ML20112F677
| ML20112F677 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1984 |
| From: | Hufham J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8501150469 | |
| Download: ML20112F677 (2) | |
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't TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II cembk/ 671984 BLRD-50-438/82-78 BLRD-50-439/82-72 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
' 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - IMPROPER USE OF ALTERNATE ANALYSIS ELBOLETS - BLRD-50-438/82-78, BLRD-50-439/82 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson on November 18, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN BLP 8231. This _ was followed by our interim reports dated December 17,1982, March 22 and December 14, 1983, and August 29, 1984.
Enclosed is our final mport.
If you have any questions conceming this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY r
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Regulations Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
' Atlanta, Georgia ~ 30339 g.
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ENCLOSURE a
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BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 IMPROPER USE OF ALTERNATE ANALYSIS FOR ELBOLETS NCR BLN BLP 8231 BLRD-50-438/82-78, BLRD-50-439/82-72 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT
' Description of Deficiency During design rev'iew, it was discovered that Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) alternate analysis calculation BLN-KC-D053-11, which concerns the componet cooling system, contains a'n elbolet. The BLN " Alternate Criteria for
. Piping Analysis and Support" (CEB 76-11), which is the basis for this calculation, excludes any component from its scope which is not specifically listed in Appendix E, " Stress Intensification Factors."
Elbolets are rot listed.
The cause of this deficiency was a lack of awareness on the part of piping analysis personnel concerning the exclusion of elbolets from the scope of CEB 76-11.
Safety Implications The failure to properly consider the high stress intensification factors associated with elbolets could cause the elbolets to be overstressed under some loading conditions. This in turn could cause a failure of the componett cooling system piping aich could adversely affect safe operation
.of the plant..
Corrective Action j
TVA has completed its myiew of this problem and has identified five cases whom piping containing an.elbolet was qualified by design personnel. In each of these five. cases, the piping has been rerouted to eliminate the
.elbolet, and ~ the piping analysis was mvised-to mflect the new pipe route..
Necessary field muork has been completed for unit 1 and will be completed
- for unit 2. by' May 19, c1986.
'To prevent recurrence of this problem, all. persons who perform piping L analysis using CEB 76-11 have been specifically instructed in the component j exclusion provision of Appendix E of the criteria.
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