
[
overview requirement was necessitated by the loss of NRC staff confidence in CPCo to successfully implement a quality' assurance program for the Midland proj ect. The CIO will remain in place at the Midland site until the necessary level of confidence in the ability of the licensee to construct the Midland project has been restored to the satisfaction of the NRC staff.11[ Given that the third. party overview is expected to continue until NRC confidence ih the Midland project is restored, petitioners' criticism that the CIO is of insuffi-cient duration appears unfounded.
Opportunity has been provided to the public to participate in the selection of S&W as the third party overviewer, and to comment on the CCP itself. A meeting was held on February 8,1983, between CPCo and the staff to discuss the CCP.
1 On August 11, 1983, the staff met with the intervernors, representatives of the Government Accountability Project (GAP) and the Lone Tree Council to discuss the CCP and the CIO.
Subsequently, on August 25, 1983, the staff met with S&W l
to discuss the CIO. These meetings were conducted in Midland, Michigan and were open to public observation. Evening sessions to receive public comments l
regarding the CCP were held on February 8, and August 11, 1983.
Similarly, i
l public comments were received following the August 11 and August 25, 1983, i
.e.
l meetings. Several additional meetings between the staff, ir tervenors and a representative of GAP to discuss the CCP and CIO have also been held.
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11/ The staff anticipates that the third. party overview will be a long term
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effort.
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The petitioners', reference in its request.to " closed do.or" meetings app.e.ars.
to refer to working level meetings that have been held principally between
+
the Midland section of the Region III staff and CPCo site personnel, and, in some cases, S&W onsite personnel. _See Petition at 19.
Such meetings continue to be necessary' to enable the NRC staff to achieve a full understanding of the CCP, including the CIO, and to di,s. charge its inspection duties.
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For the reasons set forth above, petitioners' request to reject the selec-ti,on of S&W to condu:t the CIO, and to reject the CCP, is denied.12/
4.
Removal of the' Licensee from Primary Responsibility for the Midland Quality Assurance Program The petitioners request that MPQAD be relieved of responsibility for the QA/QC function at the Midland plant and that an independent team of QA/QC personnel 5
be created which would report simultaneously to the NRC staff and CPCo.
In support of their request, petitioners cite much qf the same histgry of QA/QC deficiencies that the staff summarized in the background s.ection o.f this decision. See Petition at 20.
l l
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-12/ The staff has approved S&W to conduct the CIQ.
See Staff Evaluation I ~
of Consumers' Power Compan7-Proposal-to Use-Stone-and Mebster Michigan, l
Inc. to Conduct the Third Party Construction Implementation Overview of theMidlandNuclearPlant(Sept. 29,1983).
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s i..
The changes that, CPCo has most recently instituted through development..o.f y
tNa CCP should improve its capability to discharge its responsibility under
+
aDplicable Comission regulations, such as 10 CFR 50.34(a)(7) and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, which require the est'ablishment and execution of a QA/QC program. While Criterion I of Appendix B permits a construction permit holder to delegate to other organizations the detailed execution of the QA/QC program, the history of the Midland project makes it clear that. the licensee has retained too little control over the QA/QC program.' CPCo seems to be p'ro-
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ceeding in a positive direction by integrating the implementation of the QC function formerly under the control of Bechtel into the MPQAD. This consoli-dation of quality c'ontrol and quality assurance functions should reinforce the separation between the QC function, which will be assumed by MPQAD, and the construction function, which will remain with Bechtel.
t While it might be permissible under Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 for CPCo to retain an independent organization to execute the QA/QC program, the licensee remains ultimately responsible for the establishment and, execution of the program. As stated above, the staff considers the strengthening of MPQAD to be a positive step in improving CPCo's capability to assure the quality of construction of the Midland facility.
In view of the relatively short existence of the MPQAD, there does not currently exist any justification for requiring CPCo to retain an outside organization to execute the QA/QC program. Therefore, this aspect of petitioners' request is denied.
Petitioners also requested t' at the independent QA/QC team report simultaneously h
4 to the NRC and to CPCo management. The petitioners apparently intended that
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the NRC would be, involved in making management decisions regarding con _st.ruc -
tion of the facility based upon the reports of the independent QA/QC, team.
4 There appears to be no basis for this extraordinary departure from the NRC's regulatory function. Accordingly, this ' aspect of the petition is denied.
5.
Detailed Review of Soils Settlement Resolution Th,e petitioners requested that the staff conduct a detailed review of the resolution of the soils settlement problems, including a technical analysis of the implenantation of the underpinning project at the current stage of
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completion.
Petition at 23.
In its supporting discussion, the petition focused upon the questionable structural integrity of the diesel generator building.
1 A detailed review of the program for resolution qf the :; oils settlement problem has previously been conducted by the NRC staff and its consultants.
In 1979 the U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers was contracted to assist the staff in the safety review of the Midland project in the field of geotechnical engineering.
After the soils problem became known, additional assistance to the staff in specialized engineering fields (structural, mechartical, and underpinning) was obtained from the U.S. Naval Surface Weapons Center, Ha) stead Engineering Associates, Geotechnical Engineers, Inc., and Energy Technology Engineering Center. These consultants assisted in the review of technical studies, par-ticipated in design audits, visited the site, provided input to the Safety 4
Evaluation Report, and provided expert testimony before the Atomic Safety and M
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Licensing Board., Thus, the approach to the resolution.of the soils se.ttlement issue has baen thoroughly studied by the staff and its consultants..
4 f
The implementation of the remedici soils activities is being closely followed as part of the NRC's inspection program.
This inspection effort includes f
ongoing technical review of the rea4 dial soils program and its implementation by a Region III soils specialist. Technical expertise to evaluate implementa-l tion is also provided by the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation'.
Additionally, the NRC is utilizing Geotechnical Engineers Inc. in assessing l
aspects of the remedial soils and underpinning activities.
In addition, the l
soils settlement question has been in litigation for over two years before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
Consequently, the relief requested with regard to the soils settlement issue has been substantially satisfied by prior action of the Commission.
T l
l_
Along with review of the soils settlement issue, petitioners reguested that I
j another study of the seismic design deficiencies.of the Midl,and plant, with, emphasis on the diesel generator building, be conducted. The petitioners a
further requested that this review would be conducted by a "non-nuclear i:
construction consultant." See Petition at 23.
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The NRC staff has initir.ted a task force study by consultants from Brookhaven National Laboratory (P"' / and NRC structural engineers to evaluate concerns 1
about the structural integrity of the diesel generator building raised by a NRC Region III inspector in testimony before the Subconsnittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on. Interior and Insular Affairs.
Following their review, a. report will be issued addressing the concerns raised by the inspector.
Decisions,on whether.further actions are required will be 21 l
/.
made based upon,that report. Additional details on the. task force were, pro-vided to the Government Accountability Project by letter dated August 10, 1983, 4
and in Board Notifications83-109 and 83-142, which were transmitted to GAP on July 27 and September 22, 1983, respe'ctively.
As to the request that a review of. the diesel generator building be conducted by a "non-nuclear construction consultant", BNL has established an expert teamtoresolvetheconcernsraisedbytheRegion-IIIinspector.
Expertise
~
ra,ther than the label "non nuclear construction consultant" should be the governing criteria. The staff has reviewed the qualifications of the team members and is satisifed with their experience.
The task force study cur-rently in progress substantially satisfies this aspect of the petition.
The petition also appears to be requesting an additional review of the seismic design of structures other than the diesel generator building.
Petitioners have not, however, stated any basis why additiongl, reviews beyond those re-flected in the Safety Evaluation Report a,nd Supple,ments are_necessary. The, s
i staff does not believe that an additional review by an outside organization of the facility's seismic design is required at this time.
i l
Conclusion
-D.-
i Based upon the foregoing discussion, I have granted the petition in part and denied it in part.
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A copy of this decision will be filed with the Office of the Secretary,o.f the Comission for the Comission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of c
the Comission's regulations.
This decision will become the final action of the Cor: mission twenty-five days after date of issuance unless the Comission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the decision within that time.
/
RichardC.6 ung, Di tor
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Office of In ection and Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 6thday of October 1983 e
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9 23
GO'VERNhAENT hCCOUNTABILITY PROJECT Institute for Pohcy Stuches 1901 Que Street. N.W.. Woshington. D.C. 20009 (202)234-9382 January 9,1984 FREEDOM OF INFORMATK)N ACT REQUEST b~
M3 f e of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission k t y /,, g,
Washington, D.C.
20555 To Whom It May Concern:
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (F0IA), 5 U.S.C. 5552, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) of the Institute for Policy Studies, requests copies of any and all agency records and information, including but not limited to notes, letters, memoranda, drafts, minutes, diaries, logs, calendars, tapes, transcripts, summaries, interview reports, procedures, instructions, engineering analyses, draw-ings, files, grapns, cha ts, maps, photographs, agreements, handwritten notes, studies, data sheets, notebooks, books, telephone messages, computations, voice recordings, and any other data compilations, interim and/or final reports, status reports, and any and all other records related to Executive Notice 83-69 (EN 83-69) regarding the Midland Nuclear Power Plant.*
If any of the material covered by this request has been destroyed and/or removed, please provide all surrounding documentation, including but not limited to a description of the action (s) taken, relevant date(s), and justification (s) for the action (s).
GAP requests that fees be waived, because " finding information can be considered as primarily benefitting the general public," 5 U.S.C. 5552(a)(4)(A).
The Government Accountability Project is a non-profit, non-partisan public interest organization concerned with honest and open government. Through legal representation, advice, national conferences, films, publications and public outreach, the Project promotes whistleblowers as agents of government accountability. Through its Citizens Clinic, GAP offers assistance to local public interest and citizens groups who seek to ensure the health and safety of their communities. The Citizens Clinic is currently assisting several citizens groups, local governments, and intervenors in the mid-Michigan area concerning the construction of the Midland Nuclear Power Plant.
We are requesting the above infonnation as part of an ongoing monitoring project on the adequacy of the NRC's efforts to protect public safety and health at nuclear power plants.
For any documents or portions that you deny due to a specific F0IA exemption, pleaseg provide an index itemizing and describing the documents or portions of documcnts withheld.
Thc index should provide a detailed justification of your grounds for h
- (Upon information and belief, EN 83-69 contains information relevant to the Midland Nuclear Power Plant, however, the exact issuance number may differ slightly.)
+
4 e-Di/ector of Administration January 9,1984 U.S. Nucl. ear Regulatory Commission claiming each exemption, explaining why each exemption is relevant to the document or portion of the document withheld. This index is required under Vaughr. v.
Rosen (I), 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
We look forward to your response to this request within ten days.
Very truly yours,
.udh.m v
awj Billie Pirner Gar e Citizens Clinic Director
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i IL