ML20107M585

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Clarifies Insp Approach for RCS & Inaccessible Pipe Supports,Per Varela 841005 Exit Interview Suggestion Re Audit of Util Response to IE Bulletins 79-02,79-04,79-07 & 79-14.No Adverse Effects Expected During DBE
ML20107M585
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/19/1984
From: Lundvall A
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To: Murley T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
IEB-79-02, IEB-79-04, IEB-79-07, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, IEB-79-4, IEB-79-7, NUDOCS 8411140203
Download: ML20107M585 (5)


Text

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BALTIM ORE

' GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER P.O. BOX 1475 BALTlMORE, MARYLAND 21203 October 19,1984 ARTHUR E. LUNOVALL..JR.

Vict PRESdDENT SUPPLY Dr. Thomas 3. Murley Region I Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Subject:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units Nos. I & 2, Dockets Nos. 50-317 and 50-318 I&E Bulletins 79-02,79-04,79-07 and 79-14 Gentlemen:

A Region I inspection team recently conducted an audit of our efforts in response to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins 79-02,79-04, 79-07 and 79-14. At the conclusion of the audit your inspectors were complimentary on our control of documentation for the subject design reviews and indicated that the field effort associated with Bulletin 79-02 was particularly well organized. During the exit interview conducted on October 5,1984, an overall satisfaction was expressed (notwithstanding proposed findings) with the handling of these I&E Bulletins. To support the inspection team's proposed findings, your Mr. Varela suggested that we submit a letter clarifying our approach for inspection of the reactor coolant system and inaccessible pipe supports. The following information is provided in response to this suggestion.

Bulletin 79-14 The reactor coolant system piping is nuclear Class I and was subject to very exacting inspection during the shop fabrication and field installation stages. The controls on this piping were similar to those applied to all other portions of the nuclear steam supply system, and can be considered much more of an " engineered component" than

" piping."

Thus, we do not feel it necessary to inspect these piping configurations.

However, we will verify the surge line support configurations during the next outage involving either a cold shutdown or a hot shutdown which is expected to extend three days or more.

Attached (as Enclosure 1) are three pages which address the inaccessible sections of pipe and supports on a system-by-system basis. The total inaccessible length of piping is approximately 250 ft, which represents much less than one percent of the total safety-related large piping in the plant, which is approximately 40,000 ft.

8411140203 841019 gDRADOCK 05000317 PDR Yi/6 it

Mr. T. 3. Murlay October 19,1984 Bulletin 79-02 In earlier correspondence on I&E Bulletin 79-02 we informed the NRC that all safety-related large pipe supports had been ir.spected and tested. We should have stated that all accessible supports had been inspected and tested. As you know, there are a few supports (less than twenty) which are embedded in concrete, in high radiation areas, or otherwise impractical to inspect. Each of those was evaluated by stress analysts and it was concluded that they could be omitted from the program. Similar evaluations were made where part of the expansion anchora could not be inspected.

Mr. Varela borrowed a copy of a Bechtel letter dated June 4,1980, which provides justification for deleting from the 79-02 test program some supports that were questioned in one of our internal Quality Assurance audits.

If you should have any questions concerning these matters, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very tr.uly yours, f

WA Y

{

46uc> N-AEL/DTW/vf Enclosures cc: D. A. Brune, Esq.

G. F. Trowbridge, Esq.

Mr. D. H. Jaffe, NRC Mr. T. Foley, NRC Mr. 3. C. Ventura, Bechtel

v -1 i

f IE Bulletin 79-14:

In the normally accessible and inaccessible portions of the facility approximately 40,000 feet of piping and 3500 pipe supports were inspected.

In areas of high radiation and physical restrictions portion of piping systems were not inspected.

From review of our records, this piping totalled 250 feet or approximately 0.63% of the inspected piping.

The piping not inspected also contained 24 supports including those previously identified in the 79-02 Bulletin.

The enclosed list identifies systems or portions thereof which were not inspected. The following is a justification / evaluation of each system.

1.

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling - Stress Problem 161:

Portion of the piping and support were found inaccessible due to high radiation level in the area.

All other piping was found to be in conformance with design documents with only minor deviations.

Justification for the supports is documented in our letter CC-A1694 dated June 4, 1980 to Mr. R. F.

Ash (actached).

Also the maximum faulted stress levels in the system is 10240 psi compared with code allowable of 28900 psi.

Considering all the above facts no further investigation is required for this stress problem.

2.

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling - Stress Prob 1cm 49, 50, 92 and 93:

This piping is under water in the Spent Fuel Pool.

The piping configur-ation is simple and run, alongside the liner plate of the pool.

The supports are attached to the liner plate and guide the piping in two lateral directions.

The maximum faulted stress level is 6264 psi which is well within the code allowabic of 28680 psi.

Therefore in our judgement no further review is necessary.

3.

Service Water - Stress Problem 144B:

Piping in the degasifier room was found inaccessible.

However, all supports were verified to conform their design document. Also the maximum faulted stress in the system is 16811 psi compared to the code allowable of 31100 psi.

Therefore no further review is necessary.

4.

Service Water - Stress Problem 2-126:

Out of a total of 18 supports only one cupport was found inaccessible.

All piping and inspected supports were found in agreement with design sketch. Also the maximum faulted stress 1cvel is 19784 psi compared to allowable of 31783 psi and is not in the vicinity of the inaccessible support.

Therefore no further review of this system is required.

5.

Refueling Storage Tank #21 - Heater Recirculation Internal Standpipe -

Stress Problem 339A, 339B, 2-339A & 2-339B:

The piping is inside the Refueling Water Storage Tank.

The maximum faulted stress is 1900 psi which is well within the code allowable of 25000 psi.

The piping length is only 11'-6" and it is anchored at the nozzle.

In our judgement the piping stresses will be within code allowable even without the support.

Therefore no further review is necessary for this system.

i -2 Conclusion _:

Due to high confidence level achieved from the total inspection program and the very low percentage of items not inspected it is in our judgement, safe to assume that the inaccessible supports and piping vill not have any adverse affects on system operability during a Design Basic Earthquake (DBE).

7 6

. -3 IK BULIETIN 79 INACCESSIRf.E PTPING SYSTEMS TOTAL FIPE TOTAL MAXIMUM CODE SYSTEM SK-M STRESS ITPE OTAL

^

LENGTH INACCESSIBLE FAULTED AI.LOWABLE PROB.NO.

S ORTS INACCESSIBLE (I SUPPORTS STRESS (psi)

STRESS (psi)

S Prob.)

~

Spent Fuel Fool 637 SH.1 161 93'-6" 182'-8" 5

13 10240 28900 SK-19500, 19501, 19502 s cooling Unit 1 19509 were also found in-accessible in 79-02 Program Spent Fuel Pool 634 SH.7 49 21'-7" 21'-7" 3

3 4303 28680 Piping Under Water in Cooling Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Spent Fuel Pool 634 SH.7 50 34'-7" 34'-7" 4

4 6264 28680 liping Under Water in Cooling Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Spent Fuel Fool 634 SH.8 92 21'-7" 21'-7" 3

3 4303 78680 Piping Under Water in Cooling Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Spent Fuel Fool 634 SH.8 93 34'-7" 34'-7" 4

4 6264 28548 Piping Under Water in Cooling Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Service Water 761 144B 24'-10" 115'-3" 0

10 16811 31100 Unit 1 Service Water 900 2-126 None N/A 1

18 19784 31783 Unit 2 R.W.S.T. #21 996 2-339A

!!'-6" 11'-6" I

1 1900 25000 Piping Inside of Re-Heater Rectre.

fueling Water Storage Internal Standpipe Unit 2 Tank R.W.S.T. #21 996 2-339B 11'-6" 11'-6" l

1 1900 25000 Piping Inside of Re-Heater Rectre.

fueling Water Storage Internal Standpipe Unit 2 Tank R.W.S.T. fil 995 339A 11'-6" 11'-6" 1

1 1900 25000 Piping Inside of Re-Beater Rectre, fueling Water Storage Internal Standpipe Unit 1 Tank R.W.S.T. #11 995 339B 11'-6" 11'-6" 1

1 1900 25000 Piping Inside of Re-Reater Recirc.

fueling Water Storage internal Standpipe Unit 1 Tank